Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Immigration Policy”
By
Henry Flores, PhD
Dean of the Graduate School and
Professor of Political Science
St. Mary’s University
San Antonio, TX
Introduction
The 2009 General Election was a benchmark election for various reasons
including American voters electing their first Black African American president.
Another reason that this election will prove to be a special, “landmark” election, if
you will, is because it is the first national election where Latino voters directly
contributed to the election of the president. There are still other reasons for the
significance of this election including the wide use of new technologies in fund
raising and “get out the vote” (GOTV) efforts and the substantial role played by the
18‐24 year old voter. The focus of this paper, however, is the role played by the
Latino electorate in the election of Barack Obama to the presidency and the
potential significance of this influence on the immigration policy of the new
administration. Most importantly, however, is the role immigration policy has
played as a coalescing force among all Latino national origin groups.
The Latino Electorate in Past Elections
To better understand why the Latino electorate’s role was so important to
the election of President Obama in the 2008 General Election it is important to take
a brief look first at the participatory history of Latinos nationally. Data available for
Latino voters are sparse and have been gathered by a broad array of institutions and
media outlets whose methodologies are so diverse that interpretation is difficult at
1
best 1 . There have been only three systematic academic attempts to understand the
Latino electorate and all have had various methodological difficulties given how
various behavioral variables have undergone operationalization changes over the
last forty years 2 , funding for such projects has been difficult to obtain, and
organizing scholars with the appropriate skills to perform the necessary research
are among many reasons why such few attempts have occurred. The latter reason
was caused by the lack of young faculty who were properly trained to conduct such
research coupled with the stresses of obtaining tenure. These twin stressors left a
void of faculty interested and capable of conducting this important research. This
situation has been remedied so there should be more systematic attempts in the
future. Regardless, the data produced about the Latino voter to date is the “best”
available and so these will be used throughout this paper. Lack of funding for
conducting sophisticated elections research was due generally to the fact that the
study of Latino politics has been marginalized by traditional funding agencies and
academic disciplines. This marginalization mitigated against consideration of the
study of Latino voting behavior as a serious endeavor deserving of financial support.
The first attempt to understand the impact Latino voters have had on
American national elections was made by Grebler, Moore and Guzman in a study
1
Early studies in the 1970s depended principally on descriptive statistics while later
studies incorporated more sophisticated techniques such as ordinary least squares.
2
For instance the operationalization of Latino identity terminology over the years has
included Mexican, Mexican American, Spanish Surnamed individuals, Hispanic, and
Latino. Also, how the data was gathered for Latinos varied greatly from census to
census.
2
that was initiated in 1963 and culminated in 1968 providing the data for their
seminal study entitled The Mexican American People: The Nation’s Second Largest
Minority (1970). As the title of this study indicates it focused solely on the Mexican
American population of the United States and only a brief allusion to other Latino
groups was made in the final report. Additionally, the authors failed to discuss the
direct effects of Mexican Americans on national politics speaking instead to their
“effectiveness” at the state and local levels. The principle reasons the authors gave
for a lack of political effectiveness on the part of Mexican Americans were their
recent urbanization and the great number of barriers that had been erected by the
political system against their participation such as poll taxes, gerrymandering, and
so forth (pp. 526‐572).
The next major attempt to discern the effects of the Latino vote on American
elections was set forth by de la Garza and DeSipio in their 1992 study entitled From
Rhetoric to Reality: Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections. The authors spoke to the
inclusion of Latino politicos within the Dukakis campaign including the intention to
appoint Willie Velasquez, the founder and president of the Southwest Voter
Registration Project, to the campaign organization. Unfortunately, Mr. Velasquez
passed away before his presence could be felt on the campaign organization and no
other Latino leader replaced him. Regardless, the Dukakis campaign infused a great
deal of money and effort into organizing the Latino electorate in hopes of increasing
turnout.
Unlike their predecessors De la Garza and DeSipio generated data in their
study that discussed the political behavior of all national origin Latino groups’
3
participation in the 1988 presidential elections but came to a similar conclusion as
Grebler, Moore and Guzman concerning the level of influence Latino voters
possessed at the national level. The major difference, beyond increased
methodological sophistication, between the two studies was de la Garza and DeSipio
saw the barriers that required overcoming as imposed by the Democratic Party
rather than the government or “state”. De la Garza and DeSipio noted that Latinos
were not “swing voters” but have been an essential part of the Democratic Party
electorate for decades and it would behoove the party to do more to increase Latino
turnout. The authors felt that the Latino electorate was and would become very
important to Democrats winning general elections in the future.
