PEOPLE v.

OANIS
74 Phil. 257
G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1943

Facts:
Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal
and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
They went to the suspected house then proceeded to the room where they saw the
supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back towards the door. Oanis and Galanta
simultaneously or successively fired at him which resulted to the victim’s death. The
supposedly Balagtas turned out to be Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.

Issue:
Whether or not requisites necessary to justify or exempt the appellants are
attendant.

Held:
No. There is only a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal
provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may
be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not
the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty

PEOPLE v. BONOAN
64 Phil 95
G. R. No. 45130
February 17, 1937

Facts:
Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison
with a knife, which caused his death three days afterwards. An arraignment was then
called, but the defense objected on the ground that the defendant was mentally
deranged and was at the time confined at the Psychopatic Hospital. After several
months of summons for doctors, production of the defendant’s complete record of
 mental condition from the hospital and defendant’s admission to the hospital for
personal observation, assistant alienist Dr. Jose Fernandez finally reported to the court
that Bonoan may be discharged for being a “recovered case”. After trial, the lower court
found Bonoan guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The defense appealled, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan
suffered dementia only occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of
abnormality, that the defense did not establish the defendant’s insanity and finding
accused guilty.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty.

Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the
crime, which consequently exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his
confinement in San Lazaro Hospital or other hospital for the insane.

Comment:
Although the court did not rule that the case on hand falls under the mitigating circumstance
provided in Article 13, Paragraph 9 of the Revised Penal Code or not, it is clear that there was
lucid interval and that the defense was not able to prove insanity during the time the crime was
committed. The appellant, however, is given the benefit of the doubt that his exercise of will-
power was, in fact, diminished. He may have been conscious with his acts but given the fact
that he was hospitalized before, may have had a psychological impact on his behavior or acts.

US v. MANALINDE
G.R. L-No. 5292
August 28, 1909

Facts:
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while
Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in
Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from
behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was
standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man,
ran to his assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the
Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the
street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store
and was about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound
in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came
from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up
in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both
wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the
former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on
the Spaniard Juan Igual.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had
perpetrated the crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one
hundred days before and that he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the
Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in
order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge
against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde,
was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that
in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of
Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two
persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in
banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon reaching the
town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and,
wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the
latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter a
store nearby, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated that
he had no quarrel with the assaulted persons.
Issue:
Whether or not the act was committed with evident premeditation

Held:
It is unquestionable that the accused deliberately considered and carefully and
thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under
orders received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided
himself with a weapon. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds executed
with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and
persistent intention of the accused from the moment he received the order until the
crime was committed.
PEOPLE V. DELIM

FACTS: Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers.

They are the uncles of Leon and Ronald Delim. Modesto

Delim, the victim (deceased), was adopted by the father of

the brothers.

On January 23, 1999, Modesto, Rita (wife),

Randy (son) and their 2 grandchildren were about to eat

their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald barged into

the house. They were armed with a short handgun. Marlon

poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald

simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of

cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto. They then

herded Modesto out of the house on their way towards the

direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Leon and Manuel,

also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the door to

the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to stay

where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house at

around 7am the following day.

On January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of

his relatives, found Modesto under thick bushes in a

grassy area. He was already dead. The cadaver was

bloated and in the state of decomposition. It exuded a bad

odor. Tiny white worms swarmed over and feasted on the

cadaver. Randy and his relatives immediately rushed to

the police station to report the incident and to seek

assistance.

According to the autopsy, the cause of death was

a gunshot wound at the head and the stab wounds

sustained by the victim on his left and forearm were

defensive wounds. The investigators confirmed that the

accused had no licenses for their firearms.

Only Marlon, Ronald and Leon were arrested.

Manuel and Robert were not found.

To exculpate themselves, Marlon, Ronald and

Leon interposed denial and alibi.

