Legal Forms Cases 1

G.R. No. 167181 SPS.
CARLOS MUNSALUD and WINNIE MUNSALUD, - versus - NATIONAL HOUSING Promulgated:

AUTHORITY, December 23, 2008
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
INSUFFICIENCY in form and substance, as a ground for dismissal of the complaint, should not be based on the title or
caption, especially when the allegations of the pleading support an action.
In pursuit of a reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the order of dismissal[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in a complaint for mandamus,[3]petitioners-spouses Carlos Munsalud and Winnie Munsalud lodged
before this Court a petition for review on certiorari.
The Facts
Laid bare from the records are the following facts:
Petitioner Winnie Munsalud is the daughter and one of the compulsory heirs of the late Lourdes Bulado (Bulado) who
died on December 8, 1985. During the lifetime of Bulado, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded her a
lot located at 942 R. Higgins St., CAA Compound, Bgy. 185, Pasay City. The award was made pursuant to the Land for the
Landless program of respondent. She resided at the said property until her death.
When Bulado died, petitioner Winnie assumed the obligation to pay the monthly amortizations. Respondent NHA
recognized petitioner spouses assumption of obligations as their names were reflected in the receipts. They were
allowed to occupy the lot up to the present. To prove their occupancy over the lot, petitioners offered as evidence the
following documents, viz.:
1. Tag Card No. 77-02830-03 issued by then Pasay City Mayor Pablo Cuneta and then NHA General Manager Gaudencio
Tobias;
2. Application and Contract for Water Services No. 295319 in the name of Bulado but the same was signed by petitioner
Winnie;
3. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27566 over the land issued by the Assessors Office of Pasay City in the name of defendant
recognizing its beneficial use in favor of petitioners;
4. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27667 over the residential structure erected on the land and issued by the Assessors Office
of Pasay City in the names of petitioners;
5. Pagpapatunay dated September 5, 1989 signed by neighbors and acquaintances of petitioners attesting to their long
time residence in the property;
6. Deposit Receipt No. 286444 dated September 27, 1989 issued by the Manila Electric Company attesting to the
installation of electric service in the name of petitioner Winnie on the property.[4]
On September 14, 1989, petitioners completed the payments of the amortizations due on the property. Reflected on the
left side portion of the official receipt evidencing full payment is the annotation full payment. Consequently, petitioners
demanded that respondent NHA issue in their favor a deed of sale and a title over the property. Respondent, however,
refused.
On January 28, 2003, petitioners, by counsel, sent respondent a letter to issue a deed of sale and title. Despite receipt,
respondent did not issue the requested documents. On March 6, 2003, respondent wrote petitioners informing them
that petitioner Winnies name does not appear as beneficiary. Petitioners replied that Winnie was representing her
mother, the late Lourdes Bulado. Respondent did not respond to the reply.
1|Page LEGAL FORMS CASES 1

Left with no recourse, petitioners instituted a complaint for mandamus before the court a quo.
RTC Order
On April 22, 2003, the RTC dismissed the complaint for mandamus, disposing thus:
Considering that the petition is insufficient in form and substance, there being no reference to any law which the
respondent by reason of its office, trust or station is especially enjoined as a duty to perform or any allegation that
respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are
entitled to, the above-entitled petition is hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 3 Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but they did not succeed. Thus, petitioners seasonably appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
On August 23, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC dismissal of the mandamus petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Order of Dismissal is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In agreeing with the court a quo, the appellate court rationalized as follows:
It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It is a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
It well settled that the legal right of petitioner to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled
must be clear and complete. A clear legal right within the meaning of the rule means a right which is clearly founded in,
or granted by law; a right which is inferable as a matter of law. Likewise, mandamus refers only to acts enjoined by
law to be done. The duties to be enforced must be such as are clearly peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of
official station. However, appellants failed to point out in their petition the specific law by which defendant is duty
bound to perform the act sought to be performed, as well as the law which would grant them the clear legal right to the
issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Foregoing discussed, we find no error on the part of the court a quo in dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by
plaintiffs-appellants.
On September 20, 2004, petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA on February 22,
2005. Hence, the present recourse.
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITYDATED APRIL 22, 2003 AND SEPTEMBER 25, 2003 WHERE THE LATTER COURT
RELYING UPON THE APPELLATION AND/OR LABEL THAT PETITIONERS GAVE THEIR COMPLAINT (I.E., MANDAMUS) IN
CIVIL CASE NO. Q-03-492 DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT THEREIN PURPORTEDLY BECAUSE THE SAID COMPLAINT FAILED
TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 3, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION DATED AUGUST 23, 2004.[7] (Underscoring supplied)

Poring over the arguments presented, the focal issue is whether in giving due course to an action, the court is fenced
within the parameters of the title given by plaintiff to the case without regard to the averments of the pleading.
Elsewise stated, does the trial court have absolute discretion to dismiss an action on the ground that it is
insufficient in form and substance based alone on its designation when, from the body and the relief prayed for, it could
stand as an action sufficient in form and substance?
Our Ruling
Petitioners action designated as mandamus was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it is insufficient in form
and substance. This begs the question: when is an action sufficient in form and when is it sufficient in substance?
To begin with, form is the methodology used to express rules of practice and procedure.[8] It is the order or method of
legal proceedings.[9] It relates to technical details.[10] It is ordinarily the antithesis of substance.[11] It is an established
method of expression or practice. It is a fixed or formal way of proceeding.[12]
A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following:
1. A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action indicating the names of the parties, and the
docket number which is usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a docket number;
2. The Body, reflecting the designation, the allegations of the partys claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and
the date of the pleading;
3. The Signature and Address of the party or counsel;[13]
4. Verification. This is required to secure an assurance that the allegations have been made in good faith, or are true
and correct and not merely speculative;[14]
5. A Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, which although not jurisdictional, the same is obligatory;[15]
6. An Explanation in case the pleading is not filed personally to the Court. Likewise, for pleading subsequent to the
complaint, if the same is not served personally to the parties affected, there must also be an explanation why service
was not done personally.[16]
Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in nature, there must be:
A Proof of Service, which consists in the written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the
affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by
ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing. If service is by registered mail, proof shall
be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.[17]
In case a party is represented by counsel de parte, additional requirements that go into the form of the pleading should
be incorporated, viz.:
1. The Roll of Attorneys Number;

