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Rule 74

G.R. No. 18034 September 2, 1922

SINFORO BUENAVENTURA, as administrator of the estate of Juan Buenaventura, deceased and


TIMOTEO DEL ROSARIO, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
TOMAS B. RAMOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Vicente Platon for appellants.


Francisco, Lualhati and Del Rosario and Victoriano Yamzon for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that on the 4th day of January, 1921 the said Sinforoso Buenaventura,
administrator, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan, asking
permission to sell a certain fishery belonging to the estate of Juan Buenaventura, deceased. The petition
for permission to sell said fishery alleged that it was in bad condition; that the estate was unable to make
the necessary repairs; that the heir of the estate were poor and without adequate and necessary funds; that
the heirs were numerous and that in order to make the necessary repairs in said fishery, it was necessary
to sell and to divide the proceeds among the heirs.

On the 5th day of February, 1921, the heirs of the estate of Juan Buenaventura presented an opposition to
the said motion of the administrator. On the 7th day, February, 1921, the court denied said petition for the
reason following: First, that the commissioners appointed to make an inventory of the estate of Juan
Buenaventura had not rendered a report; second, because there was then pending an action favor of the
estate and against the tenant of said fishery by the name of Santos Chua Hong; third, that without an
inventory showing the value of the estate, the court was unable to fix the value of said fishery; and fourth,
that if the action against said Santos Chua Hong resulted favorably to the estate, its administrator might
find sufficient funds to make the necessary repairs in said fishery. On the 21st day of February, 1921, the
administrator renewed his petition for authority to sell said fishery. On the 24th day of February, 1921,
the heirs again presented further opposition to granting said petition.

Notwithstanding the strong opposition presented by the heirs to the said petition of the administrator the
Honorable Bartolome Revilla, judge, granted said petition on the 2d day March, 1921, and authorized said
administrator to offer the fishery in question for sale, with the understanding that the sale should not be
consummated until the report of the offers received by him should be made to, and confirmed by the
court. On the 14th day of March, 1921, the defendants excepted to the order, authorizing the sale of the
fishery, upon the ground that said order was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 714, 716,
717, and 718 of Act No. 190, and for the further reason that all of the heirs of the estate of Juan
Buenaventura were opposed to said sale, except the administrator, and for the further reason that the
reason given for the sale of the fishery were not sufficient in law to justify the said order of the court.

On the 15 of March, 1921, the administrator reported to the court that he had received two offers to buy
said fishery; the first for the sum of P10,500 and the second for the sum of P11,000. The first was
received from Dr. Juan Nolasco and the second from the said Timoteo del Rosario. The administrator
recommended that the offer to purchase said fishery of the said Timoteo del Rosario be accepted. On the
21st day of March, 1921, the defendants presented their opposition to the confirmation of the sale as
requested by the administrator, presenting many reasons in support of their opposition.
Notwithstanding the strong opposition presented by the heirs and defendants, the Honorable Batolome
Revilla on the 30th of March, 1921, authorized the sale and directed that the same be sold to the said
Timoteo del Rosario. To that order of the court an exception was duly made and a motion for
reconsideration was presented, which was denied by the lower court on the 8th day of April, 1921. An
appeal was duly taken.

The record was received in the Supreme Court on the 12th day of September, 1921. On the 15th day of
November 1921, the appellees presented a motion for asking that the appeal be dismissed for the reason
that if had not been perfected in accordance with the provision of the law. That motion was denied on the
8th day of December, 1921. Thereafter, and after several motion for an extension of time within which to
present their briefs, which were granted, the appellees again on 22d day of May, 1922, presented another
motion to dismiss the appeal. Said motion was based upon the ground that the appellants had not
presented their appeal bond until after fifteen days from the date on which the judge had fixed the amount
of the same, whereas the law and rules provide that the bond should have been presented within five days
from the date the amount was fixed by the trial court. The fact that the bond was not presented within
fifteen days from the date the judge fixed the amount of the same, is a fact which existed at the time the
appellees presented their first motion to dismiss in this court. The date of the order fixing the amount of
the bond, and the time of the presentation of the bond were matters of records in the lower court. Had the
fact, the bond was not presented on time, been called to the attention of the court in the first motion
having been presented at that time while the facts upon which it is based did exist at the time the first
motion was presented, it must now be denied, for the reason that we have decided in cases without
number that a second motion to dismiss the appeal upon grounds existing at the time the first motion was
presented should never be granted, unless at the time of the denying of the first motion, permission was
obtained to present a second. Appellants should not be annoyed nor delayed by subsequent motions based
upon grounds existing at the time of previous motion, made for the same purpose. (Lucido and Lucido vs.
Vita, 20 Phil., 449; King vs. Pony Gold Mining Co., 24 Montana, 470; Hellings vs. Duvall, 131 Cal., 618;
Bingham vs. Brumback, 24 Ill. App., 332; Ferguson vs. Bruckman, 164 N.Y., 481; Pettit vs. Hamlyn, 42
Wis., 434.)

The ground upon which the second motion is based necessarily existed at the time of the presentation of
the first motion to dismiss the appeal in the present case. That being true, the same is hereby denied.

Passing, to a consideration of the errors assigned by the appellants, it will be noted that in their first
assignment of error they allege that he lower court committed an error in authorizing the sale of the
fishery in question, in opposition to the wishes of the heirs, and that said order of sale was illegal and
unjustified. In support of that assignment of error the appellants cite the facts of the petition for authority
to sell and section 714 to 722 of Act No. 190. By reference to the petition for authority to sell the fishery
in question, it will be noted that the only reasons given are: First, that the fishery is in bad condition,
second, that the estate is without funds to make the necessary repairs; third, that in order to make the
neccessay repairs it will require a considerable sum of money; fourth, that the heirs are poor people and
without adequate funds to maintain their respective families; fifth, that the heirs are numerous; sixth, that
the sale was necessary in order to make a partition of interests of the estate among the heirs; and seventh,
that the partition is necessary for the convenience of the heirs. It will be noted that the petition contains no
allegation that there were any unpaid debts existing against the estate of Juan Buenaventura. The
defendants allege, and the fact is not denied, that an action was Santos Chua Hong for a considerable sum
of money, which sum, when recovered, might be sufficient to make the necessary repairs in the said
fishery.

Section 714 to 722 of Act No. 190 provide when an executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased
person may sell the property of the estate, both real and personal. Section 714, provides, among other
things, that when the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts and charges of
administration without injuring the business of those interested, and when the testator has not otherwise
made sufficient provision for the payment of debts and charges against the estate, the court, on application
of the executor or administrator, with the consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, devisees, and
legatees, residing in the Philippine Islands, may grant a license to sell, for that purpose, in lieu of personal
estate, if it clearly appears that such sale of real estate would be beneficial to the person interested, and
will not defeat any devise of land, in which case the assent of the devisee shall be required.

Section 715 provides that when an application is made for license to sell real estate for payment of debts
or charges of administration in accordance with the provisions of section 714, and it appears that a part
cannot be sold without injury to those interested, the court may grant license to sell the whole of said
estate, or such part as is necessary or beneficial to those concerned.

Section 716 provides no license to sell real estate shall be granted, if any of the person interested in the
estate give a bond in conformity with an order of the court, conditioned to pay the debts and expenses of
administration, within such time as the court may direct.

Section 718 provides that when it appears to the court that it will beneficial to the heirs and those
interested in the estate of deceased person, by reason of their residing out of the Island or otherwise, that a
part of the whole of the personal estate, or a part or the whole of the real estate or both, should be sold, the
court may, upon the application of the administrator or executor, with the consent and approbation, in
writing, of the heirs who are interested in the estate to be sold, grant license to sell the whole or a part of
the estate, although not necessary to pay debts, etc. There are other provision of section 718 which do not
relate to the question presented here. Section 722 contains the regulations for license to sell real and
personal estate of deceased persons.

It will be noted, from the sections above quoted, that there are but two cases, speaking generally, under
which an administrator may sell real and personal estate of a deceased person. The conditions are (a)
when it is necessary to pay the debts and charges against the estate, and (b) when it is made to appear to
the court that it will be beneficial to the heirs and those interested in the estate.

It will be further noted from the provisions of the sections above quoted: (a) That when it becomes
necessary or advisable to sell real estate in order to pay debts and charges, the court may order the same
sold when the consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs, are given, and not then even, unless it
clearly appears that the sale of the real estate would be beneficial to the person interested and will not
defeat any devise of land; and (b) that the court may grant a license to sell the real estate of a deceased
person when it is made to appear that the sale will be beneficial to the heirs, etc., and those interested in
the estate. But, even in that case, the sale or order for sale must be made with consent and approbating, in
writing, of the heirs, etc., who are interested in the estate to be sold. Personal property, however, may be
sold on the application of the executor or administrator, if it appears necessary for the purpose of paying
debts, legacies, or expenses of administration, or for the preservation of the property. In the sale of
personal property, for the purposes indicated, the consent of the heirs is not necessary. (Section 717 of
Act No. 190.)

Paragraph 2 of section 722 provides that, in the cases where the consent of heirs, devisees, and legatees is
required for the sale of real estate, the executor or administrator shall produce to the court their assent in
writing, signed by such heirs, etc.

In the present case there was no allegation or showing, nor any attempt to make it appear, that there were
any debts or charges against the estate of Juan Buenaventura, which make it necessary to sell the real
estate of that estate. While there was an attempt made to show that the sale of the real estate would be
beneficial to the heirs, the petition was not made "with the consent and approbation, in writing, of the
heirs," etc. Not only did the administrator fail to show "the consent and approbation, in writing of the
heir," etc., but the record clearly shows that the heirs opposed, in writing, to the sale of the fishery in
question.

The Legislature in adopting the sections to which reference is made above, preventing the sale of the real
estate of the deceased without the written consent of the heirs, evidently had in mind the provision of
article 657-661 of the Civil Code, which provide that the heirs of a deceased person succeed, from the
moment of his death, to all the rights and obligations of the deceased by the mere fact of his death. The
heirs become the owners of the property immediately upon the death of the ancestor, and they can not be
deprived of the same except in the manner provided for by law. Being the owners of the property
immediately, by succession upon the death of the ancestor, they can only be deprived of their right by the
procedure established by law. (Inocencio vs. Gat-Pandan, 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;
Fernandez vs. Tria, 22 Phil., 603, 618-620; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232, 235; Rocha vs. Tuason and
Rocha de Despujols, 39 Phil., 976, 983, 984.)

Of course, that succession may be defeated or modified provide the deceased, the former owner, left a
will. And it may be added, further, that the heir acquired the rights of the ancestor subject to any and all of
the obligations of the ancestor against the estate and subject to certain exceptions for the Civil Code
relating to the acceptance of the heir, inventory, etc. (Arts. 1010-1034, Civil Code.) In other words, if the
heir accepts without reservation an estate, he accepts it with all the obligations existing against it at the
time of the death of the ancestor. If the heir accepts an estate under inventory, then his responsibility to
satisfy the existing obligations is limited to the value fixed in the inventory.

Under the provision of the Civil Code (art. 657-661), the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the
property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before
his death. In the absence of debts or obligations existing against the estate, the heir may enter upon the
administration of said property immediately. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the
absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra; Malahacan vs.
Ignacio, supra; Fernandez vs. Tria, supra.)

The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law the possession of real
property of which his intestate was seized at the time of his death, is, that such property will be required
to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra; Malahacan vs. Ignacio,
supra.)

Of course, if the heir refuses to give his consent to the sale of the property to satisfy obligations existing
against the estate at the time of the death of the ancestor, then such obligations or debts may be recovered
in an ordinary action, because when he accepts the property, as an heir, he accepted it with the obligations
which existed against the ancestor. By pure and simple acceptance, or without benefit of inventory, the
heir becomes liable for all the debts and obligations of the estate, not only with the property of the same,
but also with his own. (Arts. 998, 999, 1003, 1023, Civil Code; Hinlo vs. De Leon, 18 Phil., 221, 227;
Aramburu vs. Ortiz, 14 Phil., 691.)

The holder of the debt or obligation against the estate of a deceased person, when the heirs have accepted
the same in accordance with the provisions of articles 998 and 999 of the Civil Code, has the right to
select from among the heirs one or more, whom he may prefer, or from whom he believes he can best
recover, and for the reason that if the debt is single the obligation of the debtors in favor of the creditor of
the deceased person is also one and indivisible, the creditor is entitled to claim the entire amount of his
credit from any one of the heirs who accepted the inheritance without benefit of inventory ,and also from
any of the others who received the same with benefit, to the extent of their hereditary portion. (Art. 988,
998, 1003, 1110, 1023, Civil Code; Aramburu vs. Ortiz, supra; Hinlo vs. Leon, supra.)

