Decision of The Impeachment Court, Appealable or Not

Decision of the Impeachment Court, Appealable or not.
Whether or not the decision of the Impeachment court is reviewable by the Supreme
Court.
A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the
University of St. La Salle University
College of Law
Bacolod City
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the degree of
JURIS DOCTOR
Dennis E. Salem
January 2017
1
Abstract
Impeachment1 is a criminal proceeding against a public officer, before a quasi
political court, instituted by a written accusation called "articles of impeachment”2. It is a
national inquest into the conduct of public officials and is intended for the protection of
the state from unwanted officials. The Constitution expressly provides that a public office
is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. 3 Impeachment plays a vital role
to ensure that public officials have the moral fitness and integrity to exercise their duty.
Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. The House of representative
shall have exclusive right to initiate all cases of impeachment and the Senate shall have
the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. 4
However, this provision was abused and misused in order to protect or overthrow
one in possession. A political party having more members in both the lower and upper
house of the congress can easily prevent any impeachment proceeding or overthrow a
public official if he stands in their way.
The hypothesis of this study is that the decision of the Honorable Impeachment
Court is appealable to the Supreme Court for the following reasons;
There is only one Supreme Court. To say that the decision of the Honorable
Impeachment Court is not appealable, it can be conclude that the Impeachment Court and
1
Black’s Law Dictionary
2
ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT. A formal written allegation of the causes for impeachment;
answering the same office as an indictment in an ordinary criminal proceeding. (Black’s Law Dictionary)
3
1987 Philippine Constitution (Sec. 1, Art. XI)
4
1987 Philippine Constitution (Sec. 3(6), Art. XI)
2
Supreme Court are of equal footing and a clear violation of the doctrine of Judicial
Supremacy.
The decision of the Honorable Impeachment Court can be a valid subject of

Judicial Review. As a general if there is grave abuse of discretion there is judicial review.
Thus, the Court can determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate acting as
Justices of the Impeachment Court.
The decision of the Honorable Impeachment Court is not a purely a Political

Question but also involves justiciable matters. The proceeding in the Impeachment Court
involves application of laws and appreciation of facts and evidence which only those
knowledgeable in law can understand. It is no secret that not all of our honorable senators
are lawyers; hence their decision may not deliver the ends of justice.
The decision of the Impeachment Court will be affected by the will of the Party of
the Senator-judges and not by the will of the people. It is more likely than not political
parties and alliances will come into play and the Senators have already a decision even
before the trial proper.
3
Table of Contents
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………2
Chapter 1
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..6
A. History of Impeachment………………………………………………………..6
B. Impeachment in some other Countries…………………………………………9
Bulgaria……………………………………………………………………9
Croatia……………………………………………………………............10
Czech Republic…………………………………………………………..10
Germany………………………………………………………………….11
South
Korea…………………………………………………………………..…11
C. Impeachment in the Philippines………………………………………………12
D. Philippine’s Impeachment Law………………………………………………14
E. Grounds for Impeachment…………………………………………………….16
F. Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceeding……………………………...17
G. Statement of the problem…………………………………………………..…23
Chapter 2
Is the decision of the Impeachment Court be a valid
subject of Judicial Review by the Supreme Court?.....................................................24
A. Power of Judicial Review…………………………………………………….24

B. A deeper look to Article VIII, Section 1
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution……………………………………………...29
4
Chapter 3
Can the Supreme Court exercise Judicial Supremacy
over the Honorable Impeachment Court?..........................................................................34
Chapter 4
Is the decision of the Impeachment Court a political question,
hence cannot be review by the judiciary and to rule
otherwise violates the doctrine of Separation of Power?...................................................36
Chapter 5
Is the decision of the Impeachment Court
tantamount to the will of the people?.................................................................................41
Chapter 6
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………….47
Chapter 7
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………..…....50
5
Chapter 1
Introduction
A. History of Impeachment
The word "impeachment" derives from Latin root impedicare expressing the idea
of becoming caught or entrapped, and has analogues in the
5
modern French verb empêcher (to prevent) and the modern English impede. Medieval
popular etymology also associated it with derivations from the Latin impetere (to attack).
In its more frequent and more technical usage, impeachment of a witness means
challenging the honesty or credibility of that person. 6
Impeachment, in common law, a criminal proceeding instituted against a public

official by a legislative body. In Great Britain the House of Commons serves as
prosecutor and the House of Lords as judge in an impeachment proceeding. In the federal
government of the United States, the House of Representatives institutes the
impeachment proceedings, and the Senate acts as judge. In Great Britain conviction on an
impeachment has resulted in fine and imprisonment, and even in execution, whereas in
the United States the penalties extend no further than removal and disqualification from
office.7
In England impeachment originated in the 14th century, when it became a means

of initiating criminal proceedings based on “clamour,” or outcry. The Good Parliament of
1376 produced the first recognized cases of impeachment, the most important being that
of William, 4th Baron Latimer, who had been closely associated with the government
of Edward III. Subsequent subjects of impeachment have often been political figures,
usually royal ministers. Latimer’s case also marks the point at which impeachment
became not merely a means of initiating criminal proceedings but also a method of trial. 8
5
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment
6
Demeter, George (1969). Demeter's Manual of Parliamentary Law and Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 265
7
https://www.britannica.com/topic/impeachment
8
Ibid
6
After the mid-15th century, impeachment fell out of use until the 17th century,
when it was revived as a means by which Parliament could get rid of unpopular ministers,
usually court favourites protected by the king. From 1621 until 1679, many of the chief
officers of the crown were brought down or at least jeopardized by this powerful
parliamentary weapon, among them the 1st Duke of Buckingham (1626), the Earl of
Strafford (1640), Archbishop William Laud (1642), the Earl of Clarendon (1667),
and Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby (1678). In the last case it was decided that the
king’s pardon could not stop an impeachment against his minister. 9
The use of impeachment gradually waned as the 18th century progressed, mainly
because it proved too blunt a political instrument by which to attack the king’s ministers.
The proceeding’s limitations were clearly evident in the unsuccessful impeachment trial
(1788–95) of Warren Hastings. 10
In the early 19th century the acceptance of the principle that cabinet ministers are
responsible to Parliament, rather than to the sovereign, made impeachment unnecessary,
and the procedure fell into disuse after the unsuccessful trial of Lord Melville in 1806. 11
In the United States , impeachment was modeled upon the English process. The House of
Commons impeaches and the House of Lords conducts the trial and issues judgment. This
process crossed the Atlantic relatively unchanged. From the 1750s through the 1770s, in
cases against British officials, colonists challenged British authority. Significantly,
colonial assemblies asserted their supremacy as representatives of the people over other
branches of government. 12
When the revolutionaries wrote their state constitutions, in most cases they
included impeachment provisions. Unlike the British system, state constitutions placed
restrictions on impeachment. Only officeholders could be impeached for
offenses committed while in office, and their punishment was limited to removal from
9
10
Ibid
11
http://www.worldhistory.biz/modern-history/82291-impeachment.html
12
Ibid
7
office and being prohibited from public office in the future. In the states, lower houses of
the legislature could impeach officials for corruption, bribery, and misuse of power. 13
Through three impeachment trials from 1797 to 1805, Congress narrowed the
definition of an impeachable party and offenses. In the end, participants found that
impeachment was not an effective partisan tool but instead was useful in stemming
corruption and malfeasance in office. In the first case, the House impeached Senator
William Blount of Tennessee for allegedly conspiring with Great Britain to foment
rebellion in the Louisiana Territory. Blount resigned his office and returned to Tennessee
before the Senate could try him. Eventually, the Senate dismissed the charges against
Blount but never definitively declared whether senators were indeed impeachable.
However, the House never again impeached a senator. 14
The second and third impeachment trials involved federal judges and tested the
principle of using impeachment as a partisan tool. In 1804, the House impeached
Judge John Pickering of New Hampshire for incompetence. It was general knowledge
that Pickering was insane and often presided over court while intoxicated. The Senate
convicted Pickering and removed him from office. The most important case was that of
Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Chase. In 1805 the Democratic-Republican
House indicted Chase for making partisan comments from the bench. This Federalist
Party justice proved to be a formidable opponent. Even Democratic-Republican senators
were uncomfortable convicting a man for his opinions. The Senate acquitted Chase, and
thus the era of partisan impeachments came to a close. 15
Through these early impeachment trials, the Senate established rules and
proceedings that would direct future trials. It established itself as a deliberative body
determined to conduct trials in a fair manner guided by judicial principles. Impeachment
proved to have limited use as a party tool. Instead, it became an infrequently used method
for removing corrupt officials. 16
13
14
15
16
8
Andrew Johnson was the first U.S. president ever impeached. In 1868 he was
charged with attempting to remove, contrary to statute, the secretary of war, Edwin M.
Stanton, with inducing a general of the army to violate an act of Congress, and
with contempt of Congress. Johnson was acquitted by a margin of a single vote. In 1974
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives voted three articles of
impeachment against President Richard M. Nixon, but he resigned before impeachment
proceedings in the full House could begin. In December 1998 the House of
Representatives voted to impeach President Bill Clinton, charging him with perjury and
obstruction of justice in investigations of his relationship with a White
House intern, Monica Lewinsky. In the trial, the Senate voted not guilty on the perjury
charge (55–45) and not guilty on the obstruction of justice charge (50–50); since 67
guilty votes are needed for a conviction, President Clinton was acquitted. 17
B. Impeachment in some other Countries
Many of other sovereign state have already given their Constitutional Court an
important role in impeachment proceeding. It is given the crucial task to be the final
arbiter to decide the outcome of the impeachment proceeding. This is possibly because
the Constitutional Court is more competent to decide the merit of the case. Of all the
branches of the government the Judiciary is more knowledgeable of the laws because it is
where they are at their best and considered to be the image of equality and impartiality.
Some of the countries which acknowledge the vital role of the Constitutional Court are:
Bulgaria
Impeachment in Bulgaria is applicable only to the President and the Vice

