G.R. No.

L-7955 May 30, 1958

JOAQUIN LOPEZ, petitioner,
vs.
ENRIQUE P. OCHOA, respondent.
Ramirez and Ortigas for petitioner.
Jose V. Rosales for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the court a qou in the sense that "all the
amounts awarded . . . shall be reduced to its equivalent in actual Philippine currency in the proportion of 15 to 1", without
costs.
On August 26, 1943, Enrique P. Ochoa executed in favor of Joaquin Lopez a document whereby he mortgaged a piece of land
located in Manila as security for the payment of a loan in the amount of P15,000 in Japanese military notes to be paid, among
other conditions, as follows:
1.—Devolera dicha cantidad ell el plazo de DOS ANOS, a contar desde la fecha de esta escritura, cuyo plazo se estipula
estrictamente en benificio recproco del el deudor y del acreedor. De tal manera que el deudor no podra pagar al acreedor el
capital ni parte del mismo, antes de la expiracion del plazo, annque ofrezca pagar los intereses correspondientes al periodo no
transcurido de dicho plazo; y de igual manera, el acreedor tampoco podraexigir el pago del capital de este prestamo antes del
plazo convenido. Esta clausula se considera como una condicion especial y esencial de este contrato, que forma parte de su
consideracion especial y de este contrato, que forma parte de su consideracion legal, pues sin ella las partes contratantes no
hubieran aceptado este contrato.
2.—Pagara sobre la mencionada cantidad intereses a razon de cinco por ciento annual, pagaderos por semesestres, vencidos en
la residencia del acreedor del necesiad de requerimento.
On March 1, 1944, Ochoa paid Lopez the sum of P375 as interest on the principal of the aforesaid loan for the period from
August 26, 1943 to February 25, 1944 and on June 12, 1944, he paid P5,000, in Japanese war notes, on account of the principal
for which Lopez issued a receipt.
On August 25, 1944, Ochoa made another payment in the sum of P323.62 on account of interest for the period from February
26, 1944 to August 26, 1944. On October 2, 1944, he tendered to Lopez the payment of the balance of the indebtedness with
the corresponding interest, but the latter refused to accept it on the ground that it was against the terms of the mortgage. In
view of such refusal, Ochoa advised Lopez that he deposit the money in court and, accordingly, he filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of Manila accompanied by a deposit in the amount of P10,631.50. Lopez was properly served with
summons on October 7, 1944 but the case was never tried nor its record reconstituted after its destruction during the battle for
the liberation of the City of Manila.
His several demands to cancel the mortgage having failed, Ochoa commenced the present action on January 30, 1950 before
the Court of First Instance of Manila with the prayer that the tender of payment and consignation made by him of the amount
of P10,000 be declared as complete payment of his obligation and that the mortgage executed by him be cancelled, with costs.
Defendant pleaded, that the alleged consignation of the obligation had not been validly made, and set up a counterclaim the
judgment against plaintiff for the mortgage debt of P10,000, still due, together with the stipulated interest and attorneys' fees
and, in default thereof, for the foreclosure of the mortgage in accordance with law.
Finding that the alleged consignation was not valid for it was made when the debt was not yet due and upholding the validity of
the terms of the mortgage contract, the court rendered judgment absolving the defendant of the complaint and sentencing the
plaintiff to pay the sum of P10,000, with interest at the rate of 5 % per annum from January 26, 1650, the further sum of
P2,707.09 as accrued interest, with interest at the legal rate from January 26, 1950, and the sum of 10 % on the principal
amount as attorneys' fees, plus the cost, and ordering plaintiff to make said payment within ninety days, with the warning that,
upon his default, the mortgaged property shall be sold as provided for in the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals modified this judgment as stated in the early part of this decision.
After considering the terms of the mortgage contract with regard to the period within which the loan may be paid particularly
the clause to the effect that the debtor shall not pay the capital before the expiration of two years, in the light of the partial
payment made by Ochoa of the sum of P5,000 on account of the principal obligation which Lopez accepted on June 12, 1944,
the Court of Appeals made the following findings:
2.—The acceptance of the partial payment in the sum of P5,000.00 made by the plaintiff-appellant on June 12, 1944 (Exh. "I")
was not a novation of the contract, but it was undoubtedly a waiver by defendant-appellee of the aforesaid term of two years.
