NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Kavanaugh, 295 U. S., 56; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S., 555, 79 L. ed., 1593).
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-3708. May 18, 1953.]
ROYAL L. RUTTER, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PLACIDO J. ESTEBAN, defendant-appellee.
Susano A. Velasquez for appellant.
Teodoro R. Dominguez for appellee.
SYNOPSIS
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; MORATORIUM; LIMITATIONS
UPON THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. — "Although conceding that the obligations of the mortgage
contract were impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an impairment was,
notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within the police power of the State
as that power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which the legislature had
found to exist." (Home Building & Loan Association vs. Bleisdell, 290 U. S., 398.) But the ruling in the
Bleisdell case has its limitations which should not be overlooked in the determination of the extent to
be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon the enforcement of a monetary
obligation; if these bounds are transgressed, there is no room for the exercise of the power, for the
constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts would assert itself. Here are instances by
which these bounds may be transgressed: (1) The impairment should only refer to the remedy and
not to a substantive right (Worthen Co. vs. Kavanaugh, 79 L. ed., 1298, 1301-1303; Bronson vs. Kinsie,
1 How., 311, 317, 46 Har. Law Review, p. 1070); (2) The protective power of the state, the police
power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be
exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision
against impairment of contracts (First Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith, 27 N. W., pp. 762, 769); (3) "A
different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow . .
." (Worthen vs. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S., 56, 62); (4) The decision in the Bleisdell case is predicated on
the ground that the laws altering existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract
clause of the Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning
their enactment (47 Harvard Law Review, p. 660).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN EXTENSIONS OF PERIOD OF MORATORIUM BECOME
UNREASONABLE. — The obligations covered by Republic Act No. 342 and Executive Orders Nos. 25
and 32 had been pending since 1945 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year
period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in
plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve years before
they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be
commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of
the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are
unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to
pay interest during the operation of the relief. There are at least three cases where the Supreme Court
of the United States declared the moratorium laws violative of the contract clause of the Constitution
because the period granted to debtors as a relief was found unwarranted by the contemplated
emergency (Worthen Co. vs. Thomas, 292 U. S., 426-435, 78 L. ed., 1344, 1347; Worthen vs.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT No. 342 AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS Nos. 25 AND 32 ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — The continued operation and enforcement ofRepublic Act No. 342 at the
present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and,
therefore, the same is declared null and void and without effect. And what is said here with respect
to said Act holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps with greater force and
reason as to the latter, considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time
as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. And there is
need to make this pronouncement in view of the revival clause embodied in said Act if and when it is
declared unconstitutional or invalid.
DECISION
On August 20, 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J. Esteban two parcels of land situated
in the City of Manila for the sum of P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance of
P4,800 was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before
August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum.
To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage over the same parcels
of land has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. The deed of sale having been registered, a new
title was issued in favor of Placido J. Esteban with the mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof.
Placido J. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest
that had accrued thereon, and so on August 2, 1949, Royal L. Rutterinstituted this action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to recover the balance due, the interest due thereon, and the attorney's
fees stipulated in the contract. The complaint also contains a prayer for the sale of the properties
mortgaged in accordance with law.
Placido J. Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint, but set up as a defense the
moratorium clause embodied in Republic Act No. 342. He claims that this is a prewar obligation
contracted on August 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War
Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under
section 2 of said Republic Act No. 342, payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the
lapse of eight years from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine War Damage Commission, and
this period has not yet expired.
After a motion for summary judgment has been presented by the defendant, and the
requisite evidence submitted covering the relevant facts, the court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint holding that the obligation which plaintiff seeks to enforce is not yet demandable under the
moratorium law. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he raised for the first time the
constitutionality of the moratorium law, but the motion was denied. Hence this appeal.
The only question to be determined hinges on the validity of Republic Act No. 342 which
was approved by Congress on July 26, 1948. It is claimed that this act if declared applicable to the
present case is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding the
impairment of the obligation of contracts (Article III, section 1, Constitution of the Philippines).
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that all debts and other monetary obligations
contracted before December 8, 1941, any provision in the contract creating the same or in any
subsequent agreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not be due and
demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the
debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission; and section 3 of said Act provides that should the
provision of section 2 be declared void and unenforceable, then as regards the obligation affected
thereby, the provisions of Executive Order No. 25 dated November 18, 1944, as amended by Executive
Order No. 32, dated March 10, 1945, relative to debt moratorium, shall continue to be in force and
effect, any contract affecting the same to the contrary notwithstanding, until subsequently repealed
or amended by a legislative enactment. It thus clearly appears in said Act that the nullification of its
provisions will have the effect of reviving the previous moratorium orders issued by the President of
the Philippines.
Statutes declaring a moratorium on the enforcement of monetary obligations are not of
recent enactment. These moratorium laws are not new. "For some 1,400 years western civilization
has made use of extraordinary devices for saving the credit structure, devices generally known as
moratoria. The moratorium is a postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state
through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign
power" (58 C. J. S., p. 1208, footnote 87). In the United States, many state legislatures have adopted
moratorium laws "during times of financial distress, especially when incident to, or caused by, a war"
(41 C. J., p. 213). Thus, such laws "were passed by many state legislatures at the time of the civil war
suspending the rights of creditors for a definite and reasonable time, . . . whether they suspend the
right of action or make dilatory the remedy" (12 C. J., p. 1078). These laws were declared
constitutional. However, some courts have also declared that "such statutes are void as to contracts
made before their passage where the suspension of remedies prescribed is indefinite or unreasonable
in duration" (12 C. J., 1078). The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium statute
lies in the determination of the period of suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension
be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.
One of the arguments advanced against the validity of the moratorium law is the fact that
it impairs the obligation of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. This argument, however,
does not now hold water. While this may be conceded, it is however justified as a valid exercise by the
State of its police power. The leading case on the matter is Home Building and Loan
Association vs. Bleisdell, 290 U. S., 398, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January
8, 1934. Here appellant contested the validity of charter 339 of the laws of Minnesota of 1933,
approved April 13, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the
contract clause of the Federal Constitution. The statute was sustained by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota as an emergency measure. "Although conceding that the obligations of the mortgage
contract were impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an impairment was,
notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within the police power of the State
as that power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which the legislature had
found to exist". This theory was upheld by the Supreme Court. Speaking through Chief Justice Hughes,
the court made the following pronouncements:
"Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the measure of
control which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also
continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interest of its people. It does
not matter that legislation appropriate to that end 'has the result of modifying or
abrogating contracts already in effect.' . . . Not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate
of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual
relations are worth while, a government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the
constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had
progressive recognition in the decisions of this court."
xxx xxx xxx
"The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its
continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with
contracts. . . . "
xxx xxx xxx
"Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a
manner otherwise appropriate in the regulation of a business it is no objection
that the performance of existing contracts may be frustrated by the prohibition of
injurious practices. . . . "
" . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts
incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that
end. . . . "
xxx xxx xxx
"Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent
with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved
power cannot be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to
be construed to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must be
construed in harmony with each other. This principle precludes a construction
which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the
destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. But it does not
follow that conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of
enforcement may be consistent with the spirit and purpose of the constitutional
provision and thus be found to be within the range of the reserved power of the
State to protect the vital interests of the community. It cannot be maintained that
the constitutional prohibition should be so construed as to prevent limited and
temporary interpositions with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made
necessary by a great public calamity such as fire, flood, or earthquake. See
American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 55 L. ed. 82, 31 S. Ct. 200. The
reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordinary conditions may be
deemed to be as much a part of all contracts, as is the reservation of state power
to protect the public interest in the other situation to which we have referred. And
if state power exists to give temporary relief from the enforcement of contracts in
the presence of disasters due to physical causes such as fire, flood or earthquake,
that power cannot be said to be nonexistent when the urgent public need
demanding such relief is produced by other and economic causes" (78 L. ed. 426,
428-429.)
This decision elicited several comments. One came from the Harvard Law Review. It said:
"Forsaking its well-trodden path of more than a century, the court sustained the first of the new
mortgage moratory laws to meet its scrutiny, and in so doing announced an elastic concept of the
contract clause which, if not newly formulated, at least received such unequivocal expression that it
bids fair to revolutionize a tradition of constitutional interpretation. . . . The court rested its decision
on the ground that laws altering existing contracts constitute an impairment within the meaning of
the contract clause only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their
enactment. Application of this 'rule of reason' was justified on the theory that all contracts are made
subject to an implied reservation of the protective power of the state, and that therefore statutes
which validly exercise this reserved power, rather than impairing the obligations of an existing
contract, are comprehended within them" (47 Harvard Law Review, pp. 660, 661-662).
But the ruling in the Blaisdell case has its limitations which should not be overlooked in the
determination of the extent to be given to the legislation which attempts to encroach upon the
enforcement of a monetary obligation. It must be noted that the application of the reserved power of
the State to protect the integrity of the government and the security of the people should be limited
to its proper bounds and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose. If these bounds are transgressed,
there is no room for the exercise of the power, for the constitutional inhibition against the impairment
of contracts would assert itself. We can site instances by which these bounds may be transgressed.
One of them is that the impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right.
The State may postpone the enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it by making the
remedy futile (W. B. Worthen Co. vs. Kavanaugh, 79 L. ed. 1298, 1301-1303). Another limitation refers
to the propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the alteration or change that the new legislation
desires to write into an existing contract must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that
would make the remedy hardly pursuing (Bronson vs. Kinziel, I How, 311, 317; 46 Har. Law Review, p.
1070). In other words, the Blaisdell case postulates that the protective power of the State, the police
power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be
exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision
against impairment of contracts (First Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith, 277 N. W., pp. 762, 769). As
Justice Cardozo aptly said, "A different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to
make the remedy a shadow . . . The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be viewed in
combination, with the cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So viewed they are seen to be
an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness and
value to collateral security (W. B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 62). In fine, the decision in the
Blaisdell case is predicated on the ground that the laws altering existing contracts will constitute an
impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the
circumstances occasioning their enactment (47 Harvard Law Review, p. 660).
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act
No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is
a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable
under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar
obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with
the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due
and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the
debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to
rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so
as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since
liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have
suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt
moratorium should be continued in force (section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945
as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still
inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941.
This period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible,
and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at
the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the
credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even
required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States
(Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, supra).
There are at least three cases where the Supreme Court of the United States declared the
moratorium laws violative of the contract clause of the Constitution because the period granted to
debtors as a relief was found unwarranted by the contemplated emergency. One of them is W. B.
Worthen Co. vs. Thomas, 292 U. S., 426-435; 78 L. ed., 1344, 1347. Here the Legislature of Arkansas
passed an act providing for an exemption, "without limitation as to amount or restriction with respect
to particular circumstances or relations, of all monies paid or payable to any resident of the state
under any life, sick, accident or disability insurance policy, from liability for the payment of the debts
of the recipient", and an attempt was made to apply the statute to debts owing before its approval.
The court held that "such an exemption, applied in the case of debts owing before the exemption was
created by the legislature, constitutes an unwarranted interference with the obligation of contracts in
violation of the constitutional provision", and cannot be sustained even as emergency legislation,
because it contains no limitation as to time, amount, circumstances or need (supra, 292 U. S., pp. 426-
432).
The other case is W. B. Worthen vs. Kavanaugh (supra). Here certain Municipal
Improvement Districts organized under the laws of Arkansas were empowered to issue bonds and to
mortgage benefit assessments as security therefor. One of these districts acted upon the powers thus
conferred. Some of the bonds were in default for nonpayment of principal and interest. So an action
was brought by the bond-holders to foreclose the assessments upon the lots of delinquent owners.
These bonds and mortgages were executed under the statutes then in force. Later the legislature of
Arkansas passed three acts making changes in the remedies available under the former statutes, which
changes were attacked as an unconstitutional impairment of contracts. The court sustained this view
holding that the "changes in the remedies available for the enforcement of a mortgage may not, even
when the public welfare is invoked as an excuse, be pressed so far as to cut down the security of a
mortgage without moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression. . . . A State is free to regulate the
procedure in its courts even with reference to contracts already made, and moderate extensions of
the time for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall within the power so reserved; but a different
situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow."
The third case is Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. ed. 1593.
This case presented for decision the question whether subsection (s) added to section 75 of the
Bankruptcy Act by the Frazier-Lemke Act, June 28, 1934, chap. 869, 48 Stat. at L. 1289 U. S. C. title 11,
sec. 203, is consistent with the Federal Constitution. The court said that it is unconstitutional if applied
to farm mortgages already existing, holding that "property rights of holders of farm mortgages are
unconstitutionally taken, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, by a statute (Bankruptcy Act, sec. 75
(s); Frazier-Lemke Act of June 28, 1934, chap. 869, 48 Stat. at L. 1289) applicable only to debts existing
at the time of its enactment, which provides that a farmer whose farm is mortgaged, and who has
failed to obtain the consents necessary to a composition under the Bankruptcy Act, may, upon being
adjudged a bankrupt, if the mortgagee assents, purchase the mortgaged property at its then appraised
value by agreeing to make deferred payments of stated percentages of the appraised value over a
period of six years, with interest at 1 per cent per annum, or, if the mortgagee refuses his assent to
such purchase, may obtain a stay of all proceedings for a period of five years, during which he shall
retain possession of all or any part of his property, under the control of the court, provided he pays a
reasonable rental therefor, and that at the end of five years he may pay into court the appraised price
thereof, or, if a lien holder shall request a reappraisal by the court, the reappraised price, whereupon
the court shall, by an order, turn over full possession and title of the property to the debtor, and he
may apply for his discharge."
In addition, we may cite leading state court decisions which practically involved the same
ruling and which reflect the tendency of the courts towards legislation involving modification of
mortgage or monetary contracts which contains provisions that are deemed unreasonable or
oppressive. Some of those which may be deemed representative follows:
1. Pouquette vs. O'Brien, 100 Pac. 2nd series, 979 (1940). The Supreme Court of Arizona
held unconstitutional a 1937 statute authorizing courts to extend for a period of not longer than two
years all actions or foreclosures of real estate mortgages, and a 1939 statute authorizing the courts to
extend foreclosure proceedings not later than March 4, 1941.
2. First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph Arp et al., 283 N.W. 441, 120
A.L.R. 932 (1939). The Supreme Court of Iowa declared unconstitutional the Moratorium Acts enacted
in 1933,1935 and 1937, providing for extension of the 1933 Moratorium Act covering a period of six "We have strengthened, . . . our internal and external finances. Six
years. years ago, we were a country prostrate from the destruction of war. . . . Today, we
can say that our people not only have returned to their prewar activities, but . .
3. First Trust Co. of Lincoln vs. Smith et al., 277 N.W. 762 (1938). The Supreme Court of
. have progressed and prospered far beyond what they ever dreamed of before the
Nebraska declared unconstitutional the Nebraska Moratorium Law as reenacted, extending the
war.
benefit of the remedy to a period of six years, as being repugnant to the contract clause of the
Constitution. . . . Three years ago the national income stood at four billion pesos;
today it is over seven billion pesos. . . . The government income has been steadily
4. Milkint vs. McNeely, Clerk of court, et al., 169 S.E. 790 (1933). The Supreme Court of
rising from 60 million pesos in 1946 to approximately 600 million pesos today, also
Appeals of West Virginia declared unconstitutional certain acts of legislature enacted in 1932,
a progress in six years.
extending the period of redemption three years beyond the one-year period then allowed by statute,
being an impairment of contract as to sales made prior to enactment thereof. xxx xxx xxx
5. Haynes vs. Treadway, 65 Pac. 892 (1901). The Supreme Court of California declared . . . The ravages of war are fast disappearing, and instead, what
unconstitutional a statute which extends the right of redemption from six months to twelve months beautiful vistas unfold themselves before our eyes at this moment in our
being a substantial impairment of the obligation contracts if applied to a mortgage already executed. immediate surroundings. Compare this beautiful view with that of the past and all
that we have accomplished in scarcely six years of struggle, sacrifice,
6. Swinburne vs. Mills, 50 Pac. 489 (1897). The Supreme Court of Washington declared a
determination, and bold decision. (Applause.) We have brought this nation out of
statute unconstitutional in so far as it provides that, on a decree for foreclosure of a mortgage
the paralysis of destruction into economic normalcy and financial stability. . . .
executed before the act was passed, the debtor shall be entitled to have the order of sale stayed for
one year, as being an impairment of the obligation of contract. . . . Our external finances have greatly improved, and . . . our pesos is
one of the most stable currencies in the world today. (Applause.) I repeat, our
These cases apply with added force in this jurisdiction considering the conditions now
pesos is one of the most stable currencies in the world today.
prevailing in our country.
All these find grateful reflection in a better-sheltered, better- clothed,
We do not need to go far to appreciate this situation. We can see it and feel it as we gaze around to
better-fed, and healthier population that has grown from 18 million to 20 million
observe the wave of reconstruction and rehabilitation that has swept the country since liberation
in a half dozen years, in a school enrollment that has doubled since the outbreak
thanks to the aid of America and the innate progressive spirit of our people. This aid and this spirit
of the last war from less than 2 million to over 4 million young students in the
have worked wonders in so short a time that it can now be safely stated that in the main the financial
public schools, and in democratic processes that are gaining in vigor and
condition of our country and our people, individually and collectively, has practically returned to
permanence with each passing year" (Address of his Excellency Elpidio Quirino,
normal notwithstanding occasional reverses caused by local dissidence and the sporadic disturbance
President of the Philippines, on the occasion of the celebration of the sixth
of peace and order in our midst. Business, industry and agriculture have picked up and developed at
anniversary of the independence of the Philippines, July 4, 1952, Luneta, Manila,
such stride that we can say that we are now well on the road to recovery and progress. This is so not
48 Off. Gaz., pp. 3287-3289).
only as far as our observation and knowledge are capable to take note and comprehend but also
because of the official pronouncements made by our Chief Executive in public addresses and in several In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the
messages he submitted to Congress on the general state of the nation. To bear this out, it would only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under
suffice for us to state some of those public statements which we deem to be most expressive and the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic
representative of the general situation. We quote: Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. And what we
"We have balanced our national budget. We shall again have at the end
say here with respect to said Act also holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, perhaps
of the current fiscal year a sizeable surplus. . . .
with greater force and reason as to the latter, considering that said Orders contain no limitation
We have greatly improved the economic and financial conditions of the whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary
country. Through the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, loans amounting to obligations. And there is need to make this pronouncement in view of the revival clause embodied in
P90,480,136 have been granted for the reconstruction and rehabilitation said Act if and when it is declared unconstitutional or invalid,
purposes. . . .
We have set up the Central Bank to expand our credit, stabilize our
Wherefore, the decision appealed from will be reversed, without pronouncement as to
currency and provide a new source of financing for the agricultural and industrial
costs.
development of the nation.
Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,800
xxx xxx xxx
with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum from August 27, 1942, until its full payment,
. . . The commitment thus far made is not only a favorable sign ushering plus 12 per cent as attorney's fees. Failure to pay this judgment as stated, the properties mortgaged
in finally the implementation of our plans of economic development, but a will be sold at public auction and the proceeds applied to its payment in accordance with law. So
significantly successful test of the solvency of our foreign credit, for it was ordered.
accepted only after a thorough examination of our resources and development
||| (Rutter v. Esteban, G.R. No. L-3708, [May 18, 1953], 93 PHIL 68-83)
plans by a board of economists of international authority" (Pres. Quirino's "State-
of-the- Nation" Message to the Joint Session of Congress on Jan. 24, 1949, 45 Off.
Gaz., Jan., 1949).
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-24670. December 14, 1979.]
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramirez & Ortigas for appellant.
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellee.
DECISION
SANTOS, J p:
An appeal interposed on June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-appellant, Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership, from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at Pasig, Hon. Andres Reyes presiding, which
dismissed its complaint in Civil Case No. 7706, entitled, "Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
plaintiff, v. Feati Bank andTrust Company, defendant," for lack of merit.
The following facts — a reproduction of the lower court's findings, which, in turn, are based on a stipulation
of facts entered into by the parties — are not disputed. Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas, Madrigal y
Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation duly organized and
existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business,
developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees,
entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5
and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On July 19, 1962, the said
vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon
completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in
favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the
stipulations or restrictions that:
"1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by the Buyer
exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove
soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be
constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly
painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the
public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of
less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines." 2
The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma Chavez. 3
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092 issued in its
name, respectively, and the building restrictions were also annotated therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought
Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D'," 5 while
Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex "E". 6 TCT No.
101719 in the name of Republic Flour Mills likewise contained the same restrictions, although defendant-
appellee claims that Republic Flour Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good faith, free from all liens and
encumbrances," as stated in the Deed of Sale, Annex "F" 7 between it and Emma Chavez. Cdpr
Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719, 101613, and
106092 were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and
development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed estate of plaintiff-appellant
where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established. 8
Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial
zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 9 It
alleges that plaintiff-appellant "completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision
facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue" 10 and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it "only on July
23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area . . . had been declared a commercial and industrial zone
. . ." 11
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the
construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which defendant-
appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes. The following day,
plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the construction of the commercial
building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the demand, contending that the building was
being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and
planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained
building and planning permits to proceed with the construction. 12
On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the lower court for decision.
The complaint sought, among other things, the issuance of "a writ of preliminary injunction . . . restraining
and enjoining defendant, its agents, assigns, and those acting on its or their behalf from continuing or
completing the construction of a commercial bank building in the premises . . . involved, with the view to
commanding the defendant to observe and comply with the building restrictions annotated in the
defendant's transfer certificate of title." cdphil
In deciding the said case, the trial court considered, as the fundamental issue, whether or not the resolution
of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of the
commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by
plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question. 13 The records do not show that a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued. cdphil
The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject
restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27,supra. It predicated its conclusion on the
exercise of police power of the said municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow down to
general interest and welfare." In short, it upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that the same rendered
"ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant-appellee. 14 The trial
court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid, considering that there is no
issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and void." 15
On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, 16 which
motion was opposed by defendant-appellee on March 17, 1965.17 It averred, among others, in the motion
for reconsideration that defendant-appellee "was duty bound to comply with the conditions of the contract
of sale in its favor, which conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Title issued in her
(Emma Chavez) favor." It also invited the trial court's attention to its claim that " . . . the Municipal Council
had (no) power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant corporation." 18
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965. 19
On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the complaint and
from the order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash
appeal bond. 20 On April 14, the appeal was given due course 21 and the records of the case were elevated
directly to this Court, since only questions of law are raised. 22
Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred —
I. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among
others, as part of the commercial and industrial zone, is valid because it did so in
the exercise of its police power; and
II. When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power
to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it
did not make a finding that the building was erected along the property line, when
it should have been erected two meters away from said property line. 23
The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors. In this connection, We already had
occasion to hold in Relativo v. Castro 24 that "(I)t is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies a purely
defensive position, and is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error."
The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of
police power; and (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations
assumed by defendant-appellee.
1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of
police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was never questioned
before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in the appellant's assignment
of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and are within the issues framed by the
parties. 25 The object of requiring the parties to present all questions and issues to the lower court before
they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable the lower court to pass thereon, so that the
appellate court upon appeal may determine whether or not such ruling was erroneous. The requirement is
in furtherance of justice in that the other party may not be taken by surprise. 26 The rule against the practice
of blowing "hot and cold" by assuming one position in the trial court and another on appeal will, in the
words of Elliot, prevent deception. 27 For it is well-settled that issues or defenses not raised 28 or properly
litigated 29 or pleaded 30 in the Court below cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.
In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted, at least impliedly, in the stipulation of
facts below, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated by the
trial court was ".. whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong . . . which declared
Lots Nos. 4 and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevails
over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in question."31 Having admitted the validity
of the subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on
appeal. LibLex
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of the
invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion that its posture is unsustainable.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, 32 empowers a Municipal Council
"to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations" 33 for the municipality. Clearly, the law does
not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is
not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word
"regulation" under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding . . ."
An examination of Section 12 of the same law 34 which prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise
reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its favor" and that "(A)ny
fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local
government and it shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates that the general welfare
clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local governments in promoting
the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the people in the community. The only
exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a province, city or
municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original terms and provisions of
the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by
the defendant-appellee — referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee — it should be stressed, that while
non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people." 35 Invariably
described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" 36 and "in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government," 37 the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. 38 As this Court held through Justice
Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. 39 police power "is elastic and
must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We
were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., 40 when We
declared: "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not
be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power."
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA,
for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously
passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial
notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located.
The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about
the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro
Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through
its Municipal Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the
subject resolution. prcd
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances, stressed this Court, speaking thru
Justice Laurel in the leading case of Calalang v. Williams, et al. 41Thus —
"As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 US 223, 238 49 L. ed. 169),
'the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful
today may in the future, because of changed situation the growth of population
or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be
required to yield to the public good.' And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil. 440), it was
observed that 'advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police power
of the state today things which were not thought of as being with in such power
yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the
growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and
 of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the
state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which
formerly were not so considered.'" 42 (Emphasis, supplied.).
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state 43 and to this
fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. 44
The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the valid exercise of police
power may also be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis 45 wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court,
resolved the conflict "between one welfare and another, between particular and general," thus —
"Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or
parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the
nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times." 46
The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a "legitimate
response to a felt public need," 47 not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of contracts clause of
the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now Chief Justice Fernando
puts it aptly when he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to succumb to the challenge that
thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory." 48
Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General 49 that laws and
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the parties.
Thus —
and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5 and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendants-appellees should be
permitted, on the strength of the resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to
use the same for commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian, et al. it was held that "restrictive covenants
running with the land are binding on all subsequent purchasers . . ." However, Section 23 of the zoning
ordinance involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not intended "to
interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or other agreement between parties." 58 In
the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution. LexLib
It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-appellee
as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Resolution No. 27, of
the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police power through the said resolution.
Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5 and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-24670, [December 14, 1979], 183
PHIL 176-198)

"Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power
is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting
contracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by
virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile — a government which
retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society."

Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 50 through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, that ". . . the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded therefrom in
those cases where such exclusion is allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the Philippines v.
Reparations Commission, 51 written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice, restates the rule.

One last observation. Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American jurisprudence and
authorities 52 to bolster its theory that the municipal resolution in question cannot nullify or supersede the
agreement of the parties embodied in the sales contract, as that, it claims, would impair the obligation of
contracts in violation of the Constitution. Such reliance is misplaced.

In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in the
Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own
lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. 53 and Burgess, et al. v. Magarian, et al., 55 two of the cases cited by plaintiff-
appellant, lend support to the conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e. that the municipal resolution
supersedes/supervenes over the contractual undertaking between the parties. Dolan v. Brown, states that
"Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the use of property by injunction where the property
has so changed in character and environment as to make it unfit or unprofitable for use should the restriction
be enforced, but will, in such a case, leave the complainant to whatever remedy he may have at
law." 56 (Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the remedy of injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied on the specific
holding that "A grantor may lawfully insert in his deed conditions or restrictions which are not against public
policy and do not materially impair the beneficial enjoyment of the estate." 57 Applying the principle just
stated to the present controversy, We can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-63419. December 18, 1986.]
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his
capacity as City Fiscal of Manila,respondents.
[G.R. Nos. L-66839-42. December 18, 1986.]
LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE GLICERIO L. CRUZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Executive Judge, Branch V, Region IV, Regional Trial Court,
sitting at Lemery, Batangas, THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF BATANGAS, and MARIA
LUISA TORDECILLA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 71654. December 18, 1986.]
ANTONIO DATUIN and SUSAN DATUIN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI
C. PANO, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY
FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 74524-25. December 18, 1986.]
OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON
CITY, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 75122-49. December 18, 1986.]
ELINOR ABAD, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 139, Makati and FEDERICO L. MELOCOTTON, JR., in his capacity as Trial Fiscal
Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati,respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 75812-13. December 18, 1986.]
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ VII and SYLVIA V. AGUILUZ,
spouses, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 154, now
vacant but temporarily presided by HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI, Branch 153,
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 725765-67. December 18, 1986.]
LUIS M. HOJAS, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE SENEN PENARANDA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XX, HONORABLE JUDGE
ALFREDO LAGAMON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch XXII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL NOLI T. CATHI, City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro
City, respondents.
[G.R. No. 75789. December 18, 1986.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 52, Manila and
THELMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
R.R. Nogales Law Office for petitioner in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75812-13, G.R. Nos.
75765-67 and counsel for respondent in G.R. No. 75789.
Pio S. Canta for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 66839-42.
Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 71654.
Abinoja, Tabalingcos, Villalon & Associates for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 75122-49.
The Solicitor General for respondent in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 66839-42, G.R. No. 71654, G.R. Nos.
74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75122-49, G.R. Nos. 75812-13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for petitioner in G.R.
No. 75789.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; B.P. 22 (BOUNCING CHECK LAW); COVERS ALL KINDS OF CHECKS. — The
language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or
whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for
something of value.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22); ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE; PRIMA
FACIE PRESUMED BY REFUSAL OF DRAWEE TO PAY UPON PRESENTMENT. — An essential element of the
offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in
or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult
to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the
check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SHALL NOT ARISE WHEN PAYMENT IS MADE WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF
DISHONOR. — To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such
presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker
or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the
check.
4. ID.; ID.; DISHONOR OF CHECK BY DRAWEE BANK; PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF MAKING OR ISSUANCE OF
CHECK AND DUE PRESENTMENT THEREOF. — Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule
of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee
bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefore, shall
constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the
drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof . . . for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawer
on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course
to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
5. ID.; ID.; DISTINGUISHED FROM ARTICLE 315, REVISED PENAL CODE.— Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code defining the crime of estafa reads as follows: "Article 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by . . . 2. By means of any
of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits; . . . (d) By
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation the offender knowing that at the time he
had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check without informing the payee of such circumstances." The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was
deemed to exclude checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligations. The rationale of this interpretation
is that in estafa, the deceit causing the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission
of the fraud. In issuing a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer does not derive any material
benefit in return or as consideration for its issuance. On the part of the payee, he had already parted with
his money or property before the check is issued to him, hence, he is not defrauded by means of any "prior"
or "simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him, by the drawer of the check.
6. ID.; ARTICLE 315, REVISED PENAL CODE AS AMENDED BY R.A. 4885; PAYMENT OF PRE-EXISTING
OBLIGATIONS NOT COVERED. — Article 315, as amended byRepublic Act 4885, does not cover checks issued
in payment of pre-existing obligations, again relying on the concept underlying the crime of estafa through
false pretense or deceit - which is, that the deceit or false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of the fraud.
7. ID.; BATASANG PAMBANSA 22 (BOUNCING CHECK LAW;) THRUST OF LAW; PUNISHES ACT OF MAKING
OR ISSUING WORTHLESS CHECK AS AN OFFENSE AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER. — The gravamen of the offense
punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is
not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
of sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them is circulation. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BATASANG PAMBANSA; MAY PRESCRIBE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT FOR ACTS
INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELFARE; MALUM PROHIBITUM. — It may be constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt excontractu. But certainly it is within the
prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only facts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the
exercise of its police power.
9. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; BATASANG PAMBANSA 22; VALID EXERCISE THEREOF; NOT REPUGNANT TO
CONSTITUTIONAL INHIBITION AGAINST IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. — The police power of the state has
been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is power not emanating from or conferred by
the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted
in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to
obstruct unreason able the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good
order and welfare." The enactment of B.P. 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions. The effect of the issuance of a worthless checks transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. In
sum, we find the enactment of B.P. 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
10. ID.; B.P. 22; FREEDOM OF CONTRACT NOT IMPAIRED CHECKS NOT CATEGORIZED AS CONTRACTS. — We
find not valid ground to sustain the contention that B.P. 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of
contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere
contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it form part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory
power of the state.
11. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW DOES NOT PRECLUDE CLASSIFICATION OF
INDIVIDUALS; CASE AT BAR. — Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies
equal protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the
payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since
without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no
crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the
swindler and the swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal
protection of the laws". The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.
DECISION
YAP, J p:
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check
Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by these petitions for decision. The
question is definitely one of first impression in our jurisdiction.
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The defendants in
those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial
courts, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to us for relief.
As a threshold issue the former Solicitor General, in his comment on the petitions, maintained the posture
that it was premature for the accused to elevate to this Court the orders denying their motions to quash,
these orders being interlocutory. While this is correct as a general rule, we have in justifiable cases
intervened to review the lower court's denial of a motion to quash. 1 In view of the importance of the issue
involved here, there is no doubt in our mind that the instant petitions should be entertained and the
constitutional challenge to BP 22 resolved promptly, one way or the other, in order to put to rest the doubts
and uncertainty that exist in legal and judicial circles and the general public which have unnecessarily caused
a delay in the disposition of cases involving the enforcement of the statute.
For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue presented here, we do not find it necessary to delve
into the specifics of the informations involved in the cases which are the subject of the petitions before us.
2 The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated,
or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for
something of value.
I at the date set for its payment, does not have sufficient deposit to cover the same. 8
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is
imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the
check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. 3
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. 4
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this
involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such
knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. 5 To mitigate the
harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within
five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for
payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in
evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written
thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor," shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making
or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof .
. . for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." 6
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the
contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
II
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks
that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed later, is proscribed by the
state because of the injury it causes to the public interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our statute books which penalize the issuance
of bouncing or rubber checks. Criminal law has dealth with the problem within the context of crimes against
property punished as "estafa" or crimes involving fraud and deceit. The focus of these penal provisions is
on the damage caused to the property rights of the victim.
The Penal Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 1887 until it was replaced by the Revised
Penal Code in 1932, contained provisions penalizing, among others, the act of defrauding another through
false pretenses. Art. 335 punished a person who defrauded another "by falsely pretending to possess any
power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency or business, or by means of similar deceit."
Although no explicit mention was made therein regarding checks, this provision was deemed to cover within
its ambit the issuance of worthless or bogus checks in exchange for money. 7
In 1926, an amendment was introduced by the Philippine Legislature, which added a new clause (paragraph
10) to Article 335 of the old Penal Code, this time referring in explicit terms to the issuance of worthless
checks. The amendment penalized any person who: 1) issues a check in payment of a debt or for other
valuable consideration, knowing at the time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in the
bank to cover its amount, or 2) maliciously signs the check differently from his authentic signature as
registered at the bank in order that the latter would refuse to honor it; or 3) issues a postdated check and,
In 1932, as already adverted to, the old Penal Code was superseded by the Revised Penal Code.9 The above
provisions, in amended form, were incorporated in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime
of estafa. The revised text of the provision read as follows:
"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation the offender knowing that at the time
he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check without
informing the payee of such circumstances."
The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks issued in payment of pre-existing
obligations. 10 The rationale of this interpretation is that in estafa, the deceit causing the defraudation must
be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. In issuing a check as payment for a pre-
existing debt, the drawer does not derive any material benefit in return or as consideration for its issuance.
On the part of the payee, he had already parted with his money or property before the check is issued to
him, hence, he is not defrauded by means of any "prior" or "simultaneous" deceit perpetrated on him by
the drawer of the check.
With the intention of remedying the situation and solving the problem of how to bring checks issued in
payment of pre-existing debts within the ambit of Art. 315, an amendment was introduced by the Congress
of the Philippines in 1967, 11 which was enacted into law as Republic Act No. 4885, revising the aforesaid
proviso to read as follows:
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check
to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from
receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act."
However, the adoption of the amendment did not alter the situation materially. A divided Court held
in People vs. Sabio, Jr. 12 that Article 315, as amended by Republic Act 4885, does not cover checks issued
in payment of pre-existing obligations, again relying on the concept underlying the crime of estafa through
false pretenses or deceit — which is, that the deceit or false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with
the commission of the fraud.
Since statistically it had been shown that the greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted of those issued in
payment of pre-existing debts, 13 the amended provision evidently failed to cope with the real problem and
to deal effectively with the evil that it was intended to eliminate or minimize.
With the foregoing factual and legal antecedents as a backdrop, the then Interim Batasan confronted the
problem squarely. It opted to take a bold step and decided to enact a law dealing with the problem of
bouncing or worthless checks, without attaching the law's umbilical cord to the existing penal provisions on
estafa. BP 22addresses the problem directly and frontally and makes the act of issuing a worthless
check malum prohibitum. 14
The question now arises: Is BP 22 a valid law?
Previous efforts to deal with the problem of bouncing checks within the ambit of the law on estafa did not
evoke any constitutional challenge. In contrast, BP 22 was challenged promptly.
Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection
clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during
its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on
Third Reading.
The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and
the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described
as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government."
15
As we enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
government, we need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our
jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its
constitutionality. This is not to say that we approach our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear
that the legislature has overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, we should not hesitate
to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute.
III
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between
the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the
statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for
debt or non-payment of a poll tax." 16 Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated
only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute
is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check,
not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment
of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.
First of all, it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional inhibition invoked by
petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is
a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century in the various states of
the American Union as a result of the people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by
common law, which permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their
debts. At common law, money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for damages
from breach of a contract could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by writ of capias ad
satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the
creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the popular ground swell against
such a barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in
the constitutions of various states of the Union. 17
This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of the century and
embodied in our organic laws. 18 Later, our fundamental law outlawed not only imprisonment for debt, but
also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in jail for non-payment of the cedula or
poll tax. 19
The reach and scope of this constitutional safeguard have been the subject of judicial definition, both by
our Supreme Court 20 and by American state courts. 21 Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Supreme
Court in Ganaway vs. Quillen, 22 stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty
has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to
prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was
never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that damages recoverable
therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties but are imposed upon the
defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed
by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime."
The law involved in Ganaway was not a criminal statute but the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions (1909)
which authorized the arrest of the defendant in a civil case on grounds akin to those which justify the
issuance of a writ of attachment under our present Rules of Court, such as imminent departure of the
defendant from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors, or concealment, removal or disposition
of properties in fraud of creditors, etc. The Court, in that case, declared the detention of the defendant
unlawful, being violative of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt, and ordered his
release. The Court, however, refrained from declaring the statutory provision in question unconstitutional.
Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes, 23 wherein a statutory provision which made illegal and
punishable the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the salaries of his employees or laborers
on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on Saturday every week, was challenged for being violative
of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The constitutionality of the law in question
was upheld by the Court, it being within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise
of the police power. It was held that "one of the purposes of the law is to suppress possible abuses on the
part of the employers who hire laborers or employees without paying them the salaries agreed upon for
their services, thus causing them financial difficulties." The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce
payment of an obligation, although obviously such could be its effect, but to banish a practice considered
harmful to public welfare.
IV
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To answer the
question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. Is it the failure
of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making and issuance of a worthless check in payment
of a debt? What is the gravamen of the offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to appear elusive and difficult to conceptualize. But
precisely in the failure to perceive the vital distinction lies the error of those who challenge the validity of BP
22.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a
debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can
punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because
of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers"
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. 24 It is a power
not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, suitably vague and
far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon
the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual
citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." 25
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus
exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of
the statute, it is not difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been
reported that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and
thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 million to 80 million
pesos a day. 26
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. 27 It is a written order
on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the payment of all events, of a sum of
money to a certain person therein named or to his order or to cash, and payable on demand. 28 Unlike a
promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to
a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is
drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of
certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have
become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender,
checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the
usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice
therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred, for the proliferation of worthless checks
can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money supply of the country, roughly
totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso demand deposits; the remaining two-thirds consists of currency in
circulation. 29 These demand deposits in the banks constitute the funds against which, among others,
commercial papers like checks, are drawn. The magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the
legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the system with
worthless checks is like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's economy.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. As aptly stated — 30
"The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the
pillars of business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place
him in the same category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and
for whom the constitutional inhibition against `imprisonment for debt, except in
cases of fraud' was intended as a shield and not a sword."
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence obtaining in the various states of the United States
on the constitutionality of the "worthless check" acts. 31 It is needless to warn that foreign jurisprudence
must be taken with abundant caution. A caveat to be observed is that substantial differences exist between
our statute and the worthless check acts of those states where the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing
to remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily from any existing statute. Furthermore, we have to consider
that judicial decisions must be read in the context of the facts and the law involved and, in a broader sense,
of the social, economic and political environment — in short, the milieu — under which they were made.
We recognize the wisdom of the old saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander.
As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of
changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional
guaranty. For example, there have been cases wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-
impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. 32 Whether the police power may
override the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to address.
This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.
We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
V
We need not detain ourselves lengthily in the examination of the other constitutional objections raised by
petitioners, some of which are rather flimsy.
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. The freedom of
contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. 33 Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized
as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from
the regulatory power of the state.
Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws
or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the
payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable
participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is
tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the
swindled. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the
laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment
under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. 34
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative powers, on the theory
that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or drawer but is made to depend on the will
of the payee. If the payee does not present the check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there
would be no crime. The logic of the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of
legislative power." What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws, 35 which
means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be punished and to
prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said that the power to define the crime
and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any
provision in the statute that can be construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive
power. The suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is
farfetched.
Lastly, the objection has been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution was violated
by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law. This constitutional provision prohibits the
introduction of amendments to a bill during the Third Reading. It is claimed that during its Third Reading,
the bill which eventually became BP 22 was amended in that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1
of the bill as adopted on Second Reading was altered or changed in the printed text of the bill submitted for
approval on Third Reading.
A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter shows that, indeed,
there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was the exact text of the paragraph in
question which the body approved on Second Reading. 36 Part of the confusion was due apparently to the
fact that during the deliberations on Second Reading (the amendment period), amendments were proposed
orally and approved by the body or accepted by the sponsor, hence, some members might not have gotten
the complete text of the provisions of the bill as amended and approved on Second Reading. However, it is
clear from the records that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was
actually approved by the body on Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved Minutes
for that day. In any event, before the bill was submitted for final approval on Third Reading, the Interim
Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the Committee in its report, which was
approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979, stated that "the clause in question was . . . an authorized
amendment of the bill and the printed copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in question as
approved on Second Reading. 37 We therefore, find no merit in the petitioners' claim that in the enactment
of BP 22 the provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the petition in G.R. No. 75789 and setting aside the order of
the respondent Judge dated August 19, 1986. The petitions in G.R. Nos. 63419, 66839-42, 71654, 74524-
25, 75122-49, 75812-13 and 75765-67 are hereby dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued in
G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted. With costs against private petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, L-66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13, 725765-67,
75789, [December 18, 1986], 230 PHIL 406-428)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-56450. July 25, 1983.]
RODOLFO T. GANZON and GREGORIO L. LIRA, in his capacity as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff of
Iloilo, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANCHO Y.INSERTO, Presiding Judge, Branch I of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, RANDOLPH C. TAJANLANGIT and ESTEBAN C.
TAJANLANGIT, respondents.
Salvador A. Cabaluna, Jr. and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Hannibal de los Reyes for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS MORTGAGE; AN ACCESSORY CONTRACT; CONSIDERATION IS THE SAME AS THAT
OF THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT. — A mortgage is but an accessory contract. The consideration of the
mortgage is the same consideration of the principal contract without which it cannot exist as an
independent contract" (Banco de Oro vs. Bayuga, 93 SCRA 443, citing China Banking Corporation vs.
Lichauco, 46 Phil. 460).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MORTGAGE LIEN IS A RIGHT IN REM; CANNOT BE SUBSTITUTED BY A SURETY BOND;
RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. — The real estate mortgage constituted on Lot No. 1901-E-61.B-1F of the
subdivision plan Psd-27482, located in the district of Molo, Iloilo City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-50324 can not be substituted by a surety bond as ordered by the trial court. The mortgage lien in
favor of petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien
on the property. To substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convent such lien from a right in
rem, to a right in personam. This conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the
mortgagee under the mortgage contract.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; NON-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE; COURT ORDERS
ALLOWING SUBSTITUTION OF MORTGAGE WITH SURETY BOND VIOLATIVE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — The
questioned court orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
Substitution of the mortgage with a surely bond to secure the payment of the P40.000.00 note would in
effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues
affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency
and dispensed with a primary condition.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
May the respondent court order that a mortgage on real property be substituted by a surety bond and
direct the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated on the Torrens Title since the surety
bond already secures the obligation earlier secured by the cancelled mortgage?
The petitioner comes to us stating that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess
of its jurisdiction in so ruling. LLpr
On August 28, 1979, petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially foreclose a real
estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in his favor. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
executed on March 19, 1979 (Annex "A", Petition) between Randolph Tajanlangit and Esteban Tajanlangit
as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other hand was to secure the
payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to P40,000.00 in favor ofGanzon, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
"That whereas, the MORTGAGORS are justly indebted to the MORTGAGEE in the
amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS. Philippine Currency, as
evidenced by their promissory note for the said sum, in the words and figures as
follows:
P40,000.00 Iloilo City
March 19, 1979
"For value received, we promise to pay RODOLFO T. GANZON, or order, at his
residence in Molo, Iloilo City, the sum of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, in two (2) installments as follows: P20,000.00 on or before 25
May 1979; and P20,000.00 on or before 25 August 1979. This note shall not draw
interest. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 15)
The mortgage covered a parcel of residential land, Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1-F of the subdivision plan
Psd-274802, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
50324.
Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira, in his capacity as ex-oficio provincial sheriff of Iloilo served personal
notice of the foreclosure proceedings on the private respondents. Lira also caused the publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Iloilo of a Notice of Extra Judicial Sale of
Mortgaged Property, setting the sale at public auction of the mortgaged property at 10:00 a.m. on
September 28, 1979, at his office at the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City.
On September 27, 1979, a day before the scheduled public auction, the private respondents filed a civil
action for specific performance, damages, and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
petitioners with the respondent court. The action, docketed as CFI Case No. 13053, sought to declare the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and all proceedings taken in connection therewith null and void. The
private respondents asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioners from
proceeding with the foreclosure and public auction sale. Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion of private
respondents, the trial court issued an order enjoining the provincial sheriff from proceeding with the
scheduled auction sale on September 28, 1979. LLjur
On October 31, 1979, the private respondents filed an amended complaint. For purposes of the instant
petition, the pertinent allegations in the amended complaint are the following: (1) On August 25, 1978,
defendant, now petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land in favor of
plaintiff, now respondent Esteban Tajanlangit. The parcel of land, subject of the sale is described as Lot No.
1900 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo located at Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-39579 with an area of 24,442 square meters, more or less; (2) The deed of real estate mortgage which is
the subject of the extrajudicial proceedings initiated by defendant Rodolfo Ganzon executed by plaintiffs
Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph Tajanlangit in his favor was for the purpose of securing the payment of
P40,000.00 which formed part of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900; (3) Incorporated in the aforesaid deed
of absolute sale was a proviso to the effect that vendor-defendant Rodolfo Ganzon guaranteed to have the
occupants of the lot to vacate the premises within 120 days after the execution thereof, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
"The vendor warrants to the vendee peaceful possession of the above-mentioned
parcel of land and that the said vendor shall see to it that all occupants thereof at
the execution of this deed shall vacate the premises within a period of one
hundred twenty (120) days computed from the date of the execution of this
document."
(4) The aforestated guaranty was violated by defendant Ganzon since the occupants of the said lot up
to the present are still within the premises of the lot; and (5) The extra-judicial foreclosure is illegal
since defendant Ganzon committed a breach in his warranty and the deed of real estate mortgage
does not contain any stipulation authorizing mortgagee Ganzon to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgaged property.
On March 28, 1980 the petitioners filed their answer to the amended complaint. They admitted the veracity
of the deed of absolute sale covering said Lot No. 1900 but denied that the real estate mortgage covering
Lot No. 1901 subject of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings was executed by Esteban Tajanlangit and
Randolph Tajanlangit in favor of Rodolfo Ganzon to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price
of Lot No. 1900. They maintained that the real estate mortgage was an entirely different transaction
between the Tajanlangits and Ganzon from the sale of Lot No. 1900 embodied in the absolute deed of sale
of realty, They further maintained that the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings would be in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage.
After the issues had been joined but before actual trial, the private respondents filed a "Motion For Release
Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu Thereof," to which the petitioners
interposed an Opposition.
In an order dated November 20, 1980, the respondent court granted the respondents' motion. The order
states:
"This is Motion for Release of Real Estate Mortgage and for the Clerk of Court to
Accept Bond or Cash in Lieu Thereof.
"It appears that defendant sold to Esteban Tajanlangit, Jr. Lot No. 1900 of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39579. The
document of sale provides that the vendee who is the defendant herein, promised
to exclude from the premises the occupants. To secure the unpaid balance of
P40,000.00, plaintiffs executed a real estate mortgage on their Lot No. 1901-4-61-
B-1-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-274802. Because defendant failed to clear the
occupants of Lot No. 1900, as provided for in the contract of sale, plaintiffs
withheld payment of the P40,000.00. To clear the title of Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1-1
plaintiffs are willing to submit a bond in the sum of P80,000.00 which is double
the consideration of the mortgage.
"WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, considering that plaintiffs are willing and
able to pay the P40,000.00 and considering further that defendant has not yet
cleared the premises he sold to plaintiffs of tenants, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo
City is ordered to cancel the mortgage lien on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
50324, upon showing by the plaintiffs that they have put up the surety bond in the
sum of P80,000.00." (Annex "F", Rollo, p. 58).
On January 28, 1981, the respondents after receipt of the aforesaid order, put up a surety bond in the
amount of P80,000.00 with the Summa Insurance Corporation as surety (Annex "G") for the approval of the
respondent court. LLpr
On February 14, 1981, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration Of The Order Dated
November 20, 1980, And Opposition To The Approval of Surety Bond.
The respondent court in its order dated February 24, 1981, denied the aforesaid motion. The order states:
Finding the motion filed by plaintiff through counsel for approval of surety bond
well taken and considering that the opposition filed by defendants does not
question the validity of the surety bond itself but is anchored upon grounds that
had already been passed upon by this Court in the order dated November 20,
1980, the surety bond in the amount of P80,000.00 issued by Summa Insurance
Corporation is hereby approved.
"The defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon, through Atty. Salvador Cabaluna, Jr., is hereby
ordered to surrender to the plaintiffs, through Atty. Hannibal de los Reyes the
owner's copy of TCT No. 50324, so that the mortgage annotated therein in favor
of defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon could be duly cancelled." (Annex "I", Rollo, p. 65).
Hence, the instant petition.
On March 18, 1981, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the
orders dated November 20, 1980 and February 24, 1981 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch I at
Iloilo City.
On July 8, 1981, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
As stated earlier, the issue raised before us is whether or not the trial court may order the cancellation of a
mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment of a promissory note and
substitute such mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same court to secure the payment of the
promissory note.
In issuing its November 20, 1980 order, the trial court before trial on the merits of the case assumed that
the real estate mortgage subject of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings was indeed a security for the
payment of a P40,000.00 promissory note which answered for the balance of the purchase price of the sale
between Ganzon as vendor and Esteban Tajanlangit was vendee of Lot No. 1900. With this assumption, the
trial court concluded that Rodolfo Ganzon violated his warranty that he would clear the parcel of land of its
occupants within 120 days after the execution of the deed of absolute sale of realty. On this premise and
upon motion of the private respondents, the court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage
lien annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the mortgaged parcel of land and to substitute
therein a surety bond approved by the trial court.
It must be noted that petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon vehemently denied the allegation that the P40,000.00,
consideration of the promissory note which resulted in the execution of the real estate mortgage to secure
its payment was a balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. As earlier stated, Ganzon maintained in
his Answer that the real estate mortgage arose from a different transaction. At the pre-trial, what the parties
admitted were the existence and due execution of the documents, including the absolute deed of sale of
realty and the subject real estate mortgage. In connection with the documents, the issues per the pre-trial
order were ". . . whether or not the documents express the true intention of the parties, and whether or
not they complied with the provisions of the document. (Rollo, p. 78) Hence, at that stage of the case, the
trial court's order dated November 20, 1980 had no factual basis. cdphil
Even on the assumption that the factual bases of the trial court's questioned orders were justified by
evidence in the records the same would still not be proper.
A mortgage is but an accessory contract. "The consideration of the mortgage is the same consideration of
the principal contract without which it cannot exist as an independent contract." (Banco de Oro v. Bayuga,
93 SCRA 443, citing China Banking Corporation v. Lichauco, 46 Phil. 460). On the effects of a mortgage we
ruled inPhilippine National Bank v. Mallorca (21 SCRA 694):
xxx xxx xxx
". . . By Article 2126 of the Civil Code, (Formerly Article 1876 of the Civil Code of
Spain of 1889). a `mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon
which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted.' Sale or transfer cannot affect or
release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and
respect the encumbrance to which is subject the purchased thing and which is at
the disposal of the creditor `in order that he, under the terms of the contract, may
recover the amount of his credit therefrom' (Bischoff vs. Pomar, 12 Phil. 690, 700)
For, a recorded real estate is a right in rem, a lieu on the property whoever its
owner may be. (Altavas, The Law of Mortgages in the Philippine Islands, 1924 ed.,
p. 2) Because the personality of the owner is disregarded; the mortgage subsists
notwithstanding changes of ownership; the last transferee is just as much of a
debtor as the first one; and this, independent of whether the transferee knows or
not the person of the mortgagee. (Id., at p. 15) So it is, that a mortgage lien
is inseparable from the property mortgaged. All subsequent purchasers thereof
must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to them be with or without the
consent of the mortgagee. For, the mortgage, until discharge, follows the
property. (Peña, Registration of land Titles and Deeds, 1961 ed., p. 225; emphasis
supplied. See also V. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1962 ed., p. 477)"
Applying the principles underlying the nature of a mortgage, the real estate mortgage constituted on Lot
No. 1901-E-61-B-IF of the subdivision plan Psd-27482, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324 can not be substituted by a surety bond as ordered by the trial
court. The mortgage lien in favor of petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable from the mortgaged property.
It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convert such
lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the
rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage contract.
Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under the
Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00
note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the
very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished
its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition. cdrep
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated November 20, 1980 and February
24, 1981 of the trial court are SET ASIDE. Our March 18, 1981 Temporary Restraining Order is made
PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ganzon v. Inserto, G.R. No. L-56450, [July 25, 1983], 208 PHIL 630-638)
FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC. August 19, 2009.]
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING
FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J p:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi,
administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote:
The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst. n Indorsement
to pay a nominal fee of Php5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection
action of 10 million pesos, thus giving us access to the Justice System previously
denied by an up-front excessive court fee.
The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying
with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this "privilege" to
indigent persons. While judges are appointed to interpret the law, this type of law
seems to be extremely detailed with requirements that do not leave much room
for interpretations.
In addition, this law deals mainly with "individual indigent" and it does not include
Foundations or Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons. As
seen in our Article of Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. reached-out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly born and
abandoned babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old
people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay for "common prescriptions", to
broken families who returned to a normal life. In other words, we have been
working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society
cannot reach to, or have rejected or abandoned them.
Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and
underprivileged people, the same option granted to indigent people?
The two Executive Judges, that we have approached, fear
accusations of favoritism or other kind of attack if they approve something which
is not clearly and specifically stated in the law or approved by your
HONOR. cDTaSH
Can your Honor help us once more?
Grateful for your understanding, God bless you and your undertakings.
We shall be privileged if you find time to visit our orphanage — the Home of Love
— and the Spiritual Retreat Center in Antipolo City.
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment oflegal fees granted to indigent
litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people.
The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause,
embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to
adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from
the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was
defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor. 1
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, 2 and Sec. 19, Rule
141, Rules of Court, 3 which respectively state thus:
Sec. 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or
defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is
satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other
lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to
be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the
indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment
rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise
provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before
judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing
that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or
property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected
by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court,
execution shall issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other
sanctions as the court may impose. (22a) ASTcEa
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. — Indigent litigants
(a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an
amount double the monthly minimum wage of an employee and (b) who do not
own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax
declaration ofmore than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be
exempt from payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to
the indigent litigant unless the court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an
affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income
abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to
the truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the litigant's affidavit.
 Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient
cause to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party,
without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted
provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an
indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with
a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, 4 is a juridical person. Among
others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and
bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. 5 As a
juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to
indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged
people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a
person's poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer.
There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for
exemption in favor of a juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the
ground that it works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the
imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on
circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the
documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts. DEacIT
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the
exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Re: Prioreschi , A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC (Resolution), [August 19, 2009], 613 PHIL 26-31)
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 176229. October 19, 2011.]
HO WAI PANG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the so-called
Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during such
investigation. 1 "The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation." 2
Petitioner Ho Wai Pang (petitioner) in this present recourse assails the June 16, 2006
Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 affirming the April 6, 1995
Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 118 of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 91-1592,
finding him and his co-accused, namely, Law Ka Wang, Chan Chit Yue, 5 Wu Hing Sum, Tin San
Mao 6 and Kin San Ho 7 guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article
III 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Also
assailed is the January 16, 2007 CA Resolution 9 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines Flight
No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA).
Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists.
At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a Baggage Declaration
Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane.
Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13 passengers as their turn came up. From the first
traveling bag, she saw few personal belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes
which she pressed. When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were
almost of the same size as those in thefirst bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out
four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, what she saw inside was
white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus immediately
called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and Customs Appraiser Nora
Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she
guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate
boxes earlier discovered. STcHEI
At the ICU, Cinco called the tourists one after the other using the passenger manifest and
further examined their bags. The bag of Law Ka Wang was first found to contain three chocolate
boxes. Next was petitioner's bag which contains nothing except for personal effects. Cinco, however,
recalled that two of the chocolate boxes earlier discovered at the express lane belong to him. Wu Hing
Sum's bag followed and same yielded three chocolate boxes while the baggages of Ho Kin San, Chan
Chit Yue and Tin San Mao each contained two or three similar chocolate boxes. All in all, 18 chocolate 7659 WITH IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION AFTER
boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six accused. SERVICE OF SENTENCE. The penalty of death cannot be imposed
since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659. HEacDA
NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro corroborated the relevant testimony of Cinco
pertaining to the presence of the chocolate boxes. According to him, he conducted a test Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused WONG KOK WAH @
on the white crystalline substance contained in said chocolate boxes at the NAIA using the Mandelline SONNY WONG, CHAN TAK PIU, HO WAI LING AND INOCENCIA CHENG.
Re-Agent Test. 10 The result of his examination 11 of the white crystalline substance yielded positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, the chocolate boxes were bundled SO ORDERED. 19
together with tape, placed inside a plastic bag and brought to the Inbond Section.
From this judgment, all the accused appealed to this Court where the case records were
The following day, September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the National forwarded to per Order of the RTC dated May 10, 1995. 20 Later, all theaccused except for petitioner,
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further questioning. The confiscated stuff were turned over filed on separate dates their respective withdrawal of appeal. 21 This Court, after being satisfied
to the Forensic Chemist who weighed and examined them. Findings show that its total weight is that the withdrawing appellants were fully aware of the consequences of their action,
31.1126 kilograms and that the representative samples were positive for methamphetamine granted the withdrawal of their respective appeals through a Resolution dated June 18, 1997. 22 Per
hydrochloride. 12 Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as Entry ofJudgment, 23 said Resolution became final and executory on July 7, 1997. Consequently,
against petitioner and his five co-accused. petitioner was the only one left to pursue his appeal.
Accordingly, six separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against Petitioner filed his Brief 24 on April 6, 1998
petitioner and his co-accused. These Informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-1591 to while the brief 25 for the respondent People of the Philippines was filed on August 27, 1998
97. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation 13 which the trial court through the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG). Per Resolution 26 dated August 30, 2004, this Court
granted. The reinvestigation conducted gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused and referred the appeal to the CA for proper disposition and determination pursuant to this Court's ruling
this resulted to the filing of a single Amended Information 14 under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 and in People v. Mateo. 27
to thewithdrawal of the other Informations. 15 The Amended Information reads:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
That on or about September 6, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, On June 16, 2006, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC. While
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, conceding that petitioner's constitutional right to counsel during thecustodial investigation was
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country without indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other evidence sufficient to warrant
lawful authority, 31.112 kilograms, more or his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioner's claim that he was deprived of his constitutional and
less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as statutory right to confront the witnesses against him. The CA gave credence
"SHABU", a regulated drug. to the testimonies of theprosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial court's ratiocination
regarding the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 16
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 which the CA denied in its Resolution 29 dated
After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, 17 all the accused testified almost January 16, 2007.
identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they have no knowledge
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their traveling bags which were
provided by the travel agency. DAaIEc I
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
On April 6, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision 18 finding all the accused guilty of violating CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the decretal portion of which reads: BOTH BY THECUSTOMS OFFICIALS AND BY THE NBI
INVESTIGATORS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Court finds the accused LAW KA EVIDENCE TAKEN DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. CSHDTE
WANG, CHAN CHIT YUE, HO WAI PANG, WU HING SUM, TIN SUN MAO, AND KIN
SAN HO(HO KIN SAN) GUILTY of Conspiracy in violating Section 15, Article II
III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having conspired to transport
into the Philippines 31.112 kilograms of methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT
locally known as Shabu, and they are hereby sentenced to PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
suffer the PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF SIX (6) [sic]RECLUSION CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM.
PERPETUA AND TO PAY EACH (SIC) THE AMOUNT OF THIRTY (30) THOUSAND
III
PESOS (P30,000.00) each as FINE, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is being
imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 considering its applicability THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
to the accused though retroactively for having a less stricter penalty than THAT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A
that of life imprisonment provided in Republic Act No. CONSPIRACY.
6425. The fine of P30,000.00 for each accused is imposed pursuant to R.A. No.
6425 it being more favorable to the accused [than] that provided in R.A. No. IV
 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AS TO OVERTURNTHE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE ACCORDED TO
PETITIONER BY THE CONSTITUTION. 30
OUR RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
prohibits as evidence only confessions
and admissions of the accused as against
himself.
Anent the error first assigned, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted
by a competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he was
not duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his choice. Hence,
petitioner faults the CA in not excluding evidence taken during such investigation.
While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial
questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under
Section 12 31 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what
said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused
as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, 32 the Court categorically ruled that
"the infractions ofthe so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible 'only the extrajudicial confession
or admission made during custodial investigation.' The admissibility of other evidence, provided they
are relevant to the issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if
obtained or taken in the course ofcustodial investigation." CDEaAI
In the case at bench, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his
custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from
him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention
and subsequently used in evidence against him. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and
his co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
on the existence of the confiscated shabu. As the Court held in People v. Buluran, 33 "[a]ny
allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in
which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their
conviction." Hence, petitioner's claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken
during the custodial investigation deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in this Court's ruling in People v. Wong Chuen Ming 34 to
exculpate himself from the crime charged. Though there are semblance
in the facts, the case of Ming is not exactly on all fours with the present case. The disparity is clear
from the evidence adduced upon which the trial courts in each case relied on in rendering their
respective decisions. Apparently in Ming, the trial court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily
on the signatures which they affixed on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic bags. The Court
construed the accused's act of affixing their signatures thereon as a tacit admission of the crime
charged. And, since the accused were not informed of their Miranda rights when they affixed their
signatures, the admission was declared inadmissible evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional rights. In ruling against the accused, the trial court also gave credence
to the sole testimony of the customs examiner whom it presumed to have performed his duties in
regular manner. However, in reversing the judgment of conviction, the Court noted that said
examiner's testimony was not corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
On the other hand, petitioner's conviction in the present case was on the strength of his
having been caught in flagrante delicto transporting shabu into thecountry and not
on the basis of any confession or admission. Moreover, the testimony of Cinco was found to be direct,
positive and credible by the trial court, hence it need not be corroborated. Cinco witnessed the entire
incident thus providing direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime.
As theCourt held in People v. Dela Cruz, 35 "[n]o rule exists which requires a testimony to be
corroborated to be adjudged credible. . . . Thus, it is not at all uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt
on the basis of the testimony of a single witness despite the lack of corroboration, where such
testimony is found positive and credible bythe trial court. In such a case, the lone testimony is
sufficient to produce a conviction."
Indeed, a ruling in one case cannot simply be bodily lifted and applied to another case
when there are stark differences between the two cases. Cases must be decided based on their own
unique facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Petitioner was not denied of his right to
confrontation.
Turning now to the second assigned error, petitioner invokes the pertinent
provision of Section 14 (2) of Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution providing for the right to
confrontation, viz.: SaHcAC
Section 14.. . .
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of his right to know and understand what the witnesses
testified to. According to him, only a full understanding of what thewitnesses would testify to would
enable an accused to comprehend the evidence being offered against him and to refute it by cross-
examination or by his own countervailing evidence.
In refutation, the OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to confront his
accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his counsel cross-examined them. It is
petitioner's call to hire an interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could not
do so, he should have manifested it before the court. At any rate, the OSG contends that petitioner
was nevertheless able to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices
as compliance with petitioner's right to confront the witnesses against him.
We agree with the OSG.
As borne out by the records, petitioner did not register any objection
to the presentation of the prosecution's evidence particularly on the testimony of Cinco
despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter
greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able
to fully cross-examine Cinco and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to
confrontation is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may cross-
examine the witnesses of the prosecution. In People v. Libo-on, 36 the Court held:
The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in
fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them
on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to
secure the opportunity for cross-examination, so that if the opportunity for cross-
 examination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also
been accomplished, theconfrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to
cross-examination.
Under the circumstances obtaining, petitioner's constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him was not impaired. HTCESI
Conspiracy among the accused was duly
established.
Respecting the third assigned error, we uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy which
was quoted by the appellate court in its assailed Decision, and which we once again herein reproduce
with approval:
On the allegation of conspiracy, the Court finds [no] direct evidence to conclude
conspiracy. However, just like in other cases where conspiracy is not usually
established by direct evidence but by circumstantial evidence, the Court finds that
there are enough circumstantial evidence which if taken together sufficiently
prove conspiracy. First, it cannot be denied that the accused somehow have
known each other prior to their [departure] in Hong Kong for Manila. Although
Law Ka Wang denied having known any of the accused prior to the incident in
NAIA, accused Ho Wai Pang identified him as the one who assisted him
in the supposed tour in thePhilippines to the extent of directly dealing
with the travel agency and [that] Law Ka Wang was the one who
received the personal things of Ho Wai Pang allegedly to be place[d] in a bag
provided for by the travel agency. Accused Wu Hing Sum has been known to
accused Ho Kin San for about two to three years as they used to work as cooks in
a restaurant in Hong Kong. Accused Ho Wai Ling, who is still at large, is know[n] to
accused Chan Chit Yue, Wu Hing Sum and Ho Kin San. These relationships in a way
can lead to the presumption that they have the capability to enter into a
conspiracy. Second, all the illegal substances confiscated from the six accused
were contained in chocolate boxes of similar sizes and almost the same weight all
contained in their luggages. The Court agrees with the finding of the trial
prosecutor that under the given circumstances, the offense charged [c]ould have
been perpetrated only through an elaborate and methodically planned conspiracy
with all the accused assiduously cooperating and mutually helping each other in
order to ensure its success. 37
We find no cogent reason to reverse such findings.
"Conspiracy is [the] common design to commit a felony." 38 "[C]onspiracy which
determines criminal culpability need not entail a close personal association or at least an acquaintance
between or among the participants to a crime." 39 "It need not be shown that the parties actually
came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design." 40 "The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from
proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole" as we ruled in People v. Mateo, Jr. 41 Here, it can be deduced from petitioner and his co-
accused's collective conduct, viewed in its totality, that there was a common design, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments in bringing about the crime committed.
Petitioner's guilt was proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He makes capital on the contention that no chocolate boxes were found in his traveling bag
when it was examined at the ICU. He claimed that it was his co-accused Sonny Wong who took charge
in ascribing upon him thepossession of the two chocolate boxes. EcHAaS
Petitioner's contentions fail to persuade.
True, when principal prosecution witness Cinco first testified on June 3, 1992, she declared
that she did not see any chocolate boxes but only personal effects in petitioner's bag. 42 Nonetheless,
she clarified in her succeeding testimony that she recalls taking the two chocolate boxes from
petitioner's bag when they were still atthe counter. This sufficiently explained why Cinco did not find
any chocolate boxes from petitioner's bag when they were at the ICU. 43 To us, this slight clash in
Cinco's statements neither dilute her credibility nor the veracity of her testimony.
The trial court's words on this matter when it resolved petitioner's Demurrer to Evidence
in its Order 44 of February 16, 1993 is quite enlightening. Thus —
In claiming that the evidences [sic] presented by the prosecution is insufficient to
command conviction, the Demurrer went on to say that the testimony of Hilda
Cinco is either conjectural or hearsay and definitely missed its mark in
incriminating accused, Ho Wai Pang, because she even testified that she found
nothing inside thehand-carried luggage of Ho Wai Pang (pp. 48-49, TSN, June 3,
1992). But that was when investigation was going on at the Intensive Counting
Unit (ICU). However, thesame Hilda Cinco later on testified that from the express
lane in going to the ICU, after the discovery of shabu, she was already carrying
with her four (4) chocolate boxes, two of [which] taken from the bag of Tin Sun
Mau and the other two retrieved from the luggage of herein
movant, Ho Wai Pang. Categorically, Cinco admitted it was the reason that
at the ICU, Ho Wai Pang's bag was already empty (pp. 53-54, TSN, June 3, 1992),
but she nonetheless recognized the bag and could recall the owner thereof,
pointing to Ho Wai Pang. Such testimony is not hearsay evidence. They are facts
from the personal perception of the witness and out of her personal knowledge.
Neither is it conjectural. 45 IcaHCS
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is
not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. "In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect
examinations must be calibrated and considered." 46 Also, where there is nothing in the records
which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused,
identification should be given full weight. Here, petitioner presented no evidence or anything to
indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution, Cinco, was moved by any improper motive,
hence her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
Verily, the evidence adduced against petitioner is so overwhelming that this Court is
convinced that his guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing else can speak so
eloquently of his culpability than the unassailable fact that he was caught red-handed in the very
act of transporting, along with his co-accused, shabu into the country. In stark contrast, the evidence
for the defense consists mainly of denials.
Petitioner tried to show that he was not aware of the shabu inside his luggage considering
that his bag was provided by the travel agency. However, it bears stressing that the act of transporting
a prohibited drug is a malum prohibitum because it is punished as an offense under a special law. As
such, the mere commission of the act is what constitutes the offense punished and same suffices to
validly charge and convict an individual caught committing the act so punished regardless of criminal
intent. Moreover, beyond his bare denials, petitioner has not presented any plausible proof to
successfully rebut the evidence for theprosecution. "It is basic that affirmative testimony of persons
who are eyewitnesses of the events or facts asserted easily overrides negative testimony." 47
All told, we are convinced that the courts below committed no error in adjudging
petitioner guilty of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabuinto the country in
violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
 Penalty EN BANC
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we
find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that [G.R. No. L-56291. June 27, 1988.]
at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was
already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. 48The decree provided that for violation of said
Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to CRISTOPHER GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JUDGE of the Court of
P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 49 further introduced new First Instance of Manila, Br. XXIX, respondent.
amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from "life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to
Rene V. Sarmiento for petitioner.
death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million". On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided
by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved. AEDISC
DECISION
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion
perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be
given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its having a less
stricter punishment. PADILLA, J p:
We agree. In People v. Doroja, 50 we held:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order, to annul and set aside
In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) the order dated 23 October 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case No.
that the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused 47622, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Cristopher Gamboa y Gonzales, Accused," and to
than the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded restrain the respondent court from proceeding with the trial of the aforementioned case.
retroactive application, . . . .
Petitioner alleges that:
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy, without a warrant of
retroactive effect", 51 the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper. arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought to Precinct 2, Manila, where he
Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty ofimprisonment, which is reclusion perpetua, as well was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others.
as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to
him. The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner, complainant
Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion." After the identification, the other
WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16, 2006 detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was ordered to stay on. While the complainant was
Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01459 being interrogated by the police investigator, petitioner was told to sit down in front of her.
are AFFIRMED.
On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the
||| (Ho Wai Pang v. People, G.R. No. 176229, [October 19, 2011], 675 PHIL 692-712)
prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case.