2. The Current Professional Tax Receipt Number; and
3. The IBP Official Receipt No. or IBP Lifetime Membership Number.[18]
4. MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and Date of Issue (effective January 1, 2009).[19]
In the case at bench, a naked perusal of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q03- 49278 designated by petitioners
as mandamus reveals that it is sufficient in form. It has the caption with the name of the court, the name of the parties,
and the docket number. The complaint contains allegations of petitioners claims. It has a prayer and the date when it

was prepared. The signature page shows the signature and name of petitioners counsel, the counsels IBP, PTR and Roll
of Attorneys Numbers. The complaint was also verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping and
signed by petitioners as plaintiffs. It was filed personally with the office of the clerk of court.
Now, is the petition insufficient in substance?
Substance is that which is essential and is used in opposition to form.[20] It is the most important element in any
existence, the characteristic and essential components of anything, the main part, the essential import, and the
purport.[21] It means not merely subject of act, but an intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial
elements, though it may be stated without recital of any details.[22] It goes into matters which do not sufficiently appear
or prejudicially affect the substantial rights of parties who may be interested therein and not to mere informalities.[23]
As used in reference to substance of common-law actions, substance comprehends all of the essential or material
elements necessary to sufficiently state a good cause of action invulnerable to attack by general demurrer.[24]
Substance is one which relates to the material allegations in the pleading. It is determinative of whether or not a cause
of action exists. It is the central piece, the core, and the heart constituting the controversy addressed to the court for its
consideration. It is the embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
The court a quo anchored the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of Rule 65, Section 3[25] of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. It found that there was no reference to any law which respondent NHA, by reason of its office, trust or
station, is specifically enjoined as a duty to perform. It declared that there was no allegation in the petition below that
respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are
entitled to.
Although the complaint was captioned as Mandamus, petitioners averments, as well as the relief sought, called for an
action for specific performance. Pertinent portions of the complaint for mandamus provide:
3. Plaintiff Winnie Munsalud is the daughter of the late Lourdes Bulado, and as such is one of Bulados compulsory
heirs. x x x;
4. During the lifetime of Bulado, she was awarded a parcel of land at a land for the landless program of the defendant;
xxxx
6. When Bulado died in 1985, Plaintiffs assumed her obligations over the aforesaid property, particularly the payment of
the amortizations therein;
7. Defendant recognized this assumption of Bulados obligations by the Plaintiffs considering that in the receipts
covering the amortizations, the names of the Plaintiffs as the ones paying the Defendant were indicated therein;
8. In fact, Defendant also allowed Plaintiffs to move into, and occupy, as they continue to occupy up to now, the above
described premises;
xxxx
10. On September 14, 1989, Plaintiffs completed the payment of the amortizations due over the property in question,
and this is evidenced by an official receipt, numbered 19492, which Defendants cashier, Yasmin D. Aquino, issued to
the Plaintiffs themselves, although the official name of the payor indicated therein was still that of the
deceased Lourdes Bulado;

xxxx
12. Significantly, that receipt contained the annotation appearing on the left side thereof, that the amount paid
thereon constituted full payment;
13. Since then, Plaintiffs have been demanding from the Defendant the issuance of the deed of sale and the title over
the property in question, but, inexplicably, and without any legal justification whatsoever, Defendant has refused to
issue that deed of sale and title;
14. On January 28, 2003, Plaintiffs, through counsel, sent a letter to the Defendant seeking the issuance of that deed
of sale and title but, despite receipt thereof, Defendant again refused and failed [to] act favorably thereon;
xxxx
20. At this point that the lot in question had already been fully paid for by the Plaintiffs, there is now a need to compel
the Defendant to comply with its duty to issue a deed of sale in favor of the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado,
particularly Plaintiffs Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, as well to issue a title over the same property in favor of the same
heirs.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered commanding the Defendant, after due notice and
hearing, to issue a deed of sale and/or a title, in favor of the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs
Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, over the property subject of this action.[26] (Underscoring supplied)
A plain reading of the allegations of the complaint reveals that petitioner Winnie Munsalud assumed the obligations of
her deceased mother, the original awardee of respondents Land for the Landless Program. One of the obligations of an
awardee is to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioners complied with said obligation and religiously paid the
amortizations until these were fully paid.
Indeed, petitioners have complied with what is incumbent upon them under the program. Hence, it is now the turn of
respondent to comply with what is incumbent upon it.
In a letter dated February 21, 2003,[27] respondent informed petitioners counsel that per its records, the name of
petitioner Winnie Munsalud does not appear as a beneficiary. For the guidance of respondent, Winnie Munsalud is not
actually a beneficiary. The beneficiary of its program is Lourdes Bulado, her deceased mother. This fact was made known
to respondent when another letter dated March 6, 2003[28] was sent by the counsel of the heirs of Lourdes Bulado. In
the same letter, respondent was informed that petitioner Winnie is representing her deceased mother, Lourdes
Bulado, viz.:
In view of the contents of that letter, we would like to notify you that Ms. Munsalud is actually representing her
deceased mother, Lourdes Bulado, who, on September 14, 1989completed her payment for Lot 12, Block 79 of the
Maricaban Estate. A copy of the receipt evidencing that completed is attached hereto as Annex B for your easy
reference.
In view thereof, may we reiterate our request for the issuance of the title over the aforesaid property in the name
of Lourdes Bulado.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
The letter was received by respondent on March 12, 2003. On account of this second letter, respondent could have
easily verified if the name of Lourdes Bulado appears as a beneficiary and awardee of its Land for the Landless
Program. However, respondent never responded to the second letter. This left petitioners with no recourse but to bring
the action to the trial court.
Evidently, the action commenced by petitioners before the trial court, although designated as mandamus, is in reality an
action to perform a specific act. The averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged as

to apprise the court of the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to compel respondent to issue a
deed of sale and the corresponding title over the property awarded to Bulado. Thus, the Court finds the complaint
sufficient in substance.
The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint, for it is not even an
indispensable part of the complaint.
Instead of focusing on what an action for mandamus should contain, the court a quo should have proceeded to examine
the essential facts alleged in petitioners complaint. For what determines the nature of the action and which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[30]
The cause of action in a complaint is not determined by the designation given to it by the
parties. The allegations in the body of the complaint define or describe it. The designation or caption is not controlling
more than the allegations in the complaint. It is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.[31]
There is no need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its office is enjoined as a duty to
perform. Respondents duty arose from its contractual obligation under the Land for the Landless Program.
The trial court is reminded that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action.[32] The
caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor, but rather the allegations in it should determine the nature
of the action, because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the proper relief
as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced.[33]
All told, whether or not petitioner Winnie, in her capacity as a compulsory heir of the awardee, becomes a beneficiary of
the program is a question best ventilated during trial on the merits. The conditions, terms, and provisions of the
program in case an awardee dies are evidentiary and should be presented for determination of the court. Even the
effect and the consequence of the assumption of obligation of the awardee as well as the presence of other compulsory
heirs are issues that should be addressed for the courts evaluation on the basis of the evidence to be laid down before
its eyes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
which is ORDERED to reinstate the case and to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22979 June 26, 1967

RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., petitioners, vs. ZOILO R. FERRER, ET AL., respondents.
IN RE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, MANUEL G. MONTECILLO,
ENRIQUE M. BELO, OSCAR R. ONGSIAKO, and JOSE S. ARMONIO, members of the Philippine Bar.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioners.
Jose T. Valmonte for respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Contempt proceedings. The following from the motion to reconsider the decision herein, filed by counsel for petitioners
—
One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to whether or not a
particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the tendency of this Honorable
Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or
contract through its decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This error is manifested by the
decisions of this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in this Honorable
Court's decision in the instant case. As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .

It may also be mentioned in passing that this Honorable Court contravened Rule 2, Section 5 of the Rules of Court when
it applied the so-called "rule against splitting of jurisdiction" in its Decision in the present case. As applied by this
Honorable Court, the rule means that when an employee files with the Court of Industrial Relations numerous claims
relative to his employment but only one [of] which is cognizable by said court under the law, while the others pertain to
other tribunals, that court has authority to entertain all the claims to avoid multiplicity, of suits. . . . .
drew from the Court an order directing counsel to show cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court.
In respondent attorneys' verified return, they offered "their most sincere apologies for the language used" and stated
that "[i]t was not and it has never been their intention to be disrespectful." They manifested that the language "was the
result of overenthusiasm on the part of Atty. [Jose S.] Armonio, who thought best to focus the attention of this
Honorable Court to the issue in the case, as not in any way meant to slight or offend this Honorable Court. They also said
that the unfortunate Motion for Reconsideration was prepared and filed by Atty. Armonio who had been personally
handling the case since its inception at the Court of Industrial Relations, and who had, perhaps, become too emotionally
involved in the case."
Respondent members of the law firm, namely, Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G.
Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako assumed "full responsibility" for what appears in the motion for
reconsideration. They submitted, not as an excuse, but as fact, that not one of the partners was able to pass upon the
draft or final form of the said motion, and that Atty. Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed and filed the motion
"without clearing it with any of the partners of the firm." The return winds up with an expression of deep regret about
the incident, coupled with an earnest pledge that it "shall never happen again."
Subsequent to the return, respondent attorneys appeared in court. Attys. Ponce Enrile and Armonio were orally
heard.1äwphï1.ñët
1. As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications there
are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on
its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this
Court blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making "any reference to and analysis of" the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently
inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that
error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction
of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due
this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and — some former members — of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm when counsel labelled as "so-called" the "rule
against splitting of jurisdiction."1
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for
lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such
duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon
of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good
fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold." 2
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and
men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in
varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this
Court or the lower courts. 3 Resort by an attorney — in a motion for reconsideration — to words which may drag this
Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the

attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force
thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." 4 It is in this context that
we must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the issue in the case"
does not give him in bridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much
more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes
distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and encouraging discontent which, in
many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief." 5 Stability of judicial institutions suggests that
the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea
when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if
channelled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard
for the proper place of courts in our system of government. 6
We are not unmindful of counsel's statement that the language used "was not in any way meant to slight or offend" this
Court. Want of intention, we feel constrained to say, is no excuse for the language employed. For, counsel cannot
escape responsibility "by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them as
meaning." 7 At best, it extenuates liability.
3. We now turn to the partners of the law firm. They explained that not one of them cleared the motion in which the
questionable portion appears. Their reason is that they were not in the office at the time said motion was filed — which
was the last day. They added that "it is the policy of the firm known to all its members and associates that only the
partners can sign court pleadings except in rare cases where, for want of time or due to unexpected circumstances, an
associate has to sign the same." We understood Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile to have said in open court that in his long
years of practice, he knows that it serves no useful purpose to downgrade the dignity of the Court. We may overlook the
shortcomings of the members of the law firm; except that, as we see it, partners are duty bound to provide for
efficacious control of court pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the name of their law firm.
Seemingly, such control was absent here.
In the end, we admonish Atty. Jose S. Antonio, with the warning that repetition of this incident will be dealt with
accordingly. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his record.
Attention of Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R.
Ongsiako is invited to the necessity of exercising adequete supervision and control of the pleadings and other
documents submitted by their law firm to the courts of justice of this country.
So ordered.
[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]

ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M.
TIONGCO petitioner, vs. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br. 26, JOSE B.
TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Order dated March 17, 1994[1] of the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City, Branch 26, which reinstated an earlier order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-92383 and T-5050, of the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lots 3244 and 3246,
respectively, located in Iloilo City.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On October 17, 1990, petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended complaint[2] before the Regional Trial Court,
6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, against private respondents Jose B. Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil
Case No. 19408, the action was one for "annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title,
reconveyance and damages.

In brief, the amended complaint alleged that respondent Tiongco, on the basis of an affidavit of adjudication dated April
17, 1974 alleging that he is the sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in having the
subject properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of the other surviving heir of the previous owner, petitioner
among them.Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both were among several heirs of Maria Luis
de Tiongco. The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City
on May 10, 1974. Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject to
partition among the lawful heirs, and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages and costs.
To protect her interest in the properties during the pendency of the case, petitioner caused to be annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546,[3] which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404, respectively. TCT
Nos. T-92383 and T-5050 were derived or transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in
the name of Tiongco.
After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which, on three separate occasions, he filed
motions seeking the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.[4] All these motions were denied.[5]
On December 14, 1993, the respondent judge issued a Decision[6] dismissing petitioner's complaint and private
respondent's counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal[7]on December 17, 1993. As before, respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation
of the notices of lis pendens[8] dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated January 10, 1994.[9] He filed
a "Second Motion for Reconsideration"[10] which was also denied in an Order dated January 26, 1994.[11] Displaying
remarkable tenacity, respondent Tiongco filed a "Third Motion for Reconsideration."[12] This time, however, his
arguments proved persuasive. In an Order[13]dated February 14, 1994, the respondent judge ruled to wit:
In the light of the ruling laid down in Magdalena Homeowners Association Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325; 330
(1990), cited in Vda. De Kilayko vs. Tengco, 207 SCRA 600; 614-615 (1992), that "the continuance or removal of a notice
of lis pendens is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action and ordinarily has no effect on the
merits thereof so that the notices of lis pendens in the case at bar may, on proper grounds, be cancelled
notwithstanding the non-finality of the judgment of this Court brought about by plaintiff's appeal and considering the
finding of this Court that plaintiff's action had already prescribed, which finding is based on the admitted fact that the
questioned deed of adjudication was registered way back of May 10, 1974 so that the possibility of this finding being
reversed is quite remote if not totally nil and, considering further, the circumstances obtaining in this case, among which
are: (1) that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose B. Tiongco based on the same
deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with finality also on the ground of prescription; (2) that the occupants
of the property who were alleged as formerly paying rentals to herein plaintiff, Estrella Tiongco Yared, had already
recognized defendant's ownership and had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much
less, contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421 where defendant Jose B. Tiongco was declared with finality as the
true and lawful owner of Lots Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very
small portion of subject lots consisting only a total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be unfair to the defendant
who has torrens title covering the parcels of lands solely in his name to have the same subjected to the harsh effect of
such a encumbrance; the Court, in view of all the foregoing considerations and upon further review of the records,
hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so holds that the continued annotation of subject
notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the defendant, Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of
plaintiff as such rights, if any, are now foreclosed by prescription.
This time, it was petitioner's turn to seek reconsideration.[14] On March 4, 1994, the public respondent issued an
Order[15] reversing himself on the ground that (1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of
the last day to appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the records had been ordered
elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Private respondent Tiongco filed another motion for reconsideration[16] against the Order dated March 4, 1994. On
March 17, 1994, the respondent judge issued the order, subject of this petition, which is quoted hereunder:
Considering that under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, although appeal had already been perfected, the Court,
prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal and considering that in the case at bar, lis
pendens is not a matter litigated in the appeal and the records have not as yet been transmitted to the appellate court
so that this Court still has jurisdiction to issue the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling the notices of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. T-92383 covering Lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 and considering further, that

