Crim Law 1 Case Digest: U.S. V.

Bull (1910)

U.S. v. Bull, 15 Phil. 7

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

ELLIOTT, J.

Lessons Applicable: Applicability of Provision

Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC

FACTS:

• accused H. N. Bull, master of vessel, willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila,

aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, 677 head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for

securing the animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering.

• animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold

and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding

• neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of

said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly

wounded, bruised, and killed.

• All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,

sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from

any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the

vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable

sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from

the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided

with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time

that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.

• Bull(Norweigan): Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the

laws thereof so it is not within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense

continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States

HELD: The defendant was found guilty

YES.

• No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial

waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to

Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable.
Note: when it comes in our territory it has the discretion to prosecute or not.

If it choose to prosecute must be justified.

• 2 well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them

1. French theory and practice-matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or

persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore

claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew

against another.

2. The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the

jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements

consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.

• The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction

of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are then

within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is

concerned.

• The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him with failure to provide

"sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the

original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and

"conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the

fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for

the protection of the animals."

Criminal Law 1 Case Digest: People V. Look Chaw

People v. Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573

G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910.

ARELLANO, C. J.

Lesson: Crimes NOT involving a breach of public order committed on board a public vessel is NOT triable by our courts

Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC, Opium Law

FACTS:

Upon arrival of steamship Erroll of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call

ports of Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the inspection and search of the cargo.

Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon

larger sack in the hold

later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep
 the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to

retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore so it was returned

2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu:

unlawful possession of opium

unlawful sale of opium

Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in

Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to

keep the sack.

The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.

The court sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of

insolvencyxxx It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.

HELD: YES. Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000

· GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does

NOT constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own

nationality

· EX: when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the

vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land with respect to which, as it is a violation of the

penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent

jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

CASE DIGEST: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978

Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:

Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8
cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board and had them in his possession during the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were
found in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine by authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the port of Cebu.
The defendant confessed that he was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He dis not confess, however,
as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug.

Issue:

Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person who unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign
country and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, unless contrary
circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.

Crim Law 1 Case Digest:

People V. Lol-Lo & Saraw (1922)

People v. Lol-lo & Saraw, 43 Phil. 19

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922.

MALCOLM, J.

FACTS:

• 2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat 11 men,

women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies.

There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch

boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on the

Dutch boat, except the 2 young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The

Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and

Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were able to escape.

• Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and

were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy

• All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful

authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.

• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any

country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no

territorial limits.

• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile

limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."

ISSUE: W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD: In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy

and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead.

YES.

 Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

 The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent
means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or

death should be imposed.

 At least 3 aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by

causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were

employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.

CASE DIGEST: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729

Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the
Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the
shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which
resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the
said offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship
is a breach of the public order because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the
demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

Nature: Original Petition in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

FACTS: Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping (along with
Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5,
1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have been
imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.

They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such complex crime, a ruling which was not handed
down until after their convictions have become final. In
People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery
was not warranted under Art. 134 of the RPC, there
being no such complex offense. This ruling was not handed down until after their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez
served more than the maximum penalty that could
have been served against him, he is entitled to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is applicable in this case (WON judicial
decisions favourable to the accused/convicted for the same
crime can be applied retroactively)

RULING: Yes. Judicial decisions favourable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners relied on Art. 22 of the RPC,
which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favour the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The
Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of our legal
system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection, given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the
same offense as they have, though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the accused by the
retroactive character of a favorable decision.

D2013 | Criminal Law 1 | Prof. I. M. Gutierrez III

Art. 3. Definition of felony

US vs. Ah Chong

Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in mess hall at Fort McKinley (now Fort Bonifacio) and stayed there at Bldg. 27. One night, he woke
up to the sound of someone trying to force his way into the room. There was no way to know who it was as it was dark and the room
only had 1 door and 1 window, and vines covered the window; all he could do was ask who it was. He asked twice, and then, when
no response came, he threatened the attacker that if he continued,he would be killed. He took a knife which he kept under his pillow
because of the robberies occurring recently, andwhen he was hit on the knee by a chair he uses to keep the door closed, he
attacked and killed the man who turned out to be his roommate, Pascal Gualberto. He called for help immediately but it was too late.

Issue: Is he liable for the crime?

