Rodriguez vs. Judge Blancaflor, GR No.
190171 aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and
March 14, 2011
Ponente: Mendoza, J.:
Facts: Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson
(arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial
prosecutor. During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy
involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to
Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one
Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and
the dismissal of the arson case.
On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the
arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said
case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said
manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually
withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On
June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and
Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their
testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before
him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement
in Tulali’s filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against
Awayan, among others.
On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose
of Judge Blancaflor’s continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had
already been promulgated.
After the submission of petitioners’ respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor
issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt.
The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00
each were imposed upon them.
Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for
contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their
rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront
the witnesses and present their own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflor’s
disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further
contempt proceedings against them.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the
suspension and contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali.
Ruling: Yes, Judge Blancaflor did not observe due process in conducting the suspension and
contempt proceedings against Rodriguez and Tulali. It must be emphasized that direct
contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules.
Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged "vilification campaign" against Judge
Blancaflor cannot be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect
contempt, as correctly concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper,
however, the requirements under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied,
to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
x x x.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may
be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed
by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges
arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition
for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and
decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of
the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure
which requires written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners.
Neither was there any written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only
learned of the contempt proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring
him to appear before the Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said
order. Tulali, on the other hand, only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to
submit his compliance to explain how he came in possession of the administrative
complaint against Awayan.
In the case at bench, there was also no prior and separate notice issued to
petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a
specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended
from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend
themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and
counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void,
having violated their right to due process.
Likewise, Judge Blancaflor’s suspension order is also void as the basis for
suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in
office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6)
violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds.
NELSON LAI Y BILBAO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
The accused assails the affirmance of his conviction for homicide through the assailed
decision promulgated on May 27, 2005 by the Court of Appeals (CA).1 The conviction had
been handed down by Judge Fernando R. Elumba of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, in
Bacolod City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 17446 entitled People of the Philippines v. Nelson
Lai y Bilbao
FACTS: The RTC, through Judge Elumba, disposed as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused NELSON LAI y BILBAO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249
of the Revised Peñal Code of the Philippines.
The petitioner raised the following errors, to wit: ERRED as accused was deprived of due
process when this case was decided by the honorable presiding judge who acted as the
public prosecutor in this case before he was appointed to the bench
In this appeal, the petitioner continues to assail the conviction, but the Court has
immediately noted that the right to due process of the petitioner had been denied to him
by Judge Elumba, the trial judge, by not disqualifying himself from sitting on and trying
Criminal Case No. 17446 despite having participated in the trial as the public prosecutor.
Thus, it is necessary for the Court to first determine if the non-disqualification of Judge
Elumba prejudiced the petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial.
The petitioner pointed to the need for Judge Elumba's disqualification in his Motion for
Reconsideration,12 but the latter ignored his concerns upon the excuse that he had
appeared in Criminal Case No. 17446 only after the Prosecution had rested its case. Judge
Elumba argued that he did not personally prosecute the case, and that, at any rate, the
petitioner should have sought his disqualification prior to the rendition of the judgment of
conviction.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the petitioner focused the CA's attention to the denial of due process to him
by the non-disqualification of Judge Elumba, but the CA upheld Judge Elumba's
justifications, stating:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to the fifth assigned error, appellant claims that he was denied due process because
the judge who rendered the assailed decision was also, at one time, the public prosecutor
of the instant case. First, the record of this case shows that when the judge, who was then
a public prosecutor, entered his appearance, the prosecution had already long rested its
case, more specifically, he appeared therein only when the last witness for the defense
was presented, not to mention the fact that it was a private prosecutor who cross-
examined the last witness, Merlyn Rojo. Thus, it cannot be said that the presiding judge
personally prosecuted the instant case, nor supervised the prosecution thereof when the
same was still pending. Second, settled is the rule that a petition to disqualify a judge
must be filed before rendition of judgment by the judge. Having failed to move for the
disqualification of the judge, appellant cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to
his cause, take a total turn about (sic.) and say that he was denied due process. 'One
surely cannot have his cake and eat it too.'14
ISSUE: Whether the accused was
deprived of his right to due process
Ruling: Yes
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot be denied to
any accused. The Constitution has expressly ordained that "no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law."15 An essential part of the right is to be
afforded a just and fair trial before his conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right
cannot be condoned, for the impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a case, and
decides it is an indispensable requisite of procedural due process.16The Court has said:This
Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge' as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we
have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled
to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to
a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go
to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and
with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall
have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in
and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Given the foregoing, the CA's justifications directly contravened the letter and
spirit of Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, supra. The words counsel in the first paragraph of
Section 1 of Rule 137, supra, and lawyer in Section 5 of Canon 3, supra, are understood in
their general acceptation because their usage by the rules has not been made subject of
any qualifications or distinctions. As such, the mere appearance of his name as the public
prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No. 17446 sufficed to disqualify Judge Elumba
from sitting on and deciding the case. Having represented the State in the prosecution of
the petitioner, he could not sincerely claim neutrality or impartiality as the trial judge who
would continue to hear the case. Hence, he should have removed himself from being the
trial judge in Criminal Case No. 17446.
To be clear, that Judge Elumba's prior participation as the public prosecutor was passive,
or that he entered his appearance as the public prosecutor long after the Prosecution had
rested its case against the petitioner did not really matter.
The purpose of this stricture is to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect
the life, liberty and property of the petitioner as the accused should be conducted and
determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A
judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law
conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and,
for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the
absence of written consent of all parties concerned.
JOSE T. TUBOLA, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts: Petitioner was the cashier of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)-Aganan,
Sta. Barbara River Irrigation System in Iloilo City. On November 8, 1982, Commission on
Audit (COA) State Auditing Examiners Yvonne Gotera (Gotera) and Theresita Cajita
(Cajita) conducted an audit examination of petitioners account which indicated a
shortage of P93,051.88.[3]
Gotera and Cajita thus sent a letter of demand dated November 23, 1982 to
petitioner directing him to account for the shortage.[4] Petitioner refused to receive the
letter, however, hence, Gotera and Cajita sent it by registered mail.[5]
Petitioner was thereupon charged of committing malversation of public funds
before the Sandiganbayan to which he pleaded not guilty.[6]
By the account of Gotera, the lone witness for the prosecution, petitioner had an account
balance of P30,162.46 prior to June 25, 1982; that from June 25 to November 8, 1982, the
date petitioners account was audited, his cash collections totaled P347,995.64; that his
remittances from June 25 to November 8, 1982 totaled P285,105.41; and that the total
collections less total remittances amounted to P93,051.88 as of November 8, 1982.[7]
Still by Goteras account, the audit team found in petitioners drawer vales/chits or
promissory notes or receivables signed by NIA employees involving the total amount
of P79,044.51.[8]

Petitioner, who claimed that he was assigned as cashier since 1978 and was also in charge
of payment of salaries of more than 2,000 field employees in the NIA Jalaur Project,
declared that his task of keeping the collected irrigation fees was temporarily assigned to
Editha Valeria (Valeria) upon instruction of his superior, Regional Director Manuel
Hicao,[9]for he (petitioner) was also handling the payroll of around 2,000 employees.
Petitioner further declared that no accounting of the collected fees was
undertaken since he trusted Valeria, who directly remitted them to the bank, after he
signed the statement of collection without reading the contents thereof. [10]
Petitioner presented vales and chits involving the total amount of P115,661.66
representing loans extended by Valeria to certain NIA employees and even COA
auditors.[11]And he identified chits and vales dated 1975 to 1981 inclusive representing
loans extended prior to the audit period
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,[15] petitioner lodged the
present appeal, imputing error on the Sandiganbayan for VIOLAT[ING] [HIS] BASIC
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT ACTIVELY TOOK PART IN THE
QUESTIONING OF THE ACCUSED WHEN HE WAS PRESENTED AS A WITNESS.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan violated his right to DP?
RULING: No
Respecting the supposed violation of petitioners right to due process in light of the
alleged active participation of the Sandiganbayan Justices in questioning him during the
hearing of the case, the People underscores that it is the duty of a trial judge to examine a
witness to secure a full and clear understanding of the facts or to test to his satisfaction the
credibility of the witness.
The Sandiganbayan Justices active participation during the trial fails too. For he
has not specified any instance of supposed bias of the Justices, or cited what questions
adversely affected him. The record does not reflect any question or objection raised by
petitioners counsel during the trial to the Justices questions or the tenor or manner they
were propounded. Nor does the record reflect any move to inhibit the Justices if petitioner
perceived that they were biased against him.
That a magistrate may propound clarificatory questions to secure a full and clear
understanding of the facts in the case is not proscribed.
JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
It is well within the Courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously
believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.
Facts: That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of Surigao del
Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below 27, while in the
performance of his official duties, thus committing the act in relation to his office, willfully, feloniously
and unlawfully did then and there, with grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith, refuse to
implement the promotion/appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as
Vocational Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing
authority and despite the directive of the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education
and the Civil Service Commission in the region, thereby causing undue injury to complainants who
were supposed to receive a higher compensation for their promotion, as well as [to] the school and
the students who were deprived of the better services which could have been rendered by Georgito
Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Instruction Supervisors.
Petitioner alleged that his refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants was
not motivated by bad faith but he just wanted to protect the interest of the government by following
strict compliance in the preparation of appointment papers.
The trial court ruled that petitioners refusal to implement the appointments of the private
complainants had caused undue injury to them. Thus, it held petitioner guilty of the crime charged
and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
month and perpetual disqualification from public office.
On appeal, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.[18] The appellate court
ruled that the Decision of the trial court, being supported by evidence and firmly anchored in law and
jurisprudence, is correct. It held that petitioner failed to show that the trial court committed any
reversible error in judgment.
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s constitutional rights to due process and equal protection
of[the law were violated when he was denied the opportunity to present in evidence CA
Decision?
Ruling: No. Petitioner was not deprived of
his right to due process.
Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard.[24] Due process is satisfied when the parties
are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy.[25] Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[26]
Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial of
his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his
defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is
the better accepted norm of procedural due process.
There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as
evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the courts discretion to reject the
presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding
on hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as
in this case, concerns an administrative matter.
SUSIE CHAN-TAN vs. JESSE C. TAN
Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in Intramuros,
Manila.[9] They were blessed with two sons: Justin, who was born in Canada in 1990 and
Russel, who was born in the Philippines in 1993.[10]
In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties submitted to the court a
compromise agreement.
On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment[12] approving the compromise
agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity
of the parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the
parties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and property relations.
Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. The
evidence presented by respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of
the country without his knowledge and without prior authority of the trial court; petitioner
failed to pay the P8,000,000 remaining balance for the Megaworld property which, if
forfeited would prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed to turn over to
respondent documents and titles in the latters name.
Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent custody of the
children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latters
name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City.
Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration[14] alleging denial of due
process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. She alleged she was not
able to present evidence because of the negligence of her counsel and her own fear for her
life and the future of the children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country,
together with her children, due to the alleged beating she received from respondent and
the pernicious effects of the latters supposed gambling and womanizing ways. She prayed
for an increase in respondents monthly support obligation in the amount of P150,000.
Issue: Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17
May 2004 resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite the alleged denial
of due process.
Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed to file pleadings
and appear at the hearings for respondents omnibus motion to amend the partial judgment
as regards the custody of the children and the properties in her possession. Petitioner
claims the trial court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony of
respondent. Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to
dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if indeed the provision is
applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the preservation of the
family.
Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of
the trial court are now final and executory and could no longer be reviewed, modified, or
vacated. Respondent alleges petitioner is making a mockery of our justice system in
disregarding our lawful processes. Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel
appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on petitioners
motion to dismiss.
In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial
court had become final and executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal.[30] Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the
trial court received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid
down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting in petitioners loss of the right
to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial courts judgments.
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While she may have lost
her right to present evidence due to the supposed negligence of her counsel, she cannot
say she was denied her day in court. Records show petitioner, through counsel, actively
participated in the proceedings below, filing motion after motion. Contrary to petitioners
allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to believe the negligence in
pursuing the case was on petitioners end.
Clearly, despite her counsels efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter disinterest in the
hearings on respondents omnibus motion seeking, among others, custody of the children.
The trial judge was left with no other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule
on the motion based on the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now
come to this Court crying denial of due process
Noryn Tan vs Judge Clarita Tabin
Remedial Law – Summary Procedure – Warrant of Arrest – Notice to the Accused
Legal Ethics – Judicial Ethics – Abuse of Authority
In 2006, a criminal case was filed against Noryn Tan for estafa in the Municipal Trial Court
of Baguio (Branch 4). Arraignment was set to fall on October 10, 2006. Tan was not able to
appear in court hence the presiding judge, Judge Clarita Tabin, issued a warrant of arrest
against Tan. Tan was arrested in Quezon City, her place of residence.
Tan posted bail. Later on, she filed an administrative case against Judge Tabin on the ground
of denial of due process. Tan alleged that she never received notice about the said
arraignment.
In her comment, Judge Tabin said that the notice was coursed through the Chief of Police
of Quezon City and that when two months lapsed after the issuance of said notice and no
return was made by the QC police office, Judge Tabin presumed that Tan received the
notice in the regular course of mail and that there was presumption of regularity in favor
of the police officers. Thus, she issued the arrest warrant against Tan but such issuance was
made in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the arrest warrant was proper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court clarified whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary
Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the
accused, unless the accused fails to appear whenever required. In this case, the estafa case
falls under the Rules on Summary procedure. Judge Tabin is not justified in issuing the
warrant of arrest and her defense of good faith is not tenable.
The judge herself admitted that there was no proof that Tan received the notice for her to
appear in court. She merely relied on the presumption of regularity which should not be
used as an excuse in violating the right of the accused to due process. So basic and
fundamental is a person’s right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or brushed aside
with the presumption that the police through which the notice had been sent, actually
served the same on Tan whose address was not even specified.
Judge Tabin failed to uphold the rules. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
her office to know and simply apply it. The Supreme Court held that a judge commits grave
abuse of authority when she hastily issues a warrant of arrest against the accused in
violation of the summary procedure rule that the accused should first be notified of the
charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and
countervailing evidence. Judge Tabin was found guilty of abuse of authority and was fined
P10,000.00.
Secretary of Justice vs Judge Ralph Lantion
Due Process
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to
conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government,
pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there.
Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request
by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still
premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not
entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor
of Jimenez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.
HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refer to an
impending threat of deprivation of one’s property or property right. No less is this true, but
even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty,
which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to
life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned
or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
Secretary of Justice vs Judge Ralph Lantion
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge
of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents,
Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the
official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but
the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments
ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part
of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and
the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the
land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere.
“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and
the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to
be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited
constitutional provision.
“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain
to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is
the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
Development Bank of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals
Due Process – Opportunity to be Heard
In 1968 and 1969, Continental Cement Corp. entered into a loan contract with DBP. In 1979,
CCC entered into a MOA with DBP restructuring its loans. In November 1985, DBP filed for
a foreclosure against the assets of CCC. In December 1985, CCC petitioned before RTC
Bulacan to enjoin DBP and the Sheriff of Bulacan from foreclosing its assets and praying
further that its loan terms with DBP be restructured and that the interest rate terms in the
promissory note be declared null and void. A TRO was issued in favor of CCC. In December
1986, PP 502 was issued transferring nonperforming assets of the gov’t to Asset
Privatization Trust. One of those transferred was CCCs account. DBP filed a petition to
dismiss the pending case as it CCC could no longer deal with DBP but rather with APT. The
trial court denied the petition and has instead allowed APT to join the proceeding pursuant
to PP 502 as amended. To determine CCCs indebtedness to DBP/APT, the RTC designated
JC Laya (former BSP Gov and DepEd Sec) as chair of a fact finding commission. He was given
60 days to come up with a report and he was given a lot of extensions thereafter. After
several months, he was able to come up with the report. The parties then filed their
reactions to the report and during the trial they were given a chance to cross examine each
other’s witnesses. After cross examination, they were ordered to submit their position
papers as to their calculation of the amount of indebtedness. CCC’s computation is at
P43.6M, the Commissioner’s computation is at P61.6M while DBP/APT’s calculation is at
P2.6B. In June 1992, 3 of CCC’s witnesses were scheduled to be cross examined by APT’s
counsel as DBP’s counsel had already done so. APT”s counsel was not able to do so raising
the issue that he just took over the case and needs time to prepare. The cross examination
was reset to August 24-26, 1992 but counsel for APT failed to appear due to Dengue. The
other counsel, Jaime Cruz, for DBP was likewise absent; he’s also a witness. On Aug 25 th,
the RTC ordered that due to the foregoing the case is deemed submitted for decision. APT
filed for a motion for reconsideration. It was denied and the RTC ruled that the
indebtedness to be paid by CCC is the calculation came up with by the Commissioner. APT
appealed before the CA averring that it was denied due process when it was not allowed to
cross examine the witnesses of CCC nor was it allowed to present further witnesses. CCC
averred that by the failure of APT’s counsel to appear APT has waived such right. The CA
sustained the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not APT was denied of due process.
HELD: The SC sustained the CA’s ruling. Long ingrained in jurisprudence is the principle that
there can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in
the proceedings but did not do so. The withdrawal of APT’s previous counsel in the thick of
the proceedings would be a reasonable ground to seek postponement of the hearing.
However, such reason necessitates a duty, nay an obligation, on the part of the new counsel
to prepare himself for the next scheduled hearing. The excuse that it was due to the former
counsel’s failure to turn over the records of the case to APT, shows the negligence of the
new counsel to actively recover the records of the case. Mere demands are not sufficient.
Counsel should have taken adequate steps to fully protect the interest of his client, rather
than pass the blame on the previous counsel.
The due process requirement is satisfied where the parties are given the opportunity to
submit position papers, as in this case. Both parties, CCC and DBP/APT, were given
opportunity to submit their respective position papers after the Commissioner rendered
his report. Contained in their position papers were their respective comments and
objections to the said report. Furthermore, the parties were also given the chance to cross-
examine the Commissioner and his representative. They were likewise granted opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses of the other party, however, like in APT’s case, they were
deemed to have waived their right, as previously discussed.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to support any evidence he may have in support of his defense. What the law prohibits
is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of
due process when he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side.
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. vs Court of Appeals
Due Process – Not Being Party to a Case
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her
group Matuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7 stockholders.
Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to
have MLE be transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLE’s petition, Davao Enterprises
Corporation filed a complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that
MLE has encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber concession. The
Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as charged and had recommended the Director
to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of Natural
Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR
Minister Ernesto Maceda found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR
and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to
pay the value in pesos of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then issued a writ of
execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The
RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from pursuing the
execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
MIWPI averred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued – a
separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution by the Minister has been made
not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without
any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPI’s constitutional rights under the
due process clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound
by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for
the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same was issued without
giving MIWPI an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the
issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI was at all
furnished with a copy of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Execution of the Minister’s
decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the
respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same,
apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Order, and without
hearing or impleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not
included or mentioned in the proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment
in DAVENCOR’s timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most basic
tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The liberal atmosphere which pervades the
procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make
conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA
Before us is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order which seeks to: (a) annul and set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31733 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it denied the People's prayer to inhibit
respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the RegionalTrial Court of Tacloban City from hearing
Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 9301-39, respectively, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Cristeta Reyes, et al." and "People of the Philippines vs.Jane C. Go"; and b) enjoin
respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in the aforesaid criminal cases.
Acting on the said petition, the Court on April 3, 1995 resolved to require respondents
all of whom are the accused in the aforesaid criminal cases, to comment thereon within 10
days from notice, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin
respondent judge from taking further action in Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39
until further orders from the Court.
It appearing that private respondents Cristeta Reyes & Rogen Doctora, Johny Santos
& Antonio Alegro & Jane C. Go failed to file their respective comments within the period
which expired on April 17, 1995 and April 18, 1995, respectively, the Court on June 26, 1995
resolved to require said private respondents to show cause why they should not be
disciplinary dealt with for such failure, and to file the required comments, both within ten
(10) days from notice.
As to respondents Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro (prisoners at the Tacloban City Jail),
copies of the resolution requiring them to file comment were returned unserved with the
postmaster's notation "unknown in said address". The Court, on October 11, 1995 directed
the Solicitor General to serve the same on said respondents and to inform the Court of such
service, both within ten (10) days from notice.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Compliance stating that the required copies
were sent to private respondents Santos & Alegro through ordinary mail on December 26,
1995.
To date, all the respondents have not yet filed their comments, for verily, delay in the
submission of the same would appear to benefit respondents, and sanction against them
may not really amount to much, considering that most of them are under detention. Thus,
so as not to unduly delay the disposition of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, we
now resolve to dispense with respondent's comments and to proceed with the disposition
of the petition.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding
is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge which was explained in Javier vs. Commission of
Elections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), in the following words:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we
have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they
can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they
will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will
not seek his judgment.Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his
action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denoucement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and
the pertinent law.
In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, can not be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial
judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the
defense in view of his previous decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he
enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office level
against herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her husband
Dominador Go.
Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and
reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the
criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to have
voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of
Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban is
hereby declared disqualified from taking cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-
01-39. It is further ordered that these criminal cases be re-raffled to another branch of
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City.
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador
Due Process – impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of
the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive
terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election
returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the
armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board
of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of
the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered
the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the
outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation
made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the
lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed
out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner.
Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law
partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2 ndDivision but the
Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during
pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition
close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at
all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they
expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be
equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and
with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall
have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in
and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Pedro Azul vs Judge Jose Castro & Rosalinda Tecson
Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance it he entered a loan agreement
with Tecson in the amount of P391k. Tecson was only able to collect P141k thus leaving
about P250k as a balance. She filed a petition for collection of sum of money before the
Rizal RTC and the case was given to J Sarmiento. On 27 Mar ’79, Azul received the copy of
the complaint. On 10 Apr ’79, Azul filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for responsive
pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento retired and was temporarily substituted by J
Aňover who granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. But Azul only
received the notice granting such on the 23rd of the same month way passed the 5 day
period. On the 17th of April, Tecson already filed a motion to dismiss averring that Azul’s 5
day extension has already lapsed. On the 18th of the same month, J Castro, the permanent
judge to replace J Sarmiento took office and he ordered Azul to be in default due to the
lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with the reception of evidence the next
day and of course without Azul’s evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default.
On April 27th, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul, unaware that J Castro already
decided the case appealed to remove his default status. On May 7 th Azul received the
decision rendered by the court on Apr 27th (but on record the date of receipt was May 5th).
Azul filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower court denied the same on the 20th of
the same month. On Aug 1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3 rd but was
reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro
approved it on the 27th but surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the 30 th, J Castro set
aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th. Finally, J Castro denied the appeal on the 7th of
September.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due process. The constitutional
provision on due process commands all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily
courts of justice, to strictly maintain standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that
procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial are observed at all stages of a proceeding. It
may be argued that when the Azul’s counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day extension from
April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that
said first extension would be granted. However, the records show that Atty. Camaya
personally went to the session hall of the court with his motion for postponement only to
be informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that his motion would be considered
“submitted for resolution.” Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon City are
literally swamped with their own heavy loads of cases, counsel may be excused for
assuming that, at the very least, he had the requested fifteen (15) days to file his responsive
pleading. It is likewise inexplicable why J Añover, who had not permanently taken over the
sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that only a five-day extension would
be allowed. And to compound the Azul’s problems, the order was sent by mail and received
only twelve (12) days later or after the five-day period. Before the much publicized Project
Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a court should have known that court orders requiring acts
to be done in a matter of days should not be sent by mail. Meanwhile, the petitioner was
declared in default. The motion to declare defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No
copy was furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon on April 18, 1979, the very first day in
office of J Castro in Quezon City.
Mayor Miguel Paderanga vs Judge Cesar Azura
Due Process – Hostility Between the Judge and the Parties – Inhibition
Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental. He petitioned that J Azura
inhibits himself from deciding on pending cases brought before him on the grounds that
they have lost confidence in him, that he entertained tax suits against the city and had
issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464)
that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive and is abusive
in his power.
ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.
HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), “All
the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of
all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide
fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A
judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion is made
of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of
mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous
judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of the judge . . .
In this Petition for Certiorari, petitioner, as City Mayor of Gingoog City, seeks to annul
respondent Judge's Order denying the Motion for Inhibition which he (petitioner) had
filed.
The grounds advanced for the inhibition of respondent Judge from hearing, deciding and
issuing Orders in any of the seven pending cases 1 in his Court wherein the City of
Gingoog, its officials, including petitioner, are parties, may be summarized as follows:
1. Loss of trust and confidence in the competence and impartiality of respondent Judge,
particularly in view of the administrative complaints filed against him by petitioner and
others before this Court.
2. Entertaining suits assailing the validity of auction sales of tax delinquent properties by
issuing restraining orders enjoining the City Treasurer of Gingoog City from proceeding
with the auction sales of said properties when under Sec. 64 and 83 of P.D. 464, the
remedy to stay execution of auction sales of tax delinquent properties is by paying the
tax, pursuant to Sec. 74 of P.D. 464, supra, and not by issuance of restraining orders;
3. Bias, oppressive dispensation of justice, and abuse of his power of contempt in ordering
the arrest of petitioner and the members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City
and imposing upon them an excessive fine of P10,000.00 and an excessive bond of
P50,000.00 when the claim for salary was only for P5,000.00, and by sensationalizing their
arrest with the aid of the Provincial Commander at Campa Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, as
if they were hardened criminals and fugitives from justice, for the purpose of
embarrassing them before the public.
4. Issuing of Orders against the interests of the City of Gingoog.
Respondent Judge denied the Petition for Inhibition on the ground that loss of trust and
confidence by petitioner in his neutrality is unfounded, notwithstanding the
administrative charges filed against him, and that the plea for inhibition was prompted
more because the "City Attorney (petitioner's counsel) appears to have persisted in his
grotesque arguments and haughty conduct in his subsequent pleadings which already
constitute direct contempt for which he may be cognizant of his inevitable punishment,
and for which reason he now entertains the resultant fears from his own indiscretions, to
appear before this presiding judge."
Petitioner assails said Order denying inhibition for having been issued despotically,
whimsically, and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondent Judge, in his Comment filed pursuant to this
Court's requirement, states:
1. He merely followed the provisions of Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, in resolving
petitioner's Motion for Inhibition, there being no legal ground for him to inhibit himself
from proceeding to hear any of the several cases therein enumerated;
2. In regard to the tax cases, he submits that if, indeed, he has no jurisdiction, the proper
remedy is not a petition for inhibition but an action for prohibition in accordance with
Sec. 2, Rule 65;
As regards the cases of Barro v. City of Gingoog and Rafael Rodriguez v.
City of Gingoog, he had rendered the corresponding decisions which
had already attained finality for lack of appeal; although in the Barro
case, a petition for review is pending before the IAC;
In the case of Ayensa v. Paderanga involving a public high school
teacher, who was not paid his salaries although he was continually
rendering services, he had ordered petitioner to pay the aforesaid
salaries, but since the Order was defied, petitioner and other officials
were cited for contempt pursuant to the Rules.
Considering the antagonistic positions taken by the parties in their respective pleadings,
and, particularly, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner, which prompted
him and others to file administrative charges against respondent Judge, we advert to this
Court's guidelines on the matter of inhibition in Pimentel vs. Salanga, L-27934, 21 SCRA
160 [1967], prescribing as follows:
All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any
to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation
where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to
the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may
not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation But when suggestion
is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party
or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self- examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that
the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. ... (Emphasis
supplied)
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous
judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of the judge ...2
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the
cases enumerated in paragraph 4 of the Petition involving the City of Gingoog or its
officials, including petitioner. The venue of said cases is hereby transferred to Cagayan de
Oro City each to be assigned by raffle to the Regional Trial Courts thereat.
Filemon David vs Judge Gregorio Aquilizan et al
Due Process – Hearing
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo
Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be
yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs and the share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David
withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to go back there. The
brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the
borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned
to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered
the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the
case filed by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in
favor of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was denied due process. J
Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision
has already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void
and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due
process. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a
view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of
law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered at all.
Earlier or on February 17, 1976, the herein private respondents, Felomeno and Ricardo
Jugar brothers, filed against Felimon C. David, herein petitioner, a "Petition for
Reinstatement" in the CAR, 15th Regional District, Branch II, Cotabato City.
They alleged, inter alia, that sometime in 1971, they were installed as share tenants by
petitioner over separate portions of the latter's landholding situated at Polomolok, South
Cotabato, each portion having a seeding capacity of two (2) hectares, more or less, their
sharing agreement being 50-50% of the net produce; that the parcels they were
cultivating are devoted to the production of corn crops, the produce per hectare being 60
to 70 cavans in corn cobs; that sometime in the middle part of 1973, private respondents
were no longer allowed to continue their cultivation of the subject lots as petitioner-
landholder prohibited them from doing so and took possession of said lots for no reason
at all; that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team Office at General Santos
intervened for the immediate reinstatement of private respondents to their respective
portions, but such intervention was to no avail as petitioner-landholder refused and still
refuses to reinstate them, and that because of such unlawful act, private respondents
suffered and will continue to suffer damages and litigation expenses. 5
In herein petitioner's answer, as respondent below, he denied that herein private
respondents were his tenants. He claimed that "... Ricardo David (should be Jugar) who was
then the tractor driver of respondent (now petitioner herein) was given additional incentive
to work on a one hectare portion of respondent's land which he surrendered after resigning
as tractor driver and after he worked with the Dolefil and as a farm tenant of his father;
Felomeno Jugar truly worked with the respondent (herein petitioner) on share basis until
the petitioner Felomeno Jugar (now private respondent) sold his working animals and
resumed his faith-healing and later worked, as in fact to the present is working, with his
father ..." 6 He further averred that the average harvest per hectare is not only 60 to 70
sacks of corn on cobs but if properly cultivated the land would easily yield no less than 120
sacks of corn on cobs at 4 cans each sack; that the truth is that private respondents
voluntarily surrendered their landholdings as follows: "...Ricardo, in September, 1972, after
he resigned as tractor driver of respondent (now petitioner), due to ill health; and later on
as farm tenant of his father; Felomeno Jugar voluntarily surrendered his landholdings after
he sold his working animals, and later, he continued his religious faith healing occupation
and as farm tenant of his father.".
September 29, 1979, respondent Judge without conducting any hearing rendered
judgment for private respondents and against herein petitioner finding that "...plaintiffs
Ricardo and Felomeno, both surnamed Jugar (now private respondents) were tenants of
defendant Filemon C. David (petitioner herein) at the time PD 27 was promulgated on
October 21, 1972," 10 and thereafter declared them "owners" thereof.
Issue: Deprived of DP?
Ruling: On the bases of the foregoing tactual and procedural antecedent petitioners seek
to annul and set aside the aforesaid order and decision of respondent Judge Aquilizan on
the grounds that: (a) he was denied due process of law; (b) the respondent Judge has no
jurisdiction over the instant case, jurisdiction being legally lodged with the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform: (c) assuming respondent Judge has jurisdiction thereof, the order of
June 29, 1978 has already become final and no new decision novating the same may be
rendered; and (d) the findings of facts, arrived at without hearing, are contrary to the
evidence (sic). 12
In his Answer, respondent Judge Aquilizan did not deny the lack of hearings alleged in the
petition, but interposed the defense that the subject decision has already become "... final
and executory after the lapse of the period for the perfection of an appeal ..." and "... there
is no showing that an appeal was brought to the Appellate Court in accordance with
provisions of PD 946 and the Uniform Rules of Procedure of the Court of Agrarian
Relations."
Respondent judge did not conduct any hearing in the case prior to issuance of the
challenged decision, the ineluctible conclusion is that the challenged decision is null and
void for want of due process. The following requisites, as set forth in a leading case before
the 1935 Constitution took effect, must concur for procedural due process in civil cases:
"(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant
must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful
hearing." 15 Thus, it is well-settled rule that "no one shall be personally bound until he
has had a day in court", by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has
been afforded an opportunity to be heard.
 Anita Lorenzana vs Polly Cayetano
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the
Bureau of Lands). She later purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property
be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment
cases against her tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land
adjacent to that of Lorenzana’s land. Cayetano was renting the same from the Bureau of
Lands. The lower court granted Lorenzana’s ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ
of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she included to eject Cayetano’s property.
Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the lower court that her
property be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetano’s petition. The CA, upon appeal,
favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases
as she already brought herself to the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetano’s right to due process has been violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that
respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of
demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency
of these ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to court to protect her property from
demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory.
Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third
person to such judgment, which does not bind her; nor can its writ of execution be
informed against her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.
Zambales Chromite Mining et al vs Court of Appeals
Due Process – Administrative Due Process
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be
declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz,
Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabiloňa. Gozon
decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agri.
And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he
instead affirmed his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then
appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that
the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules
of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining
Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an
appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a
ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from
deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with
bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA
reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to
Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis found by
Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that
Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of
Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants
the CA’s earlier decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s
finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due
process.
HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had
acted with grave abuse of discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be
other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human,
he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the
2nd decision of the CA.
Felicidad Anzaldo vs Jacobo Clave Due Process – Administrative Due Process
Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for
28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was
appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in
1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his
position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo,
averred that Anzaldo’s appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee
which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the
Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant.
Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave
was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to
the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that
resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the
CSC chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was
“inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission”, what he
meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave’s recommendation: he was
concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself)
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental
fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own
recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should
be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the
Philippines.
Miguel Singson vs National Labor Relations Commission
Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In 1991, a Japanese
national alleged that Singson extorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having
excess baggage; and that to settle the issue, she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson
was later investigated and the investigating committee found him guilty. PAL then
dismissed Singson from employment. Singson then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for
illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PAL’s side
insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and his case was raffled to the 2nd Division thereof.
The 2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio
Rayala, and former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino – same arbiter which decided Singson’s case.
The commissioners deliberated on the case and thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala
deliberated on the motion. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that
Singson was denied due process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of
the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL’s appeal. He was reviewing his own decision
as a former labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall
consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner
and one member each from the workers and employers sectors, respectively. The
composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its
members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are
impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who
decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in
this case. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the participation
of Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time
he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three
commissioners. The denial of Singson’s right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an
innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of the Philippines
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before
RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to
alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit
of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was
done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC
under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of
Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would
rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano
sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived
his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions
were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case
due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his
right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as
a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous
petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the
decision earlier promulgated is nullified.