The third scholarly attempt to understand the Latino electorate was led by
John Garcia but included a large number of other leading Latino political scientists
including Luis Fraga, Gary Segura, Michael Jones‐Correa, Valerie Martinez‐Ebers,
and Rodney Hero who conducted 15 focus groups in 2003 and surveys of over 8,000
Latinos in 2006. Unlike the earlier two studies this project focused on Latino
identity 3 . The first volume of this latter study, Latino Lives in America: Making It
Home (2010), however did not discuss the political effectiveness of Latinos nor did
the study address any barriers to the political participation of Latinos. The 2010
study also did not discuss the partisan affiliation of Latinos or how they had voted in
any general election. Essentially, the third academic study was more a study of
3
To date their findings have produced one volume that focuses on Latino identity,
however, there are indications that additional books will be forthcoming some of which
will include more on Latino voting behavior.
4
contemporary Latino identity in the face of contemporary issues, pressures and
prevailing opinions concerning the community.
In fact, the 2010 study filled a void in the sociological literature and made
two important contributions to the study of Latino politics. The first contribution
was methodological; this is the first research endeavor utilizing a mixed‐method
approach combining qualitative (focus groups) with quantitative (survey research)
approaches. Mixed‐methods allows for both the creation of aggregated data leading
to the systematic search for relations among variables while at the same time
provides the depth of analysis that results in overcoming the aggregation issues
surrounding ecological inference problems (King, 1997). The second contribution
is that the authors provide the first evidence that Latinos are beginning to coalesce
politically specifically around the need for comprehensive immigration reform
(CIR).
Political cohesiveness has, to date, been tested statistically by principally
observing how individuals of specific racial or ethnic groups vote continuously as a
block over a number of elections. The authors of the 2010 study, however, have
added depth to this level of discussion; their focus group research has uncovered
what appears to be a greater understanding of how public policy affects the Latino
community as opposed to individual national origin groups. According to the
authors, there appears to be the development of a “Latino sameness” that may have
political consequences in future elections because this phenomenon may lead to
greater political and electoral cohesiveness. The increasing evolution of identity
from national origin to an awareness of “sameness” among all Latinos seems to be
5
arising around how important comprehensive immigration reform is and how
Latinos are viewing this in relationship to their ability to affect public policy. The
massive 2006 marches and demonstrations in support of CIR proved to the Latino
community and the nation that they were and will be a political force in the future
and immigration is an important “wedge issue” for the community. Nevertheless,
whether Latinos coalesce into a viable voting bloc around the immigration issue and
hold politicians accountable for positions they take on this crucial policy remains to
be seen.
Beyond these three scholarly attempts at understanding the political
behavior of Latinos there have been many efforts at gathering voting data since
1960 in an effort at understanding the patterns, turnout levels and effectiveness of
the Latino vote. Different individuals, agencies, institutes, and media outlets
utilizing a variety of techniques and methodologies derived data available on these
topics. Like all polls the instruments were worded differently, sampling frames
were designed differently, weighting was performed using different variables and
weights, sample sizes were different, and stratification was different from one
survey/poll to another. In short, one cannot utilize these data for scholarly research
because of the significant methodological divide separating each of these efforts
nevertheless one can, given that these data are the only available, compare and
contrast their results and reach some general conclusions concerning general
historical trends of the Latino vote that can be tested later utilizing appropriate
techniques.
6
Historical Trends of the Latino Vote
The earliest available data indicating how Latinos vote were provided by CBS
News/New York Times exit polls in the 1976 general election. The other major
networks began gathering, haphazardly it appears, data on Latino political
participation with the 1984 general election. The William C. Velasquez Institute
(WCVI) conducted the first polls of any kind that specifically targeted Latino voters
in 1988 albeit these early polls only surveyed voters in Texas and California so
cannot be used to understand any national Latino voting patterns even though
almost 50% of all Latino voters reside in these two states. In 2002 WCVI and
MirRam Group conducted a national Latino telephone poll on the political behavior
and ideology of Latino voters nationally but the methodological notes discussing
sample size, margin of error and so forth are missing so the accuracy of these data
cannot be properly assessed.