On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he
was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, petitioner filed said Motion
predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his
counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.

On 23 October 1980, the respondent court issued the following order (assailed in the petition at bar)
denying the Motion to Acquit:

"For resolution is a motion to acquit the accused based on the grounds that the
constitutional rights of the said accused, to counsel and to due process, have been
violated. After considering the allegations and arguments in support of the said
motion in relation to the evidence presented, the Court finds the said motion to
be without merit and, therefore, denies the same.
 "The hearing of this case for the purpose of presenting the evidence for the
accused is hereby set on November 28, 1980, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning."
Hence, the instant petition.
On 3 March 1981, the Court issued a temporary restraining order "effective as of this date and continuing
until otherwise ordered by the court". 1
Petitioner contends that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion, in issuing the assailed order. He insists that said order, in denying his Motion To Acquit, is null
and void for being violative of his rights to counsel and to due process. 2
We find no merit in the contentions of petitioner.
To begin with, the instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980.
It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common
law traditions. 3 To warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of
jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must be
so patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all, in contemplation of law. 4 This is not the situation in the case at bar. The respondent
court considered petitioner's arguments as well as the prosecution's evidence against him, and required
him to present his evidence.
The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987 Constitution. In a democratic society, like ours, every
person is entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
On the right to counsel, Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, reads:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence."
The same guarantee, although worded in a different manner, is included in the 1987 Constitution. Section
12 (1, 2 & 3), Article III thereof provides:
"Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommumicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such
point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice
of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation,
for the commission of an offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-cited
provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases,
this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may
be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. 5
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not part
of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. The Solicitor
General states: LLphil
"When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had
not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part
of the custodial inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was
held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused
may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United
States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course
of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a
criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by
counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not
have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation
between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was identified in the
police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was,
therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from
what he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used
against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at
that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter
was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to counsel had not
accrued." 6
Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States, petitioner would have no cause
for claiming a violation of his rights to counsel and due process. In Kirby vs. Illinois, 7 the facts of the case
and the votes of the Justices therein are summarized as follows:
"After arresting the petitioner and a companion and bringing them to a police
station, police officers learned that certain items found in their possession had
been stolen in a recent robbery. The robbery victim was brought to the police
station and immediately identified the petitioner and his companion as the
robbers. No attorney was present when the identification was made, and neither
the petitioner nor his companion had asked for legal assistance or had been
advised of any right to the presence of counsel. Several weeks later, the petitioner
and his companion were indicted for the robbery. At trial in an Illinois state court,
the robbery victim testified that he had seen the petitioner and his companion at
the police station, and he pointed them out in the courtroom and identified them
as the robbers. The petitioner and his companion were convicted, and the Illinois
Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the petitioner's conviction, holding that the
constitutional rule requiring the exclusion of evidence derived from out of-court
identification procedures conducted in the absence of counsel did not apply to
preindictment identifications (121 III App 2d 323, 257 NEE 2d 589).
 "On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, although not agreeing on an
opinion, affirmed. In an opinion by STEWART, J., announcing the judgment of the
court and expressing the view of four members of the court, it was held that the
constitutional right to counsel did not attach until judicial criminal proceedings
were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating to out-of-court
identifications in the absence of counsel did not apply to identification testimony
based upon a police station show-up which took place before the accused had
been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.
"BURGER, Ch. J., concurring, joined in the plurality opinion and expressed his
agreement that the right to counsel did not attach until criminal charges were
formally made against an accused.
"POWELL, J., concurred in the result on the ground that the exclusionary rule
should not be extended.
"BRENNAN, J., joined by DOUGHLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented on the grounds
that although Supreme Court decisions establishing the exclusionary rule
happened to involve postindictment identifications, the rationale behind the rule
was equally applicable to the present case.
"WHITE, J., dissented on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions establishing
the exclusionary rule governed the present case." 8
Mr. Justice Steward, expressing his view and that of three other members 9 of the Court, said:
"In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court's
landmark opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158, 53 S Ct 55, 84 ALR
527, it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. See Powell v. Alabama, supra;
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S Ct 1019, 146 ALR 357;
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 7 L Ed 2d 114, 82 S Ct 157; Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct 792, 92 ALR 2d 733; White v. Maryland, 373 US
59, 10 L Ed 2d 193, 83 S Ct 1050; Massiahv. United States, 377 US 201, 12 L Ed
246, 84 S Ct 1199; United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 18 L Ed 1149, 87 S Ct 1926;
Gilbert v. California, 388 US 263, 18 L Ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct 1951; Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 US 1, 26 L Ed 2d 387, 90 S Ct. 1999.
This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to
counsel only at the trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right attaches
at the time of arraignment and the Court has recently held that it exists also at the
time of a preliminary hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. But the point is that,
while members of the court have differed as to existence of the right to counsel
in the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have involved points
of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings —
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment." (Emphasis supplied). 10
As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and beyond the guarantee of
the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. For while, under
the latter, the right to counsel "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him (the accused)," under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to
counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a respondent and, therefore, even before adversary
judicial proceedings against the accused have begun. LibLex
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those under police
investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators that,
while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the
moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even
plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then
and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive
and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to,
and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process
abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 11 The case at bar is far from this situation.
In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an order denying a Motion To
Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon arraignment, the defendant shall
immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both and that, if
the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should
immediately plead, which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is rendered
adversely to the movant (in the motion to quash), he can appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses
or objections (earlier raised in his motion to quash) which would then be subject to review by the appellate
court.
An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is interlocutory and not a
final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such
order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after
trial. As stated inCollins vs. Wolfe, 12 and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco, 13 the accused, after the denial of his
motion to quash, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court below, and if final judgment
is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and, upon such appeal, present the questions which he
sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.
In Acharon vs. Purisima, 14 the procedure was well defined, thus:
"Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal
cases filed against him was denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his
remedy was not to file a petition for certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice
on his part to reiterate the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if,
after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law. This is the procedure that he should have followed
as authorized by law and precedents. Instead, he took the usual step of filing a
writ of certiorari before the Court of First Instance which in our opinion is
unwarranted it being contrary to the usual course of law." 15
Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his rights to counsel and to
due process is a question which he could raise, as a defense or objection, upon the trial on the merits, and,
if that defense or objection should fail, he could still raise the same on appeal.
On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads,
he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except where the
complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. 16
Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested
its case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not applicable, petitioner is deemed to have waived
objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.
Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds provided FIRST DIVISION
in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or information. Consequently, the lower
court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to Acquit.
[G.R. Nos. 91011-12. November 24, 1994.]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 3 March 1981 is LIFTED.
The instant case is remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings to afford the petitioner-
accused the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf. This decision is immediately executory. With PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO MACAM y LONTOC,
costs against the petitioner. EUGENIO CAWILAN, JR. y BELEN, ANTONIO CEDRO y SANTOS, ERNESTO ROQUE y
MARIANO AND DANILO ROQUE y MARIANO, accused. DANILO ROQUE and
SO ORDERED. ERNESTO ROQUE, accused-appellants.
||| (Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, [June 27, 1988], 245 PHIL 598-618)

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; ATTACHES UPON
THE START OF AN INVESTIGATION. — In Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988), we held that the right to
counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions
to elicit information, confessions or admissions from the accused (See also People v. Dimaano, 209 SCRA
819 [1992]).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE IN EXTENDING RIGHT BEFORE TRIAL. — Historically, the counsel guarantee
was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial, inasmuch as the accused was "confronted with
both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of the
changes in patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the
judicial system well before his trial begins (U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 Ct 2568 [1973]). It
is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the
trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the
prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the
trial itself to a mere formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings (U.S. v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926 [1967]).

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; IDENTIFICATION OF UNCOUNSELED ACCUSED,

INADMISSIBLE. — After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused
made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police officers
first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as to impart
improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification. Appellants
were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION, ADMISSIBLE; REASON. — However,
the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellants' identification at the police line-up. Hence,
the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial identification of an uncounseled
accused can not be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not object to the in-court identification made
by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses, who made the identification of appellants at the
police line-up at the hospital, again identified appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-
court identification as being tainted by the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution
need not show that said identifications were of independent origin (Gilber v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L
Ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct 1951 [1967]).

5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; UNLAWFUL ARREST; CURED WHERE ACCUSED VOLUNTARILY
SUBMITTED TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT. — The arrest of appellants was made without the
benefit of a warrant of arrest. However, appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their
arrest. This issue is being raised for the first time by appellants before this Court. They have not moved for
the quashing of the information before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to
their arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial (People v. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990]).
6. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; NEED NOT BE PROVEN BY DIRECT EVIDENCE. — Appellants further contend
that their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, conspiracy not having been established by
positive and conclusive evidence. The presence of conspiracy between appellants and the other accused
and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., were accused of Robbery with Homicide as defined and penalized
can be shown through their conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime (People v.
under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
Dagoma, 209 SCRA 819 [1992]).
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; DENIAL; CANNOT OVERCOME POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. —
Appellant Danilo Roque's denial of his participation in the commission of the crime is not sufficient to
overcome the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who positively identified the former as one of the
persons who entered the Macam's residence, robbed and stabbed the occupants therein.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NO PRESUMPTION OF GUILT AGAINST AN ACCUSED WHO OPTS NOT TO TAKE
THE WITNESS STAND. — Appellant Ernesto Roque did not even testify in his defense at the trial. The
Constitution does not create any presumption of guilt against an accused who opts not to take the witness
stand (Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed 2d 106, 85 S Ct 1229 [1965]). That is his right.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL.
— However, appellant Ernesto Roque cannot rely on the testimony of Danilo Roque because said testimony
failed to rebut and impeach the evidence of the prosecution against both appellants (Cf. Desmond v. U.S.
345 F. 2d 225 [CA 1st 1965]). We agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant Ernesto Roque, while
remaining outside the house of Macam, stood as a look-out, which makes him a direct co-conspirator in the
crime (U.S. v. Santos, 4 Phil. 189 [1905]).
10. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; NOT TWO SEPARATE CRIMES; CASE AT BAR. — Appellants
contend that the crimes committed were robbery and homicide, and not the complex crime of robbery with
homicide. We do not agree. The rule is whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence or on
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of the special crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the
homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide (People v. Veloso, 112
SCRA 173 [1982]; People v. Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [1926]; U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1 [1970]).
11. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; LIABILITY FOR INDEMNITY FOR DEATH IS SOLIDARY; CASE AT BAR. — Lastly, the
award of civil damages made by the trial court is not in accordance with law and jurisprudence. In its
judgment, the trial court disposed in pertinent part as follows: "In Crim. Case Q-53781, the court finds
accused DANILO ROQUE and ERNESTO ROQUE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, . . . and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and each
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P30,000.00, . . . ". The trial court overlooked the rule in
Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code that the principals shall be "severally (in solidum)" liable among
themselves (People v. Hasiron, 214 SCRA 586 [1992]). WHEREFORE, the decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the civil damages awarded in favor of the heirs of Leticia Macam are increased to
P50,000.00; and (2) that the word "each" before "to indemnify the heirs" in the dispositive portion of the
decision is deleted.
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, Quezon City in
Criminal Case No. Q-53781, finding Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
I
In Criminal Case No. Q-53781, appellants, together with Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro
"That on or about the 18th day of August, 1987, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused; conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain, and by means of intimidation and/or violence upon
person, armed with a firearm and bladed weapons, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one BENITO MACAM y SY in the manner as follows:
on the date and in the place aforementioned, the said accused, pursuant to their
conspiracy, entered the residence of said offended party located at No. 43-A Fema
Road, Brgy. Bahay Toro, this City, and thereafter divested the said offended party
of the following properties:
One (1) model .59 cal. 9mm (toygun).
One (1) Walter P 38 cal. 9mm (toygun).
One (1) airgun rifle with leather attache case.
One (1) master CO2 refiller.
One (1) Sony TV antennae.
Three (3) betamax tapes.
One (1) Kenyo betamax rewinder.
One (1) Samsonite attache case.
One (1) set of four pieces of trays.
One (1) Airmail typewriter.
One (1) Sony betamax.
One (1) Sony TV Trinitron.
One (1) chessboard.
One (1) Toyota Crown car bearing plate No. CAS-997.
Assorted jewelry.
Cash money (still undetermined).
One (1) .22 Walter.
valued in the total amount of P454,000.00, more or less, Philippine Currency, and
by reason of the crime of Robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of one Leticia Macam y Tui, thereby inflicting upon her
serious and mortal injuries which were direct and immediate cause (sic) of her
untimely death, and on the occasion of said offense, one Benito Macam y Sy,
Salvacion Enrera y Escota, and Nilo Alcantara y Bautista, all sustained physical
injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of more than thirty
(30) days and which have incapacitated all of them from performing their
 customary labor for the said period of time, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the late LETICIA MACAM y TUI and to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended parties in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of
the Civil Code (Rollo, pp. 3-4).
Together with Criminal Case No. Q-53781, Criminal Case No. Q-53783 was filed against
Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-
Fencing Law (Rollo, p. 31).
Upon being arraigned, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-53781 and Q-53783
pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence on July 4, 1989, accused
Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., assisted by their respective counsels,
changed their plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" (Rollo, p. 23). Consequently, a separate judgment was
rendered sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering each of
them to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs of Leticia Macam without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, but with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs (Rollo, p. 24).
The trial proceeded with respect to Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. and appellants. Of the latter, only
Danilo Roque testified.
On September 26, 1989, the trial court rendered its judgment finding appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case No. Q-53781 and
acquitting Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in Criminal Case No. Q-53783
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).
II
The trial court accepted the prosecution's version as correct and made the following
findings of fact:
"The prosecution evidence, stripped of non-essentials, shows that on
August 18, 1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., Danilo
Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam located at 43 Fema
Road, Quezon City, and that upon arrival at said place, Eduardo Macam, a nephew
of BenitoMacam, entered the house and talked to Benito Macam. Benito then
offered lunch to Eduardo, who told him that he had companions waiting outside.
Benito then told his maid, Salvacion Enrera, to call the said companions of Eduardo
and ask them to enter the house and have their lunch. Salvacion went outside and
called the persons waiting in a tricycle who, she positively identified, were Antonio
Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque. Salvacion Enrera
testified that only Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. and Danilo Roque entered
the house and that Ernesto Roque remained in the tricycle. After Antonio Cedro,
Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. and Danilo Roque had taken their lunch,
Eduardo Macam suddenly grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled
out Benito's gun and after they announced a hold-up, they started ransacking the
place and looking for valuables. After tying up the members of Benito Macam's
household, namely, Leticia Macam, Nilo Alcantara, Salvacion Enrera, and the
children of Benito Macam, the same persons brought them to a room upstairs.
After a while, Leticia Macam, Nilo Alcantara, Salvacion Enrera, and
Benito Macam were taken out of the room and brought to another room where
Leticia Macam was killed and Benito Macam, Nilo Alcantara, and Salvacion Enrera
were stabbed. The prosecution presented as Exhibit "C" a list of the items taken
by the said persons with a total value of P536,700.00.
Nilo Alcantara testified that while he was being brought downstairs by
Antonio Cedro, he saw Leticia Macam being held by Danilo Roque inside the
comfort room and that Danilo Roque told Antonio Cedro that "pare doon mo na
upakan yan." Nilo then testified that he was brought back to a room upstairs
where he suddenly heard a very loud scream from Leticia Macam, after which, he
was suddenly stabbed by Antonio Cedro.
Salvacion Enrera testified that she was brought to another room by
Antonio Cedro where she saw Benito Macam and Nilo Alcantara bloodied from
stab wounds and that she heard a loud scream from Mrs. Leticia Macam prior to
her being stabbed by Danilo Roque (Rollo, pp. 36-37).
III
The version of the defense, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
"In exculpation, the defense in Criminal Case Q-53781 presented its
sole witness accused Danilo Roque, who testified that in the morning of August
18, 1987, while he was driving his tricycle, he was stopped by three persons who,
he came to know only during the trial of this case, were Eduardo Macam, Eugenio
Cawilan, Jr. and Antonio Cedro. According to Danilo Roque, the said persons
stopped him and asked that he bring them to Fema Road for which they were
willing to pay P50.00 and that he agreed to bring them to Fema Road after
Eduardo Macam gave him a calling card. Danilo Roque testified that they stopped
at the residence of BenitoMacam where Eduardo Macam alighted from his
tricycle and entered the compound, and that after a while, he, together with
Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., was called by the maid of
Benito Macam to go in the house and eat. After eating, Danilo stated that he
washed the dishes and swept the floor, when suddenly, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. pulled
out a gun and announced a hold-up and told Danilo to keep silent and just follow
what was asked of him to do. After the said persons tied the occupants of the
house of Benito Macam, they told Danilo to help them gather some of the things
therein, which order, Danilo obeyed for fear of his life. Danilo Roque then testified
that after placing the things in a car parked inside the house, Eduardo Macam said,
"Kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan," and that upon
hearing this, he went out of the house and went home using his tricycle. He
likewise testified that his brother, Ernesto Roque, was not at the said location.
Danilo testified that his brother Ernesto had just arrived from the province on
August 19, 1987 and that he asked Ernesto to go with him to the factory of Zesto
Juice and that while they were at the said factory, where he was told by
Eduardo Macam to get his payment, he and his brother Ernesto were suddenly
apprehended by the security guards. He and Ernesto were then brought to the
Quezon City Headquarters where Danilo alleged (sic) they (Ernesto Roque,
Eduardo Macam, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr., and Antonio Cedro) were forced to admit
certain acts" (Rollo, pp. 34-35).
The issues raised by appellants can be summarized into whether or not (a) their arrest was
valid; and (b) their guilt have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants contend that their arrest without a warrant and their uncounseled
identification by the prosecution witnesses during the police line-up at the hospital are violative of
their constitutional rights under Section 12, Article 3 of the Constitution (Rollo, p. 119).
Appellants gave the following version of the circumstances surrounding their arrests:
". . . , Accused-Appellant Danilo Roque stated that between 4:00
o'clock (sic) and 5:00 o'clock (sic) in the afternoon of August 19, 1987, he and his
brother, Accused-Appellant Ernesto Roque, went to the factory of Accused
Eduardo Macam's father in Kaloocan City to collect the fare of P50.00 from
Accused Eduardo Macam; they were suddenly approached by the security guards
of the factory and brought inside the factory where they were mauled by the
 security guards and factory workers and told they were involved in a robbery-
killing; thereafter, Patrolman Lamsin and his policemen-companions brought
them to the headquarters of the Quezon City Police Department for investigation
and detention; the other Accused, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio
Cawilan, Jr., were in the jail of the Station Investigation Division, the Accused
including Accused-Appellants Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque were forced to
admit to the robbery killing, but Accused-Appellants Danilo Roque and Ernesto
Roque refused to admit they had anything to do with it; then all the Accused were
brought to the Quezon City General Hospital before each of the surviving victims
of the crime charged in handcuffs and made to line up in handcuffs together with
some policemen in civilian clothes for identification by the surviving victims who
the policemen spoke to before all of the Accused were pointed to as the suspects
in the crime charged (TSN, July 12, 1989, pp. 15-18; Rollo, pp. 145-148) (Rollo, pp.
121-122).
It appears that the security guards at the factory of the father of accused
Eduardo Macam detained appellants. They were later brought to the Quezon City Police Headquarters
for investigation. Since they refused to admit their participation in the commission of the crime,
appellants were then brought to the Quezon City General Hospital and were made to line-up together
with several policemen in civilian clothes. Salvacion Enrera, Benito Macam and Nilo Alcantara, who
were confined at the hospital for injuries sustained during the robbery, were asked to pinpoint the
perpetrators. At that time, appellants were handcuffed and bore contusions on their faces caused by
the blows inflicted on them by the police investigators (TSN, July 12, 1989, pp. 15-18).
In Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988), we held that the right to counsel attaches upon
the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information, confessions or admissions from the accused (See also People v. Dimaano, 209 SCRA 819
[1992]).
Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the
trial, inasmuch as the accused was "confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy
of the public prosecutor." However, as a result of the changes in patterns of police investigation,
today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system well before his trial begins
(U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 S Ct 2568 [1973]). It is therefore appropriate to extend
the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement
machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pre-trial
proceedings "where the result might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere
formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings (U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926 [1967]).
After the start of the custodial investigation, any identification of an uncounseled accused
made in a police line-up is inadmissible. This is particularly true in the case at bench where the police
officers first talked to the victims before the confrontation was held. The circumstances were such as
to impart improper suggestions on the minds of the victims that may lead to a mistaken identification.
Appellants were handcuffed and had contusions on their faces.
However, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant's identification at
the police line-up. Hence, the exclusionary sanctions against the admission in evidence of custodial
identification of an uncounseled accused can not be applied. On the other hand, appellants did not
object to the in-court identification made by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution witnesses,
who made the identification of appellants at the police line-up at the hospital, again identified
appellants in open court. Appellants did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by
the illegal line-up. In the absence of such objection, the prosecution need not show that said
identifications were of independent origin (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 18 L Ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct
1951 [1967]).
The arrest of appellants was made without the benefit of a warrant of arrest. However,
appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. This issue is being raised for the
first time by appellants before this Court. They have not moved for the quashing of the information
before the trial court on this ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to their arrest was cured when
they voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not
guilty and by participating in the trial (People v. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990]).
Appellants further contend that their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
conspiracy not having been established by positive and conclusive evidence (Rollo, p. 131).
The presence of conspiracy between appellants and the other accused can be shown
through their conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime (People v. Dagoma, 209
SCRA 819 [1992]).
It is undeniable that appellant Danilo Roque was the tricycle driver, who brought the
accused Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. to the house of Benito Macam. He
contends that he did not know the said accused. Yet, why did he agree to bring them to
the Macam residence when the route going to that place is out of his regular route? Why did he agree
to bring them to that place without being paid the P50.00 as agreed but was merely given a calling
card?
Upon arriving at the residence of Benito Macam, appellant Danilo Roque, together with his
co-accused, went inside the house to eat. He even admitted that after eating, he washed the dishes,
swept the floor and sat on the sofa in the sala instead of going out of the house. This conduct is not in
keeping with his being merely the tricycle driver hired by the accused to transport them to their
destination.
Appellant Danilo Roque was the one who gathered the articles stolen from the house of
the victim and who placed them inside the tricycle. While he claimed that he was merely intimidated
by the accused to do so, his subsequent conduct belied this claim. According to him, he escaped after
hearing accused EduardoMacam tell his co-accused to kill all the possible witnesses who may be asked
to identify them. Yet he continued to ply his route as if nothing unusual happened. How he was able
to escape unnoticed by his co-accused is a puzzle by itself. Likewise, he did not mention the incident
to anyone, not even to his brother, appellant Ernesto Roque, whom he saw the following day. He did
not report the incident to the police. In People v. Logronio, 214 SCRA 519 (1992), we noted: "For
criminals to make an innocent third party a passive and unnecessary witness to their crime of robbing
and killing, and then to let such witness go free and unharmed, is obviously contrary to ordinary
human experience."
Appellant Danilo Roque's denial of his participation in the commission of the crime is not
sufficient to overcome the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, who positively identified the
former as one of the persons who entered the Macam's residence, robbed and stabbed the occupants
therein.
Salvacion Enrera testified that she was stabbed by appellant Danilo Roque. Nilo Alcantara,
likewise, positively identified appellant Danilo Roque as one of those who brought Leticia Macam to
the comfort room, where she was found dead.
Appellant Ernesto Roque did not even testify in his defense at the trial. The Constitution
does not create any presumption of guilt against an accused who opts not to take the witness stand
(Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed 2d 106, 85 S Ct 1229 [1965]). That is his right. However,
appellant Ernesto Roque cannot rely on the testimony of Danilo Roque because said testimony failed
to rebut and impeach the evidence of the prosecution against both appellants (Cf. Desmond v. U.S.
345 F. 2d 225 [CA 1st 1965]). We agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant Ernesto Roque,
while remaining outside the house of Macam, stood as a look-out, which makes him a direct co-
conspirator in the crime (U.S. v. Santos, 4 Phil. 189 [1905]).
Appellants contend that the crimes committed were robbery and homicide, and not the
complex crime of robbery with homicide (Rollo, p. 143). We do not agree. The rule is whenever
 homicide has been committed as a consequence or on occasion of the robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special crime of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that
they endeavored to prevent the homicide (People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173 [1982]; People v. Bautista,
49 Phil. 389 [1926]; U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1 [1907]).
Lastly, the award of civil damages made by the trial court is not in accordance with law and
jurisprudence. In its judgment, the trial court disposed in pertinent part as follows: "In Crim. Case Q-
53781, the court finds accused DANILO ROQUE and ERNESTO ROQUE guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, . . . and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and each to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P30,000.00, ."
(Rollo, pp. 43-44; underscoring supplied). The trial court overlooked the rule in Article 110 of the
Revised Penal Code that the principals shall be "severally (in solidum)" liable among themselves
(People v. Hasiron, 214 SCRA 586 [1992]).
WHEREFORE, the decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the civil
damages awarded in favor of the heirs of Leticia Macam are increased to P50,000.00; and (2) that the
word "each" before "to indemnify the heirs" in the dispositive portion of the decision is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Roque, G.R. Nos. 91011-12, [November 24, 1994])
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85215. July 7, 1989.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON,
Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and
FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION; RIGHT CONSTRUED. — The right against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion ofsubpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the
right to refuse to answer anyparticular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency
to incriminate him for some crime.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TIME TO ASSERT RIGHT. — The right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when aparticular question is addressed
to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the
strength of the constitutional guaranty.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A SELF-EXECUTING RIGHT. — The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing
or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection
does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to
claim it at the appropriate time.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; OTHER RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. — The accused in a criminal case in court has other rights
in the matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled
among others — 1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, and 2) to testify as witness in his
own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however,
his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO BE EXEMPT FROM BEING A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF, CONSTRUED. — The right
of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself" signifies that he
cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one
of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court.
He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself.
In other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify
by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is
put to him — the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the
witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal
to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED BEFORE AND AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN THE COURT. — A person
suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the
following rights in that matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED
IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police:
the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to
force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence
obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — a) to refuse to
be a witness; b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal; c) to testify to his own
behalf, subject to cross-examination by the persecution; d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific
question which tends to incriminate him for some time other than that for which he is prosecuted.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DOES NOT ENCOMPASS STATEMENTS MADE
DURING AN ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY; CASE AT BAR. — Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional
rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not
therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily
answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and
agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial
of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the investigation,
offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his
part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded
to Ramos.
DECISION
NARVASA, J p:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an
individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"accorded by Section 20, Article III of the
Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts
are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its
Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of
plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8, 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten
note 3 reading as follows:
"2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO
SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF
P76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL
ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe Ramos
(Printed) F. Ramos"
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R.
Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA
Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter,
his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the
effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's
findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the
money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his
obligation, and proferred a "compromise . . . to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known
in the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and
that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to
sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the
parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime
of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In
that place and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos) —
". . . with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully .
. . defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, . . . in the following manner,
to wit: said accused . . . having been entrusted with and received in trust fare
tickets of passengers for one-way-trip and round-trip in the total amount of
P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale,
account for it and/or to return those unsold, . . . once in possession thereof and
instead of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there
. . . misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of
P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, . . . failed and refused to make good
his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party . . ."
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the
Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21,
1988, 6 which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9,
1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten
admission . . . given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the
peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons
interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.' "
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony
of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A
and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the
statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an
investigation conducted by the Branch Manager . . . since it does not appear that the accused was reminded
of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and
gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit
K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 . . . for the same
reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel
when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order dated September 14,
1988. 10 In justification of said Order, respondent Judgeinvoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan
Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, Peo. v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, Peo. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and Peo. v.
Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit
precept in the present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL
Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to
him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos
was not detained at the time, or the investigation was administrative in character could not operate to
except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for certiorari and
prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines.
By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on
the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents
from proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People . . . vs. Felipe
Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in
relation to the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial
Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The
comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General
has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and thereafter
judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A'
and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might have
attended the institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de
parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue — of whether or not it was grave abuse of
discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded thePeople's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to
resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11 to which
respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealth with in the section,
namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself — set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935
Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under investigation for
the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of
these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self-incrimination, "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are
now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself."
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."16 It simply secures to a witness, whether
he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer
to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any
other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the
court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey
it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when aparticular question
is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other
officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his
right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the
well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one.
Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in
advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If
not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights.
These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the
first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a
decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense" —
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
each right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him; 22 and

