MATIENZO VS.
ABELLERA should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for
G.R. NO. L-45839 - JUNE 1, 1988
FACTS:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized
taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents,
however, admittedly operate “colorum” or “kabit” taxicab
units. On or about the second week of February, 1977,
private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent
Board of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization of their
unauthorized “excess” taxicab units citing PD 101,
promulgated on January 17, 1973, “to eradicate the harmful
and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or
allowing them to become legitimate and responsible
operators.” Within a matter of days, the respondent Board
promulgated its orders setting the application for hearing and
granting applicants provisional authority to operate their
“excess taxicab units” for which legalization was sought.
Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant
of provisional permits or authority, as well as the annulment
of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners
allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding
special permits to the private respondents. Citing Section 4 of
PD 101, the petitioners argue that neither the BOT chairman
nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the
petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the
clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power had
been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the
promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state
that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus
officio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and
unlawful taxicab operations under Section 1 of PD 101
despite the lapse of six (6) months after the promulgation of
the Decree.
RULING:
Yes.
A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to
the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step
towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations
without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in
Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration
of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the
Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the
State’s waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators
for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section
declares when the period of moratorium suspending the
relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end.
Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board’s exercise of
jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service
Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the
avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act,
Nov. 7, 1936).
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a
board or commission has a certain power, the authority given
which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary
to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be
upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the
end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given.
MATIENZO V ABELLERA
FACTS
Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators in
Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admit to operate
colorum or kabit taxis, thus, they applied for legalization of
their unauthorized excess tacis citing PD 101. Respondent
Board set such applications for hearing and granted
provisional authority to operate. Petitioners argue that the
Board cannot do this as the six month period in the
Transitory Provision has lapsed and has become functus
officio.
ISSUES W/N the board can grant such permits.
RULING
YES. The power vested by PD 101 to BOT was “to grant
special permits of limited term for the operation of public
utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board,
be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into
legitimate and responsible operators.” Such power remains
even after the six months prescribed in the law as such
period merely provides for the withdrawal of the State’s
waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators. Notice
and hearing are not required for the grant of such temporary
authority because of its provisional nature and that the
primary application shall be given a full hearing.
To determine whether a Board or Commission has power, it
should be (1) liberally construed in light of its purpose for
which is was created and (2) that incidentally necessary to a
full implementation of legislative intent as being germane to
the law.
Thus, the BOR shall, from time to time, re-study the public
need for public utilities in any area in the Phils for the
purpose of re-evaluating the policies.
VILLEGAS VS SUBIDO G.R. NO. L-26534 NOVEMBER 28, 1969
30 SCRA 498
Topic: Extent of Jurisdiction p114
Action:
Facts: Commissioner directed that petitioners Barbers,
Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced as station commanders of
the three police precincts of Manila as their continued
employment as such was illegal, the eligibility required being
that of an inspector first class, allegedly not possessed by
them.
Mayor: to disregard said directive, it being in excess of the
authority vested in [the Civil Service] Commission." As noted
in such communication: "This Office is not aware of any
provision of law requiring that Precinct or Station
Commanders should be at least a Police or Detective Major or
an Inspector First Class. Paragraph 4, Section 23 of Republic
Act No. 2260,
ISSUE: Can the CSC direct the mayor?
HELD: No , The reliance of then respondent Commissioner
was not on any law or rule but simply on his own concept of
what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his
own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be
unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work
outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to
Filipino tradition.
A public official must be able to point to a particular provision
of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged
authority. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a
public official exercises power, not rights. The government
itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state
is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise
agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its
functions. As such there is no presumption that they are
empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such
authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid
grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a
fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed.
In the appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: ‘It must
be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to
outrun the authority conferred by statute.’ Neither the high
dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then
is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law
becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains
to avoid.
Held: The question, to repeat, is one of power. What is clear
is that it is petitioner City Mayor that could so designate the
other petitioners to assume the position of station
commanders. That power is his, and his alone. He is not
required by law to share it with respondent Commissioner,
who must justify by the valid conferment of authority the
action taken by him in requiring that the City Mayor replace
the other petitioners. Power is not to be presumed, it must
be shown. Respondent Commissioner failed to do so. It was
not surprising therefore that the lower court ruled against
him. As set forth at the outset, we sustain the lower court
and affirm the judgment appealed from.
if there are constitutional overtones to this litigation,
petitioners, not the respondents, are the beneficiaries. As
they did correctly point out, not even the President is vested
with the power of control over local officials. He exercises
only "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law,
. . . ."25 Respondent Civil Service Commissioner cannot be
deemed then to be possessed of a greater prerogative, being
himself an official of a lower category in the executive
branch. Moreover, what the Constitution enjoins on the
President as well as all those entrusted with executive
functions is to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed."26 Certainly, it is a manifestation of less than
fealty to such a duty if an executive official like respondent
would enforce a statutory provision not as written but as
expanded and enlarged by him through a process of strained
construction.
4. One last word. Nothing is better settled in the law
than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The
government itself is merely an agency through which the will
of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore
are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption
that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation
of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence
of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do
suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be
sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language of Chief
Justice Hughes: "It must be conceded that departmental zeal
may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
statute."27 Neither the high dignity of the office nor the
righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute.
Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an
eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS COURT
OF APPEALS
231 SCRA 292
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
FACTS
• On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the
8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the
health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the
water content of the surrounding area.
• The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that
the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open
dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under
Presidential Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as
required under Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.
• The LLDA found that the water collected from the
leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect
the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates
the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may
have contaminated the sample during collection or handling.
• On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and
Desist Order ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other
entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping
any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the
Camarin dumpsite.
• On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the
assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias
Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all
garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area
being utilized as a dumpsite.
• The City Government of Caloocan filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order
• In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan
sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to
promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the
people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
• REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
• On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio,
after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the
consolidated cases an order denying LLDA's motion to
dismiss and granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons
acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing
its cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of
Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite
during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders
of the court.
COURT OF APPEALS
• On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for
annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within
the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under
its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D.
No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
ISSUE
• Whether or not the LLDA has the authority to
entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in
the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the
City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and
the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought
about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage
dumpsite
SUPREME COURT
Yes.
• As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB),
except in cases where the special law provides for another
forum.
• It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA,
as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of
San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
• Under such a broad grant and power and authority,
the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake
region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating
from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
• In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy,
the LLDA is mandated, among others, to pass upon and
approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the
region, public corporations, and private persons or
enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are
related to those of the LLDA for the development of the
region.
ISSUE
• Whether or not the LLDA has the power and
authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic
Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws
SUPREME COURT
Yes.
• By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify
order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." 24
(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes
the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
• To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred
the power "to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order" in a
language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan,
similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution
Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which,
admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No.
