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KANT, SCHOPENHAUER, AND NIETZSCHE ON THE
MORALITY OF PITY
BY DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT
' In an especially revealing aphorism, Nietzsche states the following about Kant:
"Kant'sJoke. Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the common man,
that the common man was right: that was the secret of this soul. He wrote against the
scholars in support of popular prejudice, but for the scholars and not for the people."
(The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York, 1974], 205, section 193). In a
note to this aphorism, Kaufmann claims that Nietzsche has in mind Kant's postulates
of rational faith, i.e., God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul. He may also have
had in mind Kant's claims in the first chapter of the Grundlegungzur Metaphysik der
Sitten (Riga, 1785; 2nd ed. 1786), Groundworkof the Metaphysic of Morals (trans. H. J.
Paton [New York, 1964], 71-73) that a person with sound, natural understanding pos-
sessed, if only obscurely, knowledge of moral principles which are present a priori in his
or her reason. Because these things are recognized only obscurely, Kant argues, the
ordinary person's sound moral judgments are often confused, corrupted, or misled by
speculation. Thus one of his tasks in the Groundworkinvolves the analysis, clarification,
and justification of the common person's moral judgments. By providing the ultimate
standard for moral judgments, Kant hopes to ground firmly and formalize those things
the common person at some level, already recognizes, in order to spare him or her
confusion. Nietzsche's point is, however, that what Kant saw as the source of the practical
principles a priori present in reason is nothing but the product of the moral prejudices
of our Judeo-Christian culture: there is nothing, he argues, either a priori or reasonable
about these things. Some of Nietzsche's strongest warnings against the danger of Kant
as a moralist are found in the tenth and eleventh section of his The Antichrist, where he
views Kant's moral philosophy as a continuation of theological ethics and as a recipe
for decadence and nihilism.
2
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indian-
apolis/New York, 1956), 123.
83
Copyright Jan. 1984 by JOURNALOF THE HISTORYOF IDEAS, INC.
84 DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT
pain, or misery of the recipient of pity to the pitier via the associative laws of the
imagination which converts an idea of the recipient's pain into an impression of this pain
itself. Through pity, then, an agent experiences the recipient's pain see Hume's A Treatise
of Human Nature [2 vols., 1839-40]; rpt. (London, 1960), 316-319, 369. Spinoza also
characterizes pity as involving the agent's suffering. He claims that the agent suffers
either because he or she loves the recipient, and that whatever painfully affects the
recipient also affects the agent painfully, or the agent imitates the suffering of the recipient.
Because the experience of pity involves pain and suffering, Spinoza, unlike Hume, who
viewed sympathetic functions simply as the medium of moral judgements, also argues
that pity itself is bad (see Spinoza's Ethics in The Worksof Spinoza, Vol. 2, trans. R. H.
Elwes [New York, 1955], Part III. Props. XXIII-XXVI, XVIII, and Part IV, Prop. L,
proof and note). Nietzsche was aware of both Kant's and Spinoza's negative assessment
of the value of pity. He mentions both, along with Plato and La Rochefoucald, as agreeing
with his claim that pity is morally worthless (see the fifth section of his Preface to On
the Genealogy of Morals). I will refer to this psychological model of pity as a Kantian
model or conception not to ascribe any originality to Kant. Rather, I will do so to stress
that this is how it probably appearedto Nietzsche. Nietzsche might not have been familiar
with Hume's analysis of pity, and he seems to ignore Spinoza's, except for his claim that
Spinoza also views pity as a morally worthless emotion. For a critical analysis of this
psychological model of pity,, see Philip Mercer's Sympathy and Ethics (London, 1972),
20-35, and Max Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy, trans. Peter Heath (Hamden, 1973),
14-18, 138-39.
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenrothein Nietzsche Werke,ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Montinari (Berlin, 1971), Vol. V, part 1, section 134, 136, my translation. R. J. Hollingdale
has recently translated this work as Daybreak (Cambridge, 1982).
7 Friedrich
Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kauf-
mann (New York, 1968), section 7.
8 Friedrich
Nietzsche, Menschliches,AllzumenschlichesI in Nietzsche Werke,Vol. IV,
part 2, section 50, my translation.
86 DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT
analysis of pity. They feel superior to the pitiers because they exercise
their power or control over them by simply being pitied.9The neurotics
feel their power by causing anyone who pities them to suffer.