The heirs having become the absolute owners of the property of the ancestor, and there being no debts or
obligations against the same which existed at the time of the death of the ancestor, it is a matter of no
importance to the administrator or to any other person, that the property is in a state of bad repair. The
repair or improvement of the property is for the heirs after having become the absolute owners of the
same, and is a question solely for their consideration. In absence of debts or obligations against the estate
at the time of the death of the ancestor, the heirs, as absolute owners, may manage and control the same
without interference on the part of the administrator.

The plaintiffs in the present case not having shown the existence of any of the facts or conditions under
which the property in question might be sold under the above quoted provisions of Act No. 190, the lower
court committed an error in granting the petition for permission to sell, and also committed an error in
authorizing the sale and in confirming the sale after it was made. Therefore, the judgment of the lower
court is hereby revoked, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that a judgment be entered, revoking the
judgment appealed from and absolving the defendants from all liability under the complaint. And without
any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Ostrand, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-21725 November 29, 1968

AURELIO ARCILLAS, petitioner,


vs.
HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
MODESTA ALFARO, GERONIMO ARCILLAS and VICENTE ARCILLAS, respondents.

Antonio J. Calvento for petitioner.


T. de los Santos for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively, are
two separate petitions having direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part of the estate of the late Eustaquio
Arcillas who died intestate on March 8, 1958 in the City of Zamboanga.

In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the names of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the petition. It was
claimed that at various dates after the death of the deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276
transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of their respective shares and participation in
Lot No. 276 executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir Vicente Arcillas.
Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the
proportion of each heir's participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new certificate of title.
But before any other material pleading could be filed with respect to this petition, five (5) other children
of the deceased filed the November 16 petition aforementioned. This later petition, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 632, prayed for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitioner
preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this later petition,
insofar as pertinent to this case, read:

3. That the deceased left an estate consisting of real property in Zamboanga City with a probable
value of not less than SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency;

4. That as far as petitioners know, the deceased left no debts remaining unpaid;

In the meantime, on November 23, 1962 herein petitioner filed his opposition to the November 12
petition on the ground that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 — the subject matter thereof — was included in the
estate of the deceased for which a petition for administration had actually been filed and was awaiting
resolution, that petition (the one dated November 12) should be held in abeyance until after Special
Proceeding No. 632 was closed and terminated. Recognizing then the merit of petitioner's ground,
respondent Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963 temporarily holding in abeyance resolution of the
November 12 petition until the termination of the intestate proceedings.

Meanwhile, in his answer to the November 16 petition (Sp. Proc. No. 632) Geronimo Arcillas, this time
joined by Vicente Arcillas and the widow Modesta Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of
administration to herein petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left by the
deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was improper. However petitioner,
in his reply on January 18, 1963, insisted that there were still other properties of the estate of the deceased
besides Lot No. 276; he likewise took issue with respondents' view that administration proceedings could
be dispensed with asserting, firstly, that there was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial partition
and, secondly, that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of their participation in the estate.

On March 8, 1963 respondent court denied the November 16 petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and at the same time gave due course to the November 12 petition. Reasoned the court: "...
to obviate the necessity of spending uselessly which would only deplete the funds of the estate; to avoid
unnecessary delay in the partition of the property involved herein, and following the doctrines established
by the Honorable Supreme Court in several cases of the same nature, which is in consonance with the
provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the court is of the opinion that the herein petition
(should) be denied and (holds that) the cadastral motion of the oppositor Geronimo Arcillas covering the
same property is the most expedient and proper action."

Unable to have this order reconsidered petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with mandamus
and preliminary injunction. On December 2, 1963, upon filing by petitioner of the required bond, we
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of
the "cadastral motion" dated November 12, 1962.

The issues to be determined are whether respondent Judge acted properly (1) in dismissing the
administration proceedings under the authority of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon
averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age and
(2) in maintaining that the "cadastral motion" brought under the provision of section 112 of the Land
Registration Act was the more proper proceeding under the circumstances.

Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the proposition that inasmuch as in the
present case the minimum requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that there is no necessity for the institution of
special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate for the reason
that it is superfluous and unnecessary. In other words, respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74
as mandatory upon the heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to be paid
and his heirs are all of age.

We cannot entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention in the past, we had occasion to
explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273:

... section I does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they
may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they
have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or
compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were
otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may its used not only once but in
the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the
heirs.
Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less expensive modes of
settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then
be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
merely on the ground that the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the
funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are consequences
which must be deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not in
the future be heard to complain of these matters. Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to
the alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from the lot in question can be more
adequately ascertained in administration proceedings rather than in any other action.

Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the "cadastral" motion, supposedly brought under the
authority of section 112 of Act 496, cannot be sustained. While this section authorizes, among others, a
person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon
the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate
have terminated and ceased," and apparently the November 12 petition comes within its scope, such relief
can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be
threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs (see Puguid v. Reyes,
L-21311, August 10, 1967 and the cases cited therein). In the instant case the obvious lack of unanimity
among the parties in interest, manifestly demonstrated by petitioners' express objection to the cancellation
of TCT No. RT-244, sufficiently removes the November 12 petition from the scope of section 112 of Act
496. Besides, the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act are summary in nature and hence
inadequate for the litigation of issues which properly pertain to the case where the incident belongs.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the appealed orders and
directing respondent Judge or whoever is presiding the court below to reinstate Special Proceedings No.
632; the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding
with the hearing of the "cadastral" motion dated November 12, 1962 is hereby made permanent. Costs
against respondents, except respondent Judge.
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.

Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.

Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without
leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the
administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the
main questions which need to be resolved in this case.

Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January
3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten
months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the
herein private respondent.

On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.
1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas
Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are
no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits
from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL
Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System
(SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay
Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had
been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of
the estate of the deceased.

On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to
the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.

In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent
Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a
bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all
the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three
months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in
its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1)
Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes
of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where
there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the
surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL,
PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in
support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the
exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her
deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses
as supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been
extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving
heirs of the deceased.

Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what
properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She
points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.

Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of
the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents.
Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion
or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5

The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration
proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the
discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations
thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving
whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.7

Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for
purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by
private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below
discussed.

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one,
should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1
of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts
due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do
not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary
action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons
to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for
not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons. 11

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations
to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings . 12

Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a
deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case.

In one case, 13 We said:

Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as
to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does
section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are
at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents
succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to
what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may
properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such
property is in the hands of one heir.

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is
merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for
the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an
action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still
another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the
husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary
in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's
deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate
proceedings of the latter.15

We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving
heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of
the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms.
The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for
her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since
these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a
judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de
Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property
left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would
only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a
similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be
properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are
protected in any event.

We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are
pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for
burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses
of an administration proceeding.

With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred
to be appointed as administratrix.

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita
Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without
prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the
property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000.]

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and


SILVERIO PADA, Respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

The victory 1 of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court 2 in
an ejectment suit 3 filed against them by private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal 4 by
the Regional Trial Court 5 on appeal. They elevated their cause 6 to respondent Court of Appeals 7
which, however, promulgated a Decision 8 on May 20, 1998, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court.chanrobles virtua| |aw |ibrary

The following facts are undisputed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and
Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land located at
Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square
meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to
build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor,
continued living in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of
Pastor’s children, has been living in that house since 1960.

Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For
this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his other brothers were
represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano
was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino
was represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and
Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said
partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.

On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-
owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.

On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father,
Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.

Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the
barangay officials concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that
end, failed.
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a
complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome,
and Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation 9 transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their
respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.

On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended
that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual
since no special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their
respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only
through a private document that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It made the following
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court finds that the evidence adduced
by plaintiff failed to establish his ownership over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has
[sic] successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said property is still under a community of
ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that
Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-described
residential property . . . as their share of the inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial
settlement, how come that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not
transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name of
Jacinto Pada up to the present while the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily
transferred in the name of his heirs . . . .

"The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the genuineness and due execution
of said document was assailed as doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and
signatories of said settlement, and there was lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those who claimed
to have represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement.

"Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-described property long before the
sale of said property on November 17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the
plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-described property since the year
1960 with the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of
Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated . . . their share of [sic] the above-described property to them, virtually
converting defendants’ standing as co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-
owners became the undivided owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of . . . Cadastral Lot No.
5581 . . . their possession in the northern portion is being [sic] lawful." 10

From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On November 6,
1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo were never questioned or
assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two
vendors were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At any rate, granting that the
co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano
and Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or
estoppel.
"It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, but this doctrine of
imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a
period sufficient to acquire it by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that
he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of the community property, the question then
involved is no longer one for partition but of ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period
of 42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long extinguished by laches,
estoppel or prescription.

"x x x

". . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother of Marciano Pada, took
place only during the inception of the case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time
the extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the
donors, among others, were absolutely bereft of any right in donating the very property in question." 11

The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment earlier promulgated by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby
ordered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the appellant, being the lawful
possessor in concept of owner;

"2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the option of acquiring the same, in
which case the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has to be applied;

"3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their occupancy and use of the portion of
the land in question in the sum of P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and
until the termination of the present case;

"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the further
sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;

"5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit." 12

Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision of the Regional
Trial Court.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said petition. It
explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de facto or physical or
material possession and not de jure. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings,
the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession, specially if the
former is inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such
issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession . . . .

"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the land possessed by petitioners on
the Deed of Sale executed in his favor by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of
Jacinto Pada who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee Maria Pada to sell the
property was derived from the extra-judicial partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto
Pada, which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject land was
adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo’s father, and Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and
genuineness of the extra-judicial partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action
was ever previously filed in court to question the validity of such partition.

"Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent facts that Maria Pavo is one of the
co-owners of the property originally owned by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed lot was adjudicated
to Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of Marciano and Ananias, their heirs
took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria Pavo the vendor for Marciano’s share and Juanita for Ananias’
share . . . . Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court that during the
cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581,
while the share of Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo and
Juanita were in possession of their respective hereditary shares. Further, petitioners in their Answer
admitted that they have been occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any
rental owing to the liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners cannot now impugn the aforestated
extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in 1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property,
Maria Pada, and her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary division of the
estate of the deceased by the heirs among themselves is conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive
ownership of the respective portions assigned to them . . . .

"The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute made by the heirs of Amador Pada,
namely, Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to
confer upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had no interest nor right to transfer. . . .
This gesture appears to be a mere afterthought to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises.
Furthermore, the respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of laches and estoppel
come into play due to the donors’ failure to assert their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty
(40) years . . . . Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the vendor over Lot No.
5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by petitioners." 13

Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.

On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said motion.

Hence this petition raising the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS, AS CO-
OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF
JACINTO PADA DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE.

"II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT MARIA PADA
SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH." 14

There is no merit to the instant petition.chanrobles.com : law library

First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is
valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in
writing and be registered in order to be valid. 15 The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules
of Court that a partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. 16 The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are involved. 17 Without creditors to take into
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof
in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place,
nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. 18 The
partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards
the heirs that participated therein. 19 The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which
have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with
which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. 20 And
neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition
among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a
transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. 21
The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada’s estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr.
Paderes and private respondent, respectively. 22

Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. 23 When they discussed and agreed on the division of
the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such,
their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate
which had not been paid. 24 No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the
estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.

The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the
subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951
extrajudicial partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal
effect. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was a
parcel of residential land in Sto. Niño, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in
the interior of Sto. Niño St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe,
Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for
they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to
repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.

Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto
Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since
1960 without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family.
25 Their admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of their
possession of the subject property is concerned.

Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners,
they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land
of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. 26 Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders
in good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 448 27 and Article 546 28 of the New Civil Code which
allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. 29 Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not
possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they
were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the time
the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere
expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized. 30 More importantly, even as that promise was
fulfilled, the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the
improvements that they built on the said lot.chanrobles.com.ph : red

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6871 January 15, 1912

JOSE McMICKING, administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
BENITO SY CONBIENG, administrator of the estate of Pio de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco,
defendant-appellee.

Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher for appellant.