the said Order does not direct cancellation of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-89483 covering Lot no. 1404 which
contains a total area of 1,587 square meters where the area of 64 square meters claimed by plaintiff can very well be
taken; as prayed for by the defendant Jose B. Tiongco, the Order of March 4, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside
and the Order of February 14, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and set aside and the Order of February 14, 1994 cancelling
the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. T-92383 covering lot 3244 and on TCT No. T-5050 covering lot 3246 is hereby
reinstated.
On April 5, 1994, the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of lis pendens.[17]
Feeling that a motion for reconsideration would be fruitless, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari,
alleging that:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE NOTICES OF LIS PENDENS ANNOTATED AT THE BACK OF THE CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 19408, AS THESE ARE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS THAT ARE
SOUGHT TO BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER.
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to make
known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.[18] The notice of lis pendens is
an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one
who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation
over said property.[19]
Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[20] and Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[21] otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree provide the statutory bases for notice of lis pendens. From these provisions,
it is clear that such a notice is proper only in:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the
building thereon.[22]
Thus, all petitioner has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property to put the property
under the coverage of the rule.[23] It is not necessary for her to prove ownership or interest over the property sought to
be affected by lis pendens.
Whether as a matter, of procedure[24] or substance,[25] the rule is that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on
two (2) grounds, namely (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when
the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.[26]
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy that we have taken
pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.
Thus, we ruled in Vergara v. Suelto[27] that:
[t]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if its is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned
to it by fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing
with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals.
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
We reaffirmed this policy in People v. Cuaresma,[28] thus:
xxx A last word. This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by
this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate Appellate Court), although
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
10 | P a g e LEGAL FORMS CASES 1

extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in this regard, supra-resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"-was
evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the
extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to
be filed with it.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it
perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and, immediately by the
highest tribunal of the land.The proceeding at bar is a case in point. The application for the writ of certiorari sought
against a City Court was brought directly to this Court although there is no discernible special and important reason for
not presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration, for the information and guidance of all concerned, that it
will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict observance thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, parties persisted in disregarding the judicial hierarchy. As we noted in Santiago
v. Vasquez,[29]
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstance justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
This policy found further application in People v. Court of Appeals,[30] Aleria v. Velez, [31] and Tano v. Socrates.[32] Only the
presence of exceptional and compelling reasons justified a disregard of the rule.[33]
Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with or non-observance of the
principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the Court
of Appeals, considering all the more that the appeal of the main case was already before it. In Magdalena, Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34] we ruled, to wit:
The notice of lis pendens-i.e., that real property is involved in an action-is ordinarily recorded without the intervention
of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It
does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the
property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any
voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which
may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a
mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its
continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal or removal of a preliminary attachment of injunction-is not
contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof.

In the case at bar, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the
perfection of the plaintiff's appeal. It therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection with the
action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no questions may be raised for the first time on
appeal have reference only to those affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g.,
cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies.[emphasis supplied]
Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could, and would, have been
consolidated with the appeal, thereby bringing under the competence of the said court all matters relative to the action,
including the incidents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the disposition of the instant case will be incomplete without a reference to
the improper and unethical language employed by respondent Jose B. Tiongco, who is also counsel for private
respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both before us and the court a quo. It is his belief that counsel for
petitioner, Atty. Marciana Deguma, "a rambunctious wrestler-type female of 52 who does not wear a dress which is not
red, and who stampedes into the courtroom like a mad fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty
grammar,"[35] is impelled by less than less than noble reasons in serving as counsel for petitioner. Her ulterior motive?
"[T]o please and tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily available Carmelo M. Tiongco,"[36] a retired
police major described by respondent Tiongco as Atty. Deguma's "nio bonito,"[37] an unmarried mestizo with curly hair
who lives with plaintiff for being houseless[38] who rents a place on the subject property sought to be recovered by
petitioner. Atty. Deguma, apparently are unmarried maiden of a certain age, is variously described by respondent
Tiongco as "a love-crazed female Apache [who] is now ready to skin defendant alive for not being a bastard,"[39] and a
"horned spinster and man-hungry virago and female bull of an Amazon who would stop at nothing to molest, harrass
(sic) and injure defendant - if only to please and attract police-major Carmelo Tiongco Junior - the deeply desired object
of her unreciprocated affections - who happens not to miss every chance to laugh at her behind her back."[40] He claims
that Atty. Deguma, a lawyer with the Public Attorney's Office, is engaged in a game of one-upmanship with a fellow
employee, in that "she happens to be ambitious enough to secretly (that what she thought) plot to put one over her
office-mate who simply netted a corporal (if not a private) by aiming at no lest than an IMDC major - hoping to catch him
by sheer brass and audacity.[41] In so doing, Atty. Deguma is using the PAO as a "marriage bureau for her own
benefit.[42] Respondent Tiongco predicts that nothing good will come out of opposing counsel's scheme since, quoting
Voltaire, "outside of virtue, ther's (sic) no happiness."[43]
Respondent Tiongco has achieved a remarkable feat of character assassination. His verbal darts, albeit entertaining in a
fleeting way, are cast with little regard for truth. However, he does nothing more than to obscure the issues, and his
reliance on the fool's gold of gossip betrays only a shocking absence of discernment. To this end, it will be wise to give
him an object lesson in the elementary rules of courtesy by which we expect members of the bar to comport
themselves. These provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility are pertinent:
CANON 8-A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01-A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use languages which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language before the courts.
In Romero v. Valle,[44] we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some latitude of remarks or comment in
the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use
of intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the court.[45] We are aghast at the facility with which
respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the opposing party and her counsel, although it is of
public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et a1.,[46] we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy
and public scandal against petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public
Attorney's Office, Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do not find a ready audience in
us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly: Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si meo
arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat, gestores linguis, auditores auribus.[47]
WHEREFORE, the petition fir certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), on leave.
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., A.C. No. 5768 - versus - ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR.,
Promulgated: March 26, 2010
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a
baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit[1] with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or
imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to
dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a
falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public
document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date
when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to
the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer,
evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magali
ng na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogadona rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito.
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the copy with the
Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is
presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a
disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal
case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In
October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined,
Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and
grave threats against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrers clients filed a case for falsification of public
document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver
document had been falsified.

