1. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ vs.

HERMINIO MARAVILLA
FACTS:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna
Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as the
universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the deceased
DignaMaravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that the will was
not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one
another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro, Asuncion, and
Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special administrator of he estate of the
deceased, for the reason that:
". . . all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and his late wife,
DignaMaravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court cannot pinpoint
which of the property subject of the Will belongs to DignaMaravilla, exclusively, that shall be
administered by the special administrator.”
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly
signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for
appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their
interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the
decedent. Said petition was heard on February 20, at which hearing, respondent's counsel orally
moved for postponement, because respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified
and was not present. The Court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies
of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record
on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise,
appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the
removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from
his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of
the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that provision of the
Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been
submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an order
dictated in open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as
special coadministrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding with the petition for
the removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary
injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to
certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this
case exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this
petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less than
P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real estate exceeding in
value P200.000.00. 1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez
as special co-administrator.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of a special co-administrator is necessary and WON are special
proceedings in term of filing, and procedure similar in nature to that of Ordinary Civil Actions.
RULING:
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction
over the present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners) is
only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the
deceased DignaMaravilla) which, as per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator,
is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable.
Note that the proceedings had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are
merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased DignaMaravilla presently on
appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate the
same to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the amount therein involved is within the latter's
exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over said testate proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein
involved are valued at P362,424.90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate
pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that
even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211,
December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663,
October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court
disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy
therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G., 5321; Valio v.
Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G., 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over
the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is
more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writ of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental
thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable where the amount or
value involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's
interest or the value of the entire estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the appellant's
rights or the entire administration of the estate. . . . In a contest for administration of an estate the
amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in controversy for purposes of appeal." (4
C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is to be observed that respondent's interest as appellant in the
probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole estate amounting
to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 thereof, or approximately P270,000.00. Such interest,
reduced to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value of the matter in
controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that the appeal taken in said
proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and should, therefore, be
certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co- administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent
as a special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and,
consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4
C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the
Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from arrived at the amount of "P90,000.00 more or
less", as the amount involved in the case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil.,
20). But this case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the estate,
nor to an order denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of
the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the administration of
a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held:
"Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court, in a suit to
compel the stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the fund,
amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not affected by the
fact that the amounts decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum" (Handly, et al. vs.
Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil
cases, are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not
enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special
proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil
case" (Carpenter v. Jones 121 Cal. 362; 58 P. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the term
"civil case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa
680, 81 N.W. 178). Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on
ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or
when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the
procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings.
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claims of the parties and
not the combined claims against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not
applicable to the instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the
amount or value involved or in controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate.
Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be
noted that respondent claims the whole estate, or at least more than 3/4, thereof. Said claim, reduced
to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and,
consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his brief, is also
inapplicable, because, unlike the instant case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the
estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No.
4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it
becomes immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which
the value in controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and
that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals
shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it had originally been brought before
it."
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, we agree
with respondent that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on
special coadministrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is
merely temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus,
it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for
special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the
duty to liquidate the community property devolves, merely to protect the interests of petitioners who,
in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to participate in the
proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407).
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in the controversy, it
is suggested that appropriate steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals involving
the probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary Act.

3. Republic vs CA and Hon. Madrona, GR 163604

FACTS:
In In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc,
Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner, the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of
September 29, 1999, granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report and accordingly
declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the
Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of
the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the trial courts order by
filing a Notice of Appeal.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/may2005/163604.htm - _ftn3
By Order of November 22, 1999s, the trial court, noting that no record of appeal was filed and served
as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present
case being a special proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order of disapproval having been denied
by Order of January 13, 2000, it filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, it
contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code
is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004 the Court of Appeals denied the Republics petition
ISSUE: WON the action for declaration of presumptive death is a special proceedings and requires a
record on appeal
HELD: NO.
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R.
No. 124320, March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in the nature
of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by
the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a
demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal
was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in
accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and
Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court .
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the trial court anchored its grant of
the petition for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouses
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in
disapproving petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria
Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to
contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a summary proceeding,
following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

