Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. Fundamental principles
Criminal law is that branch of municipal law which defines crimes, treats of their
nature and provides for their punishment. It is that branch of public substantive law which defines
offenses and prescribes their penalties. It is substantive because it defines the state’s right to inflict
punishment and the liability of the offenders. It is public law because it deals with the relation of the
individual with the state.
(i) Generality
Generality of criminal law means that the criminal law of the country
governs all persons within the country regardless of their race, belief, sex, or creed.
However, it is subject to certain exceptions brought about by international agreement.
Ambassadors, chiefs of states and other diplomatic officials are immune from the
application of penal laws when they are in the country where they are assigned. Note
that consuls are not diplomatic officers. This includes consul-general, vice-consul or any
consul in a foreign country, who are therefore, not immune to the operation or
application of the penal law of the country where they are assigned. Consuls are subject
to the penal laws of the country where they are assigned. It has no reference to
territory. Whenever you are asked to explain this, it does not include territory. It refers
to persons that may be governed by the penal law.
(iii) Territoriality
Territoriality means that the penal laws of the country have force and
effect only within its territory. It cannot penalize crimes committed
outside the same. This is subject to certain exceptions brought about by
international agreements and practice. The territory of the country is
not limited to the land where its sovereignty resides but includes also its
maritime and interior waters as well as its atmosphere. Terrestrial
jurisdiction is the jurisdiction exercised over land. Fluvial jurisdiction is
the jurisdiction exercised over maritime and interior waters. Aerial
jurisdiction is the jurisdiction exercised over the atmosphere.
The Archipelagic Rule All bodies of water comprising the maritime zone
and interior waters abounding different islands comprising the
Philippine Archipelago are part of the Philippine territory regardless of
their breadth, depth, width or dimension. On the fluvial jurisdiction
there is presently a departure from the accepted International Law Rule,
because the Philippines adopted the Archipelagic Rule. In the
International Law Rule, when a strait within a country has a width of
more than 6 miles, the center lane in excess of the 3 miles on both sides
is considered international waters.
(iv) Prospectivity
This is also called irretrospectivity. Acts or omissions will only be subject
to a penal law if they are committed after a penal law had already taken
effect. Vice-versa, this act or omission which has been committed
before the effectivity of a penal law could not be penalized by such
penal law because penal laws operate only prospectively.
2. Felonies
a) Classifications of felonies
1) According to the manner of their commission Under Article 3, they are classified as,
intentional felonies or those committed with deliberate intent; and culpable felonies or those
resulting from negligence, reckless imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
(2) According to the stages of their execution Under Article 6., felonies are classified as
attempted felony when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance; frustrated felony when
the offender commences the commission of a felony as a consequence but which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce the felony by
reason of causes independent of the perpetrator; and, consummated felony when all the
elements necessary for its execution are present.
(3) According to their gravity Under Article 9, felonies are classified as grave felonies or
those to which attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods are
afflictive; less grave felonies or those to which the law punishes with penalties which in their
maximum period was correccional; and light felonies or those infractions of law for the
commission of which the penalty is arresto menor.
d) Stages of execution
The classification of stages of a felony in Article 6 are true only to crimes under
the Revised Penal Code. This does not apply to crimes punished under special laws. But even
certain crimes which are punished under the Revised Penal Code do not admit of these stages.
The purpose of classifying penalties is to bring about a proportionate penalty and equitable
punishment. The penalties are graduated according to their degree of severity. The stages may
not apply to all kinds of felonies. There are felonies which do not admit of division.
Formal crimes are crimes which are consummated in one instance. For example, in oral
defamation, there is no attempted oral defamation or frustrated oral defamation; it is always in
the consummated stage.
So also, in illegal exaction under Article 213 is a crime committed when a public officer
who is authorized to collect taxes, licenses or impose for the government, shall demand an
amount bigger than or different from what the law authorizes him to collect. Under sub-
paragraph a of Article 213 on Illegal exaction, the law uses the word “demanding”. Mere
demanding of an amount different from what the law authorizes him to collect will already
consummate a crime, whether the taxpayer pays the amount being demanded or not. Payment
of the amount being demanded is not essential to the consummation of the crime. The
difference between the attempted stage and the frustrated stage lies on whether the offender
has performed all the acts of execution for the accomplishment of a felony. Literally, under the
article, if the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
as a consequence but the felony was not realized, then the crime is already in the frustrated
stage. If the offender has not yet performed all the acts of execution – there is yet something to
be performed – but he was not able to perform all the acts of execution due to some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, then you have an attempted felony. You
will notice that the felony begins when the offender performs an overt act. Not any act will mark
the beginning of a felony, and therefore, if the act so far being done does not begin a felony,
criminal liability correspondingly does not begin. In criminal law, there is such a thing as
preparatory act. These acts do not give rise to criminal liability.
Desistance on the part of the offender negates criminal liability in the attempted stage.
Desistance is true only in the attempted stage of the felony. If under the definition of the felony,
the act done is already in the frustrated stage, no amount of desistance will negate criminal
liability. The spontaneous desistance of the offender negates only the attempted stage but not
necessarily all criminal liability. Even though there was desistance on the part of the offender, if
the desistance was made when acts done by him already resulted to a felony, that offender will
still be criminally liable for the felony brought about his act. What is negated is only the
attempted stage, but there may be other felony constituting his act.
When conspiracy itself is a crime, no overt act is necessary to bring about the
criminal liability. The mere conspiracy is the crime itself. This is only true when
the law expressly punishes the mere conspiracy; otherwise, the conspiracy does
not bring about the commission of the crime because conspiracy is not an overt
act but a mere preparatory act. Treason, rebellion, sedition, and coup d’etat are
the only crimes where the conspiracy and proposal to commit to them are
punishable.
(i) Recidivism
g) Continuing crimes
a) Justifying circumstances
Since the justifying circumstances are in the nature of defensive acts, there
must be always unlawful aggression. The reasonableness of the means employed depends on
the gravity of the aggression. If the unlawful aggressor was killed, this can only be justified if it
was done to save the life of the person defending or the person being defended. The equation is
“life was taken to save life.”
Self Defense - In justifying circumstances, the most important is self-defense. When this
is given in the bar, it is the element of unlawful aggression that is in issue. Never confuse
unlawful aggression with provocation. Mere provocation is not enough.
Defense of property rights - This can only be invoked if the life and limb of the person
making the defense is also the subject of unlawful aggression. Life cannot be equal to property.
Defense of stranger - If the person being defended is already a second cousin, you do
not invoke defense of relative anymore. It will be defense of stranger. This is vital because if the
person making the defense acted out or revenge, resentment or some evil motive in killing the
aggressor, he cannot invoke the justifying circumstance if the relative defended is already a
stranger in the eyes of the law. On the other hand, if the relative defended is still within the
coverage of defense of relative, even though he acted out of some evil motive, it would still
apply. It is enough that there was unlawful aggression against the relative defended, and that
the person defending did not contribute to the unlawful aggression.
(1) The felony was committed while the offender was in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office; and
(2) The resulting felony is the unavoidable consequence of the due fulfillment of the
duty or the lawful exercise of the right or office.
Invariably, when you are given a problem on this premise, and the first condition is
present, but the second is not because the offender acted with culpa, the offender will be
entitled to a privelege mitigating circumstance. This is what you call incomplete justification of
fulfillment of duty or incomplete justification of exercise of a right. In that case, the penalty
would be reduced by one or two degrees.