The next attempt by WCVI to conduct an exit poll of Latino voters nationally
was in 2004. This was the first exit poll of any methodological sophistication but the
findings created controversy because they contradicted those that NBC News
publicized for the same election (PS Online, Jan. 2005). The large differences in the
polls, WCVI indicated that only 31.4% of Latinos voted for George W. Bush while
Edison‐Mitofsky’s poll for the National Election Pool(the NBC News poll) indicated
that 44% of Latinos had supported President Bush was attributed to differences in
weighting schemes. The differences, however, went further. WCVI constructed a
poll that elicited the opinions of Latinos only, stratified geographically, while the
Mitofsky poll did not attempt to stratify for Latinos. As a result, the Latinos that
7
appeared in the Mitofsky sample appeared as a result of a haphazard occurrence.
When Mitofsky looked at where the Latinos in his sample resided he realized he had
oversampled the Cuban community in the Miami‐Dade County area to a great
degree explaining the high support levels for President Bush 4 . The WCVI findings
were substantiated later by two post‐election polls conducted by Zogby
International and the Miami Herald who had both found that only 33% of Latinos
had supported Mr. Bush. WCVI replicated their efforts in the 2008 election and
found support levels for the Republican and Democratic Party Presidential
candidates comparable to those of 2004. In 2008, as in other polling efforts, the
methodologies changed dramatically. The WCVI conducted its 2008 poll using the
internet and labeled it a “flash poll”. Emailing 160,000 Latinos across eleven states
WCVI found that Latinos supported the Republican presidential ticket 28.7% and
the Democratic slate 68.6%.
Below in Table 1 are the partisan support levels for Latinos gathered from
both academic and nonacademic surveys and polls from 1972 to the present. The
data in Table 1 were gathered from a broad array of sources but were originally
collected and put in tabular form by Dr. Lorenzo Cano of the University of Houston.
The sources for the 1996 and 2000 data were missing from his original table. This
author added the data for 2004 and 2008 only. These data are interesting in several
respects. The ranges of support for Democratic candidates are from 85 to 53% and
for Republicans 44 to 15%. The mean support levels for both parties is 65.7% for
4
This was disclosed during a conversation between this author and Warren Mitofsky in
November, 2004.
8
Table 1
Latino Voting Trends
1972 – 2008
Year Source Democratic Republican Other
data so one cannot say that Latinos are becoming more Republican or Democrat;
and, the support levels vary from election to election although the support levels
appear to be more stable since 2000. One can safely conclude that in any given
General Election Democrats can expect to receive between 60 and 65% support
and Republicans can expect between 35 to 40% support from Latinos. Just given
this variably gathered data, then, Latinos appear to be relatively stable in their
partisan preference generally supporting De la Garza’s and DeSipio’s 1988
conclusion of Democratic Party loyalty. Finally, preliminarily at least, one can say
9
that Latinos do not fit the characteristics of swing voters in that the patterns of party
support are relatively stable over time and do not fluctuate between both parties.
Registration and Latino Turnout
Now that we have a general understanding of Latino voting patterns we turn
to a discussion of registration and turnout to further assess the potential voting
strength or influence of Latino voters. Essentially, registration and turnout among
Latino voters has been relatively low compared to that of nonHispanic Whites and
black African Americans since these data have been collected. The data presented in
Table 2 below were gathered by the Southwest Voter Registration and Educational
Project (SWVREP) which is an organization dedicated to the registration of Latino
voters and has been doing so since 1977.
The data in Table 2 reflects voter registration numbers (reported in
thousands) for nonHispanic whites, all Latinos, and black African Americans from
1980 through 2008. The data were gathered from Census Bureau data by the
SWVREP and reported on their website. Assuming that these data are accurate they
do appear to substantiate conventional wisdom. White nonHispanics have
higher voting registration numbers than do black African Americans or Latinos;
black African Americans have higher registration rates than Latinos; and, the Latino
voting age population has increased significantly over the last decade. Additionally,
the citizen voting age population for Latinos is much lower than that of the other
two groups identified in Table 2 placing them at a clear numerical disadvantage.
Clearly there needs to be increased effort by those organizations who register voters
10
to increase the numbers of Latino registered voters for future elections if they are to
be considered politically influential.
