KISSA
RPC ART. 3
“It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood
as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." In this instance,
there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted
any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.”
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR.,
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
 At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the
barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by
the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
 Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada,
and thus would like to surrender to the authorities.
 Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing, and Fausta with her
dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the
spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy.
 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of
the incident.
 That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the
Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the
group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman
Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where
the killing incident allegedly occurred.
 There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear,
sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9
 The next day, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the
scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other
hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police
substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio
Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had
likewise been informed of the incident, were already there conducting their own
investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the
scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal
Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
 The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on
February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
 The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of
which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and
intestines of the deceased." 12
 On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the
police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police
Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having been involved"
in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
 Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force
and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was
filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales.
The information read as follows: The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA
GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as follows
xxxxx
 Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose
Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada,
presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended
Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and
Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained, Lanida,
pleaded not guilty to the crime.
 In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might
have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim,
nevertheless opined that due to the number and different characteristics of the
wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were used is high.
 By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account
of the incident. According to Huntoria, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February
21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed
as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-cut
route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00
o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. When he was some 15 to 20 meters
away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana trees. From where he stood, he
allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking
the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he
clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through in
stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body and carried it into the house
of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the
"linasan".
  Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the
deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime.
The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep in
his house which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the
crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it
after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night
of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
 TC: disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
 On appeal, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court
erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged
eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi..
 CA affirmed the decision stating that. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused,
including the herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. The claim
that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20
meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. If Huntoria
could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only
because the assailant were moving around the victim. It is noteworthy that the
accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and
that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever.
Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question.
 The Court of Appeals, As there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
imposible penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should
have been brought to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of Honturia is sufficient to convict the appellant
HELD: NO
RATIO:
RE THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE: Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds
described in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless,
he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as
Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she
alone was responsible for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the
positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the
sixteen described in the autopsy report.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to
be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed
eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
 To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the
appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock
in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria)
stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from
where the crime was being committed. According to him, he recognized the six
accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He
further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six
accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by
each of them.
 Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the
appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
 It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the
Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a
principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him
by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by indispensable
cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing
did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court
of Appeals on him?
 Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
 Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the
commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
provides how felonies are committed.
 Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2)
the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is
performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
 Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the
appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there
is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that
"act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily
movement tending to produce some effect in the external world." In this instance, there
must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have
inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
 Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see
who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say,
because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact,
Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of
specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim
sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to
above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one
of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as
well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking
and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest
(already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And
pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that
only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds
to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is
possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal
 wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her
womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence
that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt,
the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
 RE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESS: Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is
likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or
eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. His
lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed.
There is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody.
 Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the
prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that
one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim was also his
landlord.
 At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the
appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs
and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are
sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible physical and
emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much
younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the
participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone
adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant
is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
KISSA
RPC ART 116, 137, 208. 213(B), 224, 234, 275(1)
The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral,
through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35748 December 14, 1931 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs. ROMANA
SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
 Romana Silvestre, wife of Domingo Joaquin by her second marriage, cohabited with
her codefendant Martin Atienza from the month of March, 1930, in the barrio of
Masocol, municipality of Paombong, Province of Bulacan.
 The complaining husband, Domingo Joaquin, filed with the justice of the peace for
that municipality, a sworn complaint for adultery, supported by affidavits of Gerardo
Cabigao and Castor de la Cruz .
 The said accused were arrested on a warrant. They were released on bail, each giving
a personal bond of P6,000. Pending the preliminary investigation of the case, the two
defendants begged the municipal president of Paombong, Francisco Suerte Felipe, to
speak to the complaint, Domingo Joaquin, urging him to withdraw the complaint, the
two accused binding themselves to discontinue cohabitation, and promising not to
live again in the barrio of Masocol; Martin Atienza voluntarily signed the promise.
 Domingo Joaquin acceded to it, and filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint.
 The accused then left the barrio of Masocol and went to live in that of Santo Niño, in
the same municipality of Paombong.
 Romana Silvestre met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in the barrio
of Santo Niño, and under pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves, followed him
home to the village of Masocol, and remained there.
 The accused, Martin Atienza, who had continued to cohabit with said Romana
Silvestre, followed her and lived in the home of Nicolas de la Cruz.
 On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his wife, Antonia de
la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein after supper, Martin
Atienza told said couple to take their furniture out of the house because he was going
to set fire to it. Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to
the house, he answered that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the
people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and
his codefendant, Romana Silvestre.
 As Martin Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything to
him, not even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from her codefendant.
Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple left the house at once to
communicate with the barrio lieutenant, Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just
heard Martin Atienza say; but they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they
heard cries of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back
to it; but seeing that the fire had assumed considerable proportions, Antonia took
refuge in the schoolhouse with her 1 year old babe in her arms, while Nicolas went to
the home of his parents-in-law, took up the furniture he had deposited there, and
carried it to the schoolhouse.
 The fire destroyed about 48 forty-eight houses. Tomas Santiago coming from the
barrio artesian well, and Tomas Gonzalez, teacher at the barrio school of Masocol,
and Felipe Clemente, an old man 61 years of age, coming from their homes, to the
house on fire, saw Martin Atienza going away from the house where the fire started,
and Romana Silvestre leaving it.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in finding Ramona guilty of the crime of arson as
accomplice.
HELD: NO
 With respect to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, the only evidence of record
against her are:
 That, being married, she lived adulterously with her codefendant
 that in pursuance of their promise, both of the accused went to lived in the barrio of
Santo Niño, in the same municipality;
 that Romana Silvestre listened to her codefendant's threat without raising a protest,
and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house. Upon the strength of
these facts, the court below found her guilty of arson as accomplice.
 Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an
accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who
does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act
by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in
the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
 Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the
crime of arson committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza? Is it her silence when
he told the spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their
furniture because he was going to set fire to their house as the only means of
revenging himself on the barrio residents, her passive presence when Martin Atienza
set fire to the house, where there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation, and her
failure to give the alarm when the house was already on fire?
 The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether
moral, through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external
acts.
 In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral
or material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question.
 Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute
cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to
commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a
subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice.
ISSUE (2): WON Martin is guilty of the crime of arson as defined in art 549 or 550 (1) of the RPC