It was a relinquished of his right to refuse any payment before the expiration of said term. No explanation having been given
why defendant-appellee received said partial payment before the maturity of the obligation, it may be presumed that his
relinquishment was intentional and his choice to dispense with the term, voluntary. It was not a mere forbearance. (56 Am. Jur.
pp. 102, 104, 107 and 113)
Petitioner now contends that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the acceptance of the partial payment of P5,000 on
account as a waiver of his part of the period of two years for, the reason that suck defense was not set up by respondent in the
court a quo and as such it was error to entertain it to his prejudice. It appears however that in the respondent's reply to
petitioner's answer and counterclaim, the former made the following averment: "defendant herein is now estopped from
claiming that payment of the obligation on the mortgage indebtedness cannot be made before the expiration of two years as
alleged by him in paragraph (5) and sub-paragraph 1 of paragraph (7) of his counterclaim, assuming without admitting that such
alleged stipulation was a condition in the mortgage deed executed between the parties." It may be contended that there is an
allegation of estoppel, and not of waiver, but these two terms are frequently used as convertible. The doctrine of waiver
belongs to the family of, or is based upon, estoppel. This is especially true where the waiver relied upon is constructive or
implied from the conduct of a party, when it is said that the elements of estoppel are attendant.
(2) B. Nature of Doctrine.-The doctrine of waiver has been characterized as technical, as of some arbitrariness. It is one of the
most familiar in the law, prevalent in ancient as well as in modern times throughout every branch of law as well as of practice .
It is a doctrine resting upon an equitable principle which courts of law will recognize, that a person, with full knowledge of the
facts shall not be permitted to act in a manner inconsistent with his former position or conduct to the injury of another, a rule
of judicial policy, the legal outgrowth of judicial abhorrence so to speak, of a person's taking inconsistent positions and gaining
advantages thereby through the aid of courts. The doctrine, it has been said, belongs to the family of, is of the nature of, is
based upon, estoppell. The essence of waiver, it has been stated, is estoppel, and where there is no estoppel, there is no waiver.
"Waiver" and "estoppel" are frequently used as convertible. On the other hand, it has been said that the terms are not
convertible, that an estoppel in pais has connections in no wise akin to waiver, and that the doctrine of waiver does not
necessarily depend on estoppel or misrepresentation; thus, a waiver does not necessarily imply that one has been misled to his
prejudice or into an altered position; a waiver may be created by acts, conduct, or declaration to create a technical estoppel.
However, the distinction, it has been said, is more easily preserved in dealing with express waiver, but where the waiver relied
upon is constructive or merely implied from the conduct of a party, irrespective of what his actual intention may have been, it is
at least questionable if there are not present some of the elements of estoppel. (67 C. J. pp. 294-295. Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner also, contends that it was error to consider that respondent made a partial payment of P5,000 on account of his
principal obligation there being no proof submitted by him to that effect. But the Court of Appeals found it as a fact that such
partial payment was actually made especially considering the receipt signed by him acknowledging said payment. It being a
question of fact, it cannot now be looked into at this stage of the proceeding.
Another contention refers to the application of the Ballantyne scale of values to the present case on the pretense that the same
has not been set up as a defense nor has evidence to prove it been presented. But this pretense is untenable because said
Ballantyne scale is now a matter that comes with in judicial notice it having been applied by this Court in several previous cases
and had become part of our jurisprudence. There is therefore no cogent reason why it cannot now be considered even if it has
not been set up as a defense.
It is finally contended that the Court of Appeals erred in revaluing the balance of the obligation under the Ballantyne scale of
values taking as basis the month of June, 1944 because, in the opinion of petitioner, the basis should be the date of the
mortgage, or on August 26, 1943. On this point, the court said: "Defendant-appellee having waived, on June 12, 1944, his right
to the term of two years agreed upon in the contract (Exh. "1"), the obligation under consideration became payable since June
13, 1944 and during the Japanese military occupation. Hence, conformably with the ruling of the Supreme Court, it should be
revalued on the basis of the relative value of the Japanese military notes in Philippine genuine currency on June, 1944 under
the Ballantyne sliding scale of values, which is 15 to 1."
There is nothing incorrect in this finding considering that the obligation only became payable on June 13, 1944. This became
possible because of petitioner's waiver. In fact, several attempts were made by respondent to pay the whole obligation
thereabouts but his attempts failed because of petitioner's refusal. It is therefore reasonable that the revaluation be made as of
said date and not on the date of the mortgage.
The decision appealed from being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-9343 December 29, 1959
MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALENTIN R. LIM, defendant-appellant.
De Santos, Herrera and Delfino for appellee.
Carlos, Laurea, Fernando and Padilla for appellant.
ENDENCIA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the defendant Valentin R. Lim to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1000 with legal interest from July 26, 1951, with costs. The appeal is predicated on the
proposition that the lower court erred:
1. In holding and ordering appellant to return the sum of P1000 to appellee;
2. In ordering reimbursement merely because the order under which appellee made payment was subsequently set aside and
in failing to rule that reasons of equity entitle appellant tot retain the amount delivered; and
3. In assuming jurisdiction of the action that give rise to the present appeal.
The present case is an offset of the decision rendered by Us on December 29, 1949 in cases G.R. Nos. L-2717, 2718 and 2767 *,
where in we declared that damages suffered by reason of the issuance of a writ or preliminary injunction must be claimed,
ascertained and awarded in the final judgment, and that the damages awarded therein in favor of defendant Valentin R. Lim by
reason of the issuance of the preliminary injunction in civil cases Nos. 487 and 7674 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, were
granted in violation of Section 9 of Rule 60 in connection with Section 20 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, for said damages
were not included in the decision and were awarded long time after it became final and executory.