President and the grounds are limited only to high treason and violation of the
Constitution. Impeachment shall require a motion by at least one-fourth of the National
Representatives and shall be pursued by the National Assembly if more than two-thirds
17
9
of the National Assembly have voted in favor. The Constitutional Court has the
jurisdiction to hear and decide impeachment of the President or Vice President. Should it
be established that the President or Vice President have committed high treason or have
violated the Constitution, the President or Vice President shall removed from office. 18
Croatia
Impeachment is applicable only to the President of the Republic who commits any
violation of the Constitution he has committed in the performance of his
duties. Proceedings for the impeachment of the President of the Republic may be
instituted by the House of Representatives by a two-thirds majority vote of all
representatives. The impeachability of the President of the Republic shall be decided
upon the Constitutional Court of Croatia by a two-thirds majority vote of all justices. If
the Constitutional Court of Croatia sustains the impeachment, the duty of the President of
the Republic shall cease by force of the Constitution. 19
Czech Republic
The President of the Republic may be prosecuted for high treason before
the Constitutional Court on the basis of a charge brought by the Senate. The only penalty
that may be imposed just like in the Philippines is limited only removal from office and
of further eligibility for the office. The Senate of the Parliament may with the Consent of
the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament lodge a constitutional charge against
the President of the Republic for high treason, gross violation of the Constitution or other
segment of the constitutional order before the Constitutional Court. Based on
the constitutional action the Constitutional Court may hold that the President shall lose
the Presidency office and any further eligibility for the office. 20
18
Bulgaria’s Constitution see http://www.vks.bg/english/vksen_p04_01.htm
19
Croatia’s Constitution see http://www.constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm
20
Czech-Republic’s Constitution see http://users2.unimi.it/dirpubesteuropa/2015/03/constitution-of-the-
czech-republic/
10
Germany
The Bundestag or the Bundesrat may impeach the Federal President before the
Federal Constitutional Court for willful violation of the Basic Law or any other Federal
law. The motion for impeachment must be brought forward by at least one-fourth of the
members of the Bundestag or one-fourth of the votes of the Bundesrat. The decision to
impeach requires a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Bundestag or of two-
thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat. The prosecution is conducted by a person
commission by the impeaching body. The Federal Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the impeachment and if the Federal Constitutional Court finds the
Federal President guilty of a willful violation of the Basic Law or of another Federal law
it may declare him to have forfeited his office. After impeachment, it may issue an
interim order preventing the Federal President from exercising the powers of his office. 21
South Korea
In case the President, the Prime Minister, members of the State Council, heads of
Executive Ministries, Justices of the Constitutional Court, judges, members of the
National Election Commission, the Chairman and members of the Board of Audit and
Inspection, and other public officials designated by Act have violated the Constitution or
other Acts in the performance of the official duties, the National Assembly may pass
motions for their impeachment. A motion for impeachment may be proposed by one third
or more of the total members of the National Assembly, and shall require a concurrence
of a majority of the total members of the National Assembly for passage: Provided, That
a motion for the impeachment of the President shall be proposed by a majority of the total
members of the National Assembly and approved by two thirds or more of the total
members of the National Assembly. Any person against whom a motion for impeachment
has been passed shall be suspended from exercising his power until the impeachment has
been adjudicated. A decision on impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
public office: Provided, that it shall not exempt the person impeached from civil or
criminal liability. The Constitutional Court shall have jurisdiction over Impeachment.
21
Germany’s Constitution see http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt
11
When the Constitutional Court makes a decision of impeachment the concurrence of six
Justices or more shall be required. 22
C. Impeachment in the Philippines
Impeachment in the Philippines follows procedures similar to the United States.

Under Sections 2 and 3, Article XI, Constitution of the Philippines, the House of
Representatives of the Philippines has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment against the President, Vice President, members of the Supreme Court,
members of the Constitutional Commissions (Commission on Elections, Civil Service
Commission and the Commission on Audit), and the Ombudsman. When a third of its
membership has endorsed the impeachment articles, it is then transmitted to the Senate of
the Philippines which tries and decide, as impeachment tribunal, the impeachment case. 23
A main difference from US proceedings however is that only 1/3 of House

members are required to approve the motion to impeach the President as opposed to a
simple majority of those present and voting in their US counterpart. In the Senate,
selected members of the House of Representatives act as the prosecutors and the Senators
act as judges with the Senate President presiding over the proceedings and the Chief
Justice jointly presides with the Senate President if the President is on trial. Like the
United States, to convict the official in question requires that a minimum of 2/3 of all the
Members of the Senate vote in favor of conviction. If an impeachment attempt is
unsuccessful or the official is acquitted, no new cases can be filed against that
impeachable official for at least one full year. 24
The 1987 Philippine Constitution says that the grounds for impeachment include
culpable violation of the Constitution, bribery, graft and corruption, and betrayal of
public trust. These offenses are considered "high crimes and misdemeanors" under the
Philippine Constitution. The President, Vice President, Supreme Court justices, and
22
South Korea’s Constitution see https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_South_Korea
23
Chan-Robles Virtual Law Library. "The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines - Article
XI".
24
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment.
12
members of the Constitutional Commission and Ombudsman are all considered
impeachable officials under the Constitution. 25
Former President Joseph Estrada was the first official impeached by the House in
2000, but the trial ended prematurely due to outrage over a vote to open an envelope
where that motion was narrowly defeated by his allies. Estrada was deposed days later
during the 2001 EDSA Revolution.
In 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, impeachment complaints were filed against
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, but none of the cases reached the required
endorsement of 1/3 of the members for transmittal to, and trial by, the Senate.
Former Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez was impeached by the House of

