Dominic Oswald C.

Halili LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

LLB – III – FINALS –

LOPEZ V CA 398 SCRA 550

FACTS: Fermin Lopez filed a homestead application but it was not acted upon. After his death, Hermogenez inquired
before the Bureau of Lands where he was informed that the application was unacted. He was suggested to file a new
application. Hermogenes filed a homestead application in his own name. The application was approved by BL and
certificate of title was issued in his name.

Unaware that his application was approved, Hermogenes executed an Extra-judicial Partition of the disputed land
with his brothers - the petitioners Eleuterio, Juan, and Nazario. The three executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of their share
in favor of Hermogenes. Hermogenes then applied for the registration of the property in his name. To his surprise, he
found that the land has been registered other persons, who opposed his application alleging that he sold his right to the
land to Aguilar from whom they acquired the land.

Hermogenes filed a complaint for annulment of free patent and title against these persons where the same was
annulled declaring Aguilar as the absolute owner of the land.

Heirs of Hermogenes, filed a complaint against Aguilar for the cancellation of the deed of sale executed by
Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar and Reconveyance.

The court nullified the deed of absolute sale and declared the heirs of Hermogenes as the true and absolute owner
of the disputed land.

The heirs of Nazario Lopez and heirs of Juan Lopez now instituted an action against the heirs of Hermogenez Lopez
praying that they be declared co-owners of the subject property.

The heirs of Hermogenes Lopez contended that they are the absolute owner of the land on the basis of the
homestead grant to Hermogenes.

ISSUE: Is there a co-ownership over the subject property

HELD: No. At the time Hermogenes applied for a homestead grant over the disputed property, it was still part of alienable
public land. As he applied for it in his own name, his application inures to his sole benefit. Hence, said property cannot be
partitioned since there is no co-ownership as far as the heirs of Nazario and Heirs of Juan Lopez is concerned.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CAVITE COLLEGE OF FISHERIES V. MAXIMA LENSICO, RUFINA LENSICO, ROGELIO
LENSICO AND VICTOR LENSICO, G.R. NO. 158919, AUGUST 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 361, 369

FACTS: This land was originally a part of the Friar Land. Melanio Lensico filed an Application to Purchase Friar Lands. An
investigation was conducted by Land Investigator who recommended that the lot be sold in favor of Melanio Lensico.

Cavite College occupies a portion of the subject land. Upon death of Melanio Lensico, his heirs required the
payment of rentals for the occupancy and to either vacate or buy the premises.

The Republic moved to cancel the issued TCT. Lensicos filed a petition for Recovery of Possession of Property or
Payment of Price of Land.

Petitioners argue that respondents did not have a valid title to the property, because the issued TCT was null and
void. They contend that the area covered by the title, is foreshore and beach land and, thus, a piece of public property
which may not be alienated or registered, as evidenced by the Survey Plans and the ocular inspection conducted by the
trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land id Foreshore land

HELD: Foreshore land has been defined as that which lies between the high and low watermarks, and that is alternately
wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. In other words, it is that strip of land between high and low water, the land
left dry by the flux and re-flux of the tide. In the present case, although corners 3 and 4 of lot 2833 have been shown to
adjoin the sea, they have not been proven to be covered by water during high tide. Hence, the property cannot be
considered foreshore land.
 ALMAGRO VS. KWAN GR#175806 & 175810 OCT. 20, 2010 634 SCRA 250

FACTS: Respondents are the successors- in- interest of the subject land. They filed an action for recovery of possession
and damages against the occupants. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the remaining dry portion of the
land in dispute has become foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.

Respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC conducted ocular inspections of subject land on two separate occasions: During
low tide and when the high tide registered 1.5 meters.

RTC concluded that the small portion of respondent’s property which remains as dry land is not within the scope
of foreshore land; the small dry portion is not adjacent to the sea; thus Respondent have the right to recover possession
of the remaining small dry portion of the subject property in question. CA affirmed said decision.

ISSUE: WON the disputed Lot is considered as foreshore land and is part of the public domain

HELD: The disputed land is not foreshore land.

To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.

The land's proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.
 CHAVEZ VS PEA GR 133250

DOCTRINE: In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.

FACTS: The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the CDCP to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total
reclaimed land.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD
No. 1084 tasked PEA “to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,” and “to develop, improve, acquire, x x
x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.” On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring
to PEA “the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project. On April 9, 1988,
the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the “Freedom Islands” located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. On
April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom
Islands.

Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.

On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office
of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

Several motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s July 9, 2002 decision which declared the amended
JVA null and void ab initio were filed. The conclusions of said decision were summarized by the Court as follows:

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell
or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject
to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain
until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then
can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government
can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas
of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI
will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

ISSUE: Whether or not the July 9, 2002 ruling of the Supreme Court should be reversed.

HELD: No. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999,
petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire
the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this petition, two Senate Committees had already approved on September
16, 1997 Senate Committee Report No. 560 which concluded that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public
domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the attendant risks, including the annulment of
the Amended JVA. Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the Freedom
Islands. Moreover, Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas
covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In
short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any physical improvement or development on the reclamation project
that is the subject of the Amended JVA.

PEA cannot claim that it is “similarly situated” as the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which
under R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to sell portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military reservations is
incorrect. PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the
public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR,
when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only
when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government
agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public,
not private lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction
a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. PEA will simply turn around and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed
lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
 CHAVEZ VS NHA GR 164527

DOCTRINES: Sec. 2 and 3, Art. XII of the Constitution declare that all natural resources are owned by the State and they
cannot be alienated except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain.

FACTS: On March 19, 1993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI)entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) for the development of the Smokey Mountain dumpsite and reclamation area to be converted
into a low cost medium rise housing complex and industrial/commercial site. The Project will involve 79 hectares
of reclaimed land (it was initially 40hectares but the JVA was amended). The JVA also provides that as part of the
consideration for the Project, NHA will convey a portion of the reclaimed lands to RBI. The reclamation of the area was
made; and subsequently, Special Patents were issued conveying the reclaimed land to NHA. On August 5, 2004, former
Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare NULL and
VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other
agreements in relation thereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid.

ISSUES:

1. W/N NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain (Chavez claims
that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is vested exclusively with PEA).

2. W/N NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands, as required
(Chavez claims that they were not).

3. W/N the reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain(Chavez claims that there
was no proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable).

4. W/N the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI is void since it did not undergo public bidding but by negotiated contract.

5. W/N RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain.

HELD:

1. YES. Although PEA was designated under EO 525 as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter does not mention that it has the exclusive and sole power and
authority to reclaim lands of public domain. In fact, EO525 provides that reclamation projects may also be undertaken by
a national government agency or entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land. There are 3 requisites to a legal and valid
reclamation project:

a. approval by the President;

b. favorable recommendation of PEA; and
c. undertaken by any of the ff:

i. PEA
ii. any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA
iii. the National government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands subject to
consultation with PEA.

Applying the above requirements, the SC concluded that the Project has met all 3 requirements:

a. There was ample approval by the President of the Philippines. Presidents Aquino and Ramos issued
Proclamations approving and implementing the reclamation of lands.
 b. There was an implied grant of a favorable endorsement of the reclamation phase from PEA. This is shown in
the fact that PEA was a member of the EXECOM which was in charge of overseeing the implementation of the Project.

c. The reclamation was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency authorized to reclaim lands under
its charter and other laws. While the charter of NHA does not explicitly mention “reclamation” in any of its listed powers,
such power is implied since it is vital or incidental to achieving the objective of an urban land reform and housing program.