D. R. Williams for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

On or about the 5th of February, 1902, one Margarita Jose, a native of the Philippine Islands, died at
Amoy, in the empire of China, leaving an estate consisting of personal property partly in Hongkong and
partly in the Philippine Islands. On the 16th of April, 1902, one Engracio Palanca was appointed
administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, deceased, by the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became his
sureties and qualified as such in the sum of P60,000. After the execution of this bond the said Palanca, as
such administrator, took possession of all the property of the said Margarita Jose, amounting in all to
$58,820.29 Hongkong currency. On the 22d of April, 1904, the Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the
city of Manila, testate. The fact of his death was brought to the attention of the Court of First Instance of
said city on the 2nd of November, 1904, by an application made by one of the legatees of said Margarita
Jose, deceased, for an order directing said administrator to furnish a new bond. Pursuant to this
application the court, on the 10th of November, 1904, made an order directing the said Palanca to furnish
a bond in the sum of P60,000 to take the place of the undertaking upon which said Mariano Ocampo,
deceased, and Dy Cunyao were sureties. The bond thus required was duly filed on the 22nd of November,
1904, the sureties thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca. On the
11th of May, 1904, one Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator with the will annexed of said
Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco, deceased, and on July 7 following Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia
Barretto qualified as sureties of the said administrator in the sum of P30,000. Said Mariano Ocampo Lao
Sempco left him surviving as his heirs at law and devises and legatees one daughter, to whom he devised
two-thirds of his estate, and three sons in China, to whom he devised the remaining one-third. On the 27th
of July, 1904, said Doroteo Velasco, as such administrator, filed with the court a complete report and
inventory of the property of the deceased, together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a
part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an instrument signed by all of the persons
interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the partition of he estate among
themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations against
the estate. This agreement of partition was drawn and executed under sections 596 and 597 of the Code of
Civil Procedure for the purposes and to attain the ends therein mentioned. On the 28th of July, 1904, the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, upon the request of the administrator with the will annexed
and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, entered an order in said
agreement. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the court approving the same, and after all the
liabilities under which said estate lay had been fully paid and satisfied, the said Doroteo Velasco, as said
administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, all of the
property of said decedent pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the hands of said
administrator no property or thing of value whatsoever belonging to the said estate. From that time
forward said administrator has not had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and
has not had any participation in the management thereof. At the time the agreement for participation was
made and signed and at the time of the distribution of the property of the estate pursuant thereto, no
committee had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased,
and no notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to present their claims against the said
estate in the manner prescribed by law.

On the 30th of March, 1908, by virtue of an order made by the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, upon application of all parties interested, the said Engracio Palanca was removed from office as
administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased, and the plaintiff herein, Jose McMicking, was
appointed in his stead. The said Palanca was removed from office by reason of the fact that he failed and
refused to render an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, deceased,
which has come to his possession as such administrator, and failed and refused, on order of the court, to
deliver said property and funds or any portion thereof to the court or to the said Jose McMicking, his
successor. Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with the
same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands. At the time of his removal he was indebted to the
estate in the sum of P41,960.15, no part of which has ever been received by the estate or by its
representative.

On the 30th of June, 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the court for the
appointment of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims
against the estate. The commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim was presented to it by
the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said Engracio Palanca, as administration with the will annexed
of Margarita Jose, deceased, which claim was allowed by said commission and later approved by the
court, which directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make
such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due by the commission has been paid to the
representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased.

On the 3rd of November, 1905, Pio de la Barretto, who, it will be remembered, was one of the sureties on
the undertaking of Doroteo Velasco, as administrator with the will annexed of Mariano Ocampo,
deceased, died in the city of Manila, leaving an estate consisting of real and personal property located in
the city. Said deceased left a will which was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila on the 3rd day of February, 1906, and letters of administration with the will annexed were
issued to Benito Sy Conbieng, the defendant in this case. On the 4th of June, 1909, upon the application
of the plaintiff in this case, a committee was appointed by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
to appraise the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims presented
against his estate. Thereafter and within the time prescribed by law the plaintiff herein presented to said
committee a claim for the sum of P30,000 "based upon the fact that the claim for the larger amount had
been allowed in favor of the estate of said Margarita Jose Sempco, deceased;" and based upon the further
fact "that the Court of First Instance had ordered the said Doroteo Velasco, as administrator of the estate
of said Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco, deceased, to pay the said claim if there were funds sufficient to
make such payment, but that it has not been paid by the said Doroteo Velasco, or any part thereof," The
claim so presented against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the
committee thereof. The plaintiff herein within the time allowed by law appealed to the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila from the order of the committee disallowing said claim.

It is disputed in the case that all of the claims against the estate of Mariano Ocampo were fully paid and
satisfied at the time of the partition of said estate, with the exception of the alleged claim arising by virtue
of his having been a surety of the default Palanca. It nowhere appears in the evidence or the record
exactly when this claim arose it may be inferred from the time of presentation in 1909, and we have no
means of determining whether the defalcation represented by the said claim occurred before or after the
substitution of sureties herefore referred to.
Upon these facts it was contended by counsel for plaintiff that the judgment should be rendered in his
favor for the sum of P30,000, with costs, while counsel of defendant contended that upon said facts
judgment should be rendered in favor of defendant, dismissing the complaint, with costs. The court
having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs. This appeal is from that
judgment.

We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. We base our affirmance upon the ground that
Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been
liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the
obligation, the surety cannot be.

At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stands sections 596 and 597 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. They are as follows:

SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in certain cases. —
Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and their are no
debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a
family council as shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves, duly executed
in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court.

SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it shall appear, at any time within
two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding
against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate
in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and
the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have
received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased
shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made.

These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent without
proceedings in court. The provisions which they contain are extremely important. The wisdom which
underlies them is apparent. It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the principle of
private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use
except for the most urgent and imperative reason and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights
which underlie those reasons effective. It is a principle of universal acceptance which declares that one
has the instant right to occupy and use that which he owns, and it is only in the presence of reasons of the
strongest and most urgent nature that that principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which
underlies it. The force which gave birth to this stern and imperious principle is the same force which
destroyed the feudal despotism and created the democracy of private owners.

These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal construction so that the intent of the framers
may be fully carried out. They should not be straitened or narrowed but should rather be given that
wideness and fullness of application without which they cannot produce their most beneficial effects.

Standing, as we have said, at the head of the law of administration of these Islands, they are the first
provisions to which our attention is directed in seeking a legal method for the division and distribution of
the property of deceased persons. They are thus made prominent. And justly so. The purpose which
underlies them, as we have already intimated, is to put into one's hands the property which belongs to him
not only at the earliest possible moment but also with the least possible expense. By permitting the
partition and division without proceedings in court no time is lost and substantially all expense and waste
are saved. This is as it should be. The State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery
furnished by it for the division and distribution of the property of a decedent is no cumbersome, unwidely
and expensive that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division. Where
administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished quickly and at very small expense; and a system
which consumes any considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure.
It being undoubted that the removal of property from the possession of its owner and its deposit in the
hands of another for administration is a suspension of some of its most important rights of property and is
attended with an expense sometimes entirely useless and unnecessary, such procedure should be avoided
whenever and wherever possible.

In the case at the bar we are of the opinion that, under the broad and liberal policy which we must adopt
in the interpretation and application of the provisions referred to, the decision of the property of Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, in the form, in the manner and for the purposes expressed, falls within the provisions
of said sections and may be termed, therefore, and we hold it to be, a partition of the property of a
decedent without legal proceedings within the meaning of those sections. The fact of the prior
appointment of an administrator and the filing of an inventory before such partition is of no consequence
so far as the right of the owners to partition is concerned. The only requisite for such petition prescribed
by the law is that "there are no debts . . . or all the debts have been paid by the heirs." When the condition
is fulfilled the partition can take place, no matter what stage the administration may have reached. By this
it is, of course, not meant that the partition after the appointment of an administrator will interfere with
the rights acquired by third person dealing with said administrator within the limits of his authority and
prior to the partition; nor that the administrator can be deprived of the property of which he is legally in
possession without proper proceedings and the consent of the court.

As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an administrators' bond is the fault or
failure of the principal. The liability of the principal precedes that of the surety. If Velasco incurred no
liability, then his surety incurred none. The question that naturally suggests itself is, then, In what was
Velasco at fault or in what did he fail? When the persons interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo
agreed voluntarily upon a partition and division of the property of said estate and the actual partition
followed, the matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as administrator. The parties to the partition stood
invoking their rights under section 596 and 597. Velasco was helpless. He was powerless to prevent the
parties from taking the property to which they were entitled under the agreement, it being conceded that
they were actually entitled thereto in law. Those sections were applicable to the situation and there was
nothing that Velasco could do to prevent the estate from being divided according to their provisions. In
giving his consent to the partition and in assisting the parties to obtain the approval of the court thereto he
did no wrong. He simply aided in carrying out the provisions of the sections referred to. It is a universal
principle that one who follows a law commits no fault, incurs no failure and wounds no rights. If one
obeys the law he is free not only in person but in property. Observance of the law discharges obligations;
it does not create them; and an obligation once discharged cannot be re-acted by the act of others in which
the person as to whom it was discharged takes no part. The proceedings under sections referred to were,
after the partition was actually made and the property duly turned over the administrator under the proper
proceedings, a complete settlement of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, as it then stood, so far as
the administrator was concerned. Nothing further needed to be done. Every duty which Velasco owed up
to the time of the partition had been met. All debts presented or known had been paid. The court had
given it approbation to the delivery of the property by the administrator to the partitioning parties. Every
obligation which lay upon him had been removed. Nor could there arise against him any obligation in the
future in relation to the same property. The instant that the partition occurred, in the form and manner
stated, he stood stripped of all responsibility to the estate, to its creditors, to the heirs and to the court. He
stood divested o every official duty and obligation, as fully as before his appointment — as completely as
if he had not been appointed at all. In law, therefore, he was no longer administrator with the will annexed
of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased. He was in effect, discharged. As to him the estate had been
wiped out as a legal entity. It had ceased to exist. And, while at any time within two years after the
partition the property, or a portion thereof, then in the possession of the partitioning persons could have
been placed in administration upon the happening of certain events, it would not have been the same
estate that had been represented by Velasco, nor would Velasco have been the administrator of the estate
by virtue of his appointment in the old. It would have been necessary for the court, upon the proper
application setting forth the conditions prescribed by the sections, to appoint another administrator for the
purposes specified therein. It might have been Velasco, if he would have accepted the appointment, or it
might have been another. The point is that it would have been necessary to appoint a new administrator
just as if one had not been named before. The new administrator would have had new duties, some of
which would have been quite different from those of the administrator appointed originally. He would
have had different sureties, who would have found themselves to different obligations.

That on the partition under said section the estate was, in this case, completely wiped out and the
administrator as completely discharged cannot be doubted for the following reasons:

1. The whole estate was, by virtue of these sections, taken from the administrator and turned over
to the partitioning persons. No security was required or given for its safekeeping or return.

2. The persons to whom the estate was thus turned over became absolute owners of the same,
subject to be devastated, wholly or only partly, on the happening of certain events and the taking
of certain proceedings thereon. But even such divestiture could not have been avoided by the
payment by the parties, or any of them, of the debt which was the moving cause thereof.

From these premises it is the merest conclusion to say that the decedent's estate was merged in their
partitioning parties; and this no matter whether the partition occurred before or after the appointment of
an administrator. When one has been named to perform certain acts in relation to a given thing, and
before said acts have been begun, or, having been begun, are completed, the appointing power has placed
the thing upon which those acts were to operate wholly beyond the possession, jurisdiction and control of
the one so appointed, there is a complete revocation of such appointment, so far as all subsequent acts are
concerned. An administrator cannot be held to any accountability for property over which he has
absolutely no power or jurisdiction and in which he has not the slightest legal interest. The thing on which
he was appointed to operate having been withdrawn wholly beyond his ken by the very power (the law)
which appointed him, there is a complete revocation of the appointment.

Moreover, the sureties of an administrator so appointed can not be held liable for property which by force
of law has been taken from the principal and its ownership and control turned over to others. Their
obligation is that their principal shall obey the law in the handling and distribution of the estate. Their
obligation is discharged when the estate is legally turned over to those entitled thereto. The law requires
the principal to turn it over to those who bring themselves within the provisions of section 596. Having
turned over the whole estate under the compelling power of the law, his obligation ceased. The
responsibility of the sureties ceased at the same time. Without their consent another obligation could not
be imposed upon them in relation to the same principal, and the same property, or apart thereof, especially
after the lapse of two years. Their undertaking was that their principal should discharge one obligation,
not two.

It requires no argument to demonstrate that the duties and obligations imposed upon an administrator
appointed under section 597 might and probably would be different in many respects from those of an
administrator appointed in the first instance; and that, therefore, the obligation of his sureties would not be
the same as that of the sureties of the administrator appointed originally. The administration contemplated
by section 597 is a new administration and one entirely apart from any other administration theretofore
had. This section requires the appointment of a new administrator, with a new undertaking. The
administration under the section is distinct and separate from any administration which may have been in
progress at the time of the partition and division under section 596. This is clear for the following reasons:

After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have been fully consummated, no
further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the following requisites:

1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after such
settlement and distribution of estate."

2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the appointment of
an administrator.

