I.
Introduction That after a conference among respondent,
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION
DAAROL
ADM. CASE 1512 | 29 JANUARY 1993
FACTS:
Complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college
student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old
during the time (July-October 1975) of her
relationship with respondent, while respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General Manager of
Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41
years old at the time of the said relationship.
Respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with
whom be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was
solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte by a Catholic priest, Rev. Fr.
Anacleto Pellamo, and that said respondent had been
separated from his wife for about 16 years at the
time of his relationship with complainant.
Respondent had been known by the Barrientos family
for quite sometime, having been a former student of
complainant's father in 1952 and, a former classmate
of complainant's mother at the Andres Bonifacio
College in Dipolog City; that he became acquainted
with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and
eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and,
her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her
residence; that he also befriended complainant and
who became a close friend when he invited her, with
her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes
during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog
City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch
her at her residence in the morning and took her
home from the convention site after each day's
activities;
Respondent courted complainant, and after a week of
courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love
on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of August 20,
1973, complainant with her parents' permission was
respondent's partner during the Chamber of
Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog
City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they
left the place but before going home, they went to
the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the
jeep at the beach, where there were no houses
around; that after the usual preliminaries, they
consummated the sexual act and at about midnight
they went home; that after the first sexual act,
respondent used to have joy ride with complainant
which usually ended at the airport where they used to
make love twice or three times a week; that as a
result of her intimate relations, complainant became
pregnant;
complainant and complainant's parents, it was
agreed that complainant would deliver her child in
Manila, where she went with her mother on October
22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and,
stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in
Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her there
on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and
again in February and March 1974; that later on
complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu City
in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went
there in April 1974 and her sister took her to the
Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City;
that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the
Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named
her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of
June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that during
her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the
respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she
filed an administrative case against respondent with
the National Electrification Administration; which
complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she
instituted the present disbarment proceedings
against respondent.
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully
recommend that after hearing, respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent Daarol is grossly
immoral.
HELD:
Here, respondent, already a married man and about
41 years old, proposed love and marriage to
complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing
that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal
relations with complainant by deception, made her
pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise
to marry her, and then deserted her and the child.
Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to
appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has
amply demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence,
his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct is in order. Good moral conduct is a condition
which precedes admission to the Bar and is not
dispensed with upon admission there. It is a
continuing qualification to which all lawyers must
possess. Otherwise, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred.