4. Manalo vs CA
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo,
and his eleven (11) children who are all of legal age. At the time of his death he left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and
style Manalo’s Machine Shop in Manila and QC. Eight (8) of his children filed a petition with
respondent RTC for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of
their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. RTC set the hearing. Herein petitioners, the
mother and three other children, opposed the petition, contending that such petition is actually an
ordinary civil action involving members of the same family and that there was absence of earnest
efforts toward compromise among members of the same family.
Motion denied by RTC. Petition for certiorari denied by CA. Motion for reconsideration likewise
dismissed.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition
but that the same have failed.
RULING:
NO. It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued for any cause
of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a
remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.Private
respondents herein merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be
duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right
to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited
and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
Art 151 of FC which prohibits suit between members of the family absent a compromise, is not
applicable in the case at bar for such is only a special proceeding and not an ordinary civil action.
Petition denied for lack of merit.

6. ONG vs PDIC
Facts:
Sometime in 1932 and 1933, Jerry Ong, petitioner, made some money market placements with
Omnibus Finance Inc. (OFI), which later suffered serious financial difficulties. When the money
market placements have matured, the petitioner demanded for its return. But the check issued
thereby by OFI was dishonoured by the drawee bank. OFI asked assistance from its sister companies
including the Rural Bank of Olangapo (RBO). OFI’s President and Cynthia Gonzales from the RBO
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land in favour of the petitioner which
are both registered in RBO’s name as collateral guarantee for payment of money obligations. OFI
failed to pay its money obligation, so petitioner foreclosed the mortgage. Afterwards, as alleged by
the petitioner, Central Bank approached him and borrowed the titles of the 2 parcels of land but it was
never returned despite demand. The petitioner filed an action to surrender the two titles but it was
dismissed for being premature because the one-year redemption period has not yet elapsed.
Later on, OFI and RBO filed an action for the annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, the extrajudicial
proceedings, and the Sheriff’s certificate of sale. But it was suspended due to the pending application
for rehabilitation of OFI before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Central Banks which was later on substituted by PDIC filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation
of RBO’s assets and it was consolidated with the action for annulment of Real Estate Mortgage.
Consequently, petitioner filed a motion to admit claims against RBO’s assets as a secured creditor
and as bidding winner/purchaser of the Tagaytay properties subjected in the foreclosure sale. Such
claim was declared valid and legitimate.
Upon respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, the court’s decision was reversed declaring the Real
Estate Mortgage null and avoid together with the extrajudicial proceedings. And the petitioner’s claim
was also denied.
The petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Then, the petitioner, thru his counsel, filed a notice of appeal before the RTC which was given due
course by the latter after finding the appeal as taken within the reglementary period. However, the
respondent sought for reconsideration saying that the petitioner failed to file a record on appeal, thus,
the appeal was not perfected. With this, the decision was reversed and dismissed the appeal filed by
the petitioner. MR was also denied.
Hence this petition.
Issue: WON the mode of appeal, the Ordinary Appeal, availed by the petitioner is proper.
Ruling:
No. As cited in Sec 2(a) and Sec 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 2. Modes of Appeal x x x

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of
multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
It has been held that a petition for liquidation for an insolvent corporation is classified as special
proceeding. The RTC’s decision which the petitioner sought to appeal from was rendered in a special
proceeding for liquidation of RBO’s assets, thus, applying the above-quoted provisions; the appeal in
a special proceeding requires both the filing of notice of appeal and the record on appeal within
30days from receipt of notice of judgment or final order.
Hence, the RTC did not commit grace abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal as it
clearly stated under the Rules that a notice of appeal in a special proceeding must be accompanied
by a record on appeal within 30days from receipt of notice of judgment or final order to perfect one’s
appeal.