The factual background of the present case is as follows: On February 26, 1946, in civil case No. 32 of the Justice of the Peace
Court of Pasay, Valentin R. Lim obtained a judgment against Irineo Facundo, "ordering the latter to vacate the premises
described in the complaint and to pay the plaintiff a monthly rental of P100 from February 18, 1955 until the defendant vacate
the premises and to pay the costs." Ireneo Facundo did not appeal from the decision but instead caused the filing of a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition (Case No. 7674) in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled Ireneo Facundo,
petitioner, vs. Jose M. Santos, ex-Justice of the Peace of Pasay, Ricardo C. Robles, as Justice of the Peace of Pasay, Valentin R.
Lim, respondents, wherein a writ of preliminary injunction was issued upon the filing by Facundo of a in the sum of P1000,
which bond was posted by the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. On June 21, 1946, this case was a dismissed by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and the dismissal was subsequent affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court on December 17, 1946.
On July 29, 1948, Valentin R. Lim filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in said case No. 7694, a motion for the
determination of damages sustained by him fore uncollected rentals due to the issuance of the above-mentioned writ of
preliminary injunction in said case. Despite the fact that the decision in that case — wherein no damages were awarded to
appellant Lim — had already become final two years more or less from the date of September 30, 1948, allowed appellant to
prove said damages, awarded them and ordered the confiscation of the bond posted by the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
and directed the latter to pay appellant Lim the sum of P1000, which order gave rise to a petition for certiorari filed and
docketed in this Court as G.R. No.
L-2718.
On April 9, 1948, Irineo Facundo filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a special civil action for prohibition against Lucio M.
Tinagco as municipal Judge of Rizal City, and Valentin R. Lim, wherein he prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
upon filing a bond of P1000 to prevent Judge Tinagco from issuing an alias writ of execution in civil case No. 32 of his court.
Upon Facundo's filing of the bond, which was posted by the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., the court issued the
corresponding preliminary injunction. On April 24, 1948, the court dismissed this case and dissolved the writ of preliminary
injunction; hence on July 29, 1948, appellant filed a petition with said court asking for damages sustained by him for failure to
collect the rentals because of the issuance of the aforementioned preliminary injunction; and despite the fact that the decision
in civil case No. 487 — wherein no damages were awarded for the issuance of said preliminary injunction — had become final
on May 9, 1948, the Court of First Instance of Rizal allowed the damages sought for, ordered the confiscation of the bond
posted by the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., and directed the latter to pay to Lim the full value of said Court, docketed as
G.R. No. L-2712.
Thereafter, or to be more exact, on January 24, 1949, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, issued a writ of execution in the
aforementioned cases Nos. 487 and 7674, directing the Sheriff of Manila to require the Manila Surety 7 Fidelity Co., Inc. to pay
to appellant Valentin R. Lim the sum of P1000 is satisfaction of its liability under the preliminary injunction bond, and in
compliance with the writ of execution, the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., herein appellee, delivered to the Sheriff of Manila
the sum of P1,105.01 in full satisfaction of the writ of execution and the fees of the Sheriff, of which amount the sum of P1000
was delivered by the Sheriff to appellant Valentin R. Lim.
On December 29, 1949, we declared that the writs of execution issued in civil cases Nos. 487 and 7674 of the Court of First
Instance were null and void, and on January 21, 1951, the herein plaintiff-appellee demanded from the defendant-appellant the
immediate reimbursement of the payment it made in compliance with said writs, but the herein defendant-appellant refused
to re turn the above-mentioned amount of P1,105.01, hence plaintiff-appellee initiated the present action.
The main contention of defendant-appellant is: that plaintiff-appellee has paid voluntarily its natural obligation and therefore is
precluded from recovering that which was delivered to defendant-appellant, and that the requisites of solutio indebti which is
the only basis for the return of the amount paid do not exist in the present case. Appellant invokes the following provisions of
the Civil Code:
ART. 1423. Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to
enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been
delivered or rendered by reason thereof.
ART. 1424. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed be extensive prescription, the obligor who voluntarily
performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value of the service he has rendered.
ART. 1428. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligations has failed, the defendant voluntarily performs the obligation he
cannot demand the return of what he has delivered or the payment of the value of the service he has rendered.