Held: No; it was a mistake of facts. The act would have been lawful if the facts had been as he believed them to be.-Feliciano

People vs. Oanis and Galanta

Facts: Under instructions to seize Balagtas (escaped convict), the two policemen went to a house where theysuspected Balagtas to
be hiding. Upon finding a sleeping man inside, they shot him. He turned out to be Tecson, aninnocent man.

Issue: Are they liable?

Held: Yes; unlike in Ah Chong, facts did not show that they tried to ascertain that they had the right man. As they
didnot exercise due precaution, they were guilty of murder. –Feliciano

Art. 4. Criminal Liability

People vs. Iligan

Facts: A brawl started and the defendant chases Asis and Lukban with a bolo. Later on, as the two were walking withEsmeraldo
Quinones, the 3 reappeared again. Macandog hit Quinones on the face with the bolo as the 2 ran away. Itis uncertain whether or not
there was truly a vehicle that ran over Quinones.

Issue: Who is liable for the death?

Held: Iligan is guilty by virtue of their chase being the proximate cause of the death, if indeed a vehicle did run overQuinones. –
Feliciano

People vs. Mananquil

Facts: At 11pm, 6 March 1965, defendant bought 10c worth of gasoline from Esso gasoline station, put it in a coffee
bottle and went to her husband‘s guard post at NAWASA. She poured the gasoline on him and burned him. He died of pneumonia,
a complication caused by the burns (weakened immune system; he caught the pneumonia in the hospital where he was being
treated).

Issue: Is she liable for the death when all she intended to do was burn him?

Held: Yes; the death is a consequence of her act of burning him.-Feliciano

US vs. Brobst
Facts: Saldivar had been fired from the mining company he was working for (he was a thief and was not welcome among his
colleagues). Brobst had been told not to let him back in. However, Saldivar came in with 3-4 friends, looking for a job, and ignored
Brobst‘s orders to leave. Brobst then struck him a blow which caused his own bolo to hit him, and Saldivar staggered away to his
sister‘s house. He arrived there 2 hours later and died on her doorstep. The death was attributed to possible internal bleeding.

Issue: Is Brobst liable, given that it wasn‘t his intent to kill Saldivar, and he had a right to expel Saldivar from the
property?
Held: Guilty; even though no evidence was provided to ascertain that the ―blow‖ was strong enough to cause death,
no evidence was provided to show he intervened to help Saldivar either.-Feliciano

Impossible crime

People vs. Balmores

Facts: Balmores was found guilty of attempted estafa through falsification of a government obligation. He attempted to cash in a
sweepstakes ticket that was obviously falsified (the ¼ ticket was split into⅛, and the winning ticket number written in ink at the
bottom left part of the halved ticket). He presented his falsified ticket to a PCSO booth. The PCSO employee manning the booth
saw that the ticket was obviously falsified, and had Balmores arrested. Balmores waived the right to counsel, and pleaded guilty to
the crime of attempted estafa.

Issue: WON Balmores committed an impossible crime.

Held: No; The recklessness and clumsiness of the act of falsification did not make the crime an impossible one underParagraph 2
Article 4 of the RPC.1 The alteration of a losing sweepstakes ticket would constitute a crime only if anattempt to cash it were done,
which is what occurred in this case.-Adapt

Intod vs. CA
Facts:
Intod and company were tasked to kill Palang-pangan due to land dispute. They fired at her room. However,she was in another city
then thus they hit no one.

Issue:
WON he is liable for attempted murder?

Held:
No. Only impossible crime. In the Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime
—
an act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate would constitute a
felony against person or family. Its purpose is to punish criminal tendencies. There must either be (1)legal responsibility, or (2)
physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs
where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where:(1) The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;(2) There is no intention to
perform the physical act;(3) There is a performance of the intended physical act; and(4) The consequence resulting from
the intended act does not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor or
beyond control prevent consummation of intended crime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality,
the crime was impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime
impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.-Adapt:1 Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the RPC reads: [Criminal Liability shall be incurred] by any person performing
an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Art. 6. Stages of commission

US vs. Eduave
Facts: The accused rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the
lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues
there. The accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials
with having raped her and with being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother‘s querido and was living with her as such
at the time the crime here charged was committed

Issues: WON the crime murder or homicide if the girl had been killed, WON the stage of commission is attempted orfrustrated

Held: The crime committed was MURDER; The attack was made treacherously. Qualified by the circumstance of a levosia (Sp.
treachery, a-le-vo-SI-a), the accused making a sudden attack upon his victim partly from the rear and dealing her a terrible blow in
the back and side with his bolo. The stage of commission is FRUSTRATED; Not attempted murder because defendant
PERFORMED ALL OF THE ACTS which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further
acts.-Adapt