Representatives on charges of the office's alleged underperformance and failure to act on
several cases during the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. She became the second
official after President Joseph Estrada in 2000 to be impeached. While the first
impeachment complaint against her was filed in 2009, it was dismissed later in that year
because 14th Congress was dominated by Arroyo's Lakas Kampi CMD party. In 2010,
with the election of Benigno Aquino III of the Liberal Party as president and
the concurrent elections to the House of Representatives and the subsequent political
realignment, two impeachment cases against her were voted as sufficient in form,
substance and grounds, and the House of Representatives Committee on Justice had
found probable cause on alleged betrayal of public trust as based on the two complaints.
On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Gutierrez,

sending the committee report as the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate which will act
as an impeachment court. A vote of at least two-thirds (16) of all senators (24) is required
to convict Gutierrez and remove her from office. However, Gutierrez resigned on April
26
29, 2011, thereby canceling the impeachment trial of the Senate.
25
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines - Article XI Section 2.
26
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment_of_Merceditas_Gutierrez
13
In December 2011, 188 of the 285 members of the House of
Representatives voted to transmit the Articles of Impeachment against Supreme
Court Chief Justice Renato Corona. On May 29, 2012 he has been convicted by the
Senate guilty under Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (of betraying public
trust.), with 20-3 votes from the Senator Judges. 27
D. Philippine’s Impeachment Law28
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at
all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any
27
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment.
28
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article XI, Section 1-3.
14
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with
the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by
the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee,
or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.
15
E. Grounds for Impeachment
The Constitution limits the offenses to the following:
a) Culpable violation of the Constitution
It is willful, deliberate, wrongful and intentional breach of the Constitution, any

violation of the Constitution made unintentionally, in good faith, and mere mistakes in
the proper construction of the Constitution, do not constitute an impeachable offense.
b) Treason (RPC)
According to the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, treason is defined as
"Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies,
giving them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere.”
c) Bribery (RA 3019)
The Revised Penal Code defines bribery in two forms:
1. Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code states that Direct bribery is committed by
any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of these official duties, in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the
mediation of another.
2. Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Indirect bribery is committed
by a public officer when he accepts gifts offered to him by reason of his office.
d) Graft and corruption (RA 3019)
Any violation of the Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act is an impeachable offense.
16
e) Other high crime
According to special Committee of the House of Representatives, that

investigated the impeachment charge against President Quirino, are those of serious
and enormous offenses as to strike the very life or the orderly workings of the
government
f) Betrayal of public trust
Is a new ground added by the Constitutional Commission as a catch-all to cover

all manner offenses unbecoming a public official but not punishable by the criminal
statutes such as inexcusable negligence of duty, abuse of authority, breach of official duty
by malfeasance or, misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism obstruction of justice. 29
These grounds are exclusive and offenses not falling within these parameters
shall not be sufficient for impeachment purposes.
F. Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceeding30
RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
RULE I
APPLICABILITY OF RULES
Section 1. Applicability of Rules. – These Rules shall apply to all proceedings for
impeachment in the House of Representatives against the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions and the
Ombudsman for culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes or betrayal of public trust
29
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law. 1993 Ed. p.71
30
http://www.gov.ph/2013/07/24/rules-of-procedure-in-impeachment-proceedings/.
17
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be initiated by the

filing and subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of:
(a) a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives; or
(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, or
(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment fifed by at least one-third (1/3) of

all the Members of the House,
Section 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. – A verified complaint for

impeachment by a Member of the House or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof shall be filed with the office of the Secretary
General and immediately referred to the Speaker.
The Speaker shall have it included in the Order of Business within ten (10) session days
from receipt. It shall then be referred to the Committee on Justice within three (3) session
days thereafter.
RULE III
FINDING A PROBABLE CAUSE
A. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS
Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. – Upon due referral,

the Committee on Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and
substance. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return
the same to the Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written explanation
of the insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return the same to the complainant(s)
together with the committee’s written explanation within three (3) session days from
receipt of the committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in farm.
18
Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in term, it shall then determine if the
complaint is sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it
shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.
Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. – If the committee finds the
complaint sufficient in form and substance, it shall immediately furnish the respondent(s)
with a copy of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written
notice that the respondent shall answer the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of
notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to the complainant(s). No motion to dismiss
shall be allowed within the period to answer the complaint.
The answer, which shall be under oath, may include affirmative defenses. If the
respondent fails or refuses to file an answer within the reglementary period the
respondent is deemed to have interposed a general denial to the complaint. Within three
(3) days from receipt of the answer, the complainant may life a reply, serving a copy
thereof to the respondent who may file a rejoinder within three (3) days from receipt of
the reply, serving a copy thereof to the complainant. If the complainant fails to file a
reply, all the material allegations in the answer are deemed controverted. Together with
their pleadings, the parties shall file their affidavits or counter-affidavits, as the case may
be, with their documentary evidence. Such affidavits or counter-affidavits shall be
subscribed before the Chairperson of the Committee on Justice or the Secretary General.
Notwithstanding all the foregoing, failure to file an answer will not preclude the
respondent from presenting evidence to support the defenses.
When there are more than one respondent, each shall be furnished with a copy of the
verified complaint of a Member of the House or a copy of the verified complaint of a
private citizen together with the resolution of endorsement thereof by a Member of the
House of Representatives and a written notice to answer. In this case, reference to
respondent in these Rules shall be understood as respondents.
19
Section 6. Submission of Evidences and Memoranda. – After receipt of the pleadings,
affidavits and counter-affidavits and relevant documents provided for in Section 5, or the
expiration of the time within which they may be filed, the Committee shall determine
whether the complaint alleges sufficient grounds for impeachment.
If it finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, the Committee shall
dismiss the complaint and submit the report required hereunder. If the Committee finds
that sufficient grounds for impeachment exist, the Committee shall conduct a hearing.
The Committee, through the Chairperson, may limit the period of examination and cross-
examination. The Committee shall have the power to issue compulsory processes for the
attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and other related evidence.
Hearings before the Committee shall be open to the public except when the security of
the State or public interest requires that the hearings be held in executive session.
After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the submission of
memoranda, after which the matter shall be submitted for resolution.
Section 7. Protection to Complainants or Witnesses. – The House may, upon proper

petition, provide adequate protection to a complainant or witness if it is shown that the
personal safety of the complainant or witness is in jeopardy because of participating in
the impeachment proceeding.
Section 8. Report and Recommendation. – The Committee on Justice after hearing, and
by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House containing its
findings and recommendations within sixty (60) session days from the referral to it of the
verified complaint and/or resolution. Together with the report shall be a formal resolution
of the Committee regarding the deposition of the complaint which shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten (10) session days from receipt thereof.
If the Committee finds by a vote of the majority of all its Members, that a probable cause
exists on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Committee, it shall submit with its
report a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. Otherwise, the complaint
shall be dismissed subject to Section 11 of these Rules.
20
Section 9. Report to be Calendared. – The Committee on Rules shall calendar the report
and the accompanying resolution of the Committee on Justice regarding the disposition of
the complaint in accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives. The House
shall dispose of the report within sixty (60) session days from its submission by the
Commission on Justice.
B. HOUSE ACTION
Section 10. Vote Required for Approval. – A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House is necessary for the approval of the resolution setting forth the
Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the required vote it shall then
be endorsed to the Senate.
On the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure approval by the required vote, it
shall result in the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment.
Section 11. Where Dismissal Recommended. – When the report of the Committee on
Justice dismisses the complaint, it shall submit to the House a resolution for the dismissal
of the verified complaint and/or resolution of impeachment. A vote of at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to override such resolution, in
which case the Committee on Justice shall forthwith prepare the Articles of
Impeachment.
Section 12. Vote by Roll Call. – The voting on a resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee on Justice or a contrary resolution dismissing the
Impeachment Complaint shall be by roll call, and the Secretary General shall record the
vote of each Member,
RULE IV
VERIFIED COMPLAINT/RESOLUTION
BY ONE-THIRD OF MEMBERS
Section 13. Endorsement of the Complaint/Resolution to the Senate. – A verified