If those requisites are lacking, there can be no administration. When one fails the right too such
administration does not arise and any person intersted in the estate may oppose any effort to administer
under such circumstances. These requisites combined are that and that alone which give to the
administrator when appointed the right to recover the assets from the persons who received them on the a
partition. Indeed, if these requisites are lacking no administrator can lawfully be appointed, and, if
improperly appointed, he fails of legal power to maintain an action to recover the assets in the hands of
those among whom they have partitioned; in other words, he is powerless to administer. If these requisites
fail, then the real estate in the hands either of the persons among whom it has been partitioned or of their
assignees is free from the lien created by section 597 and any attempt to enforce such lien can be
successfully opposed by any person interested in such property. The appointment of an administrator
without the concurrence of these requisites is without warrant of law and the appointee is powerless to
perform any act of administration. The statute must be strictly complied with in every essential before it
operates. Every essential requirements must be fulfilled before it will be permitted that a partition which
has the clear sanction of the law and which is strictly in accord with the public policy of the estate shall be
set aside and destroyed with all the evil consequences thereby entailed.

It is necessary deduction from the provisions of the sections mentioned that the appointment of an
administrator ought not to be permitted, even when the requisites above mentioned occur, unless the heirs
or the persons among whom the property was partitioned have been given an opportunity to be heard on
that application. It would be extremely unusual to proceed to the appointment of an administrator under
section 597, by virtue of a debt which had been discovered after the partition and division, without giving
the heirs an opportunity to avoid such administration by the payment of the debt, it being kept in view
that the object of the law in originally giving the right to pay the debts and having partition without
proceedings in court was to avoid that every administration. Such a proceeding would be unusual and
irrational. Such a course would be in direct opposition to the purposes which animated the provisions
authorizing the original partition.

(1) In the case at bar no debt was discovered during the prescribed period. It was nearly four
years after the partition of the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their respective
portions before it was even discovered that Palanca had been guilty of converting the property of
the estate to his own use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years before the
alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was fixed.

(2) No creditor made his application.


The requirements of section 597 not having been met, there could be no administration under section.
Therefore, the appointment of commissioners for the hearing of the claim against the estate of Mariano
Ocampo presented by the plaintiff in this case was an appointment without warrant or authority of law. It
was appointment in respect to an estate that did not exist and in relation to an administration that had
never been inaugurated. Under section 597 the commencement of the administration is the application of
the creditor and the appointment of the administrator pursuant to such application. Without such
appointment there is no administration. As we have before stated, when the property was partitioned a
described heretofore, the estate, as such, ceased to exist and the administration thereof by Doroteo
Velasco was wiped out. There was no administrator to carry on the administration. By operation of the
law the estate had been passed on the heirs who had become the absolute owners of it. They were subject
to the orders of the old administrator and they held rights inferior to no one. To be sure, as we have
already stated, those rights might be modified to a certain extent by the happening of subsequent events;
but until those events transpired their rights were absolute. Those conditions never having been met, a fact
admitted by both parties in the case at bar, there was absolutely no estate at all, much less one in the
process of administration, at the time the commissioners were appointed to her the claim for P30,000
presented against the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, by the plaintiff herein. Add to this the fact that
there was no administrator of said estate in extense at the time, and we have before us the absurdity of the
appointment of the commissioners to report on a claim against an estate which did not exist and under the
direction of an administrator that had never been appointed.

The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of commissioners to hear the claim above referred to
was beyond the powers of the court and was without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had
no force or effect. It gave no right against the estate and none against the so-called administrator.

It must be remembered that it is only debts discovered within the prescribed period that can be made the
reason for an administration of the estate subsequent to its partition. The necessary result is t hat a debt
not discovered within that period cannot be made the reason for an administration of the estate. The debt
in the case at bar having first discovered more than four years after the partition of the estate of Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, an administrator, even though appointed under section 57, would not no authority in
law, over the objection of one interested, to pay the debt in question or to maintain an action or other
proceeding for the recovery of property for that purpose. This section creates a statute of limitations
which deprives all debts which are not discovered within the prescribed time of the power of requiring an
administration of the estate. The administration of the estate after the partition under the law has been
accomplished depends upon the discovery of the debt "at any time within two years after such settlement
and distribution of the estate." The law does not operate unless that discovery is made within the time
prescribed.

We have not overlooked the contention that at the time this partition took place there was a contingent
claim against the estate partitioned, namely, the claim which would arise on the contingency that the
administrator for whom Mariano Ocampo was surety might default or otherwise fail to perform his duties
thus rendering Mariano Ocampo liable on his bond; and that contingent claim, being one expressly
recognized by sections 746 to 749 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a claim entirely proper to present, no
partition of this estate under section 596 and 597 was legally possible until such claim was provided for
by the petitioning parties. This contention goes upon the assumption that a partition under the sections of
the Code of Civil Procedure so often referred to is void unless every debt is paid or provided for by the
petitioning parties, and may therefore be entirely disregarded by the creditor holding a claim either unpaid
or provided for. We do not believe that this assumption is warranted. In the first place, we must remember
that the partition proceedings in question are proceedings out of court. Consequently there is no
prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of commissioners, the publication
of notice to creditors, and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in court are not
required in partition out of court. The law is silent as to how the claims are to be ascertained, presented
and determined. We must assume, therefore, that the method of ascertaining them and determining their
validity was left to the good sense and sound judgment of the persons concerned. Usually no difficulty
will be experienced in solving the problem presented by this conclusion. It is obvious that creditors
always know who owes them and that debtors generally know whom they owe. It is equally obvious that,
generally speaking, a creditor is one of the first to learn of the death of the debtor, and that heirs of the
latter are the first to begin to calculate how much of his property they are to receive. This cannot be
known until the debts are determined. The heirs know they cannot escape payment of the debts. A
surreptitious division behind the backs of the creditors would not avail as the latter have two years
thereafter in which to throw at least a portion of the estate into administration and thereby nullify the
attempt to overreach them. Even the transfer by the partitioning persons of the property received on the
partition to third persons would not profit them, inasmuch as the consideration received on such transfer
would, if necessary, be subject to seizure to pay the debt presented and the real estate would go into the
hands of the vendees charged with the lien of said debt.

The method of ascertaining claims against the defendant's estate not being prescribed, it is apparent that
no objection to a partition can be urged by a creditor whose claim has not been paid, due to the faulty
method adopted by the partitioning parties to ascertain claims, or, even, the absence of any effort at all to
ascertain them.

In the second place, it must be on served that express provisions is made by sections 596 and 597 for the
payment of a claim discovered by them or presented after the partition. That is one of the main
provisions. It is a necessary deduction, therefore, that it was not the intention of the law to pronounce the
partition void of no effect simply because not all of the debts were paid before the partition was made.
The fact of non payment cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition
directly; that is, by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the
right of partition, such partition cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is outstanding. While a
partition manifestly fraudulent in inception and result might possibly be attacked directly by an action to
set aside, a question which we do not discuss or decide, the manner of attacking the partition prescribed
by the law is the one, generally speaking, preferably to be followed; and that is to throw into
administration so much of the estate as is necessary to pay the outstanding claim. The method, though
indirect, accomplishes a better result than a direct attack. The latter, by destroying the validity of the
partition, would throw the whole situation into confusion and uncertainty, something always to be
avoided. The former does not produce that result. Where there is no fraud, and possibly where there is, a
direct attack on the partition is impossible under the provisions under discussion. A claim discovered and
presented within the two years serves not to destroy, primarily, the partition. It does not even permit the
whole estate to be thrown into administration. Only such portion as is necessary to pay the discovered
debt can be administered. This is apparent when it is observed that on such administration the
administrator is authorized to recover only the amount of property necessary to pay the debt presented,
leaving the partitioning parties in undisturbed possession of the remainder. Moreover, the partitioning
parties may still pay the debt and preserve undisturbed the partition in all it parts and thus assure and
maintain the rights of the parties thereunder. The mere fact, therefore, that a creditor was not paid before
the partition took place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply provides a fact
which he may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the consequent administration
of so much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt discovered.

But, as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such appointment and administration, the claim must
be presented within two years from the date of the partition and distribution.
Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity, either by want of notice or otherwise, and the
consequent failure to present a claim before partition, is, under the sections we are discussing, of no
consequence whatever in so far as the validity of the partition is concerned.

We have also seen that the fact that there were debts outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition took
place is of no importance so far as the validity of the partition is concerned, leaving out account the
question of fraud to which we have already adverted and left undecided.

We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is valid and subsistent against the estate is of no
consequence whatever with respect to the right of its holder to require an administration of the estate
unless such claim is discovered and presented within two years.

The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a certain period, a contingent one is of no
importance. The sections under discussion make no distinction between claims.

The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case at bar it was five years after the petition before the
alleged creditor made any attempt whatsoever to "discover" or present his claim. He knew of the death of
Ocampo very soon after it occurred. He knew that it was among the possibilities that Ocampo's estate
might be called upon to respond for the failure of Palanca to perform his duty as administrator. It was his
duty to see to it that he would be protected in that event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of Ocampo
to be partitioned and distributed without protest and without the presentation of his contingent claim, and
sat quiet and passive for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very probable that the property of
the estate was being consumed, incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it had been
distributed.

The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special finding as to costs.
G.R. No. L-47475 May 6, 1942

DONATO LAJOM, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
JOSE P. VIOLA, RAFAEL VIOLA, and SILVIO VIOLA, defendants-appellees.

Simeon P. Mangaliman for appellant.


Adolfo A. Scheerer for appellees.

BOCOBO, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, sustaining the defendants'
demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint and dismissing the case. On March 17, 1939, the plaintiff-
appellant, Donato Lajom, filed a complaint, which amended on May 16, 1939, praying, among other
things, that he be declared a natural child of the late Dr. Maximo Viola and therefore a co-heir of the
defendand-appellees, Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola, and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of said Dr.
Maximo Viola; and that after collation, payment of debts and accounting of fruits, a new partition be
ordered, adjudicating one-seventh of the estate to the plaintiff and two-sevenths to each of the defendants.
Among the allegations of the complaint are the following:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledged by his
father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola, begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom and born in 1882
when both, Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and could have contracted marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

4. That from early childhood until before the year 1889, and even thereafter, the plaintiff had
been living with his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola, and had been enjoying the status of a son,
not only within the family circle but also publicly, on account of the acts of his said father;

xxx xxx xxx

6. That a testate proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, covering the
estate left by the said Dr. Maximo Viola, registered as civil case No. 4741 of said Court; and this
special proceedings was already closed on March 17, 1937, as can be seen in a copy of the order
of said Court, hereto attached, marked as Annex D, and is being made an integral part hereof;

7. That the plaintiff did not intervene during the pendency of the special proceeding above
mentioned, as he expected that his brothers, the herein defendants, would disclose and tell the
truth to the Court that they have a natural brother whom they knew to be living, and whose
address was well known to them; a brother who should also participate in the estate of their
deceased father; and besides, the herein defendants promised to the herein plaintiff that they
would give him his lawful share in the estate of their father;

8. That the herein defendants willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed the truth from the
Court that they have a natural brother who should also participate in the estate of their deceased
father, with the single and avowed intention to deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein
plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question;

9. That the herein defendants partitioned among themselves the estate in question, as can be seen
in their "Convenio de Patricion y Adjudicacion," dated October 25, 1935, a copy of which is
hereto attached, marked as Annex E, and is made an intergral part hereof, and since then up to the
present time, each of the herein defendants has been occupying, possessing and enjoying his
corresponding share, in accordance with the said "Convenio de Particion y Adjudicacion"; while
the properties alleged to be paraphernal properties of the late Juana Roura in said "Convenio de
Particion y Adjudicacion" are not paraphernal but conjugal properties of the late spouses, Dr.
Maximo Viola and Doña Juana Roura, acquired during their martial life;

xxx xxx xxx

18. That the plaintiff had demanded of the defendants that they give to him his lawful
participation of the estate in question, as well as of the products therefrom, in order not only to
comply with their promise but also in order to comply with the law; but the herein defendants
have failed to give to the herein plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in questions, nor of the
products or fruits therefrom; and the said defendants continue to fail to give to him his legal
portion of the said estate and the fruits or products therefrom, of which the plaintiff is entitled to
one-seventh (1/7) while each of the three defendants is entitled to two-sevenths (2/7) of the same.

By an order dated July 31, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sustained the defendants'
demurrer and dismissed the case. The Court held that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action because its allegation called for the exercise of the probate jurisdiction of the
court and consequently did not constitute a cause of action in an ordinary civil case like the present. It was
further held that the court had no jurisdiction because there was no allegation that the late Dr. Maximo
Viola was, at the time of his death, a resident of Nueva Ecija; on the contrary, the complaint showed that
the will of the deceased had already been probated in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and that court
having first taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
could no longer assume jurisdiction over the same case.

The two grounds for sustaining the demurrer to the complaint will now be discussed.