927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw
therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power
to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter
or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is
expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983.
• The immediate response to the demands of "the
necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives vitality to
the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article
II, Section 16 which provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.
• As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every
person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This
is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to
protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne
in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference
Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental
human right.
CARINO V. CAPULONG
(Authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational
institution a discretionary duty)
ISSUES:
1) WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
2) WON the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant
educational institution is a discretionary duty?
HELD:
(1)Yes
(2) Yes
RATIO:
(1) In the case at bar, private respondents' application for a
permit to operate AMACC-Davao City as an educational
institution was denied by the petitioners. Otherwise stated,
the private respondents do not have a permit to operate or a
certificate of recognition from the government to undertake
educational or school operations. In fine, the private
respondents do not have any existing right that needed to be
protected during the pendency of their principal action for
mandamus. Hence, the "closing" and/or "padlocking" of
AMACC-Davao City would not and did not violate any right of
the private respondents.
Moreover, it is not the function of the WPI to restrain a public
officer from performing a duty imposed by law or to permit
the doing of that which is declared unlawful. Under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 232 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, the establishment and operation of schools are
subject to the prior authorization of the government. And, as
sanctions for operating without permit, the DECS is
authorized either to impose the total closure of school and/or
to disqualify the school from conferring title or degree in the
non-recognized program or course of studies. In ordering the
total closure of AMACC-Davao City, the petitioners were only
performing their duties as public officers; hence, the
respondent Judge should not have issued the writ of
preliminary injunction. In issuing the writ, he allowed the
private respondents to continue the operation of AMACC-
Davao City as an educational institution without a permit or
certificate of government recognition, thereby sanctioning the
act which is unlawful.
(2) The action filed by the private respondents in the court
below is a petition for mandamus to compel the petitioners to
approve their application to operate AMACC-Davao City as an
educational institution. As a rule, mandamus will lie only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a
discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so
clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of
discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a
discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the
exercise of judgment.
In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is
not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is a discretionary
duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had
to be exercised in accordance with — and not in violation of
— the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Establishment or recognition of private schools through
government grant of permits is governed by law, specifically
Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is
vested upon the judgment of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and
regulations governing the recognition on private schools
(Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).
Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is
a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the
rules and regulations prescribed.
In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school
without a permit in blatant violation of law. Public respondent
has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to
operate a school in Davao City before petitioner has even
filed an application or before his application has been first
processed in accordance with the rules and regulations on
the matter. Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by
any law to grant such permit or to allow such operation
without a permit, without first processing an application. To
do so is violation of the Educational Act
Marcos burial: Ocampo vs. Enriquez (majority opinion digest)
Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C.
Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973; Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs.
Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, G.R. No. 226097,
November 8, 2016
Facts:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential
Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly
announced that he would allow the burial former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani
("LNMB").
On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N.
Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga
Bayani. Duterte won the May 9, 2016 election and formally
assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacanan Palace.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernest C. Enriquez
issued a directive to the Philippine Army regarding the
Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.
ISSUES
1) Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense
and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they issued
the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with
the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his
election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB?
2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed
memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic
and international laws?
3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten
wealth from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the
pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have
nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to
interment at the LNMB?
4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the
burial of the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB
after they entered into an agreement with the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and
procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to
and interred in the Philippines?
RULING
The petitions must be dismissed.
Procedural issues
Political question
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's
decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. In the excercise of his powers under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the
public domain devoted for national military cemetery and
military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of
grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed
below, President Duterte's decision on that political question
is outside the ambit of judicial review.
Locus standi
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because they failed to
show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and
personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB.
Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim
illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that
Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either
express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or
jurisprudence.
Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to
disclose the direct or potential injury which they may suffer
as a result of the act complained of. Their interest in this
case is too general and shared by other groups, such that
their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is
inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.
Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of
transcendental importance. At this point in time, the
interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a
national military cemetery and declared a national shrine
would have no profound effect on the political, economic,
and other aspects of our national life considering that more
than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30)
years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly,
petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat
to their fundamental constitutional rights.
As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman,
they failed to show that the burial of Marcos encroaches on
their prerogatives as legislators.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy,
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners
should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the
assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary
ofNational Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should
be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted,
considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon
his order. Questions on the implementation and
interpretation thereof demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of his office to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be
dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could
elevate the matter before the Office of the President which
has control and supervision over the Department of National
Defense (DND).
Hierarchy of Courts
While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this
case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed
first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is
not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law
in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has
the power to issue restraining order and injunction when
proven necessary.
Substantive issues
I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in
accordance with the Constitution, the law of jurisprudence
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as
a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing
guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to
the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at
the LNMB.
Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-
executing provision considering that a law should be passed
by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle
embodied therein. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted the
Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and
Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To complement these statutes,
the Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda,
and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of
conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees;
workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on
gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and reporting; and client
feedback program
Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Ar
t. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art.
XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational
institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and
nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of
Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze
orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.
Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or
indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.
The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not
violated by public respondents. Being the Chief Executive,
the President represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his or her department. Under the Faithful
Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
"necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the
law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being
inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the
other executive functions. It is best construed as an imposed
obligation, not a separate grant of power. The provision
simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the
cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but
is obliged to obey and execute them.
There is no violation of RA 289
Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical
bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the National
Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected
because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial
place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject
matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which
was later on revoked by President Magsaysay's Proclamation
No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos'
Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist
at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to
appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of
the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of the
legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the
establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal
remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes,
and patriots.
Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved
only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be
violative of public policy as it will put into question the
validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains resting
therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of
powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on
the grant of authority to the President under existing laws
and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG
that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the
consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does
not confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name,
which is actually a misnomer, the purpose of the LNMB, both
from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to
confer to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to
require that only those interred therein should be treated as
a "hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's
burial" and "state honors," without showing proof as to what
kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains
of Marcos, is speculative until the specifics of the interment
have been finalized by public respondents.
RA 10639 is not violated
The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the
beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it
includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It
would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually
contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our
legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically
proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation"
for the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs). The law is
silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read
into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if not
unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by
supplying material details into the law. That would be
tantamount to judicial legislation.
The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368
will surely not be impaired by the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal
connection and legal relation to the law. The subject
memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and
cannot interfere with the statutory powers and functions of
the Board and the Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs'
entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368
and other domestic laws are not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368
does not amend or repeal, whether express or implied, the
provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G
161-375.
There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws
The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single
resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public
respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether
petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are
already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and
minds of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the
unborn, it must be said that the preservation and
popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of
the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of
every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions
of the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV
Memorial Commission in the memorialization of HRVV s, the
National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP),
formerly known as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is
mandated to act as the primary government agency
responsible for history and is authorized to determine all
factual matters relating to official Philippine history.
II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not
done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill
will or personal bias
The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines
enumerated in PD 105
P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact
that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not
expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the
latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in
the catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in
the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because: (1) As
stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2)
Following the canon of statutory construction known as
ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth,
exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent
leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment, the
LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the
PVAO.
Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive
words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place
and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein.
Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish
said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither
does it negate the presumed individual or collective
"heroism" of the men and women buried or will be buried
therein. The "nation's esteem and reverence for her war
dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in
issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That
being said, the interment of Marcos, therefore, does not
constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and cultural
integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military
memorials. The PVAO, which is empowered to administer,
develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the
supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is
under the Office of the President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch
of Government is a self-executing provision of the
Constitution and does not require statutory implementation,
nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the
alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos
and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred
in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free
to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into
by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he
considers, based on informed judgment and presumed
wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has
the power to reserve for public use and for specific public
purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the
reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public
purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive
issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is
located from the use it was originally intended by the past
Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for
Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a
legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military
personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether
recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such,
satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of
public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is
granted to compensate him for valuable public services
rendered.
Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos'
remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for
national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners'
highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of
exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is
actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and
bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is
not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to
establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so,
this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We
are not a trier of facts.
AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained
Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible
for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b)
Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) Secretaries of
National Defense; ( d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag
Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel
of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in
line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary
(CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related
activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who laterally
entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of
Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized
guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National
Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or
reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G)
Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries,
Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents,
Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.
Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not
qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were
dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service;
and (b) Authorized personnel who were convicted by final
judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude.
In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the
contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the
sole authority in determining who are entitled and
disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if
they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C.
Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were
themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the
rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the
LNMB. The validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must,
therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the AFP
Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary of
National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.
AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in
the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that it has
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra
vires for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical, and
capricious standards for qualification for burial at the LNMB.
It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the
dissent described it, to argue that the word "bayani" in the
LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of
heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national shrine for
military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to
its feature as a military cemetery and to those who were
already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of
the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives,
has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title
of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein
should be treated as a "hero."
In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been
loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list of eligible
includes not only those who rendered active military service
or military-related activities but also non-military personnel
who were recognized for their significant contributions to the
Philippine society (such as government dignitaries,
statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National
Defense). In 1998, the widows of former Presidents,
Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff were
added to the list. Whether or not the extension of burial
privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted
in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the
LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it
is indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active
military service and military-related activities.
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former
President and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary
of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a
Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses
and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a
President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him
the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he
held or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with
the proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in
his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was
not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like
us.
Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos
possessed none of the disqualifications stated in AFP
Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final
judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor
dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active
military service.
The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final
judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No less
than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not
be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally,
there is no property right to safeguard because even if one is
eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give
him or her the privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is
a favorable recommendation from the Commander- in-Chief,
the Congress or the Secretary of National Defense, no right
can be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is
not legally demandable and enforceable.
Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the
requisites of equal protection clause are not met. 181 In this
case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a
military personnel and a former President. The conditions of
dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War attach only
to the members of the military. There is also no substantial
distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine
Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia,
and Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification
between a military personnel and a former President is
germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and P.D.
No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military
memorials, it is also an active military cemetery that
recognizes the status or position held by the persons interred
therein.
Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military
service. PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired veteran
pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not
shown that he was dishonorably discharged from military
service under APP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative
Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for
violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of War. The
NHCP study is incomplete with respect to his entire military
career as it failed to cite and include the official records of
the AFP.
The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be
construed as that rendered by a military person in the AFP,
including civil service, from the time of his/her commission,
enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of
his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil service
after honorable separation and retirement from the AFP is
outside the context of "service" under AFP Regulations G
161-375.
Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster
from the presidency during the EDSA Revolution is
tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or
discharge from the military service. The fact that the
President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the
1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy
of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military
person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the
President can hardly be deemed "dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as
contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable
discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-
constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is
beyond the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere
administrative regulation.
IIt is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out
of office by the people through the so-called EDSA
Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be
automatically given a particular legal meaning other than its
obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To
do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous and
perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious
inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the
people. It is not the function of the Court, for instance, to
divine the exact implications or significance of the number of
votes obtained in elections, or the message from the number
of participants in public assemblies. If the Court is not to fall
into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and
oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, debates, it must
remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding stars -
clear constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain,
ambiguous and confusing messages from the actions of the
people.
CIR V CTA
GR No 106611, July 21, 1994
FACTS:
Citytrust filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals
claiming the refund of its income tax overpayments for the
years 1983, 1984 and 1985 in the total amount of
P19,971,745. The CIR could not present any evidence due to
the repeated failure of the tax credit/refund division of the
BIR to transmit the records of the case and the investigation
report to the Solicitor General. The case was decided in favor
of City Trust. Upon motion of reconsideration, petitioner
alleged that through an inter-office memorandum of the Tax
Credit/Refund Division, dated August 8, 1991, he came to
know only that Citytrust had outstanding tax liabilities for
1984 in the amount of P56,588,740.91 representing
deficiency income and business taxes.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the BIR was denied its day in court
2. Whether the CTA erred in denying petitioner’s
supplemental motion for reconsideration alleging bringing to
said court’s attention the existence of deficiency income and
business taxes
RULING:
1. Yes, the BIR is denied its day in court. When it was
petitioner’s turn to present evident evidence, several
postponements were sought by its counsel, the Solicitor
General, due to the unavailability of the necessary records
which were not transmitted by the Refund Audit Division of
the BIR to said counsel. It was under such predicament and
in deference to the tax court that the counsel was
constrained to submit the case for decision without
presenting any evidence. It is a long and firmly settled rule of
law that the Government is not bound by the errors
committed by its agents.
2. Yes. The fact of such deficiency assessment is intimately
related and inextricably intertwined with the right of the
bank. The private respondent cannot be entitled to refund
and at the same time be liable for a deficiency tax
assessment for the same year.
VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Damages; The general
rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a
person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks;
However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad
faith which being outside the scope of his authority, are no
longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.— The general rule is that a public officer is not liable
for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to
administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not
liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as
it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is
not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad
faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no
longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.
Same; Same; Same; A public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly
sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if
his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith;
Instances Where a Public Officer May Be Validly Sued in
His/Her Private Capacity for Acts Done in the Course of the
Performance of the Functions of the Office.—In addition, the
Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA
602 (1999), that a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly
sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if
his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus,
the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be
validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the office,
where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the
Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of
superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the
performance of their duties; while said provisions deal in
particular with the liability of government officials, the subject
thereof is general, i.e., “acts” done in the performance of
official duties, without specifying the action or omission that
may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.—
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the
Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of
superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the
performance of their duties. For both superior and
subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice,
and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable
for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in
particular with the liability of government officials, the subject
thereof is general, i.e.,“acts” done in the performance of
official duties, without specifying the action or omission that
may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.