3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already
in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt
for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000
and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing
did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment case
since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,[2] Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on December 29, 2000
at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his sons taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in
serious injuries to the tricycles passengers.[3] But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims
and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk.
Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident to the authorities.[4]
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled the citations
Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1,[5] the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his
application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have the
qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge and that he was facing a criminal charge for
acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report,
recommending the suspension for two years of Atty.Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on
record to prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed
to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of
evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating
Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other
counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225,[6] adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioners recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution[7] of October 19, 2002 on the
ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred
back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[8] On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation[9] of the Investigating Commissioner that denied
Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[10]
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-
2008.[11] On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for review under Rule 139
of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment,[12] reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further, he
presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in
court drunk.[13]
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding respondent
Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and

2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
The Courts Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.[14]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness
and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01,
the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the
falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he
had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and
abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and FALSIFICATION of documents,
committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for
distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly FALSIFIED document, in violation of his
oath of office as a government employee and as member of the Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA
PALATOLON, has never executed the SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT, wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view
whereof, hereby DENY the same including the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form
a belief as to the truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient
ground for DISBARMENT of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions.[15]
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of
our legal system.[16]
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a
court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely
presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly
made.Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against
Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na
abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito. Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy,

humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for
the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot
countenance it.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of
judicial forum.[17] Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was
negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.
Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The essence of due process
is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones
defense.[18] So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with.[19] Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file
countless pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of
the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.[20] Atty. Ferrers display of improper
attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the
court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809
and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt
of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrers personal record as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant
and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
in the land.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160604 March 28, 2008

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, ISAGANI YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, PERGENITO B. BANDAYREL, JR.,
GOBLETH C. MOULIC, ESTANISLAO CALDEZ, and ZENAIDA CALDEZ, Petitioners, vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, BRANCH 5, and LUZ
CORTEZ BABARAN, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the review, setting aside, and annulment of the Resolution1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79702 dated October 22, 2003 dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners.
The antecedents are as follows:
The Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), in its August 1, 2000 issue, published an article with the heading "After Bong, who’s
next?"2 The article narrates the death of Expedito "Bong" Caldez, a photo correspondent of the PDI in Cagayan. In said
article, the family of the deceased correspondent laments the death of their loved one due to the alleged erroneous
diagnosis of Dr. Luz Babaran.3
Later, in its September 29, 2000 issue, the PDI published another article with the heading "DOH orders probe of fotog’s
death."4 In said article, it was reported that the regional Department of Health (DOH) in Tuguegarao City has started
investigating the death of Expedito Caldez following an order from the DOH’s Bureau of Licensing and Regulation.
On July 25, 2001, based on the two PDI column articles, Dr. Babaran filed a complaint for Damages,5 Civil Case No. 5850,
against herein petitioners. In said complaint Dr. Babaran alleged, among other things, that: after learning about the
article published in the August 1, 2000 issue of the PDI, she wrote a letter to the editor of the PDI but she never received
any response from the latter; to aggravate the matter, another article appeared in the September 29, 2000 issue of the
PDI and she was again singled out as having erroneously diagnosed the illness of Expedito Caldez; the Report6 of the

DOH Fact-Finding Committee concluding that her diagnosis cannot be considered erroneous, was suppressed and was
never published by the PDI; the articles portrayed her as incompetent and one whose alleged erroneous diagnosis
caused the death of Expedito Caldez; and, in causing the articles to be published, petitioners acted in bad faith.
On September 13, 2001, petitioners filed their Answer7 with counterclaims. In said answer, petitioners raised, among
others, the following defenses: that the complaint states no cause of action against them; that the complaint fails and
omits to state the factual premises to support a conclusion that there was malice on the part of the PDI in publishing the
questioned news report; that private respondent failed to allege "actual malice" on the part of the petitioners; that a
case for actionable libel with claims for damages has not been adequately stated in the complaint; and, that the
complaint fails to establish the basis of petitioners’ liability.8
Pre-trial was held and terminated, and petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for a Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative
Defense Raised in the Answer (which is also a ground for a motion to dismiss).9 In said motion, it was alleged that at the
pre-trial on February 19, 2003, the court noted that one of the defenses raised by petitioners was that private
respondent has not delineated the participation of each of petitioners in the publication of the alleged libelous
articles.10 Thereupon, private respondent’s counsel asked for a few days to determine whether the complaint should be
amended to cure its defects. However, private respondent had not moved to amend the complaint, hence, petitioners
filed the motion.11
In support thereof, petitioners contend that: in libel charges, the participation of each defendant must be specifically
alleged in the complaint, which private respondent failed to do; and the allegations of the complaint are mere
conclusions of law and opinions of the private respondent.12 Petitioners ultimately prayed that a preliminary hearing be
conducted on their affirmative defense that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and that, thereafter, the
complaint be dismissed.13
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss Based on Affirmative
Defense.14 In said comment/opposition, private respondent averred that at the February 19, 2003 pre-trial, the issue of
whether or not the complaint states a cause of action was not raised. As such, it is no longer an issue to be litigated in
the case. Private respondent prayed that the court deny petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
On May 30, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order15 denying petitioners’ motion in this wise:
With this finding and conclusion, the Court finds no further necessity in dwelling at length on the other issues raised by
the defendants. Consequently, the motion for a Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defense Raised in the Answer (which
is also a ground for a motion to dismiss) is hereby DENIED. The initial presentation of plaintiff’s evidence is set on July 3,
2003, at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.16
The RTC opined that private respondent’s allegations in her complaint, as well as her documentary evidence, show that
there is sufficient cause of action. It added that the documentary evidence discloses facts which are sufficient to enable
the court to go beyond the disclosures in the complaint. Considering that the facts alleged in the complaint which make
out the principal cause of action and relief are sufficient, the case should not be dismissed.17
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was denied in the Order19 dated July 29, 2003.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction)20 with the CA, relying on the ground that:
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN NOT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE ITS FAILURE TO VALIDLY AND SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LIBEL
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS BECAUSE:
A) THE PARTICIPATION OF EACH DEFENDANT (PETITIONER) IN THE WRITING, EDITING, PRINTING, AND PUBLICATION OF
THE NEWS ARTICLES IN QUESTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT IN THE COMPLAINT;
B) THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE PURELY LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, AND NOT STATEMENTS OF ULTIMATE FACTS.21
Petitioners prayed among others: that the Orders of the RTC dated May 30, 2003 and July 29, 2003 be annulled and set
aside for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of jurisdiction; and that Civil Case No. 5850
be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.22
On October 22, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution23 dismissing the petition for being insufficient in form and substance
and for presenting no justiciable issue needing serious consideration by the court. Also, the CA noted that the Order
dated May 30, 2003 shows that the RTC had already ruled against petitioners’ affirmative defense that the complaint
states no cause of action.