In People v. Oanis and Callanta, the accused Chief of Police and the constabulary soldier
were sent out to arrest a certain Balagtas, supposedly a notorious bandit. There was an order to
kill Balagtas if he would resist. The accused arrived at the house of a dancer who was supposedly
the girlfriend of Balagtas. When they were there, they saw a certain person who resembled
Balagtas in all his bodily appearance sleeping on a bamboo bed but facing the other direction.
The accused, without going around the house, started firing at the man. They found out later on
that the man was not really Balagtas. They tried to invoke the justifying circumstance of having
acted in fulfillment of a duty.
The second requisite is absent because they acted with negligence. There was nothing
that prevented them from looking around the house and looking at the face of the fellow who
was sleeping. There could not be any danger on their life and limb. Hence, they were held guilty
of the crime of murder because the fellow was killed when he was sleeping and totally
defenseless. However, the Supreme Court granted them the benefit of incomplete justification
of fulfillment of duty and the penalty was reduced by one or two degrees.
(i) Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No.
9262)
b) Exempting circumstances
The insanity that is exempting is limited only to mental aberration or disease of the
mind and must completely impair the intelligence of the accused. Under common law countries,
emotional or spiritual insanity are exempting circumstances unlike in this jurisdiction because
the Revised Administrative Code, as defined is limited to mental aberration of the mind. This
was the ruling in People v. Dungo.
In People v. Rafanan, decided on November 21, 1991, the following are the two tests for
exemption on grounds of insanity:
(1) The test of cognition, or whether the accused acted with complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing said crime; and
(2) The test of volition, or whether the accused acted in total deprivation of freedom of
will.
Minority - In exempting circumstances, the most important issue is how the minority of
the offender affected his criminal liability. It seems that the view of many is that when the
offender is a youthful offender, he must necessarily be confined in a reformatory. This is wrong.
A youthful offender can only be confined in a reformatory upon order of the court. Under the
amendment to Presidential Decree No. 603, Presidential Decree No. 1179 requires that before a
youthful offender may be given the benefit if a suspension of sentence, there must be an
application filed with the court which should pronounce sentence. Note that the commitment of
the offender in a reformatory is just a consequence of the suspension of the sentence. If the
sentence is not suspended, there is no commitment in a reformatory. The commitment is in a
penitentiary, since suspension of sentence requires certain conditions:
(1) The crime committed should not be punishable by reclusion perpetua or death
penalty;
(2) The offender should not have been given the benefit of a suspended sentence
before. This means he is a first timer;
(3) He must be below 18 years old because a youthful offender is one who is below 18.
Note that the age of majority has been reduced to 18. There is no more bracket where
the offender is a minor yet no longer entitled to a mitigating circumstance. An offender below
18 is always entitled to a mitigating or exempting circumstance.
How does the minority of the offender affect his criminal liability?
(1) If the offender is within the bracket of nine years old exactly or less, he is exempt
from criminal liability but not from civil liability. This type of offenders are absolutely exempt.
Even if the offender nine years or below acted with discernment, this should not be taken
against him because in this age bracket, the exemption is absolute
(2) If over nine but below 15, a distinction has to be made whether the offender acted
with or without discernment. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove that the offender
acted with discernment. It is not for the minor to prove that he acted without discernment. All
that the minor has to show is that he is within the age bracket. If the prosecution would want to
pin criminal liability on him, it has to prove that the crime was committed with discernment.
Here, if the offender was exempt from criminal liability because the prosecution was not able to
prove that the offender acted with discernment, he is only civilly liable but he will be committed
to the surveillance of his parents who will be required to report to the court periodically on the
progress or development of the offender.
If the offender is proven to have acted with discernment, this is where the court may
give him the benefit of a suspended sentence. He may be given the benefit of a suspended
sentence under the conditions mentioned earlier and only if he would file an application
therefor. Suspension of sentence is not automatic. If the youthful offender has filed an
application therefor.
(3) If at the time the judgment is to be promulgated he is already above 18, he cannot
avail of a suspended sentence. The reason is because if the sentence were to be suspended, he
would be committed in a reformatory. Since he cannot be committed to a reformatory anymore
because he is not less than 18 years old, he would have to be committed to a penitentiary. That
means promulgation of the sentence shall not be suspended. If the sentence should not be
suspended, although the minor may be qualified, the court will promulgate the sentence but the
minor shall be entitled to the reduction of the penalty by at least two degrees.
When the offender is over nine but below 15, the penalty to be imposed is discretionary
on the court, but lowered by at least two degrees. It may be lowered by three or four degrees,
depending upon whether the court deems best for the interest of the offender. The limitation
that it should be lowered by at least two degrees is just a limitation on the power of the court to
reduce the penalty. It cannot be less than two degrees.
(4) If the offender is 15 years old and above but below 18, there is no exemption
anymore but he is also given the benefit of a suspended sentence under the conditions stated
earlier and if at the time the sentence is promulgated, he is not 18 years old or over yet. If the
sentence is promulgated, the court will impose a penalty one degree lower. This time it is fixed.
It is to be imposed one degree lower and in the proper periods subject to the rules in Article 64.
Damnum absque injuria - Under Article 12, paragraph 4, the offender is exempt not
only from criminal but also from civil liability. This paragraph embodies the Latin maxim
“damnum absque injuria”.
The offender must be totally deprived of freedom. If the offender has still freedom of
choice, whether to act or not, even if force was employed on him or even if he is suffering from
uncontrollable fear, he is not exempt from criminal liability because he is still possessed with
voluntariness. In exempting circumstances, the offender must act without voluntariness.
In a situation where the offender would otherwise be exempt, but the requisites for
exemption are not all present, the offender is still entitled to a mitigating circumstance of
incomplete exemption under paragraph 1 of Article 13. Apply the rule if majority of the
requisites to exempt from criminal liability are present. The offender shall be given the benefit
of privelege mitigating circumstances. That means that the penalty prescribed of the crime
committed shall be reduced by one or two degrees in accordance with Article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code. If less than a majority of the requisites for exemption are present, the offender shall
be given only the benefit of ordinary mitigating circumstances. That means the penalty shall be
reduced to the minimum period of the prescribed penalty, unless the mitigating circumstance is
offset by an aggravating circumstance.
(i) Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. No. 9344); also refer to Child
and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603, as amended)
(g) Offenses not applicable to children under Sec. 58 of R.A. No. 9344
c) Mitigating circumstances
(2) As to effect - Ordinary mitigating circumstances, if not offset, will operate to reduce
the penalty to the minimum period, provided the penalty is a divisible one. Privilege mitigating
circumstances operate to reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, depending upon what the
law provides.
You can easily detect whether the circumstance which mitigates the liability of the
offender is privilege or not, that is, if the penalty is reduced by degree. If the penalty is lowered
by one or two degrees, it is privilege; therefore, even if there is an aggravating circumstance, do
not compensate because that would be violating the rules.
Correlate Article 13 with Articles 63 and 64. Article 13 is meaningless without knowing
the rules of imposing the penalties under Articles 63 and 64.
In bar problems, when you are given indeterminate sentences, these articles are very
important. When the circumstance which mitigates criminal liability is privileged, you give effect
to it above all considerations. In other words, before you go into any circumstance, lower first
the penalty to the proper degree. That is precisely why this circumstance is considered
privileged. It takes preference over all other circumstances.