Upon careful examination of the foregoing provisions of law and undisputed facts of the case, we find appellants contention to
be untenable, for the payment made by the herein plaintiff-appellee to defendant-appellant was not voluntary, it was thru a
coercive process of the writ of execution issued at the instant and insistence of the defendant-appellant. Certainly, were it not
for said writ of execution, plaintiff-appellee would not have paid to defendant-appellant the amount in question. It should be
noted that at the time the said writ of execution was issued, the right of defendant-appellant to damages caused unto him by
reason of his inability to collect the rents of the property involved in civil cases Nos. 487 and 7674, was still pending
determination by the Supreme Court, and had defendant-appellant waited for the final decision of the Supreme Court on said
damages, surely he would not have caused the issuance of the writ of execution in said civil cases and thus compel plaintiff-
appellee to pay to him the aforementioned sum of P1,105.01.lawphi1.net
It is contended be defendant-appellant that there is not justification for ordering the return of the amount n question as the
court below did, for in the present case, the requisites of solutio indebti do not exist. But the instant case does not fall under
the provisions of Article 2154; it is based on the theory that the judgment upon which the plaintiff-appellee made payment was
declared null and void and consequently the execution of said judgment and the payment made thereunder were also null and
void. It is quite a settled rule that damages caused by the issuance of a preliminary injunction should be adjudicated in the final
judgment rendered in the case in which the injunction was issued. In civil cases Nos. 487 and 7674 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, the award of damages was done after the decision on the merit of said cases became final, so said award was illegal,
for which no writ of execution could be validly issued. Evidently, the order of September 30, 1949 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal whereby it awarded damages and ordered the forfeiture and execution of plaintiff's bond in each of said two cases, is
null and void, it having been issued in violation of the Rules of Court.
Defendant-appellant lastly raises the question of jurisdiction of the court below, claiming that the present action should have
been filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal and citing as follows:
A court which takes cognizance of an action over which it has jurisdiction and power to afford complete relief has the exclusive
right to dispose of the controversy without interference from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in which similar actions are
subsequently instituted between the same parties seeking similar remedies and involving the same questions. (21 C.J.S. 745).
(Emphasis supplied)
. . . every court has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers, and to
control its own process. (Dimayuga vs. Raymundo, et al., 76 Phil., 143.).
Independent of any statutory provision, we assert that every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for
the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Appellant's contention is untenable. The present action is for a sum of money and all the parties involved are residents of the
City of Manila as averred in paragraph 1 of the complaint. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, civil actions like the one
in question may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Wherefore, finding no error in the decision appealed from the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

GR No. L-47362 December 19, 1940JOHN F. VILLARROEL, appellant-appellant,vs. B ERNARD

IN
O
ESTRADA, turned-appellee.
D. Felipe Agoncillo in representation of the appellant-appelante.D. Crispin Oben in representation of the defendant-appellee.
DECISION
Avanceña,J.:
On May 9, 1912, Alejandro F. Callao, mother of defendant John F. Villarroel, obtained from thespousesMariano Estrada and Severina a loan of P1, 000 payable
after seven years (ExhibitoA). Alejandra died,leaving as sole heir to the defendant.Spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina alsodied, leaving as soleheir to the
plaintiff Bernardino Estrada. On August 9, 1930, the defendant signeda document (Exhibito B) bywhich the applicant must declare in the amount of P1, 000,
with aninterest of 12 percent per year. Thisaction relates to the recovery of this amount.The Court of First Instance of Laguna, which was filed in this action,
condemn the defendant to paytheclaimed amount of P1, 000 with legal interest of 12 percent per year since the August 9, 1930until full pay.He appealed the
sentence.It will be noted that the parties in the present case are, respectively, the only heirs and creditors of theoriginal debtor. This action is brought under the
defendant's liability as the only son of the originaldebtor infavor of the plaintiff contracted, sole heir of primitive loa creditors. It is recognized that theamount of
P1, 000to which contracts this obligation is the same debt of the mother's parents sued theplaintiff. Although the action to recover the original
debt has prescribed and when the lawsuit was filed in thiscase,the question raised in this appeal is primarily whether, notwithstanding such
requirement, theaction taken isappropriate. However, this action is based on the original obligation contracted by themother of thedefendant, who has already
prescribed, but in which the defendant contracted theAugust 9, 1930 (ExhibitoB) by assuming the fulfillment of that obligation, as prescribed. Being theonly
defendant in the originalherdero debtor eligible successor into his inheritance, that debt broughtby his mother in law, although it lostits effectiveness by
prescription, is now, however, for a moralobligation, that is consideration enough tocreate and make effective and enforceable obligationvoluntarily contracted
its August 9, 1930 in Exhibito B.The rule that a new promise to pay a debt prrescrita must be made by the same person obligatedorotherwise legally authorized
by it, is not applicable to the present case is not required in compliancewiththe mandatory obligation orignalmente but which would give it voluntarily assumed
thisobligation.It confirmsthe judgment appealed from, with costs against the appellant. IT IS SO ORDERED.