Hence, this petition, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPLAINT WHICH FAILS TO VALIDLY AND SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LIBEL
BECAUSE:
A) THE PARTICIPATION OF EACH DEFENDANT (PETITIONER) IN THE WRITING, EDITING, PRINTING, AND PUBLICATION OF
THE NEWS ARTICLES IN QUESTION IS NOT SPECIFICALLY SET OUT IN THE COMPLAINT;
B) THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE PURELY LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, AND NOT STATEMENTS OF ULTIMATE FACTS; AND
C) THE COMPLAINT IS VIOLATIVE OF PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO FREE PRESS AND TO FREE SPEECH.
SHOULD BE DISMISSED UPON MOTION BY THE DEFENDANTS (PETITIONERS HEREIN). 24
Petitioners argue that private respondent’s complaint failed to comply with the requirement in libel cases that the
participation of each defendant must be specifically alleged in the complaint. Petitioners maintain that their divergent
personal circumstances and different legal existence, not to mention the absence of any professional relationship of two
of petitioners with the rest of them, should have prompted private respondent to specify the participation of each
petitioner in the news gathering, reporting, editing, publication, and circulation of the subject articles. As such it cannot
be determined with certainty from the allegations in the complaint whose acts and omissions are actually complained
of.25
Also, petitioners added that the material allegations of the complaint are not statements of ultimate facts but were
mere conclusions of law and were merely private respondent’s opinions.26
Finally, petitioners contend that the complaint violates their constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of the
press.27
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the
right of another. In relation to a complaint, it is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial
right. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts
committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action. As such, the failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint
warrants its dismissal.28 Its essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
Of the three, the most important is the last element since it is only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause
of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.29 In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, "the test is as follows: admitting the truth
of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?" To be taken into account are
only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not
considered. The court may however consider, in addition to the complaint, the appended annexes or documents, other
pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records.30
When a defendant seeks the dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss, the sufficiency of the motion
should be tested on the strength of the allegations of facts contained in the complaint and on no other basis.31 The issue
of whether or not the complaint failed to state a cause of action, warranting its dismissal, must be passed upon on the
basis of the allegations stated therein assuming them to be true and the court cannot inquire into the truth of the
allegations and declare them to be false; otherwise, it would be a procedural error and a denial of due process to the
plaintiff.32
This Court finds that petitioners raised the threshold question of whether the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action.1avvphi1
Hence, the trial court should have granted petitioners’ motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses
raised in the answer based on failure to state a cause of action. This procedure is designed to prevent a tedious, if not
traumatic, trial in case the complaint falls short of sufficiently alleging a cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 22, 2003 is REVERSED, and
the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 5, for the trial court to hear and
resolve petitioners’ Affirmative Defenses Raised in the Answer.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

Re: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121, CALOOCAN CITY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is yet another administrative case confronting respondent Adoracion G. Angeles (respondent),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City (sala) filed by the Office of the Court
Administrator1 (OCA) recommending that she be suspended pending the outcome of this administrative case.
The Facts
On July 17, 2006, the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City rendered a Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-69655-56 convicting
respondent of violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610.3 The criminal cases are now on appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA).4
On July 25, 2006, Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) wrote a
letter5 to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban inquiring whether it is possible for this Court, in the public
interest, motu proprio to order the immediate suspension of the respondent in view of the aforementioned RTC
Decision. SSP Velasco opined:
1. Judge Angeles now stands convicted on two counts of a crime, child abuse under Republic Act 7610, which involves
moral turpitude. Until she clears her name of such conviction, her current moral qualification to do the work of a judge
is under a dark cloud. Litigants seeking justice in our courts are entitled to a hearing by judges whose moral
qualifications are not placed in serious doubt.
2. Although her conviction is not yet final, the presumption of innocence that Judge Angeles enjoyed during the
pendency of the trial has already been overcome by its result. The presumption today is that she is guilty and must clear
her name of the charges.
xxxx
It simply would not be right to have a person presumably guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude to hear and
adjudicate the cases of others.
3. Under section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, since the RTC of Quezon City convicted Judge Angeles
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, she no longer has a right to bail and,
therefore, should ordinarily be held in prison pending adjudication of her appeal. That the RTC of Quezon City chose
to exercise its discretionary power to nonetheless grant her bail does not change the fact that, except for the bail, Judge
Angeles' rightful place by reason of conviction is within the confinement of prison.
It would seem incongruous for the Supreme Court to allow convicted felons out on bail to hear and adjudicate cases in
its courts.
4. Finally, as a sitting judge who wields power over all persons appearing before her and has immeasurable influence
within the judicial system as one of its members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause pressure to bear, not only on the
members of the Court of Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the Office of the Solicitor General that
prosecutes her case on appeal. Only temporary suspension from official function, pending resolution of her case, will
neutralize her judicial clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice is not going well in her case.
On July 27, 2006, the matter was referred to the OCA for comment and recommendation.6
On the basis of SSP Velasco's letter and by virtue of this Court's Resolution7 dated March 31, 1981, the OCA submitted to
this Court a Report8 dated August 25, 2006 with an attached Administrative Complaint,9 the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this administrative complaint be given due course and, respondent be
ordered to file her Comment within ten (10) days from receipt. Considering the evidence is prima facie strong, it is
respectfully recommended that she be INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED pending the outcome of the instant case or until
further orders from this Court. It is further recommended that after the Comment is filed, the administrative proceeding
be suspended to await the final outcome of the criminal cases filed against her.

In a Resolution10 dated September 18, 2006, this Court's Second Division approved all of these recommendations, thus,
suspending respondent from performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases or
until further orders from this Court.
On October 6, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration11 of the aforementioned Resolution.
Respondent claimed that the suspension order was wielded against her without affording her the opportunity to be
heard since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent
submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases
against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys
the constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a
prejudgment of her guilt.
On the other hand, on October 11, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation12 to the Court En Banc on
the alleged unethical conduct of respondent, seeking the immediate implementation of this Court's Resolution dated
September 18, 2006. On October 16, 2007, SSP Velasco filed an Opposition to the said Motion for
Reconsideration,13 manifesting that respondent continuously defied this Court's Resolution dated September 18, 2006
as she did not desist from performing her judicial functions despite her receipt of said Resolution on October 6, 2006.
SSP Velasco stressed that an order of suspension issued by this Court is immediately executory notwithstanding the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. Moreover, SSP Velasco reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of
child abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in
order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence to obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and
reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Correlatively, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Caloocan, Malabon, Navotas Chapter (IBP-CALMANA Chapter),
through its Public Relations Officer (PRO) Atty. Emiliano A. Mackay, wrote a letter14 dated October 18, 2006 addressed to
the Second Division of this Court inquiring as to the effectivity of the Resolution suspending the respondent so as not to
sow confusion among the legal practitioners and party litigants with pending cases before the respondent's sala.
Likewise, the IBP-CALMANA Chapter manifested that respondent did not cease to perform her judicial functions as
evidenced by a Commitment Order15 issued by respondent on October 16, 2006, and handwritten manifestations16 of
some party litigants attesting that on various dates they attended hearings before respondent's sala. In the same vein, in
an undated letter17 addressed to Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, the Concerned Trial Lawyers in the City
of Caloocan raised the same concern before this Court.
In her Reply18 to SSP Velasco's Opposition, respondent admitted that she continued discharging her bounden duties in
utmost good faith after filing her motion for reconsideration. She averred that she did not have the slightest intention to
defy or ignore this Court's Resolution which did not categorically state that the said suspension is immediately
executory. Respondent reiterated her arguments against the suspension order on the grounds that she was deprived of
due process; that her conviction is not yet final; and that the crimes for which she was convicted have nothing to do with
the discharge of her official duties. Lastly, respondent claimed that the instant case is but another harassment suit filed
against her by SSP Velasco because she earlier filed an administrative complaint against the latter for maliciously
indicting respondent with respect to another case of child abuse.
On October 25, 2006, respondent filed a Manifestation of Voluntary Inhibition19 stating that she is voluntarily inhibiting
from handling all cases scheduled for hearing before her sala from October 25, 2006 to November 13, 2006.
On October 27, 2006, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in respondent's sala. Per Report20 of the judicial audit team, it
was established that from October 6, 2006 to October 23, 2006, respondent conducted hearings, issued orders, decided
cases and resolved motions, acting as if the order of suspension which the respondent received on October 6, 2006 was
only a "mirage." The Report was brought to the attention of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by Court Administrator
Christopher O. Lock (CA Lock).21
On October 30, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an Administrative Complaint against respondent for violation of the Court's
Circulars, the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and for Gross Misconduct,
asseverating, among others, that the suspension order was immediately executory22 and that integrity as mandated by
the New Code of Judicial Conduct is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
In her Comment,23 respondent, in addition to her previous contentions, argued that the Resolution dated September 18,
2006 ordering her suspension was issued only by a Division of this Court contrary to Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,