Same; Same; Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers.— Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in
clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an “act”
that may give rise to an action for damages against a public
officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and
liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are
governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code.
While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human
Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a
special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable
for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts
that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus
with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly
deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance
of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision
which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to
seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp.
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which
provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad
valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall
not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of
RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,”
“Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these
cigarette brands were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune
contended that the issuance of the rule violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss
that respondent has no cause of action against her because
she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official
function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed
that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and
therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She
also contended that the complaint states no cause of action
for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the
CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article
32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with
malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in connection with the
discharge of the functions of his/her office
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of
Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is
not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within the
scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his
authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she
heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused
to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law
not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for
acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity
for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil
liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness
or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice
or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may
be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the office,
where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is
Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a
general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A
tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the
commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly,
in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it
has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the
conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and
there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason
sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental
attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself,
would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of
good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does
not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of
another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded
by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO
CORPORATION
GR No. 141309, JUNE 19 2007
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune
Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture
of different brands of cigarettes, among which are
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No.
7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to
its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and
"More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1,
1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner
issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and
"More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in
effect subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes
to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1)
on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad
valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not
be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."
Fortune filed an MfR on 20 Jul, requesting the RMC's recall
but it was denied on 30 Jul, and payment of the AV tax
deficiency (9M~) was demanded within 10 days. Fortune
filed a petition for review with the CTaxApp (CTA) which
issued an injunction enjoining RMC's implementation
(defective, invalid, unenforceable). This was affirmed by the
CA, and SC in Comm, BIR v. CA, since the RMC fell short of
the requirements for a valid admin issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a
complaint for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be
held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without
due process of law and the right to equal protection of the
laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that:
(1) respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her
official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts;
(2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith;
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion
to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner
would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case
without allowing the parties to present evidence
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed
on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability
may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or
bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38,
Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the
civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code
is the special law that governs the instant case.
Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the
complaint for damages.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending
that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the
performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is
Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should
be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when
there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code,
specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for
violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the
liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public
officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant
case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence,
the same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action
Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats
in general the public officers’ "acts" from which civil liability
may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals
specifically with the public officers’ violation of constitutional
rights, is a special provision which should determine whether
the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case
of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under
Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is
not required that said public officer should have acted with
malice or in bad faith
ISSUE/S:
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of the
functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section
38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in
determining whether the instant complaint states a cause of
action?
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is
not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within the
scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his
authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she
heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused
to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law
not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for
acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity
for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil
liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness
or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice
or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may
be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the office,
where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by
respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive
provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean
Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights,
Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so
amended as to make a public official liable for violation of
another person’s constitutional rights only if the public official
acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission
opposes this suggestion for these reasons:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil
or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be
malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat
the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have
abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or
good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the
object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the
plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the
nature of a tort.
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. A
tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the
commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly,
in person, property, or reputation. There are cases in which it
has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the
conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and
there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason
sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental
attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself,
would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of
good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does
not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of
another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded
by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid
down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate
public officers for acts done in the performance of their
duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers, the
presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital
elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that
while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of
government officials, the subject thereof is general, i.e.,
"acts" done in the performance of official duties, without
specifying the action or omission that may give rise to a civil
suit against the official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and
unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may
give rise to an action for damages against a public officer,
and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties.
Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are
governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code.
While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human
Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a
special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable
for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts
that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus
with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly
deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance
of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision
which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to
seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.
ISIDRO CARIÑO VS THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human
Rights; Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to
have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over certain
specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.—The threshold question is
whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try
and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of
cases, like alleged human rights violations in volving civil or
political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human
Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by
the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded
to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of
fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil
and political rights.—The most that may be conceded to the
Commission. in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusion in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly
and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations invoking civil
and political rights.—As should at once be observed, only the
first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power
to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own
initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt
and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any
investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth.
It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions,
in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide
cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice or
even quasi-judicial bodies do.—But it cannot try and decide
cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or
even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite
distinct meanings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission
on Human Rights having merely the power to investigate
cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–
775.—Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights,
having merely the power “to investigate,” cannot and should
not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters
involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there
be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters
are undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of
the Secretary of Education and also within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.—These are
matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the
scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the
Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission.
Distinction between the power to adjudicate and the power
to investigate
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted
actions” to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to
act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in
staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The
Secretary of Education served them with an order to return
to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed
the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon
Magsaysay High School were administratively charged,
preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D.
807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee
was consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the
Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings.
Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service
of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy
and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC,
raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking
teachers’ to due process of law. The case was eventually
elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent
teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating
in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its
resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the
Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite
this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
“striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they
should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to
the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their
civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered
to investigate.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the
issues involved
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have
no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the
way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To
be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the
Commission the power to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of
any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations
of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules
of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority, it may grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in
the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required
by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or
study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or
inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same:
"(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation.
To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into
with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter
or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally
(the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide
or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try
and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved
in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there
be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings
against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no
power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether
or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the
teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted
by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite
the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education,
constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are
justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c)
what where the particular acts done by each individual
teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed
for said acts or omissions.
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec.
of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also,
within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions
reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases
are correct and are adequately based on substantial
evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due
process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had
in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil
and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon
and determined through a motion for reconsideration
addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the
event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil
Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.
204 SCRA 483 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The
Constitutional Commissions – Commission on Human Rights –
Adjudicatory Power of the CHR
On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in
Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in
order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers
were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then
investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary
Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from the service of one
teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was
appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the
meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari
regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing
the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a
subpoena to Secretary Cariño.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide
and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged
human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has
no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human
rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot
and should not try and decide on the merits and matters
involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from
proceeding with the trial.
Same; Same; Administrative Law; Department Secretaries
are authorized to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary actions for officers and employees under their
jurisdiction.—The Administrative Code of 1987 vests
department secretaries with the authority to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and
employees under the former’s jurisdiction. Thus, the health
secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. Note
that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais
was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line with the
principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint.” While the Chief Executive directly dismissed her
from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health
secretary’s disciplinary authority over respondents when he
remanded the PCAGC’s findings against them for the
secretary’s “appropriate action.”
Same; Same; Same; As a matter of administrative procedure,
a department secretary may utilize other officials to
investigate and report the facts from which a decision may
be based; Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
power to impose any administrative sanctions directly—their
authority was limited to conducting investigations and
preparing their findings and recommendations.—As a matter
of administrative procedure, a department secretary may
utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from
which a decision may be based. In the present case, the
secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to
the PCAGC. Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their
authority was limited to conducting investigations and
preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to
impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who
had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Cardinal Principles in
Administrative Due Process.—Due process in administrative
proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present one’s case and submit
supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have
some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial
evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a
decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and
must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate;
and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that
respondents would know the reasons for it and the various
issues involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the department secretary
has the competence and the authority to decide what action
should be taken against officials and employees who have
been administratively charged and investigated, the actual
exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the facts, and
failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid
decision.—The health secretary has the competence and the
authority to decide what action should be taken against
officials and employees who have been administratively
charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of
the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a prior
independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to
comply with this requirement results in an invalid decision.
The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely
on an investigator’s recommendation, but must personally
weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There can be no
shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation,
and the livelihood of the person administratively charged. In
the present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order
dismissing respondents pales in comparison with the
presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the
issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos
conducted a restudy of the doctor’s case. He even noted a
violation that had not been considered by the PCAGC. On the
other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply
and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the
Commission’s Resolution. She even misquoted it by
inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to
Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Like that of President Ramos, the
decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual
finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and
thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so
desired.—The President’s endorsement of the records of the
case for the “appropriate action” of the health secretary did
not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of
respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of
Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding
and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and
thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so
desired.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The end does not justify the
means—guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed,
unless due process is first observed, this is the essence of
fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.—In
representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor
General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges
and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service.
Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt
of respondents, but solely due process. In closing, the Court
reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end does not
justify the means. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty
imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the
essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.
DOH VS CAMPOSANO
Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing
disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must make an
independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its
face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show
the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a
case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or
group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless
weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable law.
In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the
bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their
appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting
idea of fair play in a democracy.
Facts:
Respondents are former employees of the DOH-NCR. Some
concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the
DOH Resident Ombudsman against respondents arising out
of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500
bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex
and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory.
Issue: WON there has been a failure to comply with
administrative due process
Held:
The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department
secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and
employees under the former's jurisdiction.[16] Thus, the
health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.
The Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report
to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a
formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents.
The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the
them for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA
3019.Then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued
Administrative Order No. 298 creating an ad-hoc committee
to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-
NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the PCAGC.
The PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After
the investigation, it issued a resolution disposing respondents
(guilty as charged) and so recommends to his Excellency
President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from
the government service be imposed thereon. President
Ramos issued AO 390 that DISMISSED them from the
service. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision on the
ground that the PCAGC's jurisdiction over administrative
complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus,
the Commission had no power to investigate the charges
against respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely
relying on the PCAGC's findings, the secretary of health failed
to comply with administrative due process.
Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda
Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the President, in line
with the principle that the 'power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint.[17] While the Chief Executive directly
dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless recognized
the health secretary's disciplinary authority over respondents
when he remanded the PCAGC's findings against them for
the secretary's 'appropriate action.
As a matter of administrative procedure, a department
secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report
the facts from which a decision may be based.[19] In the
present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power
to investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc
Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their
authority was limited to conducting investigations and
preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to
impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who
had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.
Due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents' right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's case and submit supporting evidence, must be
observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support
itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal
must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the
facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted
the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be
rendered in such manner that respondents would know the
reasons for it and the various issues involved.
The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had
not been observed in the present factual milieu.
Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident
from the health secretary's Order dismissing the respondents
thus guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless
due process is first observed. This is the essence of fairness
and the rule of law in a democracy.
OPLE V. TORRES
FACTS
Administrative Order No. 308, entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System," was
issued by President Fidel Ramos On December 12, 1996.
Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition seeking to invalidate A.O.
No. 308 on several grounds. One of them is that: The
establishment of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System requires a legislative act. The issuance of
A.O. No.308 by the President is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of congress. Petitioner
claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order
but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to
issue. He alleges that A.O. No.308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the
life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident,
and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
On this point, respondents counter-argue that: A.O. No. 308
was issued within the executive and administrative powers of
the president without encroaching on the legislative powers
of congress.
ISSUE
Whether the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate.
HELD
Legislative power is the authority to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them. The Constitution has vested this power in
the Congress. The grant of legislative power to Congress is
broad, general, and comprehensive. Any power deemed to
be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed
by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
The executive power, on the other hand, is vested in the
President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance. As
head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. Corollary to the
power of control, the President also has the duty of
supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
From these precepts, the Court holds that A.O. No. 308
involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the
President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The Court rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code
of 1987. The Code is a general law and incorporates in a
unified document the major structural, functional and
procedural principles of governance and embodies changes in
administrative structure and procedures designed to serve
the people.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely
implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes
for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies - the primacy
of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of
some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well
as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject
that should be covered by law.
Smart Communications, Inc. Et Al. vs. National
Telecommunications Commission (Ntc) G.R. 151908, August
12, 2003
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE
OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)
G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003
Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which
promulgated rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a
petition to declare the circular as unconstitutional. A motion
to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioner’s
to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.
Held: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power
is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and
regulations must conform to, and be consistent with, the
provisions of enabling statute.
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-
judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them for their official action and exercise of discretion in
a judicial.
2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules
issued by an administrative body contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the
Constitution which is “ the duty of the Courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The NTC circular was
issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.
Hence, the action must be filed directly with the regular
courts without requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, exhaustion of
administrative remedy is required, before going to court.
4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the same must be referred to an administrative
agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. This doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body. In such
case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.
Facts:
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued
on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services.
The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect
15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished
the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The
Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the provisions
of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of
prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile
telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of
the Memorandum Circular.
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all
cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which
contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the
incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. This was
followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
addressed to all public telecommunications entities.
Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone
Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy
Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner
Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular)
and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order.
Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate
the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade
and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that
the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of
the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property
without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid
SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that
the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a
joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-
in-Intervention and this was granted by the trial court.
Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and
Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
152063, assigning the following errors. Thus, two petitions
were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.
Issues:
1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts
over the case; and
2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional
and contrary to law and public policy.
Held:
Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-
making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power
is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine
a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises
of the regulatory statute administered.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and
decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred
in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing
the case.
Constitutionality of the Circular
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need
not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-
judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to
its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to
pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific
rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October
6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making
power.
Ruling:
Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues
raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters.
Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this
issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular
telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and
this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good
percentage of our population – and expertise in fundamental
principles of civil law and the Constitution.
Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the
decision of the Court of Appeals on the civil cases are
reversed and set aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a
quo for continuation of the proceedings.
EDU V. ERICTA
G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 En Banc [Non-delegation
of power; police power]
FACTS:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation
Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the
constitutionality of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for
certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge Ericta of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to
annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order
No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid
statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and
prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo
assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as such
administrative order.
Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17,
1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: No motor
vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or
denomination shall be registered if not equipped with
reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory
built in reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape
or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have
an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times
such that if struck by a beam of light shall be
visible 477 meters away at night. Then came a section on
dimensions, placement and color.
As to dimensions the following is provided for “Glass
reflectors - Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less
than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape - at least 3 inches
wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be
bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner. “Provision is
then made as to how such reflectors are to be “placed,
installed, pasted or painted.”
There is the further requirement that in addition to such
reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four
re ectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those
installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end
of the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors,
whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or
reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor
vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the
sides and in the rear shall all be red.
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed.
Thus “Non-compliance with the requirements contained in
this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of
the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its
registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions
of Section 16 of RA. 4136 Provided, however, that in the
case of the violation of Section 1 A and B and paragraph 8,
Sec 3 hereof, a fine of not less ten nor more than fifty pesos
shall be imposed.
ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is
constitutional and valid.
RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order
to promote public safety and order.
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons
and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent
Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2
issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being
contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April
17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing
what was set forth in the Act.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of
separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments
may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot
be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together
with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of
which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress
and emphasis on public safety which is the prime
consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a
categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land
Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and
regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such
fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no
abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the
attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority
by a particular department must be inharmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect itsgeneral provisions. By such regulations,
the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative
agencycannot amend an act of Congress.
FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes
electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries
Lawand the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The
municipal court quashed the complaint andheld that the law
does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive
and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On
appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to
the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro
fishing is valid?
HELD:NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing the administrative order. The old
Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking
body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to
that effect could have been easily embodied in the old
Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in
the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to
executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose,
the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have
the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority
granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-
making power.
REPUBLIC V. DRUGMAKERS LABORATORIES
GR No. 190837, March 5, 2014
FACTS: The DOH, thru then Secretary Alfredo R.A. Bengzon,
issued Administrative Order No. AO 67, s. 1989, entitled
“Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of
Pharmaceutical Products.” It required drug manufacturers to
register certain drug and medicine products with the FDA
before they may release the same to the market for sale. In
this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence
(BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR
for these products. However, the implementation of the
BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there
was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The
issuance of the Circular No. 1, s. 1997 resumed the FDA’s
implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the
establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country.
Thereafter, the FDA issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997 which
provided additional implementation details concerning the
BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.
ISSUE: Who has the power to validly issue and implement
Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997: Secretary of Health or FDA?
Do the assailed circulars partake of administrative rules and
regulations and, as such, must comply with the requirements
of prior hearing, consultation and publication?
RULING: The FDA has sufficient authority to issue the
circulars and since they would not affect the substantive
rights of the parties that they seek to govern, as they are not
administrative regulations, no prior hearing, consultation, and
publication are needed for their validity. Circular Nos. 1 and
8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations
because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain
existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates;
and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things
upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. The only
purpose of the circulars is for the FDA to administer and
supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s.
1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing
requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720.
ASTEC vs. ERC
September 18, 2012
FACTS: The Petitioners BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I, QUEZELCO
II, and PRESCO are rural electric cooperatives established
under P.D. 269 or the National Electrification Administration
Decree. The Petitioners are no-profit organizations engaged
in the distribution of electricity. On 8 December 1994, R.A.
7832 was enacted, which imposed a cap on the recoverable
rate of system loss that the rural electric cooperatives may
charge to their customers. Pursuant to said law, the Energy
Regulatory Board issued Orders on 19 February 1997 and 25
April 1997provisionally authorizing the petitioners and other
rural electric cooperatives to use a prescribed formula or the
computation of the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA). On 8
June 2001, R.A. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform
Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA
abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC). In an Order dated 17 June 2003, the ERC
noted that the PPA formula which was approved by the ERB
was silent on whether the PPA formula approved by the ERB
was based on gross or net of discounts. For uniformity, the
ERC ruled that for past PPAs, power cost shall still be based
on―gross while for future PPAs, power cost shall be based
on ―net.
Several rural electric cooperatives filed motions for
reconsideration on the following grounds: 1) that they are
non-profit organizations such that their rates do not include
any possible extra revenue except the discounts; and 2) that
they are burdened with expenses in their continuing
expansion programs for rural electrification. On 14 January
2005, the ERC issued an Order, in which it stressed that the
purchased power cost is a pass though cost to customers
and, therefore, the rural electric cooperatives should only
recover from their members and patrons the actual cost of
power purchased from power suppliers. Consistent with this,
any discounts extended to rural electric cooperatives must
necessarily be extended to end- users by charging only the
―net cost of purchased power.
The ERC then directed the Petitioners to refund their
respective over-recoveries to end-users arising from the
implementation of R.A. 7832.The motions for reconsideration
filed by the Petitioners were denied by the ERC.
Court of Appeals: denied the petitions for review of the rural
electric cooperatives, and affirmed the Orders of the ERC
directing the various rural electric cooperatives to refund
their respective over-recoveries.
ISSUE 1:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are
ineffective and invalid for lack of 1) publication, 2) non-
submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their 3) retroactive
application.
HELD:
1) No, publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the
policy guidelines. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers give no
real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed.
RATIO:
1) Publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process.
The purpose of publication is to duly inform the public of the
contents of the laws which govern them and regulate their
activities. Art. 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by E.O. No.
200, as well as E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
both provide that―[l]aws shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
unless it is otherwise provided.
2) Procedural due process demands that administrative rules
and regulations be published in order to be effective. In
Tañada vs. Tuvera, the S.C. held: ALL statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
3) Exceptions to the requirement of publication:
3.1. An interpretative regulation, to be effective, needs
nothing more than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. It adds nothing to the law and does not affect the
substantial rights of any person.
3.2 A regulation that is merely internal in nature. It seeks to
regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the general public.
3.3 Letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency
concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates
in the performance of their duties
4) The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are interpretative
regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No.
7832 and its IRR, particularly on the computation of the cost
of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify,
amend or supplant the IRR.
4.1. ERC‘s policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts
merely interpret the cost of purchased power as a
component of the PPA formula under R.A. 7832‘s IRR. The
guidelines merely affirmed the plain and unambiguous
meaning of ―cost‖ in said IRR. ―Cost‖ is an item of outlay,
and must therefore exclude discounts since these are ― not
amounts paid or charged for the sale of electricity, but are
reductions in rates.
4.2. ERC‘s policy guidelines uphold and preserve the nature
of the PPA formula. The nature of the PPA formula precludes
an interpretation that includes discounts in the computation
of the cost of purchased power. The PPA formula is an
adjustment mechanism the purpose of which is purely for the
recovery of cost.