7. Jao vs CA
FACTS:
Ignacio and Andrea Jao got married and begot 2 children named Rodolfo and Perico. The couple
died intestate. Perico, then, instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Pending
the appointment of a regular administrator. Perico moved that he be appointed as a special
administrator alleging that Rodolfo conducts the following:
1. Gradually dissipating the assets of the estate;
2. Receiving rentals from real property without rendering an accounting;
3. Forcibly opening the vault belonging to their deceased parents;
4. Disposing of cash valuables.
Rodolfo moved to dismiss the petition alleging that it was filed before the improper venue.
ISSUE: Where should the settlement proceedings be filed? In the permanent address or where they
actually reside before the death?

RULING:
Rule 73, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court provides that settlement proceedings must be filed at the place
where the deceased resides at the time of his death.
To determine the abovementioned, the following factors must be considered:
1. Capacity to choose and freedom of choice
2. Physical presence at the place chosen
3. Intention to stay permanently.
In the case at bar, there were substantial proof presented showing that the decedents have
transferred to Quezon City. Among others, the death certificate which was acquired or accomplished
prior to the quarrel of the siblings substantiated the fact of residence.
Residence, as contemplated by the law, connotes actual residence ex vitermini. It is understood in its
popular sense which means personal, actual and physical habitation of a person. It is nothing more
than a person’s actual residence or place of abode; provided, he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
Thus, Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss must not be granted as the case was filed before the proper venue.

16. Santero v. CFI Cavite

Facts:
• Petition for certiorari on the decision of respondent court granting the Motion for Allowance.
• Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico, and Winy Santero are the children of Pablo
Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel
are Pablo’s chldren with Anselma Diaz. Neither of the mothers got married to Pablo.
• Private respondents thru guardian, Anselma Diaz filed a Motion for Allowance on June 30,
1982 citing support, educational expenses, clothing, and medical necessities, which was granted by
the respondent court
• Petitioner-oppositors contend that the wards are no longer schooling, have reached the age of
majority, and are no longer under guardianship. Also that the administrator of the estate does not
anymore have sufficient funds because what was left was a trust fund for the Kawit property
Issues:
1. W/N respondent court acted with grave abuse in granting the allowance of 2,000 Pesos each,
despite the fact that all of them are not minors and are all gainfully employed
2. W/N respondent court acted with grave abuse in granting allowance based in the allegations
that the respondents were still schooling from 1982-83, when in fact they were not
3. W/N respondent court acted with grave abuse in granting allowance without conducting a
hearing upon the motion
Held: NO. The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no
moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art.
188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children, the
Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, private
respondents are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
father Pablo.
Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive gives the surviving spouse and the children the
right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83,
Sec. 3, which is a procedural rule.
It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted by respondent Court without hearing. The
record shows that the "Motion for Allowance" dated June 30, 1982 contains a Notice of Hearing (p. 2,
Annex "A") addressed to the lawyers for the petitioners and setting the hearing thereof on July 8,
1982 at 9:00 in the morning. Apparently a copy of said motion was duly received by the lawyer, Atty.
Beltran as he filed an opposition thereto on the same date of hearing of the motion.

17. SAN DIEGO v. NOMBRE and ESCANLAR

Facts:
On May 1, 1960, Nombre, in his capacity was judicial administrator of the intestate estate subject of
the Sp. Proc.No. 7279,leased one of the properties of the estate (a fishpond) to Pedro Escanlar, the
other respondent for three (3) years. The said lease was without previous authority or approval of the
Court where the above-stated proceedings was pending.
Nombre was therafter removed as administrator. He was replaced by Campillanos.
As the new judicial administrator, Campillanos filed a motion to allow him to lease the same fishpond
to the petitioner for 5 years. Nombre filed a written opposition stating that the property was already
leased to Escanlar and that granting the motion would in effect nullify the lease contract in favor of
Escanlar. Despite Nombre's contention, the lower court declared the lease to Escanlar as null and
void for want of judicial authority. Consequently, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari to CA.
CA upheld the validity of the lease between respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
decision but CA denied the same, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate without prior
judicial authority and approval
Ruling:
Yes, the judicial administrator can do so.
The court sustained the ruling of the CA which states that:
“No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a lease of property placed under
his custody is provided for in the present law. Under Article 1647 of the present Civil Code, it is only
when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without special
authority. Thus, regardless of the period of lease, there is no need of special authority unless the
contract is to be recorded in the Registry of Property. As to whether the contract in favor of Escanlar
is to be so recorded is not material to our inquiry.
On the contrary, Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial administrator, among
other things, to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will. Commenting on this
Section in the light of several Supreme Court decisions (Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69 Phil. 1;
Gamboa v. Gamboa, 68 Phil. 304; Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732; Rodriguez v. Borromeo, 43 Phil.
479), Moran says: "Under this provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering
the estate of the deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all
acts of administration without special authority of the Court. For instance, he may lease the property
without securing previously any permission from the court. And where the lease has formally been
entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee,
over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the
administrator or the heirs to annul the lease.”
The Court further added that while it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an
agent, are in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to
a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the
representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua Tan v. Del Rosario,
57 Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These
circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The
protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from
the fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial
administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.