The trial court rendered judgment finding

accused-appellants guilty of aggravated murder (The trial

court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance

and of taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime
and use of unlicensed firearms as separate of aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime) and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. The amount of
P75,000 for moral damages and P25,000 for exemplary
damages was awarded.

ISSUE:

1) WON the crime charged in the information is murder or

kidnapping – Murder

HELD/ RATIO:

1) The crime charged is murder.

In determining what crime is charged in an information, the

material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the

crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are

controlling. Where the specific intent of the malefactor is

determinative of the crime charged such specific intent

must be alleged in the information and proved by the

prosecution. A decade ago, this Court held in People v.

Isabelo Puno, et al., that for kidnapping to exist, there

must be indubitable proof that the actual specific intent of

the malefactor is to deprive the offended party of his liberty

and not where such restraint of his freedom of action is

merely an incident in the commission of another offense

primarily intended by the malefactor.

If the primary and ultimate purpose of the

accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of

the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of

kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing,

and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of

the victim. The crime committed would either be homicide

or murder.

What is primordial then is the specific intent of

the malefactors as disclosed in the information or criminal

complaint that is determinative of what crime the accused

is charged with — that of murder or kidnapping.

Specific intent is used to describe a state of mind

which exists where circumstances indicate that an

offender actively desired certain criminal consequences or

objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or

failure to act. Specific intent must be alleged in the

Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a

crime requiring specific intent. Kidnapping and murder are

specific intent crimes.

Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence

or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred from the

circumstances of the actions of the accused as

established by the evidence on record.

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive.

Motive generally is referred to as the reason which

prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal

activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and

hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a

general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the

offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof

of such motive does not establish the innocence of

accused for the crime charged such as murder. The

history of crimes shows that murders are generally

committed from motives comparatively trivial. Crime is

rarely rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the

victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the

victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime,

the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In

kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where

accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved

one, the motive is revenge.

In this case, it is evident on the face of the

Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in

barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that

he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant

modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of

abducting Modesto was merely incidental to their primary

purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific

allegation in the information that the primary intent of the

malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or

liberty and that killing him was merely incidental to

kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the

Information is Murder under Article 248 of the Revised

Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.

People v Carmen

Facts:

A boy named Randy Luntayao was believed by his

father (Eddie) to have a ‘nervous breakdown’ manife

stedby him talking and laughing by himself. He thinks that thebreakdown was caused by skipping meals
whenever hetook the boy with him to the farm.Upon the suggestion of one of the accused in this
case,Eddie, wife Perlita and their three children went with saidaccused to Cebu. Upon arriving in Cebu
they went to thehouse of another accused Carmen and diagnosed the boy

to be possessed with a ‘bad spirit’ and that she could

exorcise. Warning that in conducting exorcism, the badspirit might transfer to Eddie it was best to do
the healingprayer without him. Eddie, wife and children were lockedinside a room in the house.The
exorcism conducted by Carmen was witnessed by

two children who were playing ‘takyan’ when they heard a

shout asking for help from his mother. They ran to thedirection of the house of Carmen and saw that
Randy wasbeing immersed in water head first by the 4 accused.They also saw him being tied on a bench
while Carmenpoured water into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boystruggled to raise his head,
accused Alexander banged

the boy’s head against the bench. She also witnessed

accused Celedonia dropped her weight on the body of the

boy. They also took turns in pounding the boy’s chest with

their clenched fist. Then Carmen asked one of theaccused to get a knife and after which the knife was
slowlyplunged into the left side of the boy’s body. Then the boy

was carried into the house. Around 5 o’clock in the afternoon Randy was already

dead. After Eddie and his family returned to Negros Occidental,Eddie sought the assistance from the
Bombo Radyostation in Bacolod City. As the incident took place in Cebu,NBI in Cebu conducted the
investigation and autopsyreport of the exhumed body.The family filed a case in court against Carmen
et.al ofmurder. The trial court found them guilty of murderarguing that killing a person with treachery is
murder. Itcited a court decision stating that even if there is no intentto kill, in inflicting physical injuries
with treachery, theaccused in that case was convicted of murder.Intent is presumed from the
commission of an unlawfulact. In the case at bar, there is enough evidence that theaccused
confederated with each other in inflicting physicalharm to the victim (illegal act). These acts
wereintentional and thus they should be liable for all the directand natural consequences of their
unlawful act.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime ofmurder?

