Block C 2016

LABOR 2
Finals Reviewer: Prof. Battad

Azores, Bahjin, Chua, De Guzman, Haynes, Leynes, Licaros

SY 2013-2014
 b) Plenary Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator vis-à-vis Labor Arbiter 12
TABLE OF CONTENTS c) Procedures 13
d) Nature of Office and Function 14
VII. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONCEPT, PROCEDURES AND ISSUES 3
e) Interpretation Agreement 14
D. Bargainable Issues 3
f) Awards and Orders 14
E. Collective Bargaining Agreement 3 g) Finality and Execution of Awards 14
1. Definition 3 h) Appeal 15
2. Contents 4
VIII. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE 16
3. Beneficiaries 4
4. Contract Duration and Renewal 4 A. In general 16
5. Ratification 6 1. Definition and General Concept | Unfair Labor Practice vis-à-vis
Management Prerogative; Exception: 16
6. Registration 6
rd 2. Requisites 20
7. CBA and 3 Party Applicability 7
a) Employer-Employee Relationship 20
8. CBA and Disaffiliation 7
b) Act Must be Specifically Defined in the Law 21
9. Interpretation, Administration and Enforcement 8
3. Burden of Proof 22
a) Nature of Contract: Law Between Parties 8
4. Construction/Interpretation 22
b) Liberal Construction in Case of Doubt 8
5. Management Prerogative 22
c) Grievances 9
6. Inter-relations of ULP Acts 23
1) Contract Infirmity 9
2) Contract Ambiguity 9 B. Acts in Violation of Right to Self-Organization 25
d) Minutes of the Negotiation 9 1. Interference, Restraint and Coercion 25
e) Grievance Machinery/Voluntary Arbitration 10 a) Interrogation 26
b) Speech, Espionage, Economic Coercion 27
F. Voluntary Arbitration 11
c) Concerted Activities 28
1. Basis and Rationale 11
2. Non-Union Membership or Withdrawal Form Membership as a Condition
2. Arbitrable Issues 11
of Employment (Yellow-Dog Contract) 28
3. Arbitrator 12
3. Contracting Out to Discourage Unionism 28
a) Selection 12
4. Company Domination of Union 29
 5. Discrimination to Encourage/Discourage Unionism | Valid discrimination: IX. UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES 38
Union Security Clause 29
A. Basis of Right to Engage in Concerted Activities 38
a) Instances of Discrimination 30
1. Constitution 38
b) Valid Discrimination: Union Security Clause 30
2. Statutory 39
6. Retaliation Against Employee for His/Her Testimony/Indirect
Discrimination 31 3. Limitations 41
7. Illegal Exaction; Featherbedding 31
B. Types of Concerted Activities 41
C. Acts in Violation of Right to Collective Bargaining 31 1. Strike 41
1. Violation to Duty to Bargain 31 a) Definition, Nature, Purpose and Scope 41
2. Payment of Negotiation or Attorneys Fees 33 b) Rationale for Regulation by Law 42
3. Gross Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement 33 c) Effect on Work Relationship 42
d) Types and Conversion 43
D. Motive, Conduct and Proof 34
1) Unfair Labor Practice 44
1. Employer Motive and Proof 34
2) Bargaining Deadlock: Economic/ULP 44
2. Totality of Evidence 34
3) Non-Conversion: Strike to Lockout 44
E. Enforcement, Remedies and Sanctions 34
e) Grounds 44
1. Parties Against Whom ULP Committed 34
1) Allowable Strikes 44
2. Parties Liable for Acts 36
2) Prohibited Strikes 44
a) Employer 36
f) Striking Party 46
b) Labor Organization 36
g) Procedural Requirements 47
3. Prosecution and Prescriptive Period 36
1) Effort to Bargain 48
a) Civil Aspect 36
2) Filing of Notice of Intention 49
b) Criminal Aspect 37
3) Observance of Cooling-Off Periods 49
4. Compromise 37
4) Strike Vote 49
5. Remedies and Sanctions 37
h) Test of Legality 50
a) Civil Remedies 37
1) Legal Strike 50
b) Penal Remedies 38
2) Illegal Strike 50
i) Employment of Strike Breakers 52
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 j) Improved Offer Balloting and Strikes 53 C. Lockouting Party 58
2. Picketing 53
D. Ground for Lockout 58
a) Definition, Nature, Purpose of Picket Line 53
E. Prohibited Lockout 58
b) Picketing and Libel Laws 53
c) Curtailment 54 F. Procedural Requirements 59
d) Regulation/Restrictions, Innocent Third Party Rule and Liabilities 54
G. Effect of Illegal Lockout 59
e) Prohibited Activities; Peaceful Picketing 54
3. Slowdown 54 XI. LABOR INJUNCTION 60

C. Assumption of Jurisdiction/Compulsory Arbitration 54 A. Definition and Nature 60

1. Definition; Nature of Dispute for Compulsory Arbitration 54
B. General Rule: Prohibition 60
2. Rationale 55
C. Exception: When Allowed 61
3. Process Initiation/Initiating Party 56
a) Secretary of Labor 56 D. Issuing Agency; Procedural Requirements 62
b) President 56 1. National Labor Relations Commission; Labor Arbiter 62
4. Arbitration Agencies 56 2. Procedural Requirements and Rules for the Issuance of labor Injunctions 63
5. Effect of Assumption/Certification Order 56 3. Temporary Restraining Order 63
6. Awards and Orders 56
7. Option – Voluntary Arbitration After Certification 57
8. Compulsory Arbitration and Labor Rights 57