Sufficient threat or provocation - This is mitigating only if the crime was committed on
the very person who made the threat or provocation. The common set-up given in a bar
problem is that of provocation was given by somebody. The person provoked cannot retaliate
against him; thus, the person provoked retaliated on a younger brother or on an elder father.
Although in fact, there is sufficient provocation, it is not mitigating because the one who gives
the provocation is not the one against whom the crime was committed.
Vindication of a grave offense - The word “offense” should not be taken as a crime. It is
enough if what was imputed or what was done was wrong. In considering whether the wrong is
a grave one upon the person who committed the crime, his age, education and social status will
be considered.
Here, in vindication of a grave offense, the vindication need not be done by the person
upon whom the grave offense was committed. So, unlike in sufficient threat or provocation
where the crime should be inflicted upon the very person who made the threat or provocation,
here, it need not be the same person who committed the grave offense or who was offended by
the wrong done by the offended party.
The word “immediate” here does not carry the same meaning as that under paragraph
4. The word “immediate” here is an erroneous Spanish translation because the Spanish word is
“proxima” and not “immediatementa.” Therefore, it is enough that the offender committed the
crime with the grave offense done to him, his spouse, his ascendant or descendant or to his
brother or sister, whether natural, adopted or legitimate and that is the proximate cause of the
commission of the crime.
Passion or obfuscation - This stands on the premise or proposition that the offender is
suffering from a diminished self control because of the passion or obfuscation. The same is true
with the circumstances under paragraphs 4 and 5. So, there is a ruling to the effect that if the
offender is given the benefit of paragraph 4, he cannot be given the benefit of paragraph 5 or 6,
or vice-versa. Only one of the three mitigating circumstances should be given in favor of the
offender.
However, in one case, one of the mitigating circumstances under paragraphs 4, 5 and 6
stands or arises from a set of facts, and another mitigating circumstance arises from another set
of facts. Since they are predicated on different set of facts, they may be appreciated together,
although they arose from one and the same case. Hence, the prohibition against considering all
these mitigating circumstances together and not as one applies only if they would be taken on
the basis of the same set of facts.
If the case involves a series of facts, then you can predicate any one of these
circumstances on one fact and the other on another fact and so on.
In a case where the relationship between the accused and the woman he was living with
was one of common law, he came home and surprised his common law wife having sexual
intercourse with a friend. This infuriated him. He killed the friend and he claimed passion or
obfuscation. The trial court denied his claim because the relationship was a common law one.
On review, the accused was given the benefit of the circumstances and the basis of
considering passion or obfuscation in favor of the accused was the act of the common law wife
in committing adultery right from the conjugal bed. Whether or not they are married, any man
who discovers that infidelity was committed on the very bed provided by him to the woman
would naturally be subjected to obfuscation.
When a married person surprised his better half in the act of sexual intercourse with
another, he gets the benefit of Article 247. However, that requisite which in the first place, the
offender must have surprised his/her spouse actually committing sexual intercourse should be
present. If the surprising was done not in the actual act of sexual intercourse but before or after
it, then Article 247 does not apply.
Although this is the ruling, still, the accused will be given the benefit of sufficient
provocation if the intercourse was done in his dwelling. If this act was done somewhere else and
the accused kills the paramour or the spouse, this may be considered as mitigation of a grave
offense to him or otherwise as a situation sufficient to create passion or obfuscation. Therefore,
when a married man upon coming home, surprises his wife who was nude and lying with
another man who was also nude, Article 247 does not apply. If he kills them, vindication of a
grave offense will be mitigating in favor of the offender.
Voluntary surrender - The essence of voluntary surrender requires that the offender,
after having committed the crime, had evaded the law enforcers and the law enforcers do not
know of his whereabouts. In short, he continues to elude arrest. If, under this circumstance, the
offender would come out in the open and he gives himself up, his act of doing so will be
considered as indicative of repentance and he also saves the government the time and the
expense of looking for him.
As a general rule, if after committing the crime, the offender did not flee and he went
with the responding law enforcers meekly, voluntary surrender is not applicable.
However, there is a ruling that if after committing the crime, the offender did not flee
and instead waited for the law enforcers to arrive and he surrendered the weapon he used in
killing the victim, the ruling was that voluntary surrender is mitigating. In this case, the offender
had the opportunity to go into hiding, the fact that he did not flee is not voluntary surrender.
However, if he comes out from hiding because he is seriously ill and he went to get
medical treatment, the surrender is not considered as indicative of remorse or repentance. The
surrender here is only done out of convenience to save his own self. Hence, it is not mitigating.
Even if the offender may have gone into hiding, if the law enforcers had already known
where he is hiding and it is just a matter of time before he is flushed out of that place, then even
if the law enforcers do not know exactly where he was hiding and he would come out, this is not
voluntary surrender.
Whether or not a warrant of arrest had been issued against the offender is immaterial
and irrelevant. The criterion is whether or not the offender had gone into hiding or had the
opportunity to go into hiding and the law enforcers do not know of his whereabouts. If he would
give up, his act of surrendering under such circumstance indicates that he is willing to accept the
consequences of the wrong he has done and also thereby saves the government the effort, the
time and the expenses to be incurred in looking for him.
Where the offender went to the municipal building not to own responsibility for the
killing, such fact is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
Although he admitted his participation in the killing, he tried to avoid responsibility by claiming
self-defense which however he was not able to prove. People v. Mindac, decided December 14,
1992.
Physical defect - The physical defect that a person may have must have a relation to the
commission of the crime. In a case where the offender is deaf and dumb, personal property was
entrusted to him and he misappropriated the same. The crime committed was estafa. The fact
that he was deaf and dumb is not mitigating because that does not bear any relation to the
crime committed.
Not any physical defect will affect the crime. It will only do so if it has some relation to
the crime committed. If a person is deaf and dumb and he has been slandered, he cannot talk so
what he did was, he got a piece of wood and struck the fellow on the head. The crime
committed was physical injuries. The Supreme Court held that being a deaf and dumb is
mitigating because the only way is to use his force because he cannot strike back.
If the offender is blind in one eye, as long as his means of action, defense or
communication with others are not restricted, such circumstance is not mitigating. This
circumstance must also have a bearing on the crime committed and must depend on how the
crime was committed.
Analogous cases - The act of the offender of leading the law enforcers to the place
where he buried the instrument of the crime has been considered as equivalent to voluntary
surrender. The act of a thief in leading the authorities to the place where he disposed of the loot
has been considered as analogous or equivalent to voluntary surrender.
d) Aggravating circumstances
(4) Inherent or those that must of necessity accompany the commission of the
crime.
In aggravating circumstances –
In qualifying circumstance –
(1) The circumstance affects the nature of the crime itself such that the
offender shall be liable for a more serious crime. The circumstance is actually an
ingredient of the crime;
In Article 248, in the crime of murder, the law specifically mentions thereunder
several circumstances which are aggravating under Article 14. All of these will
qualify a killing from homicide to murder; however, you understand that only
one is qualifying.
If let us say, the accused was charged with murder. Three of these
circumstances: treachery, evident premeditation and act was done in
consideration of a price, reward or promise were alleged as aggravating. Only
one of these is qualifying. If any one of the three circumstances was proven, the
crime was already murder. If the other two are also proven, even if they are
alleged in the information or complaint, they are only to be taken as generic. If
there is any mitigating circumstance in favor of the offender, the two other
circumstances which are otherwise qualifying could be offset by the mitigating,
provided the mitigating circumstance is not a privileged mitigating
circumstance. Therefore, if there are three of the qualifying circumstances
alleged in the complaint or information, only one will qualify the crime. The
others will merely be considered as generic. Thus, if there is any ordinary
mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, such will be wiped out by these
circumstances, although initially they are considered as qualifying. Do not
hesitate to offset on the principle that a qualifying circumstance cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance because only one is necessary.