23. Rodriguez v. Ynza (UNREPORTED CASE**)

Facts:
The CFI of Iloilo authorized the payment to Atty Benjamin H. Tirol for professional services, charged
to the estate of Julia Ynza.
Jose Ynza objects to the said payment on the ground that Hugo P. Rodriguez, trustee of the estate of
Julia Ynza, being a member of the bar*, did not need the assistance of Atty. Tirol, and that, at any
rate, the latter had rendered legal services, not to the estate of Julia Ynza, but to the said Hugo
Rodriguez in his individual capacity.
*Rule 85, Sec. 7:
“When the executors or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any
professional fees for legal services rendered by him.”
Issue:
Whether or not, the objection of Jose Ynza to the payment to Atty Benjamin H. Tirol for professional
services charged to the estate of Julia Ynza tenable?
Held:
NO. The objection is untenable.
Rodriguez was named trustee by reason of his qualifications, as an administrator of the estate of Julia
Ynza, involved in 8 cases but not in his private capacity as a lawyer.
Atty. Tirol as counsel for Rodriguez in the said cases had rendered services for the benefit of the
estate of Julia Ynza, which obtained a favorable decision in every one of the said cases.

25. Tumang v. Laguio

FACTS:
In Special Proceeding No. 1953 involving the estate of the late Dominador Tumang and pending
before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the widow of the deceased, namely Magdalena A.
Tumang, administratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings
definitely terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of her children
The petition was opposed by appenee's daughter, Guia T. Laguio and her children on the ground that
appellee, as administratrix and executrix, had not yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them.
Considering the opposition well founded, the court hereby considers the motion to require
administratrix to render an accounting untenable, as the final accounting of the administratrix was
already approved and therefore denies the motion of oppositor
A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was filed by Guia T. Laguio and her minor
children.
he court a quo issued the second questioned Order denying the motion for reconsideration in the
following manner:chanrobles virtual law library
Issues:
1. The sole issue is whether or not the court should have required the executrix to render an
accounting of the cash and stock dividends received after the approval of her final accounts. A
corollary issue is whether or not petitioners have waived their right to demand such
accounting.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Held:
Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an account of his
administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration
..., and he shall render such further accounts as the court may requite until the estate is wholly
settled." chanrobles virtual law library
In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that the
dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final accounts rendered by the executrix.
It appears that the interests of all the parties will be better served and the conflict between petitioners
and respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is made. Further, "it has been held that
an executor or administrator who receives assets of the estate after he has filed an account should
file a supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect
to matters occuring after the settlement of final account that representatives will be compelled to file
supplementary account."
There is no question that in the instant case, the fact that the executrix received funds of the estate
after the approval of her final accounts and before the issuance of an order finally closing the
proceedings is admitted. She must, therefore, account for the same, in consonance with her duty to
account for all the assets of the decedent's estate which have come into her possession by virtue of
her office. 6 An executor should account for all his receipts and disbursements since his last
accounting. 7chanrobles virtual law library
We disagree with the lower court's finding that petitioners, by receiving the dividends without requiring
an accounting, had waived their right to do so. The duty of an executor or administrator to render an
account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It
is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally
ordered closed and terminated, 8 to the end that no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted
for. The fact that the final accounts had been approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to
require supplemental accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the Rules provide that "he shall
render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."