HELD:
2) As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the
ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law
Center in order to be effective.
RATIO:
1) The Administrative Code of 1987 requires every rule
adopted by an agency to be filedwith the U.P. Law Center to
be effective.
2) However, in Board of Trustees of the GSIS v. Velasco, it
was held that not all rules and regulations adopted by every
government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature
are not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center.
(Paragraph 9 (a) of the Guidelines for Receiving and
Publication of Rules andRegulations Filed with the U.P. Law
Center)
MANILA JOCKEY V. CA
Manila Jockey Club v CA
FACTS
On June 18, 1948, Congress approved Republic Act No. 309,
entitled An Act to Regulate Horse Racing in the Philippines.
This Act consolidated all existing laws and amended
inconsistent provisions relative to horse racing. It provided
for the distribution of gross receipts from the sale of betting
tickets, but is silent on the allocation of so-called breakages.
Thus the practice, according to the petitioners, was to use
the breakages for the anti-bookies drive and other sales
promotions activities of the horse racing clubs.
On March 20, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 420 was issued
creating the Philippine Racing Commission (PHILRACOM),
giving it exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect
of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and
scheduling of races. By virtue of this power, the PHILRACOM
authorized the holding of races on Wednesdays starting on
December 22, 1976.
Petitioners made a joint query regarding the ownership of
breakages accumulated during Wednesday races. In
response to the query, PHILRACOM rendered its opinion in a
letter dated September 20, 1978. It declared that the
breakages belonged to the racing clubs concerned.
On December 16, 1986 President Corazon Aquino amended
certain provisions Sec. 4 of R.A. 6631 and Sec. 6 of R.A.
6632 through Executive Orders No. 88 and 89.
On April 23, 1987, PHILRACOM itself addressed a query to
the Office of the President asking which agency is entitled to
dispose of the proceeds of the breakages derived from the
Tuesday and Wednesday races.
In a letter dated May 21, 1987, the Office of the President,
through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
Jr., replied that the disposition of the breakages rightfully
belongs to PHILRACOM, not only those derived from the
Saturday, Sunday and holiday races, but also from the
Tuesday and Wednesday races in accordance with the
distribution scheme prescribed in said Executive Orders.
Controversy arose when herein respondent PHILRACOM, sent
a series of demand letters to petitioners MJCI and PRCI,
requesting its share in the breakages of mid-week-races and
proof of remittances to other legal beneficiaries as provided
under the franchise laws.
ISSUE
Who are the rightful beneficiaries of the breakages derived
from mid-week races? This issue also carries an ancillary
question: assuming PHILRACOM is entitled to the mid-week
breakages under the law, should the petitioners remit the
money from the time the mid-week races started, or only
upon the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89?
HELD
A reasonable reading of the horse racing laws favors the
determination that the entities enumerated in the distribution
scheme provided under R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632, as
amended by Executive Orders 88 and 89, are the rightful
beneficiaries of breakages from mid-week races. Petitioners
should therefore remit the proceeds of breakages to those
benefactors designated by the aforesaid laws.
The holding of horse races on Wednesdays is in addition to
the existing schedule of races authorized by law. Since this
new schedule became part of R.A. 6631 and 6632 the set of
procedures in the franchise laws applicable to the conduct of
horse racing business must likewise be applicable to
Wednesday or other mid-week races.
A fortiori, the granting of the mid-week races does not
require another legislative act to reiterate the manner of
allocating the proceeds of betting tickets. Neither does the
allocation of breakages under the same provision need to be
isolated to construe another distribution scheme. No law can
be viewed in a condition of isolation or as the beginning of a
new legal system.
Proceeding to the subsidiary issue, the period for the
remittance of breakages to the beneficiaries should have
commenced from the time PHILRACOM authorized the
holding of mid-week races because R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632
were already in effect then. The petitioners contend that they
cannot be held retroactively liable to respondent PHILRACOM
for breakages prior to the effectivity of E.O. Nos. 88 and 89.
They assert that the real intent behind E.O. Nos. 88 and 89
was to favor the respondent PHILRACOM anew with the
benefits which formerly had accrued in favor of Philippine
Amateur Athletic Federation (PAAF). They opine that since
laws operate prospectively unless the legislator intends to
give them retroactive effect, the accrual of these breakages
should start on December 16, 1986, the date of effectivity of
E.O. Nos. 88 and 89. Now, even if one of the benefactors of
breakages, the PAAF, as provided by R.A. 6631 and 6632 had
ceased operation, it is still not proper for the petitioners to
presume that they were entitled to PAAFs share. When the
petitioners mistakenly appropriated the breakages for
themselves, they became the implied trustees for those
legally entitled to the proceeds.
While herein petitioners might have relied on a prior opinion
issued by an administrative body, the well-entrenched
principle is that the State could not be estopped by a mistake
committed by its officials or agents. Although there was an
initial interpretation of the law by PHILRACOM, a court of law
could not be precluded from setting that interpretation aside
if later on it is shown to be inappropriate.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY-LIST ET. AL VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
(G.R. No. 168056) - Digest
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act
9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on
July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government
from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions
for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality
of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common
proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: “That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%,
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of
the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%)”
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the
President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by
Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti.
They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange
of goods and services which can’t be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon
merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President
the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They
insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency
should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not
pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also
argue that the law also effectively nullified the President’s
power of control, which includes the authority to set aside
and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of
Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the
Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of
the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of
Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are
those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively,
legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be
delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete
as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it
shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability
of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the
validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under
Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it
must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement
and administration of the increased rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the
12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or
non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside
of the control of the executive. No discretion would be
exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the
common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately
impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the
conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot
be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose
the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority
to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by December
31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government
deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and 1½%. If either of these two instances has occurred,
the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit
such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of
Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which
its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses
all the facilities to gather data and information and has a
much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His
function is to gather and collate statistical data and other
pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions
laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of
the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
SM LAND, INC v. BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPEMENT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014
CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
FACTS:
Pursuant to RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992), the BCDA opened for disposition and development
its Bonifacio South Property. Jumping on the opportunity, SM
Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA an unsolicited
proposal for the development of the lot through a Public-
Private Joint Venture Agreement which was accepted by the
BCDA. However, the BCDA clarified that its act should not be
construed to bind the agency to enter into a joint venture
agreement with SMLI but only constitutes an authorization to
conduct detailed negotiations with SMLI and iron out the
terms and conditions of the agreement.