3) any confession obtained in violation of . . . (these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding
against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After
such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by
the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional
rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of
accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has also been more precisely
described by this Court. 28
. . . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee
is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned
and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may
be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and
unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile
to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work.
They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the
detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of their
constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms
them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this
imbalance."
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a
police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself
up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him bybarang, or witchcraft, this
Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination
and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or
already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the
time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a
defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion
to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent
sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer
under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self-incrimination set out in the
first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific
incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or
refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the
Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others —
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and
2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as
any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be
used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself" signifies
that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused,
or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the
Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for
himself. 33 In other words — unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled
to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the
time it is put to him — the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to
take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect
or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify,
then he "may be cross-examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated
in his direct examination, or connected therewith. 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer
any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have
a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of
which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against
self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should
testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he
might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question which
might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in
court, has the following rights in that matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but
after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the
free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT — 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify to his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate
him for some time other than that for which he is prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and
import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them
as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred.
To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The
thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal
principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally
unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation
of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed
apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to
bear on an employee under investigation — or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another
whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person
under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not
because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general,
incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be received against the
makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the
respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is
hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-
R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of
October 26, 1988 having become functus oficio, is now declared of no further force and effect.
||| (People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, [July 7, 1989], 256 PHIL 671-690)

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional
rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not
therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily
answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and
agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial
of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the investigation,
offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his
part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded
to Ramos.

His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger . . (of) the violation of the right of any
person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties,
complaining companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their overeagerness or
zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an
atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy, and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to
the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any
employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant
that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and
opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the
employee under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance
of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at
the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against
him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a
subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making
and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.)
which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's
statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 74123-24. September 26, 1988.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONILO PINLAC Y
LIBAO, accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BE INFORMED;
CONTEMPLATES THE TRANSMISSION OF MEANINGFUL INFORMATION. — When the Constitution requires
a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be
presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE REPETITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, NOT SUFFICIENT. — As a rule,
therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is
entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA
312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2). In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be
informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates
an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial
of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. (Peoplevs. Nicandro,
141 SCRA 289).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, ENTITLES ACCUSED TO
ACQUITTAL. — Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove
compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his
alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also replete with
evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and
tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession. All considered,
We hold that the guilt of the accused (petitioner) has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
After said accused entered a plea of not guilty, the cases proceeded to trial. On March 18, 1986, the trial
court rendered its now assailed decision finding the accused guilty as charged with the dispositive portion
thereof reading as follows:
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLV (145) Makati, Metro Manila dated March 18, 1986
rendered jointly in its Criminal Case No. 10476 and Criminal Case No. 10477, is before Us on automatic
review. Therein, accused Ronilo Pinlac y Libao was charged in two (2) separate information, as follows:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10476
"That on or about the 8th day of April, 1984, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO, with intent to gain and by means of force
and violence upon things, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
enter the house of KOJI SATO, by detaching the four (4) pieces of window jalousies
and destroying the aluminum screens of the servant's quarters and entered
through the same, an opening not intended for entrance or egress, and once
inside, took, robbed and carried away the following articles, to wit:
Cash amount and/or cash money P 180.00
Alba (Seiko) wrist watch 300.00
Gold necklace with pendant
of undetermined value,
to the damage and prejudice of the owner KOJI SATO, in the aforesaid total
amount of P480.00 and a necklace of undetermined value."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10477
"That on or about the 8th day of April, 1984, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO, with intent to gain and by means of
force and violence upon things, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the house of SAEKI OSAMU, by slashing the screen wall of his
house and entered through the same, an opening not intended for entrance or
egress, and once inside, took, robbed and carried away a Hitachi Cassette tape
recorder of undetermined value, belonging to the said SAEKI OSAMU, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof, in the amount of undetermined
value.
"That on the occasion of the said Robbery, the above named accused,
RONILO PINLAC y LIBAO in order to insure the commission of the said Robbery,
with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one SAEKI OSAMU,
several times with a kitchen knife he was then provided with, thereby causing
several mortal wounds on the person of the said SAEKI OSAMU, which directly
caused his death.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
1. In Criminal Case No. 10476 — finding accused, Ronilo Pinlac y Libao, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery, and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the offended
party, Koji Sato, in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00), Philippine
Currency, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. He is credited in the service of his sentence with the full time during which
he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
2. In Criminal Case No. 10477 — finding accused, Ronilo Pinlac y Libao, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing
him to the supreme penalty of DEATH, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Saeki
Osamu, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency, and
to pay the costs."
The facts of the case as summarized by the trial court in its decision are —
"Long before April 1984, two Japanese nationals were neighbors in San Lorenzo
Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
Mr. Koji Sato, 27 years old, married and a mechanical engineer by profession
rented a house at No. 32 Arguilla Street in the said plush subdivision. He was living
alone in said house, although he had a housemaid by the name of Irene Jandayan,
who started working for him in 1981, and a cook by the name of Delia Marcelino.
The latter was employed for almost a year; she went on maternity leave three days
before the end of February 1984, since she was due to deliver a child with her
husband, Pinlac, who had frequently visited her in Sato's place.
A low concrete fence separated the house rented by Sato from that rented by Mr.
Saeki Osamu, 35 years old, whose house is No. 34 in the same street. The latter,
whose wife, Hiroko Saeki, was in the same address but who returned to Japan
sometime after his untimely demise, was a staff member of the Japan
International Cooperation Agency in the Philippines.
April 7, 1984, fell on a Saturday. The following day was Jandayan's day-off.
According to arrangement she was allowed to begin her day-off in the evening of
Saturday.
At around five o'clock in the afternoon of April 7th Sato went out of his house. At
around 6:45 following, Jandayan also left the house in order to go home to
Novaliches, Quezon City. But before leaving the house Jandayan saw to it that the
windows and doors were securely closed and locked. It was only in the morning of
the following Monday that Jandayan returned to her employer's residence.
Returning home at around 11:30 in the evening of the same day, Sato noticed that
the front door was already unlocked. Upon returning to his room upstairs he
discovered that his Walkman transistor which was placed beside his bed was
already missing. He searched for it upstairs, downstairs and around the house. It
was only after entering Jandayan's room that he found his transistor together with
his two wrist watches (he was then wearing one), cigarette lighter and eyeglass
case. Another watch, an Alba Seiko, which he bought in Japan for 7,000 yen (the
approximate equivalent of P300.00), a gold necklace which had sentimental value
because given to him as a gift, and cash money amounting to P180.00, were all
missing. They were never recovered.
Sato thereafter went to the Makati Police Station to report the robbery. He
requested some policemen to repair to his residence to investigate. It was when
the police investigators had already reached his residence that he learned about
the death of Osamu.
On April 8, 1984, police detective Renato Mallari, together with detectives Evelio
Bactad, Alex Samson, Isagani Viclar and police sergeant Vicente Flores, acting upon
a report, went to the Makati Medical Center where Osamu was rushed to.
Learning that Osamu died upon arrival in the hospital, they proceeded to No. 34
Arguilla Street. Thereat Viclar took photographs from different angles of the scene
of the crime. The death weapon, the kitchen knife marked Exhibit "Q" was
recovered from the living room of the house. This was later turned over to the PC
crime laboratory for chemical examination. Blood was scattered in the living room.
The telephone cord in the living room was cut off. Going around the house the
investigators saw the slashed screen wall near the back door. Several footprints
were found in the backyard; these correspond to the impressions of the soles
of Pinlac's shoes (Exhibit R). Osamu's maid, Evelyn Salomea, was investigated. She
revealed that she saw Pinlac enter the house of Sato at seven o'clock in the
evening, although she did not see him leave thereafter; and that Jandayan has
knowledge of the address of Marcelino. Her two statements were introduced in
evidence as Exhibits "Z" and "AA". Subsequently, the policemen went to
Marcelino's residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and, findingPinlac thereat, invited
him to the police station. Detective Samson (who also took the witness stand)
opined that the killer made his entry by removing the panels of jalousies at the
rear of the house and that fingerprints were lifted from the victim's house.
Policemen Mallari submitted his final report Exhibit "X", regarding this incident.
Upon returning to her room at seven o'clock in the morning of April 9, 1984,
Jandayan saw that almost one-half of the jalousies were detached and that her
room was dirty. In the afternoon of the same day (4:35 P.M.) she gave her sworn
statement marked Exhibit "B". She told the investigator that in the morning of April
6 she was called by Pinlac thru the telephone to inform that she had a letter from
his wife. That she had to go to the guardhouse to get the letter from him since he
was not allowed to enter the subdivision; that at eight o'clock in the afternoon of
the same day Pinlac again called her to inquire about her reply; that she again
went to the guardhouse to deliver to Pinlac her reply letter to Marcelino and the
sum of Fifty Pesos which she owed her.
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of April 9th, Sgt. Flores extracted the extra-
judicial confession of Pinlac (Exhibit "F", "F-1" and "F-2")." (pp. 65-67, Rollo)
The foregoing findings of fact are vigorously denied by the accused. His version of the incident is that —
"From 9:00 P.M., on April 7, 1984 up to 11:00 P.M., the accused has never left the
premises of his house; this fact was corroborated by defense witness Barcelino
Heramis who noticed accused's presence in the premises as he and his children
were then practicing their musical instrument that evening.
At about 2:00 P.M., April 9, 1986, three (3) Policemen, came to his house in Taguig
and arrested the accused for robbing Mr. Sato and for killing Mr. Osamu, without
any Warrant of Arrest shown to him despite his demand. Before he was brought
first to the houses of Mr. Sato and Mr. Osamu, walked him around and showed
him the destroyed window; and thereafter brought him inside the house. In short,
he was ordered to reenact according to what the police theorized how the crime
was committed. It was at this moment that the prints of the sole of accused's
shoes were all over the premises of Osamu and Sato's houses.
During the investigation at the Police Headquarters in Makati, Metro Manila, he
was tortured and forced to admit the crimes charged; and as a result of that
unbearable physical torture, his lips and mouth suffered cuts and cracks to bleed
furiously; and that blood dripped into his clothings down to his shoes, thus
explains why there are blood stains in his shoes. Before and during the arrest, the
police officers have never mentioned about the stain of blood in accused's shoes
which they could have easily detected during the arrest. They got his shoes only
after it were stained with blood oozing from accused's lips and mouth as a result
of the injuries he sustained from the torturers.
It was on that evening of April 9, 1986 at about 9:00 o'clock, when accused could
no longer bear the torture starting from 2:00 P.M. for seven (7) solid hours when
he ultimately succumbed to the wishes of his torturers and finally signed a
prepared confession which he was not even allowed to read, nor explained to him.
The police investigators did not even wait in the following morning for the accused
 to sign the same considering that said confession was subscribed only on the showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation
following day April 10, 1986 by a certain Assistant Fiscal."(pp. 53-54, Rollo) cannot be admitted in evidence.

In assailing his conviction, the accused (now petitioner) contends that the trial court erred in admitting in Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the
evidence his extra-judicial confession, which was allegedly obtained thru force, torture, violence and accused during custodial investigation was inadmissible, although he had been
intimidation, without having been apprised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, for the reason that
counsel. the prosecution failed to show that those rights were explained to him, such that
it could not be said that "the appraisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently
Numerous factors combine to make the appeal meritorious. The prosecution evidence leaves much to be understood" by the accused." (People vs. Nicandro supra)
desired. No direct evidence or testimony of any eyewitness was presented identifying the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime charged. The only evidence furnished by the police authorities were merely Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with
circumstantial evidence regarding the fingerprints of the accused found in the window stabs of the maid's these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver
quarters and in the kitchen cabinet in the house of Mr. Sato. But this was satisfactorily explained by the was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was
accused to the effect that aside from being a frequent visitor in the house of Mr. Sato where his wife works not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7)
as a cook wherein at those times he could have unknowingly left his fingerprints, but most especially during solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.
the time when he was arrested and ordered to reenact. In the process he held some of these window slabs,
walls, furniture, etc., in accordance with the order of the arresting officer. The only evidence presented by On June 23, 1987, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of brief, praying that the
the prosecution which could have been fatal, is the extra-judicial confession of the accused, which is now judgment of conviction be reversed and the accused be acquitted of the crime charged.
being assailed as violative of the Constitution.
All considered, We hold that the guilt of the accused (petitioner) has not been established beyond
In the case of People vs. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770, promulgated on March 20, 1985, which cited the case reasonable doubt.
of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, this Court reiterated the correct procedure for peace officers to
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation. Therein, We said —
SO ORDERED.
"7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of ||| (People v. Pinlac y Libao, G.R. Nos. 74123-24, [September 26, 1988], 248 PHIL 114-123)
arrest, . . . He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or
by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see
to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless SECOND DIVISION
it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
[G.R. No. 101808. July 3, 1992.]
or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMON BOLANOS, accused-
in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence." (pp. 19-20, 139 SCRA). appellant.
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather
than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA
312; People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2). In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be
informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates SYLLABUS
an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial
of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. (People vs. Nicandro,
141 SCRA 289). 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF PERSON UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; RULE. —
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police
"The Fiscal has the duty to adduce evidence that there was compliance with the Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his
duties of an interrogating officer — As it is the obligation of the investigating Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides: "(1) Any
officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have
counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel,
by the investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. "(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of
this section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their
families."
abusive; this statement of the accused was considered admissible in evidence
against him by the Court because it was given freely and before the investigation.
"The foregoing circumstances clearly lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that
the accused Ramon Bolanos is guilty of having killed the victim Oscar Pagdalian."
(Judgment, p. 6)

A Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), was filed by the Solicitor General's Office, dated April 2, 1992,
with the position that the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of
appellant while on board the police patrol jeep. Said office even postulated that: "(A)ssuming that it was
DECISION given, it was done in violation of appellant's Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent and to have
a counsel of his choice, while already under police custody." (Manifestation, p. 4)

PARAS, J p:
This is a review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal
Case No. 1831-M-90, for "Murder", wherein the accused-appellant, Ramon Bolanos was convicted, as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the Crime of Murder and the Court hereby imposed upon the accused
Ramon Bolanos the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay
the heirs of the victim P50,000.00. With Costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Judgment, p. 6)
The antecedent facts and circumstances, follow:
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Patrolmen Marcelo J. Fidelino and
Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police (INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, Calixto Guinsaya, and Dr. Benito
Caballero, Medico-Legal Officer of Bocaue, Bulacan and documentary exhibits. The testimonial evidence
were after the fat narration of events based on the report regarding the death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian
which was communicated to the Police Station where the two (2) policemen who responded to the incident
are assigned and subsequently became witnesses for the prosecution. (Appellant's Brief, p. 2)
Patrolmen Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao testified that they proceeded to the scene of the crime
of Marble Supply, Balagtas, Bulacan and upon arrival they saw the deceased Oscar Pagdalian lying on an
improvised bed full of blood with stab wounds. They then inquired about the circumstances of the incident
and were informed that the deceased was with two (2) companions, on the previous night, one of whom
was the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased and another companion (Claudio Magtibay)
till the wee hours of the following morning, June 23, 1990. (Ibid., p. 3) prLL
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police
Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his
Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. cdphil
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
"(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section
as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices
and their families." (Emphasis supplied)
Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner by which confession can
be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the
police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides appellant's conviction was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review.
WHEREFORE, finding that the Constitutional rights of the accused-appellant have been violated, the
appellant is ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