complaint/resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and in this case the verified
21
complaint/resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate in the same manner as an approved
bid of the House.
The complaint/resolution must, at the time of filing, be verified and sworn to before the
Secretary General by each of the Members constituting at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.
The contents of the verification shall be as follows:
“We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state: That we are the
complainants in the above-entitled complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have
caused the said complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read the contents thereof;
and that the allegations therein are true of our own knowledge and belief on the basis of
our reading and appreciation of documents and other records pertinent thereto.
___________________
(Signature)
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one (1) year.
RULE VI
PROSECUTOR IN ALL IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
Section 15. Impeachment Prosecutor. – The House of Representatives shall act as the
sole prosecutor at the trial in the Senate through a committee of eleven (11) Members
thereof to be elected by a majority vote of the Members present, there being a quorum.
22
RULE VII
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Section 16. Rules of Procedure. – The Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of
Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.
Adopted, 24 July 2013
G. Statement of the problem
Is the decision of the Impeachment Court be a valid subject of Judicial Review by

the Supreme Court? Can the Supreme Court exercise Judicial Supremacy over the
Honorable Impeachment Court? Is the decision of the Impeachment Court a political
question, hence cannot be review by the judiciary and to rule otherwise violates the
doctrine of Separation of Power? Is the decision of the Impeachment Court tantamount to
the will of the people?
These series of questions will be fully discussed in the succeeding chapters. The
answers to this question will ultimately lead in resolving the main issue whether or not
the decision of the Impeachment Court is appealable to the Supreme Court.
23
Chapter 2
Is the decision of the Impeachment Court be a valid subject of Judicial Review by
the Supreme Court?
A. Power of Judicial Review
As early as 1910 the power of judicial review was already exercised by the court
in determining the validity of the acts of other departments of the government. In the case
of Severino vs. Governor-General provides that the practice of judicial review in the
Philippines derives as much from colonial practice and history as from the extension to
the Philippines of American Constitutional law, the part of it that was assumed was the
power of the courts to determine the constitutional validity of the acts of the other
departments of government. 31 Under the US Jurisprudence defines Judicial Review as the
power of the Court to review acts Congress and, by extension, actions of the President. If
the Court finds that the law is unconstitutional, it can overrule the law. It is a well-settled
doctrine that the Constitution is the “supreme law” of the land and all other laws emanate
from it and the Supreme Court has the final say over the meaning of the Constitution. 32
Therefore the Supreme Court may pass upon the validity or legality of the acts of the
other departments delegated to them by the Constitution and annuls it if contrary to the
Constitution.
However, it is an accepted rule that the court cannot pass on the constitutionality
of an act of the legislative or executive unless the requisites for judicial review are
compiled: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. It is a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
determination; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
31
Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366 (1910)
32
Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137, 2 L.Ed. 60
24
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Constitutional question must be
raised by the proper party, one who has sustained or in imminent danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Determination of constitutionality of the act or statute must
be necessary to a final determination of the case. 33
In Philippine setting the Power of Judicial Review is expanded by the 1987

Philippine Constitution. Article VII, section 1 provides that the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. 34
The power of judicial review under the 1987 Philippine Constitution has two
aspects, first to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable and second to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. The second aspect is the expanded power
of judicial review where the courts now can acquire jurisdiction over the acts, which is
once immune from judicial inquiry because of Political Question Doctrine, to determine
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in exercising such acts.
33
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006
34
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article VII, Section 1.
25
Grave abuse of discretion means capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to exercise judgment in arbitrary and despotic
manner.35 Moreover in the case of Infotech Foundation, et al vs. COMELEC defines
“grave abuse of discretion” as (1) when the act is done contrary to the Constitution, law
or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of
36
malice, ill will or personal bias. Basing in the definition of Judicial Review and the
express provision of the Constitution, there is no doubt that the decision of the
Impeachment Court, as an act of Congress, can be a valid subject of Judicial Review if
such act is violative of the constitution or there have been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The provision used the word “any branch or
instrumentality” meaning includes all branches of the government including the
legislative which in the exercise of their powers acted with grave abuse of discretion of
such powers.
On the other hand, there is also a provision in the Constitution that states “the
Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment” .37 The
word “sole” indicates exclusivity and therefore the Court cannot review the decision of
the Senate acting as justices of the Impeachment Court.
The obvious question would be which of the two provisions prevail? Is the
“Impeachment exception to the Court’s power of Judicial Review or the other way
around”?
To harmonize the conflicting provisions of the Constitution, it must be interpreted

it in its entirety in order to be operative as a whole. It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
35
Sinon vs. Civil Commission 215 SCRA 410, 416-17 (1992)
36
Infotech Foundation, et al vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004
37
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article XI, Section 3(6).
26
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution
and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction,
the two can be made to stand together. 38 It is also an accepted principle that all acts that
are contrary to law are void. Therefore it can be said that any act of either the Executive
or the legislative department if runs counter with the Constitution, the Court may annul
the act even if the same is exclusively delegated to such departments. Then it is safe to
say that any decision of the Impeachment Court which is unconstitutional or have been
made with grave abuse of discretion can never be justify just because it has the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Constitutional Supremacy shall always
prevail and the Court has the final say what is violative of the Constitution. This doctrine
was expressly mirrored in the decided case of the Supreme Court that provides, the
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. 39
To answer the question whether Impeachment proceeding is an exception to the

Court’s power of Judicial Review, Former Associate Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz
stated that a judgment of the Congress in an impeachment proceeding is normally not a
subject to judicial review but the court may annul the proceeding if there is a showing of
a grave abuse of discretion committed by the congress or non-compliance with
40
procedural requirements of the Constitution. Hence the provision of Judicial Review
prevails over the exclusivity rule of Impeachment Proceeding provided that there is
violation of the Constitution or there has been grave abuse of discretion, without this
qualification the court cannot question the decision of the Impeachment Court.
The interpretation of Former Associate Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz is

more acceptable because it harmonized the two provisions. Thus, it can be summarized
that, “as general rule the decision of the Impeachment Court is not reviewable” and “the
38
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317 (1991).
39
Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003.
40
I. A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law (1988).
27
exception is when there is a showing of a grave abuse of discretion committed by the
congress or non-compliance with procedural requirements of the Constitution then it is
reviewable”.
It is not new trend to the Supreme Court annulling the acts of the Legislative
through judicial review. Even before the legislative acknowledged and respected the
power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. There are so many instances where the
Supreme Court declared the acts of the legislative department void because such act is
violative of the Constitution. One classic example is the case of Endencia vs. David
where legislative department enacted a law R.A. 380 thereby imposing taxes to the
Judicial Officers. The issue of the case whether R.A. 380 can justify and legalize the
collection of income taxes on the salary of Judicial officers. The Supreme Court in its
decision, citing sec. 9 Art. VIII of the Constitution, declared R.A. 380 unconstitutional. It
construed that the law is clear in its provision that compensation of Judicial officers shall
not be diminished in their continuance of their office and the imposition of the taxes on
their salaries is a clear diminution of the salary. It held that when a statute transgresses
the authority vested in the legislature, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to declare it
unconstitutional. It was ruled by the court that it is only the Supreme Court that has the
power to interpret the law and Congress shall not interfere as the latter’s function is to
enact the law. 41 If the legislative has long respected the power of judicial review of the
Supreme Court there is no reason for the legislative not to respect the Supreme Court in
reviewing the decision of the Impeachment Court. The enactment of the laws and
deciding all cases of impeachment is of no difference, both are powers expressly
delegated to the legislative by the Constitution, and in both cases violation of the
Constitution and grave abuse of discretion may be committed. Hence, it is only right and
legal that both be subject of judicial review.
41
Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil 696
28
To argue that when the Supreme Court exercises judicial review over the decision
Impeachment Court may lead to constitutional crisis and conflict between the Legislative
and Judiciary and therefore the court is advised to restrain in taking cognizance of the
decision. It is well settled principle that judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law; and it is in the province of the
judiciary to test the validity of the acts of the legislative if it conforms to the fundamental
law. The court shall not be restrained to perform its duty just because of the threat of
Constitutional crises or conflicts with the Legislative.
B. A deeper look to Article VIII, Section 1 of 1987 Philippine Constitution
ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
The very essence of the expanded judicial power of the Supreme Court and why it
is expressly written in 1987 Philippine Constitution is to address the abuse of power of
the other branches of the government. During the time of President Marcos, it frequently
used the defense of Political Question to escape liabilities and the court has no choice
pass on the issue. Political Question Doctrine is used as shield by executive to justify its
acts and prevent others from questioning it. By proposing this provision it extended the
judicial power of the court not only to settle actual controversy but as well as to check
other branches of the government if they perform their powers and duties in conformity
of the Constitution. In this way, even if the other branches use the Political question
29
doctrine, the court may still inquire if such act is made without grave abuse of discretion.
This was the reasoning made by Former Chief Justice and 1986 Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion in proposing the said provision in order to avoid
repetition of the Court’s experience in failing to resolve crucial human rights cases due to
the obstacle of the political question doctrine. He stated that: 42
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose,