–

NO.

Ruling:

There was no criminal intent on the part of theaccused to kill the boy

. It was shown that the accusedare members of a cult and the bizarre ritual wasconsented to by
the parents of the boy. Their liabilityarises from their reckless imprudence because they oughtto know
their actions would not bring about the cure. Theyare guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide andnot murder.

The RPC states that reckless imprudenceconsists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing orfailing to do
an act from which material damageresults by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
onthe person performing such an act. Intentionalfelonies such as murder or homicide, what takes
theplace of the element of is the failure of the offender totake precautions due to lack if skill.

The accused lack medical skills in treating thevictim of his ailment, resulted in the latters death.

Treachery in this case cannot be appreciatedin the absence of intent to kill

. The acts of the accusedtherefore considered by the court as treachery are in factefforts by the accused
to restrain the boy so that they cancure him. Thus, the decision of the RTC is affirmed andmodified
declaring the accused guilty of recklessimprudence resulting in homicide.

PEOPLE

vs.

PUGAY & SAMSON

(may 2 or more persons kill the same victim) FACTS: The deceased victim Miranda, a 25-year old
retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. During a town fiesta, Gabion, the witness, was sitting in
the ferris wheel and reading a comic book. He then saw Pugay and Samson with several companions
making fun of Miranda. Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel
and poured its contents on the body of the Miranda. The victim died due to the incident. Gabion, Pugay,
Samson and 5 others were brought to the municipal building for interrogation. Pugay and Samson gave
statements to the police. Pugay admitted in his statement that he poured a can of gasoline on the
deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and Samson set the deceased on fire. Samson
alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set
him on fire. Pugay and Samson were found guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the
accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a conspiracy? HELD: None, there is nothing in the records showing that there
was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants
immediately before the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and
the accused Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear
that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the
respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the
deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him
(U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371). ISSUE: What is the criminal
responsibility of Pugay? HELD: Homicide through reckless imprudence. Having taken the can from under
the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of the deceased,
this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence
necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. A man must use common sense and
exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from
instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might
foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise
his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner
of danger and injury.

PEOPLE VS LAMAHANG

Lamahang was caught by a policeman the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a
store of cheap goods. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening
another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him
under custody. The lower court found him guilty of attempted robbery. Issue: Is he guilty of attempted
robbery? Held: NO. He is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling

The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to
a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts
of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an
indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical
fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.

There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by
means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to
commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of the police, did not develop beyond the first steps
of its execution.

But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the
logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will
develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
-

Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another
person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the
offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property
belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the
accused may reasonably be inferred.

in offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (

accion fin

) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (

accion medio

).

Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show
an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for
attempted nor frustrated crimes

CRIMIN L L W REVIEW DIGESTS JUSTICE ROMEO C LLEJO

57

NOTE: © = Callejo Ponente

an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.

Third

, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against
the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

PEOPLE v MARIVIC GENOSA ( GR No. 135981 September 29, 2000) FACTS:

This case involved the "battered woman syndrome," which is alleged to be equivalent to self-defense.
RTC found appellant guilty of parricide aggravated by treachery. Appellant has admitted the fact of
killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of
his head, which of said acts actually caused the victim's death.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to
determine her state of mind at the time of the killing.

HELD:

Yes. The case is hereby

REMANDED

to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered
woman syndrome" plea.