Art. 6: Rape

People vs. Orita

Facts:
Victim: Cristina Abaya, 19 years old, freshman at St. Joseph‘s College in Borongan, Eastern Samar
At around 1:30 am, after attending a party, Abayan came home to her boarding house. As she knocked at the door, Orita suddenly
held her and poked a knife at her neck. She pleaded for him to let her go but instead of doing so, Orita dragged her upstairs with
him while he had his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand holding and poking the balisong at the victim. At the
second floor, he commanded Christina to look for a room. Upon finding a room, Orita held her against the wall while he undressed
himself. He then ordered her to undress. As she took off her shirt, he pulled off her bra, pants and panty, and ordered her to lie
on the floor. He then mounted her and, pointing the balisong at her neck, ordered he to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. In
this position, only a portion of his penis entered her, so he ordered Abayan to go on top of him. With him lying on his back and
Abayan mounting him, still, he did not achieve full penetration and only part of his penis was inserted in the vagina. At this instance,
Abayan got the opportunity to escape Orita because he had both his hands and the knife on the floor. Abayan, still naked, was
chased from room to room with Orita climbing over the partitions. Abayan, frantic andscared, jumped out of a window and darted for
the municipal building and was finally found by Pat. Doncer as and other policemen. Due to darkness though, the failed to
apprehend Orita.In the medico legal, Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude had the following findings: circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck, linear
abrasions below left breas, multiple pinpoint marks at the back, abrasions on both knees, erythemetous areas notedsurrounding
vaginal orifice, tender; hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enterand with difficulty; vaginal
cavity tight, no discharges noted

Issue: Whether or not rape is consummated

Held: Rape was consummated. Perfect penetration is not essential. For the consummation of rape, any penetration ofthe female
organ by the male organ is sufficient to qualify as having carnal knowledge.In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim, he actually attains his purposeand from that moment, the essential elements of the offense have
been accomplished.-Adapt

People vs. Campuhan

Facts:
Primo Campuhan was accused of raping four year old Crysthel Pamintuan. Camp
uhan was caught by child‘smother on April 25, 1996 at around 4pm in their house. Campuhan, helper of Corazon‘s brother was
allegedly kneeling in front of the child with both their pants downa dn child was crying ―ayoko, ayoko‖ while Primo forced his penis
into child‘s vagina

Issue:
WON crime is rape?

Held:
No. Modified to attempted
rape1. Consummated rape: perfect penetration not essential. Slight penetration is equivalent to rape. Meretouching of external
genitalia considered when its an essential part of penetration not just touching in ordinary sense(People v. Orita). Labia majora must
be entered for rape to be consummated (People v. Escober) 2. Attempted no penetration or didn‘t reach labia/mere grazing of
surface 3. Failed to prove that penetration occurred. Mother‘s testimony questionable with regards to her position relative to Primo
and child. They failed to establish how she could have seen actual contact in her position 4. Man‘s instinct is to run when caught.
Primo could not have stayed or to satisfy his lust even if .. seeing Corazon 5. Child denied penetration occurred People v. Villamor
consummation even when penetration doubted: pain‘s felt, discoloration of inner lips of vagina or red labia minora or hymenal tags
not visible. Now seen in case, Medico legal officer, though penetration not needed o prove contact, no medical basis to hold that
there was sexual contact. Hymen intact.-Adapt

Art. 6: Theft

US vs. Adiao

Facts: Defendant: Tomas Adiao

 Adiao, a customs inspector, took a leather belt valued at P0.80 from the baggage of T. Murakami
 Adiao kept the belt in his desk at the Custom House, where it was found by other customs employees
 He was charged with the crime of theft in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila
 He was found guilty of frustrated theft

He appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and the decision of the Municipal Court was affirmed and he was
sentence to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The defendant claimed in
his appeal that the lower court erred in holding that he was guilty of the crime of theft as disclosed by the facts appearing of record
Issue: WON the act of the defendant is frustrated theft

Held: No, the crime cannot properly be classified as frustrated. The defendant has performed all of the acts of execution necessary
for the accomplishment of the crime of theft. He has taken possession of the belt and this
already constitutes the crime of theft. ―The act of making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however
does not go to make the elements of the consummated crime‖ (Decision of Supreme Court of Spain)

Note: The ponente referred to the decision of Supreme Court of Spain in its decision. It illustrated several situations that constitute
consummated theft.-Adapt

Art. 6: Robbery
People vs. Lamahang

Facts:
Aurelio Lamahang was caught opening with an iron bar a wall of a store of cheap goods in Fuentes St. Iloilo. He broke one board
and was unfastening another when a patrolling police caught him. Owners of the store were sleeping inside store as it was
early dawn. Convicted of attempt of robbery

Issue:
WON crime is attempted robbery?