The corroborating testimony of Patrolmen Francisco Dayao, further indicated that when they apprehended ||| (People v. Bolanos, G.R. No. 101808, [July 3, 1992])
the accused-appellant, they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly
seated; that they boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the police vehicle and brought them to
the police station. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos accordingly admitted that
he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive." (Ibid., p. 4)

During the trial, it was clearly established that the alleged oral admission of the appellant was given without
the assistance of counsel as it was made while on board the police vehicle on their way to the police station.
The specific portion of the decision of the court a quo reads as follows:

". . . the police boarded the two, the accused Ramon Bolanos and Claudio
Magtibay in their jeep and proceeded to the police station of Balagtas, Bulacan to
be investigated, on the way the accused told the police, after he was asked by the
police if he killed the victim, that he killed the victim because the victim was
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 116437. March 3, 1997.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAN y
HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Miguel P. Pineda for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION;
RATIONALE FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE THEREON. — Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision
is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation
procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. The
incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscure a later judicial
determination of what really transpired.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BEGINS WHEN THE INVESTIGATION STARTS TO FOCUS ON A PARTICULAR PERSON AS A
SUSPECT. — It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police
authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such
other police agencies in our government."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCLUSIONARY RULE; NOT APPLICABLE TO THE SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT MADE BY THE
ACCUSED WHICH WERE NOT ELICITED THROUGH QUESTIONING BY THE AUTHORITIES; CASE AT BAR. —
Under the circumstances in this case, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before
the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over
the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police
authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to
confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held
that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally
admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use
of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO CONFESSIONS MADE BY THE ACCUSED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS
BY NEWS REPORTERS; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly
admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any
other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. Clearly, appellant's
confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities.
The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under
the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They
did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did
appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the
details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news
reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the
interview of appellant by the news reporters.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not
covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of theConstitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that
may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. Governmental
power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against
aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; ABSENCE OF SPERMATOZOA DOES NOT NEGATE THE COMMISSION THEREOF. —
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the
commission of rape nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. What is essential
is that there be penetration of the female organ no matter how slight.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p :
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of oneMarianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her
consent; and the above-named accused in order to suppress evidence against him
and delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y Reyes, attack,
assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused
her death.
 Contrary to Law." 1
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision,
Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School
of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her
final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and
brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00
in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He used the
pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her
blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the
house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust
sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there
until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The
yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant
lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence
to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He
heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of
the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked
from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with
a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries" sustained
as follows:
"1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally
oblique from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular,
approximate 3 inches in width, from right MCL
to left AAL.
2.7. elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline
lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st
and 2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia,
introitus and exposed vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed
negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr.
Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to
Traumatic Injuries, Face." 3
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to
form a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body
was found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be
blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. 4
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen
in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the
stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left
without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair
of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes
were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to appellant. 5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan.
On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house.
They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was
interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police
confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen,
appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that
he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of
Marianne. 6 Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up
earlier, were likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house,
leaned over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as
belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other suspects
holding the bags. 7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The following day, February
25, a physical examination was conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran. 8 Appellant was found to sustain:
"HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with
abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index
finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt." 9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting
the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor
led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin
mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room
to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to
assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own
wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show
them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely
implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also said that the devil entered his
mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession,
appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. 13 His confession was captured on
videotape and covered by the media nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more
newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his
confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of
February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his
nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their
one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went
to Manila to collect some debts while he and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his father
cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there until February
24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the rooms, the policemen
covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped
and killed Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected something into
his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house
where he saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at
the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he
was told. 17 cdt
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him to death pursuant
to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby"
is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the
Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659
(Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous
crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the
family of Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of Marianne
Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental expenses and
P100,000.00 as moral damages. After automatic review of this case and the
decision becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED." 18
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
"I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT
OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS
AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE
EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED." 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the
investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial
oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and
reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news
reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section
12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . ."
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed
of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 20 Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against
him. 21 The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado character of
custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really
transpired. 23

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator
starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As
intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities
which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other
police agencies in our government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of
Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents'
house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the
crime, viz:
"COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this
act?
WITNESS First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the
house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen,
and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his other
companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who
cannot be found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown,
sir.
Q So you had a possible suspect?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then, what else did you do?
A We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned
that his parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there,
found him there and investigated him and in fact during the
investigation he admitted that he was the culprit." 26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the
police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and
interrogated. 27 His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered
from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
"Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags
marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where
did he point these bags?
A At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the
canal of the toilet.
Q In other words, you were given information where these two (2) bags were
located?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you
do?
A We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know
where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the
place where the bags were located?
A After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really
showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir." 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted
evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the
appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and
appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad
testified, viz:
"Mayor Trinidad: . . . During the investigation when there were already
many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and
requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I
brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of
Police, mayor?
A While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo
ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when
he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the
door to allow the media to hear what he was going to say and I asked
him again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This
was even covered by a television camera." 30
xxx xxx xxx
Q During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you
something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of
the Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed
Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako
ang pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he told
you?
A The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the
second one was before the media people, sir.
Q What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?
A These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making
further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what
he was going to say, sir." 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor
is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police
authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to
confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held
that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally
admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use
of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held
that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed
appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his
confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. 38 Orlan
Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He
testified that:
"Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place
where the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your
interview, in what particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my news gathering and interview inside the police
station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have
mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one who
raped and killed the victim and I also learned from him that the victim
was his cousin.
Q And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for
raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his
admission was voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or
violence that was committed on his person because I knew that there
were five other suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting
it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was under the
influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle
beside him at the time that you asked the question?
A The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall
anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place
of the crime scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides
but . . . All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station
Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening nature of
investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was
able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me
that he was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage
of accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment
and everything that transpired during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.
Q Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the
accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag
PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who accompanied you?
A I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and
some of the relatives of the accused.
Q At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.
Q How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?
A There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at
that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag
police, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion,
Baliuag, Bulacan, what transpired?
A I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was
committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old
house where I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate
to me and show me how he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne
Guevarra, sir.
Q Did he voluntarily comply?
A Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag
up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
A Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings for three successive
days. 40 His testimony is as follows:
"Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation
so that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.
Q Were there people?
A The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief
of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and
several other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented
 the suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that he was the one A As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
who killed Marianne. I reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you
aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a xxx xxx xxx." 41
capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994. 42 He also
said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did it and
testified that:
he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
"Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the
Q And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?
permission that you asked from him?
A Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures
A Yes, sir.
of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the
group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and Q And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
the suspect answered the same.
A The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag,
Q Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned? the chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of
police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
A The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the
Q You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you
accused?
affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?
A There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There
Court: Use the vernacular.
were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.
A I asked him the question, after asking him the question, "Ikaw ba talaga and
Q How about the other representatives from the media?
gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne?" Ang sagot nya,
"Oo." "Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, A Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there
inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw ang gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay were people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
Q How about Channel 7?
xxx xxx xxx
A They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
Q You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also
A I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped present?
his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the
pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to A Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the
him, reads almost everyday before the crime. wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from
the questions that I asked from the people there they told me that she
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court is the wife, sir.
and the public what was the physical condition of accused
Pablito Andan? Q How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?

A As I observed him that time there was no sign on his body that he was really A I do not know the others, sir, but there were many people there, sir.
down physically and I think he was in good condition.
Q Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we
Court: So he was not happy about the incident? know what question did you ask and the answer.

A He even admitted it, your Honor. A My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."

Court: He was happy? Q What was the next question?

A He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it. A I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a
tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on
Court: Was he crying? the stomach.
A As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear Q What was the next question that you asked him?
that fell on his face.
A He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim
Court: Was he feeling remorseful? was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
 Q Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on
that?
A Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q Were there other questions propounded by you?
A Yes, sir.
Q "Ano iyon?"
A He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the
fence?
A I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx." 43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the
police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They
were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's
confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the
commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed
him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his
guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives.
There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of
the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and
the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48 cdt
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical evidence against him. Dr.
Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and
found no spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly, the minimal blood found
in her vagina could have been caused by her menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of
spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
"Hymen — contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and
3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the clock." 51
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been caused by an object forcibly
inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His
testimony is as follows:
"Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6
o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . .
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the
lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it into writing
as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver
was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor the body was
autopsied first before you did your re-autopsy?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have
been sustained on account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim
which was already dead, no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated
wounds could produce blood because there is no more circulation, the
circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor
examined the victim with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal
retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is
impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by
those instruments because the victim was already dead and usually in
a dead person we do not produce any bleeding.
Q What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted
blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the walls of the
clock could have been inflicted or could have been sustained while the
victim was alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated
wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch you have just drawn
and indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the
clotted blood?
A This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6
o'clock. I found the blood clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found
on the edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Q What could have caused those lacerations?
A Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that
small opening of the hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the
hymen, sir.
Q If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
A It is possible, sir. 53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the
commission rape 54 nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is
essential is that there be penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that
the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh
and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are supported by other
evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in their house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a meter away from the
wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been dragged over a flat rough
surface. 60 This supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was
found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive for the presence of
blood type "B," the probable blood type of the victim. 61Marianne's exact blood type was not determined
but her parents had type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to be
type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and were later found at his
parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan; 65
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial evidence justify the
conviction of appellant.
Appellant's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the test
of physical improbability at the time of the commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few
kilometers away from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case
No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant PablitoAndan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court,
however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as
actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Andan y Hernandez, G.R. No. 116437, [March 3, 1997], 336 PHIL 91-117)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 97214. July 18, 1994.]
ERNESTO NAVALLO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SANDIGANBAYAN; ARRAIGNMENT OF ACCUSED AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DOES
NOT DEPRIVE THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF ITS JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE; CASE AT BAR. — Presidential
Decree No. 1606 is explicit and clear. Sections 4 and 8 of the law provide that a case falling under the
jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan shall be transferred to it so long as the accused has not as yet been
properly arraigned elsewhere on the date of effectivity of the law, i.e., on 10 December 1978. The accused
is charged with having violated paragraph 4, Article 217, of the Revised Penal Code, an offense which falls
under Title VII of the Revised Penal Code and, without question, triable by the Sandiganbayan. Navallo's
arraignment before the Regional Trial Court on 18 July 1985 is several years after Presidential Decree No.
1606, consigning that jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan, had become effective.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; REQUISITES. — Double jeopardy requires
the existence of the following requisites: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge
is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction: (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3)
The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or
acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent. When all the above elements are present, a
second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a
frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in,
the first offense charged, can rightly be barred.
3. ID.; ID.;. ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted
an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover,
neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
4. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; RIGHT NOT AVAILABLE WHERE
ONE IS UNDER NORMAL AUDIT EXAMINATION. — Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his
constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. Well-settled is the rule that such
rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation,"
which we have since defined as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." A person
under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly
be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation
of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied
by his own testimony.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; MALVERSATION; PRESUMED WHERE PUBLIC OFFICER FAILED TO ACCOUNT PUBLIC
FUNDS OR PROPERTY WHICH HE IS CHARGED WITH. — Accused-petitioner challenges the sufficiency of
evidence against him. Suffice it to say that the law he contravened itself creates a presumption of evidence.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states that "(t)he failure of a public officer to have dully forthcoming
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use." An accountable
officer, therefore, may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation
as long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to explain.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL.
— Findings of facts made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal
and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case,
those findings should not be ignored. We see nothing on record in this case that can justify a deviation from
the rule.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
On 11 May 1978, an information charging petitioner with having violated Article 217, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Surigao del Norte (docketed
Criminal Case No. 299). It read:
"That on or before January 27, 1978 in the municipality of del Carmen, Province
of Surigao del Norte and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
who is the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational
School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte and while a
Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the aforestated school therefore was holding
in trust moneys and/or properties of the government of the Republic of the
Philippines and holding in trust public funds with all freedom, intelligence, criminal
intent and intent of gain, did then and there voluntarily, unlawfully, feloniously
and without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate to his own private
benefit, public funds he was holding in trust for the Government of the Philippines
in the total sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS and
SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P16,483.62), Philippine Currency, which total sum accused
failed to account during an audit and failed as well to restitute despite demands
by the office of the Provincial Auditor, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government equal to the amount misappropriated.
"Act contrary to par. 4 of Article 217, of the Revised Penal Code with a penalty
of Reclusion Temporal, minimum and medium periods and in addition to penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and fine as provided in the same Article." 1
A warrant of arrest was issue, followed by two alias warrants of arrest, but accused-petitioner
Ernesto Navallo still then could not be found.
Meanwhile, on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating
the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public
officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later released on provisional liberty
upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") on 18 July
1985, he pleaded not guilty. On 22 May 1986, upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case
and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. On 27 January 1989, Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quinones-
Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to
the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the
Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was docketed (Criminal Case No. 13696)
with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by theSandiganbayan. The warrant was
returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. The bond,
having been later found to be defective, on 30 August 1989, a new bond was approved and transmitted to
the Sandiganbayan. prcd
Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense
and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the
attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. On 15 September
1989, theSandiganbayan issued a resolution denying Navallo's motion. On 20 October 1989, Navallo was
arraigned; he pleaded, "not guilty," to the charge. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution:
On 27 January 1978, the Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Norte, Antonio Espino, made a preliminary audit
examination of cash and other accounts of Ernesto Navallo(then Collecting and Disbursing Officer of
Numancia National Vocational School). Espino found Navallo to be short of P16,483.62. The auditor,
however, was then merely able to prepare a cash count sheet since he still had to proceed to other
municipalities. Before departing, Espino sealed the vault of Navallo.
On 30 January 1978, Leopoldo a. Dulguime was directed by Espino to complete the preliminary examination
and to conduct a final audit. Dulguime broke the seal, opened the vault, and made a new cash count.
Dulguime next examined the cashbook of Navallo. Dulguime did not examine the official receipts reflected
in the cashbook, said receipts having been previously turned over to the Office of the Provincial Auditor.
After the audit, he had the cashbook likewise deposited with the same office. The audit covered the period
from July 1976 to January 1978 on the basis of postings and record of collections certified to by Navallo.
Dulguime made a Report of Examination and wrote Navallo a letter demanding the restitution of the missing
amount. The latter neither complied nor offered any explanation for the shortage. The official receipts and
cashbook, together with some other records, were subsequently lost or damaged on account of a typhoon
that visited the province.
Evidence for the Defense:
The accused, Navallo, testified that in 1970, he was a Clerk I in the Numancia National Vocational School. In
1976, he was appointed Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the school. His duties included the collection
of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of
collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. Even while he had not yet received his appointment
papers, he, together with, and upon the instructions of, Cesar Macasemo (the Principal and Navallo's
predecessor as Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the school), was himself already doing entries in the
cashbook. Navallo and Macasemo thus both used the vault. Navallo said that he stated the job of a
disbursement officer in June 1977, and began to discharge in full the duties of his new position (Collection
and Disbursement Officer) only in 1978. There was no formal turn over of accountability from Macasemo
to Navallo.
Gainsaying the prosecution's evidence, Navallo continued that the charge against him was motivated by a
personal grudge on the part of Espino. On 25 January 1978, he said, he was summoned to appear at the
Numancia National Vocational School where he saw Espino and Macasemo. The safe used by him and by
Macasemo was already open when he arrived, and the cash which was taken out from the safe was placed
on top of a table. He did not see the actual counting of the money and no actual audit of his accountability
was made by Espino. Navallo signed the cash count only because he was pressured by Macasemo who
assured him that he (Macasemo) would settle everything. The collections in 1976, reflected in the
Statement of Accountability, were not his, he declared, but those of Macasemo who had unliquidated cash
advances. prLL
Navallo admitted having received the demand letter but he did not reply because he was already in Manila
looking for another employment. He was in Manila when the case was filed against him. He did not exert
any effort to have Macasemo appear in the preliminary investigation, relying instead of Macasemo's
assurance that he would settle the matter. He, however, verbally informed the investigating fiscal that the
shortage represented the unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo.
The Appealed Decision:
On 08 November 1990, after evaluation the evidence, the Sandiganbayan reached a decision, and it
rendered judgment, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERNESTO NAVALLO y GALON GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of malversation of public funds
defined and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code.
"Accordingly and there being no modifying circumstances nor reason negating the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, the Court imposes
upon the accused the indeterminate sentence ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to SIXTEEN (160 YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of reclusion temporal as maximum; the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification, and a fine in the amount of SIXTEEN
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS AND SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS
(P16,483.62), Philippine Currency.
"The Court further orders the accused to restitute the amount malversed to the
Government.
"SO ORDERED." 2
Accused-petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its resolution of 05
February 1991.
Hence, the instant petition.
Four issues are raised in this appeal —
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the offense filed against
petitioner in spite of the fact that long before the law creating the Sandiganbayan took effect, an
Information had already been filed with the then Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte.
2. Whether or not double jeopardy set in when petitioner was arraigned by the Regional Trial Court on July
18, 1985.
3. Whether or not petitioner was under custodial investigation when he signed the certification prepared
by State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.
4. Whether or not the guilt of petitioner has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt
as to warrant his conviction for the offense imputed against him. Cdpr
We see no merit in the petition.
On 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect providing, among other things, thusly:
"SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
"(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
"(b) Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and
"(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public offices or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office."
"xxx xxx xxx
"SECTION 8. Transfer of cases. — As of the date of the effectivity of this decree,
any case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where
none of the accused has been arraigned shall be transferred to
the Sandiganbayan."
The law is explicit and clear. A case falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be transferred
to it so long as the accused has not as yet been properly arraigned elsewhere on the date of effectivity of
the law, i.e., on 10 December 1978. The accused is charged with having violated paragraph 4, Article 217,
of the Revised Penal Code —
"ARTICLE 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of
Malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take
or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially,
or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds
or property, shall suffer:
"xxx xxx xxx
"4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua."
an offense which falls under Title VII of the Revised Penal Code and, without question, triable by
the Sandiganbayan. Navallo's arraignment before the RTC on 18 July 1985 is several years
after Presidential Decree No. 1606, consigning that jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan, had become
effective.
Accused-petitioner, invoking Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Court, pleads double jeopardy. We
cannot agree. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:
(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his
express consent.
When all the above elements are present, a second prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an
attempt to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which
necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense charged, can rightly be barred.
In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused
which by then had already been conferred on theSandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there
terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution. 3 Well-settled is the rule that such rights are invocable only when the accused is
under "custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," 4 which we have since defined as any
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 5 A person under a normal audit examination is
not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law
enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been
"pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own
testimony. To quote:
"Q. How were you pressured?
"A. Mr. Macasemo told me to sign the report because he will be the one to settle
everything.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q. Why did you allow yourself to be pressured when you will be the one
ultimately to suffer?
"A. Because he told me that everything will be all right and that he will be the one
to talk with the auditor.
"Q. Did he tell you exactly what you will do with the auditor to be relieved of
responsibility?
"As to the collections made in 1976 which Navallo denied having made, the
evidence of the prosecution shows that he assumed the office of Collecting and
Disbursing Officer in July 1976 and the cashbook which was examined during the
audit contained entries from July 1976 to January 1978, which he certified
to. Navallo confirmed that indeed he was appointed Collecting and Disbursing
Officer in 1976.
"Finally, the pretense that the missing amount was the unliquidated cash advance
of Macasemo and that Navallo did not collect tuition fees in 1976 was advanced
for the first time during the trial, that is, 12 long solid years after the audit on
January 30, 1978. Nothing was said about it at the time of the audit and
immediately thereafter."
Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results
of the case, those findings should not be ignored. We see nothing on record in this case that can justify
a deviation from the rule. Cdpr
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

"A. No, your honor. ||| (Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 97214, [July 18, 1994])

"Q. Why did you not ask him?