HELD: 550

 With the evidence produced at the trial, the accused-appellant Martin Atienza might
have been convicted of the crime of arson in the most serious degree provided for in
article 549 of the Penal Code, if the information had alleged that at the time of setting
fire to the house, the defendant knew that the other houses were occupied, taking into
account that barrio residents are accustomed to retire at the tolling of the bell for the
souls in purgatory, i.e., at 8 o'clock at night.
 For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that:
 (1) Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to
give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the
cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission
of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and
 (2) he who desiring to burn the houses in a barrio, without knowing whether there are
people in them or not, sets fire to one known to be vacant at the time, which results in
destroying the rest, commits the crime of arson, defined and penalized in article 550,
paragraph 2, Penal Code.
 By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed
with reference to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference
to the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted
KISSA
Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege: There is no crime when there is no law punishing the same.
RPC art 3, 5 (1), sec 21
In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and England
as common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by law.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 9726. December 8, 1914. ] THE UNITED STATES v. CARSON TAYLOR,
JOHNSON, J. :
FACTS:
 The complaint alleged "That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson
Taylor, being then and there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and
publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, of a newspaper, the ’Manila Daily
Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in
the United States and other countries in all of which both languages are spoken and
written, having as such the supervision and control of said newspaper, did then and
there willfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty,
virtue, and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as member of the bar of the Philippine
Islands and as a private individual, and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be composed,
printed, edited, published, and circulated in said newspaper’s issue of the above
mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious defamation and
libel in the English language of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as
follows.
o "‘OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. — CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOW
CIVIL SUIT.
o "‘Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company. "‘The building was fired to collect the
amount of insurance. "‘The movable furniture of value was removed before the
fire. "‘The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a
success. "‘The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio
Martin in connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157 Calle O’Donnell on
April 4.
o Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the
plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal
proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners.
o ‘It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings
instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the court records, Maria
Mortera de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the west of Scotland Association,
Limited, No. 10191 on the court records.
o "‘It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent
suit brought against Ex Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his
Boston home.’
o "That in this article is contained the following paragraph. to wit:
"‘ . . .Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for
the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom
criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners,’ by which
the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and
there was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read
the same; that the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false
and untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of the said offended
party as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and
exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to law."
o Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was
tried, found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced to pay a fine of P200.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in finding the defendant guilty of libel
WON the court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and publisher of the
Manila Daily Bulletin”
HELD: YES on both issues.
RATIO:
 In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States
and England as common law crimes.
 No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by law.
 Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission.
Said Act (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the particular
conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty
of such crime.
 In the present case the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the
publication of said alleged article "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer,
publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as the ’Manila Daily
Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in
the United States and other countries."
 It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor,
proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher."
 From an examination of said Act No. 277, we find that section 6 provides that: "Every
author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial publication is
chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or
number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."
 By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for
the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for the
punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor."
 It would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that the defendant in the
present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper in which the libel
was published, he can not be held liable.
 There is not a word of proof in the record showing that the defendant was either the
"author, the editor, or the proprietor." The proof shows that the defendant was the
"manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged against him, unless
it is shown by the proof that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way
directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in
said alleged libelous article.
 The prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for the
purpose of showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the only
proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the defendant had to
the publication of the libel in question.
 From an examination of the editorial page of said exhibit, we find that it shows that
the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin Publishing Company," and that
the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of proof in the record which
shows what relation the manager had to the publication of said newspaper.
 We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that the
"manager" or the "printer" may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, be
held to be the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper.
 He may denominate himself as "manager" or "printer" simply, and be at the same
time the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper. He can not avoid
responsibility by using some other term or word, indicating his relation to the
newspaper or the publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, the editor,
or the proprietor" of the same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter of
proof. The Solicitor-General, in his brief, says that the defendant used the word
"manager" with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places the
responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or proprietor of any
book, etc."
 Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply because a person
connected with the publication of a newspaper who calls himself the "manager" or
"printer" may not, in fact and at the same time, be the "author, editor, or proprietor."
 The "author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility for the writing and
publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the "manager" or the
"printer" of a newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof.
 Webster defines "manager" to be "one who manages; a conductor or director; as, the
manager of a theater." A manager, as that word is generally understood, we do not
believe includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it means one who is
representing another as an agent. That being true, his powers and duties and
obligations are generally defined by contract.
 For the foregoing reasons. therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record
showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the
newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the
complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with
costs de officio. So ordered.
KISSA
RPC Art 3, 5, 1st par., Sec 21
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that
there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal
statute. No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary
to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014 LITO CORPUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
 Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and Lito Corpuz met at the Admiral Royale Casino
in Olongapo City sometime in 1990.
 Danilo was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz approached him
at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
 Danilo agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following
items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt of even date.
 They both agreed that Corpuz shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold,
to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.
 The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning
the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the
latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to
him, but to no avail.
 Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa to which
Corpuz pleaded not guilty.
 Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant. However,
he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made
to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991
and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject
pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
 RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
 CA denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC,
ISSUE: WON the CA violated the Best Evidence Rule; WON the information is defective.
HELD: No on both issues. Pero this is not the issues based on the syllabus. Jump to the “POINT”…
 ON BEST EVIDENCE RULE: According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling
of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that
petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also
correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment
to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the
said receipt.
 ON THE DEFECTIVE INFORMATION: He contends that the Information does not
contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that
the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially
complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance
in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
 the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as
reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:x
x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
 It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:x x x x Petitioner argues that the
last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the offender,
was not proved.
 This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able
to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of
jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay
them.
 No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.
 Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand"
need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case,
property], would be tantamount to a demand.12
 With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under
this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that
the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b)
 There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those
pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of
jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
POINT BASED ON “There is no crime when there is no law punishing the same”
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property
came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and
property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division
reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided
to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter.
The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L.
Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the
following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot
be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without
any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any
act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence,
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.18
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive,
this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in
Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation
for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that
there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal
statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.
 There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based
on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it
would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite
imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and
if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the
penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had
the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same,
instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy.
 It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do
not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their
corresponding penalties. (di ko na sinama to)
 With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of
petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED.

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which
is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the
proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that
a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked
to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation.
The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The
remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but
to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
KISSA to another; and that the burnt house was not worth more than P1, because it was a
small one, the witness himself having constructed it.
RPC 3, 365