Table 2
Voter Registration by
Race, Voting Age Population, and Citizen VAP
Year Race VAP CVAP REG REG%
1980 TOT 157085 150742 105035 0.697
White 137676 132914 94112 0.708
Black 16423 15951 9849 0.617
Latino 8210 5565 2984 0.536
1984 TOT 169963 162627 116106 0.714
White 146761 141827 102211 0.721
Black 18432 17809 12223 0.686
Latino 9471 6444 3794 0.589
1988 TOT 178098 168495 118589 0.704
White 152848 145999 103830 0.711
Black 19692 18692 12700 0.679
Latino 12893 8078 4573 0.566
1992 TOT 185684 173784 126578 0.728
White 157637 149553 110684 0.74
Black 21039 19995 13442 0.672
Latino 14688 8778 5132 0.585
1996 TOT 193651 179935 127661 0.709
White 162779 153057 110259 0.72
Black 22483 21486 14267 0.664
Latino 18426 11209 6573 0.586
2000 TOT 202609 186366 129549 0.695
White 168733 157291 110773 0.704
Black 24132 22753 15348 0.675
Latino 21598 13159 7546 0.573
2004 TOT 215694 197006 142070 0.721
White 176618 162958 119929 0.736
Black 24910 23346 16035 0.687
Latino 27129 16088 9308 0.579
2008 TOT 225499 206072 146311 0.71
White 183169 169438 122020 0.72
Black 26528 24930 17375 0.697
Latino 30852 19537 11608 0.594
11
Generally, Table 2 indicates that white nonHispanics have approximately a
4% registration advantage over black African Americans and a 14% advantage over
Latinos. The nonHispanic White voter is the dominant voter in the country taking
absolute numbers into consideration. As I said earlier this simply substantiates
conventional wisdom. How registration rates for each group translate into turnout
may be discerned from the data in Table 3 below. These data were gathered by the
SWVREP from Census Bureau data as well so we can assume that they are relatively
accurate depictions of the actual turnout for the years specified. Again, the data in
Table 3 substantiate conventional wisdom; white nonHispanics have higher turnout
rates than either black African Americans or Latinos during the reporting period
with the exception of the 2008 election; and, in absolute numbers white
nonHispanic voters outvote both black African Americans and Latinos combined.
Generally, Latinos have a turnout rate that is approximately 6.4% less than that of
non‐Hispanic white voters and approximately 3.5 % less than that of black African
Americans. Although in comparing the turnout rates of the three groups one
discovers an interesting pattern. The absolute number of Latino voters continues to
increase from year to year while those of the other two groups appear to fluctuate
with both experiencing decreases in turnout in 1988 for Blacks and 1996 for Whites
respectively. Additionally, the absolute number of Latino voters has risen 74.8%
during the reporting period in Table 3 while those of Blacks rose 48.6% and White
voters 23.1% during the same time frame. Regardless, on a national level non‐
Hispanic white voters are still and will remain the dominant voting force for quite
12
some time given their advantage in terms of absolute numbers of voters who can
and do participate in general elections.
Table 3
Turnout Rates in Presidential Elections by Race
Year Race TO TO%
1980 TOT 93066 0.886
White 83855 0.891
Black 8287 0.841
Latino 2453 0.821
1984 TOT 101878 0.877
White 90152 0.882
Black 10293 0.842
Latino 3092 0.815
1988 TOT 102224 0.862
White 90357 0.87
Black 10144 0.799
Latino 3710 0.811
1992 TOT 113866 0.9
White 100405 0.907
Black 11371 0.846
Latino 4238 0.825
1996 TOT 105017 0.823
White 91208 0.827
Black 11386 0.798
Latino 4928 0.75
2000 TOT 110826 0.855
White 95098 0.858
Black 12917 0.842
Latino 5934 0.786
2004 TOT 125736 0.885
White 106588 0.889
Black 14016 0.874
Latino 7587 0.815
2008 TOT 131144 0.896
White 109100 0.894
Black 16133 0.929
Latino 9745 0.84
13
Latinos, Regional and State Voting and the Electoral College
Adding a twist to this discussion, however, is the unique political presidential
electoral structure of the United States allowing Latinos to be in an unusually
strategic political position, the position to influence who will win the presidency in
all elections in the future regardless of the absolute numbers they can muster at the
national level. When one takes into account the structure of the Electoral College
where electors are allocated proportionally by population and the fact that the vast
majority of Latinos reside in those states having large numbers of electoral college
votes the picture of the extent of political influence that Latinos can wield becomes
more clear. The first suspicions that Latinos resided in strategically important
election states were uncovered during the preparations that MALDEF and WCVI
were undertaking to participate in the 2001 Texas redistricting rounds. What I
discovered was that 89.1% of Latino voters resided in states that accounted for 295
Electoral College votes. Underlying the unique residential patterns of Latinos are
the data in Table 1 indicate that Latinos support levels for both major parties has
been relatively consistent over the last 30 years with Democrats receiving more
than 65% support and Republicans less than 32% support among Latino voters on
average.