"A. I was ashamed to ask him, your Honor, because he was my superior." 6

Navallo may have been persuaded, but certainly not pressured, to sign the auditor's report.
Furthermore, Navallo again contradicted himself when, in his very petition to this Court, he stated:

"Bearing in mind the high respect of the accused with his superior officer and
taking favors that his superior officer has extended him in recommending him the
position he held even if he was not an accountant, he readily agreed to sign the
auditor's report even if he was not given the opportunity to explain the alleged
shortage." 7

Finally, accused-petitioner challenges the sufficiency of evidence against him. Suffice it to say that the law
he contravened itself creates a presumption of evidence. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states that
"(t)he failure of a public officer to have dully forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use." An accountable officer, therefore, may be convicted of
malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long as there is evidence of shortage
in his accounts which he is unable to explain. 8 Not least insignificant is the evaluation of the evidence of
the Sandiganbayan itself which has found thusly:

"The claim that the amount of the shortage represented the unliquidated cash
advance of Macasemo does not inspire belief. No details whatsoever were given
by the accused on the matter such as, for instance, when and for what purpose
was the alleged cash advance granted, what step or steps were taken
by Navallo or Macasemo to liquidate it. In fact, Navallo admitted that he did not
even ask Macasemo as to how he (Navallo) could be relieved of his responsibility
for the missing amount when he was promised by Macasemo that everything
would be all right. When Navallo was already in Manila, he did not also even write
Macasemo about the shortage.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74517. February 23, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENNY DY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
At around midnight of 7 May 1984, death cast its shadow over Boracay Island, an internationally known
tourist spot famous for its powdery white sand beach. The Island is accessible by land from Kalibo, Aklan,
after a one-and-a-half hour trip. It can also be reached in twenty (20) minutes by pumpboat from Barangay
Caticlan, the loading point for tourists going to the Island. Caticlan has a small airfield which can service
small planes. Felled by a gunshot wound on the neck, which caused his death approximately, six (6) hours
later, was Christian Langel y Philippe a Swiss tourist who was vacationing on the Island together with his
sister and some friends.
The following day, 8 May 1984, the following police report was entered as Entry No. 3904 in the police
blotter of the Malay Police Sub-station, Malay, Aklan:
"That on or about 0700H 8 May 1984, Pat. Padilla RR reported (to) this sub-station
with the living body of one Benny Dy, with caliber .38 Danao made, as suspect to
the shooting incident at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc, Malay, Aklan, which cause(d)
the untimely death of one Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a
Swiss nationale. Pat. Salibio rushed to the hospital at Caticlan to obtain ante-
mortem but the victim died at about 0600H in the morning. Suspect
Benny Dy voluntarily surrendered to the sub-station commander with his caliber
38 with serial number 33169 Smith and Wesson (US), [Exhibit 'G']."
Acting on the report, Chief of Police Tambong, also on 8 May 1984, prepared a Complaint (Exhibits "H" and
"H-1") charging the Accused, Benny Dy, the owner of "Benny's Bar," situated on the Island, with the crime
of "Murder With the Use of Unlicensed Firearms" (ibid., p. 2, Original Record). The Complaint was subscribed
and sworn to before Judge Jaime R. Tonel of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, on 17
May 1984 (Exhibit "H-2") and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1776 of that Court on the same day (Exhibit
"H-3", Order, p. 4, Original Record).
The witnesses listed in that Complaint, namely, Bernadette Langel of Chatelaine Geneve, Switzerland, who
is the victim's sister, and Ian Mulvey, of Essex, England, executed separate Sworn Statements giving their
respective versions of the incident (Exhibits "H-4" and "H-7"). They did not take the stand, however, "for
fear of reprisal" so that said Statements were correctly considered by the Trial Court as hearsay.
On 17 May 1984, Judge Tonel issued the following:
"ORDER
"Having conducted the preliminary examination of this case, this Court finds
probable cause that the crime as charged has been committed and that the
accused may be responsible thereof.
WHEREFORE, let the records of this case be registered in the docket. No warrant
of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is
already under police custody before the filing of the complaint. For the provisional
liberty of the accused, bail is hereby fixed in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00)." (p. 4, Original Record)
The Accused posted the required bail on 13 June 1984, which was approved by Judge Tonelon the same
day. On 12 July 1984 the records of the case were forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Kalibo,
Aklan, "for further proceedings" (Order, p. 10, Original Record)
On 27 July 1984 the Provincial Fiscal filed the Information before the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
charging the Accused with Murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2001 in that Court.
After trial, the lower Court rendered judgment* on 9 December 1985 with the following decretal portion:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused BENNY DY y LIM
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs, for the
death of the victim, in the sum of P30,000.00; actual damages of P33,243.10;
moral damages of P30,000.00; exemplary damages of P30,000.00; and to pay the
costs."
Hence, this appeal. The last Brief before this Court was filed on 26 February 1987 and the case was
deliberated upon on 25 January 1988.
Testifying for the prosecution in the Court below, one Wilson TUMAOB, a resident in the area, and a
fisherman by occupation, gave his account of the incident as follows:
"At around 12:00 midnight while inside the bar, he saw the accused
Benny Dy shoot a white person, (meaning a European) who was hit on the right
side of the neck (Tsn. Nov. 12, 1984, pp. 78, 80). He recognized the accused as the
one who shot the white person because of the light coming from the petromax
lamp which was in front of him and he was just one-and-one-half meters from the
accused and about the same distance from the victim (Tsn. Nov. 12, 1984, p. 81).
When he saw the accused shoot the victim, he did not hear any conversation
between them (Tsn. Nov. 14, 1984, pp. 81, 82). At that precise time, there were
many people of different nationalities coming in and out of the bar. He did not
know anyone of them except the accused Benny Dy (Tsn. Nov. 14, 1984, p. 108).
Neither did he know the helpers in the bar, nor see anyone of these customers to
be residents of, or friends of his from, barrio Balusbos, Malay, where he resides.
"In the courtroom during the trial, the witness Wilson Tumaob demonstrated how
the accused shot the victim.
Q. When you said you saw Benny Dy shoot the victim, can you
demonstrate to the Court how he did it?
A. (As demonstrated, the victim and the accused were sitting and facing
then immediately the accused stood up and shot the victim.
(Tsn. Nov. 14, 1984, pp. 117, 118).
Wilson Tumaob testified that the accused was about one meter from the
victim when the accused shot the latter. The table where he was sitting
was parallel to the table where the victim was sitting. He was looking at
the accused and victim when he saw the accused shoot the victim, and
the chair occupied by him and the chair occupied by the victim were at
the same side. (Tsn. Nov. 14, 1984, pp. 119-120). After shooting the
 victim, the accused remained at the place where the accused was A I called one of the policemen to accompany me.
standing. (Tsn. Nov. 14, 1984. p. 118).
Q What is the name of the policeman who accompanied you?
"The victim was carried by the victim's companions to the shore and they loaded
him on a pumpboat which was anchored about fifty meters from the bar. Wilson A Pat. Manuel Casimiro.
Tumaob helped in carrying the victim to the pumpboat to be brought to the
hospital in Caticlan (Tsn. Nov. 12, 1984, pp. 82, 83). After the incident the eye- Q Were you able to get the gun from the house of Benny Dy together with your
witness (Wilson Tumaob) went home and slept at around 1:30 in the morning of companion Pat. Manuel Casimiro?
May 8, 1984. (pp. 4-5, Annex '1', Appellant's Brief)."
A Benny Dy voluntarily gave the gun to us.
Additional prosecution evidence is to the effect that in the early morning after the incident, the Accused
Q So do we understand from you that it was Benny Dy also together with your
confessed orally to Pat. Rodolfo Padilla, the operator of the radio station on the Island, and voluntarily
companion Manuel Casimiro who gave or surrendered the gun to you?
surrendered the gun he had used in shooting the victim. Pat. Padilla's testimony reads in part:
"ATTY. MARIN:
"ATTY. RESURRECCION:
Benny Dy voluntarily gave the gun to him and Pat. Casimiro.
Q Sometime on May 8, 1984, can you tell the Honorable Court if you have met the
accused Benny Dy? "COURT TO THE WITNESS:
A At home after coming from the radio station, Benny Dy came to me and inquired Q Where did Benny Dy give to you and Pat. Manuel Casimiro the gun that is
if the Office of the Chief of Police was opened? surrendered to you?
Q And what did you answer him when the accused asked you that? A In their house.
A I answered him that the Office of the Chief of Police is opened for twenty four "COURT:
hours.
Proceed.
Q Did you ask Benny Dy why he asked you if the Office of the Chief of Police was
opened? "ATTY. RESURRECCION:

A I inquired him why, then he answers me that he had shot a tourist." (p. 6, t.s.n., Q Who were the persons present in the house of Benny Dy when the gun was
October 17, 1984). given to you by him?

xxx xxx xxx A His houseboy called 'Tan-tan'.

"ATTY. RESURRECCION: Q Was this Tan-tan already adult or teen-ager?
Q When Benny Dy answered you that he shot a tourist, what did you do? A Teen-ager.
A I inquired him further if the tourist was dead but he answered me that the victim Q What time of May 8, 1984, did Benny Dy give to you and Pat. Manuel Casimiro
was brought to the hospital. the gun he gave to you?
Q What did you do as police officer when Benny Dy told you that he shot a tourist? A About 6:00 in the morning." (pp. 7-9, id.).
A He asked me to accompany him to the Office of the Chief of Police and I further xxx xxx xxx
asked him the gun he used in shooting the victim and he answered that
it was still in his house. Q When Benny Dy told you that he shot a tourist in his establishment, known as
Benny's Bar, what else did he tell you?
Q When Benny Dy told you that the gun he used in shooting the tourist was in his
house, what did you do? A He told me that after shooting the victim he requested somebody to rush the
victim to the hospital.
A I advised him to get that gun and give it to me to be deposited in the Office of
the Chief of Police. Q Did you ask him why he shot the victim?

Q Were you able to get that gun from the house of Benny Dy? A I did not.

A Yes, sir. Q You stated that the accused Benny Dy surrendered to you a gun together with
Pat. Manuel Casimiro, if that gun is shown to you, will you be able to
Q Were you alone when you went to the house of Benny Dy to get that gun? identify the same?

A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a gun in a container revolver caliber .38 and one (1) bullet
exhibit against Benny Dy, which we request that this container be
marked as Exhibit 'A' for the prosecution, Your Honor.
"COURT:
Mark it.
"ATTY. RESURRECCION:
Q Is this the same gun you are referring to which was surrendered by Benny Dy?
A Yes, sir, this is the one. (Witness identifying the gun.)" (pp. 11-12, id.).
The sequence of events presented by the prosecution then discloses that.
"Together with Pat. Manuel Casimiro, Pat. Padilla accompanied
Benny Dy to the police headquarters at the Poblacion of Malay. At the
police headquarters, Pat. Padilla gave the gun surrendered by
Benny Dy to Chief of Police Ariston Tambong who in turn handed it over
to police supply officer Pat. Romulo Sijano for safekeeping (pp. 13-24, 27,
id)." (pp. 7-9, Appellee's Brief).
The defense version, on the other hand, professes the innocence of the Accused, denies his presence inside
the bar during the shooting, and attributes the offense to an unrecognized person. Thus:
"On May 7, 1984, Benny Dy was inside his bar. However, he remained therein for
a few hours as he had a headache. He left his bar at around 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock
in the evening, and went to bed in a room at the annex building behind the bar.
He left his friend, Francisco Ureta known as 'Tan-tan' and his new helper, Romy,
to attend and take charge of the bar.
"In that evening of May 7, 1984, there were several customers inside the bar.
Some people were dancing. At about midnight, a person entered Benny's Bar and
in lees than two (2) minutes, an explosion was heard inside the bar. The explosion
caused the customers to scream; they rushed out of the bar including the person
who entered immediately before the explosion.
"The loud explosion coupled with the screaming and rushing of customers,
awakened Benny Dy. He was prompted to immediately come out of his room and
directly proceeded to the bar. Inside the bar, Benny saw a man lying on the sand
floor with blood on his shirt.
"Instinctively, Benny Dy carried this man to the beach, and woke up Charlie the
owner of a pump boat which could take the wounded man to the hospital. While
the wounded man was being loaded in a pumpboat, several persons arrived
including Australian Nurses to render assistance. The wounded man was finally
brought to Aklan Baptist Hospital at Caticlan, Malay, Aklan for treatment.
Unfortunately, the patient, whose real name is Christian Langel, died.
"The shooting in Benny's Bar 'may nabaril sa Benny's Bar', immediately, spread like
forest wild fire in the small Island of Boracay and rapidly transferred from one ear
to another and in the course thereof, it became distorted from 'may nabaril sa
Benny's Bar' to 'may nabaril sa Benny' and finally 'may nabaril si Benny'.
Consequently, loose talks rapidly spread that somebody was shot by Benny ('may
nabaril si Benny').
"Appellant Benny Dy who carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the
hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated the surrender to Pat. Rodolfo Padilla
a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar,
eventually found himself the suspect in shooting of Langel." (pp. 1-3, Appellant's
Brief)
All defense witnesses were one in testifying that the culprit was someone else other than the Accused. Thus,
Rodrigo Lumogdang, a carpenter allegedly hired by a friend of the Accused to repair the kitchen of the bar,
testified that around 11:30 P.M. of 7 May 1984, he saw a person go inside Benny's Bar but could not
recognize him because the petromax lamp in the bar was not so bright as it was covered by colored red
paper. In less than two minutes after said person entered, a shot exploded from the inside of the bar.
Thereafter he saw the man who had just entered rush outside holding a gun tucked to his waist (t.s.n., June
25, 1985, pp. 7-8). He then ran a few meters away and when he came back he saw the Accused asking
"Tantan" what had happened to which the latter replied that a white person had been shot. In particular,
Lumogdang stated that he did not see the Accused at 6:30 P.M., when he took a stroll in the beach nor
when he came back at around 11:30 P.M. Much less did he see TUMAOB inside the bar.
Another defense witness, Rogelio Lakandula, testified that he went to Benny's Bar at around 10:00 P.M. of
7 May 1984. While drinking beer thereat he saw a white person, who was three meters away from him,
shot by a person he did not recognize but he saw him come from the door and enter Benny's Bar alone.
Before and after the shooting incident, he did not see either the Accused or TUMAOB inside the bar.
Wolfer Tumaob, Jr., a nephew of the principal prosecution witness, TUMAOB, testified that on 7 May 1984
at 11:00 P.M., TUMAOB, Jover Casidsid, Welmer Taunan, Wolfer Tumaob, Sr., and he, went out fishing at
midsea staying thereat up to 6:00 A.M. of 8 May 1984 and that they did not pass Boracay Island at all on 7
May 1984 but went home on 8 May 1984.
The accused stoutly denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to
report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning
and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his (Accused's) request (t.s.n., September 2, 1985,
pp. 33-36). The Accused argues that even if he did make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible
in evidence.
The Trial Court found the testimonies of defense witnesses enmeshed in contradictions on material points,
rejected the disclaimers they had made, accorded more credence to the prosecution version, and as
previously stated, rendered a judgment of conviction.
In this appeal, the accused raises the following.
Assignments of Error.
I
The trial Court erred in holding that the Smith & Wesson revolver cal. .38
with Serial No. 33169 was the gun which caused the death of Christian
Langel.
II
The trial Court erred in finding that Wilson Tumaob testified in court
ahead of Dr. Caturan, so the former's testimony on the relative position
of the accused and victim could not have been influenced or tailored to
conform to Dr. Caturan's findings on the trajectory of the bullet slug
found in the victim's body.
 III
The trial Court erred in holding that Wilson Tumaob had no unfair motive
to fabricate a story different from what he actually witnessed, and in
giving weight to his testimony.
IV
The trial Court erred in holding that accused shot Langel.
V
The trial Court erred in holding that the conflicting testimonies of Pat.
Padilla and Casimiro relate to minor matters which do not affect their
credibility.
VI
The trial Court erred in holding that appellant made the oral confession,
and in admitting the same as well as the entries in the police blotter.
VII
The trial Court erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
VIII
The trial Court erred in holding that the uncorroborated testimony of
Wilson Tumaob is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction.
IX
The trial Court erred in holding that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is overwhelming and satisfied the test of proof beyond
reasonable doubt in convicting appellant.
X Contrary to the defense contention, the oral confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that "he had
The trial Court erred in holding that appellant's defense of alibi is weak.
XI
The trial Court erred in convicting accused-appellant.
XII
The trial Court erred in denying accused-appellant's motion for new trial.
The basic issue is actually one of credibility, the crucial question being whether the Accused had orally
admitted his authorship of the crime and surrendered the gun he had used in shooting the victim, as the
prosecution claims, or, whether he had no involvement whatsoever, the gun surrendered having been
found by a boy helper inside the bar while cleaning the place the morning after the incident, as the defense
would have us believe.
The case history and the documentary evidence attest strongly to Appellant's oral confession and voluntary
surrender. Thus, (1) Entry No. 3904 in the police blotter of the Malay Police Substation, dated 8 May
1984, supra, confirms three significant details: a) Pat. Padilla's testimony that he had accompanied the
Accused to police headquarters in the early morning of 8 May 1984 after the latter admitted having "shot
a tourist;" b) Appellant's voluntary surrender to the Chief of Police; and c) his surrender of his Smith &
Wesson revolver, cal. .38, also to the Chief of Police.
It may be that Chief of Police Ariston T. Tambong, who had presumably made such entry, died on 15 August
1984 before the start of the trial of this case below and was not in a position to identify the same before
the Court. His successor (Lt. Audie Arroyo), however, was presented as a prosecution witness and identified
said entry (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 29-33).
The revolver, marked as Exhibit "F," in turn, was identified by Pat. Padilla as the firearm surrendered by the
Accused. When Pat. Padilla stated that he saw the fatal gun, its serial number and name for the first time
(t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 17-19) he was clearly referring to particulars which he did not concern himself
with at the time of surrender.
Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper while cleaning the
bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself under
police custody in the early morning after the incident.
(2) The sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police (Exhibit
"H"), dated 8 May 1984, also attests to Appellant's oral confession. Said officer could not have prepared the
Complaint with such promptitude sans investigation at "0700H" the morning after the incident were it not
for Appellant's outright admission. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated
(Section 38, Rule 130, Rules of Court). That said Complaint was sworn to before the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge and filed before this Court only on 17 May 1984 will not detract from the fact that the Chief of
Police had taken official action promptly the very morning of Appellant's surrender by charging him with
"Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm" after having heard his admission.
(3) The fact of Appellant's surrender is further borne out by the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge, Judge Tonel, dated 17 May 1984, categorically reciting that "no warrant of arrest is issued for the
apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the
complaint." It would have been at variance with ordinary human behavior for Appellant to have voluntarily
placed himself under police custody absent any culpability for any offense.
shot a tourist" and that the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted
surrendered to the Chief of Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9), is competent evidence against him.
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in evidence
against him (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). It may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res
gestae. The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance (23 C.J.S. 196,
cited inPeople vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871, May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431).
What was told by the Accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning,
but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result
of formal custodial investigation. (People vs. Taylaran, G.R. No. 49149, October 31, 1981, 108 SCRA 373).
The Trial Court, therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case, as the defense alleges in its Error
VII.
With the indubitable official and documentary evidence on record, the identity of the Accused as the
victim's assailant is indisputable. The denials by the defense immediately lose their credibility and the errors
it has assigned are rendered without any merit whatsoever.
Thus, contrary to Error I, the gun which Appellant surrendered to Pat. Padilla and the Chief of Police, coupled period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, from ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
with his voluntary surrender, cannot but be the weapon which caused the death of the victim. That is no years and four (4) months.
inference; it is clear and direct evidence. To further require a ballistic examination and a paraffin test would
have been a superfluous exercise. WHEREFORE, the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt having been met, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED but with the penalty MODIFIED to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one
The issue raised in Error II as to who testified ahead, TUMAOB or the examining physician, Dr. Othello (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
Caturan, also becomes irrelevant, TUMAOB's testimony being corroborated by the documentary evidence temporal,as maximum. Costs against the accused-appellant Benny Dy.
heretofore mentioned. Besides, even without TUMAOB's testimony the documentary evidence on record
more than suffices to overcome the disclaimers by Appellant and on which his assigned Errors VIII & IX are SO ORDERED.
predicated.
||| (People v. Dy, G.R. No. 74517, [February 23, 1988], 241 PHIL 904-919)
TUMAOB's motive in testifying the way he did, further assailed in Error III, is immaterial considering the
corroboration his testimony received from Appellant's proven actuations after the incident. Efforts by the
defense to discredit him as a "professional witness," who allegedly asked for a consideration from Appellant
of P500.00 to swing the testimony in Appellant's favor, but which the latter rejected, with the insinuation
that he could have been paid by Swiss authorities to testify the way he did in Court, is unavailing since
conviction is not based on his testimony alone.

Whatever inconsistencies there may have been in the testimonies of Patrolmen Padilla and Casimiro,
posited in Error V, are sufficiently overcome by the documentary evidence of record.

As to the testimonial evidence presented by the defense, which the Trial Court rejected, we find no
reversible error in the meticulous assessment it had made thereof, ably pointing out the material
contradictions in the testimonies and consequently their lack of credibility.

The entries in the police blotter were properly admitted by the Trial Court, contrary to the allegation in
Error VI forming, as they do, part of official records.

The defense of alibi must likewise be rejected in the face of overwhelming evidence against the Accused.
The Trial Court cannot be faulted, therefore, for denying Appellant's bid for acquittal contrary to the
allegations in Errors IV, X and XI.

Lastly, neither was any error committed by the Trial Court in denying the defense Motion for New Trial
(Error XII) based on the affidavit of recantation of witness TUMAOB that he was not at Benny's Bar when
the victim was shot. Even assuming that it can be considered as newly discovered evidence it is insufficient
to overturn the judgment already rendered, for, it bears emphasizing that conviction is not based on
TUMAOB's testimony alone. Moreover,

"Affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who had previously testified in

court will not be countenanced for the purpose of securing a new trial. — It would
be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts
of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on change their
mind for one reason or another, for such a rule would make solemn trials a
mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. Affidavits of retraction can be easily secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses usually for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable. So courts are wary or reluctant to allow a new trial based
on retracted testimony." (People vs. Saliling, et al, L-27974, February 27, 1976, 69
SCRA 427, cited in Ibabao vs. People, L-36957, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA
216).