RATIO:

In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring into evidence the
abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse will support the 'battered woman
syndrome'," she asks the Court to "re-evaluate the traditional elements" used in determining self-
defense and to consider the "battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-
defense. Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the
violence was her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3)
she fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is
omnipresent and omniscient. Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings
are almost certain to occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of
her batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously
threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would
succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure
or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would
have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal means of
eliminating her sufferings. Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of
self-defense in the United States and in Europe. In the US particularly, it is classified as a post-traumatic
stress disorder, rather than a form of mental illness. It has been held admissible in order to assess a
defendant's perception of the danger posed by the abuser. In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa
pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to prove that her relationship with her spouse-victim
had afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an expert can explain how her experiences as a battered
woman had affected her perception of danger and her honest belief in its imminence, and why she had
resorted to force against her batterer. Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from
criminal liability. If the accused had not performed the act voluntarily, then he could not have been
criminally liable. In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had
acted freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot
properly evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on her mental and
emotional state at the time of the killing and the possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal act.

PEOPLE V. FLORES Y PARAS, G.R. No. 177355, 2010

Facts: Flores was charged with qualified rape. AAA was the name of the 13 year-old victim (under RA
9262 VAW-C, the names of women and child victims are withheld.) That the crime of rape was
committed with the qualifying circumstances of victim being under 18 years of age, the accused is her
stepfather, being the common-law spouse of her mother (BBB in this case), and that the rape was c
ommitted in full view of the victim’s mother.

Rape details: fateful evening of July 18, 2001, at

around eight o’clock, Flores ordered her to ask her

daughter AAA to sleep with them. Both AAA and BBB obeyed Flores for fear of his wrath.

At around ten o’

clock in the evening, BBB was awakened by the pinch of her daughter, BBB was then shocked to see that
Flores was already on top of her daughter, who was shouting

“Aray, Aray, Nanay, Aray.”

She felt angry but could not do anything because Flores not only had a bladed weapon poked at her
neck, but he also threatened to kill her if she shouted. BBB endured this horrifying episode for the next
thirty minutes. Sweetheart defense of Flores was stricken down by court.

Issue: Death penalty properly meted? Considering the age of the victim at time of rape incident was not
sufficiently established?

Held: Yes. But… Age not properly proven. In the case at bar, not only did the prosecution fail to present
AAA’s birth certificate, but BBB, the victim’s mother herself

, gave contradictory statements on the true age of her daughter. At one time she said that AAA was 13
years old, and yet

when asked about the year of AAA’s birthday, she

declared that it was 1982. STILL, Flores cannot escape the penalty of death. Flores forgot the important
fact that

aside from AAA’s minority, the qualifying circumstance that the rape was committed in full view of
AAA’s mother

was also alleged in the Information. BUT (again!) despite this, the 2006 law abolishing the death penalty
in effect re PEOPLE VS JAURIGUE

Facts: Defendant Avelina Jarigue(girl) and appellant Amado Capino lived in the same barrio. Prior to the
incident at hand, Capino had been courting Jarigue to no avail. A month prior to the incident, Capino
stole a hanky

belonging to Jarigue bearing her nickname “aveling” while

I was being washed. On another night, Jarigue was feeding a dog under her house, when Capino
approached her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly
embraced and kissed her and touched her boobs. She thereafter kept a long fan knife to protect herself.
A few days later, Capino climbed up the house of Jarigue and entered the room where she was sleeping.
He felt her forehead with the intention of raping her. She immediately screamed for help, which
awakened her parents and brought them to her side. Capino then came out from where he was hiding,
under the bed, and