Even if any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 on murder was
proven, if that is not the circumstance alleged in the information, it cannot
qualify the crime. Let us say, what was alleged in the information was treachery.
During the trial, what was proven was the price, reward or promise as a
consideration for killing. The treachery was not proved. Just the same, the
accused cannot be convicted of murder because the circumstance proven is not
qualifying but merely generic. It is generic because it is not alleged in the
information at all. If any of these qualifying circumstances is not alleged in the
information, it cannot be considered qualifying because a qualifying is an
ingredient of the crime and it cannot be taken as such without having alleged in
the information because it will violate the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him.
Correlate Article 14 with Article 62. Article 62 gives you the different rules
regarding aggravating circumstances. Aggravating circumstances will not be
considered when it is the crime itself. If the crime charged is qualified trespass
to dwelling, dwelling is no longer aggravating. When the aggravating
circumstance refers to the material execution of the crime, like treachery, it will
only aggravate the criminal liability of those who employed the same.
(i) Generic
Disrespect due to rank, age, sex - Aggravating only in crimes against persons
and honor, not against property like Robbery with homicide (People v. Ga, 156 SCRA
790).
Abuse of confidence - Do not confuse this with mere betrayal of trust. This is
aggravating only when the very offended party is the one who reposed the confidence.
If the confidence is reposed by another, the offended party isdifferent from the fellow
who reposed the confidence and abuse of confidence in this case is not aggravating.
Band - there should at least be four persons. All of them should be armed. Even
if there are four, but only three or less are armed, it is not a band. Whenever you talk of
band, always have in mind four at least. Do not say three or more because it is four or
more. The way the law defines a band is somewhat confusing because it refers simply to
more than 3, when actually it should be 4 or more.
Correlate this with Article 306 - Brigandage. The crime is the band itself. The
mere forming of a band even without the commission of a crime is already a crime so
that band is not aggravating in brigandage because the band itself is the way to commit
brigandage.
Nighttime - What if the crime started during the daytime and continued all the
way to nighttime? This is not aggravating. As a rule, the crime must begin and end
during the nighttime. Crime began at day and ended at night, as well as crime began at
night and ended at day is not aggravated by the circumstance of nighttime. Darkness is
what makes this circumstance aggravating.
Recidivism
Habitual Delinquency
Reiteracion
Quasi-recidivism
(1) The time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(2) An act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination;
(3) Sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution, to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Motor vehicle - The Supreme Court considers strictly the use of the word
“committed”, that the crime is committed with the use of a motor vehicle,
motorized means of transportation or motorized watercraft. There is a decision
by the Court of Appeals that a motorized bicycle is a motor vehicle even if the
offender used only the foot pedal because he does not know how to operate
the motor so if a bicycle is used in the commission of the crime, motor vehicle
becomes aggravating if the bicycle is motorized.
(ii) Qualifying
(a) Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,
Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition, of Firearms, Ammunition
or Explosives (P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294) as an aggravating
circumstance
(b) The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165)
f) Absolutory cause
The effect of this is to absolve the offender from criminal liability, although not
from civil liability. It has the same effect as an exempting circumstance, but you do not call it as
such in order not to confuse it with the circumstances under Article 12.
Article 20 provides that the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed
upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate,
natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with
the exception of accessories who profited themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.
Death of the convict as to the personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished if death occurs before final judgment; Service of the sentence;
Amnesty;
Absolute pardon;
Under Article 247, a legally married person who kills or inflicts physical injuries upon his
or her spouse whom he surprised having sexual intercourse with his or her paramour or mistress
in not criminally liable.
Under Article 219, discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence of the ward by
their guardian is not penalized.
Under Article 332, in the case of theft, swindling and malicious mischief, there is no
criminal liability but only civil liability, when the offender and the offended party are related as
spouse, ascendant, descendant, brother and sister-in-law living together or where in case the
widowed spouse and the property involved is that of the deceased spouse, before such property
had passed on to the possession of third parties.
Under Article 344, in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the
marriage of the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action.
Absolutory cause has the effect of an exempting circumstance and they are predicated
on lack of voluntariness like instigation. Instigation is associated with criminal intent. Do not
consider culpa in connection with instigation. If the crime is culpable, do not talk of instigation.
In instigation, the crime is committed with dolo. It is confused with entrapment. Entrapment is
not an absolutory cause. Entrapment does not exempt the offender or mitigate his criminal
liability. But instigation absolves the offender from criminal liability because in instigation, the
offender simply acts as a tool of the law enforcers and, therefore, he is acting without criminal
intent because without the instigation, he would not have done the criminal act which he did
upon instigation of the law enforcers.
Under the Revised Penal Code, when more than one person participated in the commission of the crime, the law looks into their
participation because in punishing offenders, the Revised Penal Code classifies them as:
(1) principal;
(2) accomplice; or
(3) accessory.
This classification is true only under the Revised Penal Code and is not used under special laws, because the penalties under the
latter are never graduated. Do not use the term principal when the crime committed is a violation of special law. Only use the term
“offender.” Also only classify offenders when more than one took part in the commission of the crime to determine the proper penalty
to be imposed. So, if only one person committed a crime, do not use principal. Use the “offenders,” “culprits,” or the “accused.”
When a problem is encountered where there are several participants in the crime, the first thing to find out is if there is a conspiracy.
If there is, as a general rule, the criminal liability of all will be the same, because the act of one is the act of all. However, if the
participation of one is so insignificant, such that even without his cooperation, the crime would be committed just as well, then
notwithstanding the existence of a conspiracy, such offender will be regarded only as an accomplice. The reason for this ruling is that
the law favors a milder form of criminal liability if the act of the participant does not demonstrate a clear perversity. As to the
liability of the participants in a felony, the Code takes into consideration whether the felony committed is grave, less grave, or light.
When the felony is grave, or less grave, all participants are criminally liable. But where the felony is only light only the principal
and the accomplice are liable. The accessory is not. But even the principal and the accomplice will not be liable if the felony
committed is only light and the same is not consummated unless such felony is against persons or property. If they are not and the
same is not consummated, even the principal and the accomplice are not liable. Therefore it is only when the light felony is against
person or property that criminal liability attaches to the principal or accomplice, even though the felony is only attempted or
frustrated, but accessories are not liable for liable for light felonies.
Principal by indispensable cooperation distinguished from an accomplice
It is not just a matter of cooperation, it is more than if the crime could hardly be committed. It is not that the crime would not be
committed because if that is what you would imply it becomes an ingredient of the crime and that is not what the law contemplates.
In the case of rape, where three men were accused, one was on top of the woman, one held the hands, one held the legs, the Supreme
Court ruled that all participants are principals. Those who held the legs and arms are principals by indispensable cooperation. The
accused are father and son. The father told his son that the only way to convince the victim to marry him is to resort to rape. So
when they saw the opportunity the young man grabbed the woman, threw her on the ground and placed himself on top of her while
the father held both legs of the woman and spread them. The Supreme Court ruled that the father is liable only as an accomplice.
