1. CRIMINAL INTENT People, 685 SCRA 637, G.R. No.
People, 685 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 192330 November 14,
So precious to her is the constitutional right of
presumption of innocence unless proven otherwise that
appellant came all the way to this Court despite the fact
that the sentence imposed upon her by the Sandiganbayan
was merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no
imprisonment at all. And recognizing the primacy of the
right, this Court, where doubt exists, has invariably
resolved it in favor of an accused. Abdulla vs. People, 455
SCRA 78, G.R. No. 150129 April 6, 2005
It bears stressing that in determining what crime is
charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts
recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to
the penal law violated are controlling. Where the specific
intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime
charged such specific intent must be alleged in the
information and proved by the prosecution. People vs.
Delim, 396 SCRA 386, G.R. No. 142773 January 28, 2003
A schoolteacher who whipped her pupil in school The
latter having sustained only moderate bruises, is not guilty
of slight physical injuries as the nature of the wound and
the circumstances of the case show that it was made only
to discipline the pupil. Bagajo vs. Marave, 86 SCRA 389,
No. L-33345 November 20, 1978
Criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular
public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is
mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense
because positive law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It
is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not
the character or effect thereof, that determines whether
or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or
criminal intent is completely irrelevant. Ysidoro vs.
A policeman in the performance of duty is justified in using
2012
It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of
mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the
acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that
may express it or from which his motive or reason for
committing it may be inferred; Motive and intent may be
considered one and the same in some instances. Salvador
vs. People, 559 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 164266 July 23, 2008
2. CULPA
Faith Healing; Where the accused had no criminal intent to
kill the boy in subjecting him to a “treatment” calculated
to drive the “bad spirit” from the boy’s body, their liability
arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought
to have known that their actions would not bring about
the cure. People vs. Carmen, 355 SCRA 267, G.R. No.
137268 March 26, 2001
Accused Pugay can only be convicted of the crime of
Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence because of his
failure to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid
every undesirable consequence arising from any act
committed by his companions. People vs. Pugay, 167
SCRA 439, No. L-74324 November 14, 1988
3. MISTAKE OF FACT
under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability,
provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due
to negligence or bad faith. In other words, if such
ignorance or mistake of facts is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which, under the law, is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the
presumption of intent and works an acquittal. United
States vs. Ah Chong., 15 Phil. 488, No. 5272 March 19,
1910
such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain
the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from
bodily harm; He is however, never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton
violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the
arrest could be effected otherwise. Oanis case
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was
awakened at night by someone touching her arm, and,
believing that some person was attempting to abuse her,
she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply,
attacked and killed the said person with a pocket knife, it
was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in the
supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or
aggression to justify her completely in using a deadly
weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the
beginning of an attempt against her, she was not
completely warranted in making such a deadly assault, as
the injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-
in-law returning home with his wife, did not do any other
act which could be considered as an attempt against her
honor United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391.
4. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Under the circumstances of this case the defendant is
liable for the killing of the deceased because his death was
the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of
striking him on the head. If the defendant had not
committed the assault in a treacherous manner, he would
nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did
not intend to kill the deceased, and since the defendant
did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of
murder, because of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil.
524, No. 38511 October 6, 1933
Cases in this jurisdiction have consistently followed the
rule of common law that every person is deemed to
contemplate, and can be held responsible for, the natural
consequences of his own acts; that one who inflicts injury
upon another is mediately or immediately responsible for
the latter’s death, and the fact that other causes may have
cooperated to cause the death of such other does not
relieve the actor of responsibility; and that it is only when
death is not the direct or indirect consequence of the
injury, but of a malicious commission on the part of the
injured, that he is relieved of responsibility. The rule is said
to be founded on the practical policy of closing to the
wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just
consequence of his wrongful act. Medical men will often
disagree as to the cause of death and proper methods of
treatment. If the rule were otherwise many a criminal can
avoid just accounting of his acts by merely establishing a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death. (People vs.
Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162) The Crime of Parricide, 96 SCRA
479
The fact that the accused threw the knife away instead of
surrendering it to the authorities and reporting the
incident negates the claim of self-defense. People vs.
Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577, G.R. No. 91999 February 25,
1999
Where death supervenes by reason or on the occasion of a
robbery it is immaterial that death was caused by mere
accident, i.e., the victim who was hogtied swallowed the
mouth. People vs. Opero, 105 SCRA 40, No. L-48796 June
11, 1981
5. ERROR IN PERSONAE
(SEE OANIS CASE)
6. ABBERATIO ICTUS
Although the mere act of firing at a person is not proof per
se of intent to kill, yet when the surrounding
circumstances of the act are such that they leave no room
for doubt that the intention was to kill the person fired
upon, the crime is not simply "discharge of firearm," but
homicide or murder as the case may be. People vs.
Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967, No. 25459 August 10, 1926
Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by
invoking accident as a defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised
Penal Code, the legal provision pertinent to accident,
contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the
act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence
and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury
to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of
the actor—an accidental result flowing out of a legal act.
Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the
sway of our will, and although it comes about through
some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences. In short, accident presupposes
the lack of intention to commit the wrong done. Talampas
vs. People, 661 SCRA 197, G.R. No. 180219 November 23,
2011
7. COMPOUND CRIME (PRAETER INTENTIONEM)
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code expressly states that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be
different from that which he intended and that the
accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious
acts. People vs. Tomotorgo, 136 SCRA 238, No. L-47941
April 30, 1985
8. EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in
Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence,
cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:...
"that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred." Urbano case
9. STAGES OF CRIME- ATTEMPTED
The evidence shows that M. K. fired four successive shots
at H. H., without hitting him, whilethe latter was fleeing
from the scene of the crime in order to be out of reach of
the appellants and their companions and save his own life.
The fact that the said appellant, not having contented
himself with firing only once, fired said successive shots at
H. H., added to the circumstance that immediately before
doing so he and his co-appellants had already killed A. H.
and M. P., cousin and brother-in-law, respectively, of the
former, shows that he was then bent on killing said H. H.
The acts thus committed by the appellant constitute the
crime of attempted homicide with no modifying
circumstance to be taken into consideration because none
has been established. People vs. Kalalo, 59 Phil. 715, Nos.
39303-39305 March 17, 1934
10. STAGES OF CRIME – FRUSTRATED
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty of
frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6,
first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads: A
felony is consummated when all the elements necessary
for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. The essential elements of a frustrated felony
are as follows: Elements: 1. The offender performs all the
acts of execution; 2. All the acts performed would produce
the felony as a consequence; 3. But the felony is not
produced; 4. By reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator. People vs. Caballero, 400 SCRA 424,
G.R. Nos. 149028-30 April 2, 2003
Accused is guilty of frustrated murder. The fact that
Eduave attacked the victim from behind, in a vital portion
of the body, shows treachery qualifying it as murder. The
crime was not consummated because the elements of the
crime’s execution and accomplishment were not complete
as the victim did not die. Neither was the crime an
attempted one because the accused’s actions has already
passed the subjective phase, that is, there was no external
force preventing defendant from performing all the acts of
execution necessary to commit the felony. Consequently,
the victim did not die because an external element has
prevented such death after Eduave has performed all the
necessary acts of execution that would have caused the
death of the victim. Eduave case
 11. CONSPIRACY
In the absence of evidence showing the direct
participation of the accused in the commission of the
crime, conspiracy must be established by clear and
convincing evidence in order to convict the accused.
People vs. Gaffud, Jr., 566 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 168050
September 19, 2008
Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.—In
Rosario’s case, the Office of the Solicitor General made a
sweeping conclusion that the extent of her participation in
the act of taking merchandise need not be specified since
she attributed her other act of taking “short-over” to
“pakikisama” or companionship. The conclusion does not
persuade. Mere companionship does not establish
conspiracy. As indicated early on, there were two different
sets of imputed acts, one individual and the other
collective. Rosario’s admission was material only to her
individual guilt as she referred only to the “short-over.”
The wording of her admission cannot be construed to
extend to the other offense charging conspiracy under
which no overt act was established to prove that Rosario
shared with, and concurred in, the criminal design of
taking away Western’s merchandise. Astudillo vs. People,
509 SCRA 302, G.R. No. 159734, G.R. No. 159745
November 30, 2006
Conspiracy; Co-conspirators are liable only for acts done
pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside
the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not
necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime,
only the actual perpetrators are liable. People vs.
Federico, 247 SCRA 246, G.R. No. 99840 August 14, 1995
12. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that anyone
who acts in defense of his person or rights does not incur
any criminal liability provided that the following
circumstances concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself. People vs. Boholst-
Caballero, 61 SCRA 180, No. L-23249 November 25, 1974
Unlawful aggression by the victim is a primordial element
of self-defense; without it, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete. To be appreciated, the unlawful
aggression must be a continuing circumstance or must
have been existing at the time the defense is made. A
person making a defense has no more right to attack an
aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased. Gotis
vs. People, 533 SCRA 441, G.R. No. 157201 September 14,
2007
In the decision of a criminal cause, it is improper to hold
that there was unlawful aggression, and thus allow the
allegation of exemption from responsibility on the ground
of self-defense when there has been nothing more than a
threatening or intimidating attitude which, under no
consideration, is sufficient to justify the commission of a
criminal act punishable per se, inasmuch as it has always
been held by the courts that it is necessary that there be
an attack, a material aggression, or an act positively
showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor, in order to
warrant such defense. United States vs. Guy-sayco., 13
Phil. 292, No. 4912 March 25, 1909
MURDER; SELF-DEFENSE.—Appellant admitted that he
inflicted upon the deceased the wounds which caused his
death, but maintained that he acted in self-defense. The
plea of self-defense, in order to exculpate the accused,
must be duly proved. There could not be self-defense until
there had been unlawful aggression.The defendant did not
receive even a scratch in the alleged attack which the
deceased, armed with a sickle and a stick, made upon him.