First, as to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The complaint alleges that the
plaintiff and one of the defendants, Jose P. Viola, are residents of Nueva Ecija; and from the complaint it
appears that 16 of the parcels of land belonging to the estate are situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija,
while 3 lots are in the Province of Isabela, 1 in the City of Baguio, 6 in Manila, and the rest (46 parcels)
are found in the Province of Bulacan. Paragraphs 7, 8, and 18 of the complaint allege a violation of
contract, a breach of trust, and therefore the case may be instituted in the Province of Nueva Ecija.
Paragraph 7 alleges "the herein defendants promised to the herein plaintiff that they would give him his
lawful share in the estate of their father." Paragraph 8 states that "the herein defendants willfully,
deliberately and fraudulently concealed from the Court the truth that they have a natural brother who
should participate in the estate of their deceased father, with the single and avowed intention to deprive
deliberately and fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question." And
paragraph 18 asserts that "the plaintiff herein had demanded of the defendants that they give to him his
lawful participation of the estate question, as of the products therefrom, in order not only to comply with
their promise but also in order to comply with the law; but the herein defendants have failed to give the
herein plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in question." These allegations clearly denounce a breach of
trust which, if proved at the trial, the courts could not for a moment countenance. Regardless of any legal
title to the plaintiff's share, declared by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in favor of the defendants in
the testate proceedings, high considerations of equity vehemently demand that the defendants shall not
take advantage of such legal title, obtained by them through a betrayal of confidence placed in them by
the plaintiff. So far as plaintiff's share in the inheritance is concerned, the defendants are trustees for the
plaintiff, who may bring an action in Nueva Ecija for breach of trust. (Sec. 337, Act No. 190, and sec. 1,
Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.) If this promise should be shown by proper evidence, its enforcement would
not necessitate the revision or reconsideration of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
approving the partition, because leaving that court order as it is the trust can and should be carried out
through conveyance to the plaintiff of his share, by the defendants out of their respective participations in
virtue of the partition.

The case of Severino vs. Severino (44 Phil. 343 [year 1923]) has declared certain principles that may be
applied in the case at bar. In that case, the defendant Guillermo Severino, who was agent of Melecio
Severino, had obtained a Torrens title in his own name to four parcels of land belonging to the principal.
More than one year having elapsed since the entry of the final decree adjudicating the lands to the
defendant, the question was whether the defendant could be compelled to convey the lands to the estate of
the deceased principal, Melecio Severino. This Court maintained the affirmative holding in part:

In the case of Felix vs. Patrick (145 U. S. 317), the United States Supreme Court, after examining
the authorities, said:

"The substance of these authorities is that, wherever a person obtains the legal title to
land by any artifice or concealment, or by making use of facilities intended for the benefit
of another a court of equity will impress upon the land so held by him a trust in favor of
the party who is justly entitled to them and will order the trust executed by decreeing
their conveyance to the party in whose favor the trust was created." (Citing Bank of
Metropolis vs. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. 19, 31; Moses vs. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns, Ch. 119;
Cumberland vs. Codrington, 3 Johns, Ch. 229, 261; Neilson vs. Blight, 1 Johns. Cas. 205;
Weston vs. Barker, 12 Johns. 276.)

The same doctrine had also been adopted in the Philippines. In the case of Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan
Ling (19 Phil. 202), the facts are stated by the court as follows:

"From the facts proven at the trial it appears that a number of Chinese merchants raised a
fund by voluntary subscription with which they purchased a valuable tract of land and
erected a large building to be used as a sort of clubhouse for the mutual benefit of the
subscribers to the fund. The subscribers organized themselves into an irregular
association, which had no regular articles of association, and was not incorporated or
registered in the commercial registry or elsewhere. The association not having any
existence as a legal entity, it was agreed to have the title to the property placed in the
name of one of the members, the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, who on his part accepted the
trust, and agreed to hold the property as the agent of the members of the association.
After the club building was completed with the funds of the members of the association,
Cho Jan Ling collected some P25,000 in rents for which he failed and refused to account,
and upon proceedings being instituted to compel him to do so, he set up title in himself to
the club property as well as to the rents accruing therefrom, falsely alleging that he had
bought the real estate and constructed the building with his own funds, and denying the
claims of the members of the association that it was their fund which had been used for
that purposes."
The decree of the court provided, among other things, for the conveyance of the clubhouse and
the land on which it stood from the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, in whose name it was registered, to
the members of the association. In affirming the decree this court said:

"In the case at bar the legal title of the holder of the registered title is not questioned; it is
admitted that the members of the association voluntarily obtained the inscription in the
name of Cho Jan Ling, and that they had no right to have that inscription cancelled; they
do not seek such cancellation, and on the contrary they allege and prove that the duly
registered legal title to the property is in Cho Jan Ling, but they maitain, and we think
that they rightly maintain, that he holds it under an obligation, both express an implied, to
deal with it exclusively for the benefit of the members of the association, and subject to
their will."

Torrens titles being based on judicial decrees there is, of course, a strong presumption in favor of
their regularity or validity, and in order to maintain an action such as the present the proof as to
the fiduciary relation of the parties and of the breach of trust must be clear and convincing. Such
proof is, as we have seen, not lacking in his case.

But once the relation and the breach of trust on the part of the fiduciary is thus established, there
is no reason, neither practical nor legal, why he should not be compelled to make such reparation
as may lie within his power for the injury caused by his wrong, and as long as the land stands
registered in the name of the party who is guilty of the breach of trust and no rights of innocent
third parties are adversely affected, there can be no reason why such reparation should not, in the
proper case, take the form of a conveyance or transfer of the title to the cestui que trust. No
reasons of public policy demand that a person guilty of fraud or breach of trust be permitted to
use his certificate of title as a shield against the consequences of his own wrong.

In the present case, the defendants partitioned the estate among themselves in the administration
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Even granting that the partition was binding
against the whole world (though it will be shown later that it was not), nevertheless it could not have a
more puissant finality than a decree of title under the Torrens system. Upon the authority of the Severino
vs. Severino, the legal title obtained by the defendants to the plaintiff's share in the estate, in the partition
approved by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, must yield to the superior and inviolate rights equity
of the plaintiff, who abstained from taking part in that partition because of the promise made to him by
the defendants that they would deliver to him lawful share as an acknowledged natural child.

A posssible objection to the promise of the defendants to give the plaintiff his share in the estate as an
acknowledged natural child is that such agreement may run counter to article 1814, Civil Code, which
reads: "No se puede transigir sobre el estado civil de las personas, ni sobre las cuestiones matrimoniales,
ni sobre alimentos futuros" (There can be no compromise over the civil status of persons, or over
matrimonial questions, or over future support). However, it does not appear from the complaint that the
defendants ever impugned or denied the plaintiff's status as an acknowledged natural child; on the
contrary, according to the complaint, the defendants admitted such status by promising to give the
plaintiff his lawful share in the estate of the father. There having been, in accordance with the allegations
in the complaint, no controversy over the condition of the plaintiff as acknowledged natural child, the
agreement between the plaintiff and defendants alleged in par. 7 of the complaint, if shown at the trial, is
not a compromise at all, and is not frowned upon by the legislator in article 1814 of the Civil Code.

Furthermore, article 1965 of the Civil Code, which has been held by this court to be still in force, in spite
of secs. 43 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857 872-3) provides as
follows: "No prescribe, entre coheredores, condueños o propietarios de fincas colindantes la accion para
pedir la particion de la herencia, la division de la cosa cumon o el deslinde de las propiedades contiguas."
(Among coheirs, co-owners or proprietors of adjoining lands, the action to ask for the partition of the
inheritance, the division of the thing owned in common or the fixing of boundaries of adjoining lands,
does not prescribe.) The defendants having, according to the complaint, promised to give the plaintiff his
share in the inheritance, his right to demand partition of the inheritance does not prescribe, in view of said
article 1965.

In the case of Bargayo vs. Camumot, just cited, the defendant, Jorge Camumot, an uncle of the plaintiffs,
had been in possession for many years, of the whole estate in question, which had belonged to the
deceased grandfather of the plaintiffs and father of the defendant. This court held that the defendant had
not acquired the property by prescription under section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure because his
possession had not been hostile and adverse, and that therefore, the plaintiffs should be awarded one half
of the estate This court said:

Taking the evidence together, it does not appear that the defendant's act upon the land had been of
real ouster, i e., that if among strangers said acts may be sufficient to characterize his possession
as adverse, such is not the case in the present suit wherein we are dealing with prescription among
coheirs. For it appears that when called upon by the plaintiffs to bring about the partition, the
defendant did not deny that the plaintiffs had any right to share in the inheritance. When Basilio
Bargayo was asked why they did not institute this action before, he replied that it was because
they considered the defendant as their father, since he was their uncle, and they expected him to
give them their respective shares of the inheritance, and that when they first asked him to make
the partition, he (defendant) asked them a postponement, saying that they should leave him the in
the possession of the land in order to compensate himself from what he has spent for their
grandfather when the latter was, and died, under his (defendant's) care. All of these show in some
way that defendant's possession was not adverse, i. e., hostile or repugnant to the plaintiff's right.
The same witness, who is once of the plaintiffs, only says that whenever they would ask him for
the partition, the defendant did not pay any attention to them, i. e., he limited himself in laying
aside the fullfiment of the partition, a conduct which can be explained in various ways. And it is
probable that said conduct was simply tolerated by the plaintiffs on account of his being their
uncle, and they never thought that by said conduct the defendant inheritance, not that the
defendant would have so intended. In any way dealing as we do here with the acquisition of a
thing by prescription, the evidence must be so clear and conclusive as to established said
prescription without any shadow of doubt. This does not happen in the instant case, for the
defendant did not even try to proven that he has expressly or impliedly refused plaintiff's right
over an aliquot part of the inheritance.

But regardless of the defendants' under taking referred to, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had
jurisdiction over the case because the complaint contains allegations which, if shown at the trial, would be
sufficient to support and warrant an action for reivindiction of his right as a co-owner of the sixteen
parcels of land situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija. From the moment of the death of the late Dr.
Maximo Viola on September 3, 1933, succession was opened (art. 657, Civil Code.) The possession of his
whole estate was transmitted to all his heirs (including the plaintiff) without interruption and from the
moment of his death. (Article 440, Civil Code.) The plaintiff's dominion over his share of the estate was
therefore automically and by operation of law vested in him upon the death of his natural father, subject
of course to the lien of the creditors of the decedent. This being true it is difficult to ignore the right of the
plaintiff to recover his charge in the lands in Nueva Ecija, (the debts of the estate having been adjusted
before the partition approved by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan) by an action of reivindication
because of the defendant's refusal to deliver said share to him.
In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil. 855, 869), this court held:

The law in force in the Philippine Islands regarding the distribution of estates of deceased persons
is to be found in section 753 et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure. In general terms the law is
that after the payment of the debts and expenses of administration the court shall distribute the
residue of the estate among the persons who are entitled to receive it, whether by the terms of the
will or by operation of law. It will be noted that while the law (sec. 754) provides that the order of
distribution may be had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such
application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our
law is every vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex parte
proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the court
undertake to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who
are not represented therein.

Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that ten years actual adverse possession by
"occupancy grant, descent, or otherwise" shall vest title in the possessor. This would indicate that
a decree of distribution under which one may be placed in possession of land acquired by descent,
is not in itself conclusive, and that, as held in Layre vs. Pasco (5 Rob [La.], 9), the action of
revindication may be brought by the heir against the persons put in possession by decree of the
probate court at any time within a period allowed by the general statute of limitations.

In the case just cited, this court upheld two propositions: (1) that a judicial partition in probate
proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto; and (2) that in such cases, the heir who
has been deprived of his share in the estate may bring an action for reivindication with the prescriptive
period against the persons put in possession by the probate court.

Upon the first point, the following quotation from Corpus Juris (vol. 47, pp. 434 and 435) would seem to
be pertinent:

Sec. 417. Persons concluded — A judgment in partition is conclusive upon all persons having
any interest who were made parties to the proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

Persons not parties — The general rule is that persons not parties to the action or suit are not
bound by the decree or judgment for partition and their rights cannot be adjudicated; but such a
decree is not invalid as between the parties thereto, although it has been considered as erroneous.
Among the persons held not to have been concluded by the decree or judgment, by reason of not
having been made parties, are, besides owners of an undivided in the property, persons having a
contigent remainder therein, a widow with a dower right, creditors having a lien on the property,
and a person who had attached, on mesne process, the interest of one of the tenants in common.

In Rodriguez vs. De la Cruz (8 Phil., 665, 667), this court said:

With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, we are of the opinion, and so hold,
that for the reason that the said Matea E. Rodriguez had not been made a party in the action for
partition between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de la Cruz, interest in said lands
was in no way prejudiced by the decision of the court in that cause.
But, it may be said, the plaintiff knew of the probate proceedings in the Province of Bulacan, and is
therefore bound thereby. However, it is alleged in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer, that he did
not appear in those proceedings because of the defendant's promise to give him his share.