The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the Trial Court, however, will have to be modified. With the
abolition of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution, the penalty for Murder is now reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. With the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to
which the Accused should be entitled, the penalty is imposable in its minimum period or from seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years and eight (8) months. For the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the penalty next lower is prision mayor in its maximum
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 117487. December 12, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARNEL ALICANDO Y
BRIONES, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose B. Tiongco for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA; REQUIREMENT THAT THE
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION MUST BE READ IN THE LANGUAGE OR DIALECT KNOWN TO THE ACCUSED;
NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge
failed to follow Section (1)(a) of Rule 116 on arraignment. The reading of the complaint or information to
the appellant in the language or dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him." The new rule also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a
country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of evolution. Judicial
notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or
English language, our official languages for purposes of communication and instruction. The importance of
reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him cannot thus
be understated. In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was
read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English
language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what
dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information as couched in English
was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. One need not draw a picture to
show that the arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It violated Section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule
implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that
we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we
cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume. We must be sure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE; NULL AND VOID WHERE THE SEARCHING INQUIRY
CONDUCTED BY THE COURT IS PROCEDURALLY INADEQUATE. — The plea of guilt made by the appellant is
likewise null and void. The trial court violated Section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the
appellant. Said section provides: "Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shallconduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf." The
records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching inquiry."
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely incorporated the decision
of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., (24 SCRA 798 [1968]) and reiterated in an unbroken line of cases.
The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus,
the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the
voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any information about
the personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free
and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant
were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that
appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to
explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide. A cursory examination
of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt will show their
utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did
not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated,
whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to
discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone.
Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the following damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events
of the Iloilo PNP (Exh. "M") showing that after his arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail
and had suffered hematoma. Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the
mandatory death penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory." It did not inform the appellant
of the indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim It cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some
effects on your civil rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of
his are involved Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death.
We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest
alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial
court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his
culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital
offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. The
change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the criminal process which is to minimize erroneous
conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value determination of our system that it is far
worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go free." ADHcTE
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; VERBAL CONFESSION MADE DURING THE CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF COUNSEL AND THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM, INADMISSIBLE.
— Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant,
were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant. The trial court gave
full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the prosecution. To quote its Decision, viz: ". . .
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains
in its center and the T-shirt of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical
evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that
the victim was raped." These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the
Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation whereappellant verbally confessed to the crime without
the benefit of counsel. It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized
as inadmissible evidenceuncounselled confession or admission. In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have
the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present
any writing showing that appellant waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent
counsel. Despite the blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his
uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death. It is not only
the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom.
The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled
confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. We have not only constitutionalized
the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as
the " fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case
of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act,
whereas the " fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The " fruit of the
poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible.
The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain
other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT ACCUSED VALIDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT AND TO COUNSEL RESTS WITH THE PROSECUTION; CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE REQUIRED.
— The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before
making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the
prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of
Article III of the Constitutionprovides only one mode of waiver — the waiver must be in writing and in the
presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge
this burden. It matters not that in the course of the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection
to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the
heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.
5. ID.; COURTS; COMMITMENT TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. — Our commitment to the criminal
justice system is not only to convict and punish violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal
that the process of detection, apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should be
accomplished with fairness, and without impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a death penalty case,
the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a
lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice. ACSaHc
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA; PROCEDURE COMPLIED WITH IN
CASE AT BAR. — A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance with existing rules
on arraignment and plea. It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the record
of the case that: 1) there is absolutely nothing on the record which would warrant a finding the information
was not read in the language or dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does
not absolutely require that the same be indicated in the record of every criminal case; 3) Rule 116, Section
1 contains nothing requiring trial courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information was read in
the language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in fact actually complied with by the
lower court. When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge, it is the duty of the court
to inform him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to comprehend the charges against him as
well as the circumstances attendant thereto. When the charge is of a serious nature, it becomes the
imperative duty of the lawyer present not only to assist the accused during the reading of the information
but also to explain to him the gravity and consequence of his plea. Trial judges are enjoined to refrain from
accepting with alacrity the accused's plea of guilty. While justice demands speedy administration, judges
are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he fully understands
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. Consequently, three things need to be
accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense: (1) the court
should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the accused's plea; (2) the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and
the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to
present evidence on his behalf and should allow him to do so if he so desires. A judge who fails to observe
this requirement commits a grave abuse of discretion. These requirements have been complied with in this
case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE; MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE SEARCHING INQUIRY
INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS AND FULL COMPREHENSION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA; LEFT TO
THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE. — There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their
searching inquiry in the detailed manner suggested by the majority opinion, although judges should ideally
strive to conduct as detailed an inquiry as would be reasonable under the circumstances. In People v.
Dayot (187 SCRA 637 [1990]) we held that: A searching inquiry . . . compels the judge to content himself
reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress — and that his guilty
plea has not therefore been given improvidently — other by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent
quarters or simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes. . . . While there can be no hard and fast
rule as to how a judge may conduct searching inquiry, as to the number and character of questions he may
put to the accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be
measured according to its individual merit, taking into consideration the age, educational attainment, and
social status of the accused confessing guilt, among other things, the singular barometer is that the judge
must in all cases, fully convince himself that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and
(2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt, based on his
testimony. This Court leaves to judges, considering their training, ample discretion, but expects them at the
same time, that they will be true to their calling and be worthy ministers of the law. The purpose of a
searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant's plea was entered into voluntarily and that the
defendant understood the consequences of his plea. There is no hard and fast rule, as theDayot case states,
as to the number and character of the questions propounded. Judges are not required to go into obsessive
detail about the psychological, educational and sociological background of the accused if from a reasonable
inquiry conducted through a reasonable number of questions he is fully convinced a searching inquiry has
been met. There is a world of difference between a fastidious attention to detail which furthers the end of
justice and an attention to detail and minutiae bordering on obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs
justice and defeats the purpose of the law. caIDSH
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PLEA OF GUILTY IN CASE AT BAR; NOT IMPROVIDENT. — In the case before us, when the
appellant pleaded guilty in open court on June 28, 1994, appellant was clearly assisted by counsel. The court
took pains to repeatedly remind him of the grave consequences of a plea of guilty, which appellant said he
understood. On every such occasion, he had every opportunity, through his counsel, to ask the court for
clarification. The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of
the nature of his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. On July 11, 1994, before the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he was sure of his
plea. At this time, appellant had more than sufficient time or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible
consequences of his plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he had enough time
and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to recant or at least express reservations about the same.
However, in spite of several warnings given by the trial court on different occasions, appellant stood pat
with his judicial admission. Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of
guilty at any stage of the trial. He had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution.
He did not put up any defense nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence
presented against him (in fact, it was appellant himself who directed the police investigators to the location
of the various physical evidence, e.g., green slippers. earrings). Appellant's silence as to the accusations
made against him in open court from the time of his arraignment and during his entire trial therefore
assumes a great deal of significance in the context of the majority's insistence that herein appellant's plea
of guilty was improvident and therefore void. In the face of the seriousness of the accusations against him,
his reticence was eloquent. As the Court held in People vs. Pillones: Silence is assent as well as consent, and
may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a
quasi-confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime,
as a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's
silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent.
(Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.) The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract
from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty, it does not affect the requirement compelling the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. Nowhere in the rule
does it state that an extrajudicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. While
the constitutional infirmities that attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and
should not be glossed over, his conviction was based mainly on his plea of guilt made in open court and not
on the extrajudicial confession, which formed but a small aspect of the prosecution's case. An extrajudicial
confession only serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of guilty entered in open court. As between an
extrajudicial confession and a judicial admission, the latter significantly is given evidentiary weight. Even
assuming the extrajudicial confession in this case could not be given evidentiary weight because of mistakes
committed by authorities in conducting their custodial investigation and in their gathering evidence, his
plea of guilty on arraignment, his repeated admissions to the same in spite of repeated warnings of the trial
judge of the consequences of his plea and the presence of ample corroborating testimony from a credible
eyewitness to the crime establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The essence of the plea of
guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
consequences and meaning of his act, and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime
charged in the complaint or information. A plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment is sufficient
to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. This, notwithstanding, (in
line with the pronouncement of the Court in several cases) the trial court received evidence to determine
if the appellant erred in admitting his guilt. Independent of such plea, there was more than sufficient
evidence adduced to prove that appellant indeed committed the acts charged.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
OFFICIAL DUTIES; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The records in an overwhelming number of criminal cases
brought before us contain informations written in the English language without any indication, whatsoever,
that the same was translated from a language or dialect known to the defendant. And yet, even in Metro
Manila alone, one observes that the bulk of proceedings in our trial courts, including the process of
arraignment, is conducted in the vernacular. On the record of these cases normally printed in English, courts
hardly bother to point out those sections of the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated into English.
Because of this widespread practice, which the section on arraignment in the Rules of Court does not
proscribe — the presumption of regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel ourselves to review
the criminal cases decided by this Court since the imposition of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure and see whether there was any indication that the arraignment of these criminal cases were, the
records therein then ought to show, conducted in a language known to the defendants. The absurdity of this
argument by the defense then becomes apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that most
of these proceedings were actually conducted in the vernacular, but the fact was never put on record. In
fact, Section 1(b) of Rule 116 even states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to
enter (the same) of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. Even the rule on placing the
arraignment and plea on record is not absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating
on record whether proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where in fact the proceedings were
so conducted. The argument that the information was not read in the language or dialect known to
appellant merely grasps on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so inconsequential as to be bereft
of merit. Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court, especially in the provinces, an
interpreter is always at hand to translate to the parties all questions propounded to them in the language
or dialect known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of stenographic notes submitted to
the court only reflect the court proceedings conducted in the English language. While again, the records do
not categorically indicate that the information was read in the language or dialect known to the defendant
or that the questions asked were mandated in the vernacular or dialect understood by him it is presumed,
as we have actually done in many cases before this, that such duty was regularly performed in the absence
of any evidence to the contrary. In the face of this common practice, the burden now lies on the defense to
prove the contrary. Under the principle of equal application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of
fastidiousness in the enforcement of procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.
5. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBJECTED TO FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. — I submit, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence
objected to would have been inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts have recognized
that evidence derived from information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible under the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine where it is shown that such evidence would have been inevitably gained even
without the unlawful act. The case of U.S. vs. Seohnlein, for instance, held the view that a confession by the
accused in a bank robbery case was not fruit of the poisonous tree for the reason that the information which
led to his confession, though the product of an illegal search would have been discovered in the absence of
such illegality. The Court in Lockridge vs. Superior Court was of the opinion that where a witness is
discovered as a result of illegal police conduct, his testimony is admissible is he would have been discovered
in the normal course of a normally conducted investigation. These and other recognized limitations to the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine do not have the effect of diluting the effect of our exclusionary rules.
Rather, they serve the purpose of the rule well by maintaining a reasonable balance between the need to
deny evidence come by through the exploitation of an illegality on one hand and the need to minimize
opportunity for the defendant in a criminal case to reap an undeserved and socially undesirable bonanza.
Certainly it could not be argued that with nothing in their hands, the police would not have gone back to
the site for a better inspection. AEcTaS
6. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
CONVICTION IN CASE AT BAR. — Assuming arguendothe validity of the defense's arguments over the pieces
of evidence recovered by the police in the case at bench above-mentioned, a thorough review of the
evidence utilized by the trial court leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's conviction would have
been sustained, in any case, without the pieces of evidence objected to. Lest we mistake the trees for the
forest, a shifting of the pieces of evidence, and a separation therefrom of the physical evidence objected to
would nevertheless still leave the prosecution with enough legal evidence to convict the accused with moral
certainty. These include: 1. The defendant's own repeated admissions, in the presence of counsel and in
open court that he committed the acts charged; 2. The essentially uncontradicted testimony of the
prosecution's eyewitness, Luisa Rebada. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a lone
witness, free from signs of impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if
uncorroborated. In this case, Rebada's testimony was positive and straightforward. I see no reason why the
same should not be given the credence and the weight that it deserves, without our ignoring established
principles in the law on evidence. Such factual findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of a
witness are accorded great weight and respect on appeal, as it should have been in the instant case, because
the trial court had the every available opportunity to observe the demeanor of the lone witness during the
trial. Her belated reporting of the incident the next morning, to which the defense urged the lower court to
accord great weight, is hardly out of the ordinary. Individual reactions are motivated by varied and varying
environmental factors. There is no standard norm of human behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling or frightful experience. Fear and self-preservation are strong motivating factors. It
is common for people to choose not to get involved when a crime is committed, otherwise there should
only be a few unsolved crimes. Rebada, in this case, was obviously terrified with what she saw. Self-
preservation and fear of possible reprisals from the appellant would have initially overwhelmed any desire
on her part to reveal what she had seen during the incident. She tried her best to remain as calm and casual
as possible, and pretend that she did not see anything the instant she saw Alicando, when she asked
appellant what time Khazi Mae got down from his house following the incident. Given these factors, it would
have been too much to expect Rebada in her mixed state of dread, fear, revulsion and instinctive self-
preservation to harness superhuman reserves of courage to stop appellant when she saw him in that
compromising position. Man's actions and reactions cannot be stereotyped. Some individuals flee from an
adverse stimulus, others confront it. Upon seeing the dead girl's distraught parents, and overcoming her
fear with some prodding from her husband, Luisa Rebada was finally driven by conscience to reveal what
she knew the following morning. The minor inconsistencies in Rebada's testimony are understandable
under these circumstances. However, it should be stressed here that the trial court's conclusions were
founded principally on the direct, positive and categorical assertions made by Rebada as
regards material events in the crime. It is worthy to stress, moreover, that Rebada never wavered in her
oral testimony even on intense cross-examination from the defense. In her affidavit, she declared that she
saw Khazi Mae at appellant's house, that appellant closed the window; and after hearing the child's cry and
squeal, peeped into the opening and saw appellant on top of the victim. These were the very same
declarations she made when she took the witness stand. While she may have wavered on a minor detail (as
to whether it was the right or the left hand of the appellant which was used in choking the victim) these
should not be sufficient to debunk her credibility. She had no reason to falsely testify against the appellant
and there were no possible motives alleged for her to do so. She is not in any way related to the Penecillas,
and there was no evidence adduced to show that she harbored any ill-feelings towards the appellant. In a
sense, her credibility is even enhanced by the absence of any improper motive. Together with the direct
testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I repeat, sufficient evidence corroborating and unmistakably
pointing to the appellant as the author of the crime. Khazi Mae was last seen in the company of the
appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae. Recovered from the latter's
house were Khazi Mae's green slippers, pair of gold earrings, her dress, bloodied buri mat and pillow. The
fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of these pieces of evidence does not escape us. But whether or
not these pieces should have been admissible is on hindsight hardly relevant in the face of ample legally
admissible evidence justifying the trial court's guilty verdict.

7. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE WITH HOMICIDE; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. — Rape is committed whenever
there is penetration, no matter how slight into the genital organ of the victim. The vaginal and anal findings
of Dr. Tito Doromal revealed that the lacerated wound from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum
was caused by a forcible entry of an object. In view of settled jurisprudence to the effect that rape is
committed by the mere touching of the male genital organ on the vagina, it hardly is relevant whether or
not semen or sperm are present or absent. Absence of emission does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony
that she saw appellant naked on top of the victim when she peeped through an opening between the floor
and the door of appellant's house and the autopsy report revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently
testify to the crime committed and its authorship in the case at bench. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, the corpus delicti was there for all to see. The trial court, therefore, did not err in dispensing with
the results of the NBI laboratory examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to determine the presence of male
semen, a fact of little relevance after the rape was established by definitive legal evidence. Finally,
notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation, it cannot be
denied that Khazi Mae was raped and killed on the same occasion. As we observed in People v. Yu, (1 SCRA
199 [1961]) unity of thought and action in the criminal purpose of the accused cannot be altered by the
circumstances that both the crime of rape and the crime of murder resulted. The accused had to choke and
strangle the girl at the same time that he was satisfying his lust on her. Based on all of the foregoing, it is
clear and inescapable that appellant committed the heinous crime of Rape with Homicide under Sec. 11 of
RA. 7659.
8. ID.; PENALTIES; IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSES UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
7659; MANDATORY. — I reiterate my position in People vs. Veneracion, that the reimposition of the death
penalty for specific offenses under Republic Act 7659 has left our courts with no choice but to impose the
penalty for crimes clearly enumerated in the said law. If a court, after leaving no stone unturned, finds it
necessary to impose the penalty, I believe that it does not do so as an infallible God exercising a divine right
to give or take away human life, but as a fallible human institution recognizing the importance of according
majesty to laws so indispensable to maintaining social order. In the instant case; after a thorough and
searching review of the evidence and an evaluation of the procedural and constitutional objections adduced
either in support of an acquittal or of imposing a less severe penalty it should be fairly obvious to us that
the trial court committed no error in finding the accused guilty as charged. Recognizing our fallible nature,
the quantum of evidence necessary to convict has never been absolute proof beyond any doubt but merely
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The death penalty in the instant case was clearly imposed in conformity
with the mandate of law and Constitution. SADECI
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we are
asked to play the role of an infallible God by exercising the divine right to give or take away life. We
cannot err in the exercise of our judgment for our error will be irrevocable. Worse, our error can result
in the worst of crimes — murder by the judiciary.
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide 1 in an
Information which reads:
"That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit:
by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years
of age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
her and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured
cervical vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing
profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which
were the direct cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera
of the PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so desired. 2
The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla,
father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus
Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but
every now and then would take leave and return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five
(5) arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and
left.
Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2) arm's
length from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the victim at the window
of appellant's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but appellant closed the window. Soon she heard
the victim crying. She approached appellant's house and peeped through an opening between its floor
and door. The sight shocked her — appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking
her neck. She retreated to her house in fright.
She gathered her children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in
her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find Khazie
Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada
was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew.
Instead, Rebada called out appellant from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his
house. Appellant replied he was drunk and did not know.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house
to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her
parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart. She
informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that appellant committed the crime. Forthwith,
appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without
the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounseled verbal confession and follow up
interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green
slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were
presented as evidence for the prosecution.
The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer. His
autopsy report reveals the following injuries sustained by the victim:
"HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion, purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior
neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero-inferior
chest wall.
 4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest .
ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:
a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.
b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.
c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.
EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd, left forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm. in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd, right forearm.
VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum.
b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the promontory
of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and anal
openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA..
C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL & RECTAL OPENINGS."
Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to
prove that the proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death, viz:
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with Homicide penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4)
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. Arnel Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer
a (sic) penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie
Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00.
The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under sentence to
death by electrocution (electric chair). As soon as facilities are provided by the
Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out his sentence shall be changed by
gas poisoning (sic).
Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for the
grievous offense he had committed. He deserves no mercy.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED. "
The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the
trial court. A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. In his Brief, appellant
assails the decision of the trial court as a travesty of justice.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of
errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is based on an amalgam of inadmissible and
incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to
follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in
open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint
or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or
dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in
the complaint or information."
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him
is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It implements the
constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him." 3 The new rule also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by
dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of evolution. 4 Judicial notice can be
taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English
language, our official languages for purposes of communication and instruction. 5 The importance of
reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him cannot
thus be understated.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was
read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the
English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it
known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information
couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty
transcript during his arraignment, reads: 6
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Edwin Fama — Appearing as public prosecutor
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera — For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment
and pre-trial.)
Interpreter — (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-
trial.)
Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty)"
One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It violated
section l(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right (Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his body from
to due process of law. 7 It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was waist up.)
regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. We cannot
assume. We must be sure. Accused

Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court No, Your Honor.
violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section provides:
Court
"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching You were not maltreated in the jail?
inquiryinto the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of Accused
culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf."
No, Your Honor.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching
Court
inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the transcripts reveal the following: 8
xxx xxx xxx Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined by a
physician to the order of the court?
Note
Accused
(After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)
No, Your Honor.
Court
Court
Question (sic) of the court to the accused.
If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no use because there will be a
Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a heinous crime, mandatory death penalty, do you still insist on your plea of guilty?
because of your plea of guilty without the consent or even against the
discretion of the court, the court will give you a mandatory death Accused
penalty because of the crime charged, do you understand?
Yes, Your Honor.
Accused
Court
Yes, Your Honor.
If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your civil
Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any force or rights but not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
intimidation from any one or whatever?
Accused
Accused
Yes, Your Honor.
None, Your Honor.
Note
Q Are you sure?
(See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached to the records of this case.)"
Accused
In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange transpired, viz: 9
Yes, Your Honor. xxx xxx xxx
Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and that will Fiscal Fama:
just be the consideration for you to plead guilty?
Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Accused
Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Court
For the accused, Your Honor.
Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?
Atty. Antiquiera:
Note
 Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the prosecution
Arnel Alicando, please come here. (at this juncture, Arnel Alicando,
come near to the court)
The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the
prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you
understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of rape with homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary without force, intimidation
or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable penalty
is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court
Okey, proceed."
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely
incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 10 and reiterated in an unbroken
line of cases. 11 The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and
informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the
voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor
did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The
records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the appellant which can serve
as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic
status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The
questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of
English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential
elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of
appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if appellant
had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested
him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his
interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the
following damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP (Exh. "M") showing
that after his arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma,
viz:
"c- 0262-94
INFORMATION
2:50 PM - PO2 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP MFC, informed
this office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about 9:00 AM this date when the
suspect ARNEL ALICANDO Y BRIONES, 24 yrs. old, residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone
I, CP, been arrested and mobbed by the irate residents of Zone I, Rizal, Palapala,
GP, in connection of the Rape with Homicide case wherein the victim KHAZIE MAE
PENECILLA Y DRILON, 4 yrs. old, residence of same place who was discovered dead
under the house thereat. Suspect when turned over to this office and put on lock
up cell was also mobbed by the angry inmates thus causing upon him hematoma
contusion on different parts of his body."
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the mandatory
death penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory". It did not inform the appellant of the
indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some
effects on your civil rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights"
of his are involved.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death.
We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot
rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt,
the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree
of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt
even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need
of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the criminal process which
is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value determination
of our system that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go free." 12
Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the
appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court convicting the appellant.
Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the
prosecution. To quote its Decision, 13 viz:
"xxx xxx xxx
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of
a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored
white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the
highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the
victim was raped."
These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a
result of custodial interrogation where appellant verballyconfessed to the crime without the benefit of
counsel. PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz: 16
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. ANTIOUIERA:
Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you see Arnel Alicando?
A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.
Q Previous to that you have never seen him?
A Yes, sir.
Q When for the first time did you start investigating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished investigating the body of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla.
Q And that was also after you were informed that Arnel Alicando was a suspect in
the raping of Khazie Mae Penecilla?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q And who was that person who informed you of the suspect?
A Luisa Rebada.
Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
A I cannot remember the length of time I investigated him.
Q Did it take you the whole morning of June 13, 1994 in interrogating and
investigating Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the investigation you conducted continued in the afternoon of the same
date?
A Yes, sir.
Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still investigated and interrogated
Arnel Alicando.
A Yes, sir.
Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating and interrogating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in relation to this case.
Q What date did you stop your investigation?
A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering the white T-shirt and pair of earring.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q You testified in this case, Mr. Witness you never informed the court that you
apprised the accused of his constitutional rights, is that correct?
A I apprised him.
Q My question is, during your testimony before this court under the direct
examination of the prosecution you never informed the court that you
apprised the accused of his constitutional rights?
Pros. Fama:
I did not ask him that question. How will he answer?
Court:
Sustained.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q When did you inform, the date when you informed Alicando of his
constitutional rights?
A On June 13.
Q On what hour did you inform him?
A After the witness identified him.
Q What constitutional rights inform Alicando of?
A The right to remain silent and right to get his lawyer and I have interpreted in
Visayan language.
Q And during your investigation for almost two (2) days the accused was never
represented by counsel, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a public officer to inform the person of his
constitutional rights?
A Yes, sir.
That is all, Your Honor."
It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselled
confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible against him."
In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important
confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant
waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel. Despite the blatant
violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow
into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also
evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence
derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. Again,
the testimony of PO3 Tan makes this all clear, viz: 17
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did the accused Arnel Alicando accompany you to the place of the incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you do?
A He pointed to the fish basin.
Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to you by Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point?
A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as Exhibit "H".)
Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?
A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he answered that he
used the fish basin to cover Khazie Mae Penecilla when she was already
dead.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say to conceal the crime ?
A Yes, sir.
Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you recover?
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered inside he room of
Imelda Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the mat?
A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)
Q Did you find something on the pillow?
A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.
This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and the mat as Exhibit "I".
Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of incident?
A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning the accused
Arnel Alicando further informed me that he kept the gold earring of
the victim and her clothes inside the room of the house of
Imelda Alicando.
Q Where?
A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room where the rape took
place hanged on the clothes line. And I found the pair of earring at the
bamboo post of the fence.

A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us the old mat and Court:
the pillow wherein he laid the victim Khazie Mae Penecilla.
Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?
Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of the incident that time?
A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated at the from gate on the right side
A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo Ignacio, my .
companion, who went to the place of the incident.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the accused?
Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you recovered the items
A Yes, sir. accompanied by the accused?

Q In what particular place did you recover those things ? A No more, I only followed his direction.

A Inside the room where he raped child. Q He made verbal direction to you?

Q Whose house is that ? A Yes, sir.

A The house of Imelda Alicando. Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?

Q The wife of Romeo Alicando? A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)

A Yes, sir. Q Please examine that white t-shirt?

Q In what particular place is that situated ? A The t-shirt have a bloodstain."

A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.

 We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have In Binabay vs. People, et al., 24 a ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held that no
also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment
minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United of the appellant is void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant, and in
States. 18 According to this rule, once the primary source(the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. There is
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill without any semblance of fairness and
inadmissible. 19 Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal justice.
act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused
the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally
Arnel Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not
is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained.20 We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. SO ORDERED.
Salanga, et al., 21 a ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing
||| (People v. Alicando y Briones, G.R. No. 117487, [December 12, 1995], 321 PHIL 656-724)
of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into custody. They
gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The underwear was later identified as that
of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons, we ruled that "the underwear allegedly
taken from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called " fruit of the poisonous tree." 22

But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still,
the trial court erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that
the victim was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains on
the pillow and t-shirt were human bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any
expert. To hold that they were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no testimony
that the stains were caused by either the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no testimony
that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he allegedly committed the crime. It must
also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by
occupation. Romeo Penecilla himself, the father of the victim, testified he knows the appellant
"because he used to accompany me during butchering of animals." 23
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to
counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also
the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing
evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution provides only one mode of
waiver — the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records
show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. It- matters not that in the course of
the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these
constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof
that rested on the prosecution.
There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Court
should be concerned with the heinousness of the crime at bar and its despicable perpetration against
a 4-year old girl, an impersonation of innocence itself. The Court should also be concerned with the
multiplication of malevolence in our midst for there is no right to be evil and there are no ifs and buts
about the imposition of the death penalty as long as it remains unchallenged as part of the laws of our
land. These concerns are permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they transcend the transitoriness of
time.
Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and
punish violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of detection,
apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness, and
without impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to
judgment even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in our
escutcheon of justice.
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the
procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial court.