the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major
branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the
executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its
decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to
conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most
powerful of all other powers without exception…
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our

experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents
in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away
with it.
As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of

habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: “Well, since it is political, we have
no authority to pass upon it.” The Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
42 “Record of the Constitutional Commission R.C.C. NO. 27” The 1986 Constitutional Commission,
created through Proclamation No. 9, s. 1986, was a body composed of 48 national, regional, and sectoral
representatives who collectively drafted the current Constitution of the Philippines. See:
http://www.gov.ph/1986/07/10/r-c-c-no-27-thursday-july-10-1986/
30
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime….
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential

proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the government
was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case.
Under the Constitution, the President may declare martial law in case of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof. If public
safety or public interest requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law….
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In
other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the

courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question….
Thus, the main purpose of the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 is to
review any acts of the legislative and executive there has been grave abuse of discretion
even it involves political question. Here the Court is given a passage to hear and decide
cases even if separation of power and political question are used as a defense. This is also
the main reason why the decision of the Impeachment Court may be a valid subject of
judicial review even it is political in nature.
31
However it must be clearly point out that the doctrine of separation of power and
political question are not abandoned, the court still cannot inquire on the wisdom of
legislative and executive acts. The provision is applicable only whenever there is grave
abuse of discretion. Hence the burden of proof lies to the one who claims that there has
been grave abuse of discretion. This was clearly point out by honorable Roberto
Concepcion when asked by Fr. Bernas during the deliberation of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution: 43
FR. BERNAS: On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away

with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION: No.
FR. BERNAS: It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION: No, because whenever there is an abuse of

discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS: So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to
do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION: No, certainly not.
FR. BERNAS: So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from
the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION: It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.
Is the intention of the framers to include all acts of the legislative including the
impeachment proceeding, to be subject to judicial review? Well the intelligent answer
would be “Yes” according to honorable Roberto Concepcion when this provision was
32
originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power, but it will notice it says,
“judicial power includes” and the reason being that the definition that we might make
may not cover all possible areas. 44 Hence the framers already foreseen that the Power of
Judicial Review may be applied to all acts, including the decision of the Impeachment
Court, for as long as there has been a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. Here, it can be said that the intention of the framers of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution is to subject all acts of the executive and legislative to judicial review which
definitely include the decision of the Impeachment Court, where grave abuse of
discretion maybe committed. And the Supreme Court as ht highest court of the land has
the final say whether the Impeachment Court has acted with grave abused of discretion.
33
Chapter 3
Can the Supreme Court exercise Judicial Supremacy over the Honorable
Impeachment Court?
That Judicial Supremacy as defined in the case of Angara vs. Electroral

Commission, is the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
45
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. In
addition, Judicial Supremacy is vested in the Judiciary and nonetheless has the power to
annul the acts of either the Legislative or the Executive department or both when not
conformable to the fundamental law. It is the power of the Court to interpret what the law
is. The Supreme Court has the final say over the meaning of the Constitution.
The power of the courts, to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in
light of their conformity with the Constitution, is not an assertion of superiority by the
courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the
46
Constitution. This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Defensor-Santiago vs.
Guingona that provides that in this country the judicial supremacy is established, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well. 47
The Supreme Court, without a doubt can exercise Judicial Supremacy over the
Impeachment Court. There is only one Supreme Court and to say that the decision of the
Impeachment Court is not reviewable by the Supreme Court seems to show that both
courts are of equal footing, which violates the mere essence of Judicial Supremacy.
Whenever the Congress commits any act in contradiction of the Fundamental law of the
land, the Judiciary has the legal obligation to nullify such act. The Judiciary has the duty
to see to it that Constitutional Supremacy always prevails and other branch of the
government do not go beyond the power given to them by Constitution. Under the
45
Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
46
Ibid
47
Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998.
34
doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy, as defined, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void
and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract. 48
Moreover, Former Justice Isagani Cruz added that the Constitution is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however
nobly intentioned, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain
supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to
sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution
must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest its
disregard result in the usurpation of the majesty of the law by the pretenders to
illegitimate power. 49
All powers are delegated by the Constitution. Such powers must be exercised in
accordance of the Law which delegated it and must be respected by other branches. Great
power carries with it great responsibilities and if there is abuse of such power, there are
consequences. The Congress exercising its power delegated to it by the constitution is of
no problem, the problem arises only when the Congress steps outside it boundaries and
when that happen, it is where the power of the judiciary comes into play, the power of
Judicial Supremacy.
48
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997
49
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., Inc. 1991 Ed., p. 11
35
Chapter 4
Is the decision of the Impeachment Court a political question, hence cannot be
review by the judiciary and to rule otherwise violates the doctrine of Separation of
Power?
Political Question is one, the resolution of which has been vested by the
Constitution exclusively in either the people, in the exercise of their sovereign capacity,
or in which full discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal branch of the
50
Government. Political Question is a doctrine which prevents a court of law from
determining issues which are essentially political; within the purview of the executive or
legislative branch of government.51 Thus, the courts cannot acquire jurisdiction of the
case if it involves a political question because for these questions have been vested by the
Constitution in the Executive and Legislative Departments. Political questions are
associated with the wisdom of the legality of a particular act. However if the center of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political and the court may acquire jurisdiction over the issue.
It can be argued that under the US law where the Philippine follow its
impeachment law, in the case of Nixon vs US impeachment proceeding is a political in
nature hence beyond the power of judicial review of the courts. US Supreme Court cites
the US Constitution giving the Senate the sole power to try all impeachments 52. The word
"sole” is a clear indication that the power is vested to the Senate exclusively. Moreover in
concurring opinion of Justice White he stated that the Framers' sparing use of "sole" is
thought to indicate that its employment in the Impeachment Trial Clause demonstrates a
concern to give the Senate exclusive interpretive authority over the Clause. 53 And if the
court reviews the decision, it defeats the intention of the framers in using the word “sole”.
It may be true that we aligned our impeachment law from US law however it does
follow that we have to follow their interpretation of the impeachment law. First the
50
Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101.
51
www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/PoliticalQuestionDoctrine.aspx
52
US Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 3)
53
Nixon v US 506 US 224
36
Philippine is a sovereign state and is not bound to any law or jurisprudence of another
sovereign state. We might have followed the impeachment law of the US but not entirety
of their Constitution and definitely not their framers’ intention. Moreover the power of
judicial review is expressly written in our Constitution while in US Constitution is not.
Second the Philippines’ Impeachment law set limitations how to conduct the
impeachment proceeding while in US law it does not, hence the Court may inquire to the
legality of the Impeachment proceeding. The limitations of impeachment proceeding are
(1) when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Congress conducting the
impeachment proceeding citing Article VII, Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and (2) when there is violation in the conduct of impeachment proceeding laid down in
Article XI, Section 2 and 3. If the issue involves interpretation of the Constitution, it is
without a doubt a justiciable matter where court may exert itself. The Court may inquire
to the validity of the impeachment proceeding through its power of judicial review. The
Power of judicial review is not only a power but also a duty hence it cannot be waived.
Therefore the court cannot refuse to decide the constitutionality of an act when it is
presented to it.
Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, impeachment proceeding is undeniably a