Hence we find that Nietzsche adopts and scores some critical points
by employing the Kantian line. There is a danger for the pitier, Nietzsche
claims, not simply because of the suffering involved in this emotion, but
also because of the susceptibility of the pitier to the manipulation and
control by those pitied. This susceptibility to the control and manipulation
by others suggests two other important Kantian themes, the loss of one's
self-control vs. autonomy and the irrational and. involuntary nature of
emotions such as pity. Both Nietzsche and Kant maintain that one of
the problems with pity is that it usurps the agent's autonomy. Nietzsche
argues that in being manipulated and controlled by the recipient of pity,
an agent may lose autonomy in two ways. The agent is made to suffer,
and this is something that most people find undesirable, and, since pity
for someone is usually conative, the agent may act to help the recipient
escape his or her suffering, and this may be something the agent would
usually not want to do. While the agent is not exactly out of control,
Nietzsche's point is that in pity the agent loses self-control by being
controlled by someone else.
The notion of self-control is the basic idea behind Kant's conception
of autonomy. Kant argued that to be autonomous it was necessary for
agents to be free from external forces which compel their behavior. This
sort of negative freedom, he argued, was not sufficient for autonomy,
however. An autonomous will must also have ". . . the property ... of
being a law to itself."'1Kant held that autonomous agents act from their
own conceptions; their actions are ascribed to causal factors whose origins
are, in some way, identified with their rational natures. In other words,
autonomous agents are self-controlling because they determine their own
actions. In pity, nevertheless, autonomy is usurped because it, like any
emotion, is initiated by factors external to the agent, factors that over-
whelm or "infect" the agent.
This Kantian theme is evidenced in the following note in which
Nietzsche discusses the relationship between the emotions and reason:
A higherstage [ than followingone'sfeelings]is to overcomeeven this pressure
withinus and to performa heroicact not on impulse-but coldly, raisonnable,
withoutbeing overwhelmedby stormyfeelingsof pleasure-the same applied
to compassion[Mitleid]:it must first be habituallysifted by reason;otherwise
it is just as dangerousas any other affect."
Here we find the idea that emotional behavior is nonrational and invol-
untary. The passions are stormy; they overwhelm us. He appears to adopt
the Kantian suggestion that one should act from reason and not from
mere inclination. There is, however, a significant departurefrom Kantian
theory. Nietzsche does not conceive of autonomy as implying the denial
or suppression of one's emotions. He avoids the separation of reason
from emotion, a bifurcation associated with Kant. Nietzsche does not
advocate the denial or suppression of our emotions or inclinations as
springs or motives of our actions. Rather, he advocates the focusing,
controlling, and directing of these forces for specific aims. Like
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche thought that our passions, desires, needs, and
the Principles of Virtue, Kant details Mitfreude as the opposite of Mitleid. Mitfreude
(rejoicing with another) involves the passive transferralof another'sjoy (Freude) as Mitleid
involves the passive transferralof another's pain (Leiden). They have, however, the same
ethical status because they both are sensible feelings, i.e., things we passively experience,
things which happen to us, things we suffer. In other words, like all emotions, Mitfreude
and Mitleid are pathological. They do not belong to us as autonomous agents. Conse-
quently, Kant argues that both types of feelings are morally worthless and are things we
cannot be obligated to have. Nietzsche also details Mitfreude as the polar of Mitleid. He
does not, however, consider Mitfreude to be morally worthless. Nietzsche argues that
Mitfreude is desirable, e.g., "I want to teach . . . what is understood by so few today,
least of all by these preachers of pity: to share not suffering but joy [Mitfreude]." (The
Gay Science, Section 338) Nietzsche thus believes that certain emotions can be valuable
and desirable even though they are pathological.
It should be mentioned, however, that Kant takes a more liberal view concerning
the ethical significance of the emotions in the Principles of Virtue than he does in the
Groundworkor the Critique of Practical Reason. His view becomes more liberal in the
sense that he details a way in which we can control certain of our emotions. This enables
him to claim that we have a general duty to cultivate our sympathetic feelings (teil-
nehmende Empfindung) and that active sympathy (tatige Teilnehmung) is a duty. (Prin-
ciples of Virtue, Section 34) These things are duties in the sense that they are natural
dispositions which are under our control, and which can be based on moral principles,
e.g., one ought to develop those natural dispositions which are helpful to morality. While
I cannot help feeling either Mitleid or Mitfreude in certain situations-this is a function
of one's emotional constitution-Kant claims that one can choose to expose or not expose
oneself to situations in which they are elicited, e.g., It is a duty not to shun sickrooms
or prisons and so on in order to avoid the pain of compassion [Mitgefiihl], which one
may not be able to resist. For this feeling, though painful, nevertheless is one of the
impulses placed in us by nature for effecting what the representation of duty might not
accomplish by itself." (Principles of Virtue, Section 35).