Presumption of intent: Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed
to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary
shall appear. (Art. 1, Penal Code.)
G.R. No. 5126. September 2, 1909 THE UNITED STATES, v. CATALINO APOSTOL,
ARELLA NO, C.J. :
FACTS:
 The CFI of Nueva Ecija finds that on the 16th of December, 1907, five individuals,
among them being the accused herein, went to the house where Pedro Tabilisima,
Celestino Vergara, and Tranquilino Manipul were living, and there inquired after some
carabaos that had disappeared, and because these above-mentioned inmates
answered that they knew nothing about the matter, ordered them to leave the house,
but as the three men named above refused to do so, the accused, Catalino Apostol,
set fire to the hut and the same was burnt down.
 In the opinion of the trial court the responsibility of the accused has been fully
established by the testimony of the injured parties. And inasmuch as the act comes
within the provisions of article 549 of the Penal Code, Catalino Apostol was sentenced
to sixteen years and one day of cadena temporal, to the accessories of the law, to
indemnity the value of the burnt hut in the sum of P1, and to pay the costs.
 On appeal, the defense claimed, on behalf of the offender: (1) The absence of proof
of criminal intent; (2) that in view of the fact that the burnt hut was situated in an
uninhabited place, it is not proper to apply article 549, but article 554 of the Penal
Code.
Celestino Vergara says that several individuals arrived at 8 o’clock at night, asked
them for carabaos that they claimed to have lost, wounded Tranquilino Manipul, who
was asleep, and Pedro Tabilisima, forced them to leave the house, and as they did not
want to do so for fear of being assaulted the accused set fire to the same; they tried
to put out the fire as long as they could, but when no longer able jumped out of the
house. The house was in an uninhabited locality, in the fields, the nearest house being
a small store to which the cry of a person might carry, and the neighboring houses
could be seen.
 Tranquilino Manipul testified in almost the same terms as this last witness. The
argument which the defense advances, based on article 554, which in connection with
553 punishes the setting fire to a building intended for habitation, in an uninhabited
place, does not apply, because the article in question refers to an edifice intended for
human habitation in an uninhabited place at a time when the same is unoccupied. It
is article 549, which punishes with the very severe penalties of cadena temporal to
cadena perpetua "those who shall set fire to any edifice, farmhouse, hut, shed, or
vessel in port, with knowledge that one or more persons were within the same," that
must be applied.
 For the reasons above set forth the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with
costs against the Appellant.

ISSUE: WON the absence of proof of criminal intent is material in the conviction of a crime.

HELD: NO

RATIO:

 Criminal intent as well as the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on
the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the
contrary shall appear. (Art. 1, Penal Code.)
 As to the circumstances connected with the burning of the hut, Pedro Tabilisima
testified that he and his friends were in the same; that the accused and his
companions arrived at 8 p.m. and questioned them about carabaos that they said had
been stolen from them; that after they replied that they knew nothing, the former set
fire to the house and they jumped out of it; that the witness and two companions
lived in the house; that it was situated in an uninhabited place, surrounded by fields;
that the nearest houses were far away, and cries could not be heard from one house
KISSA
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied
by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law,
is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.xxx
It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of a
criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal
act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal intention, and that it is for
the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such
presumption springs must be a criminal act.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6486 March 2, 1911 UNITED STATES vs. RAFAEL B. CATOLICO,
MORELAND, J.:
 It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as justice of the peace
of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, had before him sixteen separate civil cases
commenced by Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct individuals, each one for
damages resulting from a breach of contract; that said cases were all decided by the
appellant in favor of the plaintiff;
 that each one of the defendant in said cases appealed from the decision of the justice
of the peace and deposited P16 as required by law, at the same time giving a bond of
P50, each one of which was approved by the court; that on the 12th day of said month
the plaintiff in said cases presented a writing to the appellant as said justice of the
peace, alleging that the sureties on the said bonds were insolvent and later
demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the appellant; that thereupon the latter
ordered the cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order, required each of
the appellants to file another bond within fifteen days, that, inasmuch as none of the
appellants in said causes presented new bonds within the time fixed, the plaintiff in
said causes applied to the appellant, as said court, for an order declaring final the
judgment entered in each of the said sixteen cases and commanding the execution of
the same, at the same time asking that the sums deposited by the defendants in said
actions be attached (so called in the record) and delivered to him in satisfaction of
said judgments; that the accused acceded to the petition of the plaintiff, ordered said
sums attached and delivered same to the plaintiff, at the same time requiring of the
plaintiff a bond of P50 for each attachment, conditioned that he would respond for
the damages which should result from such attachment.
ISSUE: WON there can be a presumption of criminal intention that arises from the act.
HELD: None
RATIO:
 Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the acquittal of the
accused. We are in entire accord with that recommendation for the lack many of the
essential elements required by law to be present in the crime of malversation of
public funds.
 The accused did not convert the money to his own use or to the use of any other
person; neither did he feloniously permit anybody else to convert it. Everything he
did was done in good faith under the belief that he was acting judicially and correctly.
 The fact that he ordered the sums, deposited in his hands by the defendants —
appellants in the sixteen actions referred to, attached for the benefit of the plaintiff
in those actions, after the appeals had been dismissed and the judgments in his court
had become final, and that he delivered the said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction
of the judgment which he held in those cases, can not be considered an appropriation
or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No. 1740.
 He believed that, as presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had a
perfect right under the law to cancel the bonds when it was clearly shown to him that
the sureties thereon were insolvent, to require the filing of new undertakings, giving
the parties ample time within which to do so, to dismiss the appeals in case said
undertakings were not filed, and to declare the judgment final.
 To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit
reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of be innocent.
 In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of
justice of the peace. He had jurisdictions of the actions before him. He had a right and
it was his duty to require the payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving
of a proper undertaking with solvent sureties.
 While, in dismissing the appeals and delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the said
cases, he may have exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond the limits
of his jurisdiction and power, a question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so
far as appears from the record, at most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of the
mind operating upon a state of facts.
 Giving the act complained of the signification most detrimental to the appellant, it,
nevertheless, was simply the result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function,
and not an intention to deprive any person of his property feloniously. His act had
back of it the purpose to do justice to litigants and not to embezzle property. He acted
that honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were legally and justly due,
and not to enrich himself or another by criminalmisappropriation. It was an error
committed by a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It was a mistake,
not a crime.
 It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the
commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the accused
committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with
criminal intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must
 be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be
a criminal act.
 In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may have been an error; it may have
been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have been declared erroneous and
set aside on appeal or other proceeding in the superior court. It may well be that his
conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as properly to subject
him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from office. But, from the facts of
record, it was not criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of criminal intention
arises from the act.
 Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of,
even though it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public
funds as defined and penalized in Act No. 1740.
 It is true that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for violations of the preceding
section, the absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person
described in said section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to
produce all the funds and property properly in his charge on the demand of any officer
authorized to examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or depositary shall be
deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or property have been
put to personal uses or used for personal ends by such person within the meaning of
the preceding section.
 " Nevertheless, that presumption is a rebuttable one and constitutes only a prima
facie case against the person accused. If he present evidence showing that, in fact, he
has not put said funds or property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an
end and the prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was necessary for the
accused to offer any such evidence, for the reason that the people's own pleading
alleged, and its own proofs presented, along with the criminal charge, facts which
showed, of themselves, that said money had not been put to personal uses or used for
personal ends.
 In other words, the prosecution demonstrated, both by the allegations in its
information filed against the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that the absence
of the funds in question was not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, thus
affirmatively and completely negativing the presumption which, under the act
quoted, arises from the absence of the funds.
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from custody
forthwith.

KISSA
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC INTENT
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE
AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," .
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
 That on 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, xxx the said accused xxx kidnapped
and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of
extorting ransom, xxx:
 ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and
ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a
highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term
of reclusion perpetua.
 Appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under
Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime
therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the
charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be
used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged.
 Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon
City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband
does
 At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something
bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place .
 Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the
Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned
right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver and pointed a gun at Socorro.
 Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know,
I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may
get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken.
 Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to
give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati
where the money is
 The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is
called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied.
She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40
thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused
 Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out
of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some
vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van.
 On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM.
 Both accused were, day after, arrested.
 As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of
complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North
Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the
car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway.7
 Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San
Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter
ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the
trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was
in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.
ISSUE: whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended
by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished
by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
HELD: simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period.
 Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those
instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds
true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at
a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
 Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential
to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was
committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former,
or whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion
and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted
on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official
duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by
reason of the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the
crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
 In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,
nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of
threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other
esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated,
 candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I
know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you
doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that
I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any
bale (sic). . . ." 12
 With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had
kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that
for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such
restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of
another offense primarily intended by the offenders.
 That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the
complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
 Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the
nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the
complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when
complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what
she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the
concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. T
 These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants.
Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article
293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same
constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential
Decree No. 532.
 TC: In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is
that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty
is reclusion perpetua.18
BRIGANDAGE LAW: The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands
of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three
armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute
a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a
member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose
of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery
is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of
committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery.
Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would
not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is
required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
 In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if
there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein,
could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted
the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by
the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when
and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated.
Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
 Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular
clauses thereof
 Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person
chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on
the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and
which single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and
social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly
constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress
of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration
bordering on the ridiculous.
 Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery
defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their
concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the
determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of
craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence
shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in
favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use
of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by
Article 295 of the Code.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno
of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised
Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento,
the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.