2. YES. The DENR exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain. As such, it decides whether areas, like foreshore or submerged lands, should be reclaimed or not and whether
they should be classified as alienable and disposable. In this case, when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work, making DENR a member of the EXECOM
(committee asked to implement the project), the required authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed
satisfied. Also, the issuance of the Environmental Compliance Certificates by the DENR shows its ratification of the
reclamation project.

3. YES. When Proclamations Nos. 39 (placed the lands under the administration and disposition of the NHA) and
465 (increased the reclamation area from 40 hectares to 79 hectares) were issued, the inalienable lands covered by said
proclamations were converted to alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Furthermore, when the titles to such
reclaimed lands were transferred to the NHA, said alienable and disposable lands of public domain were automatically
classified as lands of the private domain or patrimonial properties of the State. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land
is not converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it
will not be able to transfer such lands to qualified entities and thus, it will not achieve its purpose.

4. VALID. Since the lands reclaimed became patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of their titles to the
NHA, the latter can therefore legally transfer them to RBI or to any other interested qualified buyer without any bidding.
Unlike the PEA, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to sell lands of the public domain.

5. NO. RA 6957, as amended (BOT Law), states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of the
reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporations with at least 60%
Filipino equity can acquire the same. In this case, RBI is a private corporation wherein Filipino citizens own at least 60% of
its shares.
 ALFREDO VS BORRAS 404 SCRA 145

FACTS: A parcel of land measuring 81,524 square meters ("Subject Land") in Barrio Culis, Mabiga, Hermosa, Bataan is the
subject of controversy in this case. The registered owners of the Subject Land were petitioner spouses, Godofredo Alfredo
("Godofredo") and Carmen Limon Alfredo ("Carmen"). The Subject Land is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 284
("OCT No. 284") issued to Godofredo and Carmen under Homestead Patent No. V-69196.On 7 March 1994, the private
respondents, spouses Armando Borras ("Armando") and Adelia Lobaton Borras ("Adelia"), filed a complaint for specific
performance against Godofredo and Carmen before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 4. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. DH-256-94.Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the
Subject Land for P7, 000.00 with the Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP"). To pay the debt, Carmen and
Godofredo sold the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay the DBP loan and its
accumulated interest, and the balance to be paid in cash to the sellers. Armando and Adelia gave Godofredo and Carmen
the money to pay the loan to DBP which signed the release of mortgage and returned the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT
No. 284 to Godofredo and Carmen.

Armando and Adelia subsequently paid the balance of the purchase price of the Subject Land for which Carmen
issued a receipt dated 11 March 1970. Godofredo and Carmen then delivered to Adelia the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT
No. 284, with the document of cancellation of mortgage, official receipts of realty tax payments, and tax declaration in
the name of Godofredo. Godofredo and Carmen introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land,
to the Natanawans, the old tenants of the Subject Land. Armando and Adelia then took possession of the Subject Land. In
January 1994, Armando and Adelia learned that hired persons had entered the Subject Land and were cutting trees under
instructions of allegedly new owners of the Subject Land. Subsequently, Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo
and Carmen had re-sold portions of the Subject Land to several persons. On 8 February 1994, Armando and Adelia filed
an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of Bataan.

Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had secured an owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No.
284 after filing a petition in court for the issuance of a new copy. Godofredo and Carmen claimed in their petition that
they lost their owner’s duplicate copy. Armando and Adelia wrote Godofredo and Carmen complaining about their acts,
but the latter did not reply. Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific performance.