or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues
in the case and voted thereon."
On November 9, 2006, SSP Velasco filed a Supplement to the Opposition to Respondent's Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration24 of the Resolution dated September 18, 2006. Thereafter, numerous pleadings25 were filed by both
parties practically repeating their previous allegations.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated February 19, 2007, this Court lifted the suspension of respondent on the ground
that:
Upon verification, it appears that the Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division, indeed failed to attach a copy of the
OCA complaint to the copy of our resolution dated September 18, 2006 sent to Judge Angeles. Due process requires that
Judge Angeles be accorded the opportunity to answer the complaint.
Respondent was then given a fresh period of ten (10) days from the receipt of the OCA Administrative Complaint within
which to file her comment.
On March 15, 2007, respondent filed her Comment26 with the following material assertions: (1) that CA Lock as Court
Administrator and who in behalf of the OCA stands as the complainant in this case, has no personal knowledge of the
facts, issues and evidence presented in the criminal cases; (2) that the instant case, filed eleven (11) years after the
criminal charges for child abuse were filed by Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay, smacks of malice and bad faith on the
part of CA Lock; (3) that CA Lock is a friend and former subordinate of then National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Director Epimaco Velasco (Director Velasco), father of
herein party SSP Velasco, thus, CA Lock's ill motive against respondent is clear; (4) that CA Lock should not use the OCA
to harass a member of the judiciary; (5) that the decision in the aforementioned criminal cases has not yet become final;
(6) that the acts for which she was convicted are totally alien to her official functions and have nothing to do with her
fitness and competence as a judge; (7) that there is no wisdom in the imposition of the suspension which in this case is
preventive in character because respondent cannot do anything through her office that could possibly cause prejudice
to the prosecution of the child abuse case; (8) that the lifting of the suspension order retroacts to the date of its
issuance; (9) that the instant case should be struck down because the judgment of conviction was contrary to law and
jurisprudence; and (10) that under the circumstances, all the charges were merely concocted by respondent's detractors
in order to embarrass, humiliate and vex her.
In his Motion for Reconsideration27 of this Court's Resolution dated February 19, 2007, SSP Velasco argued that
respondent's deprivation of her right to due process was cured when she filed her motion for the reconsideration of the
suspension order; thus, there is no need to lift such order. He reiterated his previous statement that "as a sitting judge
who wields power over all persons appearing before her and thus has immeasurable influence within the judicial system
as one of its members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause pressure to bear, not only on the members of the Court of
Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that prosecutes her case
on appeal. Only her suspension from official function, pending resolution of her case, will neutralize her judicial clout and
clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice is not going well in her case."28
In response, respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the said motion with a Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in
contempt of Court29 due to this aforementioned statement. Respondent argued that such statement betrays SSP
Velasco's cheap and low perception of the integrity and independence of this Court, of the CA and of the OSG. It also
shows his utter lack of respect for the judicial system. Moreover, respondent added that since she was not furnished a
copy of the OCA Administrative Complaint, the issuance of the suspension order deprived her of her right to due process
and prevented her from fully ventilating her arguments. Respondent, likewise, questioned SSP Velasco's legal
personality in this case as it was the OCA which, motu proprio, initiated the filing of the said case.
In a Resolution dated July 4, 2007, this Court, among others, directed SSP Velasco to file his comment on respondent's
motion to cite him for contempt. On August 21, 2007, SSP Velasco filed his Comment claiming that he has legal
personality to file pleadings before this Court because it was he who initiated the filing of this case through his letter to
then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban on July 25, 2006. He admitted that the allegedly contemptuous statements
were merely lifted from said letter. He argued that the former Chief Justice or the Court for that matter, did not find any
contemptuous statement in the letter. Taking the letter in its entire context, SSP Velasco posited that he did not commit
any act of disobedience to the orders of this Court; neither did he bring the Court's authority and the administration of
law into disrepute nor did he impede the due administration of justice. Nowhere in the letter was it stated that this
Court, the CA and the OSG could be pressured; the letter merely stated that respondent could cause pressure. SSP