On the second point, that is to say, that the aggrieved coheir may bring an action for reivindication within
the prescriptive period, this court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur properly applied section 41 of the Code
of Civil Procedure regarding acquisitive prescription after ten years of adverse possession by "occupancy,
grant, descent or otherwise." In order words, that even after a decree of distribution, an action for
recovery may be brought by the excluded heir within ten years.

In Layre vs. Pasco (5 Rob. [La.] 9), cited by this court in Ramirez vs. Gmur, it was held:

II. This action may be considered as petitory one, brought against a third possessor. The plaintiff
must recover upon the strength of her title to the succession of her sister; and for that purpose, she
must show that she is the natural sister of the deceased, and that the deceased left no lawful heir
entitled to her inheritance. This has been done satisfactorily. The evidence establishes. that the
defendant was put in possession of the estate, as testamentary heir, by a decree of the Court of
Probates. It was, therefore, useless for the plaintiff to attempt to demand the possession of the
property of the succession, since it had been delivered to the defendant, and the estate had ceased
to be under the control and supervision of the Probate Court. Her application to the Court of
Probates Court would have had no object, as that court was no longer possessed of any power
over the succession, and, consequently, no order could have been rendered to take it out of the
defendant's hands. The action of reivindication was left to the plaintiff, and we are not prepared to
say, that previous to her instituting it, it was necessary that she should have been recognized as
heir by the Probate Court. This requisite is only to be complied with, as long as the succession is
under the supervision of the court by which the administrator, curator, or executor has been
appointed, as it seems to us, that after delivery to the heir who is apparently entitled thereto, it
would be requiring a vain thing. Lex neminen cogit ad vana.

xxx xxx xxx

With regard to the exception of jurisdiction: it was not insisted on by the defendant's counsel, and
was properly overruled by the Judge, a quo. The rule is well established, that "when an action of
reivindication is instituted by an heir at law, against the testamentary heir or universal legatee,
who has been put in possession of the estate, and who sets up the will as his title to the property,
District Courts are the proper tribunals in which such suits must be brought." (Roberts vs. Allier,
17 La. 15.)

It would not be amiss, at this juncture, to bring into view section 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(similar to sec. 12 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court) and article 405 of the Civil Code.

Section 196 of Act No. 190 provides:

Section 196. Paramount rights and amicable partition not affected. — Nothing herein contained
shall be construed so as to injure, prejudice, defeat, or destroy the estate, right or title of any
person claiming a tract of land, or any part thereof, by title under any other person, or by title
paramount to the title of the joint tenants, tenants in common, or co-parceners by whom partition
may have been made. (emphasis supplied.)

The plaintiff has a paramount title to his share in the estate.


Article 405 of the Civil Code reads:

La division de una cosa comun no prejudicara a tercero, el cual conservara los derechos de
hipoteca, servidumbre u otros derechos reales que la pertenecieran antes de hacer la particion.
(Emphasis supplied.) (The division of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice any third
person, who shall preserve the rights of mortgage, easement or other real rights which might
belong to him before the partition.)

It is to be observed that ownership is the real right par excellence. If, as alleged in the complaint, the
plaintiff is the owner of a share in the estate, then rights are shielded by article 405 of the Civil Code
against any adverse or inimical effect of the partition already mentioned.

These safeguards established both by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Code are sound in
principle and farsighted in the protection of property rights. They are morally and juridically right because
no partition, either by decree of court or by extrajudicial agreement, could add one iota or particle to the
interest which the partitioners had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of
ownership (Manresa's comment on article 400-406, Civil Code), and certainly none of the co-owners may
convey to the others more than his own true right. Section 196 of Act No. 190 and article 405 of the Civil
Code are also an effective guarranty of ownership because otherwise, it would be possible for usurpers to
carry out their covetous designs either by deceiving the court or through the egregious mockey of a
contract solemnized by the signature and seal of a notary public.

Moreover, a judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, as shown by articles
1073, 1074, 1080 and 1081 of the Civil Code.

1073. Las particiones pueden rescindirse por las mismas causas que las obligaciones.

1074. Pordan tambien ser rescindidas las particiones por causa de lesion en mas de la cuarta parte,
atendido el valor de las cosas cuando fueron adjudicadas.

1080. La particion hecha con pretericion de alguno de los herederos no se rescindira, a no ser que
se pruebe que hubo mala fe o dolo por parte de los otros interesados; pero estos tendran la
obligacion de pagar al preterido la parte que proporcionalmente le corresponda.

1081. La particion hecha con uno a quien se creyo heredero sin serio, sera nula.

The above legal provisions — section 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and articles 405, 1073, 1074,
1080 and 1081 of the Civil Code — are material in this aspect of the present case, not because we believe
the partition in the probate proceedings in Bulacan should be annulled or rescinded but because said
partition not being of such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a coheir who has been
deprived of his lawful share, such coheir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for
reivindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. In this case,
16 of the lots belonging to the estate of the deceased Dr. Viola are located in the Province of Nueva Ecija
where the present action was brought.

Broad perspectives of which policy, which the lawmaker must have contemplated, would seem to reveal
the wisdom of allowing a coheir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition, judicial or
extrajudicial, has been had. Not infrequently, the heirs are living in different provinces, far from one
another and far from the residence of the decedent. Some of them may not hear of the probate
proceedings, or if they do, they may not have at the time either the means or the inclination to participate
therein. Sometimes, one of the heirs, by cajolery, bluster or truculence succeeds in preventing a number of
the coheirs from laying their just claims before the probate court. There are also instances where an heir,
cut of a sense of self-reliance, does not care to show keen and active interest in the partition. In some
cases, as it might have happened in the present one, a cohier, from delicacy or fitting pride does not want,
at the time of the settlement of the estate, to appear in court as a natural child, and thus make himself the
object of public pity or disdain and inconsiderately lift the veil which time has benignantly placed over
the father's past social deviation. Why should it be presumed that the lawmaker did not respect this
attitude of the child? It often occurs, likewise, that a child, out of reverence for the memory of the
deceased, is loath to show eagerness to secure his share of the inheritance. Why should it be assumed that
the legislator wanted to compel such a child to haggle and argue over sordid and material things when the
heart-wounds from the death of the beloved father or mother still smart? To such a child, zealous alacrity
to get one's share in the inheritance so soon after the death of the father or mother is akin to the
sacrilegious avarice of those who, after the Crucifixion, parted and divided the garments. It is reasonable
to suppose that the lawmaker did not deem such child's feelings worthy of deferential regard?

The second main question is, Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?

Paragraph 2 of the complaint reads thus:

2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledge by his father,
the late Dr. Maximo Viola, begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom, and born in 1882 when
both, Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and could have contracted marriage;

Law 11 of Toro, promulgated in 1505, provides:

Ordenamos y mandamos que entonces se digan ser los hijos naturales, cuando al tiempo que
nacieren, o fueren concebidos, sus padres podian casar con sus madres justamente sin
dispensacion. (We order and command that children shall be said to be natural when at the time
they are born, or conceived, their fathers could marry their mothers justly without dispensation.)

The complaint does not allege that the parents were free to marry "each other" and "without
dispensation." One who is prone to search for the "nice sharp quillets of the law" would consider these
omissions in the complaint fatal because Law 11 of Toro requires that the children's "fathers could marry
their mothers justly without dispensation" ("sus padres podian casar con sus madres justamente sin
dispensacion"). In other words, a strict interpretation of the complaint would hold (1) that the parents
might be free to marry others but not each other; and (2) that by omitting the words "without
dispensation," the complaint contains no allegation that the parents were not so related as to require
dispensation to get married to each other. For example, under Law 11 of Toro, if the parents are uncle and
niece, the child is not natural because they need dispensation to marry each other. Law 11 of Toro is on
this point different from the Civil Code in that under the latter (article 119) it is sufficient if the parents
can marry each other "without dispensation," that is to say, according to the Civil Code, even if the
parents are, for instance, uncle and niece, the child is natural if said parents have obtained dispensation to
marry each other.

But pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties (sec.
106, Code of Civil Procedure and sec. 17, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court). Upon this principle the
complaint is sufficient because the allegation that the parents "were free and could have contracted
marriage" signifies that neither was married and that there was no impediment on account of relationship
which would have required dispensation. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855, 861-862), this
court held:
Relative to this presumption of the capacity of the parents to marry, the author Sanchez Roman
makes the following comment:

"Furthermore, viewing the conception of natural child in connection with two mutually
interrelated circumstances, to wit, the freedom of the parents to inter-marry, with or
without dispensation, at the time of the conception of the offspring stigmatized as natural,
the first of those, or freedom to marry, is a point upon which there is, according to the
jurisprudence of our former law, whose spirit is maintained in the Code, an affirmative
presumption which places the burden of proving the contrary upon those who are
interested in impugning the natural filiation." (Vol. 5, Derecho Civil, pp. 1018, 1019.)

The Supreme Tribunal of Spain in its Sentence of October 11, 1882, declared that paternity having been
proved, it is presumed that the parents were not disqualified to marry each other.

This liberal interpretation of the complaint is the more compelling in this case because the status of the
plaintiff as a natural child is to be determined in harmony with Law 11 of Toro, which was the least serve
toward natural children in the history of Spanish legislation. The development of the law on this subject
has had three periods; first, the Roman law viewpoint which was the most strict; second, the Laws of
Toro which gave the largest measure of concessions to the natural child; and third, the Civil Code, which
places greater limitations on the concept of natural children. (See "Hijos Naturales" by Victor Covian,
Vol. XVII, Enciclopedia Juridica, p. 809; and "Comentario Historico, Critico y Juridico a las Leyes de
Toro," by Joaquin Francisco Pacheco, pp. 136-141.) The Laws of Toro having been promulgated in 1505,
their relatively liberal concept of natural children was the one which prevailed in the Philippines during
practically the entire period of the Spanish regime.

The complaint states that the plaintiff was born in 1882 when his parents were free to marry. This is
sufficient because Law 11 of Toro requires the freedom of the parents at the time either of the conception
or of the birth of the child, although according to the Civil Code this freedom to marry must exist at the
time of the Child's conception (article 119).

The complaint alleges that "the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledged
by his father." Under Law 11 of Toro, voluntary recognition of a natural child may be tacit while under
the Civil Code (article 131) it must be in a record of birth, in a will or in any other public document.

Finally, it is proper and pertinent to invoke the case of Larena and Larena vs. Rubio (43 Phil. 1017).
Asuncion Larena, Maximiana Larena and Eustaquio Larena appeared in the proceedings for settlement of
the estate of the deceased Demetrio Larena, alleging that they were his natural children and claimed the
right to participate in the inheritance. The widow, Josefina Rubio viuda de Larena, by whom the deceased
had had four legitimate children, opposed the petition. The lower court dismissed the petition, and
Asuncion Larena appealed. The appellant was Demetrio Larena's natural daughter, born in 1880 when he
and the mother were free and could have been married to each other. From early childhood she had been
living with her father and enjoying the status of a daughter, not only within a family but also publicly on
account of the acts of her father. This court reversed the order of the lower court and declared the
appellant as the natural daughter of the deceased with a right to a share in the estate, holding in part as
follows;

The lower court based its decision upon the fact that since the appellant had attained the age of
majority in the year 1901, and her father having died in 1916, without any effort on her part
previous to that time looking to her acknowledgment as a natural child, she had lost such right in
view of article 137 of the Civil Code which requires that action for acknowledgment should be
commenced during the lifetime of the father. This is an error. The Civil Code is not applicable to
this case. The appellant was born and had enjoyed the status of a natural child by acts of
acknowledgment of her father even before the said Code was put in force here. Under the law at
that time (Law 11 of Toro), this tacit acknowledgment on the part of her father was itself
sufficient to give the appellant the status of a natural child, and such acknowledgment could be
established by the ordinary means of evidence without any limitations as to time. This civil status
granted to the appellant by the former law, derived from the fact of her birth and from the acts of
implied acknowledgment of her father, having taken place under the former legislation, gives
appellant a vested interest inherent to her status which cannot in any way be impaired by the
provisions of the civil Code. The transitory provisions of this Code declare that the changes
introduced by it, when prejudicial to the rights acquired under the former civil legislation, shall
not have retroactive effect, and such former legislation shall regulate all the rights arising under it
although the Civil Code may provide differently or may not recognize them. (Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain of January 16, 1900; of April 11 and December 28, 1907; and decisions
of this court in the cases of Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil. 195. and of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 3 Phil.
697.)