Congressional power delegated to the House of Representatives which have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment and the Senate which have the sole power to
try and decide all cases of impeachment. This is clearly an exercise of political authority
and the Courts cannot inquire into the wisdom of such exercised power as this involves a
purely political question. To initiate an impeachment case against a public official and to
bring him before the impeachment proceeding is a policy decision belonging exclusively
to the Congress. The Court cannot decide the issue without encroaching into the power of
a separate and co-equal branch of government. But while the House of Representative
and the House of Senate have the exclusive authority to initiate, try and decide all cases
of impeachment, the Constitution has laid down the manner in which such power shall be
exercised. Hence, if the issue involves the validity and legality on how impeachment
proceeding was done, it is definitely within the legitimate jurisdiction of the judicial
department to review and pass upon the validity such impeachment proceedings. The
Court has the authority to determine whether or not it is in accordance with the
37
fundamental law or whether there has been grave abuse of discretion. The issue here is no
longer the wisdom, but the legality of the legislative move. This is a legal, not a political
question anymore. So the judiciary can resolve it without violating the principle of
separation of powers.
Moreover, the impeachment proceeding can be considered both political and

justiciable in nature. Political in the sense that it was expressly delegated by the
Constitution to the Congress and Justiciable because it involves application of law.
Justiciable Question is explained as a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
54
interest which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.
Impeachment is a criminal proceeding against a public officer, before a quasi political
court, instituted by a written accusation.55 Since Impeachment is a court proceeding, the
law on evidence applies and it plays a vital role in deciding the case. If there is
misappreciation of facts and evidence more likely than not there will be a mistake in
judgment tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, that can be a subject for review before
the Supreme Court. Therefore it can be said that Impeachment Proceeding is not purely a
political in nature but also a justiciable one.
Even saying, it is purely political question, it cannot escape the Review Power of
the Supreme Court. Because of the adoption of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the
power of Judicial Review by the Court has been expanded. Any act of the Congress in the
exercise of its power delegated by the Constitution and considered political in nature can
be review if there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. This was clearly stated in Article VII section 1 of the Constitution that
provides Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law and such power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Even the act is political in nature, it can still be review as discussed in the case of
Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, as cited earlier, that provides that in this country
54
Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 3, 2001.
55
38
(Philippines) the judicial supremacy is established, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well. 56
There is other power of the Legislative that is exclusively and solely delegated to
legislative itself by the Constitution. Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an

Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
57
respective Members.
Granting we follow the argument that the decision the Impeachment Court is not
reviewable by the Supreme Court because the Constitution states that the Senate shall
have the sole power to try and decide all cases of Impeachment, then it is only logical to
say that the decision of the Electoral Tribunal is not reviewable by the Supreme Court
because the Constitution also states that the Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. However it is not the case, in a decided case the Supreme Court
ruled that while it is true that the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives have the sole power to decide all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members nevertheless the Supreme
Court may review the proceeding and orders of these Tribunals when there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.58 Hence if the
decision or proceeding of Electoral Tribunals are reviewable even of its exclusivity
clause, it fallows that the decision of the Impeachment Court is also reviewable even it
has also exclusivity clause.
To argue that reviewing the acts of Congress is a clear violation of the Doctrine of
Separation of Power, this was long settled in the Philippine jurisprudence. In the case of
Angara vs. Electoral Commission provides that the power of the courts to test the validity
56
57
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article VI, Section 17.
58
Compare Co. vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 520
39
of executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution is not
an assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but merely an
expression of the supremacy of the Constitution.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government.

It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and is supreme in its own sphere. The Purpose of Separation of power is to prevent the
accumulation or concentration of power in the same hand that might lead to an
irreversible damage or abuse in its exercise. But it does not follow from the fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for
an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. Each branches of the government check or limit
the powers of another so that one branch cannot become powerful as to dominate the
others. This is to prevent encroachment of power and grave abuse of power delegated by
the Constitution. To cite Former Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, the theory is that the
ends of the government are better achieved through the exercise by its agencies of only
59
the powers assigned to them. In turn the judiciary may check the acts of the other
60
branch through judicial review. The role of the judiciary, as defined in Section 1,
Article VIII, includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse, of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government and to make
sure that the distribution of power among the departments of the government is
maintained, respected and observed. This role does not exert superiority of the judiciary
but the supremacy of the Constitution.
59
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law. 1993 Ed. p.71
60
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.139.
40
Chapter 5
Is the decision of the Impeachment Court tantamount to the will of the people?
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the

61
people and all government authority emanates from them. Republican State is one
wherein all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by
representatives chosen by the people. Democratic State this merely emphasizes that the
Philippines has some aspect of direct democracy such as initiative and referendum.
Ideally it can be construed that any decisions and acts of the Congress are the will of the
people because they are chosen by the people to represent them. It is expected of the
Congress to perform their duties with outmost consideration of the will and the benefits
of the people they tend to represent.
But in reality, the will and the benefits of the people is not first priority of our
Congress. No matter how much they deny it, the truth that we can see in their action is
that, it is the will of their Political party and their allies take precedence over the will of
the people.
One best example is what happened in the Impeachment Trial of Former President
Joseph Estrada, when the Senate Majority Floor Leader Francisco Tatad requested to the
Impeachment court to make a vote for opening the second envelope. The vote resulted in
10 senators in favor of examining the evidence, and 11 senators in favor of suppressing it.
61
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article II, Section 1.
41
The list of senators who voted for the second envelope are as follows: 62
Voted to examine Voted against examining
1. Rodolfo Biazon 1. Blas Ople
2. Renato Cayetano 2. Juan Ponce Enrile
3. Franklin Drilon 3. Nikki Coseteng
4. Juan Flavier 4. Gregorio Honasan
5. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. 5. Robert Jaworski
6. Loren Legarda 6. Teresa Aquino-Oreta
7. Ramon Magsaysay, Jr. 7. John Henry Osmeña
8. Sergio Osmeña III 8. Ramon Revilla
9. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. 9. Miriam Defensor Santiago
10. Raul Roco 10. Vicente Sotto III
11. Francisco Tatad
The eleven senator-judges, who voted against the opening of the second envelope,
are administration senators and supporters of Former President Joseph Estrada. 63 Their
votes were definitely not the will of the people but the will of their Political Party. The
results brought dismay and anger to the people and resulted to the famous “People Power
II” which overthrew Former President Joseph Estrada to his presidency. And most of the
senators who voted “No” and run on the next election were unsuccessful.
62
http://www.lawphil.net/bulletin/n_011601.html
63
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_EDSA_Revolution
42
Another example is the impeachment proceeding against Former Philippine
Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez. There was a first Impeachment complaint filed
against her in 2009, however it was dismissed for lack of necessary required votes
because at the time the Congress was dominated by Arroyo's Lakas Kampi CMD political
Party. However in 2010, when there was a change in administration there was also
political realignment in the House of Congress. The Congress was now dominantly ruled
by former President Noynoy Aquino’s Liberal Party. Another Impeachment complaint
was filed against Former Philippine Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez, this time it
gathered necessary votes to proceed. In March 2011, the House of Representatives voted
to impeach Gutierrez, sending the committee report as the Articles of Impeachment to
the Senate which will act as an impeachment court. However, Gutierrez resigned in April
2011, thereby canceling the impeachment trial of the Senate. 64
And lastly the Impeachment proceeding of former Chief Justice Renato Corona is
covered by controversies. Corona was brought to impeachment trial and was removed
from office by 20-3 votes, where twenty voted for his removal. After trial, controversies
arose. Former Senator Jinggoy Estrada stated in a privilege speech that senators who
voted to convict Corona in the impeachment trial were given an additional ₱50 million in
discretionary funds. He claimed that the allocation was provided in a private and
confidential letter from Senate President Franklin Drilon, the Senate finance committee
chairperson at the time, as an "incentive" for voting for Corona's conviction. 65 Following
the allegations, Drilon confirmed that ₱50 million was released to the senators as part of
the Priority Development Assistance Fund, but denied it was intended to be a bribe. 66
Senators Ralph Recto and Serge Osmeña also confirmed receiving the funds but could
67
not recall the amount or purpose of the funds. Following the revelations, Budget
Secretary Florencio Abad confirmed the release of an additional ₱1.107 billion in pork
barrel funds to senators who voted to convict Corona. According to Abad, two of the
64
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment_of_Merceditas_Gutierrez
65
Calonzo, Andreo (September 25, 2013). "Jinggoy: P50M additional funds given to senators who voted to
convict Corona". GMA News Online. GMA Network.
66
Labog-Javellana, Juliet; Ubac, Michael Lim; Bordadora, Norman (September 27, 2013). "Drilon confirms
P50M pork barrel". Inquirer.net. Philippine Daily Inquirer.
67
Castaneda, Jing (September 30, 2013). "Recto, Osmena did not know purpose of additional
funds". ABS-CBN News.com.
43
three senators who voted to acquit Corona got nothing: Senator Bongbong Marcos and
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago. He claimed the funds were part of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), a relatively new and little known lump-sum budgetary item
introduced by the Aquino administration. 68 On July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled the
Disbursement Acceleration Program unconstitutional and reaffirming that ruling on
February 3, 2015. 69 In a statement to reporters, Former Chief Justice Corona said that the
revelations vindicated him and proved that his ouster was a violation of the
constitution. He said he was not surprised by them, as they merely confirmed what he and
many Filipinos had suspected.70 On January 20, 2014, Sen. Ramon Bong Revilla also
revealed that he was convinced by President Benigno Aquino III to convict the Chief
Justice. 71
The point of all of this is that, the very essence of being a republican and
democratic state of this country is taken for granted. The Representatives chosen by the
people, oath to uphold the will of the people have failed to do so, instead uphold their
own interest and the interest of their Political Party. If a public official is impeached just
because he was a torn to others and the Political Party is used to remove him from his
office, is there no any other recourse for such official to protect his rights against
harassment? For the sake of fair play and equity and in order to meet the ends of justice,
it is only right that impeached official may seek the help of the Highest Court of the Land
to once in for all deliver justice.
Even assuming the Senators acting as judges in the Impeachment Court cannot be
influenced by their Political Party and allies, the fact remains that not all of the Senators
are lawyers or knowledgeable of laws. Hence, there is always a higher risk of committing
a wrong judgment. Thus, in order to correct any mistake committed in the Impeachment
68
Ubac, Michael Lim (September 29, 2013). "Post-impeachment pork: Drilon, Enrile top list". Inquirer.net.
Philippine Daily Inquirer.
69
"Supreme Court affirms DAP unconstitutionality". The Philippine Star. February 3, 2015.
70
Punay, Edu (September 26, 2013). "I feel vindicated – Corona". Philstar.com. Philippine Star.
71
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/344680/news/nation/bong-revilla-pnoy-personally-asked-me-to-
convict-corona
44
Court, the decision of the Impeachment Court must and shall be reviewable by the
Supreme Court so that justice may be served best and to erase all doubts.
If we will have an impeachment trial today, the members of the senate are as
follows:
Non-Lawyer Senators Lawyer Senators
1. Sen. Paolo Benigno "Bam" A. Aquino IV 17. Sen. Allan Peter S. Cayetano
2. Sen. Maria Lourdes Nancy S. Binay 18. Sen. Francis "Chiz" G. Escudero
3. Sen. Joseph Victor "JV" G. Ejercito 19. Sen. Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III
4. Sen. Gregorio "Gringo" B. Honasan II 20. Sen. Leila M. de Lima
5. Sen. Loren B. Legarda 21. Sen. Franklin "Frank" M. Drilon
6. Sen. Grace L. Poe 22. Sen. Richard "Dick" J. Gordon
7. Sen. Antonio "Sonny" F. Trillanes IV
8. Sen. Cynthia A. Villar 23. Sen. Francis Pancratius "Kiko" N.
9. Sen. Sherwin "Win" T. Gatchalian Pangilinan
10. Sen. Ana Theresia "Risa" N. Hontiveros
11. Sen. Panfilo "Ping" M. Lacson 24. Sen. Juan Edgardo "Sonny" M.
12. Sen. Emmanuel "Manny" D. Pacquiao Angara
13. Sen. Ralph G. Recto
14. Sen. Vicente "Tito" C. Sotto III
15. Sen. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
16. Sen. Juan Miguel "Migz" F. Zubiri
Out of twenty four Senators only eight are lawyers. It only means that only eight
senators can properly apply the law, specifically the rules on criminal proceeding and the
rules on evidence. These rules are very important in resolving a case, for example the
exclusionary rule, that no matter how material or relevant an evidence is, if illegally
acquired, is inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. According to former Justice
Isagani Cruz Impeachment proceeding are in the sense judicial and penal in nature,
hence, the constitutional rights of the accused as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights such as
45
due process and right against self-incrimination are available in impeachment
proceedings. 72 In order to render a correct judgment, the judge must carefully study the
case at hand, weigh the evidence presented by both parties and correctly apply the law.
Even after the judge carefully studies the case, he may still commit a wrong
verdict. The point of the matter is, if a judge who is competent and knowledgeable of
laws is capable of making wrong decision, how much more the members of the Senate
who are not judges. Thus, in order to rectify possible mistake of the Impeachment Court
and to achieve the ends of justice, the decision of the impeachment Court should be
reviewable by the Supreme Court.
One scenario in mind is, since the constitution provides that Judgment in cases of
impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification
to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment,
according to law. What if the tribunal having jurisdiction of the criminal and civil aspects
finds the impeached official not guilty of the impeachable offense charged, can the
tribunal nullify the decision of the Impeachment Court and order the reinstatement of the
Impeached Official? I think it cannot, and if that is the case, an official is removed from
his office for the crime he never committed. In order to avoid this complicated matter and
in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of the case the decision of the
Impeachment Court, as extraordinary case as it is, must de directly raised to the Supreme
Court.
72
Rolando Suarez, Political Law Reviewer p. 836
46
Chapter 6
Conclusion
To make it straight, I am neither against the Congress nor against the

Impeachment. In the contrary I support the Impeachment because it is legal way to
remove one in power without using force and to insure that a public office is still a public
trust. What concerns me is how it is used in the later years and the competency of the
persons deciding it. It is used by some powerful persons as a tool to remove one who
62tgoes against their path. Therefore, in order to give the impeached official at least a
fighting chance it is just proper and legal to raise the decision of the Impeachment Court
to the Supreme Court. An impeached official would rather like to trust his faith to
somebody else than to put it in the hands of his enemies.
If there is a political party which has a dominant member in both the House of
Representative and the House of Senate, it is easy to either initiate or prevent any
impeachment proceeding because impeachment proceeding is a matter of numbers. If
impeachment is already initiated and the same is sent in the Senate for Impeachment trial,
more likely than not you can already tell what the outcome would be by simply knowing
who filed the claim, who supported it and their political parties and the members of the
senate and their political parties without deeply studying the merit of the case. If such is
the case, it is only just that any decision of the Impeachment Court be questioned by the
impeached official to the Supreme Court and to have an unbiased judgment that every
accused deserves.
The competent and impartiality of the decision of the Impeachment Court may be
questionable. It is known to all that not all of the Senators are lawyers. The judgment of
one Senator must not base on the interest of his political party much more he must not be
influenced by his personal belief or interest. For a judgment to be correct it must be base
on careful and deep study of the case, taking into consideration facts and the evidence
presented by both parties. The Senator must rely only to pieces evidence not disqualified
by law. And in order to do this one must be knowledgeable of law. It is not enough that
one reads and understands the law but it requires a deeper study of what the law is and
47
how it is correctly apply, whom only lawyers and judges can fully understand. Even
lawyers and judges, who have a better grasp of the law, commit mistake what more those
who are not. To rectify any mistake that the Impeachment Court may commit, the
decision of the Impeachment Court must be reviewable by the Supreme Court.
It can be argued that Impeachment proceeding is an act of Congress expressly

delegated by the Constitution, thus, political in nature which the Court cannot interfere.
That such cannot be a subject of Judicial Review, for it will violates the doctrine of no
less than the Separation of Power.
However, the doctrine of Political question has been narrowed down by the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Section One of Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that the court may determine if there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. Therefore, it can be conclude that any act of the Congress even expressly
delegated by the Constitution is reviewable by the Supreme Court if there has been grave
abuse of discretion. The Court exercising Judicial Review does not violates the doctrine
of Separation of Power, it is a well settled rule that the court exercising judicial review
does not asserts superiority, it only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution. The court has the duty to see to it that Constitutional Supremacy
always prevails and no instrumentality of the government goes beyond the power given
to them by the Constitution.
The Court, in reviewing the decision of the Impeachment Court does not violates
the provision of the Constitution that states “The Senate shall have the sole power to try
and decide all cases of impeachment” applying the doctrine of Checks and Balance
which allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify
mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments. The Courts may declare the
acts of both the legislature and executive as unconstitutional or invalid so long as there is
grave abuse of discretion. This doctrine is expressly mirrored in Article VIII Section 1 of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution that says “The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
48
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”.
The Senator-judges of the Impeachment Court should not be alarmed or felt

humiliated if the Court reviews its decision. The Court is only performing the duties
mandated to it by the Constitution. If the Court finds no violation of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will be the first one to uphold the decision of the
Impeachment Court and declare it a valid and legal act. The Court guaranties that before
nullifying the act, it will act with outmost circumspection, bearing in mind the
consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of law of no less
than the doctrine of Separation of Power on the theory that before it was decided it was
carefully studied by the Senator-judges.
It is best for the Country to let the highest Court of the land be final arbiter to
decide whether the impeached official committed the impeachable offense in order to
avoid the Impeachment Court to be a venue of political attacks and harassments. After all
they are the most competent to say if the accused is guilty or not.
49
Chapter 7
Bibliography
"Supreme Court affirms DAP unconstitutionality". The Philippine Star. February 3, 2015.
“Record of the Constitutional Commission R.C.C. NO. 27” The 1986 Constitutional
Commission, created through Proclamation No. 9, s. 1986, was a body composed of 48
national, regional, and sectoral representatives who collectively drafted the current
Constitution of the Philippines. See: http://www.gov.ph/1986/07/10/r-c-c-no-27-
thursday-july-10-1986/
Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.139.
Calonzo, Andreo (September 25, 2013). "Jinggoy: P50M additional funds given to
senators who voted to convict Corona". GMA News Online. GMA Network.
Castaneda, Jing (September 30, 2013). "Recto, Osmena did not know purpose of
additional funds". ABS-CBN News.com.
Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 3, 2001.
Chan-Robles Virtual Law Library. "The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines - Article XI".
Compare Co. vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 520
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317 (1991).
David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006
Demeter, George (1969). Demeter's Manual of Parliamentary Law and Procedure, 1969
ed., p. 265
50
Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil 696
Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003.
Http://users2.unimi.it/dirpubesteuropa/2015/03/constitution-of-the-czech-republic/
Http://www.constitution.org/cons/croatia.htm
Http://www.constitution.org/cons/germany.txt
Http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/344680/news/nation/bong-revilla-pnoy-
personally-asked-me-to-convict-corona
Http://www.gov.ph/2013/07/24/rules-of-procedure-in-impeachment-proceedings/.
Http://www.lawphil.net/bulletin/n_011601.html
Http://www.vks.bg/english/vksen_p04_01.htm
Http://www.worldhistory.biz/modern-history/82291-impeachment.html
Https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment
Https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment_of_Merceditas_Gutierrez
Https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_EDSA_Revolution
Https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_South_Korea
Https://www.britannica.com/topic/impeachment
I. A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law (1988).
Infotech Foundation, et al vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, Central Lawbook Publishing, Co., Inc. 1991
Ed., p. 11
51
Labog-Javellana, Juliet; Ubac, Michael Lim; Bordadora, Norman (September 27,
2013). "Drilon confirms P50M pork barrel". Inquirer.net. Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997
Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137, 2 L.Ed. 60
Nixon v US 506 US 224
Punay, Edu (September 26, 2013). "I feel vindicated – Corona". Philstar.com. Philippine
Star.
Rolando Suarez, Political Law Reviewer p. 836
Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366 (1910)
Sinon vs. Civil Commission 215 SCRA 410, 416-17 (1992)
Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101.
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines - Article XI Section 2.
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article XI, Section 1-3.
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article VII, Section 1.
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article XI, Section 3(6).
The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines – Article II, Section 1.
Ubac, Michael Lim (September 29, 2013). "Post-impeachment pork: Drilon, Enrile top
list". Inquirer.net. Philippine Daily Inquirer.
US Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 3)
www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/PoliticalQuestionDoctrine.aspx
52

Decision of The Impeachment Court, Appealable or Not

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Decision of The Impeachment Court, Appealable or Not

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Decision of the Impeachment Court, Appealable or not.

Presented to the Faculty of the

University of St. La Salle University

Of the Requirements for the degree of

The decision of the Honorable Impeachment Court can be a valid subject of

The decision of the Honorable Impeachment Court is not a purely a Political

B. Impeachment in some other Countries…………………………………………9

C. Impeachment in the Philippines………………………………………………12

D. Philippine’s Impeachment Law………………………………………………14

E. Grounds for Impeachment…………………………………………………….16

F. Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceeding……………………………...17

G. Statement of the problem…………………………………………………..…23

A. Power of Judicial Review…………………………………………………….24

Impeachment, in common law, a criminal proceeding instituted against a public

In England impeachment originated in the 14th century, when it became a means

B. Impeachment in some other Countries

Impeachment in Bulgaria is applicable only to the President and the Vice

C. Impeachment in the Philippines

Impeachment in the Philippines follows procedures similar to the United States.

A main difference from US proceedings however is that only 1/3 of House

Former Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez was impeached by the House of

On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Gutierrez,

D. Philippine’s Impeachment Law28

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least

The Constitution limits the offenses to the following:

a) Culpable violation of the Constitution

It is willful, deliberate, wrongful and intentional breach of the Constitution, any

c) Bribery (RA 3019)

The Revised Penal Code defines bribery in two forms:

d) Graft and corruption (RA 3019)

According to special Committee of the House of Representatives, that

f) Betrayal of public trust

Is a new ground added by the Constitutional Commission as a catch-all to cover

F. Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceeding30

RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. – Impeachment shall be initiated by the

(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment fifed by at least one-third (1/3) of

Section 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. – A verified complaint for

Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. – Upon due referral,

Section 7. Protection to Complainants or Witnesses. – The House may, upon proper

Section 13. Endorsement of the Complaint/Resolution to the Senate. – A verified

The contents of the verification shall be as follows:

Adopted, 24 July 2013

G. Statement of the problem

Is the decision of the Impeachment Court be a valid subject of Judicial Review by

A. Power of Judicial Review

In Philippine setting the Power of Judicial Review is expanded by the 1987

To harmonize the conflicting provisions of the Constitution, it must be interpreted

To answer the question whether Impeachment proceeding is an exception to the

The interpretation of Former Associate Supreme Court Justice Isagani Cruz is

B. A deeper look to Article VIII, Section 1 of 1987 Philippine Constitution

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose,

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our

As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the

FR. BERNAS: On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away

MR. CONCEPCION: No.

FR. BERNAS: It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION: No, because whenever there is an abuse of