This type of active sympathy, then, disposes us to do what is prescribed by duty-
say, helping others-and this may later facilitate our doing our duty simply because it
is our duty. In this sense, some of our emotional dispositions were viewed by Kant as
having ethical dimensions, namely, those which are servicable to morality (in section 17
of the Principles of Virtue, the cultivation of these dispositions is classified as a duty to
oneself). Nietzsche also attributes a conditional value to "Mitgefuhl" (fellow feelings-
a literal "feeling with another"). Mitgefuhl is desirable when one has it with a noble
feeling or worthy individual. It is undesirable when one has it with a vulgar feeling or
unworthy individual. See his Beyond Good and Evil, Section 284 and Will to Power,
Sections 864, 1020.
88 DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT
wants are the true motors of our actions. The problem is that these drives
and forces often lack direction; they are impulsive and steer us blindly.
Reason or our intellect is used to direct, shape, make efficient, and provide
the means to satisfy our deepest needs. Furthermore, Nietzsche consid-
ered these drives, passions, and needs as uniquely constituting our per-
sonalities. By sifting our passions, refining, and guiding them by our
rational abilities, we become more aware of our authentic nature, for
reason and passion are both essential to realizing our individual person-
alities.
We have seen that pity can usurp agents' autonomy by placing them
under the control of the persons pitied. This was one of the dangers
Nietzsche saw in pity. He also detailed a parallel problem for the recipients
of pity. Pity can become a surreptitous way through which agents gain
control over recipients whose autonomy is threatened by pitiers:
Whenwe seesomeonesuffer,we liketo exploitthisopportunityto takepossession
of him; those who becomehis benefactorsand pity him, for example,do this
and call the lust for a new possession"love."'2
The autonomy of sufferers is in an especially vulnerable position. People
usually suffer because they are unable to relieve their own misery. Suf-
fering is typically a sufficient reason for the agent to do something to
relieve it. When we lament our woes, vocalize our misery, often we are
announcing our inability to care for ourselves. We seek the assistance of
others. Pitiers are more than happy to give this assistance. Some pitiers,
Nietzsche argued, may actively seek individuals to pity in order to
heighten their own feelings of superiority and/or to gain control of the
sufferer. The pitiers increase their feelings of superiority by doing for
others things that they cannot do for themselves, and then by conceiving
of their actions as virtuous. They gain control over others by benefiting
them. The recipients become indebted to their benefactors and being in
their debt is also being subject to their control. The pitier can even
accentuate this sense of debt by not allowing recipients to satisfy their
desire to repay it, e.g., "you do not owe me a thing." The control can
become less subtle, however. The pitiers can even make the recipients
completely dependent on their help by engendering within them the idea
that they are helpless and need the help of others to live a minimally
normal life.13
12
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, section 14.
13This was one of Nietzsche's points in his analysis of social decadence and individual
decline. Societies or cultures in which pity is praised, promoted, or deemed desirable,
are viewed as instances of "weak" cultures or societies. They are societies in which
everyone is dependent on everyone else. Nietzsche argued that these societies reflect a
lack of individual self-confidence and the inability for individuals to provide for them-
selves. Consequently, autonomy is sacrificed, the distance between individuals is obscured,
and pity is praised in these societies because the members of this society have a low
opinion of themselves which is engendered in them either by tradition or collective
THE MORALITY OF PITY 89
experience, e.g., they are currently having, or have had, a hard go at life, or they suspect
that they will face difficult times, etc. It is interesting to note that Nietzsche's analysis
of individuals often parallels his analysis of cultures. In this regard, he recalls Plato.
14 15
Kant, Principles of Virtue, Section 34. Kant, Principles of Virtue, Section 23.
90 DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT
are helping themselves saves them the humiliation and shame resulting
from the reputed benevolence of pity. By doing this, of course, the pitier
is also less likely to promote the idea among sufferers that they are weak
and helpless. In the same manner, this strategy can save the pitier from
the false feelings of superioritywhich can result from pity. One recognizes
that benefiting sufferers is not a great expression of one's power; for
sufferers are in an especially vulnerable position, and, as such, are "easy
prey."23It is far more difficult to benefit one who is relatively well-off,
Nietzsche observes.