Upon the authority of the decision just cited, the plaintiff in the present case is entitled to be considered
and declared a natural son of Dr. Maximo Viola, voluntarily acknowledged by him through his own acts.
There is, however, a statement in the decision in the Larena case which needs some revision, and it is this:
"Such acknowledgment could be established by the ordinary means of evidence without any limitations as
to time." These italicized words seemed to have been based on the sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain of December 28, 1906 cited by Manresa in his comment on the 1st rule of the transitory provisions.
But later decisions of that Tribunal, such as that of January 10, 1919, have held that the action by a
natural child under Law 11 of Toro is limited by the period for personal actions, which under article 1964
of the civil Code is fifteen years from the death of the natural father. (See also Sentence of December 29,
1927.) It should also be noted that personal actions under Law LXIII of Toro should be brought within
twenty years; and that under section 44 of the code of Civil Procedure all action not otherwise provided
for should be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. It will thus be seen that whether
Law LXIII of Toro, or the Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure is applied, there is a period for the
bringing of an action by a natural child whose status is governed by Law 11 of Toro. In view of the
repealing provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in section 795 thereof, the period for bringing an
action by a natural child voluntarily recognized by the father under Law 11 of Toro, for declaration of the
status of a natural child, should be 10 years from the death of a natural father. In this case, less than six
years have elapsed from the death of Dr. Maximo Viola to the filing of the complaint. In any event this
matter of prescription of the action has not been set up as a defense.

Wherefore, the order of the lower court sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint and
dismissing the case, should be and is hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs. Let record of
the case be returned to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-26876 December 27, 1969

LUCRECIA JEREZ, JULIA JALANDONI, JULIETA JALANDONI, EVA JALANDONI,


CARMELO JALANDONI, JOSE JALANDONI and ELISEO JALANDONI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EMIGDIO V. NIETES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, LUCILO
JALANDONI and VICTORIA JALANDONI DE GORRICETA, respondents.

Tomas Concepcion, Lorenzo F. Miravite and Corazon Miraflor for petitioners.


No appearance for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

This Court has not had previously the opportunity to pass squarely on the question raised in this petition
for the review of a resolution of the Court of Appeals sustaining an order of respondent Judge Emigdio V.
Nietes of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, reopening the proceedings in the intestate estate of the late
Nicolas Jalandoni, after having approved a project of partition and final accounting, and allowing a plea
of intervention filed within the reglementary period by the other respondents, Lucilo Jalandoni and
Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, allegedly children of the deceased with an illegitimate status. The
petitioners are the widow and the legitimate children of the late Nicolas Jalandoni.1

The Court of Appeals cannot be reversed for recognizing the existence of such a power possessed by the
respondent Judge to thus act favorably on a motion to intervene even if submitted at such a stage. That is
the answer we give to the main issue thus posed. Our approval of the action taken, however, is not
unqualified. For respondent Judge apparently was much too generous in his appraisal of the right of the
private respondents to intervene, accepting as established what ought to have been proved. A modification
of the appealed resolution is thus called for.

The facts are undisputed. Nicolas Jalandoni died on October 3, 1960. Before the end of that month, on
October 27, a special proceeding2 for the settlement of his estate was filed before the sala of respondent
Judge, petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, being appointed as administratrix. A project of partition and
final accounting was submitted on June 14, 1966, resulting in an order from respondent Judge dated June
15, 1966, approving the same. On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta,
alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they
were preterited in the project of partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for being
contrary to law. Then came on July 80, 1966 an order of respondent Judge allowing intervention and
reopening the proceedings to permit the movants, now private respondents, "to present whatever evidence
they may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." After a motion for
reconsideration, filed by petitioners, was denied, the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed on September 3, 1966.

As set forth at the opening of this decision, the Court of Appeals in a resolution of September 21, 1966
denied such petition to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge. The basis for such resolution,
penned by Justice Martin with the concurrence of Justice Rodriguez, Justice Esguerra concurring in the
result with a separate opinion, was explained in this wise: ". . . that the determination of a prima facie
interest in an estate to justify reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is primarily addressed to
the sound discretion and judgment of the probate court; that, while no supporting documents are appended
to the motion to reopen tending to show the personality to intervene, the said motion is nevertheless
verified upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the probate court has authority to require the
submission of at least a prima facie showing of said interest; that the motion to reopen was filed on June
29, 1966 before the order closing the proceedings of June 15, 1966 had achieved finality and during the
reglementary period within which the court still had jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to
amend and control its process and orders so as to make them comfortable to law and justice; that, because
the closure order aforesaid had not yet become final, the requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from
judgment do not apply and, hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any of the grounds therein
stated is not fatal; that the better practice in case of the appearance of alleged preterited heirs is to secure
relief by reopening the proceedings by a proper motion within the reglementary period (Ramos, et al. vs.
Ortuzar, et al., G.R. No. L-3299, August 20, 1951), it being desirable that all aspects of a controversy be
ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity of suits; . . . ."3

Evidently, an ordinary division of three Justices did not suffice for a decision on such petition for
certiorari and prohibition resulting in a creation of a division of five. Two Justices dissented from the
aforesaid resolution, the dissenting opinion being penned by Justice Lucero with whom Justice Villamor
concurred. The dissent is premised on the following considerations: "We should not let Lucilo Jalandoni
(alleged acknowledged natural son) and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta (alleged illegitimate daughter) to
come in first and identify themselves later, because the better policy according to jurisprudence (Asinas
vs. Court, 51 Phil. 665) is to require them first to produce prima facie evidence of such a civil status
before opening the door and letting them in. Under Section 2, Rule 12, Revised, 'a person may, before or
during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest
in the matter in litigation.' The possibility of interlopers getting in for a share in the estate cannot be
totally discounted specially considering that the present intestate proceedings had been pending for the
last six (6) years without a motion to intervene having been filed by the present claimants in spite of the
notice of publication and the in rem character of the intestate proceedings. According to their residence
certificate, the claimants are residents of Iloilo City (Rec. 20). The procedure adopted by the lower court
is more conducive to prejudice and unnecessary loss of time, effort and expense than the method
suggested by jurisprudence of requiring first a prima facie evidence of status before letting them come in
to intervene. Hence, the order of July 30, 1966 sought to be nullified under the present petition insofar as
it reconsidered the approval of the project of partition and the first accounting is unjustified, as practically
putting the cart before the horse instead of the horse before the cart. Moreover, the claims can be asserted
in a separate action against the legitimate children to whom the share of the deceased Nicolas Jalandoni
was adjudicated."4

Stress is laid in this petition for review in respondent Judge allowing private respondents to intervene
after the intestate proceedings were closed. We do not see it that way. We repeat what we said at the
outset. The challenged resolution cannot be reversed insofar as it recognized the power of respondent
Judge to reopen the proceedings and allow intervention. While it is undeniable that the question presented
has not been definitely passed upon before, still an indication of how such an issue should be resolved is
to be found in an opinion of Justice Tuason in Ramos v. Ortuzar,5 referred to in the resolution of the Court
of Appeals. Thus: "The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond
his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice
to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of
an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court
or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of."

The above excerpt commends itself for approval. We do so now and definitely hold that rather than
require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate
proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the
relief that is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final accounting had
been approved.

Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for intervention so consistently followed
and adhered to by this Court.6 As was emphatically expressed by Justice Makalintal, speaking for this
Court, in Balane v. De Guzman:7 "Respondent Judge would have done well to brush aside narrow
technicalities in this case, allow the intervention prayed for and thus avoid needless delay in the resolution
of the conflicting interests of all the parties."

It is thus understandable why the resolution of the Court of Appeals upholding the power of respondent
Judge to reopen the proceedings and allow intervention is not vulnerable to attack. It was within his
competence to do so. The question remains, however, whether he did so in the appropriate manner. It is
not the existence of the power but the mode of its exercise that is open to question. In that sense, the
appealed resolution bears further scrutiny.

It is indisputable that after the project of partition and final accounting was submitted by the counsel for
petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, as administratrix, on June 14, 1966, respondent Judge approved the same and
declared closed and terminated the intestacy the next day, June 15, 1966. Subsequently, on a verified
petition by private respondents, filed on June 29, 1966, based on the assertion made that they should have
had a share in the estate as illegitimate children but that they were omitted in the aforesaid project of
partition, they sought to be allowed to intervene and "to have the project of partition rejected for being
contrary to law." Such a pleading, without more, resulted in the questioned order of July 30, 1966,
reopening the proceedings and reconsidering the approval of the project of partition and final accounting,
to enable the private respondents "to present whatever evidence they may have to show their right to
participate in the estate of the deceased." Although the recognition of their right to intervene appeared to
be tentative and conditional, it cannot be denied that they were given a standing sufficient to set aside the
project of partition.

Respondent Judge acted too soon. The verified motion on the part of private respondents did not suffice to
call into play the power of respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be proof beyond
allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action
taken by respondent Judge could be considered premature. As was stated by us in an opinion penned by
Justice Sanchez: "No one may quibble over the existence of the court's discretion on whether to admit or
reject intervention. But such discretion is not unlimited."8

WHEREFORE, the resolution of September 21, 1966 of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified in the
sense that respondent Judge, Honorable Emigdio V. Nietes of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Judicial
District, Branch I, or whoever may be acting in his place, is directed to require private respondents Lucilo
Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to intervene in
Special Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni pending before such sala. In the
event that they could so justify such a right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to proceed
conformably to law. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN


GERONA, petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA
DE GUZMAN respondents.

Manuel J. Serapio for petitioners.


D. F. Castro and Associates for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan.

In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958, petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio,
Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate
children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a
legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of
his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely,
respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman;
that Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents
executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman",
fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had
thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land,
issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in
their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by
the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from
respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the
respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the
latter prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it
deprives them of their participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to
reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register of deeds to
cancel the transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates
of title in the name of both the petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the former
and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of said properties and
to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and
attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was
not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter,
and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.

After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a
legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife, Camila Ramos; and that
petitioners' action has already prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. On
appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with costs against them.

Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the
present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if
affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual
discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and
that accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4,
1958.

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs
does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an
adverse title (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of limitations operates as in
other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs.
Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).

When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they
are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own
name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a
title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed
upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. 1äwphï1.ñët

Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-12540, February 28, 1959;
Cuison v. Fernandez, L-11764, January 31, 1959; Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956; and
Sevilla v. De los Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an
action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud,
may be barred by the statute of limitations (Candelaria v. Romero, L-12149, September 30, 1960; Alzona
v. Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the
ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is deemed
to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register
of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the
registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz
v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958; Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v. Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964).

As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:

In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at least
constructively, of the alleged fraud committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when
the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman was
registered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until
4 November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3
March 1948. He is deemed to have discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had,
therefore, only 4 years from the said date within which to file this action. Plaintiff Maria
Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December 1949 or after the registration of the deed of
extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the remainder of the period of 4 years from December
1949 within which to commence her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9
January 1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained knowledge (even if only constructive)
of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin Gerona
became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a minor at the time he gained
knowledge (although constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948.
Francisco Gerona and Delfin Gerona had, therefore, two years after the removal of their disability
within which to commence their action (Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act
190), that is, January 29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August 1954, with respect to
Delfin.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners
herein. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed
RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY,
LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA,
HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE
CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings
before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa.
On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of
Miguel and Rosalina.

On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.

On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the
CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.

On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the
private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.

On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar.
Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters.

The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area
of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the
heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of
parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively.1 The total
land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.

Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to
secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other
respondents herein.2

Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to
respondents Chuan Lung Fai,3 but not included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred
to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was
subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C,
560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detall4
and was subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No.
T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla5 and was
later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-
11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No.
T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under
TCT No. T-10207. The remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by
respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.6

On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed
a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the
validity of the adoption of petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the
Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not
their blood relatives.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28,
1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed." 7

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its
ruling was premised on the following grounds:8

1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the
partition, and since she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-
in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;

2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by
her inconsistent claim that the partition would have been alright had she been given a more
equitable share;

3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was
filed beyond the 4 year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;9

4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated December 20, 1994.10

Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed by
the Court of Appeals in -

I. ……FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO


BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID
AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID
TRANSACTION

II. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY


PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION

III. ...…CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR


ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208

IV. ……SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS


YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL
RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"

V. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY


SHOWN THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE
IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS

VI. ……FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER
DEFENDANTS–APPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY
FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID

VII. ……FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFF–APPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO


TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS–APPELLANTS THAT THERE
WAS A VALID PARTITION

VIII. ……AWARDING PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE


IN THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION11

In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the
"Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is
valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been
transferred to the respondent buyers.

Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed
since the prescriptive period which should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran vs.
Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive
period needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been given notice, and
two, the party assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements
are not present in her case,12 since she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition." She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of extrajudicial
partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is
fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel.13

Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise
the necessary due diligence required before purchasing the lots in question.14 In the alternative, petitioner
wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article
1620 of the New Civil Code.15

Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the
rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.16

Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they
argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel
Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in
AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the
extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In
any case, they assert that the shares of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected in the said partition. 17

Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or
taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section
119 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.20

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-
year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA
153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed
within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place
when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were
issued in the name of respondents exclusively.21

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten
months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her
action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement.
It states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of


general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.22

Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be
sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all
interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which
was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson,
since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought
to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some
of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.23 Maria Elena is
an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she
excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of
Article 1003 of the Civil Code.24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not
aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither
can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at
the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only
twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria
Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this
factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent
to defraud Maria Elena.

In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:

This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been deprived
of his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert
his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate under
Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so
as the right will have prescribed.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in
the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a
total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that
their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.25

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the
adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own
interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically
vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include
Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.

Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are
constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be
recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the
doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for such purpose.26

Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence
was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must be proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages.27 The same is true for moral damages. These cannot be
awarded in the absence of any factual basis.28 The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is
hearsay and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the
basis of hearsay evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her claims for
damages does not mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal
damages are awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be
vindicated and recognized.30
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately
and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of
the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of the properties
involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to
grant in petitioner's favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.31 The
amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the
petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages.32 Such award is given in view of the
peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this case.33 Thus, the grant of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the
technical injury she has suffered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private
respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to
petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5033 June 28, 1954

In the matter of the Summary Settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
JOSE M. FRANCISCO, TIBURCIA M. VDA. DE FRANCISCO, administratrix-appellees,
vs.
FAUSTA CARREON and CATALINA CARREON, oppositors-appellants.

Celestino L. de Dios for appellants.


Pedro Magsalin for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

September 2, 1947, Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal summarily to
settle the estate of her husband Jose M. Francisco who had died in 1944. Alleging under oath that they
had three minor children who were his legal heirs, and that the deceased left a parcel of land with house
thereon, and no creditors, she asked for declaration that the persons entitled to share in his estate are the
said three minor children, with herself as usufructuary.

In connection with her petition she requested for appointment as guardian ad item of her three minor
children, and her request was granted in due course.

After the requisite publication, the petition was heard, and later approved by an order dated November 29,
1947, declaring "the petitioner Rosa Aldana Francisco, and her children Jose Francisco Jr., Thelma
Francisco and Aurelio Francisco as the only heirs of the deceased" and adjudicating unto the said heirs the
above-mentioned property in the proportion of one-half undivided share to the widow, and the other half
in equal parts, to the said children.

This order was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, who issued thereafter (January 15, 1948)
a new certificate of title in the names and in the proportion already stated.

August 4, 1948, Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to the sisters Fausta Carreon
and Catalina Carreon for the sum of P13,000, and the deed of mortgage was duly registered August 16,
1948. Afterwards, on January 19, 1950 she conveyed by absolute deed of sale, to the aforesaid creditors,
her interest and participation in the land. This sale was likewise inscribed in the office of the Register of
Deeds.

However, in a motion of March 14, 1950, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, mother of the deceased
Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in representation of the minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, seventeen,
averred that this minor was a recognized natural son of the deceased, with legal right to participate in his
estate, that the previous proceedings were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco had concealed such fact,
and because she had interests in conflict with those of her three sons, the truth being that the land was
private property of Jose M. Francisco of which she could not have been awarded a portion in fee simple.

Tiburcia prayed specifically for the following remedies:

(a) Her appointment as guardian ad item of Jose Francisco y Palumpon; (b) her appointment as guardian
ad item of the three legitimate children Jose, Thelma and Aurelio, in place of Rosa Aldana Francisco; (c)
declaration that Jose Francisco y Palumpon was a recognized natural child of the deceased with the right
to inherit; (d) annulment of the order of November 29, 1947, with the adjudication that the only heirs of
the deceased are the four children already named, the widow being entitled to usufruct only; (e)
annulment of the mortgage and sale executed by Rosa Aldana Francisco in favor of the Carreon sisters;
and (f) appropriate instruction to the Register of Deeds.

Oppositions to the motion were presented by Rosa Aldana Francisco and by the two sisters Fausta and
Catalina Carreon.

One of the objectors pointed out that Tiburcia Magsalin could not be named guardian of the natural and
the legitimate children, because she would then be representing interests in conflict. Wherefore the court
chose to appoint, and did appoint, the natural mother of Jose Francisco y Palumpon (Macaria Palumpon)
as his guardian ad item even as it named Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco the guardian ad item of the
minors, legitimate children Jose Thelma and Aurelio.

Now, when the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing, Macaria Palumpon requested in open
court the dismissal, without prejudice, of Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for recognition. Her
request was granted; but the court announced that the three minor children's petition for reopening of the
order adjudicating one-half to Rosa Aldana Francisco, with all consequent effects upon the mortgage and
sale, will be taken up later, i.e., on May 5, 1950.

Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration, contending that, inasmuch as Jose
Francisco y Palumpon had withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter became a closed
incident.

Thereafter, and probably to meet objections, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, as guardian ad item of
the three legitimate, submitted an "amended motion" wherein she made practically the same allegations of
her previous motion and prayed for identical remedies — except those touching the recognition of Jose
Francisco y Palumpon.

Overruling objections, the court admitted the amended motion, heard it granting the interested parties
opportunity to present their evidence and arguments, and rendered judgment holding the realty was
private property of the deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four years before his marriage to
Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it revoked the order of November 29, 1947; it held that the whole property
passed to the ownership of the three legitimate children of the deceased, subject to usufructuary rights of
the widow; it annulled the mortgage and the sale executed by Rosa Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters,
and then issued other appropriate instructions to the Register of Deeds.

Rosa Aldana acquiesced in the resolution. Not the Carreon sisters, who appealed in due time, asserting the
court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion for reopening, even after the natural child had withdrawn
from the litigation and (2) in taking cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and sale, which it could
validly consider as a probate court.

Arguing their first assignment of error, the appellants assert that Jose Francisco y Palumpon was the only
one applying for positive relief — recognition as natural child — and that once his petition for
recognition had been withdrawn, the court had no jurisdiction in ordering the continuance of the hearing
in so far as the other heirs were concerned. The "amended motion", appellants add, could serve no
purpose, because the motion was not susceptible to any amendment, for it had ceased to exist. Strictly
speaking, and at first blush, appellants seem to be correct. Yet inasmuch as the original order granting the
widow Rosa Aldana one-half of the property was entirely erroneous, and she apparently failed to fully
protect her children's right, their point results in pure technicality on which "scant consideration" is
ordinarily bestowed.1 All the more when it serves to promote unfair advantage.
Nevertheless, let us carefully examine the motion of March 14, 1950. It is signed by Tiburcia Magsalin.
In it she asked for appointment as guardian ad item for the natural child and for the three legitimate
children. She asked for remedial measures beneficial to the four children. Hence, the motion may be
regarded in a spirit of liberality, as interposed on behalf of the said four children — not only a motion of
the natural child. It is true that the motion begins, "Comparece el menor Jose Francisco y Palumpon,
quien en este case sera representado por su curadura-ad-litem etc."; but that did not necessarily exclude
the other children for whom relief was prayed. Precisely, because the complaint also prayed for relief
beneficial to the three legitimate children — contrary to the interests of the natural child as hereinbefore
related — the court declined to permit Tiburcia Magsalin to represent the four children, but allowed her to
act for three only. At any rate "parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or of its own initiatives at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just".2 And in line with
this receipt, the court's position may equitably be upheld.

Again, supposing the original motion of March 14 did not afford legal standing to the three legitimate
children, and that it could not be "amended", as contended by appellants, we perceive no reason to
prevent the court below from considering such amended motion as a new and independent petition in the
expediente, filed expressly on behalf of the three minor children.3 The matter of time might conceivably
be material in regard in considering the "amended" motion as "original" motion; but in this case it
happens to be immaterial, because under section 5 of Rule 74 such motion may be lodged with the court
within one year after the minors have reached majority; and they are still minors now. Incidentally this
section 5 fully answers appellants' contention that Tiburcia's moves should have been initiated within two
years after November 8, 1947.

Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such petition for readjustment or reopening could
take place only within two years as prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate
of title; because they are conclusively presumed to know the existence and provisions of section 5, Rule
74. As the trial judge correctly observed:

But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with the encumbrance annotated; and
while it referred to Rule 74, Section 4, and did not specifically mention section 5, the fact that
section 4, Rule 74 was therein noted should have been sufficient warning to them that the title
was subject to the interest of persons unduly prejudiced hereby. We take judicial notice of the fact
that in the adjudication in summary settlements more often that not, the order merely says that the
sale shall be subject to the provisions of section 4, Rule 74. This is the case because the Court can
not foresee whether the movant would be affected; but section 5 being an imposition of the law,
and being a mere sequence to the provisions of Section 4; we hold that where the title on its face
shows that it was subject to the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a third person who accepts it
must take notice that he is running the risk of interferring with the rights of minors as provided
under section 5, Rule 74.

Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be directed against the bond which, according
to appellants, should have been demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because that section applies where
personal property is distributed — not where, as here, realty is the subject of partition.

Last stand of appellants is the proposition that the court of first instance of Rizal, acting as probate court,
had no jurisdiction to act on the petition, which should have been the subject of a separate action. And the
case of Mendiola vs. Mendiola 7 Phil., p. 7 is cited; but such precedent is inapplicable, because there a
partition by contract was signed by the parties who were all of age.
Of course, several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceeding some of the heirs claim, by title
adverse to that of the decedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon
the issue which must be decided in a separate suit".4 But here there is no question that the realty belonged
to the decedent; and a separate suit was unnecessary, specially remembering that in these summary
settlements the judge is expected to "proceed summarily" and "without delay" "to determine who are the
persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them."5

The resolution under review apportions property admittedly belonging to the decedent among his legal
heirs. It is no objection that it affects the herein appellants. They knew or ought to know the rule
permitting such to reapportionment even after two years, and they have been given every chance to be
heard, having been by their own petition, regarded as parties to the entire proceedings. And section 4,
Rule 74 (which must be deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5, Rule 74) expressly
authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful participation in the real estate "notwithstanding any
transfers of such real estate" and to "issue execution" thereon. All this implies that, when within the
amendatory period the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among the heirs has authority
to direct cancellation of such alienation in the same estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to
do so. To require the institution of a separate action for such annulment would run counter to the letter of
the above rule and the spirit of these summary settlements.

From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial error was committed by the lower court,
whose order is, consequently, affirmed with costs.
G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,


vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.

Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.


Moises B. Ramos for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of
four parcels of land described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an action
instituted by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants
one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.

According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He
left for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel,
Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of
deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an
affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de
Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties"
(Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of
Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato
Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
(See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).

In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro
Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix,
brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register
of Deeds and said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26,
1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato
Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950.

The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of
adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had
Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer
alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the
statute of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is
malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that
the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C",
are all null and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in question,
and finally declaring that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated.
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit of
adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B"
and "C", insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the
same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the judgment, declaring that Exhibits
"B" and "C" are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the
responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it ordered the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her
capacity as administratrix of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of
the lands described in the complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure
adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and
also his right to bring an action for the damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and
Benny Sampilo.

Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the
following errors in their brief:

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to
recover her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time
the action to recover was filed.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.

In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years
after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of
Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not
brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as
decided in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855
869.

Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two years after
the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first
two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation
of the such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .

Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. — If the decedent left no debts
and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians,
the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office
of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.

It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case in
which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which
there is only one heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act
No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:

SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever all the heirs
of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due
from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in
writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as
they may see fit, without proceedings in court.

We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if
there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This
requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the
clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons
to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that
no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part
therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had
knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim
to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial
settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both the
distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons in
accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the two-year
period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the
decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they
also be required to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the
settlement to them, to those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal
provision to that effect, would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we held:

It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had
upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no
provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding,
therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and
incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice
by personal service or by publication, by which the court undertakes to distribute the property of
deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte


proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would
affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial
settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.
We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the
circumstances on which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the
opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is
applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements
because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals
having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his
death.

The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The origin
of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of
Act No. 190, fails to support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source
which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar
against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not
Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No.
190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would
naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.

But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The
action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her
affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's
right which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190;
Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings
where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery
of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of
limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four
years had already elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.

The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for value was
rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said.

The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of
the heirs of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the
evidence of record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a
nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the
heirs of the deceased who are claiming the property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is
hard, therefore, to believe that Benny Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that
he was not aware that they were nephews and nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the
deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his aunt
Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who
was the former's uncle, to have him prepare the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the
deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the
property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she acknowledged before said
notary public, coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the consideration for
the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo
knew that the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property, and that the
immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights.
And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis pendens appeared
annotated in the certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might
be true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis pendens was noted
on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a
purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a
purchaser of registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and
investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and
investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a
valid title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-
4106, May 29, 1952.

Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.

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