26. Santos vs Manarang

FACTS:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal property
which, by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth
clause of this will reads as follows:
I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be
religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.
Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one
due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the
dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee
was regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate as might be presented.
This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14, 1908, the plaintiff,
Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required to reconvene
and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of testator. This petition
was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present proceedings
against the administratrix of the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief
was denied in the court below, and now appeals to this court.
In his petition of July 14, 1909, asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claims,
plaintiff states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it
was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them
and directed that they should be paid. The inference is that had plaintiff's claims not been mentioned
in the will he would have presented to the committee as a matter of course; that plaintiff was held to
believe by this express mention of his claims in the will that it would be unnecessary to present them
to the committee; and that he did not become aware of the necessity of presenting them to the
committee until after the committee had made its final report.
ISSUE: WON the committee may reconvene to consider the belated claim of the plaintiff
HELD: NO.
Under these facts and circumstances, did the court err in refusing to reconvene the committee for the
purpose of considering plaintiff's claim? The first step towards the solution of this question is to
determine whether plaintiff's claims were such as a committee appointed to hear claims against an
estate is, by law, authorized to pass upon. Unless it was such a claim plaintiff's argument has no
foundation. Section 686 empowers the committee to try and decide claims which survive against the
executors and administrators, even though they be demandable at a future day "except claims for the
possession of or title to real estate." Section 700 provides that all actions commenced against the
deceased person for the recovery of money, debt, or damages, pending at the time the committee is
appointed, shall be discontinued, and the claims embraced within such actions presented to the
committee. Section 703 provides that actions to recover title or possession of real property, actions to
recover damages for injury to person or property, real and personal, and actions to recover the
possession of specified articles of personal property, shall survive, and may be commenced and
prosecuted against the executor or administrator; "but all other actions commenced against the
deceased before his death shall be discontinued and the claims therein involved presented before the
committee as herein provided." Section 708 provides that a claim secured by a mortgage or other
collateral security may be abandoned and the claim prosecuted before the committee, or the
mortgage may be foreclosed or the security be relied upon, and in the event of a deficiency judgment,
the creditor may, after the sale of mortgage or upon the insufficiency of the security, prove such
deficiency before the committee on claims. There are also certain provisions in section 746 et seq.,
with reference to the presentation of contingent claims to the committee after the expiration of the
time allowed for the presentation of claims not contingent. Do plaintiff's claims fall within any of these
sections? They are described in the will as debts. There is nothing in the will to indicate that any or all
of them are contingent claims, claims for the possession of or title to real property, damages for injury
to person or property, real or personal, or for the possession of specified articles of personal property.
Nor is it asserted by the plaintiff that they do. The conclusion is that they were claims proper to be
considered by the committee.
This being true, the next point to determine is, when and under what circumstances may the
committee be recalled to consider belated claims? Section 689 provides:
That court shall allow such time as the circumstances of the case require for the creditors to present
their claims the committee for examination and allowance; but not, in the first instance, more than
twelve months, or less than six months; and the time allowed shall be stated in the commission. The
court may extend the time as circumstances require, but not so that the whole time shall exceed
eighteen months.
It cannot be questioned that thus section supersedes the ordinary limitation of actions provided for in
chapter 3 of the Code. It is strictly confined, in its application, to claims against the estate of deceased
persons, and has been almost universally adopted as part of the probate law of the United States. It
is commonly termed the statute of nonclaims, and its purpose is to settle the affairs of the estate with
dispatch, so that residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being
afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of
limitations, have not yet prescribed.
The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the
speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate
in the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. (Estate of De Dios, 24 Phil. Rep., 573.)
Due possibly to the comparative shortness of the period of limitation applying to such claims as
compared with the ordinary statute of limitations, the statute of nonclaims has not the finality of the
ordinary statute of limitations. It may be safely said that a saving provision, more or less liberal, is
annexed to the statute of nonclaims in every jurisdiction where is found. In this country its saving
clause is found in section 690, which reads as follows:
On application of a creditor who has failed to present his claim, if made within six months after the
time previously limited, or, if a committee fails to give the notice required by this chapter, and such
application is made before the final settlement of the estate, the court may, for cause shown, and on
such terms as are equitable, renew the commission and allow further time, not exceeding one month,
for the committee to examine such claim, in which case it shall personally notify the parties of the time
and place of hearing, and as soon as may be make the return of their doings to the court.
If the committee fails to give the notice required, that is a sufficient cause for reconvening it for further
consideration of claims which may not have been presented before its final report was submitted to
the court. But, as stated above, this is not the case made by the plaintiff, as the committee did give
the notice required by law. Where the proper notice has been given the right to have the committee
recalled for the consideration of a belated claim appears to rest first upon the condition that it is
presented within six months after the time previously limited for the presentation of claims. In the
present case the time previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the plaintiff
until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee.

