EN BANC

G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015

ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE

CAPITAN,Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold elective
public office.

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Per
Curiam Resolution2 dated December 9, 2013 of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPA No. 13-309 (DC),
which affirmed the Resolution3 dated September 6, 2013 of the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec, relying on our ruling
in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,4 disqualified petitioner Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado) from running in the May 13, 2013
elections, set aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and declared respondent Florante T.
Capitan (Capitan) as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United
States of America (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for
repatriation under Republic Act No. 92255 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship
Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.

On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.

Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the
ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from
the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.

While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of
votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning candidate.

On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado's continued use of his US passport
effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply
with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on
succession should be followed.

Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the Comelec First Division erred in applying
the rule on succession.

On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the ruling of the Comelec First Division. It held that
Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in
Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his US passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine
passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En Banc further noted that, after receiving his Philippine passport,
Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.

Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as G.R No. 195649.

While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections
officially began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the
mayoralty post of Kauswagan.

On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it annulled and set aside the Comelec En Banc's
February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and declared Maquiling as the duly elected
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined
that in his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport
effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation." Tills does not mean that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A.
No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after complying with the requirements that he perfonned positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be
thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as
a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

xxxx

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding
the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. 7

The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the present controversy.

On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C.
Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April3, 2009."8cralawrednad

The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a Petition9 seeking to disqualify him
from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. The case
was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was raffled to the Comelec's Second Division. The resolution of said petition was,
however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan
obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes cast) votes only.

On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.

Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to nullify Arnado's proclamation. He argued that with the April 16, 2013
Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective office. Hence,
Arnado's proclamation is void and without any legal effect.

Ruling of the Comelec Second Division

On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution granting the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and
disqualify Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time he filed his CoC on
October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship. While he executed the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or
recalled when he subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held inMaquiling.

The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13,
2013 elections. While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009" was
submitted in evidence, the same would not suffice because it should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on
October 1, 2012.

The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's Resolution reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is disqualified from
running in the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.12 He argued that the Comelec Second Division erred in
applying Maquiling claiming that the said case is not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed
beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must
uphold the sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming support for him as their
mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and that he be declared as
eligible to run for mayor ofKauswagan.

On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Comelec Second Division. It accordingly annulled the
proclamation of Arnado and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the Comelec En
Banc's Resolution reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED. The Proclamation of Private
Respondent Rommel C. Arnado as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte inthe May 13, 2013
Elections.
SO ORDERED.13

Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary prayer for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo
ante. On December

26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order or Temporary Restraining Order14 in view of the
issuance by the Comelec En Banc of a Writ of Execution to implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.

On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15 requiring the respondents to file their respective comments on the petition. In
the same Resolution, this Court granted Arnado's ancillary relief for temporary restraining order.

Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order dated January 14, 2014, 16 contending that
the acts sought to be restrained by Arnado are already fait accompli. He alleged that the Comelec En Banc had already issued a
Writ of Execution17 and pursuant thereto a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed him to be the duly
elected mayor of Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took his oath of office. Since then, he has assumed and performed the
duties and functions of his office.

In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order directing the parties to allow
Arnado to continue performing his functions as mayor of Kauswagan pending resolution of this case.

Issues

In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND DIVISION VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE GROUND
OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR LATE FILING, ETC.

II

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY
ALLOWING COM. ELIAS YUSOPH TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.

III

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE
VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013 ELECTIONS.

IV

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS
FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, 2012. 19

Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and violated his right to procedural due process in not
dismissing Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC). He avers that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because the latter
subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC No. 13-019. In addition, SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day
prescriptive period reckoned from the time of the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.

Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered with procedural infirmities. He asserts that the Comelec
violated its own rules in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate; that SPA No. 13-309
(DC) was not set for trial and no hearing for the reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the Comelec did not follow its
own rules requiring the issuance of a notice of promulgation of resolutions.

Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave abuse of discretion but also violated his constitutional
right to due process when it allowed Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph (Commissioner Yusoph) to participate in the review of the
Decision he penned for the Second Division. Furthermore, the Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it
disqualified him from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby disenfranchising 84% of the voters of Kauswagan who all voted
for him.

Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial register of his former counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M.
Quijano, revealed that he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance20 on November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time
he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country and,
therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections.

Our Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.

Petition for certiorari is limited to the

determination of whether the respondent
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether
the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had
committed grave abuse of discretion.21 Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper.
Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."22 "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave."23 Grave abuse of discretion has
likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. 24cralawrednad

In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the Comelec En Banc acted capriciously or whimsically in
issuing its December 9, 2013 Resolution. Neither did it act contrary to law or jurisprudence.

Arnado's allegations that Capitan

violated the rule against forumshopping
and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late,
unsubstantiated and erroneous.

There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.25cralawred It exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.26 Thus, there is forum-shopping
when in both actions there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interests in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.27cralawrednad

Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely made a general averment that in resolving the petitions
of Capitan in SPA No. 13-309 (OC) and SPC No. 13-019, the Comelec En Banc, as well as its Second Division, failed to comply
with this Court's Revised Circular No. 28-91,28without demonstrating how forum-shopping was supposed to be present. He has not
shown that the petitions in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 involved the same parties, issues, and reliefs. In fact, Arnado
did not even bother to submit to this Court a copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019 (annulment of proclamation case). As the party
insisting that Capitan committed forum-shopping, Arnado bears the burden of establishing the same. After all, it is settled that he
who alleges has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not sufficient. 29cralawrednad

Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 are not the
same. In the first case, the parties are only Capitan and Arnado. In the second case, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as respondent. There is also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case sought
to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC while the latter case prayed for the annulment of Arnado's proclamation as mayor of
Kauswagan.

With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), it appears that Arnado either failed to
grasp the import of Capitan's allegations therein or he made a deliberate partial misrepresentation in stating that the same is one for
cancellation of CoC. A copy30 thereof annexed to Arnado's herein petition states that it is a petition "to disqualify and/or cancel the
certificate of candidacy" of Arnado. The allegations therein state in no uncertain terms that it is one for disqualification based on
Arnado's failure to comply with the requisites of RA 9225 and on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec Second
Division appropriately treated it as a petition for disqualification with the alternative prayer to cancel Arnado's CoC. It is elementary
that the nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the petition. 31cralawrednad

Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,32 a petition for disqualification should be filed "any day after the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." Here, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning
candidate on May 14, 2013.33 Thus, the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.34cralawrednad

The other procedural lapses allegedly

committed by the Comelec are likewise
unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of
Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's
motion to consolidate likewise lacks substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said motion to his petition.
This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being
accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. 35 Also, it was Capitan who filed the motion for
consolidation. Not being the movant, Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the Comelec on said motion. And
even assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec En Banc and subsequently appealing to
this Court despite the still unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for consolidation.
In Cayago v. Hon. Lina,36it was held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to
have abandoned the unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin. "[I]t is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte
face and deny that same jurisdiction."37cralawrednad

In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only permissive. It is not mandatory.
Section 9 reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding involves a question of law and fact which is similar to or common
with that of another action or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket
number.

In Muoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated "that the term 'may' is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the
right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto, which in this case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve
similar questions of law and fact."39 In this case, the consolidation of SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 does not appear to
be necessary. As earlier mentioned, said cases do not even involve the same parties and reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the Comelec in not consolidating them.

Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without setting it for trial likewise
deserves scant consideration. The proceedings in a special action for disqualification of candidates under Rule 25 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure are summary in nature where a trial type proceeding may be dispensed with. 40 In Diangka v. Comelec,41 this
Court held that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings
specially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualifications are subject to summary hearings. In relation thereto, Section 3, Rule 17 of the said
Rules provides that it remains in the sound discretion of the COMELEC whether clarification questions are to be asked the
witnesses-affiants, and whether the adverse party is to be granted opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses affiants.
Furthermore, when the COMELEC en banc reviews and evaluates a party's petition, or as in the case at bar, a party's answer and
the supporting papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case. 42

Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc

committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
his right to due process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of
substantiation.

Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division and the
December 9, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is not correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with Commissioners
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Tito F. Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which would indicate that
Commissioner Yusoph was the writer or the ponente of said Resolution. The September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second
Division does not state who the ponente is. The same goes true with the questioned December 9, 2013 Per Curiam Resolution43 of
the Comelec En Banc. As a per curiam resolution, it was arrived at by the Comelec En Banc as a whole and without any
particular ponente. Hence, we need not belabor Arnado's claim of denial of due process as his basis therefor lacks factual moorings.

Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin

requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at
the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.

Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local
position. In Mercado v. anzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as
referring to "dual allegiance.''45 Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and
political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that
they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath46 prior
to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with
the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held inMaquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the
time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second
requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.

The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second
Division disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for
public office during the 2010 elections being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
- still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the
ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.

Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his qualification
because at the time this Court promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for local elective
office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo D. Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the
chance to submit a replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then there was an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity equivalent
to grave abuse of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013,
Arnado substantially complied therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.

The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport
on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of
the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of
the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have divined
the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court in Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence
towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly
complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court inMaquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly
complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his qualification by
submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this case, we should similarly require strict compliance
with the qualifications to run for local elective office.

The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013
elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation
resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC
for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this
case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle
things which are established.48 Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same." 49 It enjoins
adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue.50cralawrednad

It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a petition to disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind that
the use of his US passport might pose a problem to his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012,
he was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport after he had executed the Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact
on his qualification and candidacy. In fact, at that time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But despite the petitions filed
against him questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010, Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 unmindful of any
possible legal setbacks in his candidacy for the 2013 elections and without executing another Affidavit of Renunciation. In short, the
argument that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his CoC since Maquiling was promulgated after
the lapse of the period for filing a CoC for the 2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling
in Maquiling, Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed
his CoC on October 1, 2012 or even before that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every
election period if only to avert possible questions about his qualifications.

The alleged November 30, 2009

Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.

As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance, the same is highly
suspect. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the original or certified true copy thereof was not presented. In addition,
such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the outcome of the case was never presented before the Comelec much less in
the Maquiling case. Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time in this petition. In Jacot v. Dal,51 this Court disallowed the belated
presentation of similar evidence on due process considerations. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi- judicial body need not be
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and
due process impel this rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial
haphazardly.

Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7
February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of any applicable provisions of these
Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and
effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally
presented:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it.
To admit this document would be contrary to due process. Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with
orderly justice.52

Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 201 0, certifying that the name "Arnado,
Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the
following pertinent travel records:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

DATE OF Arrival:01/12/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :057782700
DATE OF Arrival:03/23/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :05778270053
Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are puzzled why Arnado never bothered to correct or refute it. He neither
alleged nor presented evidence in this petition to prove that he did not travel abroad on those dates using his US passport.

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same position he had taken inMaquiling that Arnado's use of his
US passport in 2009 is an isolated act justified by the circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use his Philippine
passport in his travels abroad beginning December 11, 2009 and thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is borne out by Arnado's
Philippine passport.

With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only reviving an issue that had already been settled
with finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado's
argument in this case-that he is qualified to run for mayor as he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to
the May 13, 2013 elections- is premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does
not claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In Vazquez v.
De Borja,54 it was held that courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the pleading nor tried with the express or
implied consent of the parties. They cannot render judgment based on issues that have never been raised before them. Equally
settled is the rule that "points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be,
and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic
considerations of due process underlie this rule."55 The same goes true with J. Brion's theory that what was cancelled by virtue
of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation where Arnado expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not the
July 10, 2008 Oath of Allegiance which carried with it an implied abdication of foreign citizenship. For J. Brion, "[t]he requirement of
an express renunciation x x x does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit renunciation of citizenship and
allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance." Again, this was never raised in this petition. At any rate, the execution of an
Oath of Allegiance is required by Section 356 of RA 9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public
office, Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not useless or meaningless
surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even
assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has also been negated by his use of his US passport in
2009, following the ruling in Maquiling.

Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an express one specifically required by law.

Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnado's use of his US passport effectively recanted his Affidavit of
Renunciation has already become final and immutable. We can no longer resurrect in this case the issues that have already been
resolved there with fmality.