The point is not just on participation but on the importance of participation in committing the crime. In the first situation, the facts
indicate that if the fellow who held the legs of the victim and spread them did not do so, the offender on top could hardly penetrate
because the woman was strong enough to move or resist. In the second situation, the son was much bigger than the woman so
considering the strength of the son and the victim, penetration is possible even without the assistance of the father. The son was a
robust farm boy and the victim undernourished. The act of the father in holding the legs of the victim merely facilitated the
penetration but even without it the son would have penetrated. The basis is the importance of the cooperation to the consummation
of the crime. If the crime could hardly be committed without such cooperation, then such cooperation would bring about a principal.
But if the cooperation merely facilitated or hastened the consummation of the crime, this would make the cooperator merely an
accomplice. In a case where the offender was running after the victim with a knife. Another fellow came and blocked the way of the
victim and because of this, the one chasing the victim caught up and stabbed the latter at the back. It was held that the fellow who
blocked the victim is a principal by indispensable cooperation because if he did not block the way of the victim, the offender could
not have caught up with the latter. In another case, A was mauling B. C, a friend of B tried to approach but D stopped C so that A
was able to continuously maul B. The liability of the fellow who stopped the friend from approaching is as an accomplice.
Understandably he did not cooperate in the mauling, he only stopped to other fellow from stopping the mauling. In case of doubt,
favor the lesser penalty or liability. Apply the doctrine of pro reo.
Principal by inducement
Concept of the inducement – one strong enough that the person induced could hardly resist. This is tantamount to an irresistible
force compelling the person induced to carry out the execution of the crime. Ill advised language is not enough unless he who made
such remark or advice is a coconspirator in the crime committed. While in the course of a quarrel, a person shouted to A, “Kill him!
Kill him.” A killed the other fellow. Is the person who shouted criminally liable. Is that inducement? No. It must be strong as
irresistible force.
There was a quarrel between two families. One of the sons of family A came out with a shotgun. His mother then shouted, “Shoot!”.
He shot and killed someone. Is the mother liable? No. Examples of inducement: “I will give you a large amount of money.” “I will
not marry you if you do not kill B”(let us say he really loves the inducer). They practically become co-conspirators. Therefore you do
not look into the degree of inducement anymore.
In People v. Balderrama, Ernesto shouted to his younger brother Oscar, “Birahin mo na, birahin mo na.” Oscar stabbed the
victim. It was held that there was no conspiracy. Joint or simultaneous action per se is not indicia of conspiracy without showing of
common design. Oscar has no rancor with the victim for him to kill the latter. Considering that Ernesto had great moral ascendancy
and influence over Oscar being much older, 35 years old, than the latter, who was 18 yrs old, and it was Ernesto who provided his
allowance, clothing as well as food and shelter, Ernesto is principal by inducement.
In People v. Agapinay, 186 SCRA 812, the one who uttered “Kill him, we will bury him,” while the felonious aggression was
taking place cannot be held liable as principal by inducement. Utterance was said in the excitement of the hour, not a command to
be obeyed.
In People v. Madali, 188 SCRA 69, the son was mauled. The family was not in good graces of the neighborhood. Father
challenged everybody and when neighbors approached, he went home to get a rifle. The shouts of his wife “Here comes another, shoot
him” cannot make the wife the principal by inducement. It is not the determining cause of the crime in the absence of proof that the
words had
great dominance and influence over the husband. Neither is the wife’s act of beaming the victim with a flashlight indispensable to
the commission of the killing. She assisted her husband in taking good aim, but such assistance merely facilitated the felonious act of
shooting. Considering that it was not so dark and the husband could have accomplished the deed without his wife’s help, and
considering further that doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused, the liability of the wife is only that of an accomplice.
Accessories
Two situations where accessories are not criminally liable:
(1) When the felony committed is a light felony;
(2) When the accessory is related to the principal as spouse, or as an ascendant, or descendant or as brother or sister whether
legitimate, natural or adopted or where the accessory is a relative by affinity within the same degree, unless the accessory himself
profited from the effects or proceeds of the crime or assisted the offender to profit therefrom.
One cannot be an accessory unless he knew of the commission of the crime. One must not have participated in the commission of the
crime. The accessory comes into the picture when the crime is already consummated. Anyone who participated before the
consummation of the crime is either a principal or an accomplice. He cannot be an accessory. When an offender has already involved
himself as a principal or accomplice, he cannot be an accessory any further even though he performs acts pertaining to an accessory.
Accessory as a fence
The Revised Penal Code defines what manners of participation shall render an offender liable as an accessory. Among the
enumeration is “by profiting themselves or by assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime”. So the accessory shall be
liable for the same felony committed by the principal. However, where the crime committed by the principal was robbery or theft,
such participation of an accessory brings about criminal liability under Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law).
One who knowingly profits or assists the principal to profit by the effects of robbery or theft is not just an accessory to the crime, but
principally liable for fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612. Any person who, with intent to gain, acquires and/or sell,
possesses, keeps or in any manner deals with any article of value which he knows or should be known to him to be the proceeds of
robbery or theft is considered a “fence” and incurs criminal liability for “fencing” under said decree. The penalty is higher than that
of a mere accessory to the crime of robbery or theft. Likewise, the participation of one who conceals the effects of robbery or theft gives
rise to criminal liability for “fencing”, not simply of an accessory under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Code. Mere possession of
any article of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft brings about the presumption of “fencing”.
Presidential Decree No. 1612 has, therefore, modified Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed
them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. Although Republic Act No. 7659, in amending Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, incorporated therein the crime of piracy in Philippine territorial waters and thus correspondingly superseding Presidential
Decree No. 532, Section 4 of the Decree which punishes said acts as a crime of abetting piracy or brigandage, still stands as it has
not been repealed nor modified, and is not inconsistent with any provision of Republic Act No. 7659.
On the other hand, in case of a civilian, the mere fact that he harbored concealed or assisted the
principal to escape does not ipso facto make him an accessory. The law requires that the principal must have committed the crime of
treason, parricide, murder or attempt on the life of the Chief Executive. If this is not the crime, the civilian does not become an
accessory unless the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Even if the crime committed by the principal is
treason, or murder or parricide or attempt on the life of the Chief Executive, the accessory cannot be held criminally liable without
the principal being found guilty of any such crime. Otherwise the effect would be that the accessory merely harbored or assisted in
the escape of an innocent man, if the principal is acquitted of the charges.
a) Decree Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders (P.D. 1829)
(ii) Compare with Art. 20, RPC (accessories exempt from criminal liability)
5. Penalties
Why does the Revised Penal Code specify that such detention shall not be a penalty but merely a preventive measure?
This article gives justification for detaining the accused. Otherwise, the detention would violate the constitutional provision that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. And also, the constitutional right of an accused to
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
Repeal of Article 80
When may a minor be committed to a reformatory?
If the minor is between 9 - 15 years old and acted with discernment, sentence must first be suspended under the following conditions:
(1) Crime committed is not punishable by death or reclusion perpetua;
(2) He is availing of the benefit of suspension for the first time;
(3) He must still be a minor at the time of promulgation of the sentence.
Under Article 24, preventive imprisonment of an accused who is not yet convicted, but by express provision of Article24 is not a
penalty. Yet Article 29, if ultimately the accused is convicted and the penalty imposed involves deprivation of liberty, provides that
the period during which he had undergone preventive detention will be deducted from the sentence, unless he is one of those
disqualified under the law.