He did not make any claim of self-defense in the
statement sworn to by him before the justice of the peace,
but, instead, he pleaded guilty in that court. Held:
Appellant did not act in self-defense. People vs.
Apolinario, 58 Phil. 586, No. 38562 October 18, 1933
An accused was no longer acting in self-defense when he
pursued and killed a fleeing adversary, though originally
the unlawful aggressor, there being then no more
aggression to defend against, the same having ceased
from the moment the deceased took to his heels. People
vs. Alconga and Bracamonte, 78 Phil. 366, No. L-162 April
30, 1947
13. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the
syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence
was her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the
responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she
fears for her life and/or her children’s lives; and (4)
she has an irrational belief that the abuser is
omnipresent and omniscient.There is legal and
jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the so-called
“battered woman syndrome” as a possible modifying
circumstance that could affect the criminal liability or
penalty of the accused; Accused persons facing the
possibility of the death penalty must be given fair
opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that
could save them from capital punishment. People vs.
Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, G.R. No. 135981 September
29, 2000
14. DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
Act of accused in delivering knife thrusts at the deceased
to stop the latter’s attack against a relative who had
already suffered a substantially serious wound, justified;
Reasons; Case at bar; Acquittal.—Tested by these
standards, petitioner’s acts justified the knife thrust(s) that
he delivered at the deceased in order to stop the latter’s
attack against Francisco who had already suffered a
substantially serious wound with the scythe imbedded in
his right armpit which the deceased did not let go. Since
there is evidence that the deceased aggressor was bigger
than Francisco, he could have inflicted with a little more
effort a much more serious, if not fatal, wound on
Francisco. The stab wounds inflicted by petitioner on the
deceased were all directed at the left forearm of the
deceased, sustaining petitioner’s statement that he did
not intend to seriously injure Harder but merely wanted
torelease the latter’s hold on Francisco because the scythe
was stuck under the latter’s armpit. Eslabon vs. People,
127 SCRA 785, No. L-66202 February 24, 1984
15. DEFENSE OF STRANGER
Self-defense and defense of the rights of another are
recognized circumstances justifying an offense and
exempting the perpetrator from criminal liability. People
vs. Punzalan, 153 SCRA 1, No. L-54562 August 6, 1987
16. ACTING IN THE FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR IN
THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF RIGHT OR OFFICE
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a
duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of The Revised Penal Code
may be successfully invoked, the accused must prove
the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury
caused or the offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. The second
requisite is lacking in the instant case. People vs.
Ulep, 340 SCRA 688, G.R. No. 132547 September 20,
2000
17. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
According to the dictionary, an imbecile is a person
marked by mental deficiency while an insane person
is one who has unsound mind or suffers from a
mental disorder. Insanity has been defined as “a
manifestation in language or conduct of disease or
defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently
diseased or disordered condition of the mentality,
functional or organic, and characterized by
perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the
sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired
or disordered volition. The fact that immediately
after the incident he thought of surrendering to the
law-enforcing authorities is incontestable proof that
he knew that what he had done was wrong and that
he was going to be punished for it. People vs. Ambal,
100 SCRA 325, No. L-52688 October 17, 1980
18. ANY PERSON WHILE PERFORMING A LAWFUL
ACT WITH DUE CARE CAUSES AN INJURY BY
MERE ACCIDENT
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which
no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is
“a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency,
an event which under the circumstances is unusual
or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.” yielded the same result, i.e., that the cigarettes the
Jarco Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, accused was selling were marijuana sticks. People vs.