The political position Latinos find themselves relative to the Electoral College
vote is based in the fact that, even though they remain a small proportion of the
overall national vote, they do comprise a significant voting block in those states
having large numbers of electoral votes. The substantiation of the unique political
position of Latinos is borne out by the fact that while only 270 Electoral College
14
votes are required to win the presidency fully 89.1% of Latino voters reside in states
possessing 295 electoral votes.
Table 4
Electoral College and Latino Votes
15
In the perception of some, specifically the William C. Velasquez Research
Institute, Latinos were responsible for delivering some of the states that President
Obama required to secure his victory in 2008. Specifically, the report (WCVI,
undated) 5 insinuated that the states of Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia were decided by margins provided
by Latino voters. Methodologically, the WCVI assertions were lacking,
impressionistically however their assertions were intriguing particularly in light of
the data in Table 4. Table 4 sets forth the strategic information that the WCVI report
was partially based on. Some interesting observations about these data are that
President Obama won all but two states, Arizona and Texas, in the 2008 General
Election. As the data show all states with the exception of Indiana, Iowa and North
Carolina identified in the WCVI report are depicted in Table 4. Presumably the loss
of Texas and Arizona, 44 electoral votes, was made up by the three states missing
from the table that represented 33 votes. Essentially, following the WCVI logic and
the potential Latino voting power displayed in Table 4 it is conceivable that Latinos
delivered or played a significant role in the election of the current president.
The data in Table 4 sets forth the 15 states where 89.1% of Latino
registered voters reside. Although the 4th and 5th columns indicate 88.8% of Latino
voters reside in the states the difference is found in rounding. According to the
United States Bureau of the Census in November 2008 there were 11,609,000
5
I suspect this report was published in January or February 2009 given that it was based
on the November 2008 General Election Results.
16
registered Latino voters while the total number of Latino registered voters in the
fifteen states identified in Table 4 is 10,341,000 which represents 89.1% of the total
number in the country. The data in column 4 presupposes that Latinos comprise an
effective set of voters, some may call them a block, that possesses the potential of
being a determining collection of voters in a closely contested statewide election.
This may also be true of certain congressional or state assembly elections within
each state.
Of the fifteen states in Table 4 President Obama won 13 losing only Texas
and Arizona. In all Obama garnered 251 Electoral College votes from those states
having Latinos as an important group of voters. Given reapportionment in 2011 the
landscape will not change. The same fifteen states in Table 4 still will account for
295 Electoral College votes and the states having been won by President Obama
again will account for 251 EC votes. Speculation is always to be avoided in these
types of presentations, however, if Latino voters vote their partisan preference in
their historical percentages in the states where they represent an important bloc of
voters in future general elections then one can conclude that Democrats have
somewhat of a potential advantage in winning control of the White House in years
to come. This would hold true particularly if the turnout trend identified in Table 3
is, in fact, a trend that holds steady during presidential elections and there is a
steady and continuing increase in Latino registered voters over time.
17
Latinos and Public Policy, Specifically Immigration Reform
Developing a direct linkage between voting turnout and their effects on a
public policy decision by a president is a very difficult if not impossible proposition
because of the broad array of diverse variables involved in the development of
public policy (Stone, 2002). Nevertheless, in the area of immigration policy the task
is a bit easier, still difficult just easier, because of the more clear relationship
between Latinos generally and immigration policy and the specific politicians
involved who champion such a policy. This latter group will become evident as this
discussion progresses. For the time being it is simply important to note the voting
and residential patterns of Latinos in the United States and the relation to the
Electoral College as being potentially strong variables in this linkage. The next
phase of this discussion involves presenting a narrative of the relationship between
immigration policy, the Latino communities, elected officials at the national levels
and presidential election campaigns.