D. Role of Peace Officers During Strikes and Picketing 57

1. Escorting 57
2. Arrest and Detention of Law Violators 57

X. EMPLOYER LOCKOUT 57

A. Basis, Definition, Limitation 57

B. Effect on Work Relationship 58

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VII. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONCEPT, PROCEDURES AND ISSUES
D. Bargainable Issues
Art.262 Meaning of Duty to Bargain Collectively
The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiation an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms
and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or
questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating
such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any
party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
 Manila Fashions, Inc. v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 104 (1996)
Facts: CBA provides for the condonation on the part of the Union of the mandated
increases in the Wage Order.
Held: Void because by agreeing to condone the implementation of the Wage
Order, the parties thereby contravened its mandate on wage increase. It is only the
Tripartite Wage Productivity Board of the DOLE that could approve exemption of an
establishment from coverage of a Wage Order. Instead of bargaining on the wage
increase the financially distressed company could have just applied for a wage
exemption
 Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confessor, 432 SCRA 308
(2004)
Facts: During CBA negotiations, Union filed complaint against the Bank for refusing
to bargain (surface bargaining) while Bank alleged Union’s blue sky bargaining.
Held:
1. Surface bargaining is defined as “going through the motions of negotiating”
without any legal intent to reach an agreement. The resolution of surface
bargaining allegations never presents an easy issue. The determination of whether
a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one because
it involves, at bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually
such intent can only be inferred from the totality of the challenged party’s conduct
both at and away from the bargaining table. It involves the question of whether an
employer’s conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in good faith or is
merely hard bargaining.
2. As to allegations of blue sky bargaining: Bank failed to show that the economic
demands made by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. Union based its
economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic
benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in
the Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.
Also, the suggestion of the Bank to exclude Federation from the bargaining table is
not anti-union conduct. Both are not guilty of ULP.
E. Collective Bargaining Agreement
1. Definition
Book V, Rule I, Section 1. (j) Definition of Terms
(j) “Collective Bargaining Agreement” or “CBA” refers to the contract between a
legitimate labor union and the employer concerning wages, hours of work, and all
other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.
 TSPI Corp. v. TSPI Corp. Employees Union, 545 SCRA 216 (2008)
Facts: Company notified certain employees that they had been overpaid, and had
received the CBA increases in addition to the increase under Wage Order No. 8. CBA
provides: “that the salary/wage increase for the year 2001 shall be deemed
inclusive of the mandated minimum wage increases under future wage orders.”
Held: It must be understood to mean that Company granted the salary increases
under the condition that any wage order that may be subsequently issued shall be
credited against the previously granted increase.
CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and
the employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions
of employment in a bargaining unit. As in all contracts, the parties in a CBA may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes
the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express
policy of the law.
 Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association,
614 SCRA 63 (2010)
Facts: CBA provided for the grant of a Christmas gift package/bonus to the
members of the respondent Association. The Christmas bonus was one of the
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enumerated "existing benefits, practice of traditional rights" which "shall remain in
full force and effect." Company failed to give Christmas Bonus. They allege that such
was not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It argued that the giving of extra
compensation was based on the company’s available resources for a given year and
the workers are not entitled to a bonus if the company does not make profits.
Held: Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a
bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and
expressly agreed upon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this case is integrated
in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by
virtue of its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to respondent
Association has become more than just an act of generosity on the part of the
petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken. The CBA is the law
between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions
2. Contents
See your sample CBA; Identify Basic Articles (and specific
provisions that promote gender equality in the workplace, if
there are any)
3. Beneficiaries
Art.266. Exclusive Bargaining Representation and Workers’ Participation in Policy and
Decision-Making
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in
an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an
individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right,
subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making processes of the
establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect
their rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may
form labor-management councils: Provided, That the representatives of the
workers in such labor-management councils shall be elected by at least the majority
of all employees in said establishment.
 New Pacific Timber and Supply Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 328 SCRA 404 (2000)
Facts: May the term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) as to its economic
provisions be extended beyond the term expressly stipulated therein, and, in the
absence of a new CBA, even beyond the three-year period provided by law? Are
employees hired after the stipulated term of a CBA entitled to the benefits provided
thereunder? Yes to both.
Held:
Until a new CBA has been executed by the parties, they are duty-bound to keep the
status quo and to continued in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing agreement. “It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and
to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by
the parties.”
When a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the union representing the
employees and the employer, even the non-member employees are entitled to the
benefits of the contract. To accord its benefits only to members of the union
without any valid reason would constitute undue discrimination against
nonmembers.
4. Contract Duration and Renewal
Art.263 Duty to Bargain Collectively When There Exists a Collective Bargaining
Agreement
When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively
shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement
during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or
modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be
the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and
effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached b y the parties.
Art.264 Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement
Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall insofar as
the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be
entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of
Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date
of expiry of such five-year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later
than three (3) years after its execution.
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Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the term of such other
provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the
day immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond
six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. In case
of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement, the
parties may exercise their rights under this Code.
Book V, Rule XVII Section 7. Term of representation status; contract bar rule.
The representation status of the incumbent exclusive bargaining agent which is a
party to a duly registered collective bargaining agreement shall be for a term of five
(5) years from the date of the effectivity of the collective bargaining agreement. No
petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent exclusive bargaining
agent or petition for certification election filed outside of the sixty-day period
immediately preceding the expiry date of such five-year term shall be entertained
by the Department.
The five-year representation status acquired by an incumbent bargaining agent
either through single enterprise collective bargaining or multi-employer bargaining
shall not be affected by a subsequent collective bargaining agreement executed
between the same bargaining agent and the employer during the same five-year
period.
Book V, Rule XVII Section 8. Re-negotiation of collective bargaining agreements.
All provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, except the representation status
of the incumbent bargaining agent shall, as a matter of right, be negotiated not
later than three (3) years after its execution.
The re-negotiated collective bargaining agreement shall be ratified and registered
with the same Regional Office where the preceding agreement was registered. The
same requirements and procedure in the registration of collective bargaining
agreements prescribed in the preceding rules shall be applied.
 Meralco Electric Co. v. Quisumbing, 302 SCRA 173 (1999)
Facts: SOLE assumed jurisdiction and ordered that new CBA’ s effectivity will
retroact to the date of the commencement of the last two years of the effectivity of
the existing CBA.
Held: The 5-year term requirement is specific to the representation aspect. What
the law additionally requires is that a CBA must be renegotiated within 3 years after
its execution. If no agreement is reached within 6 months from expiry date of the 3
years that follow the CBA execution, the law expressly gives the parties - not
anybody else - the discretion to fix the effectivity of the agreement. Significantly,
the law does not specifically cover the situation where 6 months have elapsed but
no agreement has been reached with respect to effectivity. In this case, there’s no
sufficient legal ground to justify the retroactive application of the disputed CBA.
Hence, its effectivity should be counted from the date of the issuance of the SOLE’s
orders.
 Rivera v. Espiritu and Laguesma, supra
Facts: PALEA offered a 10 year moratorium on strikes and similar actions and a
waiver of some of the economic benefits in the CBA. Petitioners allege that CBA
suspension was unconstitutional.
Held: It was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of PAL’s ground employees,
that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that voluntarily
opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA. Either case was the union’s exercise
of its right to collective bargaining. The right to free collective bargaining, after all,
includes the right to suspend it. The sanctioning of the 10-year suspension of the
PAL-PALEA CBA did not contravene the “protection to labor” policy of the
Constitution. The agreement afforded full protection to labor; promoted the
shared responsibility between workers and employers; and the exercised voluntary
modes in settling disputes, including conciliation to foster industrial peace.
 FVC Labor Union – Phil. Transport & General Workers Org. v. Sama-
samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-SIGLO, 606 SCRA 198
(2009)
In the event that the parties, by mutual agreement, enter into a renegotiated
contract with a term of 3 years or one which does not coincide with the said 5-year
term and said agreement is ratified by majority of the members in the bargaining
unit, the subject contract is valid and legal and therefore, binds the contracting
parties. The same will however not adversely affect the right of another union to
challenge the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent within 60 days
before the lapse of the original 5 year term of the CBA.
While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together
with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years
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will not carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining status.
By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining
status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter
not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement
for a CBA with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by
amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only for
five years and can be challenged within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the
CBA’s first five years.
 PICOP Resources, Inc (PRI) v. Tañeca, et al., supra
Facts: During the effectivity of CBA, members of said Union campaigned for and
filed a PCE for another Union. Old Union recommended their dismissal pursuant to
a union security clause for acts of disloyalty.
Held: Illegal dismissal. Union already ceased to be recognized as the incumbent
bargaining representative upon the expiration of their CBA. While it is incumbent
for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only
do so when no petition for certification election was filed. When there is a
representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the
creation of a new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd
situation where the union members will be forced to maintain membership by
virtue of the union security clause existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support
another union when filing a petition for certification election. If we apply it, there
will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to
self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that
should not be circumvented, or compromised.
5. Ratification
Book V, Rule XVII, Section 2. Requirements for registration.
The application for CBA registration shall be accompanied by the original and two
(2) duplicate copies of the following documents which must be certified under oath
by the representative(s) of the employer(s) and labor union(s) concerned:
(a) The collective bargaining agreement;
(b) A statement that the collective bargaining agreement was posted in at least
two (2) conspicuous places in the establishment or establishments concerned for at
least five (5) days before its ratification; and
(c) A statement that the collective bargaining agreement was ratified by the
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit of the employer or employees
concerned.
 Associated Labor Unions, v. NLRC, 204 SCRA 913 (1991)
Unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as are not enforceable against a
transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts being in personam, thus binding only
between the parties. 26 As a general rule, there is no law requiring a bona fide
purchaser of the assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its employ the
employees of the latter. 27 However, although the purchaser of the assets or
enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the employees of the seller
of such assets or enterprise, the parties are liable to the employees if the
transaction between the parties is colored or clothed with bad faith. The sale or
disposition must be motivated by good faith as an element of exemption from
liability.
6. Registration
Art. 236 Registry of unions and file of collective agreements
The Bureau shall keep a registry of legitimate labor organizations. The Bureau shall
also maintain a file of all collective bargaining agreements and other related
agreements and records of settlement of labor disputes, and copies of orders, and
decision of voluntary arbitrators. The file shall be open and accessible to interested
parties under conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
provided that no specific information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed
unless authorized by the Secretary, or when it is at issue in any judicial litigation or
when public interest or national security so requires.
Within thirty (30) days from the execution of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the
parties shall submit copies of the same directly to the Bureau or the Regional
Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment for registration accompanied
with verified proofs of its posting in two conspicuous places in the place of work
and ratification by the majority of all the workers in the bargaining unit. The Bureau
or Regional Offices shall act upon the application for registration of such Collective
Bargaining Agreement within five (5) calendar days from receipt thereof. The
Regional Offices shall furnish the Bureau with a copy of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement within five (5) days from its submission.
The Bureau or Regional Office shall assess the employer for every Collective
Bargaining Agreement a registration fee of not less than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) or in any other amount as may be deemed appropriate and necessary
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by the Secretary of Labor and Employment for the effective and efficient
administration of the Voluntary Arbitration Program. Any amount collected under
this provision shall accrue to the Special Voluntary Arbitration Fund.
The Bureau shall also maintain a file, and shall undertake or assist in the
publication, of all final decisions, orders and awards of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, Regional Directors and the Commission
Book V, Rule XVII, Section 1. Where to file.
Within thirty (30) days from execution of a collective bargaining agreement, the
parties thereto shall submit two (2) duly signed copies of the agreement to the
Regional Office which issued the certificate of registration/certificate of creation of
chartered local of the labor union-party to the agreement. Where the certificate of
creation of the concerned chartered local was issued by the Bureau, the agreement
shall be filed with the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the place where it
principally operates.
Multi-employer collective bargaining agreements shall be filed with the Bureau.
Book V, Rule XVII, Section 2. Requirements for registration.
The application for CBA registration shall be accompanied by the original and two
(2) duplicate copies of the following documents which must be certified under oath
by the representative(s) of the employer(s) and labor union(s) concerned:
(a) The collective bargaining agreement;
(b) A statement that the collective bargaining agreement was posted in at
least two (2) conspicuous places in the establishment or establishments concerned
for at least five (5) days before its ratification; and
(c) A statement that the collective bargaining agreement was ratified by the
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit of the employer or employees
concerned.
Book V, Rule XVII, Section 3. Payment of registration fee.
The certificate of registration of collective bargaining agreement shall be issued by
the Regional Office upon payment of the prescribed registration fee.
7. CBA and 3rd Party Applicability
 Associated Labor Unions v. NLRC, supra
Unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as are not enforceable against a
transferee of an enterprise, labor contracts being in personam, thus binding only
between the parties. 26 As a general rule, there is no law requiring a bona fide
purchaser of the assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its employ the
employees of the latter. 27 However, although the purchaser of the assets or
enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the employees of the seller
of such assets or enterprise, the parties are liable to the employees if the
transaction between the parties is colored or clothed with bad faith. The sale or
disposition must be motivated by good faith as an element of exemption from
liability.
8. CBA and Disaffiliation
 Elisco-Elirol Labor Union v. Noriel, 80 SCRA 682 (1977)
Facts: Local union disaffiliated from their mother union and registered itself.
Company refused to recognize local union.
Held: The employees and members of the local union did not actually form a new
union but merely registered the local union as was their right. Actually, local union
was the REAL principal party to the agreement. NAFLU acting as the mother union
in participation in the execution of the bargaining agreement with respondent
company acted merely as agent of the local union which remained the basic unit of
the association. The petitioners had every right to disaffiliate themselves with
NAFLU when the circumstances warranted so.
In Benguet Consolidated: “during the effectivity of a CBA through their agent, the
employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind them up to its
expiration date. The only consideration involved is the employees’ interest. The
majority of the employees is the true party in interest to the contract, holding rights
through the agency of the union representative. Any exclusive interest claimed by
the agent is defeasible at the will of the principal.
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 9. Interpretation, Administration and Enforcement
a) Nature of Contract: Law Between Parties
 Dole Phils., Inc. v. Pawis ng Makabayang Obrero, 395 SCRA 112 (2003)
Facts: Interpretation of “free meals after three (3) hours of overtime work” in the
CBA.
Held: Provision should be interpreted in its literal sense. No amount of legal
semantics can convince the Court that “after more than” means the same as
“after”.
The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and unambiguous. The terms are explicit
and the language of the CBA is not susceptible to any other interpretation. Hence,
the literal meaning of “free meals after three (3) hours of overtime work” shall
prevail, which is simply that an employee shall be entitled to a free meal if he has
rendered exactly, or no less than, three hours of overtime work, not “after more
than” or “in excess of” three hours overtime work.
Exercise of management prerogatives is not a valid justification when the opinion of
the management in interpreting a CBA provision is clearly contrary to its clear
meaning.
 Zuellig Pharma Corp. v. Alice M. Sibal, et al., G.R. No. 173587, 15 July
2013
Facts: Employees claim that they are entitled to avail of both redundancy pay and
retirement benefits under the terms and conditions of the CBA and the Retirement
and Gratuity Plan
Held: Here, the parties’ CBA provides in no uncertain terms that whatever amount
of money the employees will receive as retirement gratuity shall be chargeable
against separation pay. It is the unequivocal manifestation of their agreement that
acceptance of retirement gratuity forecloses receipt of separation pay and vice
versa.
b) Liberal Construction in Case of Doubt
Civil Code Art. 1700.
The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of
labor and similar subjects
Civil Code Art. 1702.
In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
 Cirtek Employees Labor Union – FFW v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc, 650
SCRA 656 (2011)
Facts: SOLE gave arbitral awards higher than those provided for in the MOA.
Company wants to uphold the validity of the MOA between them and the Union.
Held: The MOA came about as a result of the constitution, at Company’s behest, of
the Labor-Management Council (LMC) which, in the first place, should not be used
as an avenue for bargaining but for the purpose of affording workers to participate
in policy and decision-making. Hence, the agreements embodied in the MOA were
not the proper subject of the LMC deliberation or procedure but of CBA
negotiations and, therefore, deserving little weight.
On the contention that the MOA should have been given credence because it was
validly entered into by the parties, the Court notes that even those who signed it
expressed reservations thereto.
A CBA (assuming in this case that the MOA can be treated as one) is a contract
imbued with public interest. It must thus be given a liberal, practical and realistic,
rather than a narrow and technical construction, with due consideration to the
context in which it is negotiated and the purpose for which it is intended.
 Bank of Phil. Islands v. BPI Employees Union – Metro Manila, 678 SCRA
674 (2012)
Facts: CBA provides for loan benefits and relatively low interest rates. However,
Company subsequently issued a “no negative data bank policy” in order to avail of
such loans.
Held: Although it can be said that BPI is authorized to issue rules and regulations
pertinent to the availment of the loans under the CBA, the additional rules and
regulations, however, must not impose new conditions which are not contemplated
in the CBA and should be within the realm of reasonableness. The "no negative data
bank policy" is a new condition which is never contemplated in the CBA. To include
such policy after the effectivity of the CBA is deceptive and goes beyond the original
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agreement between the contracting parties. It is also unreasonable for the
employees.
In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer.
c) Grievances
1) Contract Infirmity
 Associated Labor Unions v. Calleja, 173 SCRA 179 (1989)
Facts: CBA is claimed to be defective for failure to compy with the posting
requirements.
Held: Petitioners argue that this was not complied with because of the existence of
a strike. Court found this justification unacceptable. In the first place, the posting of
copies of the collective bargaining agreement is the responsibility of the employer
which can easily comply with the requirement through a mere mechanical act. The
purpose of the requirement is precisely to inform the employees in the bargaining
unit of the contents of said agreement so that they could intelligently decide
whether to accept the same or not. The assembly of the members of
ALU wherein the agreement in question was allegedly explained does not cure the
defect. The contract is intended for all employees and not only for the members of
the purported representative alone. It may even be said that the need to inform the
non-members of the terms thereof is more exigent and compelling since, in all
likelihood, their contact with the persons who are supposed to represent them is
limited.
Another t reason for annulling the CBA is the finding that 181out of the 281 workers
who "ratified" the same now "strongly and vehemently deny and/or repudiate the
alleged negotiations and ratification of the CBA. "
In re contract bar rule: the delay of the right to select representatives can be
justified only where stability is deemed paramount. Excepted are those which do
not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the
representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts must be
subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because it does not establish the
type of industrial peace contemplated by the law.
2) Contract Ambiguity
 Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. v. Holy Cross Faculty Union-KAMAPI,
461 SCRA 319 (2005)
Facts: Involves the interpretation of a CBA provision: ” the Management shall grant
to all academic personnel a grant-in-aid program, where the academic teaching
personnel, whenever scholarship opportunities should arise, be afforded a leave of
absence to further their studies in Institutions of Higher Learning with a grant-in-aid
equivalent to their salary and allowance”.
Held: Employee is entitled to a leave of absence with a grant-in aid equivalent to
her monthly salary and allowance, provided such grant is to promote her
professional growth or to enhance her studies in institutions of higher learning.
Such provisions need no interpretation for they are clear. When there is no
ambiguity, terms are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and not
beyond their obvious intendment.
d) Minutes of the Negotiation
 Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing v. NLRC, 295
SCRA 171 (1998)
Facts: Union contends that they agreed to drop a provision in the CBA in re:
automatic across-the-board wage increase because of management’s pledge of
sincerity to grant it anyway even if it’s not embodied in the CBA.
Held: If there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part of management to
obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-board wage increase, Union should
have requested or demanded that such “promise or undertaking” be incorporated
in the CBA. After all, Union has the means under the law to compel Top to
incorporate this specific economic proposal in the CBA. Duty to bargain includes
“executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party.”
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties. Only provisions embodied in
the CBA should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a
contracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a part thereof and the
proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation. If indeed Top promised
to continue with the practice of granting across-the-board salary increases ordered
by the government, such promise could only be demandable in law if incorporated
in the CBA. By making such promise, Top can’t be considered in bad faith or at the
very least, resorting to the scheme of feigning to undertake the negotiation
proceedings through empty promises. Union had the right to demand its
embodiment in the CBA but it didn’t, hence the promise remained a promise.
9|P a g e
 e) Grievance Machinery/Voluntary Arbitration
Art. 224 (c) Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
Art.272 Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration
The parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions
that will ensure the mutual observance of it terms and conditions. They shall
establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.
All grievances submitted to the grievance machinery which are not settle within
seven (7) calendar days from the date of its submission shall automatically be
referred to voluntary arbitration prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
For this purpose, parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall name and
designate in advance a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, or
include in the agreement a procedure for the selection of such Voluntary Arbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, preferably from the listing of qualified Voluntary
Arbitrators duly accredited by the Board. In case the parties fail to select a
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, the Board shall designate the
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators as may be necessary,
pursuant to the selection procedure agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, which shall act with the same force and effect as if the Arbitrator or
panel of Arbitrators has been selected by the partied as described above.
 Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug Corp. Employees
Association, GR 142666, Sept. 26, 2005 471 SCRA 45 (2005)
Facts: Company filed a motion to dismiss with the LA alleging that Union’s
complaint for ULP lodged in the NLRC is in excess of the latter’s jurisdiction and
should be filed with the voluntary arbitrator instead. LA dismissed Company’s
motion so the latter filed a petition for certiorari with CA.
Held: Improper. NLRC had the appellate authority to correct a claimed “erroneous
assumption of jurisdiction” on the part of the Labor Arbiter. Under the NLRC rules,
no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to dismiss. Thus, the
remedy of the aggrieved party, in case of denial of a motion to dismiss is to file an
answer and interpose as a defense the ground relied upon in the motion to
dismiss, proceed to trial and in case of adverse judgment, to elevate the entire
case by appeal in due course. Company’s first recourse should be with the NLRC.
They should have submitted its position paper as ordered by the Labor Arbiter and
raise therein the question of supposed lack of jurisdiction.
 University of San Agustin Employees’ Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals,
485 SCRA 526 (2006)
Facts: On July 27, 2000, the University entered into a CBA with the Union. The
conflict arose with regard to how the computation of salary increases was to be
done what constituted 80% of the TIP (tuition incremental proceeds under RA No.
6728). Under the petitioner’s theory, it could rightfully subtract from the TIP the
cost of the scholarships and tuition fee discounts that it granted to its students, its
employees, and the dependents of the latter. According to the university, the term
“salary increases” refers not only to the increase in salary but also to corresponding
increases in other benefits. The Union, on the other hand, was of the petition that
“salary increases” was to be construed strictly and limited only to actual increases
of salary. Due to failure to agree on what the terms of their CBA meant, the parties
underwent voluntary arbitration.
Doctrine: WON the CBA provision applied only to salary increases to the exclusion
of other benefits granted by the university – YES “Absent any proof that
petitioner’s consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed that it
entered into the CBA voluntarily, had full knowledge of the contents thereof, and
was aware of its commitments under the contract.”
According to the Court, a plain reading of the CBA shows that the parties agreed
that 80% of the TIP or at least P1500 is to be allocated for individual salary
increases. The CBA does not speak of any other benefits that would be covered by
the share of employees in the TIP. As applied, the claim of the university that the
80% TIP should be taken to mean as covering all increases cannot be given merit.
Further, under the law, the duty to collectively bargain does not mean that one
party has to accommodate all the demands of the other party. As again applied to
the case at bar, the university could have opposed the inclusion of such a provision
during the collective bargaining negotiations.
10 | P a g e
F. Voluntary Arbitration
1. Basis and Rationale
1987 Const. Art. XIII, Sec. 3
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing
the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
Art. 218 A (a) Declaration of Policy
A. It is the policy of the State:
(a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes
of settling labor or industrial disputes.
Art.272 (see page 10)
2. Arbitrable Issues
Art.273 Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department
of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the
Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
Art.274 Jurisdiction over Other Labor Disputes
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the
parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor
practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Art. 224 (a) (5) (c)Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission
(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear ad decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even
in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
5. Cases arising from any violation of Art. 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and
those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.
11 | P a g e
 3. Arbitrator
a) Selection
Art. 219 (n) Definitions
(n) "Voluntary Arbitration" means any person accredited by the board as such, or
any person named or designated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement by the
parties to act as their Voluntary Arbitrator, or one chosen with or without the
assistance of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, pursuant to a selection
procedure agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, or any official that
may be authorized by the Secretary of Labor and Employment to act as Voluntary
Arbitration upon the written request and agreement of the parties to a labor
dispute.
Art. 272 (see page 10)
b) Plenary Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator vis-à-vis Labor Arbiter
Art. 273 (see page 11)
Art. 274 (see page 11)
Art.277 (h) Strikes, Picketing, and Lockouts
(h) Before or at any stage the compulsory arbitration process, the parties may opt
to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.
Art. 224 (a) (c) Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission
(a)Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear ad decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even
in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Art. 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding P5,000.00 regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
decided by Labor Arbiters
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements.
 Negros Metal Corp. v. Armelo J. Lamayo, 629 SCRA 470 (2010)
Facts: Armelo was suspended for grinding his tool and subsequently dismissed.
Filed an illegal dismissal with the LA,. Company argued that the proper way was for
Respondent to have taken up 1st the grievance procedure under the CBA. Court
ruled that LA had original and exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes, absent any
showing that the parties agreed to send it to a voluntary arbitrator. VA has no
original and exclusive juris over the action also since the CBA provision about
grievance proceedings did not expressly state that termination disputes can be a
subject of VA’ion. Even if it was, such was not applicable since Armelo quit the year
before his suspension and even denied invoking the grievance machinery.
Who has jurisdiction? LA
HELD: Under Article 217, it is clear that the LA has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over termination disputes. On the other hand, under article 261, a VA has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company policies.
12 | P a g e
As a general rule then, termination disputes shold be brought before a LA, except
when the parties, under Article 262, unmistakably express that they agree to submit
the same to VA’ion
In present case, the CBA provision on grievance machinery being invoked by P does
not expressly state that termination disputes are included in the ambit of what may
be brought before the company’s grievance machinery.
“For this purpose, a grievance is defined as any disagreement between the UNION
and the EMPLOYER or between a worker or group of workers on one hand and the
EMPLOYER on the one hand as to the application and interpretation of any of the
provisions of this contract…”
Even assuming that the suspension of an EE may be considered a disagreement
which bears on the application and interpretation of any of the provisions of the
CBA, Armelo could not have brought such matter to grievance procedure or VA in
light of the documented fact that he had resigned from the U one year before his
suspension. He also denied having a hand in the preparation of the letter invoking
the U’s grievance procedure.
Finding of the LA should therefore be accorded respect.
 Manila Pavilion Hotel v. Henry Delada, 664 SCRA 334 (2012)
Delada, a head waiter, protested his transfer to another restaurant within the hotel.
He demanded a grievance meeting, and when he and the hotel could not reach a
settlement, they submitted it to a panel of VAs at the NCMB. The PVA ruled that the
transfer was a valid exercise of management prerogative, but the suspension
imposed by the hotel was not, because it no longer had authority to discipline
Delada.
Held: Here, the PVA did not make a definitive ruling on the merits of the validity
of the 90-day suspension; hence, MPH did not lose authority to discipline Delada
for his continued refusal to report to his new assignment. The Court, citing Allied
Banking Corp. v. CA, reasoned that until and unless rules or orders issued by
employers are declared illegal or improper by the competent authority, the
employees ignore or disobey these at their peril. There is a presumption of validity
of the order issued by MPH.
Since PVA eventually ruled that the transfer order was a valid exercise of
management prerogative, MPH had authority to continue with the administrative
proceedings against Delada. The CA decision is hereby modified to reflect the fact
that MPH retained authority to discipline Delada for insubordination and willful
disobedience.
 7 K Corporation v. Eddie Albarico, G.R. No. 182295, 26 June 2013
Facts: Eddie was allegedly illegally dismissed. He submitted his money claims
against 7K for arbitration with the NCMB. The issue in the NCMB case was whether
Eddie was entitled to sep pay and sales commission, NOT the legality of his
dismissal. VA ruled that 7K was liable for illegal dismissal. 7K argues that the VA is in
GAD for ruling on an issue not expressly stated in the Submission Agreement. Held:
VA correctly assumed jurisdiction, for to determine the basis of Eddie’s entitlement
to sep pay and sales commission, the legality of his dismissal must first be resolved.
W/N VA has jurisdiction. YES
While sep pay may be awarded for reasons other than illegal dismissal, the circs
in this case show that Eddie’s claim of sep pay was premised on his allegation if
illegal dismissal (not premised on any authorized causes like retrenchment, nor
premised on considerations of social justice). Thus, the voluntary arbitrator
properly AJ-ed over the issue of the legality of his dismissal.
Even the NLRC was of the understanding that the NCMB arbitration case sought
to resolve the issue of the legality of the dismissal—it was the basis of the NLRC’s
finding of Eddie’s forum shopping and consequent dismissal of the case before it.
7K is also stopped from claiming otherwise since it acknowledged the issue of illegal
dismissal in its position paper and when it filed a MTD with the NLRC for forum
shopping.
Sime Darby Pailipinas v Deputy Admin Magsalin: A voluntary arbitrator has plenary
jurisdiction and authority to interpret an agreement to arbitrate and to determine
the scope of his own authority when the said agreement is vague—subject only, in a
proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of the SC.
c) Procedures
Art.275 Procedures
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel o Voluntary Arbitrators shall have the power to
hold hearings, receive evidences and take whatever action is necessary to resolve
the issue or issues subject to the dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary
settlement between parties.
All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the arbitration proceedings. The
attendance of any third party or the exclusion of any witness from the proceedings
shall be determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.
Hearing may be adjourned for cause or upon agreement by the parties.
13 | P a g e
Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory for the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision within
twenty (20) calendar days from the date of submission of the dispute to voluntary
arbitration.
The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executor
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award of decision by the
parties.
Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of
the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators for any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff
of the Commission or regular courts or any public official whom the parties may
designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or
award.
d) Nature of Office and Function
Art. 272 (see page 10)
Art. 219 (n) (see page 12)
e) Interpretation Agreement
 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corp. v. Lepanto Local Staff union, 562
SCRA 495 (2008)
Facts: There was a question on the application of CBA provisions re: night shift diff
and longevity pay.
Held: In disposing of the issue, SC said that the terms and conditions of CBA
constitute the law between the parties. If the terms of the CBA are clear and have
no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall prevail. To ascertain the intention of the contracting parties, the VA
shall consider 1) contemporaneous and subsequent acts and 2) Negotiating and
contractual history. In this case, VA’s interpretation is correct and ruled in favor of
the employees.
f) Awards and Orders
Art. 275 (see page 13)
 Equitable PCI Banking Corp. v. RCBC Capital Corp, 574 SCRA 858 (2004)
Facts: RCBC and EPCIB went into arbitration after failing to settle the case amicably.
The 3-person tribunal gave a Partial Award to RCBC, which RCBC sent to the RTC for
confirmation but petitioners wanted it vacated. RTC ruled in favor of RCBC.
Petitioners directly appealed it to the SC. SC held that (1) appeal must be to CA first,
(2) the action by RCBC was not time barred as Sec. 5 (h) was applicable and (3)
there was no denial of due process as they were given plenty of opportunities to be
heard and they were also able to appeal the decisions multiple times.
Held: The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof
and the lack of opportunity to be heard. Where an opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.
g) Finality and Execution of Awards
Art. 275 (see page 13)
 Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union- PTGWO-BALAIS
v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippine, Inc., 464 SCRA 507 (2005)
Facts: A decision of the VA panel was received on Feb 20. But the dissenting opinion
was not attached. Union only received it on Mar 2. On Mar 12 they filed MR. They
appealed the decision to the CA but was dismissed because the MR they filed with
VA was filed out of time. The SC agrees with the CA that the 10 day period should
be counted from Feb. 20 when the main decision was received. The dissenting is
not part of the decision.
WON appeal should be dismissed because the MR was filed out of time?
Held: Decision in this case was dismissal by the Panel. Such decision was not
contained in the dissenting opinion. A dissenting opinion is not binding on the
parties as it is a mere expression of the individual view of the dissenting member
14 | P a g e
from the conclusion held by the majority. Even if they did not receive the dissenting
opinion on Feb. 20, they did receive the main opinion and from that point on the
counting of the 10 days began. Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the petition before it as it no longer had any appellate
jurisdiction to alter or nullify the decision of the Panel. The Panel’s Decision had
become final and executory, hence, unchallengeable.
h) Appeal
Rules of Court RULE 43
Appeals From the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of
Appeals
Section 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions
of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President,
Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board,
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Invention Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission,
and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. (n)
Section 2. Cases not covered. — This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. (n)
Section 3. Where to appeal. — An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court
of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. (n)
Section 4. Period of appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with
the governing law of the court or agencya quo. Only one (1) motion for
reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (n)
Section 5. How appeal taken. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for
review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of
a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original
copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by
the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court of the
Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of
P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and
the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified
motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the
motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for
costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial. (n)
Section 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues
involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers;
and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last
paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates
showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (2a)
Section 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment
of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (n)
Section 8. Action on the petition. — The Court of Appeals may require the
respondent to file a comment on the petition not a motion to dismiss, within ten
(10) days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently
without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration. (6a)
Section 9. Contents of comment. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days
from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified
true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with
15 | P a g e
other supporting papers. The comment shall (a) point out insufficiencies or
inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues; and (b) state the reasons
why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on
the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
(9a)
Section 10. Due course. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings
or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the
expiration of the period for the filing thereof, and on the records the Court of
Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned has committed errors
of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the
petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or
agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the
Court of Appeals. (n)
Section 11. Transmittal of record. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the
petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may require the court or
agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the
entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be
abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may
require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record. (8a)
Section 12. Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct
otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. (10a)
Section 13. Submission for decision. — If the petition is given due course, the Court
of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit
memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be
deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum
required by these Rules or by the court of Appeals. (n)
VIII. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. In general
1. Definition and General Concept | Unfair Labor Practice vis-à-vis
Management Prerogative; Exception:
ILO convention No. 98
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
Preamble
The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation,
Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International
Labour Office, and having met in its Thirty-second Session on 8 June 1949, and
Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals concerning the application
of the principles of the right to organise and to bargain collectively, which is the
fourth item on the agenda of the session, and
Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international
Convention,
adopts this first day of July of the year one thousand nine hundred and forty-nine
the following Convention, which may be cited as the Right to Organise and
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949:
Article 1
1. Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination
in respect of their employment.
2. Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts calculated to--
(a) make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join
a union or shall relinquish trade union membership;
(b) cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union
membership or because of participation in union activities outside working hours
or, with the consent of the employer, within working hours.
Article 2
1. Workers' and employers' organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against
any acts of interference by each other or each other's agents or members in their
establishment, functioning or administration.
16 | P a g e
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers'
organisations under the domination of employers or employers' organisations, or to
support workers' organisations by financial or other means, with the object of
placing such organisations under the control of employers or employers'
organisations, shall be deemed to constitute acts of interference within the
meaning of this Article.
Article 3
Machinery appropriate to national conditions shall be established, where
necessary, for the purpose of ensuring respect for the right to organise as defined in
the preceding Articles.
Article 4
Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to
encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for
voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers'
organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment
by means of collective agreements.
Article 5
1. The extent to which the guarantees provided for in this Convention shall apply to
the armed forces and the police shall be determined by national laws or
regulations.
2. In accordance with the principle set forth in paragraph 8 of Article 19 of the
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation the ratification of this
Convention by any Member shall not be deemed to affect any existing law, award,
custom or agreement in virtue of which members of the armed forces or the police
enjoy any right guaranteed by this Convention.
Article 6
This Convention does not deal with the position of public servants engaged in the
administration of the State, nor shall it be construed as prejudicing their rights or
status in any way.
Article 7
The formal ratifications of this Convention shall be communicated to the Director-
General of the International Labour Office for registration.
Article 8
1. This Convention shall be binding only upon those Members of the International
Labour Organisation whose ratifications have been registered with the Director-
General.
2. It shall come into force twelve months after the date on which the ratifications of
two Members have been registered with the Director-General.
3. Thereafter, this Convention shall come into force for any Member twelve months
after the date on which its ratification has been registered.
Article 9
1. Declarations communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour
Office in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 35 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation shall indicate --
(a) the territories in respect of which the Member concerned undertakes that the
provisions of the Convention shall be applied without modification;
(b) the territories in respect of which it undertakes that the provisions of the
Convention shall be applied subject to modifications, together with details of the
said modifications;
(c) the territories in respect of which the Convention is inapplicable and in such
cases the grounds on which it is inapplicable;
(d) the territories in respect of which it reserves its decision pending further
consideration of the position.
2. The undertakings referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be deemed to be an integral part of the ratification and shall have the
force of ratification.
3. Any Member may at any time by a subsequent declaration cancel in whole or in
part any reservation made in its original declaration in virtue of subparagraph (b),
(c) or (d) of paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. Any Member may, at any time at which the Convention is subject to denunciation
in accordance with the provisions of Article 11, communicate to the Director-
General a declaration modifying in any other respect the terms of any former
declaration and stating the present position in respect of such territories as it may
specify.
Article 10
1. Declarations communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour
Office in accordance with paragraph 4 or 5 of Article 35 of the Constitution of the
17 | P a g e
International Labour Organisation shall indicate whether the provisions of the
Convention will be applied in the territory concerned without modification or
subject to modifications; when the declaration indicates that the provisions of the
Convention will be applied subject to modifications, it shall give details of the said
modifications.
2. The Member, Members or international authority concerned may at any time by
a subsequent declaration renounce in whole or in part the right to have recourse to
any modification indicated in any former declaration.
3. The Member, Members or international authority concerned may, at any time at
which this Convention is subject to denunciation in accordance with the provisions
of Article 11, communicate to the Director-General a declaration modifying in any
other respect the terms of any former declaration and stating the present position
in respect of the application of the Convention.
Article 11
1. A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the
expiration of ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into
force, by an act communicated to the Director-General of the International Labour
Office for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year after
the date on which it is registered.
2. Each Member which has ratified this Convention and which does not, within the
year following the expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, exercise the right of denunciation provided for in this Article, will be
bound for another period of ten years and, thereafter, may denounce this
Convention at the expiration of each period of ten years under the terms provided
for in this Article.
Article 12
1. The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall notify all Members
of the International Labour Organisation of the registration of all ratifications,
declarations and denunciations communicated to him by the Members of the
Organisation.
2. When notifying the Members of the Organisation of the registration of the
second ratification communicated to him, the Director-General shall draw the
attention of the Members of the Organisation to the date upon which the
Convention will come into force.
Article 13
The Director-General of the International Labour Office shall communicate to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations full particulars of all ratifications,
declarations and acts of denunciation registered by him in accordance with the
provisions of the preceding articles.
Article 14
At such times as it may consider necessary the Governing Body of the International
Labour Office shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of
this Convention and shall examine the desirability of placing on the agenda of the
Conference the question of its revision in whole or in part.
Article 15
1. Should the Conference adopt a new Convention revising this Convention in whole
or in part, then, unless the new Convention otherwise provides,
(a) the ratification by a Member of the new revising Convention shall ipso jure
involve the immediate denunciation of this Convention, notwithstanding the
provisions of Article 11 above, if and when the new revising Convention shall have
come into force;
(b) as from the date when the new revising Convention comes into force, this
Convention shall cease to be open to ratification by the Members.
2. This Convention shall in any case remain in force in its actual form and content
for those Members which have ratified it but have not ratified the revising
Convention.
Article 16
The English and French versions of the text of this Convention are equally
authoritative.
Art. 219 (k) Definitions
(k) "Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice as expressly defined in
this Code
18 | P a g e
Art. 256 Non-abridgement of right to self-organization
It shall be unlawful for any person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or
unduly interfere with employees and workers in their exercise of the right to self-
organization. Such right shall include the right to form, join, or assist labor
organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of
their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same
purpose or for their mutual aid and protection, subject to the provisions of Art. 264
of this Code
Art.277 (g) Strikes, Picketing, and Lockouts
(g) When, in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
lock out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same.
In line with the national concern for and the highest respect accorded to the right of
patients to life and health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar
medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all serious
efforts, not only by labor and management but government as well be exhausted to
substantially minimize, if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and health,
through the exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and by
management to lock out. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued
operation of such union, clinics, or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the
striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal
workforce of medical and other health personnel whose movement and services
shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and
adequate protection of the life and health of its patients , most especially
emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment is mandated to immediately assume, within
twenty-four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such strike or lockout,
jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply
with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issues by the Secretary or
Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary
action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-
out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal
prosecution against either or both of them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be
precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to
the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction
over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.
 General Santos Coca-Cola Plant Free Workers Union-TUPAS v. Coca-
Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 579 SCRA 414 (2009)
Facts: ER experienced decline in profits. Implemented early retirement program for
EEs, w/c created vacancies and led Union to negotiate w/ LMC to fill these up w/
permanent EEs. Due to freeze hiring directive, ER contracted-out jobs. Union filed
notice of strike for ER’s ULP in contracting-out. NLRC & CA ruled no ER ULP. SC
agreed. ER’s action to contract-out the services and functions performed by Union
members did not constitute ULP as this was not directed at the members’ right to
self-organization. WoN Coke’s contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to ULP -
NO
Held: As correctly found by NLRC and CA, the company’s action to contract-out the
services and functions performed by Union members did not constitute ULP as this
was not directed at the members’ right to self-organization.
ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE OF EMPLOYERS. – It shall be unlawful for an
employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when
such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization;
Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.” The
prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the
observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair
labor practices.
Both the NLRC and the CA found that Union was unable to prove its charge of ULP.
It had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of ULP,
which burden it failed to discharge.
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 Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications, 495
SCRA 214 (2006)
Facts: Parties started to negotiate renewal of their CBA. While this was ongoing,
PEU filed with NCMB a notice of strike due to a ULP. Company suspended nego, so
the union filed another notice of strike due to bargaining deadlock. At a conciliation
conference, parties agreed to consolidate the two notices and maintain status quo.
However, while some union officers were negotiating, some union officers staged a
strike and barricaded the entrances and setting up a picket at the main entrance of
the building. The next day, the company filed for the SOLE to AJ. Acting SOLE
Trajano issued a return to work order and a cease and desist order and required
both parties to submit their position papers within 10 days. The Union raised issues
(see ratio for enumeration) constituting ULP and that the SOLE has no jurisdiction
over the strike since there was no petition to declare it illegal. The Company raised
the illegality of the strike. WON the acts of the management constituted ULP? NO,
and thus the strike was illegal.
Held: Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize.
The prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization and to the
observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not
unfair labor practices. The SOLE properly took cognizance of the issue of the
legality of the strike since the reason for the AJ was the declaration of strike. The
authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest
includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor
dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to
effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute.
PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in
the CBA. In disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who knowingly
participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. The law cannot interpose its
hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts.
 Nelson A. Culili v. Eastern Telecom. Phil., Inc., 642 SCRA 338 (2011)
Facts: Employee terminated due to redundancy, which was proven to have been
done in good faith. SC held that employer not guilty of ULP because the termination
was done in its bona fide exercise of its management prerogatives and that in
charging ULP acts, the burden of proof lies on the one making the allegation, failure
in the discharge of which would lead to the finding of no ULP on the part of the
employer. WON ETPI is guilty of ULP – NO
Held: ETPI cannot be held guilty of ULP for violating Arts. 248(c) and (e) of the LC.
Under Art. 247 of the LC, ULP refers to ‘acts that violate the workers' right to
organize.’ The prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization
and to the observance of a CBA. Thus, an employer may only be held liable for ULP
if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right of his employees
to self-organize. Here, there is no showing that ETPI, in implementing its Right-
Sizing Program, was motivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was aimed at
interfering with its employees’ right to self-organize. Both the LA and NLRC erred in
finding ETPI guilty of ULP simply because of its failure to dispute Culili’s allegations.
This is against the basic principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith to the actuations of
ETPI, Culili has the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the
allegation of ULP. Culili failed to discharge this burden and his bare allegations
deserve no credit.
2. Requisites
a) Employer-Employee Relationship
 Sterling Products International, Inc. v. Loreta C. Sol and CIR, 75 SCRA
446 (1963)
Facts: Sol was dismissed from Sterling after filing a complaint for underpayment so
she filed a ULP case against Sterling. Sterling contends that Sol was only an
independent contractor and that it was not guilty of ULP w/in the contemplation of
Industrial Peace Act. SC held that Sol was an ee of Sterling as the latter exercised
control and supervision over the means and method of Sol’s work. However,
Sterling was not guilty of ULP because although Sol was an ee, she was not a
member of any labor union nor has she attempted to join any.
WON company is guilty of ULP - NO
Held: Sterling is not guilty of ULP because Sol is not a member of any labor union.
The term unfair labor practice has been defined as any of those acts listed in See. 4
of the Act. Sol has never been found to commit any of the acts mentioned in
paragraph (a) of Sec. 4. She was not connected with any labor organization, nor has
she ever attempted to join a labor organization, or to assist, or contribute to a labor
organization. The company cannot, therefore, be considered as having committed
an unfair labor practice.
20 | P a g e
 American President Lines, Inc. v. Clave, 114 SCRA (1982)
Facts: There was a contract of security between the parties. Upon its expiration,
petitioner hired a new security agency. The employees of MSA complained and filed
ULP against the petitioner. The court held that since there was no ER-EE
relationship, the petitioner is not guilty of ULP.
WON company is guilty of ULP – NO. because there is no ee-er relationship.
Held: Therefore, the absence of an ER-EE relationship means that the petitioner
could not be guilty of ULP because RA 875 specifically states that ULP can only be
committed within the context of an ER-EE relationship. Assuming that there was
such a relationship, APL is not guilty of ULP because the union failed to present
evidence that it gave written proof of requests to bargain with APL. There was also
no evidence proving that the dismissal of the respondents was due to union
activities. The simple fact is that the contract expired already.
b) Act Must be Specifically Defined in the Law
Art. 258 Unfair Labor Practice of Employers
It shall be unlawful for any employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practices:
(a)To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee
shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members
when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other
support to it or its organizers or supporters;
(e)To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties
from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a
condition of employment, except those employees who are already members of
another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.
Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining agent may be assessed a
reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the
benefits under the collective agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization
required under Art. 242, par (o) of this Code shall not apply to the nonmembers of
the recognized collective bargaining agent;
(f) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an
employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its officers or agents
as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute;
or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and
agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated
in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.
Art. 259 Unfair Labor Practices of labor Organizations
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on
any ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or
continuation of membership is made available to other members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer,
provided it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay
or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for
services which are performed or not to be performed including the demand for fee
for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiations or attorney’s fees from employers as part
of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
21 | P a g e
 (f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers,
members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor
associations or organization who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified
unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.
3. Burden of Proof
 Schering Employees Labor Union v. Schering Plough Corporation, 451
SCRA 689 (2005)
Facts: Sereneo was charged with willful violation of co. rules and was asked to
submit a written explanation. She did not reply because she believed that it would
be futile to do so due to her belief that the co. was bent on getting rid of her. She
was later on dismissed. SC held that it is the union, therefore, who had the burden
of proof to present substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor
practices committed by management.
WON ULP by the SPC was proven? NO.
Held: Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, fraud or willful breach by
the employee of trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative is a ground for terminating an employment. Petitioners’ accusation
of union busting is bereft of any proof. We scanned the records very carefully and
failed to discern any evidence to sustain such charge.
It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial
evidence to support its allegations (of unfair labor practices committed by
management). In the case at bar the facts and the evidence did not establish even
at least a rational basis why the union would wield a strike based on alleged unfair
labor practices it did not even bother to substantiate during the conciliation
proceedings. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed
acts of unfair labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima
facie showing to warrant such a belief.”
4. Construction/Interpretation
 Caltex Filipino Mangers and Supervisors Association v. CIR, 44 SCRA
350 (1972)
Facts: CFMSA is a LO of Filipino managers and supervisors in Caltex. Caltex said that
CFMSA should institute a certification proceeding instead to remove doubts on
position titles to be included in the BU. CFMSA didn’t follow so Caltex filed the
certification proceeding. CFMSA filed a notice of strike based on the grounds of
refusal to bargain and union busting. During the certification proceedings, Judge
Tabigne instructed the parties to maintain status quo. He advised CFMSA not to go
on strike but making it clear that if there is indeed ULP, they can go on strike even
without notice. Based on what CFMSA considered as ULP, and after the BLR2 failed
to lead the parties to a compromise, the LO staged a strike. In response, the
company added to the petition he previously filed, denominated as an “urgent
petition” to have the strike declared illegal and that the officers responsible be
declared to have lost their employment status. CFMSA filed a MTD questioning
CIR’s jurisdiction. CIR denied the MTD.
WON CFMSA conducted an illegal strike and the subsequent dismissal of CFMSA is
warranted. NO. Strike is legal.
WON Caltex committed ULP in refusal to bargain and union busting. YES.
The Court first noted the role of an injunction order in labor disputes. The Court
looked at the “urgent petition” filed by Caltex. The pleading is actually in the nature
of an injunctive relief under RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act / Magna Carta for Labor).
The scheme in RA 875 in achieving industrial peace rests on the premise of free and
private agreement. As such, there is a general prohibition in the issuance of an
injunctive relief involving labor disputes. This prohibition is designed to give labor a
comparable bargaining power against capital and must be liberally construed to
that end. There can be no injunction issued against any strike except in only one
instance: when a labor dispute arises in an industry indispensable to national
interest. The injunction should not be directed against the strike itself but on the
unlawful activities.
CONSTRUCTION/INTERPRETATION – injunction never used on strikes. Partial
agreement construed in favor of labor. CFMSA accused Caltex of ULP and vice-
versa.
5. Management Prerogative
 San Miguel Corporation Employees v. Bersamira, 186 SCRA 496 (1990)
Facts: SMC entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and
D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by DOLE. In
these contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed
by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be
deemed employees or agents of SMC – no ER-EE relation between the contractors
&/ its workers, on one hand, and SMC on the other.
22 | P a g e
the Union advised SMC that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for
union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with SMC.
The Company refused. Series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers
in SMC plants and offices. SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and
Damages before Pasig RTC to enjoin the Union from acting for and in behalf of the
ees of LIPERCON &/ D'RITE for CB purposes, and from staging a strike to compel
SMC to hire the workers of LIPERCON & D'RITE to compel SMC to hire the workers
of LIPERCON & D'RITE, etc.
WON the case involves, or relates to a labor dispute. - YES.
WON the RTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the present controversy and
properly issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. – NO. It should therefore be
enjoined from taking any further action in the civil case.
Held: labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relationship of er and ee" provided the controversy
concerns, among others, t&c of employment or a "change" or "arrangement"
thereof.
That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. What the
Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and
D'Rite so that they will be absorbed into the working unit of SMC. This matter
definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SMC.
As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to the
labor tribunals. As explicitly provided for in Art 217 LC, prior to its amendment by
RA6715 on Mar 21, 1989, since the suit was instituted on Mar 6, 1989, LAs have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
all workers including "1. unfair labor practice cases; 2. those that workers may file
involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; ...
and 5. cases arising from any violation of Art 265 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts. ..."
The claim of SMC that the action is for damages under the CC would not suffice to
keep the case within the jurisdictional boundaries of Regular Courts. The said claim
for damages is interwoven with a labor dispute existing between the parties and
would have to be ventilated before the administrative machinery established for
the expeditious settlement of those disputes. To allow the action filed below to
prosper would bring about "split jurisdiction" which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.
6. Inter-relations of ULP Acts
Art.248 Equity of the Incumbent
All existing federation and national unions which meet the qualifications of a
legitimate labor organization and none of the grounds for cancellation shall
continue to maintain their existing affiliates regardless of the nature of the industry
and the location of the affiliates.
Art.249 Rights and Conditions of Membership in a Labor Organization
The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization:
(a) No arbitrary or excessive initiation fees shall be required of the members
of a legitimate labor organization nor shall arbitrary, excessive or oppressive fine
and forfeiture be imposed;
(b) The members shall be entitled to full and detailed report from their
officers and representatives of all financial transactions as provide for in the
constitution and by-laws of the organization;
(c) The members shall directly elect their officers, including those of the
national union or federation, trade center or any similar aggrupation to which their
union is affiliated, by secret ballot at intervals of five (5) years. No qualification
requirements for candidacy to any position shall be imposed other than
membership in good standing in subject labor organization. The secretary or any
other responsible union officer shall furnish the Secretary of Labor and Employment
with a list of the newly elected officers, together with the appointive officers or
agents who are entrusted with the handling of funds within thirty (30) calendar
days after the election of officers or from the occurrence of any change in the list of
offices of the labor organization;
(d) The members shall determine by secret ballot, after due deliberation, any
question of major policy affecting the entire membership of the organization,
unless the nature of the organization of force majeure renders such secret ballot
impractical, in which case the board of directors of the organization may make the
decision in behalf of the general membership;
(e) No labor organization shall knowingly admit as member or continue in
membership any individual who belongs to a subversive organization or who is
engaged directly or indirectly in any subversive activity;
23 | P a g e
(f) No person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
shall be eligible for election as union officer or for appointment to any position in
the union;
(g) No officer, agent or member of a labor organization shall collect fees ,
dues, or other contributions in its behalf or make any disbursements of its money or
funds unless he is duly authorized pursuant to its constitution and by-laws;
(h) Every payment of fees, dues or other contributions by a member shall be
evidenced by a receipt signed by the officer or agent making the collection and
entered into the record of the organization to be kept and maintained for the
purpose;
(i) The funds of the organization shall not be applied for any purpose or
object other than those expressly provided by its constitution and by-laws or those
expressly authorized by written resolution adopted by the majority of the members
at a general meeting duly called for the purpose;
(j) Every income or revenue of the organization shall be evidenced by a
record showing its source, and every expenditure of its funds shall be evidenced by
a receipt from the person to whom the payment is made, which shall state the
date, place and purpose of such payment. Such record or receipt shall form part of
the financial records of the organization;
Any action involving the funds of the organization shall prescribe after three (3)
years from the date of submission of the annual financial report to the Department
of Labor and Employment or from the date the same should have been submitted
as required by law, whichever comes earlier; Provided, That this provision shall
apply only to a legitimate labor organization which has submitted the financial
report requirements under this Code; Provided, further, That failure of any labor
organization to comply with the periodic financial reports required by law and such
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder six (6) months after the effectivity of
this Act shall automatically result in the cancellation of union registration of such
labor organization;
(k) The officers of any labor organization shall not be paid any compensation
other than the salaries and expenses due to their positions as specifically provided
for in its constitution and by-laws, or in a written resolution duly authorized by a
majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose. The minutes of the meeting and the list of participants and ballots casts
shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives. Any irregularities in the approval of the resolutions shall be a
ground for impeachment or expulsion for the organization;
(l) The treasurer of any labor organization and every officer thereof who is
responsible for the account of such organization for the collection, management ,
disbursement, custody or control of the funds, moneys, and other properties of the
organization, shall render to the organization and to its members a true and correct
account of all moneys received and paid by him since the last day on which he
rendered such account, and of all bonds, securities and other properties of the
organization entrusted to his custody or under his control. The rendering of such
account shall be made:
(1) At least once a year within thirty (30) days after the close of its fiscal year;
(2) At such other times as may be required by a resolution of the majority of
the members of the organization; and
(3) Upon vacating his office.
The account shall be duly audited and verified by affidavit and a copy thereof shall
be furnished the Secretary of Labor
(m) The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of any
labor organization shall be open to inspection shall be open to inspection by any
officer or member thereof during office hours;
(n) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon the
members of a labor organization unless authorized by a written resolution of a
majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose. The secretary of the organization shall record the minutes of the meeting
including the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special
assessment of fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees. The record shall be
attested to by the president;
(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessments, attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may
be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an individual written
authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically
state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction; and
(p) It shall be the duty of any labor organization and its officers to inform its
member on the provisions of its constitution and by-laws, collective bargaining
agreement, the prevailing labor relations system and all their rights and obligations
under existing labor laws.
For this purpose, registered labor organizations may assess reasonable dues to
finance labor relations seminars and other labor education activities.
24 | P a g e
Any violation of the above rights and conditions of membership shall be a ground
for cancellation of union registration or expulsion of officers from office, whichever
is appropriate. At least thirty percent (30%) of all the members of union or any
member or members specially concerned may report such violation to the Bureau.
The Bureau shall have the power to hear and decide any reported violation to mete
the appropriate penalty.
 Republic Savings Bank v. CIR, 21 SCRA 226 (1967) – Fernando, J.,
concurring opinion, 240-241
Facts: 8 ees were dismissed by the bank due to an allegedly libelous letter they
wrote to the bank president urging him to resign. The employees argue that such
violated certain provisions of the Industrial Peace Act, making it an unfair labor
practice. The Court agreed, stating that the employees were protected because
they were engaged in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid and
protection and that their dismissal amounted to interference, coercion or restraint
which made the Bank guilty of ULP.
WON the dismissal of the 8 employees constituted unfair labor practice? YES
Held: The Court held that the respondents were protected because they were
engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right to self-organization
which includes concerted activities for mutual aid and protection, interference with
which constitute an ULP. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
Collective Bargaining be contemplated.
J.Fernando Concurring opinion
On the assumption that there was indeed a valid cause for grievance, a more
diplomatic approach could have been attempted or at least a procedure to settle
the grievance. But in this case the respondents issued an ultimatum.
J. Fernando states that collective bargaining presupposes a give and take of
discussion, with neither party adopting a hard-line position, at least at the start,
from which there can be no retreat. The respondents here knew what they wanted
and they did not sugarcoat their desire to have the bank president removed due to
his misdeeds. Since that was the case, he finds it hard to agree that their dismissal
was a refusal to bargain collectively. He points out that the letters were signed not
as a union, but in each of the employees’ individual capacity. If the letter was
indeed libelous then their dismissal would have been justified.
However he still agreed with the majority because of the mass dismissal made by
the company. The unions were left leaderless under the current circumstances. For
collective bargaining to be meaningful, there must be two parties, one representing
management and the other representing the union. Nor could management select
who would represent the latter or with whom to deal, otherwise in effect there
would be only one party. Obviously there would then be no bargaining. To that end,
he finds that the dismissals amounted to interference, restraint or coercion, as
prohibited by the IAP.
B. Acts in Violation of Right to Self-Organization
1. Interference, Restraint and Coercion
ILO Convention No. 98, Arts. 1, 2 (see page 16)
Arts. 258 (a) (see page 21)
Art. 266 (see page 4)
Art.291 (g) (h) Miscellaneous Provisions
(g) The Ministry shall help promote and gradually develop, with the
agreement of labor organizations and employers, labor-management cooperation
programs at appropriate levels of the enterprise based on shared responsibility and
mutual respect in order to ensure industrial peace and improvement in
productivity, working conditions and the quality of working life.
(h) In establishments where no legitimate labor organization exists,
labor0management committees may be formed voluntary by workers and
employers for the purpose of promoting industrial peace. The Department of Labor
and Employment shall endeavor to enlighten and educate the workers and
employers on their rights and responsibilities through labor education with
emphasis on the policy thrusts of this Code.
Art. 259 (a) Unfair Labor Practices of labor Organizations
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;
25 | P a g e

 Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers-Food,
396 SCRA 518 (2003)
Facts: Mgt refused to bargain collectively with the Union. The former even went so
far as to not give the Union members and work assignments and also employed
means to prevent the organizers from entering the premises. The Court held in this
case that there’s illegal dismissal and that the petitioners are guilty of ULP. Such
acts by the petitioners interfered with the respondents’ right to self organization.
WoN there’s ULP and petitioners are liable for damages – YES
Held: Petitioners are guilty of ULP. From respondents’ refusal to bargain, to their
acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew
from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the 12 organizers to come in,
and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that the
Ps didn't want a union in their hacienda – a clear interference in the right of the
workers to self-organization. The finding of ULP in BF carries with it the sanction of
moral and exemplary damages.
 General Milling Corporation v. Hon. Court of Appeals, 422 SCRA 514
(2004)
Facts: Union sent proposals for new CBA and requested for a counter-proposal.
GMC did not submit it’s counter-proposal, claiming that it received 13 letters of
withdrawal from union members and that the Union no longer had standing to
negotiate a CBA. Union filed for ULP on ground of interference of right to self-
organization. SC ruled that the letters sent by the workers clearly indicated that
GMC exerted pressure on its employees to prove that the union no longer enjoyed
support. The fact that the resignation letters occurred during the pendency of the
case before the LA shows that it was a desperate attempt by GMC to cast doubt on
the legitimate status of the Union and thus was an interference of the workers’
right to self-org.
WON GMC is guilty of ULP. YES. Guilty of interfering with right to self-org (also for
violating duty to bargain)
The union’s proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from
the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It
was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with
the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain
anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed a ULP of violating
duty to bargain.
GMC’s refusal to make a counter-proposal to the union’s proposal for CBA
negotiation is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even
bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a
clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.
 Prince Transport, Inc. & R. Claros v. Diosdado Garcia, 639 SCRA 312
(2011)
Facts: Respondents worked for PTI. In a series of meetings to negotiate their
commission rate, the President of the Company voiced out his objection to their
forming a Union. Nonetheless, they formed one to protect their own interests. PTI
transferred union members to a subsidiary, Lubas, which the company neglected.
Because of the neglect, Lubas closed down, which led to the respondents losing
their employment. They thus filed for ULP and ID, among others. SC held that there
was no doubt that PTI was guilty of ULP. Their act of transferring the union
members and then leaving them hanging later on was a clear manifestation of their
opposition to the formation of a union in the company, clearly violating the right of
the EEs to selforganization.
WON PTI guilty of ULP. YES.
Held: reason to depart from CA findings that PTI guilty of ULP.
Respondents’ transfer to Lubas was designed by PTI as a subterfuge to foil their
rights to organize themselves into a Union to protect their own interests. Under
Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair labor
practice if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization. ULP is highlighted by the fact
that after their transfer to Lubas, PTI left them hanging as far as the operations of
Lubas were concerned. Respondents were left virtually jobless as PTI refused to
maintain the vehicles which led to Lubas’ closure.
a) Interrogation
 Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller, 99 Phil. 762 (1956)
Facts: Micaller was fired by Scoty's for refusing to reveal the members of the union
and her refusal to withdraw from the same. The CIR found the employer guilty of
ULP. The Court held that questioning of employees concerning union membership
26 | P a g e
and activities in a way that would hamper exercise of free choice among the
employees is an unfair labor practice.
Whether Scoty's committed ULP. YES
Held: The Court no longer went to review the questions of fact that were raised by
the petitioners. They however, looked to American jurisprudence in determining
whether Scoty's did commit ULP when it fired Micaller for participating in union
activities. The SC found this case in all fours with the case of NLRB v. Harris-
Woodson, which stated that:
Questioning of employees concerning union membership and activities and
disparaging remarks by supervisory employees made in such away as to hamper the
exercise of free choice on the part of the employees, have been uniformly
condemned as a violation of the Act
 Philippine Steam Navigation Company v. Philippine Marine Officers
Guild, 15 SCRA 174 (1965)
Facts: PMOG sent the company a set of demands including a request for collective
bargaining. In its reply the company required PMOG to first prove that it
represented majority of its employees before its demands would be considered. On
the same day, the company began interrogating and investigating its captains,
deckofficers, and engineers in order to find out which of them had joined PMOG.
Subsequently, PMOG sent a reply that implored PHILSTEAM to first consider its
requests and demands before requiring proof of majority representation. Forthe
perceived failure of the company to collectively bargain with them and for alleged
ULPs, PMOG filed a notice of strike.
WON the company’s act of interrogating its employees in this particular instance
constituted ULP – YES
Held: Contention of the company that it conducted interrogations only for the
purpose of determining WON PMOG had attained majority representation was
untrue because it conducted interrogations before
PMOG declined to give proof regarding its status as majority representative. Note
that the company conducted the interrogations the same day it replied to the initial
demand for collective bargaining. While the general rule is that an employer is not
denied the privilege of interrogating its employees as regards union affiliation, it
must be for a legitimate purpose and no adverse consequences must redound to
those who admit to union membership. In this particular case, the Court found that
the manner in which the company interrogated its employees restrained and
coerced the latter in their exercise of the right to self-organization. “The rule in this
jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to a series of
questionings regarding their membership in the union or their union activities, in
such a way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on theirpart, constitutes unfair
labor practice”
b) Speech, Espionage, Economic Coercion
 The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees Association v. Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 243 (1971)
Facts: Company refused to send counterproposals, which prompted unions to go on
a strike. During the strike, the companies sent letters to each striking member,
offering him benefits like food and bed, to leave the strike. The companies then
sent strike-breakers causing injuries to both sides. After that, the company then
sent another letter threatening to replace them if they don’t return. Upon
returning, the company didn’t even readmit all of them, giving preference to those
who were not participants of the strike and even dismissing the union officers.
The Court held that the companies (related companies) were guilty of ULP. One for
interfering with an EE’s right to concerted action (The letters), for discrimination
(readmitting only a few) and for dismissing the officers of the Union.
W/N Companies guilty of ULP – YES
Held:
1. Interference: The letters were addressed to the individual members
without being coursed through the Union. It is ULP for an ER to negotiate with or to
attempt to negotiate with its EEs individually, since it is still under obligation to
bargain with the Union as the EEs’ rep.
2. Discrimination: The Court took into consideration many factors: 1st was
the fact that even though the non-strikers who caused violence had criminal
charges, they were still readmitted to work. Even if the strikers were able to get
their clearances, 34 were still refused readmission. Olbes appointed employees who
participated in the strike-break (thus hostile to the others) to lead the screening
activities.
3. Dismissal of U Officers: not a single dismissed worker was given the
opportunity to defend himself. Even when they reported back to work, they were
not readmitted and were subsequently issued termination letters.
27 | P a g e
 c) Concerted Activities
 Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills, Co. v. 51 SCRA 189 (2006)
Facts: The Union staged a protest against police harassment, which had nothing to
do with management; however, because of their absence, and for allegedly
violating the no strike/lockout provision of the CBA, the petitioner union leaders
were dismissed. The Court held that such dismissal was contrary to the
constitutional protection of the workers’ freedoms. Any losses sustained by the
company would only be an assertion of property rights, while the workers asserted
basic human freedoms—accordingly, it is the latter that must be given primacy.
Whether the Union’s participation in the protest constituted unfair labor practice.
NO. The protest was not directed towards management, and was a constitutionally
protected right.
Held: The Union’s protest was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer. The protest was not rooted in any industrial dispute. As
such, they were merely exercising their right to freedom of expression, their right of
assembly, and their right to petition for redress of grievances.
As a matter of fact, it was the duty of PBM to protect the Union and its members
from harassment by local police officers: it was thus in PBM’s interest to rally to its
employees’ defense, so that they may report to work free from harassment,
vexation, or peril, and thus may perform more efficiently their tasks and enhance
productivity and profits. But PBM did not even offer to intercede: its failure to
defend the employees only weakened their position.
2. Non-Union Membership or Withdrawal Form Membership as a
Condition of Employment (Yellow-Dog Contract)
Art. 258. (b) Unfair labor practices of employers.
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not
join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
 Visayan Stevedore Trans. Co. v. CIR, 19 SCRA 426 (1967)
Facts: P refused to engage the services of the 139 workers who were members of
UWFA allegedly because of their union activities. UWFA filed ULP. Held: ULP was
substantially proved—Branch Mngr Xaudaro had told the workers point-blank that
severance of their connection with UWFA was the remedy, if they wanted to
continue working with the Company.
WoN VISTRANCO is guilty of ULP. YES.
Held: 4 point test of ER-EE relnship. As applied: Workers under the direction and
control of P’s officers, whose paymaster paid the compensation. The agencies
and/or LOs involved in such cases merely perform the role of a
representative/agent of the ER in the recruitment of men needed for the operation
of the ER’s business. Workers not terminated at the end of every milling season—
merely on LoA without pay during the off-season. Er-EE relnship merely deemed
suspended.
The workers belonging to UWFA who were not admitted to work were told by
Xauduro point-blank that severance oftheir connection with the UWFA was the
remedy, if they wanted to continue working with the company.
3. Contracting Out to Discourage Unionism
Art. 258. (c) Unfair labor practices of employers.
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when
such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization;
 Digital Telecommunications, Phil., Inc. v. Digitel Employees Union, et
al., 683 SCRA 466 (2012)
Facts: Digitel was reluctant in negotiating with its SEBA. Subsequently, Digiserv, the
call center arm of Digitel, ceased its operations and 42 union members-ees were
retrenched. I-Tech was thereafter created to perform the same functions as
Digiserv and rehired some of the dismissed ees of Digiserv (presumably the non-
union members). Union now challenges the legality of dismissal of its 13 union
members (nag-alisan na kasi ung iba sa 42) and alleges ULP on the part of ER—
contracting out to discourage unionism. SC ruled that Digiserv was a LOC, thus the
retrenched ees were in fact Digitel’s ees. They were illegally dismissed as the
retrenchment was not made in good faith. ER’s bad faith was evidenced by the
timing of and reasons for the closure and the timing of and reasons for the
subsequent opening of I-Tech. Such dismissal also constitutes ULP because it
interferes with, restrains or coerces ees in the exercise of their rights to SO
WON Digiserv met the requirements of retrenchment. NO
Only (1), (2) and (3) of the requisites of retrenchment were met:
28 | P a g e
(1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses
which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious,
actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived
objectively and in good faith by the ER;
(2) That the ER served written notice both to the ees and to DOLE at least 1 month
prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
(3) That the ER pays the retrenched ees separation pay equivalent to 1 month pay
or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;
(4) That the ER exercises its prerogative to retrench ees in good faith for the
advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the ees’ right to
security of tenure; and
(5) That the ER used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
dismissed and who would be retained among the ees, such as status, efficiency,
seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers
When SOLE AJ-ed, both ER and ees have to maintain the status quo. There is no
doubt that Digitel defied the assumption order when it abrubtly closed down
Digiserv. The closure of a department is not illegal per se. What makes it unlawful is
when the closure is undertaken in bad faith. In St. John Colleges, Inc. v. St. John
Academy Faculty and Employees Union, bad faith was evidenced by the timing of
and reasons for the closure and the timing of and reasons for the subsequent
opening. Similar to St. John, bad faith was manifested by the timing of the closure
of Digiserv and the rehiring of some ees to Interactive Technology Solutions, Inc. (I-
tech), a corporate arm of Digitel.
(MAIN) The timing of the creation of I-tech is dubious:
(1) It was incorporated on 18 January 2005 while the labor dispute within Digitel
was pending.
(2) Itech’s primary purpose was to provide call center/customer contact service, the
same service provided by Digiserv.
(3) It conducts its business inside the Digitel office at 110 E. Rodriguez Jr. Avenue,
Bagumbayan, Quezon City.
(4) The former head of Digiserv, Ms. Teresa Taniega, is also an officer of Itech.
(5) Thus, when Digiserv was closed down, some of the employees presumably non-
union members were rehired by I-tech.
It needs to be mentioned too that the dismissal constitutes a ULP under LC which
refers to contracting out services or functions being performed by union members
when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization. At the height of the labor dispute, occasioned by Digitel’s
reluctance to negotiate with the Union, I-tech was formed to provide, as it did
provide, the same services performed by Digiserv, the Union members’ nominal
employer. 5th criterion was not also met because all ees of Digiserv were dismissed.
4. Company Domination of Union
Art. 258. (d) Unfair labor practices of employers.
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other
support to it or its organizers or supporters;
Art. 219. (i) Definitions.
(i) “Company union” means any labor organization whose formation, function or
administration has been assisted by any act defined as unfair labor practice by this
Code;
 Progressive Development Corporation v. CIR, 80 SCRA 434 (1977)
Facts: Union was alleging that Company encouraged and assisted in the formation
of a new union and coerced the former’s members to disaffiliate and join the new
one. Those who refused to do so were terminated.
Held: Company is guilty of ULP for Union busting - discriminating against employees
who refuse to disaffiliate and aiding the creation of a Company Union.
5. Discrimination to Encourage/Discourage Unionism | Valid
discrimination: Union Security Clause
Art. 258. (e) Unfair labor practices of employers.
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties
from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a
condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of
another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.
Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent
to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining
29 | P a g e
agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under
Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent;
Art. 259. (b) Unfair labor practices of labor organizations.
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,
including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground
other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or
continuation of membership is made available to other members;
a) Instances of Discrimination
 Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Zaldivar, supra
Facts: Employees were charged with disloyalty to the Union. They were dismissed
pursuant to a Union Security Clause of the CBA.
Held: A "closed-shop" may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement
between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may
be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or
she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good
standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are
a part A CBA provision for a closed shop is a valid form of union security and it is
not a restriction on the right or freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution. However, in doing so, the employer must observe substantive and
procedural due process. Non-observance of either = illegal dismissal.
 Elcee Farms Inc. v. NLRC, 512 SCRA 602 (2007)
Facts: Hacienda Trinidad was leased. The new management entered into a CBA with
the Union providing for a closed shop agreement. The respondents refused to join.
Hence, they were dismissed. Respondents reason that they were already members
of another Union even before the CBA was concluded.
Held: New management not liable to dismissed employees. They were dismissed
pursuant to a valid closed shop clause. At the time the management took legal
possession, there was no existing Union yet. The Union of the respondents only
filed for PCE when the CBA was already concluded
b) Valid Discrimination: Union Security Clause
 Alabang Country Club, Inc. v. NLRC, 545 SCRA 351 (2008)
Facts: Former officers of the Union were expelled from the Union for malversation
of funds. Company, after weighing the verbal and written explanations, terminated
the officers.
Held:
1. Union Shop - all new regular employees are required to join the union within a
certain period as a condition for their continued employment.
2. Membership shop - employees who are union members as of the effective date
of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union
membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or
transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated.
Requisites for terminating an employee based on the CBA’s Union Security Clause:
(1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in
the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel
the employee from the union.
The employees in this case were afforded due process and thus, were validly
dismissed.
 General Milling Corp. v. Casio, et al., 615 SCRA 13 (2010)
Facts: Respondents were charged with acts inimical to the Union and thus were
expelled. Union then requested Company to immediately dismiss the aforesaid
employees with a threat of filing a ULP case if they fail to do so. Ultimately,
respondents were dismissed.
Held: Illegal dismissal for failure to observe procedural due process. No evidence
that respondents were actually notified of the charges against them or that they
were given the chance to explain their side.
30 | P a g e
 PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Tañeca, et al., supra
Facts: Employees were expelled from the Union. Latter sought their dismissal
pursuant to the Union Security Clause. The CBA at this time however had already
expired.
Held: Illegal dismissal. When there is a representational issue, the status quo
provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new agreement will not
apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union members will
be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing
under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for
certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty
whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a
certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented, or
compromised. (Automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the
CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA)
6. Retaliation Against Employee for His/Her Testimony/Indirect
Discrimination
Art. 258. (f) Unfair labor practices of employers.
(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee
for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
 Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Baldo, 12 SCRA 599 (1964)
Facts: Employee allegedly dismissed for having testified against the company in a
certification election case.
Held: ULP: Discrimination against employee for his/her testimony.
7. Illegal Exaction; Featherbedding
Art. 259. (d) Unfair labor practices of labor organizations.
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or
deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services
which are not performed or not to be performed, including the demand for fee for
union negotiations;
C. Acts in Violation of Right to Collective Bargaining
1. Violation to Duty to Bargain
Art. 258. (g) Unfair labor practices of employers.
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
Art. 259. (c) Unfair labor practices of labor organizations.
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided
it is the representative of the employees;
Art. 260. Procedure in collective bargaining.
The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice;
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may
request for a conference which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days
from the date of request.
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or
both parties or at its own initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation
meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to
participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call;
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from
doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes;
and
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the
parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator.
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Art. 261. Duty to bargain collectively in the absence of collective bargaining
agreements.
In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary arrangement providing for a
more expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be the duty of employer
and the representatives of the employees to bargain collectively in accordance with
the provisions of this Code.
Art. 262. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.
The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms
and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or
questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating
such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any
party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
Art. 263. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining
agreement.
When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively
shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement
during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or
modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be
the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and
effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
 Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., 39
SCRA 276 (1971)
Facts: Company dissolved its security guard section. This was in spite of an existing
CBA. Company reasons that it’s a valid exercise of management prerogatives.
Held: ULP. There can be no justification for Company's insistence on pushing
through its project of such dissolution without thereby incurring a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement. An unfair labor practice is committed by a labor
union or its agent by its refusal 'to bargain collectively with the employer'.
Collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement, being a
continuous process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the
obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective bargaining agreement if
entered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes an unfair
labor practice.
 St. John Colleges, Inc. v. St. John Academy Faculty and Employees
Union, 505 SCRA 764 (2006)
Facts: Union and Company entered in a bargaining deadlock. Strike! Pending
resolution of labor dispute by SOLE, Board of Directors passed a resolution closing
the school.
Held: Closure was done to defeat the parties’ agreement to refer the labor dispute
to the SOLE; to unilaterally end the bargaining deadlock; to render nugatory any
decision of the SOLE; and to circumvent the Union’s right to collective bargaining
and its members’ right to security of tenure. By admitting that the closure was due
to irreconcilable differences between the Union and school management,
specifically, the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations, the School in
effect admitted that it wanted to end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the
problem of dealing with the demands of the Union. This is precisely what the Labor
Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net effect is to defeat
the Union’s right to collective bargaining.
 Union of Filipro Employees – DFA Unions KMU v. Nestle Phil. Inc., 547
SCRA 323 (2008)
Facts: Union filed a complaint for ULP alleging Company’s refusal to bargain.
Held: The failure to reach an agreement after negotiations have continued for a
reasonable period does not establish a lack of good faith. For a charge of ULP to
prosper, it must be shown that Company was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or
fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy. It is not enough that the Union believes the ER committed
acts of ULP when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to
warrant such a belief. (Refusal to include Retirement Plan: 8 out of 9 BU’s already
agreed that it is a unilaterally granted benefit)
 CABEU-NFL v. Central Azucarera de Bais, Inc., 635 SCRA 339 (2010)
Facts: Petitioner filed a ULP complaint against the Company after the latter
concluded a CBA with another Union, pending conciliation proceedings.
Held: There was a mass disaffiliation from Petitioner. Company believed that
Petitioner was no longer the representative of the workers. It just wanted to foster
industrial peace by bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its rank
32 | P a g e
and file workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with the
newly-formed Union. Such actions of the Company are nowhere tantamount to
anti-unionism, the evil sought to be punished in cases of unfair labor practices.
Furthermore, basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Petitioner failed to substantiate
allegations of bad faith.
2. Payment of Negotiation or Attorneys Fees
Art. 258. (h) Unfair labor practices of employers.
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its officers or agents as part
of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute;
Art. 259. (e) Unfair labor practices of labor organizations.
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney’s fees from employers as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute;
3. Gross Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement
Art. 258. (i) Unfair labor practices of employers.
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
Art. 259. (f) Unfair labor practices of labor organizations.
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
Art. 273. Jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department
of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the
Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
 BPI Employees Union – Davao City – FUBU v. BPI, G.R. No. 174912, 24
July 2013
Facts: Union filed a complaint for ULP against Company alleging that its outsourcing
of functions formerly performed by union members violates the CBA.
Held: Only GROSS violations of the economic provisions of the CBA are treated as
ULP. Otherwise, they are mere grievances. The alleged violation of the union shop
agreement, even assuming it was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of an
economic provision in the agreement. Company has exclusive rights and
prerogatives which included the hiring of employees, promotion, transfers and
dismissals for just cause etc. Contracting out of services is an exercise of
management prerogative. Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious
and arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by
the employer.
 Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP)
v. PAL, 559 SCRA 252 (2008)
Facts: Pursuant to its Rehabilitation Plan, PAL enforced retrenchment on its cabin
crew employees. Union filed for ULP.
Held: ULP claim is without basis. Violations of a CBA, except those which are gross
in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved
as grievances under the parties’ CBA. “Gross violations of CBA" refers to flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such
agreement, which is not the issue in the instant case.1 There was no specific
instance of union busting, oppression or harassment and similar acts of FASAP’s
officers. The fact that majority of FASAP’s officers were either retrenched or
demoted does not prove restraint or coercion in their right to organize. Instead, we
33 | P a g e
see a simple retrenchment scheme gone wrong for failure to abide by the stringent
rules prescribed by law, and a failure to discharge the employer’s burden of proof in
such cases.
D. Motive, Conduct and Proof
1. Employer Motive and Proof
 Me-Shurn Corporation v. Me-Shurn Workers Union, 448 SCRA 41
(2005)
Facts: Shortly after the Union filed PCE, corporation decided that it would
temporarily lay off employees and cease operations, on account of its alleged
inability to meet the export quota required by the Board of Investment. Union: ULP
(union busting and illegal lockout)
Held: Corporation failed to substantiate business losses. To constitute an unfair
labor practice, the dismissal need not entirely and exclusively be motivated by the
union’s activities or affiliations. It is enough that the discrimination was a
contributing factor. If the basic inspiration for the act of the employer is derived
from the affiliation or activities of the union, the former’s assignment of another
reason, no matter how seemingly valid, is unavailing.
To justify the closure of a business and the termination of the services of the
concerned employees, the law requires the employer to prove that it suffered
substantial actual losses. The cessation of a company’s operations shortly after the
organization of a labor union, as well as the resumption of business barely a month
after, gives credence to the employees’ claim that the closure was meant to
discourage union membership and to interfere in union activities. These acts
constitute unfair labor practices.
2. Totality of Evidence
 Royal Undergarment Corporation of the Philippines v. CIR, 185 SCRA
278 (1990)
Facts: Union President was dismissed on allegations of supervisors that the former,
under the influence of liquor, threatened to kill them.
Held: The totality of evidence supports the conclusion that UP has been unjustly
dismissed by reason of his union activities. It has previously been indicated that an
employer may treat freely with an employee and is not obliged to support his
actions with a reason or purpose. However, where the attendant circumstances,
the history of the employer's past conduct and like considerations, coupled with an
intimate connection between the employer's action and the union affiliations or
activities of the particular employee or employees taken as a whole raise a
suspicion as to the motivation for the employer's action, the failure of the employer
to ascribe a valid reason therefor may justify an inference that his unexplained
conduct in respect of the particular employee or employees was inspired by the
latter's union membership or activities.
E. Enforcement, Remedies and Sanctions
1. Parties Against Whom ULP Committed
Art. 258. Unfair labor practices of employers.
It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not
join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when
such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other
support to it or its organizers or supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties
from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a
condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of
another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement.
Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent
to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining
agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under
Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent;
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(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee
for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney’s fees to the union or its officers or agents as part
of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and
agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated
in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.
Art. 259. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations.
It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,
including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground
other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or
continuation of membership is made available to other members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided
it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or
deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services
which are not performed or not to be performed, including the demand for fee for
union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney’s fees from employers as part of the
settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers,
members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor
associations or organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or
ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.
Art. 219. (e) (f) (g) Definitions.
(e) “Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or
agents except when acting as employer.
(f) "Employee" includes any person in the employ of an employer. The term shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Code so
explicitly states. It shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a result of
or in connection with any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice if he has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular
employment.
(g) "Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists
in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.
 American President Lines v. Clave, supra
Facts: Union abolished itself due to termination of its contract with company
(former provided security guard services to company for a period of 1 year, after
which their contract was not renewed) Union revived itself and filed ULP charges
against company for illegal dismissal and union discrimination.
Held: There was no EE-ER relationship. ULP can only exist within the context of an
EE-ER relationship. Even granting so, there was no proof of the “repeated
requests”. Also, with regard to the termination of the contract between the
petitioner and the agency, there was no evidence that it bears any relationship to
the alleged union activities of the individual members of the agency. The hard fact
is that the contract had a lifetime of one year. Hence, after that period, and without
it being renewed, it lived out its term. Moreover, it was pointed out that the
termination was caused primarily by a “misunderstanding” between the operator of
the agency and Captain of the petitioner. There was no indication that union
activities had something to do with such termination.
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 2. Parties Liable for Acts
a) Employer
Art. 258. (last par.) Unfair labor practices of employers.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and
agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated
in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.
Art. 302. Penalties.
Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or unless the acts complained of hinge
on a question of interpretation or implementation of ambiguous provisions of an
existing collective bargaining agreement, any violation of the provisions of this Code
declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less
than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than three
years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
In addition to such penalty, any alien found guilty shall be summarily deported upon
completion of service of sentence.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any criminal offense punished
in this Code, shall be under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Municipal or City
Courts and the Courts of First Instance.
Art. 303. Who are liable when committed by other than natural person.
If the offense is committed by a corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or
any other entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the guilty officer or officers of
such corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or entity.
Art. 304. Offenses.
Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
All unfair labor practice arising from Book V shall be filed with the appropriate
agency within one (1) year from accrual of such unfair labor practice; otherwise,
they shall be forever barred.
b) Labor Organization
Art. 259 (last par) (see page 36)
Art. 304 (see page 36)
 National Labor Union v. CIR, 116 SCRA 417 (1982)
Facts: Union started CBA negotiations with former owner. 4 days after the sale, the
CBA was concluded. After which, Union alleged that the new management hired 24
new employees and that on the pretext of selling/closing its business, it locked out
and dismissed all members of the Union.
Held: It is irrational if not specious to assume that new owner bought a business
lock, stock, and barrel without inquiring into its labor-management situation and
that his dismissal of all the union members without retaining a few experienced
workers and their replacement with a completely new set of employees who were
strangers to the company was anything other than an attempt to rid the firm of
unwanted union activity. There is substantial evidence to sustain a finding of the
new owner’s knowledge of the bargaining negotiations and the resulting CBA and,
consequently, of unfair labor practice on his part. Former and new owners are
jointly and severally liable for the payment of backwages.
3. Prosecution and Prescriptive Period
a) Civil Aspect
Art. 257. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof.
Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and
management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with
each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only violations of the civil rights of both
labor and management but are also criminal offenses against the State which shall
be subject to prosecution and punishment as herein provided.
Subject to the exercise by the President or by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment of the powers vested in them by Articles 263 and 264 of this Code, the
civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices, which may include claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney’s fees and other
36 | P a g e
affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor
Arbiters shall give utmost priority to the hearing and resolution of all cases involving
unfair labor practices. They shall resolve such cases within thirty (30) calendar days
from the time they are submitted for decision.
Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings shall bar recovery under
the Civil Code.
No criminal prosecution under this Title may be instituted without a final judgment
finding that an unfair labor practice was committed, having been first obtained in
the preceding paragraph. During the pendency of such administrative proceeding,
the running of the period of prescription of the criminal offense herein penalized
shall be considered interrupted: Provided, however, that the final judgment in the
administrative proceedings shall not be binding in the criminal case nor be
considered as evidence of guilt but merely as proof of compliance of the
requirements herein set forth.
Art. 304 (see page 36)
b) Criminal Aspect
Art. 257 (see page 36)
Art. 304 (see page 36)
4. Compromise
 CCLC E.G. Gochangco Workers Union v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 656 (1988)
Facts: Union requested for permission from Company for some of its members to
attend hearing for PCE. Company refused. After the hearing, several EE’s were
placed under suspension for “abandonment of work”. They were later dismissed.
Union filed for ULP. Company seeks dismissal on the basis of an agreement
concluded in a separate case whereby there was a Waiver of Claims, Rights and
Interests.
Held: Unfair labor practice cases are not, in view of the public interest involved,
subject to compromises. Furthermore, the alleged waivers do not appear to have
been presented in the first instance. They cannot be introduced for the first time on
appeal.
5. Remedies and Sanctions
a) Civil Remedies
Art. 257 (see page 36)
Art. 229. Appeal.
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained
only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including
graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided herein.
To discourage frivolous or dilatory appeals, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter
shall impose reasonable penalty, including fines or censures, upon the erring
parties.
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the
other party who shall file an answer not later than ten (10) calendar days from
receipt thereof.
37 | P a g e
The Commission shall decide all cases within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt
of the answer of the appellee. The decision of the Commission shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
Any law enforcement agency may be deputized by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission in the enforcement of decisions, awards or orders.
Art. 293. Security of tenure.
In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
b) Penal Remedies
Art. 257 (see page 36)
Art. 302 (see page 36)
Art. 303 (see page 36)
Art. 304 (see page 36)
 Quadra v. Court of Appeals, 497 SCRA 221 (2006)
Facts: Petitioner was allegedly dismissed because of his militant union activities. He
was later reinstated and filed with the CIR a claim for moral and exemplary
damages.
Held: In 1967, SC rendered ruling upholding the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims
for damages incidental to an employee's illegal dismissal. Thus, Quadra properly
filed his claim for damages. “The civil aspect of all cases involving ULP, which may
include claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, attorney’s
fees, and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the LA”.
IX. UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
A. Basis of Right to Engage in Concerted Activities
1. Constitution
1987 Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 3 (see page 11)
 Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. v. NLRC, 226 SCRA
499 (1993)
Facts: Union conducted strike. NLRC granted Company’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.
Held: PI was not proper. In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more
as a rhetoric than a reality, labor has vigilantly fought to safeguard the sanctity of
the right to strike. Its struggle to gain the right to strike has not been easy and
effortless.
• On June 17, 1953, Congress gave statutory recognition to the right to strike
when it enacted RA 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. For nearly
two (2) decades, labor enjoyed the right to strike until it was prohibited on
September 12, 1972 upon the declaration of martial law in the country. The 14-year
battle to end martial rule produced many martyrs and foremost among them were
the radicals of the labor movement. It was not a mere happenstance, therefore,
that after the final battle against martial rule was fought at EDSA in 1986, the new
government treated labor with a favored eye.
• For the first time in our constitutional history, the fundamental law of our
land mandated the State to ". . . guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." This constitutional
imprimatur given to the right to strike constitutes signal victory for labor. Our
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 did not accord constitutional status to the right to
strike. Even the liberal US Federal Constitution did not elevate the right to strike to
a constitutional level. With a constitutional matrix, enactment of a law
implementing the right to strike was an inevitability. RA 6715 came into being on
March 21, 1989, an intentional replication of RA 875. In light of the genesis of the
38 | P a g e
right to strike, it ought to be obvious that the right should be read with a libertarian
latitude in favor of labor. In the wise words of Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a
distinguished commissioner of the 1987 Constitutional Commission " . . . the
constitutional recognition of the right to strike does serve as a reminder that
injunctions, should be reduced to the barest minimum"
2. Statutory
Art. 218. (a) (b) (c) Declaration of policy.
A. It is the policy of the State:
(a) To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes
of settling labor or industrial disputes;
(b) To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of
democracy and the promotion of social justice and development;
(c) To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor
movement;
Art. 277. (a) (b) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
(a) It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective
bargaining.
(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of
legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout,
consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected.
However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on
grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.
Book V, Rules XXII. Conciliation, strikes and lockouts.
Section 1. Conciliation of labor-management disputes. – The board may, upon
request of either of both parties or upon its own initiative, provide conciliation-
mediation services to labor disputes other than notices of strikes or lockouts.
Conciliation cases which are not subjects of notices of strike or lockout shall be
docketed as preventive mediation cases.
Section 2. Privileged communication. – Information and statements given in
confidence at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged
communications. Conciliators and similar officials shall not testify in any court or
body regarding any matter taken up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them.
Section 3. Issuance of subpoena. – The Board shall have the power to require the
appearance of any parties at conciliation meetings.
Section 4. Compromise agreements. – Any compromise settlement, including those
involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the
assistance of the Board and its regional branches shall be final and binding upon the
parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume
jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof
or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation, or coercion. Upon motion of any interested party, the Labor
Arbiter in the region where the agreement was reached may issue a writ of
execution requiring a sheriff of the Commission or the courts to enforce the terms
of the agreement.
Section 5. Grounds for strike or lockout. - A strike or lockout may be declared in
cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Violations of collective
bargaining agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its
economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be
strikeable. No strike or lockout may be declared on grounds involving interunion
and intra-union disputes without first having filed a notice of strike or lockout or
without the necessary strike or lockout vote having been obtained and reported to
the Board.
Neither will a strike be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
Section 6. Who may declare a strike or lockout. - Any certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases of bargaining deadlocks and
unfair labor practices. The employer may declare a lockout in the same cases. In the
absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate
labor organization in the establishment may declare a strike but only on grounds of
unfair labor practices.
Section 7. Notice of strike or lockout. - In bargaining deadlocks, a notice of strike or
lockout shall be filed with the regional branch of the Board at least thirty (30) days
before the intended date thereof, a copy of said notice having been served on the
39 | P a g e
other party concerned. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be
fifteen (15) days.
However, in case of unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment
of any union officer duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-
laws which may constitute union-busting where the existence of the union is
threatened, the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately after the strike vote is conducted and the results thereof
submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the Board.
Section 8. Contents of notice. - The notice shall state, among others, the names and
addresses of the employer and the union involved, the nature of the industry to
which the employer belongs, the number of union members and of the workers in
the bargaining unit, and such other relevant data as may facilitate the settlement of
the dispute, such as a brief statement or enumeration of all pending labor disputes
involving the same parties.
In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state
the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the
written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the
proof of a request for conference to settle the differences. In cases of unfair labor
practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of and the
efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.
In case a notice does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing
section/s, the regional branch of the Board shall inform the concerned party of such
fact.
Section 9. Action on Notice. - Upon receipt of the notice, the regional branch of the
Board shall exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to
settle the dispute amicably. The regional branch of the Board may, upon agreement
of the parties, treat a notice as a preventive mediation case.
It shall also encourage the parties to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration.
During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or
impede the early settlement of the dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty
to bargain collectively in good faith and to participate fully and promptly in the
conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the Board.
A notice, upon agreement of the parties, may be referred to alternative modes of
dispute resolution, including voluntary arbitration.
Section 10. Strike or lockout vote. - A decision to declare a strike must be approved
by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned
obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for the purpose. A
decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of
Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners in a
partnership obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose.
The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon request of any
affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the
union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and the notice
of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours
before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days
before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in
this Rule.
Section 11. Declaration of strike or lockout. – Should the dispute remain unsettled
after the lapse of the requisite number of days from the filing of the notice of strike
or lockout and of the results of the election required in the preceding section, the
labor union may strike or the employer may lock out its workers. The regional
branch of the Board shall continue mediating and conciliating.
Section 12. Improved offer balloting. - In case of a strike, the regional branch of the
Board shall, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, conduct
a referendum by secret balloting on the improved offer of the employer on or
before the 30th day of strike. When at least a majority of the union members vote
to accept the improved offer, the striking workers shall immediately return to work
and the employer shall thereupon re-admit them upon the signing of the
agreement.
In case of a lockout, the regional branch of the Board shall also conduct a
referendum by secret balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before the
30th day of the lockout. When at least a majority of the board of directors or
trustees or the partners holding the controlling interest in the case of partnership
vote to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall immediately return to work and
the employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement.
Section 13. Peaceful picketing. - Workers shall have the right to peaceful picketing.
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises
for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
No person shall obstruct, impede or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion,
threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by workers during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-organization or collective
bargaining or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference. No employer shall
40 | P a g e
use or employ any person to commit such acts nor shall any person be employed
for such purpose.
Section 14. Injunctions. - No court or entity shall enjoin any picketing, strike or
lockout, except as provided in Articles 218 and 263 of the Labor Code.
The Commission shall have the power to issue temporary restraining orders in such
cases but only after due notice and hearing and in accordance with its rules. The
reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated
by the Commission to any Labor Arbiter who shall submit his recommendations to
the Commission for its consideration and resolution.
Any ex parte restraining order issued by the Commission, or its chairman or Vice-
Chairman where the Commission is not in session and as prescribed by its rules,
shall be valid for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days.
 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 (1991)
Facts: Union demanded for the correction of wage distortions pursuant ot the
Wage Rationalization Act. RA 6727 provides that when the application of increases
in wages results in wage distortions and gives rise to a dispute, such dispute shall
first be settled voluntarily between the parties. In case of a deadlock, the dispute
shall be resolved through compulsory arbitration before the NLRC regional branch
having jurisdiction over the workplace. However, EE’s at the bottling plant declared
that they refused to work beyond 8 hours a day, as a means of compelling Company
to correct wage distortion. Company moved to declare the strike/slowdown illegal.
Held: Strike/slowdown was illegal. Statute implicitly excluded strikes, lockouts or
other concerted activities as modes of settlement of issues arising from the
application of wage increases. The legislative intent is that wage distortions are to
be solved by voluntary arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts or other concerted
activities of the employees or management. Sec. 16, Chapter I of Rules
Implementing RA 6727 states that “Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be
a ground for a strike/lockout.” Also, it is prohibited by their CBA. Even if it wasn’t,
slowdown is considered illegal for being a strike on installment plan.
3. Limitations
 BLTB Co. v. NLRC, 212 SCRA 792 (1992)
Facts: After assumption of jurisdiction by SOLE, Union still went on a strike. A return
to work order was issued but some Union members failed to comply therewith.
They were later on dismissed.
Held: The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by
management. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But
precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest
it blow up in the workers' own hands. Any violation of the legal requirements and
strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries affected with
public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it
is supposed to protect. Even war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands
no less observance of the rules, for the benefit of all concerned.
B. Types of Concerted Activities
1. Strike
a) Definition, Nature, Purpose and Scope
Art. 219. (o) Definitions.
(o) "Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
Book V, Rule I, Sec.1 (uu)
(uu) “Strike” refers to any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of a labor or industrial dispute.
 Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting Corporation –
Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms
(BMC-SUPER) v. Court of Appeals, 448 SCRA 642 (2005)
Facts: Union alleges that it could not have staged a strike because the operations at
the Company were temporarily shut down. It insists that it merely protested the
unjustified closing of the Finishing Division by forming a picket in front of the
Company’s compound to urge the re-opening thereof.
Held: A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
41 | P a g e
In this case, there was a temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial
dispute.
Clearly, the petitioner union, its officers, members and supporters staged a strike.
In order for a strike to be valid, the following requirements laid down in paragraphs
(c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code must be complied with: (a) a notice of
strike must be filed; (b) a strike-vote must be taken; and (c) the results of the strike-
vote must be reported to the DOLE. It bears stressing that these requirements are
mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The
evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike vote report is to
reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of
legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law
 Santa. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. CBP, 512 SCRA 437
(2007)
Strike is a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a
result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, the Court
ruled that “the fact that the conventional term ‘strike’ was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the
substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be
controlling.” The term “strike” encompasses not only concerted work stoppages,
but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or
sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer,
usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the
facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the
stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose
of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.
For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites must be observed: (a) a
notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15
days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot
in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of
the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are
mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.
 Alex Q. Naranjo, et al. v. Biomedica Health Care, Inc., 681 SCRA 438
(2012)
Facts: Petitioners absented themselves from work on the day of the Company
President’s birthday. They received texts to return to the company premises but
were barred from entry by the President and told to look for another work.
Petitioners were later on accused of conducting an illegal strike.
Held: Individual absences did not amount to temporary stoppage of work. Even if
there was indeed an illegal strike, none of the employees involved were union
officers. Therefore, they can only be dismissed for commission of illegal acts during
strike which in this case there was none.
b) Rationale for Regulation by Law
 Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 95 (1995)
Facts: A concurrence of several circumstances (portrayal of the union as a
subversive leftist group, death of a union board member at the hands of the
company’s security personnel) led the union to skip work and to picket in front of
the offices of the company’s security agencies. It was only thereafter that they
conducted their strike vote and submitted the results to the NCMB.
Doctrine: Strike was held illegal for being held within the 7-day cooling off period.
The rational for the period is to ensure that the strike rests on rational basis and not
upon emotionality. Observance of the period is necessary for strike validity. The
DOLE uses it to ascertain that such is held with the imprimatur of a majority of
union members. Strike is a last resort and must be resorted to upon a confirmation
of unity amongst union members to ensure the best chances of its success.
c) Effect on Work Relationship
Art. 291. (b) Miscellaneous provisions.
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right
to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and
without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the
employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a
written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford
the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance
of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the
right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a
42 | P a g e
complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall
rest on the employer.
The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment may suspend the
effects of the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima
facie finding by the appropriate official of the Department of Labor and
Employment before whom such dispute is pending that the termination may cause
a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass lay-off.
Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2 (d)
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due
process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the
Labor Code:
i. A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;
ii. A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
iii. A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon
due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify
his termination.
For termination of employment as defined in Article 283 of the Labor Code, the
requirements of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a
written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment at least thirty days before effectivity of the
termination, specifying the ground or grounds for termination.
If the termination is brought about by the completion of a contract of phase
thereof, or by failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in the
case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is
served the employee within a reasonable time from the effective date of
termination.
 Culver B. Suico v. NLRC, GR 163793, 513 SCRA 325 (2007)
Facts: 3 consolidated cases, all dealing with strike that refused to stop despite
return-to-work order by SOLE. Suico and several other employees, all union
members, were dismissed because of alleged illegal actions that resulted in the
injury of other non-striking employees and one PLDT subscriber.
Doctrine: PLDT’s company policies on the illegality of violent acts during strikes
were deemed to have ripened into a source of obligation and in fact supplemented
the provisions of the labor code. However, despite such supplementation, the
procedural requirements for dismissal must still be complied with. Failure to comply
with procedural requirements of dismissal makes the employer liable for damages.
 Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Buklod ng Manggagawa,
sa Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation, 513 SCRA 621 (2007)
Facts: Union went on strike because of alleged ULP. The company had the strike
declared illegal for being attended by unlawful and illegal acts (blocking of gates,
unruly, violent and intimidating behavior). Strike was declared illegal and
participating employees were dismissed.
Doctrine: Strike was illegal for blocking the ingress and egress of the premises.
Union officers who knowingly participated in the strike, as well as union members
who participated in illegal acts may be deemed to have lost their employment.
However, such liability for illegal acts is individual and not collective.
d) Types and Conversion
 Master Iron Labor v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47 (1993)
Facts: Master Iron implemented a “rotational” work schedule then began hiring
outside laborers for jobs usually and regularly performed by union members. One
union member protested and was suspended for insubordination; hence, a strike
was held. Master Iron petitions for declaration of strike’s illegality for being
contrary to “no strike” clause in the CBA.
Doctrine: No strike clause only works to bar strikes held for economic purposes.
Since, the strike was clearly in protest of the company's contracting-out of work, it
is a ULP that cannot be held illegal under the said clause. Likewise, the strikers
believed in good faith that there was ULP, and such presumption of legality prevails
even if subsequently proven to be untrue.
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 1) Unfair Labor Practice
Art. 277. (c) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
(c) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent
may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the
Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified
or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate
labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence
of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the
union may take action immediately.
 Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell
Company of the Philippines, supra
2) Bargaining Deadlock: Economic/ULP
Art. 277 (c) (see page 44)
 Consolidated Labor Association of the Phils. V. Marsman and Co., 11
SCRA 589 (1964)
Facts: Strike because of CB deadlock on economic benefits. Employees eventually
returned to work upon learning that the union accepted the company’s offer of
economic benefits. However, some employees were denied entry under the
condition that they withdraw from the Union. Union revived their strike
Doctrine: Deadlock on economic benefits is a valid ground for economic strike.
When the company started discriminating based on union membership, the strike
turned into a ULP strike. No backwages may be awarded during an economic strike
because of “no work, no pay”.
3) Non-Conversion: Strike to Lockout
 Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant v. Court of Appeals, 495 SCRA 336
(2006)
Facts: PLAC (Union) filed their first notice of strike and submitted their strike vote
results but held a wildcat strike thereafter. They refilled a second notice of strike to
convert it to a sit-down strike, then into an actual strike. They claim that they
complied with the requirements based on their previously filed notice.
Doctrine: Strike is illegal. It failed to comply with the necessary requirements
according to Art. 264, and was also held pending voluntary arbitration. Dismissals of
employees during VA are not enough grounds to stage wildcat strike. The strike was
likewise attended by numerous unlawful acts.
e) Grounds
Book V, Rule XXI, Section 5. Grounds for strike or lockout.
A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair
labor practices. Violations of collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions, shall not be
considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout
may be declared on grounds involving interunion and intra-union disputes without
first having filed a notice of strike or lockout or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote having been obtained and reported to the Board.
Neither will a strike be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
1) Allowable Strikes
Art. 277 (c) (see page 44)
2) Prohibited Strikes
(2.1) Assumption of Jurisdiction
Art. 277. (b) (g) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of
legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout,
consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected.
However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on
grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
44 | P a g e
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return-to-work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same.
Art. 278. (a) Prohibited activities.
(a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike.
 Bilflex Phils. Inc. Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Filflex Industrial and
Manufacturing Corporation and Biflex (Phils.), Inc., 511 SCRA 247
(2006)
Facts: members of the union joined in a “welga ng bayan” to protests the rise on
gasoline prices. They found themselves terminated and prevented from entering
the premises upon returning to work.
Doctrine: Joining a “welga ng bayan” is akin to a general strike or a sympathy strike,
hence, the need for the strike requirements. Though it may be an exercise of
freedom of expression, such is not absolute.
(2.2) Intra-Union Dispute
Book V, Rule XI, Section 1. Coverage.
A. Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:
(a) conduct, or nullification of election of officers of unions and workers’
association;
(b) audit/accounts examination of union or workers’ association funds;
(c) deregistration of collective bargaining agreements;
(d) validity/invalidity of union affiliation or disaffiliation
(e) validity/invalidity of acceptance/non-acceptance for union membership;
(f) validity/invalidity of voluntary recognition;
(g) opposition to application for union of CBA registration;
(h) violations of or disagreements over any provision of the constitution and by-
laws of a union or workers’ association;
(i) disagreements over chartering or registration of labor organizations or the
registration of collective bargaining agreements;
(j) violations of the rights and conditions of membership in a union or workers’
association;
(k) violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements;
(l) validity/invalidity of impeachment/expulsion/suspension or any disciplinary
action meted against any officer and member, including those arising from non-
compliance with the reportorial requirements under Rule V;
(m) such other disputes or conflicts involving the rights to self-organization, union
membership and collective bargaining;
(1) between and among legitimate labor organizations; and
(2) between and among members of a union or workers’ association.
B. Other labor relations disputes, not otherwise covered by Article 217 of the Labor
Code, shall include:
(a) any conflict between:
45 | P a g e
 (1) a labor union and the employer; or
(2) a labor union and a group that is not a labor organization; or
(3) a labor union and an individual who is not a member of such union;
(b) cancellation of registration of unions and workers associations filed by
individual/s other than its members, or group that is not a labor organization; and
(c) a petition for interpleader involving labor relations.
Book V, Rule XI, Section 2. Effects of the filing/pendency of inter/intra-union and other
related labor relations disputes.
The rights, relationships and obligations of the parties litigants against each other
and other parties-in-interest prior to the institution of the petition shall continue to
remain during the pendency of the petition and until the date of finality of the
decision rendered therein. Thereafter, the rights, relationships and obligations of
the parties litigants against each other and other parties-in-interest shall be
governed by the decision so ordered.
The filing or pendency of any inter/intra-union dispute and other related labor
relations dispute is not a prejudicial question to any petition for certification
election and shall not be a ground for the dismissal of a petition for certification
election of suspension of proceedings for certification election.
 Employees Union of Bayer Phil., et al. v. Bayer Phili., Inc., 636 SCRA
473 (2010)
Facts: Internal dispute between union members led to difficulties in negotiations
for wage increases. Union membership was divided into two factions, with each
filing ULP complaints for the company’s inaction with regard to their CB proposals.
In the meantime, the Company concluded a CBA with one of the factions.
Doctrine: The NLRC cannot take cognizance of the legality of the actions of the
union leaders, it being a purely intra-union dispute. As such, the dispute is within
the jurisdiction of VA. They can, however, take cognizance of the ULP of the
company in utterly disregarding the existing CBA with the SEBA in concluding a new
CBA with one of the factions.
(2.3) No Strike Clause
 Panay Electric co., Inc. v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 688 (1995)
Facts: An employee was dismissed for insubordination in refusing a
recommendation to be a “Report Clerk”. The Union claims that the dismissal was
because of the company’s suspicion that the employee was the writer of the “red
column” in the union publication. They then held a strike, despite the no strike
clause, claiming that they believed in good faith that the company had committed
ULP.
Doctrine: While the no strike clause only bars economic strikes and not ULP strikes,
the one held in this case cannot be held to have been done in good faith because
there was sufficient time to bring the dismissal to the grievance machinery. The
Union failed to substantiate its claims of ULP.
 Malayang Samahan ng Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG-UWP) v.
Ramos, 357 SCRA 77 (2000) (Supra)
f) Striking Party
Art. 277. (b) (c) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
b. Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of
legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout,
consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected.
However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on
grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.
c. In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent
may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the
Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified
or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate
labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence
of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the
union may take action immediately.
46 | P a g e
Book V Rule XXII Sec. 6. Who may declare a strike or lockout.
Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in
cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. The employer may declare
a lockout in the same cases. In the absence of a certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in the establishment
may declare a strike but only on grounds of unfair labor practices.
g) Procedural Requirements
Book V. Rule XXII, Section 5. Grounds for strike or lockout
A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair
labor practices. Violations of collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions, shall not be
considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout
may be declared on grounds involving interunion and intra-union disputes without
first having filed a notice of strike or lockout or without the necessary strike or
lockout vote having been obtained and reported to the Board.
Neither will a strike be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
Book V. Rule XXII, Section 6. Who may declare a strike or lockout.
Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in
cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. The employer may declare
a lockout in the same cases. In the absence of a certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in the establishment
may declare a strike but only on grounds of unfair labor practices.
Book V. Rule XXII, Section 7. Notice of strike or lockout.
In bargaining deadlocks, a notice of strike or lockout shall be filed with the regional
branch of the Board at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof, a
copy of said notice having been served on the other party concerned. In cases of
unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be fifteen (15) days.
However, in case of unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment
of any union officer duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-
laws which may constitute union-busting where the existence of the union is
threatened, the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately after the strike vote is conducted and the results thereof
submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the Board.
Book V. Rule XXII, Section 8. Contents of notice.
The notice shall state, among others, the names and addresses of the employer and
the union involved, the nature of the industry to which the employer belongs, the
number of union members and of the workers in the bargaining unit, and such
other relevant data as may facilitate the settlement of the dispute, such as a brief
statement or enumeration of all pending labor disputes involving the same parties.
In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state
the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the
written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the
proof of a request for conference to settle the differences. In cases of unfair labor
practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of and the
efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.
In case a notice does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing
section/s, the regional branch of the Board shall inform the concerned party of such
fact.
Book V. Rule XXII, Section 9. Action on Notice.
Upon receipt of the notice, the regional branch of the Board shall exert all efforts at
mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably. The
regional branch of the Board may, upon agreement of the parties, treat a notice as
a preventive mediation case.
It shall also encourage the parties to submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration.
During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or
impede the early settlement of the dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty
to bargain collectively in good faith and to participate fully and promptly in the
conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the Board.
A notice, upon agreement of the parties, may be referred to alternative modes of
dispute resolution, including voluntary arbitration.
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Book V. Rule XXII, Section 10. Strike or lockout vote.
A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings
or referenda called for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be
approved by a majority of the Board of Directors of the employer, corporation or
association or the partners in a partnership obtained by a secret ballot in a meeting
called for the purpose.
The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon request of any
affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the
union or the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and the notice
of meetings referred to in the preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours
before such meetings as well as the results of the voting at least seven (7) days
before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period provided in
this Rule.
Book V. Rule XXII, Section 11. Declaration of strike or lockout.
Should the dispute remain unsettled after the lapse of the requisite number of days
from the filing of the notice of strike or lockout and of the results of the election
required in the preceding section, the labor union may strike or the employer may
lock out its workers. The regional branch of the Board shall continue mediating and
conciliating.
1) Effort to Bargain
Art. 278. (a) Prohibited activities.
a. No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike.
Art. 260. Procedure in collective bargaining.
The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:
a. When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice;
b. Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may
request for a conference which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days
from the date of request.
c. If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or
both parties or at its own initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation
meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to
participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call;
d. During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from
doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes;
and
e. The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the
parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator.
Art. 261. Duty to bargain collectively in the absence of collective bargaining
agreements.
In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary arrangement providing for a
more expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be the duty of employer
and the representatives of the employees to bargain collectively in accordance with
the provisions of this Code.
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Art. 262. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.
The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms
and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or
questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating
such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any
party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
2) Filing of Notice of Intention
Art. 277. (c) (d) (e) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
c. In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent
may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the
Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified
or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate
labor organization in behalf of its members.
However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union
busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off
period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
d. The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations
as the Minister of Labor and Employment may promulgate.
e. During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Ministry to exert all
efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the
dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the
mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may
declare a lockout.
Art. 278 (a) (see page 48)
Book V. Rule XXII, Section 7. Notice of strike or lockout.
In bargaining deadlocks, a notice of strike or lockout shall be filed with the regional
branch of the Board at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof, a
copy of said notice having been served on the other party concerned. In cases of
unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be fifteen (15) days.
However, in case of unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment
of any union officer duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-
laws which may constitute union-busting where the existence of the union is
threatened, the fifteen-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may
take action immediately after the strike vote is conducted and the results thereof
submitted to the appropriate regional branch of the Board.
3) Observance of Cooling-Off Periods
Art. 277 (c) (e) (see page 49)
4) Strike Vote
Art. 277. (f) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
f. A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings
or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be
approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association
or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for
that purpose.
The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the
same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken.
The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party,
supervise the conduct of the secret balloting.
In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the
voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the
cooling-off period herein provided.
Art. 278 (a) (see page 48)
 Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant v. Court of Appeals, supra
 National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied
Industries-Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. NLRC, 570 SCRA 598 (2008)
Facts: After notice of strike was filed, and the strike vote was conducted, the
employees of Manila Pavillion Hotel came to work with shaved heads. They were
49 | P a g e
prevented from entering the premises for violating the Hotel’s grooming standards.
The employees held a picket in response
Doctrine: Deliberate and concerted act of shaving their heads was a willful violation
of the Hotel’s grooming policy was considered a strike because it resulted in a
deliberate stoppage of work. Also, the strike failed to comply with the 30-day
cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban.
h) Test of Legality
1) Legal Strike
(1.1) Purpose and Means Test
 Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 365 (1991)
Facts: Reliance Surety changed the seating arrangements of its office employees to
decrease work inefficiency, leading the latter to file ULP for union discrimination.
Reliance dismissed the employees after refusal to comply. Union members went on
strike, barricading the entrances and exits.
Doctrine: Rearrangement of seats is a valid management prerogative. The strike
failed to satisfy the strike requirements (defective strike) and was also attended by
illegal activities (illegal strike).
 San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC, 403 SCRA 418 (2003)
Facts: SMC Union submitted notice of strike with NCMB upon which the latter
ordered preventive mediation. Union proceeded with strike vote and wanted to
push through with the strike despite repeatedly being reminded of the order.
Company petitioned for issuance of injunction but was denied after reaching an
agreement with the union to end hostilities.
Doctrine: The strike was illegal for being held without notice since the NCMB order
for preventive mediation was an effective dismissal of the previously filed notice of
strike. Injunction should have been issued by the NLRC because of the existing
threat of revival of the strike, as could be seen from circulation union pamphlets
stating: “ipaalala sa management na hindi iaatras and ating notice of strike at
anumang oras ay puwede nating itirik muli and picket line”.
(1.2) Guidelines and Balancing of Interest
 Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Company of the Philippines, supra
 Stamford Marketing Corporation v. Josephine Julian, 423 SCRA 633
(2004)
Facts: Julian’s union sent the company a letter seeking recognition as SEBA, when it
had not yet registered with the BLR. Julian was dismissed upon receipt of the letter,
while several others were dismissed pursuant to the strike held because of her
dismissal.
Doctrine: The dismissal of officers held to be ineffectual for not complying with the
requirements of procedural due process, but was not ULP because the strike was
still illegal for being without notice. However, nothing in Art 264 authorizes
immediate dismissal of officers without notice; Officers to be paid backwages. No
proof of the dismissals intending to prohibit union membership, therefore, no ULP.
(1.3) Defenses: Good Faith
 Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC, supra
 National Union of Workers Hotels, Restaurant and Allied Industries v.
NLRC, 287 SCRA 192 (1998)
Facts: “Junta” faction of NUWHRAIN conducted impeachment proceedings of its
officers and elected new ones. When the national office of NUWHRAIN refused to
recognize their new officers, they filed a notice of strike for interference. NCMB
dismissed the notice for being a non-strikeable issue (intra-union). Junta held a
wildcat strike when one of its new officers was suspended.
Doctrine: The general rule is that strikes held for non-strikeable grounds are illegal,
unless it can be shown that the union believed, in good faith, that ULP was
committed. However, such belief in good faith must be substantiated by the
circumstances and not merely alleged. Junta’s refusal to abide by NCMB’s
prohibition of the strike is evident bad faith on their part.
2) Illegal Strike
(2.1) Basis of Illegality
Arts. 277 (b) (c) (see page 46)
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Art. 278 (a) (see page 48)
Art. 279. Improved offer balloting.
In an effort to settle a strike, the Department of Labor and Employment shall
conduct a referendum by secret ballot on the improved offer of the employer on or
before the 30th day of the strike.
When at least a majority of the union members vote to accept the improved offer
the striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement.
In case of a lockout, the Department of Labor and Employment shall also conduct a
referendum by secret balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before the
30th day of the lockout.
When at least a majority of the board of directors or trustees or the partners
holding the controlling interest in the case of a partnership vote to accept the
reduced offer, the workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement.
 Toyota Motors Philippines Workers Association v. NLRC, 537 SCRA 171
(2007)
Facts: The union filed a notice of strike because the company refused to recognize
them as SEBA, despite their winning the certification election. Hearings were held in
the BLR to determine the union’s representation status but the company prohibited
the union members from attending. Union members held mass actions in front of
the BLR office and were subsequently dismissed for illegal strike.
Doctrine: Participation in the mass action was an illegal strike. It was a temporary
stoppage of work arising from a labor dispute that lacked the needed requisites,
and was attended by unlawful acts (blocking free ingress/egress). Union cannot
claim similarity with mass actions held in Phil. Blooming Mills because the activities
in the latter were not spurred by a labor dispute. The strike also violated the
company’s code of conduct, the penalty for which is dismissal.
6 types of illegal strikes:
1. Contrary to prohibition by law
2. Violates specific requirements of the law
3. When declared for unlawful purposes
4. Employment of unlawful means
5. In violation of an existing injunction or prohibition
6. Contrary to an existing agreement.
 A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation,
596 SCRA 189 (2009)
Facts: The company suspended 8 of its mechanics for allegedly violating the no
strike clause when they refused to render overtime work (1st strike). The union
filed a notice of strike and held it (2nd strike) when no settlement was reached.
NLRC held illegality of strikes until reversed by CA.
Doctrine: The first strike (refusal to render OT) was a temporary stoppage of work
in violation of the no strike clause; therefore, illegal because it was a non-strikeable
ground. The second strike was legal at the onset for complying with the requisites,
but became illegal because of unlawful acts (violence and intimidation).
Intermittence of the violence does not lessen the illegality of the strike.
 Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Coop v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng
LGS, et al., 659 SCRA 768 (2011)
Facts: Union filed notice and conducted strike vote despite only becoming
registered the day after the vote. Strike was staged and was attended by illegal acts.
Doctrine: Strike was illegal because the union had not yet acquired legal personality
when it filed the notice and held the strike vote. Only legitimate labor organizations
may validly file notices of strike and hold strike votes. Prohibitied acts were likewise
committed (ingress/egress).
(2.2) Illegal Acts/Prohibited Activities
Art. 270. Employer as Bystander.
In all cases, whether the petition for certification election is filed by an employer or
a legitimate labor organization, the employer shall not be considered a party
thereto with a concomitant right to oppose a petition for certification election. The
employer's participation in such proceedings shall be limited to: (1) being notified
or informed of petitions of such nature; and (2) submitting the list of employees
during the pre-election conference should the Med-Arbiter act favorably on the
petition.
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 Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph Internatioal v.
Secretary of DOLE, et al., 623 SCRA 185 (2010)
Facts: A strike was held in response to a notice of lockout (because of slowdown),
but was enjoined by SOLE’s AJ and RTWO. The company refused to take back
several union officers and shop stewards pending preventive mediation
proceedings regarding the unlawful acts by the officers, their refusal to abide by the
RTWO, and the illegal slowdown.
Doctrine: All three acts done by the union officers were unlawful acts, namely: the
work slowdown without filing notice of strike beforehand; the blocking of
ingress/egress during the strike; and their refusal to end the strike despite the
SOLE’s assumption of jurisdiction and issuance of two RTWO’s. The company need
not allege unlawful acts for them to dismiss on those grounds.
 C. Alcantara & Sons, INc. v. Court of Appeals, Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa Alsons-SPFL (NAMAAL-SPFC), et al., 668 SCRA 136 (2011)
Facts: Strike by the union was held to be illegal for violating the no strike/no lock
out provision of the CBA, resulting in the dismissal of both union officers and
members. The courts vacillated on WON to pay the union members back wages
and/or separation pay.
Doctrine: The LA’s order of reinstatement is immediately executory, even pending
appeal. Union members must be paid their wages from the time they were ordered
reinstated by the LA, but the company failed to do so. These are not necessarily
back wages, but are liabilities for failure to exercise options of reinstatement. No
separation pay when dismissed for participating in illegal strikes.
(2.3) Effect of Illegality; Liabilities of Participating
Officer/Member
Art. 278 (a) (see page 48)
 Phimco Industires, INc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA),
et al., 628 SCRA 119 (2020)
Facts: A strike was held and subsequently enjoined by ex parte TRO, upon a finding
by the NLRC that the union members had blocked the free ingress and egress of the
company premises.
Doctrine: While the strike validly complied with the strike requirements, the
subsequent unlawful act of blocking free ingress to and egress from the company
premises rendered it illegal. The officers stand to be dismissed pursuant to Art
264a, par. 3 for knowingly participating in an illegal strike. The members on the
other hand will only be dismissed upon particular identification of having
participated in illegal activities.
 Solidbank Corporation v. Solidbank Union, 634 SCRA 554 (2010)
Facts: CBA negotiations reached a deadlock. Union filed a Notice of Strike. SOLE
assumed jurisdiction. Union performed “mass leaves”, “protest actions” and pickets
at DOLE and other offices of the company. 199 of 712 defied the return to work
order.
Issues: What is the liability of the officers and members? What are the appropriate
damages?
Ratio: Union officer may be terminated for knowingly participating in an illegal
strike. A union member may be terminated for knowingly participating in the
commission of an illegal act. ON BACKWAGES, “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s
labor”, UNLESS, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally
locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working.
But for this to apply, strike must be legal. ON SEPARATION PAY, since union
members are entitled to reinstatement and did not perform any prohibited act,
they are entitled to separation pay.
i) Employment of Strike Breakers
Art. 278. (c) Prohibited activities.
c. No employer shall use or employ any strike-breaker, nor shall any person be
employed as a strike-breaker.
Art. 219. (r) Definitions.
r."Strike-breaker" means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with by
force, violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation any peaceful picketing affecting
wages, hours or conditions of work or in the exercise of the right of self-
organization or collective bargaining.
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 j) Improved Offer Balloting and Strikes
Art. 279. (see page 51)
Book V, Rule XXII, Section 12. Improved offer balloting.
In case of a strike, the regional branch of the Board shall, at its own initiative or
upon the request of any affected party, conduct a referendum by secret balloting
on the improved offer of the employer on or before the 30th day of strike. When at
least a majority of the union members vote to accept the improved offer, the
striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon
re-admit them upon the signing of the agreement.
In case of a lockout, the regional branch of the Board shall also conduct a
referendum by secret balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before the
30th day of the lockout. When at least a majority of the board of directors or
trustees or the partners holding the controlling interest in the case of partnership
vote to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall immediately return to work and
the employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement.
2. Picketing
Book V, Rule XXII, Section 13. Peaceful picketing.
Workers shall have the right to peaceful picketing. No person engaged in picketing
shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free
ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct
public thoroughfares.
No person shall obstruct, impede or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion,
threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by workers during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-organization or collective
bargaining or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference.
No employer shall use or employ any person to commit such acts nor shall any
person be employed for such purpose.
a) Definition, Nature, Purpose of Picket Line
 Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association v. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., supra
Facts: SUPRA
Issue: What is the nature of a picket line?
Ratio: “The picket line is an explosive front, charged with emotions and
fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be marked by
colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the
pickets and those who pass the line.” Regarding the fist fight, “[t]he picket
line being the natural result of the respondent’s unfair labor practice,
Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to
reinstatement.”
 Santa Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers,
Phil., supra
Facts: SUPRA
Issue: What is the definition and purpose of a picket?
Ratio: “Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of
the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other
signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a
labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to
observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a
means of peaceable persuasion.”
b) Picketing and Libel Laws
 Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Philnabank Employees
Association, 105 SCRA 314 (1981)
Facts: Union picketed PNB with placards and signboards with statement “PCIB BAD
ACCOUNTS TRANDFERRED TO PNB-NIDC?” PCIB filed a libel case against the union.
Issues: WON picket and signs constitute libel. / NO.
Ratio: Peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the
Constitution. Labor disputes give rise to strong emotional response. Therefore, it is
far from likely that the language employed would be both courteous and polite.
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 c) Curtailment
 Nagkaisang Manggagawa sa Cuizon Hotel v. Libron, 124 SCRA 448
(1983)
Facts: This case arose from a clarificatory order of respondent labor arbiter that
stated “[t]he consequences resulting from the declaration of a strike as illegal
carries with it sanctions on the immediate incidents thereto such as picketing X X
X.”
Issue: WON picketing is illegal per se. / NO.
Ratio: Peaceful picketing is embraced in freedom of expression. PD 849 accorded
picketing due recognition. It is to be understood that the peaceful picketing
authorized cannot countenance acts of illegality.
d) Regulation/Restrictions, Innocent Third Party Rule and Liabilities
 Liwayway Publishing Co., Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union,
108 SCRA 161 (1981)
Facts: Union is picketing Permanent Conrete. Liwayway is a sublessee of an
adjacent bodega but is separate and distinct company engaged in a completely
different business. Union prevented Liwayway from getting supplies from its
bodega. Liwayway filed this case.
Issue: WON the appellee is a third party or an "innocent bystander" whose right has
been invaded.
Ratio: If peacefully carried out, picketing cannot be curtailed even in the absence of
employer-employee relationship. However, the right may be regulated at the
instance of third parties or "innocent-bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable
result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they
have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or
constitute an invasion of their rights.
e) Prohibited Activities; Peaceful Picketing
Art. 278. (b) Prohibited activities.
b. No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion,
threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor
controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-organization or collective
bargaining, or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference.
Book V, Rule XXII, Section 13. (see page 53)
3. Slowdown
 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC, supra
Facts: SUPRA
Issue: WON the slowdown is a strike. / YES.
Ratio: The Court is in substantial agreement with the petitioner's concept of
a slowdown as a "strike on the installment plan"; as a wilfull reduction in
the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the purpose of
restricting the output of the employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an
activity by which workers, without a complete stoppage of work, retard
production or their performance of duties and functions to compel
management to grant their demands. The Court also agrees that such a
slowdown is generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable,
because while the employees "continue to work and remain at their
positions and accept the wages paid to them," they at the same time
"select what part of their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own
volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the employer's damage, to do other
work;" in other words, they "work on their own terms”.
C. Assumption of Jurisdiction/Compulsory Arbitration
1. Definition; Nature of Dispute for Compulsory Arbitration
Art. 277. (g) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
g. When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-to work
54 | P a g e
and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance
of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as
with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
In line with the national concern for and the highest respect accorded to the right of
patients to life and health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar
medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all serious
efforts, not only by labor and management but government as well, be exhausted
to substantially minimize, if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and
health, through the exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and
by management to lockout. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued
operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the
striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal
workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services
shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and
adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most especially
emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout.
In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately
assume, within twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a
strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration.
For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such
orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action,
including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out
employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal
prosecution against either or both of them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be
precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to
the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction
over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.
Issue: WON assumption of jurisdiction is proper. / NO.
Ratio: Production and publication of telephone directories can scarcely be
described as an industry affecting national interest. The expected income tax to be
received by the Government is not enough to constitute national interest to justify
an assumption of jurisdiction. Its services cannot be deemed to be in the same
category of such essential activities as "the generation or distribution of energy" or
those undertaken by "banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries." It cannot
be regarded as playing as vital a role in communication as other mass media.
2. Rationale
 University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor, supra
Facts: During CBA negotiations, the issue of the inclusion exclusion of
certain positions in the collective bargaining unit was unresolved. Pending
the motion for reconsideration filed by the union with the panel of
voluntary arbiters, the union filed a Notice of Strike. SOLE assumed
jurisdiction.
Issue: WON SOLE exceeded her jurisdiction in the assumption of jurisdiction
and subsequent order of reinstatement of employees excluded by the panel
of VA. / NO.
Ratio: One of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment
of the national interest. The main reason or rationale for the exercise of the
SOLE’s power is the maintenance and upholding of the status quo while the
dispute is being adjudicated.

 GTE Directories Corp. v. GTE Directories Corp. Employees Union, 197

SCRA 452 (1991)
Facts: Company implemented new Sales Evaluation and Production Policy. Union
filed a Notice of Strike. Assumption of Jurisdiction based on national interest in the
income tax paid by the company (P 10 M)
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 3. Process Initiation/Initiating Party
Art. 277 (g) (see page 54)
a) Secretary of Labor
b) President
4. Arbitration Agencies
 Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Phils., Inc., supra
Facts: A deadlock was reached over the ground rules of the negotiations
due to the issue of the retirement plan and other one-time gratuities. Union
filed a Notice of Strike. Company requested SOLE to assume jurisdiction.
SOLE assumed jurisdiction and requested parties to submit pleadings
regarding various issues not included in the Notice of Strike.
Issue: WON SOLE exceeded authority in tackling issues of the CBA in the AJ.
/ NO.
Ratio: This Court maintains its original position in the Decision that, based
on the Notices of Strike filed by UFE-DFA-KMU, the Secretary of the DOLE
rightly decided on matters of substance. That the union later on changed its
mind is of no moment because to give premium to such would make the
legally mandated discretionary power of the SOLE subservient to the whims
of the parties.
5. Effect of Assumption/Certification Order
Art. 277 (g) (see page 54)
 Manila Hotel Employees Association and its Members v. Manila Hotel
Corp., 517 SCRA 349 (2007)
Facts: Union filed a Notice of Strike. SOLE certified case for compulsory arbitration
and enjoined any strike or lockout. Union held a strike. A copy of the order was
served on the picket lines. Union filed a Motion to Set Aside Order and a Motion for
Reconsideration. Union alleged that NLRC had no jurisdiction because of the
motions.
Issue: WON Motions divested NLRC with jurisdiction. / NO.
Ratio: A return-to-work order is immediately executory even if a motion for
reconsideration was filed. Defiance of the AJ order is considered an illegal act.
 YSS Employees Union – Philippine Transport & General Workers
Organization v. YSS Laboratories, Inc., 607 SCRA 187 (2009)
Facts: Company retrenched 11 employees, 9 of which are union officers and
members. Union held a strike. SOLE certified for compulsory arbitration and issued
a return-to-work order. Company refused to accept retrenched employees.
Issue: WON company may refuse to accept retrenched employees after AJ. / NO.
Ratio: Since the strike was specifically because of the retrenchment, the company
may not refuse to accept the said employees. All striking employees are covered
under the status quo ante order. They must return to work and the company must
accept them under the same status before the strike.
6. Awards and Orders
Art. 277. (i) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
i. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary
arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute, as the case may be. The decision of
the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the
voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt
thereof by the parties.
Art. 291. (i) Miscellaneous provisions.
i. To ensure speedy labor justice, the periods provided in this Code within which
decisions or resolutions of labor relations cases or matters should be rendered shall
be mandatory. For this purpose, a case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required
by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself, or the Labor Arbiter, or
the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations or Med-Arbiter, or the Regional
Director.
Upon expiration of the corresponding period, a certification stating why a decision
or resolution has not been rendered within the said period shall be issued forthwith
by the Chairman of the Commission, the Executive Labor Arbiter, or the Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations or Med Arbiter, or the Regional Director, as the case
may be, and a copy thereof served upon the parties.
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Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the aforesaid officials
shall, without prejudice to any liability which may have been incurred as a
consequence thereof, see to it that the case or matter shall be decided or resolved
without any further delay.
 LMG Chemicals Corp. v. Sec. of Labor and Employment, 356 SCRA 577
(2001)
Facts: CBA negotiations reached a deadlock on wage increases. Union held a strike.
Company presented an improved offer of P 135/day for 3 years. Assumption of
jurisdiction awarded P140/day based on the improved offer of the company and
claim of loss in one department only.
Issue: WON SOLE’s award was issued with grave abuse of discretion. / NO.
Ratio: Grave abuse of discretion means a whimsical and capricious exercise of
power. Since the SOLE had substantial basis on its award, the order was not issued
with grave abuse of discretion. Since the losses were reported to be from one
division only, the SC stated that “the loss in one is usually offset by the gains in the
others.” Furthermore, since the company made an improved offer of P135/day for
3 years and recent increases granted to supervisory employees, the decision of the
SOLE has sufficient basis.
7. Option – Voluntary Arbitration After Certification
Art. 277. (h) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
h. Before or at any stage of the compulsory arbitration process, the parties may opt
to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.
8. Compulsory Arbitration and Labor Rights
 Philread Workers Union (PTWU), et al. v. Confessor, 296 SCRA 393
(1997)
Facts: Union filed a Notice of Strike. Company subsequently filed a Notice of
Lockout for illegal work slowdowns. SOLE assumed jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the assumption of jurisdiction impeded the right to strike. / NO.
Ratio: The assumption of jurisdiction clearly does not interfere with the workers’
right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national
interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute.
They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised
arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be
protected and not one of them is given undue preference.
D. Role of Peace Officers During Strikes and Picketing
1. Escorting
Art. 278. (d) Prohibited activities.
d. No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police, or armed person,
shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any individual who seeks to
replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place
of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the picket lines unless actual
violence or other criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall be
interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure necessary to
maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and
legal order.
2. Arrest and Detention of Law Violators
Art. 280. Requirement for arrest and detention.
Except on grounds of national security and public peace or in case of commission of
a crime, no union members or union organizers may be arrested or detained for
union activities without previous consultations with the Secretary of Labor.
X. EMPLOYER LOCKOUT
A. Basis, Definition, Limitation
Art. 277. (b) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
b. Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of
legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout,
consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected.
However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on
grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes.
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Art. 219. (p) Definitions. Art. 277. (g) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
p. "Lockout" means any temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a g. When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
result of an industrial or labor dispute. strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Book V, Rule I, Sec. 1 (gg) Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
(gg) "Lockout" refers to the temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
result of a labor or industrial dispute. certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-to work
B. Effect on Work Relationship and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
Art. 219 (p) (see page 58) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance
of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as
C. Lockouting Party with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.

Art. 277 (b) (see page 57)
Art. 277. (c) Strikes, picketing and lockouts.
c. In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent
may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the
Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified
or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate
labor organization in behalf of its members.
However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union
busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off
period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
D. Ground for Lockout
Art. 277 (c) (see page 58)
E. Prohibited Lockout
Art. 277 (b) (see page 57)
In line with the national concern for and the highest respect accorded to the right of
patients to life and health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar
medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all serious
efforts, not only by labor and management but government as well, be exhausted
to substantially minimize, if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and
health, through the exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and
by management to lockout. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued
operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the
striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal
workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services
shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and
adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most especially
emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout.
In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately
assume, within twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a
strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration.
For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such
orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action,
including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out
employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal
prosecution against either or both of them.

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The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be
precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to
the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction
over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same.
Art. 278. (a) Prohibited activities.
a. No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike.
F. Procedural Requirements
Art. 278 (a) (see page 59)
Art. 278. (d) (e) Prohibited activities.
d. No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police, or armed person,
shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any individual who seeks to
replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place
of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the picket lines unless actual
violence or other criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall be
interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure necessary to
maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and
legal order.
e. No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises
for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
Book V, Rule XXI (see page 39)
 Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 805 (1993)
Facts: Union filed a Notice of Strike. Company filed a Notice of Lockout. Union
picketed and gave away flyers claiming the products of the company had defects.
SOLE certified for compulsory arbitration with a return-to-work order. Company
issued a call back of striking employees but refused to accept the 36 union officers.
In proceedings, union officers agreed to accept financial concessions to suspend the
return-to-work order. Union officers were still awarded backwages from call back
until agreement to financial concessions.
Issue: WON backwages are proper. / YES.
Ratio: Since a return-to-work order was issued, the company was required to
accept the striking employees under the same status as before the strike. Since the
company refused to accept the union officers, the company is liable for backwages
from the date of the call back, regardless of whether or not the strike was legal.
Since the union officers accepted the financial concessions, the computation of
backwages are until said agreement only.
G. Effect of Illegal Lockout
Art. 278. (a) par. 3. Prohibited activities
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike.
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 XI. LABOR INJUNCTION
A. Definition and Nature
 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672 (1998)
Facts: Private respondents were dismissed for violations of the Code of Discipline
based on claims of being involved in currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Private
respondents filed for a writ of temporary injunction with the NLRC.
Issue: WON NLRC had jurisdiction to issue a writ of temporary injunction. / NO.
Ratio: “An injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one’s
substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.” For an injunction to issue, it is
necessary that 1) the complaint alleges facts which appear sufficient to constitute a
proper basis for injunction and 2) that on the entire showing from the contending
parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the
plaintiff pending the litigation. It is a special equitable relief granted only in case
where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. Since the issue of
illegal dismissal could have been filed with the LA, the NLRC exceeded its
jurisdiction.
B. General Rule: Prohibition
Art. 265. Injunction prohibited.
No temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or
growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as
otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.
Art. 225. (e) Powers of the Commission.
The Commission shall have the power and authority:
e. To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited
or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor
dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after
hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in
support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in
opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the Commission, to
the effect:
1. That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except
against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or
committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the
same after actual knowledge thereof;
2. That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow;
3. That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon
complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting of relief;
4. That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
5. That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property
are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in
such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom
relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public
officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened
or committed, charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property: Provided,
however, that if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining
order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant’s property will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order
may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the
Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice.
Such a temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20)
days and shall become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. No such
temporary restraining order or temporary injunction shall be issued except on
condition that complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in
an amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined
for any loss, expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance
of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together with a
reasonable attorney’s fee, and expense of defense against the order or against the
granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently
denied by the Commission.
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The undertaking herein mentioned shall be understood to constitute an agreement
entered into by the complainant and the surety upon which an order may be
rendered in the same suit or proceeding against said complainant and surety, upon
a hearing to assess damages, of which hearing, complainant and surety shall have
reasonable notice, the said complainant and surety submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Commission for that purpose. But nothing herein contained shall
deprive any party having a claim or cause of action under or upon such undertaking
from electing to pursue his ordinary remedy by suit at law or in equity: Provided,
further, That the reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction
may be delegated by the Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct
such hearings in such places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties
and their witnesses and shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the
Commission.
Book V, Rule XXII, Section 14. Injunctions.
No court or entity shall enjoin any picketing, strike or lockout, except as provided in
Articles 218 and 263 of the Labor Code.
The Commission shall have the power to issue temporary restraining orders in such
cases but only after due notice and hearing and in accordance with its rules. The
reception of evidence for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated
by the Commission to any Labor Arbiter who shall submit his recommendations to
the Commission for its consideration and resolution.
Any ex parte restraining order issued by the Commission, or its chairman or Vice-
Chairman where the Commission is not in session and as prescribed by its rules,
shall be valid for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days.
 Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. CIR, supra
Facts: SUPRA
Issue: WON an injunction may be issued against a strike. / Generally, NO.
Ratio: The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a
comparable bargaining power with capital and must be liberally construed to that
end. It is said that the prohibition creates substantive and not purely procedural
law. There can be no injunction issued against any strike EXCEPT in only one
instance, that is, when a labor dispute arises in an industry indispensable to the
national interest and such dispute is certified. As a corollary to this, an injunction in
an uncertified case must be based on the strict requirement See. 9 (d) of Republic
Act No. 875; the purpose of such injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but
ONLY unlawful activities.
C. Exception: When Allowed
Art. 265 (see page 60)
Art. 225 (e) (see page 60)
Art. 278 (see page 54)
 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC, supra
Summary of injunction requirements under IBM v NLRC
Requisites to issue an injunction:
a) a HEARING held "after DUE AND PERSONAL NOTICE thereof has been served"
b) reception at the hearing of "TESTIMONY of witnesses, with opportunity for
CROSS-EXAMINATION";
c) a FINDING OF FACT by the Commission, to the effect:
(1)That PROHIBITED OR UNLAWFUL ACTS have been threatened and will
be committed and will be continued unless restrained;
(2)That SUBSTANTIAL AND IRREPARABLE INJURY to complainant's
property will follow;
(3)That as to each item of relief to be granted, GREATER INJURY will be
inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted
upon defendants by the granting of relief;
(4)That complainant has NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW; and
(5)That the PUBLIC OFFICERS charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property are UNABLE OR UNWILLING to furnish
adequate protection.
TRO EX PARTE:
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a) the complainant "shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall
be issued without notice, a SUBSTANTIAL AND IRREPARABLE INJURY to
complainant's property will be unavoidable;
b) there is "TESTIMONY under oath, SUFFICIENT, if sustained, TO JUSTIFY the
Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice;"
c) the "complainant shall first file an undertaking with ADEQUATE SECURITY in an
amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined for
any LOSS, EXPENSE OR DAMAGE caused by the IMPROVIDENT OR ERRONEOUS
ISSUANCE OF SUCH ORDER OR INJUNCTION.; " and
d) the "temporary restraining order shall be effective for NO LONGER THAN
TWENTY (20) DAYS and shall become void at the expiration of said twenty (20)
days.
 Ravago v. Eastern Marine, Ltd., 453 SCRA 381 (2005)
Facts: Pet. was a seafarer. P worked for the more than 22 years for the Respondent
company under various contracts. P was shot in the leg and found unfit for work. P
later had another physician examine him and was found able to return to work. P
filed for illegal dismissal and money claims. Respondent filed an Urgent Application
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
Issue: WON the CA had jurisdiction to issue said TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. / YES.
Ratio: The law proscribes the issuance of injunctive relief only in those cases
involving or growing out of a labor dispute. The case before the NLRC neither
involves nor grows out of a labor dispute. It did NOT involve the fixing of terms or
conditions of employment or representation of persons with respect thereto. In
fact, the petitioner’s complaint revolves around the issue of his alleged dismissal
from service and his claim for backwages, damages and attorney’s fees. Moreover,
Article 254 of the Labor Code specifically provides that the NLRC may grant
injunctive relief under Article 218 thereof.
The indispensable conditions for granting temporary injunctive relief are:
(a) that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be satisfactory to establish
a proper basis for injunction, and
(b) that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the
litigation.
D. Issuing Agency; Procedural Requirements
Art. 225 (e) (see page 60)
1. National Labor Relations Commission; Labor Arbiter
 National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Vera, 133 SCRA 259 (1984)
Facts: Union filed a case of ULP against Phil. Iron Mines. Union was awarded P 4M.
A writ of execution was granted to the Union. Said writ was unsatisfied, hence the
sheriff levied the properties of Phil. Iron Mines. Respondent companies filed a
complaint for "Injunction with Preliminary Injunction” since said companies bought
the properties in an auction sale due to the foreclosure of mortgage contracts of
Phil. Iron Mines.
Issue: WON CFI had jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction. / YES.
Ratio: Union is trying to enforce a writ of execution issued by the NLRC on
properties not belonging to the Phil. Iron Mines, Inc., the judgment debtor, but to
herein plaintiffs. When the sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his authority, seizes
a stranger's property, the writ of injunction, which is issued to stop the auction
sale of that property, is not an interference with the writ of execution issued by
another court because the writ of execution was improperly implemented by the
sheriff. Under that writ, he could attach the property of the judgment debtor. He is
not authorized to levy upon the property of the third party claimant. The private
respondents are not parties to the said NLRC case.
 Nestle Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 340 (1991)
Facts: Private respondents are sales reps and med reps of the company. Said
respondents availed of the Company’s car loan policy, where the company retained
title until fully paid. The R’s held an illegal strike and were subsequently dismissed.
The company filed a case with the RTC for the recovery of the cars. R’s sought a TRO
in the NLRC.
Issue: WON the NLRC had jurisdiction to issue the TRO. / NO.
Ratio: The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The
rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a
separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.
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 2. Procedural Requirements and Rules for the Issuance of labor
Injunctions

 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC, supra

See page 61.

 Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. v. NLRC, supra

Facts: “Kahit ipis hindi makakapasok at hindi makakalabas” case. Union held a
strike for ULP and union busting. Company filed a petition for injunction with the
NLRC. The NLRC granted the TRO.
Issue: WON the NLRC issued the TRO with grave abuse of discretion. / YES.
Ratio: The Company failed to prove 2 of the 5 required findings of fact:
(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
The Company failed to call on police or security to escort the employees of the
company.

 Ravago v. Eastern Marine, Ltd., supra

See page 62

3. Temporary Restraining Order

 Dinio v. Laguesma, 273 SCRA 109 (1997)

Facts: Two unions are vying for union elections. Party for Reform (led by petitioner)
filed a Petition for injunction w/ TRO against COMELEC. Med-Arbiter granted TRO,
but only Metro Manila suspended elections.
Issue: WON Med-Arbiter validly granted TRO. / NO.
Ratio: Though an injunction or TRO may be granted at the discretion of the proper
authority, it must be issued only upon compliance with the guidelines set by law.
The petition filed by the petitioners is manifestly insufficient to show grave or
irreparable injury.

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