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Salaw vs NLRC
G.R. No. 90786
September 27, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner, Espero Santos Salaw, was employed by the private respondents
Associated Bank in September 1967 as a credit investigator-appraiser. His
duties included inspecting, investigating, appraising, and identifying the
company's foreclosed assets; giving valuation to its real properties, and
verifying the genuineness and encumbrances of the titles of properties
mortgaged to the respondents.
On November 27, 1984, the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary extracted from the petitioner a Sworn Written Statement
without the assistance of counsel which made the petitioner appeared as in
cahoots with a co-employee, Reynaldo Madrigal, a supervisor in charge of the
acquired assets of respondent Associated Bank.
Petitioner appeared before the Personnel Discipline and Investigation
Committee of the said bank. And April 1, 1985, the petitioner was terminated
from his employment effective March 27, 1985, for alleged serious
misconduct or wilful disobedience and fraud or wilful breach of the trust
reposed on him by the private respondents.
The petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal against
respondent Bank and submitted an affidavit recanting his Sworn Statement
before the CIS.
Issue:
Whether or not in exercise of the administrative power, the respondent bank
legally dismissed the petitioner?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court said that the dismissal of the petitioner was illegal.
The dismissal of the petitioner from his employment was characterized by
undue haste. The law is clear that even in the disposition of labor cases, due
process must not be subordinated to expediency or dispatch.
It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication cases. However, the right to
counsel, a very basic requirement of substantive due process, has to be
observed. Indeed, rights to counsel and to due process of law are two of
fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution to person under
investigation, be the proceeding administrate civil, or criminal. Hence the
petition was granted.
American Inter-Fashion Corporation vs. Office of the President, Garments and
Textile Export Board and Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Manufacturing Co.
(G.R. No. 92422)
Facts:
Glorious Sun Fashion was found guilty by GTEB of dollar salting and mis-
declaration of importations. As a result, its export quotas were cancelled.
After GTEB rendered its decision, Glorious filed with the Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition contending that its right to due process of law was
violated and that GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
The Court then issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further
proceedings. However, on July 25, 1984, Glorious filed a manifestation of its
intention to withdraw the petition. The Court granted the motion for
withdrawal. Glorious filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice which the
Court duly noted.

After two years, Glorious filed with GTEB a petition for restitution of its
export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB
decision dated April 27, 1984. Glorious once again alleged that the charges
against them were not supported by evidence. Moreover, it alleged that the
GTEB decision cancelling its export quota was rendered as a result of duress,
threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by former Minister
Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious export quotas to “Marcos
crony-owned” corporations. Glorious further alleged that it was coerced by
Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 67180 and to enter
into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of De Soleil
Apparel and AIFC.
On Sept. 4, 1987, GTEB denied the petition of Glorious. An appeal was then
taken on Oct. 5, 1987 to the Office of the President. AIFC filed its opposition
to Glorious’ appeal claiming that the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984 has
long been final. The Office of the President ruled in favor of Glorious and
remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings. The motion for
reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. W/N the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to the instant case
on the ground that the former decision was a final judgment on the merits. –
NO
2. W/N Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB
decision. – NO
Held:
The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal of private respondent
Glorious, the Office of the President “had unwittingly made itself a tool in a
cunning move to resurrect a decision which had become final and executory
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more than three years earlier. The petitioner asseverates resolution
dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was res judicata on the matter.
The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements for a judgment to be a
bar to a subsequent case is that the it must be a judgment on the merits. A
judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to
the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact
or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the
right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objection or contentions. Certainly, the dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 cannot be
categorized as a judgment on the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve
anything. In fact, when the court heard the parties during the oral arguments,
GTEB was not able to present any showing of mis-declaration if imports. The
motion to withdraw te petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that
not only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed by the
martial law regime. The resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was based solely
on the notice of withdrawal by the private respondent. The dismissal of the
petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits of
the petition. Hence, it cannot constitute res judicata.
With regards to the second issue, the Petitioner contend that Glorious Sun
was not denied due process. Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB
decision failed to disclose to Glorious vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving
at its conclusion that Glorious was guilty of dollar-salting, it contends that the
subsequent disclosure in 1987, where relevant documents were given to
Glorious and that the latter was given an opportunity to comment thereon,
cured the defect. This contention by AIFC, the court holds, is MISLEADING.
The SC recognized that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of the
GTEB. AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the
evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB
resolution. The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when
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GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against
Glorious. Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987
enhanced the charge that the former was denied due process.
Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the Chairman
of the Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade and Industry
admitted that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin to look for ways and
means to remove the quotas from Glorious. AIFC claims that it is an
inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did not give credence to it and
also, none of the members of the committee would agree that there was any
pressure or instruction from Minister Ongpin.
Contrary to the petitioners posture, the record clearly manifests that in
cancelling the export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the
private respondent’s constitutional right to due process. Before the
cancellation in 1984, Glorious had been enjoying export quotas granted to it
since 1977. In effect the private respondent’s export quota allocation which
initially was a privilege evolved into some form of property right which should
not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly
confer it on another.
The motion for reconsideration was GRANTED. The instant petition is
DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other members would not
agree that there was pressure from Ongpin does not mean that Puno was not
telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured. He did not state that
the members of the investigating panel were pressured. Mr. Puno was the
Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of his
position he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is every reason
to suspect that even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision to strip
it of its quotas and to award them to friends of their administration had
already been made.

The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be
disregarded if they are not supported by evidence; where the findings are
initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedures which lead
to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or
when grave abuse of discretion arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.