Latinos and Immigration Policy
The fundamental relationship between Latinos and immigration policy is
based in a long history of the relationship between Latinos and the United States
generally. The current Southwestern part of the United States was part of Mexico
until 1848 when the US‐Mexican War concluded with the ceding of California,
Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada and parts of Utah and Wyoming to the
United States as an outcome of the conflict. What became the southwestern
boundary of the United States split a culture, familial, and various types of social
relationships. Between 1848 and the creation of the Immigration and
18
Naturalization Service (INS), precursor of the current Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), there was a free flow of human beings across the border
involved in trade, familial visits, and work. When the southern border was “closed”
in the early 1920s it disrupted a long standing tradition of cross‐border commuting
so persons on both sides of the border sought other means to continue their north‐
south movements. To this day there are still more legal and undocumented
immigrants coming into the United States from Mexico than any other country and
by one congressional estimate (Gutierrez, Jan, 2010) this migration north will
continue to the tune of 3.5 million persons a year into the indefinite future.
Currently, according to the Department of Homeland Security undocumented
persons from Mexico account for anywhere from 50% to 60% of all undocumented
persons in the United States. In real numbers this translates into 6.6 million in 2009
and 4.7 million in 2008 (Homeland Security, January, 2010). According to the same
report approximately 80% of all unauthorized residents in the United States hale
from Latin American Countries. Essentially, then, in the general immigration policy
of the United States is aimed at immigration streams from Latin America regardless
of all of the provisions on immigration quotas for various countries, special
occupations, or national security issues.
The Latino community, regardless of national origin has been calling for
comprehensive immigration policy reform for quite some time culminating with the
dramatic street demonstrations of 2006 that saw millions of persons rally in cities
across the United States protesting House Resolution 4437, The Border Protection,
Anti‐Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. This passed the
19
Republican controlled house but was voted against by 80% of the Democratic
congresspersons and failed to pass the Senate. HR 4437, among many provisions,
included building a fence between the US and Mexico and increased penalties for
hiring and housing undocumented residents. In short, many of the bill’s central
provisions appeared to be aimed directly at Latin America.
The Role of Congress and Executive Branch in Immigration Reform
United States Representative Luis Gutierrez (D‐IL) proposed in the closing
moments of the First Session of the 111th Congress (December 15, 2009) new
comprehensive immigration legislation entitled “Comprehensive Immigration
Reform for America’s Security and Prosperity Act of 2009 (CIR ASAP)” that included
among provisions for increased border security one that allowed for the legalization
of many unregistered residents including a refined version of the DREAM Act that
would have allowed for persons who arrived in the United States as children to
achieve legal resident status and eventually naturalization upon completion of a
certain level of education or a number of years in the military. At this very moment,
however, it is unclear whether Congressman Gutierrez’s legislation will ever
become law given congressional gridlock that appears to have set in during the
Second Session of the 111th Congress. However, if the political rhetoric of Senators
Harry Reid (D‐NV) and Dick Durbin (D‐IL) are to be believed then CIR will be at the
top of the Senate’s agenda beginning in May 2010 (New York Times, April 11, 2010)
As far as the executive branch is concerned President Obama has yet to take
on immigration reform given the trials and tribulations he has faced in righting the
economy, reorienting the war in Afghanistan and passage of health care reform.
20
During President Obama’s political maneuverings culminating in the passage of
health care reform he met with a group of Latino legislators who had indicated they
would not support his health care reform package unless he placed immigration
reform high on his policy agenda. Exactly what the outcome of the meeting was is
still to be determined upon completion of interviews with members of the congress
who met with the president. The media, however, reported that the Latino
congressmen agreed to support health care reform and the president, in turn,
agreed to give CIR policy priority after the mid‐term 2010 elections. If this trade‐off
is indeed the case then the president has acknowledged that Latinos are an essential
part of his voting constituents and this constituency has voting strength potential
important enough to influence his policy positions.
The Relationship Between Latinos and President Obama
The final piece of this puzzle lies in the “strange” and evolving relationship
between President Obama and the Latino community. This relationship is
characterized as strange because of the manner in which the Obama campaign
interacted with the Latino community during the 2008 presidential campaign.
Interviews with several Latino leaders and a person inside the Obama campaign
revealed that the traditional Latino leadership had been sidestepped by the
campaign as Obama tried to restructure the orientation of his organization.