So, if the accused has actually undergone preventive imprisonment, but if he has been convicted for two or more crimes whether he is
a recidivist or not, or when he has been previously summoned but failed to surrender and so the court has to issue a warrant for his
arrest, whatever credit he is entitled to shall be forfeited. If the offender is not disqualified from the credit or deduction provided for
in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, then the next thing to determine is whether he signed an undertaking to abide by the same
rules and regulations governing convicts. If he signed an undertaking to abide by the same rules and regulations governing convicts,
then it means that while he is suffering from preventive imprisonment, he is suffering like a convict, that is why the credit is full.
But if the offender did not sign an undertaking, then he will only be subjected to the rules and regulations governing detention
prisoners. As such, he will only be given 80% or 4/5 of the period of his preventive detention.
From this provision, one can see that the detention of the offender may subject him only to the treatment applicable to a detention
prisoner or to the treatment applicable to convicts, but since he is not convicted yet, while he is under preventive imprisonment, he
cannot be subjected to the treatment applicable to convicts unless he signs and agrees to be subjected to such disciplinary measures
applicable to convicts. Detention prisoner has more freedom within the detention institution rather than those already convicted. The
convicted prisoner suffers more restraints and hardship than detention prisoners.
Under what circumstances may a detention prisoner be released, even though the proceedings against him are not yet terminated? on
September 20, 1980. This amendment is found in the Rules of Court, under the rules on bail in Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the same treatment exactly is applied there. In the amendment, the law does not speak of credit. Whether the person is
entitled to credit is immaterial. The discharge of the offender from preventive imprisonment or detention is predicated on the fact
that even if he would be found guilty of the crime charged, he has practically served the sentence already, because he has been
detained for a period already equal to if not greater than the maximum penalty that would be possibly be imposed on him if found
guilty. If the crime committed is punishable only by destierro, the most the offender may be held under preventive imprisonment is 30
days, and whether the proceedings are terminated or not, such detention prisoner shall be discharged. Understand the amendment
made to Article 29. This amendment has been incorporated under Rule 114 precisely to do away with arbitrary detention. Proper
petition for habeas corpus must be filed to challenge the legality of the detention of the prisoner.
a) Classification
The classification of principal and accessory is found in Article 25. In classifying the penalties as principal and accessory, what is
meant by this is that those penalties classified as accessory penalties need not be stated in the sentence. The accessory penalties follow
the principal penalty imposed for the crime as a matter of course. So in the imposition of the sentence, the court will specify only the
principal penalty but that is not the only penalty which the offender will suffer. Penalties which the law considers as accessory to the
prescribed penalty are automatically imposed even though they are not stated in the judgment. As to the particular penalties that
follow a particular principal penalty, Articles 40 to 45 of the Revised Penal Code shall govern. If asked what are the accessory
penalties, do not just state the accessory penalties. State the principal penalty and the corresponding accessory penalties.
Penalties in which other accessory penalties are inherent:
(1) Article 40. Death - perpetual absolute disqualification, and civil interdiction during 30 years following date of sentence;
(2) Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal - civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case
may be, and perpetual absolute disqualification;
(3) Article 42. Prision mayor - temporary absolute disqualification perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage;
(4) Article 43. Prision correccional - suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and perpetual
special disqualification from the rights of suffrage if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed 18 months.
(5) Article 44. Arresto - suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the sentence.
There are accessory penalties which are true to other principal penalties. An example is the penalty of civil interdiction. This is an
accessory penalty and, as provided in Article 34, a convict sentenced to civil interdiction suffers certain disqualification during the
term of the sentence. One of the disqualifications is that of making a conveyance of his property inter vivos.
Reclusion perpetua
What is the duration of reclusion perpetua?
Do not answer Article 27 to this question. The proper answer would be that reclusion perpetua has no duration because this is an
indivisible penalty and indivisible penalties have no durations. Under Article 27, those sentenced to reclusion perpetua shall be
pardoned after undergoing the penalty for 30 years, unless such person, by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, shall be
considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon. Under Article 70, which is the Three-Fold Rule, the maximum period shall
in no case exceed 40 years. If a convict who is to serve several sentences could only be made to serve 40 years, with more reason, one
who is sentenced to a singly penalty of reclusion perpetua should not be held for more than 40 years. The duration of 40 years is not
a matter of provision of law; this is only by analogy. There is no provision of the Revised Penal Code that one sentenced to reclusion
perpetua cannot be held in jail for 40 years and neither is there a decision to this effect.
Destierro
What is the duration of destierro?
The duration of destierro is from six months and one day, to six year, which is the same as that of prision correcional and suspension.
Destierro is a principal penalty. It is a punishment whereby a convict is vanished to a certan place and is prohibited form entering or
coming near that place designated in the sentence, not less than 25 Kms.. However, the court cannot extend beyond 250 Kms. If the
convict should enter the prohibited places, he commits the crime of evasion of service of court, there is no evasion of sentence because
the 240-Km. limit is upon the authority of the court in vanishing the convict.
Under the Revised Penal Code, destierro is the penalty imposed in the following situations:
(1) When a legally married person who had surprised his or her spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another and while in
that act or immediately thereafter should kill or inflict serious physical injuries upon the other spouse, and/or the paramour or
mistress. This is found in Article 247.
(2) In the crime of grave threat or light threat, when the offender is required to put up a bond for good behavior but failed or refused
to do so under Article 284, such convict shall be sentenced to destierro so that he would not be able to carry out his threat.
(3) In the crime of concubinage, the penalty prescribed for the concubine is destierro under Article 334.
(4) Where the penalty prescribed by law is arresto mayor, but the offender is entitled privileged mitigating circumstance and
lowering the prescribed penalty by one degree, the penalty one degree lower is destierro. Thus, it shall be the one imposed.
Civil Interdiction
Civil interdiction is an accessory penalty. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence:
(1) The rights of parental authority, or guardianship either as to the person or property of any ward;
(2) Marital authority;
(3) The right to manage his property; and
(4) The right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
c) Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. No. 4103, as amended)
Indeterminate Sentence Law governs whether the crime is punishable under the Revised Penal Code or a special Law. It is not limited
to violations of the Revised Penal Code. It applies only when the penalty served is imprisonment. If not by imprisonment, then it does
not apply.
The purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence law is to avoid prolonged imprisonment, because it is proven to be more destructive than
constructive to the offender. So, the purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in shortening the possible detention of the convict in
jail is to save valuable human resources. In other words, if the valuable human resources were allowed prolonged confinement in jail,
they would deteriorate. Purpose is to preserve economic usefulness for these people for having committed a crime -- to reform them
rather than to deteriorate them and, at the same time, saving the government expenses of maintaining the convicts on a prolonged
confinement in jail. If the crime is a violation of the Revised Penal Code, the court will impose a sentence that has a minimum and
maximum. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence will be arrived at by taking into account the attendant mitigating and/or
aggravating circumstances according to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. In arriving at the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence, the court will take into account the penalty prescribed for the crime and go one degree lower. Within the range of one
degree lower, the court will fix the minimum for the indeterminate sentence, and within the range of the penalty arrived at as the
maximum in the indeterminate sentence, the court will fix the maximum of the sentence. If there is a privilege mitigating
circumstance which has been taken in consideration in fixing the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, the minimum shall be
based on the penalty as reduced by the privilege mitigating circumstance within the range of the penalty next lower in degree. If the
crime is a violation of a special law, in fixing the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, the court will impose the penalty within
the range of the penalty prescribed by the special law, as long as it will not exceed the limit of the penalty. In fixing the minimum,
the court can fix a penalty anywhere within the range of penalty prescribed by the special law, as long as it will not be less than the
minimum limit of the penalty under said law. No mitigating and aggravating circumstances are taken into account.