Velasco pointed that the letter to the then Chief Justice, in itself, shows his respect for the judiciary and the promotion
of the administration of justice.
In her Reply30 to said Comment, respondent argued that it cannot be said that somebody could cause pressure if no one
is believed to be susceptible to pressure. Thus, the use of this kind of language tends to degrade the administration of
justice and constitutes indirect contempt. She stressed that SSP Velasco's act of misrepresenting himself as the
complainant in this case while it is clear from the Resolution of this Court that the OCA motu propriofiled the same,
is per se contemptuous.
Meanwhile in its Memorandum,31 the OCA reiterated its earlier position that respondent should be suspended pending
the outcome of this administrative case. The OCA opined that the Resolution lifting the suspension order was basically
premised on the ground that respondent was not accorded her right to due process. By filing her Comment raising
arguments against her suspension, respondent has fully availed herself of such right. However, the OCA submitted that
respondent's arguments are devoid of merit on the following grounds: (1) the Court Administrator need not personally
know about the criminal cases of respondent because the instant case is based on a public document, i.e., the decision
of the RTC convicting the respondent of child abuse; (2) the fact that said decision has not attained finality is of no
moment for what is being sought is merely preventive suspension. Thus, in the event that respondent is acquitted in the
criminal cases of which she stands accused, she will receive the salaries and other benefits which she would not receive
during her suspension; (3) even if the acts of child abuse have no connection with respondent's official functions as a
judge, it is established that the private conduct of judges cannot be dissociated from their official functions; (4)
respondent's preventive suspension shall serve an important purpose: it will protect the image of the judiciary and
preserve the faith of the people in the same; and
(5) citing the case of Leonida Vistan v. Judge Ruben T. Nicolas,32 the RTC decision convicting respondent of child abuse
is prima facie evidence that respondent committed the said crime which indicates the moral depravity of the offender
and, as such, warrants the punishment of dismissal from the service. Thus, the OCA recommended that respondent be
suspended pending the outcome of this administrative case and that the CA be directed to resolve the criminal cases
with dispatch.
The Issues
There are two ultimate issues in this case:
First, whether or not grounds exist to cite SSP Velasco for indirect contempt of Court; and
Second, whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the resolution of this
administrative case.
The Court's Ruling
We resolve the first issue in the negative.
In Pilar Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Romeo C. Albarracin,33 we held:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their
witnesses during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to
be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect
contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would constitute indirect
contempt.
In her Comment/Opposition with Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in contempt of Court, respondent espoused the view
that SSP Velasco is guilty of indirect contempt for using language which tends to degrade the administration of justice.
But if this were so, respondent should have availed herself of the remedy in accordance with Section 4, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements
for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
A charge of indirect contempt must be filed in the form of a verified petition if it is not initiated directly by the court
against which the contemptuous act was committed. On previous occasions, we clarified that such petition is in the
nature of a special civil action. Certified true copies of related documents must be submitted with the petition and
appropriate docket fees must be paid. The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. As Justice Florenz D.
Regalado has explained:
This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While
such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice,
tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor
and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of
[Section 4].34
On the charge of indirect contempt of court, we therefore find that SSP Velasco's statement, while irresponsible, did not
necessarily degrade the administration of justice as to be considered contumacious. The salutary rule is that the power
to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. A lawyer's remarks explaining his position in a case under consideration do not
necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies the court's exercise of the power of contempt.35 We note that SSP
Velasco's statement was made in support of his argument for the imposition of preventive suspension, i.e., to prevent
the respondent from using her current position to alter the course of the investigation and the disposition of the
appealed criminal cases.
Nevertheless, SSP Velasco must bear in mind that as a lawyer, he must be circumspect in his language. We remind him
of our admonition to all lawyers to observe the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
Canon 8. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
A lawyer is an officer of the Court. It is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not unnecessarily destroy the
people's high esteem and regard for the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
A lawyer's language may be forceful but should always be dignified;
emphatic but respectful, as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel, and should use such language as may be properly addressed by one person to another.36
We likewise resolve the second issue in the negative. The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the OCA.
Pertinent is our ruling in Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles,37 which involved the same parties and
where we held:
An act unrelated to a judge's discharge of judicial functions may give rise to administrative liability even when such act
constitutes a violation of penal law. When the issue is administrative liability, the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case
against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. Conversely,
conviction in the criminal case will not automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case. We
emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, and
each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to it.
In Nuñez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,38 the Court held that the mere existence of pending criminal charges against the
respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the
door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We
agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the
CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must
be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack
of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown

in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.39 In Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan,40 the Court held that
respondent Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion, correctible by certiorari, when it ruled
that despite her convictions, "Preagido has still in her favor the constitutional presumption of innocence x x x (and until) a
promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails." The Court therein further held that such
ruling is not bereft of legal or logical foundation and cannot, in any sense, be characterized as a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment. So also must we hold in this case.
Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands
to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment.41 As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges may be
used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP Velasco,
failed to prove that other than the fact that a judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered against the
respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other lawful grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension.
Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente
lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty,42 the rules on
preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at
best.43 Likewise, we consider respondent's argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive suspension as the
criminal cases are now before the CA, and that she cannot, by using her present position as an RTC Judge, do anything to
influence the CA to render a decision in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also been rendered moot as
the Court opted to resolve this administrative case.
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to
warrant the imposition of preventive suspension, we do note the use of offensive language in respondent's pleadings,
not only against SSP Velasco but also against former CA Lock. To reiterate our previous ruling involving the respondent,
her use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly below the standard expected of an officer of the court.
The esteemed position of a magistrate of the law demands temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and in
language.44 Illustrative are the following statements: "CA Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex";45 "In a
frenzied display of arrogance and power";46 "(CA Lock's) complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial
court";47 and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity and misuses the full powers of his Office to persecute the
object of his fancy, then it is time for him to step down."48 In the attempt to discredit CA Lock, respondent even dragged
CA Lock's son into the controversy, to wit:
It is noteworthy to mention that CA Lock's hostile attitude was aggravated by his embarrassment when the undersigned
mentioned to him that she knew how he used his influence to secure a position for his son at the RTC Library of Pasay
City which was then managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock had made sure that his son be assigned to the library to
enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule in reviewing for the bar examination.
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent said: "A reading of the motion for reconsideration readily
discloses that it is mainly anchored on SSP Velasco's malicious speculations about the guilt of the
undersigned. Speculations, especially those that emanate from the poisonous intentions of attention-seeking individuals,
are no different from garbage that should be rejected outright";49 and "His malicious insinuation is no less than a
revelation of his warped mindset that a person's position could cause pressure to bear among government officials. This
brings forth a nagging question. Did SSP Velasco use his position at the DOJ to 'cause pressure to bear' and obtain a
favorable disposition of the administrative cases lodged against him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of his own ghost?"50
It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times,
avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She must maintain composure and equanimity. The judicial office circumscribes
the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay for
accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the administration of justice.51
One final word. The parties herein have admitted in their various pleadings that they have filed numerous cases against
each other. We do not begrudge them the prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their opinion, may have
wronged them. But it is well to remind them that this privilege must be exercised with prudence, when there are clearly
lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the right to institute
shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel, not unlike that
of two irresponsible children.
Judge Angeles and SSP Velasco should bear in mind that they are high-ranking public officers whom the people look up
to for zealous, conscientious and responsive public service. Name-calling hardly becomes them.

Cognizant of the adverse impact and unpleasant consequences this continuing conflict will inflict on the public service,
we find both officials wanting in the conduct demanded of public servants.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Nevertheless, respondent
Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is
hereby REPRIMANDED for her use of intemperate language in her pleadings and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall merit a more severe sanction.
Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the Department of Justice is hereby WARNED that he should be more
circumspect in the statements made in his pleadings and that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
The motion to cite him for contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve CA-G.R. CR No. 30260 involving respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 167181 SPS.

CARLOS MUNSALUD and WINNIE MUNSALUD, - versus - NATIONAL HOUSING Promulgated:

REYES, R.T., J.:

Laid bare from the records are the following facts:

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A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following:

3. The Signature and Address of the party or counsel;[13]

1. The Roll of Attorneys Number;

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Now, is the petition insufficient in substance?

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G.R. No. L-22979 June 26, 1967

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[G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000]

DE LEON, JR., J.:

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The Facts and the Case

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The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

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The Courts Ruling

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G.R. No. 160604 March 28, 2008

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A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

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