ISSUE: Whether the action to enforce the alleged oral contract of sale brought after 24 years from its alleged perfection
had been barred by prescription and by laches

HELD: Action Not Barred by Prescription and Laches. The ultimate relief sought by Armando and Adelia is the
reconveyance to them of the Subject Land. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring
property through fraud becomes by operation of law a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the
property. The presence of fraud in this case created an implied trust in favor of Armando and Adelia. This gives Armando
and Adelia the right to seek reconveyance of the property from the Subsequent Buyers.40

To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff’s possession of the
disputed property is material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. The ten-year
prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession
of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the
prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for
reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
In this case, the appellate court resolved the issue of prescription by ruling that the action should prescribe four years
from discovery of the fraud.
 We must correct this erroneous application of the four-year prescriptive period. In Caro v. Court of Appeals, we
explained why an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust should prescribe in ten years. In that case, the
appellate court also erroneously applied the four-year prescriptive period. We declared in Caro: We disagree. The case of
Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261, September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396 illuminated what used
to be a gray area on the prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to real property and, corollarily, its point of
reference: xxx It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the
old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided: SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods after the right of
action accrues: x x x x x x x x x3. Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action
in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud; x x x x x x x x x In contrast, under the
present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so
is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context,
and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.

Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment. x x x x x x x x x An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates
this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is
Balbin vs. Medalla which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance
can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June
25,1948,hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August30, 1950
as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that article 1144 and article 1456, are new provisions. They
have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal
basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false
pretenses. An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,which
provides: In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on
the original petition or application, xxx This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code,
which provides: Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The law thereby
creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating
Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil
Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title xxx (Emphasis supplied)46Following Caro, we have
consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years.47 We went further by
specifying the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance
of the title.

Had Armando and Adelia remained in possession of the Subject Land, their action for reconveyance, in effect an action to
quiet title to property would not be subject to prescription. Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual
possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
Armando and Adelia lost possession of the Subject Land when the Subsequent Buyers forcibly drove away from the Subject
Land the Natanawans, the tenants of Armando and Adelia. This created an actual need for Armando and Adelia to seek
reconveyance of the Subject Land. The statute of limitation becomes relevant in this case. The ten-year prescriptive period
started to run from the date the Subsequent Buyers registered their deeds of sale with the Register of Deeds. The
Subsequent Buyers bought the subdivided portions of the Subject Land on 22 February 1994, the date of execution of
their deeds of sale. The Register of Deeds issued the transfer certificates of title to the Subsequent Buyers on 24 February
1994. Armando and Adelia filed the Complaint on 7 March 1994. Clearly, prescription could not have set in since the case
was filed at the early stage of the ten-year prescriptive period. Neither is the action barred by laches. We have defined
laches as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable time, to do that which, by the exercise of due diligence, could or
should have been doneearlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.53Armando and Adelia
discovered in January 1994 the subsequent sale of the Subject Land and they filed this case on 7 March 1994. Plainly,
Armando and Adelia did not sleep on their rights.
 RURAL BANK OF DAVAO VS CA 217 SCRA 559

FACTS: Respondents Abellano and Sequitan obtained a loan of 45k from Rural bank, As security respondents mortgaged
a parcel of land situated in Davao, said land was acquired through a homestead patent.

NHA then filed for expropriation, on the same area where the mortgaged property of the respondent is situated.
to carry out its Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program. The respondents failed to pay so the mortgaged property
was foreclosed. During the foreclosure sale, the Petitioner submitted the highest bid of 54,883 and certificate of sale was
registered.

Respondents failed to redeem the foreclosed property within the period of two (2) years. The title was cancelled
and a new title was generated in lieu of the old title in favor of Rural Bank of Davao.

Later on, the CFI of Davao issued an order requiring NHA to pay 490,000 for the property sought to be expropriated.

Respondents notified the petitioner of their desire to repurchase the foreclosed property pursuant to Section 119
of the Public Land Act. Rebuffed by the latter, respondents the filed a complaint for reconveyance of their foreclosed
property under said Section 119.

Petitioner contended that the action of the respondent will no longer prosper because their right to repurchase
had become moot and academic pursuant to PD 875

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent still has a right to repurchase the subject property.

HELD: Section 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance."

Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land acquired under free patent or
homestead statutes may be summarized as follows:

If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under R.A. No. 720, as amended, the mortgagor may redeem the property
within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure or from the registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale at such
foreclosure if the property is not covered or is covered, respectively, by a Torrens title.

If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years
from the expiration of the two (2) year redemption period pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1)
year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may
repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119
of the Public Land Act.
 CAPISTRANO V LEONARDO-DE CASTRO GR 152413

FACTS: Petitioner owned a parcel of land in Laguna pursuant to a free patent issued on1977. She sold that parcel of land
with right to repurchase to spouses Zuasola and Subida. Later on, she sold ½ of the same parcel of land to respondents in
the amount of 75K with the understanding that 10K will be paid as initial payment and the balance will be paid in
installment basis. Upon receipt of the initial payment, the petitioner signed the deed of absolute sale. Subsequently,
respondents failed to pay the installment despite repeated demand made by the petitioner. The respondents claimed that
they have fully satisfied the consideration of the sale of the land in question according to the terms and conditions of the
sale. Later on, respondents learned that the subject land was already sold by the petitioner to spouses Zuasola and Subida
so the respondents filed a criminal case of estafa against petitioner. The petitioner was convicted. After 4 months,
petitioner repurchased the subject land from spouses Zuasola and Subida. She also offered to repurchase from
respondents the ½ parcel of the land in question but was refused. A certificate of title was issued in favor of the
respondents. Petitioner filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale. She also invoked Sec. 119 of the Public
Land Act as an alternative cause of action. The RTC sustained the validity of the deed of sale and denied the petitioner’s
right to repurchase the subject land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may still repurchase the land under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act

HELD: NO. Sec. 119 subject said land’s alienation, impliedly after the expiration of the prohibitive period, upon a right of
repurchase by the homesteader, his widow, or heirs, w/in a period of 5 yrs from the date of its conveyance. The Court
ruled that the Petitioner’s right to repurchase the 1/2 portion of the property no longer exists. The prohibition against the
alienation of the land acquired by petitioner by free patent ended on 1983 or 5 years from its issuance. Thus, when
petitioner sold the one-half (1/2) portion of the property to respondents on 1989, the redemption period contemplated
by Section 119 of the Public Land Act, no longer finds application. When petitioner sold the subject property to the
respondents, she no longer had any right to do so for having previously sold the same property to other vendees. It is
undeniable then that petitioner fraudulently obtained the consent of respondents in the execution of the assailed deed
of sale. Certainly, petitioner’s action for annulment of the subject deed should be dismissed based on Art. 1397 of the Civil
Code which provides that the person who employed fraud cannot base his action for the annulment of contracts upon
such flaw of the contract. Petitioner is, therefore, precluded from seeking the annulment of the said contract based on
the fraud which she herself has caused.
 AGUSTIN VS IAC GR L-66075-76

FACTS: Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying the western bank of
the Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin. From 1919 to 1968, the Cagayan river
has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including Agustin’s Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo
Binuyag. In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course and returned it to its
1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side. To cultivate the
lands they had to cross the river. When they were cultivating said lands, (they were planting corn) Agustin accompanied
by the mayor and some policemen claimed the land and drove them away. So Melad and Binuyag filed separate complaints
for recovery of their lots and its accretions. The Trial Court held ordered Agustin Et. Al. to vacate the lands and return
them to respondents. On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the judgment thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by the sudden and
abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed

HELD: YES. Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these elements
are present:

1) Deposit be gradual and imperceptible

2) It resulted from the effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is adjacent to the river bank. When the River
moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.

Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to floods and other damage due to the
destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements,
it is only just that such risks or dangers should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion. Also, respondent’s
ownership over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the river; their
accretions were transferred to the other side. Art. 459 states when the current of a river x x x segregates from an estate
on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains ownership
provided he removes the same w/in 2 years. And Art. 463 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself into
branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains ownership. He also retains it if a
portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.
 REP VS CA 132 SCRA 514

FACTS: Respondents sought the registration of land adjacent to their fishpond. 3

They are the registered owners of parcel of lot bordering on the Bocaue and Meycauyan rivers. The lower
and appellate court allowed registration but this was opposed by the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is Accretion

HELD: There is no accretion if by man-made causes.

 VDA DE NAZARENO VS CA GR 98405

FACTS: A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City is said to have been formed as a result of
sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Sometime in 1979, Jose
Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result,
Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was
rendered against Salasalan and Rabaya, which decision was affirmed by the RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 20. The case
was remanded to the Municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and executory. Private
respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the RTC Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 and subsequently, a case
for certiorari for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25; both
of which were dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected
from portions of the subject lots they occupied. Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of
Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being
claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, it was protested by private
respondents before the Bureau of Lands. The report of the Land Investigator, made in compliance with the order of the
District Land Officer, recommended the Survey Plan MSI-10-06-000571-D (Lot 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio
Nazareno be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public application. Based on the report,
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands rendered a decision ordering an amendment to the survey plain of Nazareno
by segregating there from the areas occupied by the private respondents. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Undersecretary of Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of Lands; which was denied. The
petitioners, Desamparada vda. De Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazero filed a case before the RTC, for the annulment of
the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding the parcel of land. The
RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, resulting to the finality of the administrative
decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint.
Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land is public land.Held: Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an
accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which provides: ‖To the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.‖

In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the
Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites:

(1) That the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;

(2) That it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes
place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast).These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case,
give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of
the current of waters. The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the present case as the first and second
requirements of the rules were not met. Thus, the Nazarenos cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. By their own
admission, the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the
Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of
such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or
the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.

In Hilario v. City of Manila, this Court held that the word ―current‖ indicates the participation of the body of water
in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners’ submission not having met the first and second
requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. Petitioners are estopped from
denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio
Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application MSA (G-6) 571. The mere filing of said Application constituted an
admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of Survey Plan MSI-10-06-000571-D
which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno’s Miscellaneous Sales Application wherein said land was
described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was controverted by the findings of the ocular inspection
that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of Cagayan River.

In Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the requirement that the deposit should due to the effect of the current of the
river is indispensable. This excludes from Article 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting
it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land
was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence
of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public
domain. In the present case, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber
Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. As the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno’s labor
consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding
his land, the same would still be part of the public domain.
 PAYATAS ESTATE VS TUAZON 53 PHIL 55

FACT: In 1904, Maria Concepcion Canas obtained a Torrens title over a large parcel of land (5,122 hectares) situated near
the Marikina (then Mariquina) River. On the opposite side of the river is situated an equally large parcel of land belonging
to the Tuasons (Mariquina Estate).

In 1920, Concepcion sold her land to Payatas Estate Improvement Co. Payatas Estate had the land surveyed but
this time it is showing that the total land area is 22 hectares less than the original plan. The surveyor explained that this
was due to erosions that took place near the river bank and that some portions of the land were washed away by the river
toward the opposite estate.

Payatas Estate is now claiming some portions of the Mariquina estate. Payatas Estate avers that since the land is
covered by a Torrens title, the rule on accretion is not applicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not Payatas Estate has a right to claim some portions of the Mariquina Estate.

HELD: No. Article 366 of the [Old] Civil Code provides: “any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive
from the effect of the current belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.” This provision applies even to
Torrens titled lands.

Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by
the registration laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner (Payatas Estate) against diminution
of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream.

Avulsion cannot be raised as well as a ground to lay claim over the 22 hectares land now forming part of the
Mariquina estate. There was no evidence presented to show that the increase was due to avulsion. The presumption is
that the change was gradual and cause by erosion of the Payatas bank of the river and consequent accretion to the
Mariquina estate. It follows that the land in question is now a part of that estate and no longer pertains to the Payatas
estate.
 HILARIO VS. CITY OF MANILA, 19 SCRA 931, 939 (1976)

DOCTRINE: Navigable Rivers, streams and creeks. It has been held that a river is a compound concept consisting of three
elements, namely: 1. The running waters; 2. The bed ;and 3. The Banks.
All these constitute the river. Since a river is but one compound concept, it has only one nature, i.e., it has either to be totally
public or completely private. And since rivers are of public ownership, it is implicit that all the three component elements be of the
same nature.

FACTS: Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around 49 hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang,
San Mateo, Rizal). Upon his death this property was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title
was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiff’s father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo
River.3 To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern
side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose.
However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring
barrios and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the
Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of this
lenticular strip which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand
and gravel plant within the premises, and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby
areas along the River. The operations eventually extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently, a claim for
damages was filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr. Hilario’s estate. The US
Army paid. In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its operations.
On 22 October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages against the defendants City Engineer of
Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to join the litigation as
intervenors; as per issue of fees and penalties for materials (sand and gravel) extracted. On 14 March 1954, defendants
filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case, alleging that the latter have fenced
off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement had between the latter and the Director of Public Works wherein
the defendants were allowed to continue their operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. On13 May
1954, plaintiff amended his complaint and impleaded as additional defendants the City of Manila, the Provincial Treasurer
of Rizal, and Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely
for damages directed against the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the amount of
P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted the refrom until defendants stop
their operations

ISSUE: Whether all riverbanks, as part of the riverbeds, are of public ownership

HELD: Under the old Civil Law and the Law of Waters, all riverbanks are of public ownership, including those formed
when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a private estate. Article 339 of the old Civil Code is very
clear. Without any qualifications, it provides that “that devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character” are property of public
ownership. Further, the riverbank is part of the riverbed. Article 73 of the Law of Waters which provides that the phrase
“banks of a river” is understood those lateral strips of zones of its beds which are washed by the stream only during such
high floods as do not cause inundations. The use of the words “of its bed [de sus alveos] “clearly indicates the intent of
the law to consider the banks for all legal purposes, as part of the riverbed. Thus, the banks of the River are part of its bed.
Since undeniably all beds of river are of public ownership, it follows that the banks, which form part of them, are also of
public ownership.
 JAGUALING V CA GR 94283

FACTS: Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later increased in size due to erosion
caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent
squatters to come to the area.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura which was
the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of the parties. In the amicable settlement the
heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an area of 1,289 square meters more or less to
Eduave.

Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they are the real owners of the land
in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less. According to them, they acquired the land by
acquisitive prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They presented tax declarations and photos of
actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.

Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against Jagualing. RTC
dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over
the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part of public domain not susceptible of appropriation.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent thereto the
accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of this case
and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to private respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription

HELD: No. From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of Eduave actually
existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river. The CA, therefore, properly applied Article
463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or isolated by river movement to be
retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation or isolation. The parcel of land in question is part of an island that
formed in a non-navigable and non-floatable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased
to its present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did not
err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the
nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private
respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property
along the margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under
Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they
are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over
the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be registered.
However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required period and their possession cannot be
considered in good faith since by their admission they have recognized Eduave’s ownership over the land. Thus the land
still belongs to Eduave. Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin. However such
accretion may be lost to third parties thru prescription.
 AGUIRRE VS VILLANUEVA GR 169898 OCTOBER 27, 2006

ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BY LACHES

FACTS: The petitioners have been in possession of a parcel of land for more than 26 years. They declared it for taxation
purposes, occupied it, built fences, planted trees and used the same as ingress and egress towards their cottages. The
respondent knew all these but they did not lift a finger to bar them from doing so. They waited for 16 years to oust
them.

ISSUE: Whether or not their action should prosper

HELD: No. Laches had already set it. Since they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the disputed
land in good faith and with a just title since 1971 until 1997, petitioners doubtlessly obtained title by ordinary acquisitive
prescription.

The action is barred by laches which is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length or time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or
declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement
of stale claims for the peace of society.