Held:
No. Attempted trespass to dwelling. Attempt should have logical relation to a particular and concrete offense which would lead
directly to consummation. Necessary to establish unavoidable connection & logical & naturalrelation of cause and effect. Important
to show clear intent to commit crime. In case at bar, we can only infer that his intent was to enter by force, other inferences are not
justified by facts. Groizard: infer only from nature of acts

Crim Law Case Digest: People Of The Philippines V. Romeo Gonzales

People of the Philippines v. Romeo Gonzales

G.R. Nos. 113255-56 July 19, 2001

Lessons Applicable: Pro reo doctrine, indeterminate sentence law, buy-bust operation, buy-bust operation

Laws Applicable: indeterminate sentence law

FACTS:

 Early February 1991: the police received an information that Romeo Gonzales was selling large quantities of marijuana.

 February 13, 1991: After 4 days of surveillance, they conducted a buy-bust entrapment operation. Their informant

introduced Sgt. Ortiz to Gonzales as a buyer (poseur-buyer) of 1 kg. marijuana for P1,200. Then, Ortiz took out his

handkerchief as a pre-arranged signal so the team immediately rushed to the scene introducing themselves as Narcom

agents and arrested Gonzales. Sgt. Ortiz handed over the bag of marijuana to Pfc. Danilo Cruz.

 The team confiscated 1 more bag containing 2 blocks of marijuana weighing about 1.5 kg and 10 medium size plastic

bags containing 300 grams of marijuana. The tests yielded positive indications for the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol,

or THC

 Gonzales orally admitted that he was selling marijuana to different buyers, but claimed that somebody else owned the

marijuana he sold. When asked to identify the owner, he kept silent.

 2 informations charging Gonzales with violation of RA 6425:

o Crim. Case No. 91-180: possession, custody and control of 2 block size of marijuana weighing (1.5 kilos) and 10 medium size plastic

bags of dry marijuana weighing (300 grams)

o Crim. Case No. 91-181: selling more or less 1 kilo of high-grade marijuana

 RTC: Romeo Gonzales guilty for Violation of Sections 8 and 4, Art. II., RA 6425 and imposes penalty of imprisonment of 6

years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000 for Criminal Case No. 91-180 life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000 for Criminal

Case No. 91-181.

 Gonzales: Victim of a frame-up since he was inside the comfort room of a neighbor from whom he borrowed P100 to buy

medicines for his sick mother and he was just wearing underwear when he was brought out of the house. – NOT proven

 A buy-bust operation, normally preceded by surveillance, is an effective mode of apprehending drug pushers and, “if

carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, it deserves judicial sanction.” A warrant of arrest is not

essential because the violator is caught in flagrante delicto. Searches made incidental thereto are valid.

ISSUE: W/N the Indeterminate Sentence Law should apply to Crim. Case No. 91-180

HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. 91-181,life imprisonment and fine of P20,000. In Criminal

Case No. 91-180, indeterminate penalty of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of

prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P6,000.

 The Dangerous Drugs Act, Sec. 8 (special law) prescribes as penalty for possession of Indian hemp (marijuana),

regardless of amount, an imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and a fine of P6,000 to P12,000. Applying the

pro reo doctrine in criminal law (when in doubt favour the accused), we hold that the penalty prescribed in R. A. No. 6425,

Section 8 while not using the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC is actually prision mayor. Consequently, it is

the first part of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which shall apply in imposing the indeterminate sentence.

Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs Mariano Medina

102 Phil 181 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Proximate Cause
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina from Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the
driver of the bus was driving fast and when he applied the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and
some passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The passengers called the help of the
villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers
of the fact that gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus thereby killing the 4
passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires of the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited
the gasoline.
HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the negligence of the driver because he was
speeding and also he was already advised by Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning
of the bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural for the villagers to respond to the
call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting.
Further, the smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to provide warning about said fact
to the villagers.
WHAT IS “PROXIMATE CAUSE”?
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.