321 SCRA 375, G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999 Juma, 220 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 90391 March 24, 1993
19. UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF EQUAL OR A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment that is
GREATER INJURY resorted to for trapping and capturing felons who are
pre-disposed to commit crimes; Entrapment should
be distinguished from instigation which has been
Where an accused, who was ordered by his superiors
viewed as contrary to public policy. People vs.
to kill a person, had not only the means with which
Cortez, 593 SCRA 743, G.R. No. 183819 July 23, 2009
to protect himself from any retaliation on the part of
his superiors if they should threaten to punish him if
he disobeyed their order, but also the opportunity to 21. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
escape with the intended victim to avoid the ire of
said superiors, yet did not do so, but instead carried
Whether complete or incomplete, self-defense, by its
out the order, it cannot be said that he acted on the
very nature and essence, always would require the
matter involuntarily or under the influence of
attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the
uncontrollable fear. He acted on his own free will
victim which must clearly be shown.—When the
and with the desire to collaborate with the criminal
foregoing requisites concur, there can be a legitimate
design of his superiors and was, therefore, a co-
claim of self-defense and no criminal liability
principal by direct participation. People vs. Rogado,
attaches. Where, upon the other hand, only one or
et al., 106 Phil. 816, No. L-13025 December 29, 1959
two but not all three of the above requisites essential
to justify the act or to exempt one from criminal
20. INSTIGATION V. ENTRAPMENT liability are attendant (termed “incomplete self-
defense”), the accused still incurs, albeit entitled to a
mitigation of, criminal liability. We did repeatedly say
Buy-bust operation a form of entrapment, not
before that, whether complete or incomplete, self-
instigation.—In this case, it is very clear that there
de-fense, by its very nature and essence, always
was no instigation because when the poseur-buyer,
would require the attendance of unlawful aggression
Sgt. Undangan, offered to buy marijuana cigarettes
initiated by the victim which must clearly be shown.
from the accusedappellant by handing over to him
When unlawful aggression on the victim’s part is
the P10.00 buy-bust money and in exchange
alone established, incomplete self-defense is so
therefor, the latter readily gave him ten (10) pieces
appreciated merely as an ordinary mitigating
of marijuana sticks, the crime was already
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 1, of the
consummated. All that the NARCOM agents had to
Code. When such unlawful aggression is coupled
do was apprehend the accused. This procedure is
with still another element of self-defense,
commonly known as a "buy-bust" operation which is
incomplete self-defense becomes a privileged
a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to
mitigating circumstance, referred to in Article 69 of
trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is
the Revised Penal Code, that entitles the accused to
an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the
a reduction of the penalty imposed by law for the
act of the commission of the offense. Entrapment
felony by one or two degrees depending on the
has received judicial sanction as long as it is carried
conditions and circumstances therein obtaining. De
out with constitutional and legal circumspection. This
Luna vs. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 758, G.R. No.
requirement was observed, in the present case. That
111484 June 2, 1995
there was no inducement on the part of the
NARCOM agents is further bolstered by the fact that
the test-buy operation conducted by the same Sgt. When the deceased sat by the side of defendant and
Undangan the day before, or on October 27, 1988, appellant on the same bench, near the door of the
barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper
portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the
said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there
were already several people, about ten of them,
inside the chapel, including her own father and the
barrio lieutenant; there was and there could be no
possibility of her being raped. And when she gave A.
C. a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck,
inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4½ inches deep,
causing his death a few moments later, the means
employed by her in the defense of her honor was
evidently excessive. Held: That she cannot be legally
declared completely exempt from criminal
liability.People vs. Jaurigue and Jaurigue, 76 Phil.
174, CA-No. 384 February 21, 1946
perhaps because he was momentarily shocked by the
enormity of his crime, nevertheless when brought to
the police station immediately thereafter as a
possible witness (accused was with the police
investigators all that time), he confided to the
investigators that he was “voluntarily surrendering”
and “also surrendering the fatal gun used in the
shooting of the victim” (p. 9, t.s.n. December 26,
1969). People vs. Benita, 62 SCRA 351, No. L-32042
February 13, 1975

As we noted, the trial court repudiated the accused’s

posturing of defense of relatives, so also do we.
“Defense of relatives” requires the concurrence of
three elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending the
relative had no part in provoking the assailant,
should any provocation have been given by the
person attacked. Of these three requisites, “unlawful
aggression” is said to be the most essential and
primary, without which any “defense” is not possible
or justified. Thus: “If there is no unlawful aggression
there would be nothing to prevent or repel.” In that
event, not even incomplete self-defense can be
validly invoked. People vs. Agapinay, 186 SCRA 812,
G.R. No. 77776 June 27, 1990

Mitigating circumstances; Voluntary surrender; Case

at bar, acts implying voluntary surrender.—The
intention of the accused to surrender could be
clearly discerned from the fact that immediately
after the shooting, the accused having all the
opportunity to escape, did not do so but instead
called up the Manila Police Department. When the
policemen went to the scene of the crime to
investigate, the accused voluntarily approached
them and, without revealing his identity, told them
that he would help in connection with the case as he
knew the suspect as well as the latter’s motive.
While it may be true that the accused did not
immediately tell the police that he was the assassin,