Upon arriving at mutually acceptable terms and conditions, a
Certification of Successful Negotiations (Certification) was
issued by the BCDA and signed by both parties with the
provisions that the BCDA undertook to “subject SMLI’s
Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge” and committed
itself to “commence the activities for the solicitation for
comparative proposals.” Then, instead of proceeding with the
Competitive Challenge, the BCDA corresponded with SMLI
stating that it will welcome any “voluntary and unconditional
proposal” to improve the original offer, with the assurance
that the BCDA will nonetheless respect any right which may
have accrued in favor of SMLI. In turn, SMLI increased the
total secured payments with an upfront payment.
Without responding to SMLI’s new proposal, the BCDA sent a
memorandum to the Office of the President (OP)
categorically recommending the termination of the
Competitive Challenge. Alarmed by this development, SMLI
urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive Challenge
as agreed upon. However, the BCDA, via the assailed
Supplemental Notice No. 5, terminated the Competitive
Challenge altogether. In the meantime, the BCDA issued in
favor of SMLI a check without explanation attached to it but
its value corresponds to the proposal security posted by
SMLI, with interest. SMLI attempted to return the check but
to no avail. The BCDA caused the publication of an
“Invitation to Bid” for the development of the subject
property. This impelled SMLI to file an Urgent Manifestation
with Reiterative Motion to Resolve SMLI’s Application for
Temporary Restraining (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction.
The Court issued the TRO prayed for by SMLI and enjoined
BCDA from proceeding with the new selection process for the
development of the property. For its part, SMLI alleged in its
petition that the Certification issued by the BCDA and signed
by the parties constituted a contract and that under the said
contract, BCDA cannot renege on its obligation to conduct
and complete the Competitive Challenge. The BCDA relies
chiefly on the reservation clause in the Terms of Reference
(TOR), which mapped out the procedure to be followed in
the Competitive Challenge, which allegedly authorized the
agency to unilaterally cancel the Competitive Challenge.
BCDA add that the terms and conditions agreed upon are
disadvantageous to the government, and that it cannot
legally be barred by estoppel in correcting a mistake
committed by its agents.
ISSUES:
Whether or not BCDA correct in issuing Supplemental Notice
No. 5, which unilaterally aborted the Competitive Challenge,
and in subjecting the development of the project to public
bidding?
RULING:
NO. SMLI has the right to a completed Competitive Challenge
pursuant to the Detailed Guidelines for Competitive Challenge
Procedure for Public-Private Joint Ventures (NEDA JV
Guidelines) and the Certification issued by the BCDA. The
reservation clause adverted to by the BCDA cannot, in any
way, prejudice said right. NEDA promulgated the NEDA Joint
Venture Guidelines, which detailed two (2) modes of
selecting a private sector Joint Venture partner: by
competitive selection or through negotiated agreements.
Competitive selection involves a selection process based on
transparent criteria, which should not constrain or limit
competition, and is open to participation, by any interested
and qualified private entity. Furthermore, it is well to point
out that after BCDA accepted the unsolicited proposal of
SMLI and after both parties successfully concluded the
detailed negotiations on the terms and conditions of the
project, SMLI acquired the status of an Original Proponent.
An Original Proponent, per the TOR, pertains to the party
whose unsolicited proposal for the development and
privatization of the subject property through Joint Venture
with BCDA has been accepted by the latter, subject to certain
conditions, and is now being subjected to a Competitive
Challenge. In this regard, SMLI insists that as an Original
Proponent, it obtained the right to a completed Competitive
Challenge. A scrutiny of the NEDA JV Guidelines reveals that
certain rights are conferred to an Original Proponent. As
correctly pointed out by SMLI, these rights include the right
to the conduct and completion of a competitive challenge. By
their mutual consent and in signing the Certification, both
parties, in effect, entered into a binding agreement to subject
the unsolicited proposal to the Competitive Challenge.
Evidently, the Certification partakes of a contract wherein
BCDA committed itself to proceed with the Third Stage of the
process and simultaneously grants SMLI the right to expect
that the BCDA will fulfill its obligations under the same. The
preconditions to the conduct of the Competitive Challenge
having been met, what is left, therefore, is to subject the
terms agreed upon to a Competitive Challenge
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan.
The widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern
Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular
No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits
and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned
the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends
that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the
said regulation; and even with such authorization, the
regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2
is a violation of non-delegation of powers.
RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided
in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ... "The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA)."
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of
the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has
found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the
broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation
of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the
new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect
of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
KMU V. GARCIA
FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within
15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of
one year. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed
by the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla
Bautista as they were exorbitant and unreasonable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to
reduce and increase fare rates based on the order of the
LTFRB
HELD:
The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service
Commission the power of fixing rates of public services and
the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation
is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of
modern life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the
provincial bus operators to set a fare range is illegal and
invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of
legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari protest.
What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further
delegation of power would constitute a negation of the duty
in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to
discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus
operators to change their fares would lead to a chaotic
situation and would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators.
PEOPLE V. MACEREN
Lesson: The rule-making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted.
SC’s words: The inclusion in that decree of provisions
defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of
the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries
Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is
not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended
to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of
Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector
of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. vs.
Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs. Phil. Veterans
Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the
Fisheries Law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to
time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistent"
with that law, "as may be necessary and proper to carry into
effect the provisions thereof. That power is now vested in the
Secretary of Natural Resources by section 7 of the Revised
Fisheries Law, Presidential Decree No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the
Commissioner of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, forms, instructions, rules and regulations
consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the
development of fisheries."
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative
agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry
into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be
confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An
administrative agency can have only the administrative or
policing powers expressly or by necessary implication
conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 SE 2d
534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or
administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate
rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting
statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making
power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate (State vs. Miles, 5 Wash. 2nd 322; 105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it
must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within
the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative
body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care.
(State vs. Miles, supra).
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, supra
SC’’s words: There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz,, the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. 14 Both tests are intended
to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all
the three major powers of the Government but is especially
important in the case of the legislative power because of the
many instances when its delegation is permitted. The
occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to
be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain.
In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions
have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This
had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative
power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To
many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts
in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and
their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has
found it more and more necessary to entrust to
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry
out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."
manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp.
(NAFCO).
• Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO
with annual salary of P15,000.00
• NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo.
Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for
1949.
• This allowance was disapproved by the Central
Committee of the government enterprise council under
Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO
auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two
grounds:
o a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting
manager’s salary to P15,000/year.
o b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.
ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising
control over Government Owned and Controlled Corporations
(GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and
void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control
over GOCCs is Constitutional.
DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal
delegation of legislative power to the executive as argued by
petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline
GOCC’s operation. Executive Order 93 is valid because it was
promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for
review DISMISSED with costs

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the

broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details
which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation
of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the
new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect
of law.

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative

regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been
applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge
by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the
National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the
delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard
is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers
to "fair and equitable employment practices."

CERVANTES V. AUDITOR GENERAL

• This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor

General denying petitioner’s claim for quarters allowance as