The minimum and the maximum referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Law are not periods. So, do not say, maximum or
minimum period. For the purposes of the indeterminate Sentence Law, use the term minimum to refer to the duration of the sentence
which the convict shall serve as a minimum, and when we say maximum, for purposes of ISLAW, we refer to the maximum limit of
the duration that the convict may be held in jail. We are not referring to any period of the penalty as enumerated in Article 71.
Courts are required to fix a minimum and a maximum of the sentence that they are to impose upon an offender when found guilty of
the crime charged. So, whenever the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable, there is always a minimum and maximum of the
sentence that the convict shall serve. If the crime is punished by the Revised Penal Code, the law provides that the maximum shall be
arrived at by considering the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime according to the proper rules
of the Revised Penal Code. To fix the maximum, consider the mitigating and aggravating circumstances according to the rules found
in Article 64. This means –
(1) Penalties prescribed by the law for the crime committed shall be imposed in the medium period if no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance;
(2) If there is aggravating circumstance, no mitigating, penalty shall be imposed in the maximum;
(3) If there is mitigating circumstance, no aggravating, penalty shall be in the minimum;
(4) If there are several mitigating and aggravating circumstances, they shall offset against each other. Whatever remains, apply the
rules.
(5) If there are two or more mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, penalty next lower in degree shall be the one
imposed.
Rule under Art 64 shall apply in determining the maximum but not in determining the minimum. In determining the applicable
penalty according to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there is no need to mention the number of years, months and days; it is
enough that the name of the penalty is mentioned while the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied. To fix the minimum and the
maximum of the sentence, penalty under the Revised Penal Code is not the penalty to be imposed by court because the court must
apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The attendant mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime
are taken into consideration only when the maximum of the penalty is to be fixed. But in so far as the minimum is concerned, the
basis of the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, and go one degree lower than that. But penalty one degree lower shall be
applied in the same manner that the maximum is also fixed based only on ordinary mitigating circumstances. This is true only if the
mitigating circumstance taken into account is only an ordinary mitigating circumstance. If the mitigating circumstance is privileged,
you cannot follow the law in so far as fixing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is concerned; otherwise, it may happen that
the maximum of the indeterminate sentence is lower than its minimum.
In one Supreme Court ruling, it was held that for purposes of applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code and not that which may be imposed by court. This ruling, however, is obviously erroneous. This is so because
such an interpretation runs contrary to the rule of pro reo, which provides that the penal laws should always be construed an applied
in a manner liberal or lenient to the offender. Therefore, the rule is, in applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it is that penalty
arrived at by the court after applying the mitigating and aggravating circumstances that should be the basis.
Crimes punished under special law carry only one penalty; there are no degree or periods. Moreover, crimes under special law do not
consider mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the crime. So in the case of statutory offense, no
mitigating and no aggravating circumstances will be taken into account. Just the same, courts are required in imposing the penalty
upon the offender to fix a minimum that the convict should serve, and to set a maximum as the limit of that sentence. Under the
law, when the crime is punished under a special law, the court may fix any penalty as the maximum without exceeding the penalty
prescribed by special law for the crime committed. In the same manner, courts are given discretion to fix a minimum anywhere within
the range of the penalty prescribed by special law, as long as it will not be lower than the penalty prescribed.
Although the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is death or reclusion perpetua, if after considering the attendant
circumstances, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal or less, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies (People v. Cempron, 187
SCRA 278).
Under this rule, when a convict is to serve successive penalties, he will not actually serve the penalties imposed by law. Instead, the
most severe of the penalties imposed on him shall be multiplied by three and the period will be the only term of the penalty to be
served by him. However, in no case should the penalty exceed 40 years. This rule is intended for the benefit of the convict and so,
you will only apply this provided the sum total of all the penalties imposed would be greater than the product of the most severe
penalty multiplied by three but in no case will the penalties to be served by the convict be more than 40 years.
Although this rule is known as the Three-Fold rule, you cannot actually apply this if the convict is to serve only three successive
penalties. The Three-Fold Rule can only be applied if the convict is to serve four or more sentences successively. If the sentences
would be served simultaneously, the Three-Fold rule does not govern. The chronology of the penalties as provided in Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code shall be followed. It is in the service of the penalty, not in the imposition of the penalty, that the Three-Fold
rule is to be applied. The three-Fold rule will apply whether the sentences are the product of one information in one court, whether
the sentences are promulgated in one day or whether the sentences are promulgated by different courts on different days. What is
material is that the convict shall serve more than three successive sentences.
For purposes of the Three-Fold Rule, even perpetual penalties are taken into account. So not only penalties with fixed duration, even
penalties without any fixed duration or indivisible penalties are taken into account. For purposes of the Three-Fold rule, indivisible
penalties are given equivalent of 30 years. If the penalty is perpetual disqualification, it will be given and equivalent duration of
30 years, so that if he will have to suffer several perpetual disqualification, under the Three-Fold rule, you take the most severe and
multiply it by three. The Three-Fold rule does not apply to the penalty prescribed but to the penalty imposed as determined by the
court.
e.) Subsidiary imprisonment
Among the different grounds of partial extinction of criminal liability, the most important is probation. Probation is a manner of
disposing of an accused who have been convicted by a trial court by placing him under supervision of a probation officer, under such
terms and conditions that the court may fix.This may be availed of before the convict begins serving sentence by final judgment and
provided that he did not appeal anymore from conviction. Without regard to the nature of the crime, only those whose penalty does
not exceed six years of imprisonment are those qualified for probation. If the penalty is six years plus one day, he is no longer
qualified for probation.
If the offender was convicted of several offenses which were tried jointly and one decision was rendered where multiple sentences
imposed several prison terms as penalty, the basis for determining whether the penalty disqualifies the offender from probation or not
is the term of the individual imprisonment and not the totality of all the prison terms imposed in the decision. So even if the prison
term would sum up to more than six years, if none of the individual penalties exceeds six years, the offender is not disqualified by
such penalty from applying for probation. On the other hand, without regard to the penalty, those who are convicted of subversion
or any crime against the public order are not qualified for probation. So know the crimes under Title III, Book 2 of the Revised Penal
Code. Among these crimes is Alarms and Scandals, the penalty of which is only arresto menor or a fine. Under the amendment to the
Probation Law, those convicted of a crime against public order regardless of the penalty are not qualified for probation.
Although a person may be eligible for probation, the moment he perfects an appeal from the judgment of conviction, he cannot avail
of probation anymore. So the benefit of probation must be invoked at the earliest instance after conviction. He should not wait up to
the time when he interposes an appeal or the sentence has become final and executory. The idea is that probation has to be invoked
at the earliest opportunity. An application for probation is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the trial court that renders the
judgment. For the offender to apply in such court, he should not appeal such judgment. Once he appeals, regardless of the purpose of
the appeal, he will be disqualified from applying for Probation, even though he may thereafter withdraw his appeal.