People vs. Silvestre and Atienza (Crim1)

People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-appellants.

En Banc

Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:

 Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage

 Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan
 On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint for adultery
 After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of Paombong to speak to
the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint
 The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in Masocol (Atienza signed
the promise)
 On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the justice of the peace
dismissed the adultery case
 The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong
 About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo Niño and followed
him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)
 Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas
 On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were gathered after supper, Martin
told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it
 He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had
instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana
 Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him
 Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late
 The fire destroyed about 48 houses
 Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire
 The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
 Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena temporal)
 Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)
 The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI decision with regard to Martin,
but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
 The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice
 The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt
Issue:
 Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice
Holding:
 No.
Ratio:
 Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in
the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another
act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous
actions.
 In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an agreement to commit the
crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not
appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that
being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
 Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of
agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of
the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO

No. 27972

October 31, 1927

FACTS:

On November 23, 1926, herein appellant Felipe Santiago raped Felicita Masilang, his wife’s niece, in an uninhabited place

across a river in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. After the deed, he took her to the house of his brother, Agaton Satiago, who in turn fetched a

protestant minister who there and then officiated the ceremony of their marriage. After having given money by Felipe, Felicita

proceeded home to her father and told what had just occurred.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage executed by the protestant minister is of legal effect.

HELD:

The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequence of his

act. It shows that he had no bona fide intention of making her his wife and the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her

because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution

of the wrongdoer.
U.S. vs. Pablo
G.R. No. L-11676;
October 17, 1916
FACTS: In compliance to an order from his chief, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of Balanga, went to the barrio of
Tuyo to raid a jueteng game; but before the said officer arrived there the players left and ran away. He was able to recover on his
arrival a low table, a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls). Said officer also saw the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo
left but only Francisco Dato was arrested. This information was contained in his report to his chief who immediately filed a complaint
in the court of justice of the peace against Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato for illegal gambling in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5.

Pablo testified under oath that on a particular date he and a companion raided a jueteng game, that when they arrived in the place
they saw Dato and a low table that made them suspect that a jueteng game was being held; that they did find a tambiolo and 37
bolas, but that they did not see Rodrigo and Malicsi on the scene nor did they see them scamper; and that only after the incident
that they learned of Rodrigo and malicsi as being the ringleaders of the said jueteng game according to a source. This testimony
was acted upon by the court acquitting the defendants Rodrigo and Malicsi and sentenced only Dato.

The provincial fiscal investigated further on the case and found out that before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace
court, the policeman Pablo had conference with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo and agreed that he would exclude the
involvement of the two in the case in exchange of a bribe of fifteen pesos.

Because of this development, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance charging Andres Pablo with the
crime of perjury in violation of section 3 of Act No. 1697 declaring that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously affirmed and swore
under oath in legal form before the justice of the peace during the hearing of the case of Rodrigo and Malicsi for violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga when he excluded the two accused from involvement in the
incident despite being utterly false and material to the decision of the case.

When the court found him guilty and sentenced to suffer years imprisonment, a fine, and disqualification to hold public office as
well as from testifying in Philippine courts, he appealed for such judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of the crime of perjury or of false testimony under art. 318 to 324 of the Revised
Penal Code

HELD: Yes. The respondent is guilty of such crime under Article 318 to 324 of the penal code since such articles are not expressly
repealed by the Administrative code when it repealed Act No. 1697.

Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion states that, “All laws… not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must
be literally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail.”

Said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are properly applicable to crimes of false testimony. In the present case, the proven
evidence showed that Andres Pablo falsely testified before the court by perverting the truth in favor of the alleged gamblers,
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and in receiving bribe from the said accused which aggravated the crime – proof showed he
received P15 in order that he exclude the two ringleaders in his sworn testimony. The court held that, “ … in the commission of the
crime of false testimony, there concurred the aggravating circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no
mitigating circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the defendant has incurred the maximum period
of the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.”

U.S. v. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18 (1901)

FACTS: Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with the CFI,
who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for
which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was
“acting in the line of duty.”

ISSUES:
1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI.

Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more
than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater
than $100 may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their
territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI
because he failed
to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty.

2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the penal code?

Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW is not in the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC.

3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, whether or not the military character sustained by the person charged with
the offence at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?

No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character brought before them for trial (R.A.
No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was servicebut this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case.”

Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed “An offense charged against a military officer in consequence of an act done in obedience to
an order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Civil Government.” ––Per Cooper, J., concurring