President Obama’s strategy centered on getting out the young and new voters
building his own networks utilizing newer technologies and techniques that had
never been brought to bear in a presidential election. What this meant, however,
was that he would have to bypass the leadership and organizations that traditionally
21
supported Democratic Party candidates in order to create his own organizational
structure meaning that his reorganization efforts required bypassing the leadership
of traditional Latino community organizations who normally worked with the
Democratic Party structure during elections. He felt that his election was a
“transitional election” in many ways and he needed a different organizational
orientation to insure victory. Several Latino leaders felt that they had been slighted
due to their support for the Hillary Clinton candidacy during the primary and
indicated that they thought that Obama would not place Latino issues at the
forefront of his administration in retaliation. These same leaders indicated that they
felt that one of the policy areas that would fail to receive his support would be
immigration policy. This picture appears to be changing as the mid‐term elections
near and the president incorporates the support of the Latino community into the
ranks of his staunch supporters.
Obama, the Latino Vote and the Future of Immigration Policy
Now that all the pieces of the puzzle have been identified let us put them all
together.
Latinos are an integral part of the Democratic Party’s voting block this has
been confirmed by both scholarly research and popular polls.
Latinos form significantly important percentages of voters in states of
strategic Electoral College value.
Latinos form significantly important percentages of voters in states required
by Democratic Party candidates to win and keep the White House.
US immigration policy is aimed primarily at Latinos.
22
President Obama seems ambivalent to immigration policy reform in light of
his other policy priorities.
President Obama appears ambivalent to Latino voters and their policies.
Superficially, at least, one can conclude that the relationship between all of the
above variables is tangential at best and spurious at least. President Obama and
Democratic Party leaders may not see CIR as important simply given that the
presidential agenda is top heavy with domestic and international economic issues
and have two official wars and various unofficial ones to deal with. Immigration
reform would appear to be “too soft” of an issue to find an important place on the
White House’s policy agenda.
Latino leadership can argue for pulling electoral support from President Obama
and other future Democratic Party presidential candidates but to what avail? With
only two party preferences Latinos are caught between a party who cannot listen to
the immigration reform petition because of other seemingly more pressing issues
and a party who only wishes to build more, higher, stronger and sophisticated walls
between the United States and Latin America. Obama and the Democratic Party
understand that Latinos have no choice but support them so they do not feel
threatened by a Latino boycott.
There appear only a few possibilities for immigration policy reform. One is a
piecemeal legislative approach by Latino congresspersons adding riders here and
there or composing extremely narrow legislation focusing on one or only safe
immigration issues. Or, brokering a deal with the Obama administration to support
legislation that the Obama administration can only marginally win or lose requiring
23
Latino support in order to be successful such as health care or a jobs bill in exchange
for his support of CIR. Another possibility, less likely than the previous two is based
upon Obama winning reelection and then supporting CIR as a “lame duck”
president. Regardless, unless Latinos become a much more important voting block
that, in fact, delivers states to the presidential winner they will not be taken
seriously as far as public policy issues are concerned, let alone being able to
influence CIR. This requires both increasing voter registration numbers and turnout
rates in the strategic Electoral College states.
A Note on the Current Situation
Although the previous section of this paper discusses various variables and
possibilities of how CIR could come about what it does not include is the turmoil
engendered by the passage of a law by the state of Arizona that would require local
policing agencies
24
List of Works Cited
delaGarza, Rodolfo and Louis DeSipio. (1992). From Rhetoric to Reality:
Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics.
(Jan., 2010). “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population
Residing in the United States: January 2009”. www.dhs.gov.
Garcia, John, Luis Fraga, Gary Segura, Michael Jones‐Correa, Valarie Martinez‐
Ebbers, and Rodney Hero. (2010). Latino Lives in America: Making
It Home. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Gonzalez, Antonio and Steven Ochoa. (2009). “The Latino Vote in 2008:
Trends and Characteristics”. Los Angeles: William C. Velasquez
Institute.
Grebler, Leo, Joan W. Moore, and Ralph C. Guzman. (1970). The Mexican‐
American People: The Nation’s Second Largest Minority. New York:
The Free Press.
Gutierrez, Luis. (Jan., 2010). Speech at the National Latino Congreso. El
Paso, TX.
King, Gary. (1997). A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem:
Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
“Latino Voter Statistics”. (2009). Webpage of the William C. Velasquez
Institute.
Leal, David, Matt A. Baretto, Jongho Lee, and Rodolfo O. de la Garza.
(Jan., 2005). “The Latino Vote in the 2004 Election”. PSOnline.
Stone, Deborah. (2002). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision
Making. Revised Edition. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
25
26