VI. A.
Upholding Integrity of the Profession for the family of complainant, spoke to the father of
TEODORO R. RIVERA VS. ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000
FACTS: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of
Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case. Rivera and
his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty.
Angeles received almost Php 50,000 from one of the
defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the
judgement against the latter. Atty. Angeles, however,
never told his clients of the amount he had received
and never remitted the same to him, leaving them to
discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his co-
plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Angeles.
HELD: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the
Court ruled that his act amounted to serious
misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of integrity and good moral character as
part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice of his
profession. For it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and
confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a
lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has
extended to his client but such right should not be
exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the
money intended for his clients. There should never be
an instance where the victor in litigation loses
everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. For
deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was
suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR. VS. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON,
JR. AND CRISPULO DUCUSIN
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified letter-complaint[1] for
disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.;
Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo Ducusin for deceit
and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyers
oath. Investigation proceeded only against
respondent Villalon because it was discovered that
Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo
Ducusin passed away on February 3, 1996.[2]
In the letter-complaint,[3] complainant alleged that
on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel
complainant and asked that he be given the title over
a property owned by complainant located in Pinugay,
Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT No. M-3023,
Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he
allegedly had to verify the proper measurements of
the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991,
however, complainant and his family were surprised
when several people entered the subject property
and, when confronted by the companions of
complainant, the latter were told that they were
workers of Canares and were there to construct a
piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay
authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but
respondent Canares did not appear before it and
continued with the construction of the piggery in the
presence of armed men who were watching over the
construction. Complainant then went to respondent
Villalon to complain about the people of respondent
Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against
respondent Canares. In his Reply however, the latter
answered that the subject property was already sold
by complainant to respondent Canares in the amount
of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and
notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo
Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred that he
never sold the property, signed any document nor
received any money therefor, and he also denied
having appeared before respondent Ducusin who
was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Complainant discovered that respondent Villalon
claimed that complainants father allegedly gave the
subject property to him (respondent Villalon) as
evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed
by complainant.
In his Comment,[4] respondent Villalon denied that
allegations of the complainant and in turn, he alleged
that the property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat,
Sr. to him out of close intimacy and for past legal
services rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with
the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr.,
allowed the subject property to be used by Andres
Canares to start a piggery business without any
monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land was then signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence
that he has conveyed the subject property to
respondent Villalon with the name of respondent
Canares included therein as protection because of
the improvements to be introduced in the subject
property. Upon presenting the title covering the
subject property, it was discovered that the property
was registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr. and not
Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon
and Canares not to worry because the land was
actually owned by him and that he merely placed the
name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then
suggested that the subject property be transferred
directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares;
hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed
that he would return the document already signed
and notarized, which he did the following
day. According to respondent Canares, the trouble
began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office
demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut
the trees inside the subject property by the caretaker
of respondent Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote[5] to this
Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of
Sale covering the subject property nor did he appear
before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who
notarized the same. He averred that respondents
Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the
practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned
for forging his signature and selling the subject
property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder[6], respondent Villalon denied the
allegations of complainant and maintained that he is
a member of good standing of the Integrated Bar and
that he has always preserved the high standards of
the legal profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his
willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by the
National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that
the subject property was orally given to him by Jose
Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the
conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that
the complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr.,
was the person who signed the said document for and
in his behalf and that this was done with his consent
and knowledge.
This Court referred[7] the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner
who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for two (2) years and likewise directed respondent
Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No.
M-3023 within ten (10) days from receipt of notice,
otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez are as follows:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified
in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner. The sincerity and demeanor they displayed
while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as
to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly,
respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part
of the complainant and his witness which can impel
them to institute the instant complaint and testify
falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of the
complainant and his witness deserves the
Commissions full faith and credence.
Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves
much to be desired. His defense (that he considered
himself the owner of the subject property which was
allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow
in the face of a welter of contravening and
incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is
complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent
(being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose
Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said
property unless the former is duly authorized by the
complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No
such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose
Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the
subject property to the respondent. This denial is not
too difficult to believe considering the fact that he
(Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought
to know that conveyance of a real property, whether
gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in
writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would
consider himself the owner of the subject property on
the basis of the verbal or oral giving of the property by
Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter
may have said that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for
the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant)
allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of
respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres
Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which
respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of
Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier
adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said
property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land is a falsified document as admitted by the
respondent himself when he said that the signature
over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of
Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a
lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the
act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes signature is
tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have
treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has
(sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying
on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject
property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of
note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously
denied having executed said document which denial
is not too difficult to believe in the light of the
circumstances already mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property
(Exh. 2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in
favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property
(which respondent claims he prepared upon
instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable
character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously
denied having executed said document. He claims
that he has never sold said property to Andres
Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has
never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to
subscribe to the document; and that he has never
received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the
consideration of said transaction. More importantly,
the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property was supplied by the respondent no less when
he admitted that there was no payment of
P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the
document only to make it appear that the
conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly,
and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to
know the irregularity of his act and that he should
have treated the document as another scrap of
worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to
substantiate his defense.[8]
After a careful consideration of the record of the
instant case, it appears that the findings of facts and
observations of the Investigating Commissioner,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all
adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the
same being supported by the evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers
to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A
lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any
misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor,
thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.[9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high
standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this
end, nothing should be done by any member of the
legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the profession.[10]
It has been established that the subject parcel of land,
with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio
Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in
the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat,
Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the
property was orally given to him by complainants
father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete
knowledge of the fact that the subject property
belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law,
however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled
real property must be in writing, signed by the
registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by
virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly
notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is
presumed to know, or ought to know, this
process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in
writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land,[11] purportedly in favor of Atty. Arsenio C.
Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr., respondent
Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed
the said document of sale without any Special Power
of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose
Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his
wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word Conforme. As
regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the same
property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres
Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that
there was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that
the said amount was placed in that document only to
make it appear that the conveyance was for a
consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant
Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and credible denial that he
allegedly sold the subject property to respondent
Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he
allegedly appeared before respondent notary public
Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalons acts
herein complained of which constitute gross
misconduct were duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded
by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a
member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and
comport himself in such a manner that would promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. Members of the Bar are expected to
always live up to the standards of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney
and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
utmost fidelity and good faith.[12]
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of
two (2) years suspension to be imposed upon
respondent Atty. Villalon too severe in the light of the
facts obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces
vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera,[13] this Court suspended
therein respondent Atty. Aportadera for a period of
two (2) years from the practice of law for two main
reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the preparation and
notarization of the falsified sale of his clients property
merits the penalty of suspension imposed on him by
the IBP Board of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent
misrepresented himself to Gregorio Licuanan as being
duly authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2)
it was respondent who prepared the various deeds of
sale over Isabels subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already
confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4,
1980, the deeds date of execution; (4) respondent
knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila
when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel
died in Metro Manila soon after her confinement; and
(6) he did not give the seller a copy of the questioned
deed of sale.[14]
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case
of Aportadera, the record does not show that
respondent Villalon had any direct participation in the
notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo
Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property
dated December 5, 1991,[15] which was supposedly
signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however,
strongly denied having signed the same. The earlier
Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated this ___day of
October 1991, allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr.,
as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of
respondent Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares,
Jr. was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose
Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father
and son and that they live in the same house at 912
Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed
that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a
number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON,
JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct, and he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to
deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose
Ducat Jr., the latters TCT No. M-3023 covering the
subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from
receipt of this Decision, at his sole expense; and that
failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.
Villalons personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
PURISIMA BARBA VS. HECTOR PEDRO, RESPONDENT.
FERNANDO, J.:
Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the
1956 examinations, having obtained an average of
81.16%, but thus far unsuccessful in his efforts to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath, which had to be
deferred because of a complaint for immorality filed
against him by Purisima Barba, reiterates his plea for
admission to the bar. It is unquestioned that he had
amorous relations with the complainant resulting in the
birth of a child. He failed, however, to marry her,
having thereafter chosen another woman for his bride.
After the lapse of eighteen years, and considering that
his conduct in the meanwhile has not on the whole
shown to be blameworthy, this Court feels that he has
sufficiently atoned for that youthful indiscretion, having
in mind likewise, that people of prominence in the
municipality where he resides, did intercede on his
behalf. Accordingly the long-sought privilege of
membership in the bar will not be denied him any
longer, but with this caveat. He must comply with his
moral and legal obligation to his child born out of
wedlock with complainant Purisima Barba.
He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates
back to January 15, 1969: "In the matter of the petition
of Hector S. Pedro to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar, alleging that while he passed the bar
examinations given by this Court in 1956 with an
average of 81.16%, he was not permitted to take his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar by reason of
an administrative complaint against him filed with this
Court be a Miss Purisima Barba of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, the complaint alleging immorality in that
petitioner, sometime in July, 1953, came to her house
and with lewd designs succeeded in gratifying his
carnal desires, an act repeated thereafter on three
different occasions accompanied by pledges to
marry, as a result of which a child was born on April 23,
1954, a matter which when investigated resulted in a
report that the complaint was well-grounded,
petitioner being prevented thus from taking his oath;
the present petition alleging further that petitioner is
now married to Mrs. Estela U. Pedro, a public school
teacher of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and that from
January 4, 1960 up to the present, he has been
employed as community development worker with
the Presidential Arm on Community Development
(PACD) that he has since then conducted himself well
in his relations with the community as well as in the
performance of his duties as such official, attaching to
his petition certifications of his good behavior from the
Municipal Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the
Provincial Development Officer of the PACD, the
President of the San Nicolas Bar Association, and the
Grand Knight of the Knights of Columbus of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a resolution of the Ilocos
Norte Bar Association and likewise enclosing an
affidavit of complainant Miss Purisima Barba attesting
to petitioner's good conduct and behavior and
expressing that she no longer has any opposition to his
taking his oath as a lawyer this Court resolved to defer
action on such petition until petitioner has given
satisfactory proof to this Court as to the action
subsequently pursued by him with reference to the
child who was born out of his relations with
complainant Miss Purisima Barba."1 Thereafter came
this resolution of February 26, 1969: "Hector S. Pedro
having offered proof as to the action subsequently
pursued by him with reference to the child who was
born out of his relations with complainant Purisima
Barba, in compliance with the resolution of January
15, 1969, [the Court resolved] to allow respondent
Hector S. Pedro to take the lawyer's
oath."2Unfortunately, before he could do so in
accordance with the above resolution, there was a
letter from the aforesaid complainant Purisima Barba
objecting to his taking his oath as a lawyer, premised
on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as to
her withdrawal of her opposition to his membership in
the bar did not represent her true feelings.
Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the
effectivity of its previous resolution of February 26,
1969, which would have allowed him to take the
lawyer's oath. Moreover, he was required to
comment. This he did in a pleading submitted on
March 28, 1969. He denied the allegation of falsity
concerning the affidavit of complainant. This Court
then, in another resolution of April 8, 1969, referred the
matter to its Legal Officer, Ricardo Paras Jr., for
investigation and report. A report was submitted on
August 26, 1969. It stated that after a careful
evaluation of the testimony given by the complainant
and the respondent, the conclusion is warranted that
complainant "had all along thought that the
document Exhibit "A" was an affidavit of recognition of
their daughter, Imelda, and definitely not an affidavit
of withdrawal of her opposition to Mr. Pedro's
admission to the Philippine Bar."3 The parties were
heard on the matter on January 19, 1970, with the
complainant standing fast on her firm resolve to
prevent respondent from taking the lawyer's oath. That
attitude she has maintained all this while. It remains
her deep conviction that respondent lacks good
moral character, as proven by his failure to marry her
"after having carnal knowledge of her." As she pointed
out in her last pleading dated July 5, 1972: "The
respondent was twenty seven years old when he
committed the acts complained of and he was very
much qualified to marry the complainant herein, but
he did not comply with his promise to march her to the
altar. Instead he married another
woman."4
It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left
much to be desired. He had committed a
transgression, if not against the law, against the high
moral standard requisite for membership in the bar. He
had proven false to his word. What is worse, he did
sully her honor. This on the one side. On the other
hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of
the 1956 examinations. He was a successful bar
candidate but because of this lapse from moral
propriety, he has not been allowed to take the
lawyer's oath. It likewise appears, from the testimonials
submitted, that he has behaved rather well. At least,
no other misdeed has been attributed to him. There is
no affront to reason then in ruling that the punishment,
while deserved, has lasted long enough. He has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution has been
exacted, He has expiated for his offense. It is
understandable that the bitterness in the heart of
complainant cannot easily be erased, but that should
not prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes
prescribe after a certain period.5 Moreover, as the
transgression resulted from the frailty of flesh, the
sociologist MacIver referring to it as "so powerful an
appetite," an imperative of life closely associated with
the "recklessness and the caprice of desire,"6 this Court
feels that all the years he has been denied the
privilege of being a lawyer would satisfy the
requirement that failure to live up to the requisite
moral standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also
be said that in offenses of this character, the blame
hardly belongs to the man alone.7
It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro,
however, that while his plea to take the lawyer's oath
is to be granted, it is indispensable, if he expects to be
a member of the bar in good standing, that he
complies with the moral and legal obligation
incumbent upon him as the father of the child born
out of wedlock as a result of his relationship with
complainant Purisima Barba.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969,
suspending a previous resolution of February 26, 1969,
is set aside and in accordance therewith, respondent
Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take the lawyer's oath as
was provided in the February 26, 1969 resolution.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF
TELESFORO DIAO VS. SEVERINO MARTINEZ
FACTS:
DIAO was admitted to the Bar.
2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for the Bar examination,
that he had the requisite academic qualifications.
Solicitor General investigated and recommended that
Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys
i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:
1. Did not complete his high school training
2. Never attended Quisumbing College
3. Never obtained a diploma.
DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although
he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of the U.S. Army, passed the General
Classification Test given therein, which (according to
him) is equivalent to a high school diploma
Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd
and 4th year high school.
No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on
this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious:
i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing
College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A.
graduate.
ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title
from the Arellano University in April, 1949
1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as
a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school
records.
ISSUE:
WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for
passing the Bar despite not completing pre-law
requirements? NO.
HELD:
STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO
REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA WITHIN
30 DAYS.
Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.
Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A.
from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed
that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six
months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.
He would not have been permitted to take the bar
tests:
i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That
previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education (A.A.).
ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the
bar examinations
iii. Such admission having been obtained under
false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked.
Passing such examinations is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential.
IN RE INVESTIGATION OF ANGEL J. PARAZO FOR
ALLEGED LEAKAGE OF QUESTIONS IN SOME SUBJECTS IN
THE 1948 BAR EXAMINATIONS.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item
prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J.
Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star
Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that
appeared on the front page of the issue of September
14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in
large letters — "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS,"
followed by another in slightly smaller letters —
"Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One
School Favored," under the name — "By Angel J.
Parazo of the Star Reporter Staff." For purposes of
reference we quote the news item in full:
Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar
examinations were denounced by some of the law
graduates who took part in the tests, to the Star
Reporter this morning.
These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph
copies of the questions in one subject, days before the
tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.
Only students of one private university in Sampaloc
had those mimeographed questions on said subject
fully one week before the tests.
The students who made the denunciation to the Star
Reporter claim that the tests actually given were
similar in every respect to those they had seen
students of this private university holding proudly
around the city.
The students who claim to have seen the tests which
leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court
institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find
out the source of the leakage, and annul the test
papers of the students of the particular university
possessed of those tests before the examinations.
The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the
bar examinations came close on the heels of the
revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of
the student body of the University of the Philippines, on
recent government tests wherein the questions had
come into the possession of nearly all the graduates of
some private technical schools.
To the publication, evidently, the attention of the
Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr.
Justice Padilla, who had previously been designated
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this
year, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de
la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E.
Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for
questioning and investigation. In this connection, and
for purposes of showing the interest of the Supreme
Court in the news item and its implications, it may here
be stated that this Court is and for many years has
been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every
year, including that of this year, held in August, 1948.
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the
Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law, and
pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court
conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a
Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of
the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report
of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to
the practice of law, the candidates and examinees
who have passed the examinations.
The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on
September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified
under oath and, answering questions directed to him
by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the
author of the news item; that he wrote up the story
and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of
public service; and that he knew the persons who
gave him the information which formed the basis of his
publication but that he declined to reveal their names
because the information was given to him in
confidence and his informants did not wish to have
their identities revealed. The investigators informed
Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the
confidence of the public in the regularity and
cleanliness of the Bar Examinations and also in the
Supreme Court which conducted said examinations,
and repeatedly appealed to his civic spirit and sense
of public service, pleading with and urging him to
reveal the names of his informants so that the
Supreme Court may be in a position to start and
conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify
their charge and complaint and take action against
the party or parties responsible for the alleged
irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo
consistently refused to make the revelation.
In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was
appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice
in the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to
succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the
Committee of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was
appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this
opinion was furnished a copy of the transcript of the
investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and
he made a report thereof to the Court in banc,
resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court
dated October 7, 1948, which reads as follows:
In relation with the news item that appeared in the
front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14,
1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar
examination questions, which examinations were held
in August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner,
and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized
by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the
committee of bar examiners to conduct an
investigation thereof, particularly to receive the
testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter
responsible for and author of said news item. An
investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948;
stenographic notes were taken of the testimony of Mr.
Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, the
new chairman of the committee of bar examiners, has
submitted the transcript of said notes for the
consideration of this Court.
From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr.
Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined and
refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed
to have given him the data and information on which
his news item was based, despite the repeated
appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his
cooperations, in order to enable this Court to conduct
a thorough investigation of the alleged bar
examination anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr.
Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him,
explain to him that the interests of the State demand
and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or
sources of his information and of his news item, and to
warn him that his refusal to make the revelation
demanded will be regarded as contempt of court
and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor
will advise the Court of the result.
Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion
cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13,
1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly
explained to him that the interest of the State
demands and this court requires that he reveal the
source of sources of his information and of his news
item; that this was a very serious matter involving the
confidence of the people in general and the law
practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the
regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations;
that it also involves the good name and reputation of
the bar examiners who are appointed by this Court to
prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass
upon and correct the examinations questions and last
but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the
confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme
Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It
was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is
keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly
and leakage of the examination questions and is
determined to punish the party or parties responsible
therefor but that without his help, specially the
identities of the persons who furnished him the
information and who could give the court the
necessary data and evidence, the Court could not
even begin the investigation because there would be
no basis from which to start, not even a clue from
which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told
that under the law he could be punished if he refused
to make the revelation, punishment which may even
involve imprisonment.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was
advised to think it over and consider the
consequences, and if he need time within which to do
this and so that he might even consult the editor and
publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be
given an extension of time, and at his request, the
investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On
that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel,
Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in
the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen,
Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz,
and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr.
Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under
oath, but he declined and refused to make the
revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before
this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be
accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first
obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day,
October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney
Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his
client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the
first section of which reads as follows:
SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited
reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of
general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal
the source of any news-report or information
appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless
the court or a House or committee of Congress finds
that such revelation is demanded by the interest of
the state.
This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and
mature consideration, involving as it does interesting
and important points of law as well as questions of
national importance. Counsel contends that the
phrase "interest of the state" found at the end of
section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only
to the security of the state, that is to say — that only
when National Security or public safety is involved,
may this Court compel the defendant to reveal the
source or sources of his news report or information. We
confess that it was not easy to decide this legal
question on which the conviction or acquittal of
Parazo hinges. As a matter of facts, the vote of the
Justice is not unanimous.
In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature
that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the
Senate were it originated, we examined the record of
the proceedings in said legislative body when this Act,
then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We
gathered from the said record that the original bill
prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity
to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any
newspaper was absolute and that under no
circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the
source of his information or news report. The
committee, however, under the chairmanship of
Senator Cuenco inserted an amendment or change,
by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless
the court finds that such revelation is demanded by
the public interest."
When the bill as amended was recommended for
approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the
author of the original bill proposed an amendment by
eliminating the clause added by the committee —
"unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest," claiming that said
clause would kill the purposed of the bill. This
amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various
Senators objected to the elimination of the clause
already referred to on the ground that without such
exception and by giving complete immunity to
editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be
committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee chairman, in
advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment,
and in defending the exception embodied in the
amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting
in the clause: "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the public interest," said
that the Committee could not accept the Sotto
amendment because there may be cases, perhaps
few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of
the state required that the names of the informants be
published or known. He gave as one example a case
of a newspaperman publishing information referring to
a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He argued
that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman
should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto
amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-
free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it
was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed
another amendment by changing the phrase "public
interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the
Committee be changed to and substituted by the
phrase "interest of the state," claiming that the phrase
public interest was too elastic. Without much
discussion this last amendment was approved, and
this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.
In view of the contention now advanced, that the
phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases
involving the "security of the state" or "public
safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the
last amendment proposed by Senator Sotto, changing
the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state,"
was approved without much discussion. But we notice
from the records of the deliberations on and discussion
of the bill in the Senate that the phrase "public interest"
was used interchangeably by some Senators with the
phrase "interest of the state." For instance, although
the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by
Senator Cuenco, used the words "public interest,
"when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the
Senate he used in his speech or remarks the phrase
"interest of the State" (interes del Estado). Again,
although the bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco
Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the
words "public interest, "Senator Sebastian referred to
the exception by using the phrase "interest of the
state." This understanding of at least two of the
Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the
similarity or interchangeability of the two phrases
"public interest" and "interest of the estate," may
account for the readiness or lack of objection on the
part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto
amendment, to accept the second Sotto
amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to
"interest of the state."
In referring to a case wherein the security of the state
or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the
plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously
giving it only as an example of what he meant by
"interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only
case or example. We do not propose to define or fix
the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;"
but we can say that the phrase "interest of the state"
can not be confined and limited to the "security of the
state" or to "public safety" alone. These synonymous
phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety,"
— are not uncommon terms and we can well presume
that the legislators were familiar with them. The
phrase "public safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5)
of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that
"the privacy of communications and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court or whenpublic safety and order require
otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same
Constitution provided that the President may suspend
the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of
invasion, insurrection, etc., when thepublic
safety requires it.
The phrase "National Security" is used at the beginning
of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, —
Crimes against National Security and the law of
Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes against National Security.
Then, more recently, the phrase "National Security"
was used in section 2, and the phrase "public
security" was equally used in section 19, of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People's
Court, promulgated on September 25, 1945. If, as
contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the
Philippine Senate, had meant to limit the exception to
the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where
the "security of the state," i.e., "National Security" is
involved, it could easily and readily have used such
phrase or any one of similar phrases like "public
safety," "National Security," or "public security" of which
it must have been familiar. Since it did not do so, there
is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind
and intent of the legislators, and that, in using the
phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope
and the limits of the exception when a
newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to
reveal the sources of his information.
The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and
extensive. It is of course more general and broader
than "security of the state." Although not as broad and
comprehensive as "public interest" which may include
most anything though of minor importance, but
affecting the public, such as for instance, the
establishment and maintenance of barrio roads,
electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the
phrase "interest of the estate" even under a
conservative interpretation, may and does include
cases and matters of national importance in which
the whole state and nations, not only a branch or
instrumentality thereof such as a province, city or
town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be
affected, such as the principal functions of
Government like administration of justice, public
school system, and such matters like social justice,
scientific research, practice of law or of medicine,
impeachment of high Government officials, treaties
with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate
branches of the Government, their relations to each
other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.
We are satisfied that the present case easily comes
under the phrase "interest of the state." Under
constitutional provision, article VIII, section 13,
Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court
takes charge of the admission of members to the
Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed
the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar
Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the
subject of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the
Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who
prepare the questions, then correct the examination
papers submitted by the examinees, and later make
their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar
Examination candidates who are found to have
obtained to passing grade are admitted to the Bar
and licensed to practice law. There are now
thousands of members of the Philippine Bar, scattered
all over the Philippines, practicing law or occupying
important Government posts requiring membership in
the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a
number, sometimes several hundreds, are added to
the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine
Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for
the legal profession, both in academic preparation
and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair
dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers
themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is
to admit to the practice of this noble profession only
those persons who are known to be honest, possess
good moral character, and show proficiency in and
knowledge of the law by the standard set by this
Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in
the regular and usual manner. It is of public
knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the
conditions obtaining in this country, or the great
demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as
compared to other professions, is the most popular in
these islands. The predominantly greater number of
members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as
compared to those of other learned professions, attest
to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind is
that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to
the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships
and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal
departments of the Government, draw exclusively
from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any
charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar
Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and
general interest and national importance.
If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some
reason or another, find their way out and get into the
hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are
actually given, and as a result thereof some
examinees succeed in illegally and improperly
obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to
the Bar and to the practice of law, when otherwise
they should not be, then the present members of the
legal profession would have reason to resent and be
alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long
before the legal profession will have fallen into
disrepute. The public would naturally lose confidence
in the lawyers, specially in the new ones, because a
person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or
to defend himself before it would not know whether a
particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has
legally passed the Bar Examinations because of
sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and
that he is honest, or whether he was one of those who
had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination
questions in advance, passed the Bar Examinations
illegally, and then started his legal career with this act
of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar examinees who, by
intense study and conscientious preparations, have
honestly passed the Bar Examinations and are
admitted to practice law, would be affected by this
anomaly, because they would ever be under a cloud
of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public,
they might be among those who had made use of Bar
Examination questions obtained before hand. And,
incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of students
and graduates of the different law schools, studying
law and later preparing for the Bar Examinations,
would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may
be born the idea that there is no need of much law
study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and
not difficult to obtain copies of questions before the
examinations and pass them and be admitted to the
Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the
Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who
in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have
consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at
the request and designation of this Court. They would
be suspected, — one or two or more of them — that
through negligence, or connivance, or downright
corruption, they have made possible the release if
they have not themselves actually released, before
examination day, the questions they had prepared.
The employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the
Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or
mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar
examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly,
and more important still, the Supreme Court itself
which has to overall supervision and control over the
examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of
which the confidence of the people in this High
Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this
Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might be
affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital
importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently
cause the present case to fall and be included within
the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state,"
involving as it does, not only the interests of students
and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and
of the entire legal profession of this country as well as
the good name and reputation of the members of the
Committee of Bar Examiners, including the employees
of the Supreme Court having charge of and
connections with said examinations, but also the
highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one
of the three coordinate and independent branches or
departments of the Philippine Government.
In support of if not in addition to the power granted by
section 1 of Republic Act. No. 53 to this Court, we
have the inherent power of courts in general, specially
of the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial
Department, to adopt proper and adequate
measures to preserve their integrity, and render
possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions,
including, as in the present case, the investigation of
charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials
and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers
of the Court. (Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 350;
21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the
revelation demanded of the respondent, of the
identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to
the investigation of the charge contained in the
publication already mentioned.
It will be noticed from Parazo's news item as quoted in
the first part of this decision, that, informants, law
graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the
supposed anomaly — consisting of the alleged
leakage of the Bar Examination questions — to the
Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons
really meant and intended to make a bona fide and
effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the
right place to air their grievance was the Supreme
Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted
an investigation, they should have come forward and
furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which
to base and from which to start an investigation,
instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain
of press immunity.
Examining the news item in question, it is therein
claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in
at least one subject had been obtained and used by
bar examinees coming from a certain university, one
week before the examinations were actually held.
Parazo in his statements and answers during the
investigation said that examination questions in several
subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or
copies of said examination questions were furnished
us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said
alleged copies of examination questions; that they
were actually and carefully compared with the
legitimate examination questions given out on the day
of the examination and found to be identical; no one
is ready and willing to reveal the identity of the
persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with
the said Bar Examination questions, although they as
well as the university where they came from, was
known; and even the law subjects to which the
questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we
are not allowed to know even the identity of
respondent Parazo's informants who claim to have
seen all these things.
In this connection it may be stated that in the las Bar
Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately nine
hundred candidates took them, each candidate
writing his answers in a book for each subject. There
were eight subjects, each belonging to and
corresponding to each one of the eight bar
examiners. There were therefore eight sets of bar
examination questions, and multiplying these eight
sets of questions by nine hundred candidates, gives a
total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200)
examination papers involved, in the hand of eight
different examiners. The examination books or papers
bear no names or identifications of their writers or
owners and said ownership and identification will not
be known until the books or papers are all corrected
and graded. Without definite assurance based on
reliable witnesses under oath that the alleged
anomaly had actually been committed, — evidence
on the identity of the persons in possession of the
alleged copies of questions prematurely released or
illegally obtained and made use of, the law subjects
or subjects involved, the university from which said
persons come, this Court does not feel capable of or
warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and
desperately revising each and every one of the 7,200
examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of
finding any similarity or identity in the answers of any
group of examinees and basing thereon any definite
finding or conclusion. Apart from the enormity of the
task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and
cannot base its findings and conclusions, especially in
any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on
that kind of evidence. Under these circumstances, this
Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is
unable to conduct, nay, even start, an investigation;
and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the
identities of his informants, and those informants and
or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and
cooperate with the Court in its endeavor to further
examine and probe into the charges contained in the
news items, said charges are considered and held to
be without basis, proof or foundation.
When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the
respondent herein that he reveal the names of his
informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere
idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to
start an investigation because it is vitally interested in
keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board
and specially, not only to protect the members of the
Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the
public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar
Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of
this Court in preparing the examination questions and
correcting the examination papers, but also, as
already stated, to keep the confidence of the people
in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its
function relative to the admission to the practice of
law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar
Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and
punishing those found guilty, even annulling
examinations already held, or else declaring the
charges as not proven, if, as a result of the
investigation, it is found that there is insufficiency or
lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent
that he reveal the sources of his information, this Court
did not intend to punish those informants or hold them
liable. It merely wanted their help and cooperation. In
this Court's endeavor to probe thoroughly the
anomaly, or irregularity allegedly committed, it was its
intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to
punish the guilty parties, if the charges are found to be
true, but also even to annul the examinations
themselves, in justice to the innocent parties who had
taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this
because in every examination, whether conducted
by the Government or by a private institution, certain
standards are unconsciously adopted on which to
base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of
the correction of many or all of the examination
papers, it is found that only very few have passed it,
the examiner might reasonably think that the
questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to
understand, or too long, as a result of which he may
be more liberal and be more lenient and make
allowances. On the hand, if too many obtain passing
grade, the examiner may think that the examination
questions were too easy and constitute an
inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and
training required to be a lawyer, and so he may raise
his standard and become more strict in his correction
of the papers and his appreciation of the answers. So,
in a case where examinees, especially if many,
succeed in getting hold of questions long before
examinations day, and study and prepare the answers
to those questions, it may result that when the
examiner finds that many of the examinees have
easily and correctly answered the questions, he may
think that said questions were too easy, raise the
standard by being strict in his correction of the papers,
thereby giving a grade below passing to a number of
examinees who otherwise would have validly passed
the examinations.
In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in
the present case demands that the respondent Angel
J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his
information which formed the basis of his news items or
story in the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star
Reporter, quoted at the beginning of his decision, and
that, in refusing to make the revelation which this
Court required of him, he committed contempt of
Court. The respondent repeatedly stated during the
investigation that he knew the names and identities of
the persons who furnished him the information. In other
words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act
commanded by this Court which is yet in his power to
perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.)Ordinarily,
in such cases, he can and should be imprisoned
indefinitely until he complied with the demand.
However, considering that case like the present are
not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that
there is no reason and immediate necessity for
imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other
cases where it is advisable or necessary to mete out
severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming
number of cases of a certain offense or a crime wave,
and, considering further the youthful age of the
respondent, the majority of the members of this Court
have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his
immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period
of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that
period he makes to this Court the revelation
demanded of him. So ordered.
together with a woman and a child who was later
identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and
Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. xxxx
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I
was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the
child, stating among others that the said child is their
daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and
Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at
Hongkong sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal
home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at
their residence x x x

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO VS. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed
and ROMANA P. VALENCIA
and still failing to give us our needed financial support
to the prejudice of our children who stopped
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-
schooling because of financial constraints.
affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E.
xxxx
Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia
(Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging
his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty.
them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit
Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their
states:
immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but
also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido
sleepless nights; x x x
by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San
Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was
solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied
Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us
defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal
blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth,
wife, as he was already married to Constancia David
Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel
(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He
Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed
claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
Garrido;
Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that
Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his
3. xxxx
bad boy image before she married him in 1962. As he
and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with
financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia.
our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine
He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he
confided to me that sometime on the later part of
confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his
1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that
personal problems and his financial difficulties with his
the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and
second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to
dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth,
give financial support to his children with Maelotisea,
also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the
in private schools; all graduated from college except
Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila
for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary
course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had
not been employed and had not practiced her
profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were
contracted before he became a member of the bar
on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted
after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977.
Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before
he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that
she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained
that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido
since the marriage between them was void from the
beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty.
Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that
Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between
her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and
Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent
about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had
maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia)
financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his
second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea
was not a proper party to this suit because of her
silence; she kept silent when things were favorable
and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that
Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the
following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of
Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal complaint for
concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty.
Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for
lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss[8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty.
Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since
Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido,
the respondents argued that she had no personality to
file her complaints against them.The respondents also
alleged that they had not committed any immoral act
since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a
widower, and the acts complained of were
committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this
motion.[9]
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the
complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing
that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with
Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6)
children.[10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
likewise denied this motion.[11]
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan)
submitted her Report and Recommendation for the
respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of
Governors) approved and adopted this
recommendation with modification under Resolution
No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in
part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited
conduct which lacks the degree of morality required
as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the
case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion
under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18,
2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through
the present petition for review. He submits that under
the circumstances, he did not commit any gross
immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also
argues that the offenses charged have prescribed
under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed
on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession;
he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his
promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life
notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25,
2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal),
Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her
Comment on the petition. She recommends a
modification of the penalty from disbarment to
reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very
harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido
took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his
ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his
bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that
no other administrative case has ever been filed
against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the
findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty.
Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with
respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure
such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the
filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do
not apply in the determination of a lawyers
qualifications and fitness for membership in the
Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no
reason to depart from this ruling.[14] First, admission to
the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the
public.[15] The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into through
this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in
the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her
own;[16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a
witness who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed
between the immoral acts charged and the filing of
the complaint is not material in considering the
qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for
admission to the practice of law, and his continuing
qualification to be a member of the legal
profession. From this perspective, it is not important
that the acts complained of were committed before
Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the
possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession. Admission to the
bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry,
upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before
he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the
applicant has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary even after admission to the
Bar.[19]
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the
Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the
Court over the members of the Bar to be merely
incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit
applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the
implementation of this constitutional authority
is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which
expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit,
grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that
he is required to take before admission to the practice
of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice
of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a
public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or
abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have
stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note further
that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she
had presented her evidence; her evidence are now
available for the Courts examination and
consideration, and their merits are not affected by her
desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to
disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but
solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of
concern for her personal financial interest in
continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to
the opinion of the upright and respectable members
of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when
it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree,
or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys
sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions as
the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.[22]
In several cases, we applied the above standard in
considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful
second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent
lawyer entered into multiple marriages and
subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We
ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct
undermined the institutions of marriage and family
institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of
our children, for the development of values essential
to the survival and well-being of our communities, and
for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this
light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the
wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer
married the complainant while his marriage with his
first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents
act of contracting the second marriage was contrary
to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of
good moral character required by the Rules of Court
disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco,
Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of
his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made
a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that
demands respect and dignity. We also declared his
act of contracting a second marriage contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the
evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that
warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only
corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the
highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to
pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the
marriage, he had romantic relationships with other
women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that
the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife;
marriage and the study of law are not mutually
exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a
bachelor, when in truth he was already married to
Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as
an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited
relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage
with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his
first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of
an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair
with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in
place and without taking into consideration the moral
and emotional implications of his actions on the two
women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by
his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his
marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who
bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and
convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer)
that he was free to marry, considering that his
marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty.
Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an
apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union
entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty.
Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were
both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with
two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10)
years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his
marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position
advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an
act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of
mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal
knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by
having his second marriage declared void after the
present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations
relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations
of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of
the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required
of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers
oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[30] all of which commonly require him
to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea,
he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this
second marriage while his first marriage with
Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his
bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage
to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession,
specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido
with the expectation and that he would set a good
example in promoting obedience to the Constitution
and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted
it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish
motives, he discredited the legal profession and
created the public impression that laws are mere tools
of convenience that can be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this
case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted
relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar
to live up to the standards and norms expected of the
legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles
embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the
watchful public eye and community
approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose
conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have
to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings,
accordingly penalized.[34]
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating
Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be
administratively liable under the circumstances for
gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not
yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married
shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for
good moral character is required as a condition
precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no
distinction whether the misconduct was committed in
the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life.
Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was
void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from
responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of
the respondent was subsequently declared null and
void the fact remains that respondents exhibited
conduct which lacks that degree of morality required
of them as members of the Bar.[35]
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that
corresponds to objective reality.[36] To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he
or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion
generally entertained about a person or the estimate
in which he or she is held by the public in the place
where she is known.[37] The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely:
(1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public
image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients;
and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the
other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that
prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already
knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to
Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already
had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante,
she was under the moral duty to give him proper
advice; instead, she entered into a romantic
relationship with him for about six (6) years during the
subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married
Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an
outstanding second marriage. These circumstances,
to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked
good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a
person possessed of high moral values, whose
confidential advice was sought by another with
respect to the latters family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic
liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby
effectively alienating the other persons feelings and
affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos
marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact
remains that he took a man away from a woman who
bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would
have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos
advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-
married man with both marriages subsisting at that
time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the
very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty.
Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia,
away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea
and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty.
Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido
even left his second family and six children for a third
marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality
even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed
belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry
Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict
legal sense and was later on confirmed by the
declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to
Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of
this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be
married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given
that this marriage transpired before the declaration of
the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can
only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine
marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of
celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite
Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty.
Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity
to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the
celebration of their marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us
to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in
Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard,
we cannot help but note that
Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her
surname instead of using the surname of her
husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind
that her husband did not live and cohabit with her
under one roof, but with his second wife and the
family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did
not mind at all sharing her husband with another
woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty.
Valencias perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality,
we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her
actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal
act, for she married a man who, in all appearances,
was married to another and with whom he has a
family. Her actions were also unprincipled and
reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of
Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during
the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As
already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could
not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of
shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she
professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped
the second family build a house prior to her marriage
to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her
husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her
behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited
the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a
lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v.
Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the
court, must not only be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and
must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to
live up to these standards before she was admitted to
the bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the
lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of
lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from
Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia
for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the
respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is
one to be exercised with great caution and only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as a legal
professional and as an officer of the Court.[42]
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence
on hand that the present case is one of them. The
records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral
misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental
and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify
them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on
lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for
compassion and his act of supporting his children with
Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his
plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his
oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility overrides what under other
circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long
period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic
and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot
simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of
the legal profession and without placing the integrity
of the administration of justice into question. She was
not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but
a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle
whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves
to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of
law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath;
and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice
of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names
of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the
Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
EVANGELINE ARGAÑOZA VS. BENITO P. TUBACES
FERNANDO, J.:
Complainant Evangeline Argañoza sent a telegram to
this Court on April 7, 1970 requesting that "the oath-
taking of Atty. Benito P. Tubaces be held in
abeyance." It was therein further stated that the
reason relied upon was immorality and that a letter
would follow. Subsequently, four days later, a letter
duly subscribed and sworn by the complainant was
receivedby this Court. It was therein alleged: "In 1966, I
agreed to live with Benito who was then a sophomore
student in Cebu and we had a child. Per his request, I
left with our kid in July 1967 so he can muster the usual
financial support from his parents. As agreed I
sacrificed almost two years of painful
seclusionalthough, I received constant
communication from him as he likewise did from me.
We saw each other again in 1968 when he came to
Manila for his review and participation in the bar
examinations. In November of the same year,
however, he returned to his home province, leaving
me and the kid behind giving flimsy excuse the
uncertainty of his passing in the exam."1 The next
paragraph of such letter was worded thus: "He did
flunk in the first exam and having decidedto take the
next, he further requested me to stop communicating
with him untilthe examination was over. I wrote him
several letters immediately after especially when I
delivered our second baby but I constantly faced a
blank wall. This never put me off, though. Instead, my
eagerness to hear from him kept on mounting until
that eventful day came — the release of the results
ofthe bar examinations. He made the grade this time
and I was no more glad than my folks. We sent him
two congratulatory messages and again we were
disappointed to hear no word from him."2This Court
was likewise informed therein that they met
accidentally, on which occasion she tried to convince
him that they should live together but instead of
agreeing, his proposal was just to get the two children
to live with him and for them to separate for
good.3 She would plead then that "he be barred from
membership in the Philippine Bar."