In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad in the first quarter of 2010, J. Leonen relies on the copy
thereof attached to the rollo of the Maquiling case. But said copy of Arnado's Philippine passport57 is a mere "CERTIFIED TRUE
COPY FROM THE MACIDNE COPY ON FILE" as attested to by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of the Comelec. 58 This is
clearly stamped on aforesaid copy of Arnado's Philippine passport. A machine copy or photocopy is a mere secondary
evidence.59 As such, it cannot be admitted in evidence until and unless the offeror has proven the due execution and the
subsequent loss or unavailability of the original.60 In this case, however, Arnado's Philippine passport is not missing. Thus, said
photocopy of Arnado's Philippine passport cannot sway us to depart from the uncontroverted certification of the Bureau
ofimmigration that Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Consequently, even assuming that the
recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance is true and authentic, Arnado once more
performed positive acts on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010, which effectively negated the alleged November 30, 2009
Affidavit resulting in his disqualification to run for an elective public office.

Landslide election victory cannot

override eligibility requirements.

In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado
won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same "cannot override the
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications."61 In Velasco v. Comelec,62 this Court pronounced
that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of
laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote cannot override
the required qualifications under Section 39,63a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy when it
comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 4064 of the same law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are
roughly half of the requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section which lays
down the circumstances that disqualify local candidates."65cralawrednad

Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec.66 In that case, petitioner Lopez was also a natural-born Filipino
who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of
RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the
synchronized Barangay andSangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007 without first making a personal and sworn
renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this Court still affmned the Resolution of
the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a local elective position for his failure to comply with the requirements of Section
5(2) of RA 9225. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his
victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified
candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.67

In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En Banc in sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec
Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections and in accordingly setting aside his proclamation
as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions areAFFIRMED. The Status Quo
Ante Order issued by this Court is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for certiorari filed by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of probable cause.

The factual antecedents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to
the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a 600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they
constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of
the salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that
he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed
a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4(R.A. 9225) as evidenced by Identification
Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been
assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to
the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondents family.

On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172
of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he
filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners MLA. It ruled that petitioners subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did
not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the elements of the
crime of falsification of public document suffices to warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he gained or
intended to injure a third person in committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed
before the MTC (Criminal Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner.

On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable
Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding that R.A. 9225 makes a
distinction between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when
the governing law was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a Canadian
citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and insisted that the
issue raised is purely legal. He argued that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action by the DENR Region IV-B office in
Manila, it is academic to ask the citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease
of public land. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of probable cause by the
court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who
had been naturalized in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on
account of said naturalization.

In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not yet re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status and not his criminal
act which was long consummated prior to said oath of allegiance.

On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
lower court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner is not left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to trial where
he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of conviction, to appeal such
conviction.

SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that

A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for falsification, the lower court has disregarded the undisputed fact that petitioner is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost
it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship.

B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal residence in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be arrested under a warrant
for his alleged false claim to Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to
question the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial of due
process.18

In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioners argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit. It is contended that
this Courts rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the retroactivity of ones re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship to the date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that such doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not work for petitioners cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged,
much less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land Application
that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of gain or intent to injure a third
person be present. As to petitioners defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be properly raised and proved in a full-blown trial.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from the MTC when
he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said courts jurisdiction by
his voluntary appearance. Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners
motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence
submitted before the court.

In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the MTC properly denied
petitioners motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused (petitioner).

R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of
natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens
who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.

The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Although the heading of Section 3 is Retention of Philippine Citizenship, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms re-acquire and
retain to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law using
both re-acquisition and retention.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost
pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares,
R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining
Philippine citizenship. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite
having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.

Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that interpretation of
the law which favors the accused is preferred because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence, and in this case it becomes
more relevant when a seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his query, stating that
his status as a natural-born Filipino will be governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.

These contentions have no merit.

That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003, where Senator Franklin Drilon
was responding to the query of Representative Exequiel Javier:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section 3 of the Senate version, Any provision of law on the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, shall and so forth, ano, shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity of this Act are
deemed to have reacquired

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.

REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here. Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the effectivity of this
act are considered to have retained their citizenship. But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the effectivity of this act are
considered to have reacquired. May I know the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who became, lets say, American citizens
after the effectivity of this act are considered natural-born?

Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural born citizens
because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is precisely retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to those who
lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can agree on this, upon the effectivity
of this new measure amending Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship
upon the effectivity of the act.

The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances. So thats the distinction.

REP. JAVIER. Well, Im just asking this question because we are here making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is very
important for certain government positions, no, because natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.

REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. Its one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation,
Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of Commonwealth
Act 63, and retention for those in the future. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born
Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual
citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost Philippine
citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2
declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with
Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new laws effectivity.

As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225 without any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of reacquisition and
retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.

Petitioners plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more favorable to the
accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. 23 R.A.
9225, however, is not a penal law.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents. The elements of falsification
of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.26
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in
fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign
country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for denying petitioners motion for re-determination of
probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an
application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of
the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking
an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits
(such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering
trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.cralawred
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law andjurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before
the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either
by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be
under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet
not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is
literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

xxxx

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative
relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case ofSantiago, seeking an affirmative relief
in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

xxxx

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred in stating that it
lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding such erroneous ground stated in the MTCs order, the RTC correctly ruled that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the MTC in denying the said motion for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case
No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is herebyAFFIRMED and UPHELD. With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The
1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The
mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger
or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community."3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE

ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence
of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed
out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros,
Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same
day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an
"honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate
of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in
filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City
and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by
writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After
respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as
petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First
District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
 petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along
with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing
with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of
an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently
be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in
Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have
responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has
never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification
by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she
only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she
would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was
rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident
of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in
Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate
of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence
of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical
presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In
fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of
merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case ofAlialy
v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only
applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from
provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case
considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be
considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence
in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as
a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate
which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting
minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by
claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be
gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that
she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition).
Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August
24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different
documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on
March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the
respondent's contention that it was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

 Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied
with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which
imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil
294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the
Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing
more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold
ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied
and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after
her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the
Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City
of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she
claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a
letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These
facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This
debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District
of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered
as a voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she
spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408) the Court explained
how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on
in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that
she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood
and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not
presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in
Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more
than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at
precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident
of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had
been a resident of the district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
 After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new
substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition
for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that
she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event
that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the
public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general
areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one
year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period
mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the
question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of
"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts
and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact
of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of
a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as
soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode,
whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one
 has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can
have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is
used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So
settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere
absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of
domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the
principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the
same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence
rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the
Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated
by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy
stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there
is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would
lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided
for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply
detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then
registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in
her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for
residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed
domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries
in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could
be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte.
First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then,
in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have
served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences
in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence
from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face
of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes. InLarena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family
in a municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or
with his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular
and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot,
and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an
election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town
to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself
from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to
be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth.
This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment
for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to
run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and
the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim
from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated
from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in
Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still
in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in
his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with
him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines
and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San
Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for
different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile
of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the
country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her
close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the
quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of
the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there
until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many
years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not
agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in
spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

37
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the
case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires
the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of
law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is
one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
 In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations
between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with
the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon
marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo,
podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a
pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el
marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be
understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often
as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the
sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their
residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art.
110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is
synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a
consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously,
at other times they are distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person
can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by
living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle;
In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain
situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a
residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being
allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In
instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or
reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of
contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this
country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of
course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an
order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he
experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married
people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or
wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by
process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render
conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such
orders, and inWeldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not
be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the
Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis
of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever
attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a
case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of
New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil
Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the
doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the
idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the
Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon
her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to
deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might
accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not
appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than
the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does
not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for
contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110
of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos
had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these
places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal
residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile
in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes
revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of
mutual agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived
from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to
choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate
(our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's
house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have
gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and
"residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile.
Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her
domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations
exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the
facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in
the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered
on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover,
petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely
directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such
result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds
of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the
reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days
within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions
which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are
usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of
the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was
construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated
in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then
refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881
even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground
here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-
EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established
principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn
ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. SO ORDERED.