Nietzsche also provides other reasons for concealing one's pity. There
are more immediate and practical dangers for pitiers than being controlled
by sufferers or being deluded by false feelings of superiority. This is
suggested by his claim that God died out of sacrificial pity for humans,
which connotes several things, e.g., Christ's crucifixion, human suffering
being too great of a burden for even a god to bear, etc. These allusions
suggest that the pathology of pity involves two types of danger for pitiers.
Pity may lead one to perform actions which entail undesirable forms of
self-sacrifice, and/or pity may just wear one out-the suffering of others
undermines one's own health. Nietzsche, however, indicates a danger to
pitiers other than self-sacrifice or illness, i.e., one which is not a direct
consequence of the experience of pity or of an agent's action itself. The
"ugliest man" tells Zarathustra that he murdered God out of revenge;
But he had to die: he saw with eyes that saw everything;he saw man'sdepths
and ultimategrounds,all his concealeddisgraceand ugliness.His pity knewno
shame:he crawledinto my dirtiestnooks. This most curious,overobtrusive,
overpitying,one had to die. He alwayssaw me: on such a witnessI wantedto
have revengeor not live myself.The god who saw everything,evenman-this
god had to die! Man cannotbear it that such a witnessshouldlive.24
29Ibid., 55.
30
Arthur Schopenhauer, Der handschriftlicheNachlass, Vol. 3, ed. Arthur Hibscher
(Frankfurt am Main, 1970) 474, my translation. 31Schopenhauer, Basis, 130.
94 DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT
specify the drives and urges from which our actions stem. Insofar as
Schopenhauerfails to appreciate this, Nietzsche considers his views naive
and unconvincing.
Nietzsche, however, took Kant's thesis more seriously than Kant.
While Kant recognizes the possibility that we cannot be certain about
our actual motives, he then proceeds to develop an ethical theory in
which it is important to determine our motives. After all, for Kant, only
actions which result from one's respect for the moral law are actions
having moral worth, and only characters who act from this motive are
characters having a good will. Nietzsche takes Kant's opacity thesis,
extends and revitalizes it, and uses it to challenge any type of ethical
theory which determines the moral worth of characters and actions ac-
cording to intentions and motives. Seen in this light, Nietzsche's criticism
of Schopenhauer's ethics applies with equal force to Kant's. Our inner
world, our self-conscious experiences, Nietzsche suggests, are subject to
the same sort of interpretation and structuralization as the outer world,
the world of our senses. Thus Nietzsche speaks of a phenomenalism of
our inner world, one which parallels the phenomenalism of the outer
world:
I maintainthe phenomenalityof the innerworld, too: everythingof which we
becomeconsciousis arranged,simplified,schematized,interpretedthroughand
through-the actual processof inner "perception,"the causal connectionbe-
tweenthoughts,desires,betweensubjectand object,are absolutelyhiddenfrom
us-and are perhapspurelyimaginary.The "apparentinnerworld"is governed
byjust the sameformsandproceduresas the "outer"world.We neverencounter
"facts."47
If we are to rely on introspection or self-consciousness to discover our
motives and intentions, Nietzsche contends, we are involved in a process
compassion. The main reason I say this is that the emotion referred to by Schopenhauer
is free from the pejorative cast that is associated with pity, e.g., consider the insult, "I
pity you," the condescending attitude toward those we pity; the description "you pitiful
wretch," the frequency with which pity is rejected-I don't want your pity," and desir-
ability of self-pity. This pejorative cast, lacking in compassion, is in full flower in the
emotions Nietzsche analyzes. I would, thus, agree with Jean Stambaugh's assessment
that Nietzsche's writings lack a conception of "compassion." See her "Thoughts on Pity
and Revenge," Nietzsche Studien (Berlin, 1971), I, 27-35. If what I say is true, any
comparison between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer's conceptions of Mitleid should take
into account that although they use the same German noun, they are referringto different
emotions. I have not taken this into account in my explanation of Nietzsche's criticism
of
Schopenhauer's ethics primarily because these particular criticisms are such that they
would apply to any emotion Schopenhauer might claim is the basis of morality.
47Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 477. Of course, Kant anticipated Nietzsche in
teaching the phenomenality of the inner world. This is suggested by his opacity thesis,
but, more importantly, by his distinction between the empirical and the transcendental
self or the phenomenal and noumenal self. For example, see his Critiqueof Pure Reason,
B154-B158.
98 DAVID E. CARTWRIGHT
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater.