flores vs mallare Philips

SUMMARY:

• Flores has 2 causes of actions: 1st against Binongcal for refusing to pay amount representing
cost of truck tires purchased on credit from Flores from Aug-Oct 1981 and 2nd against Calion for
refusing to pay amount representing cost of truck tires from 1981-1982. RTC dismisses case for lack of
jurisdiction. The SC ruled that Flores is partially correct, but still in favor of respondent judge. The
application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of BP 129 and Sec 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to
the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3: the total of claims shall
furnish the jurisdictional test and that they arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions
and there is a common question of law or fact.

HOW THE CASE REACHED THE SC:

RTC Baguio City and Benguet Province dismissed petition -> Petition for review SC Rule 45

FACTS:

• Flores appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Mallare-Phillipps of the RTC of Baguio City
and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Flores did not attach to his
petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the case shall
be transmitted to this Court pursuant to Sec 39 of BP129. This provision applies only to ordinary appeals
from the RTC to the CA.

• However, the order appealed from states that the 1st cause of action alleged in the complaint
was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck
tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on various occasions from Aug to Oct 1981; and the 2nd
cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several
occasions from Mar 1981-Jan 1982.

• Counsel for Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss. At the MTD hearing, counsel for respondent
Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel
for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT:
• Lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Sec
33(l) of BP129 and Sec 11 of the Interim Rules.

• Flores compares the provisions with the pertinent portion of the former rule under Sec 88
Judiciary Act of 1948: ... Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned
by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...

• With the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and
brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.

• Sec 11 Interim Rules: In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount
involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of
interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different
parties. If any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

• 12/15/83, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8)
of BP129 RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although another
person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.

ISSUES: WON the RTC correctly dismissed Flores’ petition for lack of jurisdiction - YES

HELD:
• Flores’ argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former and present rules
in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action. In such cases, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. If the total demand
exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the
causes of action are separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not
mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less
may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.

• However, there is a difference between the former and present rules in cases where two or
more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint.

• Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace Under the former rule, "where the claims or causes of
action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate
claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test". As worded, the former rule applied only to cases of permissive
joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties
defendant.

• The application of the totality rule under Sec 33(l) of BP 129 and Sec 11 Interim Rules is subject
to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3: the total of claims
shall furnish the jurisdictional test and that they arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact.

• After a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the
reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of
which falls within its jurisdiction

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

ramon ching and po wing corp vs rodriguez

FACTS:

The respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stroghold Insurance Company, Global
Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc.,
Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching
(Ramon).

The Complaint was captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with
Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction." In
the complaint, the respondents alleged that (1) they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that Ramon
misrepresented himself as Antonios son when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth certificated merely
simulated; (2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime suspect and prior to the conclusion of the
investigations, Ramon made an inventory of the formers estate and illegally transferred to his name the
titles to Antonios properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked respondent Mercedes into surrendering to him a
Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and the TCTs of two condo units
registered under Ramons name; (4) Ramon illegally transferred to his own name through a forged
document 40,000 shares in Po Wing Corporation; (5) Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the
respondents; and (6) Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic
Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon
to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price.

The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or his representatives from
disposing or selling any property that belongs to the estate of Antonio; (2) that Ramon be declared as
disqualified from inheriting from Antonio Ching; and (3) declaring null the unauthorized transfers made
by Ramon.

The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss with regard to the issues which
could only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an ordinary civil action

HELD:

No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the denial of the
petitioners' second motion to dismiss was proper.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause
therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their
Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument
supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer
for Ramon's disinheritance, the case filed does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and
does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the standing to
seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no consideration
for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them.
Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios
estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said affidavit, are null and void
as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall first require a declaration of the
respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly
exercise jurisdiction.

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of the civil case
could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to protect the
respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find grounds
to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of the
properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. The civil case was not instituted to
conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and distribution of Antonio's
estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon
the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are matters
which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding

paglaum management and development corp and health marketing technologies vs union bank of the
Philippines

FACTS:

Paglaum Management and Development Corporation (PAGLAUM) is the registered owner of three
parcels of land located in the Province of Cebu with Benjamin B. Dy, the president of petitioner Health
Marketing Technologies, Inc. (HealthTech) as co-owner. On 3 February 1994, Union Bank of the
Philippines (Union Bank) extended HealthTech a credit line in the amount of P 10,000,000 which was
eventually increased to 36,500,000. This was secured by three real estate mortgage on the lands.

The venue in the real estate mortgage was stipulated to be in Makati, Metro Manila or in the place
where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located (Cebu), at the absolute option of the Mortgagee, the
parties hereto waiving any other venue. Unfortunately, Healthtech is having difficulties on paying its
obligation. They both executed a Restructuring Agreement whereby it states that that any action or
proceeding arising out of or in connection therewith shall be commenced in Makati City, with both
parties waiving any other venue.
Healthtech still defaulted on the obligation. Union Bank foreclosed the properties through an auction
sale, bought it as the sole bidder as secured a Certificate of Sale. Healthcare filed a complaint for
annulment of sale and titles on the RTC of MAKATI. The RTC ruled in favor of Healthtech and restrained
restraining Union Bank from proceeding with the auction sale. Union Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss
citing lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. RTC of Makati granted Union Banks motion to dismiss. CA
affirmed Makati RTC.

Union Bank argues that the Restructuring Agreement only pertains to the loan and does not affect the
stipulations in the real mortgage which states that it has the option to choose the venue. Healthtech
argues the restructuring agreement also carries with it the venue for the settlement of cases for the real
mortgages. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC Makati is a proper venue for the case

RULING:

YES.

The Supreme Court held that an action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different
from an action to annul a private sale of real property. Therefore, this case falls under Rule 4. The
general rule in Rule 4 is that the venue is on where the property is located. However, among the
exceptions is where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof. The Supreme Court adds that the mere stipulation on the venue of an action,
however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be
able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. Failure to do so would result to the parties stipulating
additional venues for the case.

In the case at bar, both the stipulation in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Restructuring Agreement
have words of exclusivity. The Supreme Court held that the Restructuring Agreement should prevail as
this modified the entire loan obligation. The later Restructuring Agreement reveals the intention of the
parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not only to the principal obligation,
but also to the mortgages.
 belen vs Chavez

FACTS: Spouses Pacleb (private respondents) filed an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment
against spouses Belen (petitioners). The complaint alleged that the Pacleb secured a judgment by
default rendered by Judge John W. Green of the Superior Court of the State of California, which ordered
the spouses Belen to pay $56,204.69 representing loan repayment and share in the profits plus interest
and costs of suit. The summons was served on the Belen’s address in Laguna, as was alleged in the
complaint, and received by Marcelo M. Belen.

1. Spouses Belen filed an answer alleging that they were actually residents of California and that
their liability had already been extinguished via a release abstract judgment issued in the collection case
abroad.

2. For failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC ordered the ex parte presentation of
evidence for Pacleb.

3. Belen subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss citing the judgment of dismissal issued by the
Superior Court of California; however the MTD was dismissed for failure to submit a copy of the
judgment of dismissal

4. Spouses Pacleb, for their part, filed for the amendment of the complaint, stating that they
withdrew the complaint (in California) because of the prohibitive cost of litigation.

5. For failure of spouses Belen to appear in the rescheduled pre-trial conference, RTC declared
Belen in default and allowed the presentation of ex parte evidence. In the meantime, the counsel
(Alcantara) of petitioners died without the RTC being informed of such fact. The RTC ruled against Belen
and ordered them to pay Pacleb

6. A copy of the decision was sent to Atty. Alcantara but was returned with the notation
“addressee deceased.” A copy of the same was then sent to the last known address of spouses Belen in
Laguna. Atty. Culvera, the new counsel of spouses Belen, filed a motion to quash the Writ of Execution
as well as a notice of appeal. The RTC denied the same.

7. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 65) alleging that CA committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to quash the writ of execution and notice of appeal
despite sufficient legal bases in support thereof.

ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners through either the proper
service of summons or the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners

HELD: Yes. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. As a
rule, if defendants have not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a
judgment rendered against them is null and void. To be bound by a decision, a party should first be
subject to the court’s jurisdiction.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not
voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Sec 7,
Rule 14 ROC. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be made in accordance with Sec 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any
of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Sec 8; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of
court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was laid down
in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a
resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed
by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.

CAB: the records of the case reveal that spouses Belen were permanent residents of California. It has
been consistently maintained that they were not physically resent in the Philippines. Therefore, the
service of summons in the petitioners’ address in Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court
jurisdiction over their person. Nevertheless, the CA correctly concluded that the appearance of Atty.
Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest such jurisdiction. By supplying the
court with various documents that could only have been supplied by spouses Belen, implied
authorization could be gleaned from such. In sum, there was voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the RTC.

The running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did not commence upon the service of the RTC decision
at the address on record of Atty. Alcantara or at the Laguna address. It is deemed served on petitioners
only upon its receipt by Atty. Culvera on 29 December 2003. Therefore, the filing of the Notice of Appeal
on 06 January 2004 is within the reglementary period and should be given due course.
planters development bank vs julie chandumal

Facts:

BF Homes and Julie Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located in Las Pinas. Later,
BF Homes sold to PDB all its rights over the contract.

Chandumal paid her monthly amortizations until she defaulted in her payments. So, PDB sent a notice to
Chandumal with a demand to vacate the land within 30days, otherwise all of her rights will be
extinguished and the contract will be terminated and deemed rescinded. In spite of the demand,
Chandumal failed to settle her account.

PDB filed an action for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession but still
Chandumal refused to do so. Summons were then issued and served by deputy sheriff Galing but its was
unavailing as she was always out of her house on the dates the summons were served.

RTC then issued an order granting the motion of PDB. Chandumal filed an urgent motion to set aside
order of default and to admit attached answer. Chandumal said that she did not receive the summons
and was not notified of the same and her failure to file an answer within the reglementary period was
due to fraud. RTC denied Chandumal's motion to set aside the order of default.

Chandumal appealed to the CA. CA nullified the RTC's decision.

Issue: (1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons? (2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC? (3) Whether there was proper rescission by notarial act of the
contract to sell?

Held:

(1) Correctly ruled that the sheriff’s return failed to justify a resort to substituted service of summons.
According to the CA, the Return of Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual
exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in attempting to serve the
summons personally to the defendant.
(2) The Court notes that aside from the allegation that she did not receive any summons, Chandumal’s
motion to set aside order of default and to admit attached answer failed to positively assert the trial
court lack of jurisdiction. In fact, what was set forth therein was the substantial claim that PDB failed to
comply with the requirements of R.A. No. 6552 on payment of cash surrender value, which already
delves into the merits of PDB’s cause of action. In addition, Chandumal even appealed the RTC decision
to the CA, an act which demonstrates her recognition of the trial court’s jurisdiction to render said
judgment.

(3) R.A. No. 6552 recognizes the right of the seller to cancel the contract but any such cancellation must
be done in conformity with the requirements therein prescribed. In addition to the notarial act of
rescission, the seller is required to refund to the buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on the
property. The actual cancellation of the contract can only be deemed to take place upon the expiry of a
thirty (30)-day period following the receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission by a notarial act and the full payment of the cash surrender value.

Petition is denied.

biaco vs philippine countryside rural bank

Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired several loans from Philippine Countryside Rural Bank
(PCRB) from 1996 to 1998. To secure the loans, he mortgaged certain property in favor of the bank. He
was able to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he defaulted in loans obtained in 1998 which amounted to
more than a million pesos.

Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure against the spouses Biaco. Summons were issued by
the trial judge. The Sherriff served the summons to Ernesto at the latter’s office. No summons was
served to Teresa.

Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did Teresa because she was not aware sans the summons
being served her). The case was heard ex-parte and the spouses were ordered to satisfy the debt and
failure to do so will authorize the Sheriff to auction the mortgaged the property.

Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for P150k which is not sufficient to cover the P1 M+
debt. Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy was issued against the personal properties of Teresa to
satisfy the deficiency.
It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought to
have the judgment annulled as she now claims that she was deprived of due process when she did not
receive summons; that it was only her husband who received the summons; that there was extrinsic
fraud because her husband deliberately hid the fact of the foreclosure proceeding.

PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem, hence Teresa’s participation is
not required so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res which is what happened in the case at
bar; that Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic fraud because such situation cannot occur in her case because
she is a co-defendant of Ernesto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the trial court should be annulled.

HELD: Yes. It is admitted that the proceeding is a quasi in rem proceeding and that the presence of
Teresa is not required because the trial court was able to acquire jurisdiction over the res (mortgaged
property). HOWEVER, her constitutional right to due process is superior over the procedural matters
mentioned. Her right to due process was violated when she did not receive summons. Teresa, as a
resident defendant, who does not voluntary appear in court must be personally served with summons
as provided under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Even if the action is quasi in rem, personal
service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the
sheriff at her husband’s office cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had
been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts failed. Further, the order of the
trial court compelling Teresa to pay off the debt using her personal property is a judgment in personam
which the court cannot do because it only acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over the person of
Teresa.

On the issue of extrinsic fraud, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with PCRB, is correct that there is none in
the case at bar. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side
of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic fraud is present
where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise;
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and
connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest
to the other side. The above is not applicable in the case of Teresa. It was not PCRB which made any
fraud. It should be noted that spouses Biaco were co-defendants in the case and shared the same
interest

yu vs. pacleb

NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed to set aside the decision made by the Court of Appeals in
ruling that the respondent has the better right over the subject property and is the true owner thereof.

FACTS: Respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the owners of parcel of
land in Langcaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by a transfer certificate of title.

Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier offered the said land to spouses Ernesto and Elsie Yu.
Javier claimed that he purchased the property from Rebecca Del Rosario who bought it from spouses
Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan. Despite the alleged sales being unregistered, the spouses Yu
accepted the offer and made a down payment and entered into an Agreement for the sale of the
property. After giving the amount, the spouses Yu discovered that a portion of the property was
tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, one of the respondent's sons. The petitioners then demanded the
cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial payment.

Javier then made arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay Ramon for his
disturbance compensation. With that, Javier and the spouses YU proceeded to enter into a Contract to
Sell. But, Javier failed to comply with his obligations. So, on April 23, 1993, the petitioners filed with the
RTC a Complaint for specific performance and damages against Javier to compel Javier to deliver to
them ownership and possession, and the title to the property.

However, Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in default, so, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The decision and its Certificate of Finality were
annotated in the title of the property.

On March 10, 1995, the petitioners and Ramon and his wife entered into an agreement that the
spouses will pay Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of his tenancy rights over the land.

On October 12, 1995, the respondent filed a Complaint for annulment of deed of sale and other
documents arising from it claiming that the deed of sale supposedly executed between him and his late
first wife and Del Rosario was spurious and the signatures were forged. He also moved for the summons
to be served upon Del Rosario via publication since her address cannot be found, but was denied. So,
respondent moved to dismiss the case which was granted by the trial court.

On November 23, 1995, the petitioners filed an action for forcible entry against the respondent
with the MTC. They contend that they had prior physical possession over the property through their
trustee Ramon Pacleb, until the respondent ousted them in September 1995. The MTC and the RTC
ruled in favor of the petitioners, but the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts. The
CA decided that it was the respondent who had prior physical possession of the property which was
shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon.

On May 29, 1996, respondent filed an instant case for removal of cloud from title with damages
alleging that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife could not have been executed on the
date appearing thereon. He claimed that he was residing in the US at that time and that his late first
wife died 20 years ago.

On May 28, 1997, while the case was still pending, the respondent died, hence, he was
substituted by his surviving spouse and some of his children.

On December 27, 2002, the respondent's case was dismissed and the petitioners were held to be
purchasers in good faith. The trial court also held that the petitioners' action for specific performance
against Javier was already final, and the trial court also ordered the respondents' heirs and all other
persons claiming under them to surrender the possession of the property to the petitioners. Upon
appeal by the respondent, the CA reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the action for specific performance filed by the petitioners against Javier is not merely an
action in personam, but an action in rem, and is thus, conclusive and binding upon respondent even if he
was not a party thereto since it involves a question of possession and ownership of real property.

HELD: The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners against Javier to compel him
to perform his obligations under their Contract to Sell is an action in personam.

The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the purchase price, and to
execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of the petitioners. The obligations of Javier
mentioned attach to Javier alone and do not burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the
petitioners is an action in personam and is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and
duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot bind the respondent since he was
not a party therein and considering the fact that his signature and that of his late first wife were forged
in the deed of sale. Hence, the petition is denied and the Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the
respondent having a better right over the property as the true owner thereof.

manchester development vs ca

A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City
Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester.
Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain
transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was
alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint.
Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of
Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered
Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of
claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.

HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is deemed
filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court.
Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint
to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So, any
subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.

Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. The
Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action
for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.

Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the
complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper
filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that
from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and
said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails
to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.

sun insurance vs Asuncion

Facts:

Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation
of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition,
PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the
amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount
of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a
number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought
as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct
or sufficient docket fees?

YES.

It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party
claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the
docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim
not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

ballatan vs ca

Land Owner in Good faith, Builder in Good faith scenario -The right to choose between appropriating
the improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands,
is given to the owner.

-If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time
of payment.

FACTS:
Eden Ballatan, together with other petitioners, is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 24.
Respondent Winston Go is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 25 and 26. And Li Ching Yao is living
in and the registered owner of Lot. 27. The Lots are adjacent to each other

When Ballatan constructed her house in her lot, she noticed that the concrete fence and side pathway
of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of
her property. She was informed by her contractor of this discrepancy, who then told respondent Go of
the same. Respondent, however, claims that his house was built within the parameters of his father’s
lot; and that this lot was surveyed by engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of Araneta
Institute of Agriculture (AIA). Petitioner called the attention of AIA on the matter and so the latter
authorized another survey of the land by Engineer Quedding. The latter then did the survey twice which
led to the conclusion that Lots Nos 25, 26 (owned by respondent Go) and 27 (owned by Li Ching Yao)
moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot 24 (owned by petitioner Ballatan.) –(it was later on
discovered by the courts that Go encroached 42 square meters from the property of Ballatan and Yao
encroached 37 square meters on Go’s property, all of which were in GOOD FAITH) Ballatan made
written demands to the respondent to dismantle and move their improvements and since the latter
wasn’t answering the petitioner filed accion publiciana in court. Go’s filed their “Answer with Third-Party
Complaint” impleading as third party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer
Quedding.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering respondent Go to demolish their improvements and pay
damages to Petitioner but dismissing the third-party complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal of the third
party-complaint as to AIA but reinstated the the complaint against Yao and the Engineer. CA also
affirmed the demolition and damages awarded to petitioner and added that Yao should also pay
respondent for his encroachment of respondent Go’s property. Jose Quedding was also ordered to pay
attorney’s fees for his negligence which caused all this fuzz.

ISSUE: What is the proper remedy in this situation (everyone was in good faith)?

RULING:

Art 448 is the proper remedy (Lower Courts are wrong in awarding the damages). It was established in
the case that the parties had no knowledge of the encroachment until Ballatan noticed it there all of
them were builders in Good faith. In that scenario they have two options. 1st option is that the land
owner will buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige the builders to buy the land given that
the value of the land is not considerably more than the buildings or tree; other wise the owner may
remove the improvements thereon.
The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably
more than the building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to
the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court
must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the
land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to the owner. If the
option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of
payment.

Petitioner was given by SC 30 days to decide on what to do or which right to exercise. Likewise, Go was
also given time to do the regarding Yao’s encroachment. Engineer Quedding was still asked to pay
attorney’s fees.

Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso Sr., v. CA (2011)

Doctrine: A reiteration of the more liberal Sun Insurance case. Where the party does not deliberately
intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules
by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply.

Facts:

• In 1979, Ruben Reinoso was a passenger in a jeepney traversing E. Rodriguez Ave. The jeepney
owned by Tapales, collided with a truck owned by Guballa.

• Reinoso died as a result of the collision. His heirs filed the instant case for Damages against
Tapales and Guballa

• IN 1988, RTC found the Truck liable and held Guballa liable for damages sustained by the Heirs
of Reinoso and the jeepney owner

• Case litigated before the RTC which rendered a decision

• In 1994, CA motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees
pursuant to the 1987 Manchester ruling

• Reinoso’s defense: Manchester should not be made to apply retroactively to their case as the
case was filed prior to the promulgation of Manchester ruling

WON: The dismissal by the CA was proper due to the nonpayment of docket fees? NO!
HELD:

• The Court reiterates the ruling in Sun Insurance v. Asuncion

• the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are already
before this Court, a remand of the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) would only unnecessarily prolong
its resolution

• In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however,
relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion

• The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester ruling
came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the
petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the
cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals

• RTC decision was reinstated

goodland company vs asia united bank

Facts:

Goodland Company mortgaged its two parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna through a
Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) with Smartnet to secure the loans extended by Asia United Bank
(AUB). Petitioner also executed another REM for its Makati properties. Both the REMs were signed by its
President Gilbert Guy. AUB registered the mortgages with the Registry of Deed at the concerned
properties. Afterwards, Goodland repudiated the REMs. Hence, Goodland filed a complaint for
annulment of mortgage before the RTC of Bian, Laguna on the ground that the REM was falsified and
against the agreement that the blank mortgage would only serve as a comfort document and not to be
registered by AUB.

Smartnet defaulted on its loan obligation which prompted AUB to extra-judicially foreclose the
REM and then was issued a Certificate of Sale registered with the Registry of Deeds. Goodland filed
another case seeking for the annulment of the foreclosure sale and enjoin consolidation of the title in
favor of AUB. AUB moved to dismiss both the cases filed by Goodland on the ground of forum shopping
and litis pendentia. It was granted. On appeal, the decision of the RTC were reversed. As to the Makati
properties, the same case was filed by Goodland including the President of AUB and the notarizing
lawyer whose signature was falsified. The same was contradicted by AUB but this time, the motion to
dismiss on the ground of forum shopping, non-payment of proper docket fees, and litis pendentia were
denied. AUB argued that there was no service of summons, thus the court never acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of the respondents. On appeal, the CA held Goodland guilty of forum shopping for
failing to inform AUB of the other case filed while the case on the REM is pending.

Issue:
 Is Goodland Company guilty of forum shopping?

Ruling:

Yes. All the elements of forum shopping are present in this case. There is forum shopping when
the following elements are present:

a. identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;

b. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

c. the identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

There can be no dispute that the prayer for relief in the two cases was based on the same attendant
facts in the execution of REMs over petitioner’s properties in favor of AUB. While the extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, consolidation of ownership in AUB and issuance of title in the latter’s name
were set forth only in the second case, these were simply the expected consequences of the REM
transaction in the first case. There is also identity of parties. The parties in the first and second case are
substantially the same as they represent the same interest and offices. Goodland’s argument that the
certification and verification appended to its complaint satisfactorily conforms with the requirements of
the required certificate of non-forum shopping. However, the Supreme Court disagrees. Goodland filed
a certificate which is partly false and misleading.

The elements of litis pendentia are also present. It refers to the situation where two actions are pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits.

juana complex homeowners association vs fil estate land

FACTS:

Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana
Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions, instituted a complaint for damages, in its own behalf and
as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring
subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.

Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them
in their use of La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
They claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or
cause of action for JCHA, etal. against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and
each may be affected differently than the others. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the
defendants averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the
use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there
was neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.

ISSUES:k/md

Whk/mdether or not the complaint was properly filed as a class suit?gk/mdgk/mdddd

HELD:

The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:1) the subject matter of controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons;2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all to court; and3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently
numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. “The
individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.”

NOTES:

Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action?

The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding
the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or
essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. In the present case, the Court
finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for its issuance
are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. For the writ to issue, the right sought to be
protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown to be clear and positive. This
means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in their complaint.