kissed the hand of Jarigue’s father to

beg for forgiveness. Several days later on the fateful night, her family went to the local church where it
was quite bright. When Jarigue was left alone in the bench while her father tended to some business,
Capino sat beside Jarigue and placed his hand on top of her thigh. On observing this highly improper
conduct, Jaurigue stabbed Capino in the neck, fatally causing a single wound from which he died.
Jaurigue surrendered without question. Issue: WON defendant acted in the legitimate defense of her
honor and should be completely absolved from all criminal liability. Side issue: WON there were
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Held: She is not absolved from criminal liability. If the
defendant had killed Capino when he climbed up her house to rape her, she could have been perfectly
justified in killing him. However, when the deceased sat beside defendant on the same bench in a well lit
chapel with several people inside, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant where there is no
possibility of being raped. She cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability for
fatally wounding the deceased since the means employer by her in the defense of her honor was
evidently excessive. On the side: The fact that she voluntarily surrendered to the lieutenant in the
chapel and admitted to stabbing the deceased , and the fact that she had acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation
as to produce passion or temporary loss of reason, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in
her favor. The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious
worship cannot be legally sustained as there is no evidence to show that defendant had murder in her
heart when she entered the chapel. She should therefore be charged with homicide without aggravating
circumstances and with mitigating circumstances.

PEOPLE VS. NARVAEZ FACTS:

Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by

treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia when the two were
constructing a fence (that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill). Narvaez,
who was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction, awoke and asked them to stop destroying
his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "

No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead

." Narvaez lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher first, then Rubia, who was running towards the jeep
to get his gun. Both died. Narvaez voluntarily surrendered and claimed he killed in defense of his person
and of his rights. The CFI convicted him of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premediation and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Prior to
the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the
Narvaez over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for
annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). Narvaez had leased
his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25,
Narvaez received a letter terminating the contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6
months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.

ISSUE:

W/N CFI erred in convicting Narvaez despite the fact that he was acting in defense of his person and of
his rights.

HELD/RATIO

: YES (with respect to rights)

Narvaez ordered released immediately coz his penalty was reduced and he had already served it as he
was imprisoned for 14 years.

Defense of his person

- NO

The courts said that alth

ough the fencing of Narvaez’

house was indeed a form of aggression against him, this aggression was not done against his person but
rather on his rights to property. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts
referred to Art. 30 of the civil code, which recognizes the right of owners to

close and fence their land. But the Narvaez can’t

subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still
pending, therefore putting ownership into question. It is accepted that Narvaez

Defense of his rights

YES (although incomplete)

The argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are
fulfilled, according to Art. 11(1) RPC: 1.

Unlawful aggression

. 2.

Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack

. 3.

Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself

. Unlawful aggression due to the utterance of

Fleischer and the invasion of Narvaez’s property was

clear. The pending case regarding ownership was decided only over a year after the incident, and even
then, Fleischer had given Narvaez until the end of the year to leave the land. Lack of sufficient
provocation was clear because Narvaez was asleep in his house, then asked Fleischer to stop so they
could talk. Firing a shotgun from a window, however, was a disproportionate means of resistance. Since
not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete
defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion &
obfuscationduced his sentence to reclusion perpetua.

© Llave vs People

FACTS: Neil Llave, a 12 year old boy, was charged with

raping Debbielyn, a 7 year old girl, in Pasay City. After

school, Debbielyn proceeded home, changed her clothes

and went to her mother’s store to bring home unsold quail

eggs. On her way, she passed by a vacant house adjacent

to Teofisto’s house (their neighbor). She was suddenly

pulled by petitioner to a pile of hollow blocks; forced her to

lay down on the cement. Petitioner removed his and the

victim’s clothes. He lay on top of the victim, started kissing

her and inserted his penis inside the victim’s vagina. The

victim resisted to no avail.

Thereafter Teofisto heard the victim’s cries and

went out to see what has happened. At that point, Llave

took off.

The parents of the victim, upon knowing the

incident, found petitioner in the latter’s grandparent’s

house. Llave was arrested by the tanod.

The victim was brought to the Child Protection

Unit of the PGH where Dr. Castillo found that no injury

was found on the hymen and perineum, there was a

scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora.

There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1

o’clock position near the anus which can only be caused

by a blunt object such as erect penis or finger. The

findings, according to the Dr., were consistent with the

claim that victim was sexually abused.

The RTC and the CA both convicted petitioner of

the crime of rape. Both courts found that petitioner, by his

conducts during the incident, acted with discernment.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner acted with discernment

HELD: Yes he did! Article 12, par3 of the RPC exempts

from criminal liability persons who are over 9 years and

under 15 UNLESS he acted with discernment. The ratio

for the exemption is the absence of intelligence which is

an essential part of a felony whether by dolo or culpa.

Intelligence is the power to determine the morality of

human acts and to distinguish licit from illicit acts.

Discernment is the metal capacity to understand the

difference of right and wrong.

In this case, presence of discernment was

deduced from the calculated acts of petitioner i.e. dragging

the victim in the vacant house so as not to be discovered

and quickly taking off when Teofisto discovered the crime.

In fact, upon prodding of petitioner’s dad, he hid at his

grandmother’s house to evade arrest.

MINOR ISSUE:

Whether or not there petitioner, as he contends,

was deprived of preliminary investigation

No. No need for preliminary investigation.

According to the rules on criminal procedure, when there

is a valid warrantless arrest, preliminary investigation may

not be conducted provided there was an inquest. In this

case there was a valid warrantless arrest and inquest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENRICO A.

VALLEDOR

3 informations were filed against Valledor: 1. murder (with

treachery and evident premeditation) for stabbing Elsa

Rodriguez on the chest; 2. Attempted murder (with

treachery and evident premeditation) for stabbing Ricardo

Maglalang but due to timely medical assistance, he was

able to survive; 3. Frustrated murder (with treachery and

evident premeditation) for stabbing Roger Cabiguen on his

right forearm but due also to timely medical assistance, he

was able to survive.

Victim Roger Cabiguen was inside his bedroom

working on a lettering job together with his first cousin,

victim Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen

and Antonio Magbanua. All of a sudden, Valledor entered

the room; uttered Rogers nickname (Jer) and immediately

attacked him with a knife, but Roger was able to evade the

thrust and was stabbed instead on the right forearm.

Valledor then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and

said, I had my revenge, Elsa. Valledor then left.

Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the

hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a commotion

and saw victim Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor, wounded.

Antonio learned from the by-standers that Ricardo was

likewise stabbed by Valledor. Upon reaching the hospital,

Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the other

hand was treated for the 5-centimeter wound sustained by

him on his right forearm. Victim Roger Cabiguen testified

that Valledor suspected him of killing his dog. Valledor

also courted Elsa but she rejected him. Elsa even spat on

and slapped Valledor.

Valledor’s defense of insanity:

Valledor was employed as provincial jail guard. His mother

Pacita noticed that Valledor was behaving abnormally. For

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days he was restless and unable to sleep. He likewise

complained that their neighbors were spreading rumors

that he was a rapist and a thief, prompting Pacita to bring

his son to Dr. de Guzman. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de

Guzman that insanity runs in their family. After

examination, Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as suffering

from psychosis with schizophrenia. He prescribed a

depressant (Thoracin), which kept Valledor sane for a

period two months.

Pacita noticed that Valledor was again acting strangely.

She left to buy Thoracin but when she returned he was

nowhere to be found. He was seen swimming across the

river and uttering that his family will be killed. The brgy.

Officials went to get him and on their way to the city,

Valledor jumped off the jeep. That afternoon, it was

learned that Valledor killed and wounded his neighbors.

Defense offered the findings of: Dr. Melendres-

Valledor suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classified

under Schizophrenia (deterioration from previous level of

functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of reference,

delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor judgment and

absence of insight), Psychoactive Substance Use

Disorder.

TC: Valledor guilty of Murder, Frustrated Murder

and Attempted Murder. But since he was confined at the

Mental Hospital, the service of his sentence was

suspended. Valledor appealed.

ISSUE: WON Valledor sufficiently invoked the defense of

insanity to exempt him from liability? No. WON Valledor

should be held liable of frustrated murder for stabbing

Roger? No. only Attempted murder because the wound is

not fatal.

RULING: In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when

there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in

committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental

faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must

be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal

intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the

least discernment because there is a complete absence of

the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of

the will.

Since the presumption is always in favor of

sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting

circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence.

And the evidence on this point must refer to the time

preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment

of its execution.

In the case at bar, Valledor failed to discharge

the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at the

time of the commission of the crime. The following

circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that

Valledor was not legally insane when he perpetrated the

acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was

positioned nearest to Valledor but the latter chose to stab

Roger and Elsa; 2) Valledor called out the nickname of

Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and

Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside the room

were left unharmed; 4) Valledor, a spurned suitor of Elsa,

uttered the words, I had my revenge, Elsa, after stabbing

her; and 5) Valledor hurriedly left the room after stabbing

the victims.

Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said

to be performed by one who was in a state of a complete

absence of the power to discern. Valledor was clearly

aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact

purposely chose to stab only the two victims. His obvious

motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by

calling out their names and uttering the words, I had my

revenge after stabbing them. Finally, his act of

immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident

indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and

the consequence thereof.

Valledor acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit:

crying; swimming in the river with his clothes on; and

jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that

he was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the

crime.

As consistently held by this Court, A man may act

crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove

that he is legally so. Then, too, the medical findings

showing that Valledor was suffering from a mental

disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing

on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at

the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to

discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane

when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for

his felonious acts.

For stabbing Roger Cabiguen, Valledor should

only be liable of attempted murder (not frustrated) for the

wound sustained was not fatal. The settled rule is that

where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to

cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since

the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that

would have brought about death

PEOPLE V. VALENTIN DOQUENA

Nature: Appeal from an order of the Court of First

Instance of Pangasinan (convicting Valentin Doquena, 13

yrs, 9 months, and 5 days old, of homicide; having acted

with discernment in committing the said act.)

Facts: Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos

and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of

their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the

accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who

was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena,

and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the nape,

and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos

went back to Rarang to resume playing volleyball.

Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at

Ragojos, finding none, he got his cousin’s (Romualdo

Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo’s denied

Doquena’s request for a fight and resumed playing.

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Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest,

thereby killing the latter. The court held that in committing

the act, the accused acted with discernment and was

conscious of the nature and consequences of his acts,

therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable

(given that the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the

brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT

program), and thus convicted him of the crime of

homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to the Training

School for Boys until he reaches the age of majority. Thus,

the appeal by the accused, stating that to determine

whether or not there was discernment on the part of the

minor, the following must be taken into consideration:

a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to

the act committed.

b) The state of mind at the time the crime was

committed

c) The time he had at his disposal

d) The degree of reasoning of the minor

Issue: WON the accused acted with discernment

Held: Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with

discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment for

premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a

mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT

that constitutes an exception to the exemption from

criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine,

who commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL

CAPACITY to understand the difference between right and

wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be

determined by taking into consideration all the facts and

circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the

very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment

and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the

commission of the act, but also after and even during the

trial.

UNITED STATES VS. HICKS (once you go black…)

Facts: Agustina Sola was the mistress of Augustus Hicks,

an afro-american. They lived together for about 5 years

until Sola decided to leave Hicks. Sola found another afroamerican

lover in Wallace Current. When Hicks learned

about this he went to Current’s house to confront the two.

While conversing, Hicks said “God damn, I’ve made up my

mind” as he was about to grab his revolver. Current got

hold of Hicks’ hand but the latter slapped it away. Current

ran inside a room just as Hicks drew his revolver and shot

Sola, who was close by in the sala of the house, on the left

side of the breast. Sola died. Hicks was charged and

found guilty of murder, sentenced to death.

Issue: W/N there is the mitigating circumstance of passion

and obfuscation?

Held: None!

Generic aggravating circumstance of premeditation

SC held that the crime was attended with the aggravating

circumstance of premeditation because it found, according

to one of the witnesses, that before the crime, the witness

and Hicks were drinking and the latter, while cleaning a

revolver said that Sola’s time had come. SC found that

Hicks deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to

kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in

order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety,

notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with

a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other

loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he

entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and

conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper

manner, disguising his intention and claiming her by his

apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to

successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving

himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand.

Absence of mitigating circumstance

As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances

no mitigating circumstances is present, not even that

mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code,

to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by

jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the

only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility

for the loss of self-control are such as originate from

legitimate feelings, not those which arise from

vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

PEOPLE VS. TAC-AN (the BRONX Gang)

Facts: In two criminal cases, the trial court found Renato

Tac-An guilty of qualified illegal possession of firearm and

murder, imposing upon him the penalty of death in both

cases. Tac-An was a good friend and fellow Bronx Gang

member of Francis Escano III. They were both attending

3rd year high school in Divine World College in Tagbilaran

City. Tac-An was 18 years old while Escano was 15.

Escano left the gang after his mom told him to stop

hanging out with Tac-An upon learning that the latter had

been carrying a gun around with him. From that point on,

their relationship soured. They got into a fist fight and

derogatory graffitis against the Bronx gang and Tac-An

were written on the walls of the school saying. Tac-An

blamed Escano for this.

During an English class Tac-An got up from his

chair and approached the teacher to ask a question,

leaving on his seat his scrapbook. When he returned to his

chair he found Escano sitting on his scrapbook. They got

into a fist fight. After they were seaparated, Tac-An

sneaked out of the school, went home and got his gun. He

returned 15mins later during math class, under Mr.

Pasilbas. Upon entering the room he fired his gun and

demanded for Escano. The students ran towards the

teacher for protection. As Escano was running towards the

door, Tac-An shot him on the head. The trial court found

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that the crime was aggravated with the circumstance of

contempt or insult to public authority.

Issue: W/N the crime was committed in contempt or with

insult to public authority?

Held: Nope!

A teacher or professor is not a public authority

Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Republic Act No. 1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299,

provides as follows:

Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of

persons in authority. — Who shall be deemed as

such. — In applying the provisions of the

preceding and other articles of this Code, any

person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether

as an individual or as a member of some court or

government corporation, board, or

commission, shall be deemed a person in

authority. A barrio captain and a barangay

chairman shall also be deemed a person in

authority.

A person who by direct provision of law

or by election or by appointment by competent

authority, is charged with the maintenance of

public order and the protection and security of life

and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio

policeman and barangay leader and any person

who comes to the aid of persons in authority,

shall be deemed an agent of a person in

authority.

In applying the provisions of Articles 148

and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and

persons charged with the supervision of public

or duly recognized private schools, colleges and

universities, and lawyers in the actual

performance of their professional duties or on the

occasion of such performance,shall be deemed

persons in authority.

Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article

152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a public

or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in

authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed

only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct

assault upon a person in authority), and 151

(resistance and disobedience to a person in authority

or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal

Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article

152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal

Code for the application of which any person "directly

vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in

authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a

longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the

ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such

statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not

believe that a teacher or professor of a public or

recognized private school may be regarded as a "public

authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14

of the Revised Penal Code, the provision the trial court

applied in the case at bar.

In addition, the SC also found no aggravating

circumstance of evidence premeditation for the simple

reason that no sufficient evidence was presented to prove

that Tac-An had formed the intention and determination to

take Escano’s life.

Similarly, the special aggravating circumstance of

acting while under the influence of Dangerous Drugs was

also deleted because there was no medical proof

presented to show that Tac-An was ‘high’ when he

committed the crime.

So in the end, SC found no aggravating as well

as mitigating circumstances.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her
legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for
the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.

The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.

On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings
she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense
theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was
equivalent to self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of self-
defense is applicable in this case.

Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and
an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing,
the batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.