This Court, on April 16, 1970, resolved: "... (a) to note
the contents of the telegram of Evangeline Argañoza
requesting that the oath-taking of Benito P. Tubaces
be withheld on the ground of immorality; (b) to require
that a copyof the letter of Evangeline Argañoza be
sent to Benito P. Tubaces and (c) require respondent
Tubaces to answer said letter-complaint, within 10
daysfrom notice hereof."4 Instead of answering,
respondent Benito P. Tubaces waited until August 26,
1970 when he filed a petition alleging that
complainantwas retracting or withdrawing her
complaint and that therefore he should be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath. Enclosed in such petition is a
letter signedby Evangeline Argañoza where, after
referring to the complaint filed by her against
respondent, there was this declaration of retraction or
withdrawal. Thus: "Without pressure nor influence
exerted upon me, I voluntarily, irrevocably, and
unconditionally retract or withdraw the said complaint
on theground that we have applied and was granted
a marriage license having agreed to get married on
December of this year. The marriage license was
issued on the 21st day of August, 1970 by the Quezon
City Civil Registrar."5
Then came the resolution of this Court of August 31,
1970 to the following effect: "Complainant is required
to comment, within 10 days from notice hereof,on the
petition of the respondent with the latter's affidavit
attached thereto,praying that he be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath in view of the complainants
withdrawal of her complaint."6 The reply of
complainant was received on September 21, 1970. It
was stated therein: "In reply thereto, I amhereby
informing your good office that I am objecting to said
lawyer's oathtaking of Mr. Benito P. Tubaces on
grounds of immorality on one hand and deceit on the
either. Accordingly, I thereby request that my letter
dated August 26, 1970 to your Office be withdrawn
and considered without force and effect. Evidently, I
am reviving my complaint against Mr. Benito P.
Tubaces on grounds of immorality because of his
refusal, upon my request, to put in writing the
fulfillment of his promise to marry me not later than
December 21, 1971."7 This Court, however, on
September 28, 1970, considering the petition of
respondent Tubaces praying that he be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath in view of the withdrawal of the
complaint filed against him and the comment therein,
denied the petition, respondent being further required
tofile an answer on the charges lodged against him
ten days from notice. There was a motion for the
reconsideration of the above action taken by this
Court filed by respondent on October 21, 1970,
wherein he justified his failure to file an answer thus:
"The petitioner, in view of the retraction or withdrawal
of complainant, felt it needless to file his answer to her
complaint as required by the resolution of this Court as
there is no more to answer for the complaint was
withdrawn and instead file this motion for
reconsideration which filing is delayed because of the
honest and innocent belief that the letter of
withdrawal or retraction is already sufficient and will
serve as petition of the undersigned to take the oath
of attorney."8 The prayer in such motion for
reconsideration was a reiteration of his plea that he be
allowed to take the oath of an attorney. The above
motion for reconsideration was referred to
complainant for comment in a resolution of October
26, 1970. The comment came on November 16, 1970,
complainant "retracting or withdrawing [her]
complaint against Mr. Tubaces on the reasons stated
in [her] letter of withdrawal and [interposing] no
objection to his oath-taking in the earliest time
possible, as prayed for in his motion."9
Both complainant and respondent were required by
resolution of this Court of November 18, 1970 it on
appear personally before it on December 16, 1970.
Both complainant and respondent duly appeared
and informed the Court thatthey had settled their
differences and were intending to get married. Five
dayslater, on December 21, 1970, in a pleading filed
with this Court by respondent,there was an allegation
of such marriage having taken place on December
18, 1970 with City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes of Quezon
City having performed the ceremony, a photostat
copy of the marriage contract accompanying such
manifestation. To satisfy itself, this Court resolved, on
January, 5, 1971, torequire that both complainant and
respondent appear before it on Monday, February 22,
1971. At such a date, the parties appeared before this
Court withthe additional information that they
intended to get married in a religious ceremony, such
a marriage to take place on March 1, 1971 in the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church with Rev. Fr.
Emilio Castro officiating. A photostat copy of the
marriage contract was submitted by complainant and
respondent in an urgent joint motion praying that the
respondent be allowed to take the oath of attorney,
filed with this Court on March 3, 1971. Included in such
motion is a photostat copy of the marriage contract
resulting from the religious ceremony.
This Court takes due cognizance that respondent
Benito P. Tubaces appears to have mended his ways
and that a satisfactorily long period had elapsed from
the time the results of the 1969 bar examinations were
announced on March 5, 1970. Under the
circumstances, it is of the opinion that his plea to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath may be favorably
acted on. Respondent is admonished to be duly
mindful of the standard of rectitude to which a
memberof the bar is expected to live up to. The delay
in his being duly admitted to the practice of his
profession, a matter traceable solely to his far-from-
exemplary conduct, ought to admonish him to
observe with fidelity itscanons of behavior. He must by
this time be fully cognizant that a failure to do so
would be sufficient cause for the appropriate
disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, the urgent joint motion of March 3, 1971,
praying that respondent Tubaces be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath, is granted.
ROSARIO DELOS REYES VS. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR (A.M.
NO. 1334 NOVEMBER 28, 1989)
FACTS:
Complainant is a second year medical student of the
Southwestern University in which respondent Atty.
Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of
Medicine. Complainant was compelled to go to
Manila with respondent for three days where he
repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the
threat of respondent that if she would not give in to his
lustful desires, she would flunk in all her subjects and
she would never become a medical intern. After due
investigation, the Solicitor General found the
respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and
recommends that since the complainant is partly to
blame for having gone with respondent to Manila
knowing fully well that respondent is a married man
,with children, a rich man and is not practicing his
profession before the court, he should merely be
suspended from the practice of law for not less than
three (3) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper?
HELD:
NO. The fact that he is a rich man and does not
practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render
respondent a person of good moral character.
Evidence of good moral character precedes
admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and
such requirement is not dispensed with upon
admission thereto. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to
continue in the practice of law.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension
from his office as attorney, among others, by grossly
immoral conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined
as that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.
In the present case, it was highly immoral of
respondent to have taken advantage of his position in
asking complainant to go with him under the threat
that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she
refused.
Respondent Jose B. Aznar is DISBARRED.