If the offender would appeal the conviction of the trial court and the appellate court reduced the penalty to say, less than six years,
that convict can still file an application for probation, because the earliest opportunity for him to avail of probation came only after
judgment by the appellate court. Whether a convict who is otherwise qualified for probation may be give the benefit of probation or
not, the courts are always required to conduct a hearing. If the court denied the application for probation without the benefit of the
hearing, where as the applicant is not disqualified under the provision of the Probation Law, but only based on the report of the
probation officer, the denial is correctible by certiorari, because it is an act of the court in excess of jurisdiction or without
jurisdiction, the order denying the application therefore is null and void.
Probation is intended to promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment; to
provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence;
to prevent the commission of offenses; to decongest our jails; and to save the government much needed finance for maintaining
convicts in jail Probation is only a privilege. So even if the offender may not be disqualified of probation, yet the court believes that
because of the crime committed it was not advisable to give probation because it would depreciate the effect of the crime, the court
may refuse or deny an application for probation. Generally, the courts do not grant an application for probation for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Law, because of the prevalence of the crime. So it is not along the purpose of probation to grant the convict the
benefit thereof, just the individual rehabilitation of the offender but also the best interest of the society and the community where the
convict would be staying, if he would be released on probation. To allow him loose may bring about a lack of respect of the members
of the community to the enforcement of penal law. In such a case, the court even if the crime is probationable may still deny the
benefit of probation. Consider not only the probationable crime, but also the probationable penalty. If it were the nonprobationable
crime, then regardless of the penalty, the convict cannot avail of probation. Generally, the penalty which is not probationable is any
penalty exceeding six years of imprisonment. Offenses which are not probationable are those against natural security, those against
public order and those with reference to subversion.
Persons who have been granted of the benefit of probation cannot avail thereof for the second time. Probation is only available once
and this may be availed only where the convict starts serving sentence and provided he has not perfected an appeal. If the convict
perfected an appeal, he forfeits his right to apply for probation. As far as offenders who are under preventive imprisonment, that
because a crime committed is not bailable or the crime committed, although bailable, they cannot afford to put up a bail, upon
promulgation of the sentence, naturally he goes back to detention, that does not mean that they already start serving the sentence
even after promulgation of the sentence, sentence will only become final and executory after the lapse of the 15-day period, unless
the convict has waived expressly his right to appeal or otherwise, he has partly started serving sentence and in that case, the penalty
will already be final and exeuctory, no right to probation can be applied for.
Mandatory conditions:
(1) The convict must report to the Probation Officer (PO) designated in the court order approving his application for Probation
within 72 hours from receipt of Notice of such order approving his application; and
(2) The convict, as a probationer, must report to the PO at least once a month during the period of probation unless sooner required
by the PO.
These conditions being mandatory, the moment any of these is violate, the probation is cancelled.
Discretionary conditions:
The trial court which approved the application for probation may impose any condition which may be constructive to the correction
of the offender, provided the same would not violate the constitutional rights of the offender and subject to this two restrictions: (1)
the conditions imposed should not be unduly restrictive of the probationer; and (2) such condition should not be incompatible with
the freedom of conscience of the probationer
6. Modification and extinction of criminal liability
Prescription of the crime begins, as a general rule on the day the crime was committed, unless the crime was concealed, not public, in
which case, the prescription thereof would only commence from the time the offended party or the government learns of the
commission of the crime. “Commission of the crime is public” -- This does not mean alone that the crime was within public knowledge
or committed in public. offender may not have filed a motion to quash on this ground the trial court, but after conviction and
during the appeal he learned that at the time the case was filed, the crime has already prescribed, such accused can raise the question
of prescription even for the first time on appeal, and the appellate court shall have no jurisdiction to continue, if legally, the crime
has indeed prescribed.
The prevailing rule now is, prescription of the crime is not waivable, the earlier jurisprudence to the contrary had already been
abrogated or overruled. Moreover, for purposes of prescription, the period for filing a complaint or information may not be extended
at all, even though the last day such prescriptive period falls on a holiday or a Sunday. For instance, light felony prescribes in 60
days or two months. If the 60th day falls on a Sunday, the filing of the complaint on the succeeding Monday is already fatal to the
prosecution of the crime because the crime has already prescribed. The rules on Criminal Procedure for purposes of prescription is that
the filing of the complaint even at the public prosecutor’s office suspends the running of the prescriptive period, but not the filing
with the barangay. So the earlier rulings to the contrary are already abrogated by express provision of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
But where the crime is subject to Summary Procedure, the prescription of the crime will be suspended only when the information is
already filed with the trial court. It is not the filing of the complaint, but the filing of the information in the trial which will
suspend the prescription of the crime. On the prescription of the penalty, the period will only commence to run when the convict has
begun to serve the sentence. Actually, the penalty will prescribe from the moment the convict evades the service of the sentence. So if
an accused was convicted in the trial court, and the conviction becomes final and executory, so this fellow was arrested to serve the
sentence, on the way to the penitentiary, the vehicle carrying him collided with another vehicle and overturned, thus enabling the
prisoner to escape, no matter how long such convict has been a fugitive from justice, the penalty imposed by the trial court will never
prescribe because he has not yet commenced the service of his sentence. For the penalty to prescribe, he must be brought to
Muntinlupa, booked there, placed inside the cell and thereafter he escapes.
Whether it is prescription of crime or prescription of penalty, if the subject could leave the Philippines and go to a country with
whom the Philippines has no extradition treaty, the prescriptive period of the crime or penalty shall remain suspended whenever he is
out of the country. When the offender leaves for a country to which the Philippines has an extradition treaty, the running of the
prescriptive period will go on even if the offender leaves Philippine territory for that country. Presently the Philippines has an
extradition treaty with Taiwan, Indonesia, Canada, Australia, USA and Switzerland. So if the offender goes to any of these
countries, the prescriptive period still continues to run. In the case of the prescription of the penalty, the moment the convict commits
another crime while he is fugitive from justice, prescriptive period of the penalty shall be suspended and shall not run in the
meantime. The crime committed does not include the initial evasion of service of sentence that the convict must perform before the
penalty shall begin to prescribe, so that the initial crime of evasion of service of sentence does not suspend the prescription of penalty,
it is the commission
b) Pardon and Amnesty
The effects of amnesty as well as absolute pardon are not the same. Amnesty erases not only the conviction but also the crime itself.
So that if an offender was convicted for rebellion and he qualified for amnesty, and so he was given an amnesty, then years later he
rebelled again and convicted, is he a recidivist? No. Because the amnesty granted to him erased not only the conviction but also the
effects of the conviction itself.
Suppose, instead of amnesty, what was given was absolute pardon, then years later, the offended was again captured and charged for
rebellion, he was convicted, is he a recidivist? Yes. Pardon, although absolute does not erase the effects of conviction. Pardon only
excuses the convict from serving the sentence. There is an exception to this and that is when the pardon was granted when the convict
had already served the sentence such that there is no more service of sentence to be executed then the pardon shall be understood as
intended to erase the effects of the conviction. So if the convict has already served the sentence and in spite of that he was given a
pardon that pardon will cover the effects of the crime and therefore, if he will be subsequently convicted for a felony embracing the
same title as that crime, he cannot be considered a recidivist, because the pardon wipes out the effects of the crime. But if he was
serving sentence when he was pardoned, that pardon will not wipe out the effects of the crime, unless the language of the pardon
absolutely relieve the offender of all the effects thereof. Considering that recidivism does not prescribe, no matter how long ago was
the first conviction, he shall still be a recidivist.