ALAWI V ALAUYA
JANUARY 31, 2016
FACTS:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real
estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial
Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates,
and used to be friends.
Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for
the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing
loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He
claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi
had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso
wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa
and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an
administrative complaint against him. One of her
grounds was Alauya’s usurpation of the title of
“attorney,” which only regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the
assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers
have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title
of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken
for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term
“consial,” connoting a local legislator beholden to the
mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not Alauya, a member of the
Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney
HELD:
He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass
the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this
Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has
been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is
reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only
who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
II. Practice of Law
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS.
LADAGA
350 SCRA 326 [2001]
FACTS:
Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as
pro bono counsel for a relative in a criminal case,
without the previous authority from the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court as required by the
Administrative Code. An administrative complaint
was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law
without permission from the Department Head (CJ) as
required by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance
as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative
and that he was on an approved leave of absence
during his appearances as such counsel. Moreover,
the presiding judge of the court to which he is
assigned knew his appearances as such counsel.
ISSUE:
 Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro
bono counsel for a relative constitutes
practice of law as prohibited by the
Administrative Code.
HELD:
No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the
statute should be customarily or habitually holding
one’s self to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. It does not pertain to
isolated court appearances as in this case.
Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as
required by law, respondent was reprimanded.
CAYETANO VS. MONSOD 201 SCRA 210
SEPTEMBER 1991
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There
shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
 Whether the respondent does not posses the
required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
HELD:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs.
Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice. Practice of law means any
activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the
required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since
Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for
the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED.
MAURICIO C. ULEP VS. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
B.M. NO. 553. JUNE 17, 1993
FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to order
the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to cease and
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the
same tenor as that of Annexes `A' and `B' (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to
the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law.” The advertisements complained of
by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment
in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the
reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the
fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the
light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs.
State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law
and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services offered
by the respondent constitute practice of law. The
definition of “practice of law” is laid down in the case
of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of
all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied
by respondent's own description of the services it has
been offering. While some of the services being
offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for
the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these
will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the
law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law
and advise him or her on the proper course of action
to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will
not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to
legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting,
and so forth.
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of
his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The proscription against advertising of legal
services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. The canons of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a
way of publicizing itself and catching public attention.
That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.
III. Admission to Practice
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES 49 SCRA
22
FACTS:
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for
the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in
September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from
the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a
Commission on Bar Integration and in December
1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the
integration of the bar. The Court accepted all
comments on the proposed integration.
ISSUES:
 Does the Court have the power to integrate
the Philippine bar?
 Would the integration of the bar be
constitutional?
 Should the Court ordain the integration of the
bar at this time?
RULING:
In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted
the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the
Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions
sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention
of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys.
An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is
decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State.
Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by
government authority of a national organization of
the legal profession based on the recognition of the
lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the
legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision
and regulation by the Supreme Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate
the Bar in the exercise of its power “to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.”
Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of
the Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following
constitutional rights: freedom of association and of
speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted
from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus
levies a tax. The Court held:
1. Integration is not violative of freedom of
association because it does not compel a
lawyer to become a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. All that it
does is “to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.” The
lawyer too is not compelled to attend
meetings, participate of activities, etc. The
only compulsion is the payment of annual
dues. Assuming, however, that it does
compel a lawyer to be a member of an
integrated bar, the court held that “such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
police power of the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the
freedom of speech just because dues paid b
the lawyer may be used for projects or
programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule
otherwise would make every government
exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore,
the lawyer is free to voice out his objections
to positions taken by the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the
nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.
As to the third issue, the Court believes in the
timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored
integration.
IN RE CUNANAN 94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known
as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar
Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no
grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate
who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the
grade/grades shall be included in the computation of
the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.”
ISSUE:
 Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the
fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar
flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial
passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was
declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955
was declared in force and effect. The portion that
was stricken down was based under the following
reasons:
1. The law itself admits that the candidates for
admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the
fact that this was very close to the end of
World War II;
2. The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of the court on the petitions of the
said candidates;
3. The law is an encroachment on the Court’s
primary prerogative to determine who may
be admitted to practice of law and, therefore,
in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter
and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules
laid down by Congress under this power are
only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who
can practice law; and
4. The pretended classification is arbitrary and
amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the
Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take
effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the
bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall
within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or
modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
IN RE: VICTORIO LANUEVO
FACTS:
This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio
Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during the 1971
Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of
one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar
exam, in his confidential letter that the result of the
bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified
as Ramon Galang was raised before the result was
released to make him pass the bar.
Acting upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar
examiners and the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit
their sworn statements on the matter. It appears that
each of the 5 bar examiners were approached by
Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to
re-evaluate the grades of the bar examiner explaining
that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will
review the grades obtained in all subjects by an
examinee and when he finds a candidate to have
extraordinary high grades in other subjects and low
grade in one subject he can bring it to the examiner
for reconsideration to help the candidate pass.
In good faith of trust and confidence to the authority
of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of
the candidate and reconsider the grade they give for
each subject matter. Further investigation also
revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime
of slight physical injuries in the Mla. MTC but did not
revealed the information in his application to take the
bar examination.
ISSUE:
 WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar
examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the
examination result of a bar candidate.
RULING:
The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has
deceptively staged a plot to convince each examiner
individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in
order to help him pass the bar without prior
authorization of the Court. His duty as a Bar
Confident is limited only as a custodian of the
examination notebooks after they are corrected by
the examiners where he is tasked to tally the general
average of the bar candidate. All requests for re-
evaluation of grades from the bar exam shall be
made by the candidate themselves. With the facts
fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-
evaluation of the exam answers of Galang without
the authority of the Court, he has breached the trust
and confidence given to him by the court and was
disbarred with his name stricken out from the rolls of
attorneys. Galang was likewise disbarred for
fraudulently concealing the criminal charges against
him in his application for the bar exam while under
oath constituting perjury. The court believed that the
5 bar examiners acted in good faith and thereby
absolved from the case but reminded to perform their
duties with due care.
IN RE: 2003 AR EXAMINATIONS
FACTS:
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of
questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations.
Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant
lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of
whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for
Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The
Court had adopted the findings of the Investigating
Committee, which identified petitioner as the person
who had downloaded the test questions from the
computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably
recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the
Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the
OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the
relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a
lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream to
become one. This task was not particularly easy for
him and his family but he willed to endure the same
in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he
already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering
service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his
exposure to public service when he was elected
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of
Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he
initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their
barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking
up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually
pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law
school, he was elected as the President of the
Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far
Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded
various activities including the conduct of seminars
for law students as well as the holding of bar
operations for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth
and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel
in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic
Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of
Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner
immediately entered government service as a Legal
Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig.
Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services
to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who were
then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the
Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law
Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his
craft as a lawyer was polished and developed.
Despite having entered private practice, he continued
to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate,
petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as he was
stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged
involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar
Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself
inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable
consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new
lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the
City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated
as a member of the Secretariat of the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5)
years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering
public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging
impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised
the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be
borne from the records of the investigation, he
cooperated fully in the investigation conducted and
took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he
has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to
the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for
the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his
mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience
to make him a better person.
RULING:
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to
punish but to correct offenders. While the Court is
ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers,
it also knows how to show compassion when the
penalty imposed has already served its purpose.
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute
the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the
lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of
the disbarred lawyer and the conduct of his public life
during his years outside of the bar.

Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service

affords the Court some hope that if he were to
reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his
achievements as a lawyer would redound to the
general good and more than mitigate the stain on his
record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.
Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following
stern warning:

"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most

sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic."