Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD, 2.

That before the death of the transferor, the

respondent transfer should be revocable, by the transferor
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008 at will, ad nutum, but revocability may be
provided for indirectly by means of a reserved
Facts: power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed; and
Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent
Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses 3. That the transfer should be void of the transferor
Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six should survive the transferee.
lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde
The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to
adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter, she
become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits
executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos
of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did
in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed
not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to
provided that such will become effective upon the death
petitioner’s mother during the former’s lifetime. Further
of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die
the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the
before the Donor, the present donation shall be deemed
DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they
rescinded. Provided, however, that anytime during the
could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all
lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should
the parcels of land herein donated,” means that Matilde
survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the
or even all of the parcels of the land.
right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing
Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, without other limitations than those established by law
Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four is an attribute of ownership. The phrase, “anyone of
(4) of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of
Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death. Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the
Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have
the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of referred to the donor.
ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of
donated to Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been
a will should have been observed but they were not, as it
transmitted to the latter because such lots have been
was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses
previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of
following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and
Donation. The lower court decided in favor of the
transmitted no right to petitioner’s mother. But even
petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon
assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed,
appeal of Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation
since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was
was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and
transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the
as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities
lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to
of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for
the qualification that her will must be probated. With
Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has
respect to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly
been filed.
sold by Matilde to Zenaido.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation
inter vivos and whether or not such deed is valid. If so,
DELA CERNA V. POTOT
whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the
lots in question to Zenaido Aluad.
Facts:
Ruling:
The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gervasia Rebaca
The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s executed a joint will where they gave two (2) parcels of
mother) one of mortis causa, it having the following
land to Manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have
characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will was
before the death of the transferor, or what probated in 1939.
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the
control of the property while alive;
failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appear, the same
was dismissed in 1954. The CFI held the petition
(Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to
law (prohibition on joint will). While the Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive
as to the due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held
that Once a decree of probate becomes final in
accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata.
THe final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of
Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite
the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed
the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the
court but the decree has now become final.)
GIST:
In a case where a joint will between husband and wife
was executed and the will was probated when the
husband died before the effectivity of the Civil Code, the
final decree of probate has conclusive effect as to the last
will and testament, despite the fact that even then the
Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. A
final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of
a will is binding upon the whole world and public policy
and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional
errors, judgment of courts should become final at some
definite date fixed by law. The probate decree of the will
of the husband could only affect the share of the
deceased husband. It could not include the disposition of
the share of the wife who was then still alive, and over
whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate
court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her
estate could not then be in issue. It follows that the
validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife
was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and
adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a
separate will of each testator. Thus, probate of the wife’s
will is denied as joint wills are now prohibited by the Civil
Code.
DACANAY VS. FLORENDO
SUMMARY: Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate a joint
and reciprocal will with his deceased wife Isabel
Florendo. The will provides that he will inherit all the
properties of Florendo. The relative of Florendo opposed
the probate. The trial court dismissed the petition for
probate on the ground that the said will is null and void
ab initio for violating Art 669 of the Civil Code. Dacanay
argues that the prohibition of Art 669 is against joint wills
and not reciprocal wills and that Art 669 is already
repealed, contending that whether two wills should be
executed conjointly or separately is but a matter of
extrinsic formality. The Court affirmed the ruling of the
trial court and held that the reason for the provisions is
that when a will is made jointly or in the same
instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger
in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate the
terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of
third persons whom he or she desires to favor. And,
where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one
of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous,
wicked, faithless or desperate, may be tempted to kill or
dispose of the other. The Court ruled that considering
the wisdom of the provision and that fact that it is not
yet expressly repealed, Art 669 is still in force.
DOCTRINE: The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code
prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more
persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for
their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person, is not unwise and is not against public policy.
The reason for this provision, especially as regards
husband and wife, is that when a will is made jointly or
in the same instrument, the spouse who is more
aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant is
liable to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own
benefit or for that of third persons whom he or she
desires to favor.
And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either
one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous,
wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does
the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the
spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the
survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
Issue: W/N joint and reciprocal will of the spouses is
void?
NOTES:
Art 669, CC: Two or more persons cannot make a will
conjointly or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
Art 818, NCC: Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly,
or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person.
Art 819, NCC: Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in
the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the
country where they may have been executed.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND
SANCHO ABADIA. SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET
AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL. G.R. No. L-7188 August
9, 1954
Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of
Father Sancho Abadia, which was executed on
September 6, 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some
cousins and nephews of the deceased, who would inherit
his estate if he left no will, filed opposition. The trial court
ruled in favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the said
document is a holographic will, one which is not
permitted by law at the time it was executed and at the
time of the testator’s death, such form of a will is already
allowed at the time of the hearing of the case since the
new Civil Code is already enforced, and that to carry out
the intention of the testator which according to the trial
court is the controlling factor and may override any
defect in form. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the
validity of the holographic will of Rev. Sanchio, the time
of the hearing of the case shall be considered and not the
time of its execution
Held:
No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law
enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time
the supposed will is presented in court for probate or
when the petition is decided by the court but at the time
the instrument was executed, as supported by Art. 795
of the new Civil Code. One reason in support of the rule
is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about
the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among
the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the
will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then
becomes a completed act.
When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of
its execution then upon his death he should be regarded
and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent
law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses
with such requirements as to execution should be
allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest
the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature
cannot validate void wills. Hence, the trial court’s
decision was reversed.
BELLIS v BELLIS
FACTS: Amos was a Texas born US citizen. He had 5
legitimate children from his first wife who he divorced, 3
legitimate children from his second wife and three
illegitimate children.
He executed a will on 1952 in the Philippines. He died in
158 and the will was executed for probate in CFI Manila.
However, prior to the closing of its administration, the
residuary estate was divided into seven equal portions
for the benefit of the 7 legitimate children by his first and
second wife.
Appellants herein filed their oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they have been deprived of
their legitimes as illegitimate children and therefore
compulsory heirs of the deceased under Philippine Law.
CFI – denied opposition
ISSUE: Which law must be applied. Texas Law or
Philippine Law
RULING:
Philippine Law.
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national
law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled
in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not
require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are
not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which
is the national law of the deceased.
Why the renvoi doctrine does not apply: the parties did
not submit or discuss renvoi in the case.
In the absence of proof that Texas law is different from
Philippine Law, it should not be presumed to be
different. Also he executed 2 wills: one for
his texas propert and one for his Philippine property.
Llorente vs CA G.R. No. 124371 –
Unfaithful 1st wife v 2nd Wife
Facts: The decedent was a naturalized American citizen
of New York having served in the US Navy.
Lorenzo married Petitioner PAULA (unfaithful wife) and
upon return from US, he discovered that his wife was
living in and impregnated by his brother, Ceferino (LDR
PA MORE). He can’t forgive her so both agreed to
dissolve their marriage, among others: family allotment
suspended and no case to be filed against Paula as long
as she let Lorenzo live peacefully.
In 1951, Lorenzo obtained a judgment of divorce- NEW
YORK. He later married Alicia in Manila and had three
children. In 1981, he executed a last will and testament,
duly notarized and attested that he is leaving all his
property to Alicia and their three children. The will also
provide ALICA to be the sole executor of the will.
The will was probated before the RTC- CamSur. Lorenzo
himself filed this probate petition and died before its
termination. Paula seeks to administer the estate of
Lorenzo claiming that she is the surviving spouse and the
only compulsory heir and that the will infringes
her legitime and ½ share in the conjugal property.
LOWER COURT RULINGS:
RTC- the will is intrinsically INVALID since it favors Alice
who was considered as a paramour. Ruled in favor of
Paula.
CA- Affirmed with modification. Alice is entitled to ½ of
the properties acquired during the 25 years of
cohabitation under Article 144 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WHETHER the wife can still inherit considering
that a divorce decree was obtained by the naturalized
American ex-husband.
RULING: NO.
Van Dorn v Romillo Jr.
Pilapil v Ibay-Somera
Quita v CA
The SC in these cases held that a divorce obtained by a
Filipino who later became a foreign national is valid and
the OTHER spouse loses right to inherit from the
former.
ITC, divorce obtained by Lorenzo was valid and
recognized in the PH as a matter of comity. The lower
court erred when it disregard the foreign law and the
issue on divorce.
Be it noted that intestate and testamentary succession
shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is questioned.
>ARTICLE 15-16 of the NCC.
AS TO THE WILL
Lorenzo was clear to his intention to bequeath all his
property to his second wife and children and considering
further that the will was probated through his petition.
VERDICT: Remand to RTC to determine the amount of
successional rights in accordance with the decedent’s
national law.
PALAGANAS VS. PALAGANAS
Article 816 of the CC - The will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place
where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
FACTS
Ruperta Palaganas a naturalized US citizen, executed a
will in California. Respo Ernesto, a brother of Ruperta,
filed with the RTC of Bulacan, a petition for the probate
of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate. The nephews, Pet Manuel
and Benjamin, opposed on the ground that Ruperta's will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S.
where she executed it. They also added that it was
executed under duress and without the testators full
understanding of the consequences of such act. And that
Ernesto, is not qualified to act as administrator of the
estate.
RTC & CA in favor of Ernesto. (probate in the place of
execution not needed)
ISSUE
W/N a will may be probated without first being
previously probated and allowed in the country where it
was executed.
HELD
Yes.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the
allowance of a will must show: (a) the jurisdictional facts;
(b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c)
the probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having custody of it.
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign
will has already been allowed and probated in the
country of its execution.
ITC, the nephew incorrectly based its stance on
REPROBATE of will. Reprobate or re-authentication of a
will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is
different from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent court. A different
rule applies to it (Rule 77) which cannot be applied in this
present case.
NB (if ever) for recits: in the will Sergio (a brother) was
appointed by Ruperta to be the executor, but the court
allowed Ernesto upon the request of Sergio.
IN RE ESTATE CHRISTENSEN, G.R. NO. L-16749, JAN. 31
1963
Facts:
Edward Christensen, a New York-born, migrated to
California where he resided for a period of 9 years and
was then considered a Californian citizen. He came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time
of his death; but still, he considered himself as a citizen
of California.
In his will, Maria Lucy Christensen, an acknowledged
natural daughter of Edward, was his only heir but a
legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court
had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter
of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of
the Civil code, California law (Art 946 thereof) should be
applied, the matter is returned back to the law of
domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that
the share of Helen must be increased in view of
successional rights of illegitimate children under
Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for Maria
Lucy, inasmuch that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of
the New Civil Code, the national of the deceased
must apply, our courts must apply internal law of
California on the matter. Under California law, there are
no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should
dispose any property possessed by him in absolute
dominion.
Issue: Whether or not the national law of the deceased
should be applied in determining the successional rights
of his heirs or the Philippine law.
Ruling:
The Philippine law.
There are two rules in California on the matter: (a) the
internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in
California and (b) the conflict rule for Californians
domiciled outside of California.
The California conflict rule says: “If there is no
law to the contrary in the place where
personal property is situated, is deemed to
follow the person of its owner and is governed
by the law of his domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of
his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings – the
determination of the successional rights under
Philippine law only.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile
in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
xxxxx
Renvoi Doctrine: takes place when the conflicts rule of
the forum makes a reference to a foreign law, but the
foreign law is found to contain a conflict rule that
returns or refers the matter back to the law of the
forum (Remission).