27. Tan Sen Guan v. Go Siu San

FACTS:
 Petitioner is administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng Sue and the defendant is the
administrator in the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Antonio
Tampoco. Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue, about the month of January, 1920, the sum
of P25,802.60, which with the interest stipulated by the two deceased Tan Peng Sue and
 Antonio Tampoco in their lifetime at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent per year, amounted to
P30,272.89 at the end of the year 1922.
 upon the death of Antonio Tampoco on February 5, 1920, proceeding was instituted in the CFI
Manila for the settlement of his estate
 on December 14 of that year commissioners were appointed to hear and decide whatever
claim might be presented against the estate, and d rendered their final report on June 27,
1921, which was approved by the court below on July 14 of said year
 about August 30, 1922, the plaintiff, in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Tan Peng
Sue, moved the court that the committee on claims be again authorized, or a new committee
appointed, to hear and decide a claim that he had and which he was to present against the
estate
 on September 21, 1922, Geo. R. Harvey, judge, appointed new commissioners and the latter
recommend payment by the defendant administrator, which was by agreement of the parties
estimated at P30,272.89 at the end of the year 1922
 On December 22, 1923, the court presided over by Judge Diaz rendered decision, absolving
the defendant administrator of the estate of Tampoco from the complaint, holding that the
commissioners appointed on September 21, 1922, had no authority under the law to hear and
decide said claim, because the court that had appointed them had on the said date no
jurisdiction to appoint them in view of the fact that more than fourteen months have elapsed
since their final report was submitted by the former committee on claims in the aforesaid
testamentary proceeding and approved by the court. To this decision the plaintiff excepted on
the 29th day of the same month, and moved for the new trial on January 9, 1924, on the
ground that said decision was against the law and the facts proven at the trial.
 On March 27, 1924, the lower court presided over by the Honorable Geo. R. Harvey, judge,
after considering the motion for new trial, rendered a new decision, setting aside that of
December 22, 1923, and ordering the administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco to pay
the administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue the sum of P28,802.60, with interest thereon
at the rate of 9 6/10 per cent annum from March 28, 1920.

Issue: WON action for new trial had already prescribed

HELD: Yes.
The failure of Tan Chu Lay, heir of Tan Peng Sue, to present his claim was an omission committed by
an heir who had knowledge of the existence of the credit of his deceased father. The fact that Tan
Chu Lay might have been induced by fraudulent machinations and unlawful influence of the
defendant administrator cannot affect the legal consequences of said act. And even if it be admitted
that the widow of Tan Peng Sue was in China while the committee on claims was acting in the
proceeding for the settlement of Antonio Tampoco's estate, still the result would be the same.
The law does not make any reservation or exception whatever, and this court cannot make either.
 The pertinent part of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: A person having a
claim against a deceased person proper to be allowed by the committee, who does not, after
publication of the required notice, exhibit his claim to the committee as provided in this chapter,
shall be barred from recovering such demand or from pleading the same in offset to any
action, except as hereinafter provided.

Under section 690, a creditor who has failed to present his claim within the period fixed by the
committee on claims may apply to the court, within six months after the period previously fixed, for the
renewal of the commission for the purpose of examining his claim. Also a creditor may make such
application even after six months from the expiration of the period formerly fixed and before the final
settlement of the estate, if the committee shall have failed to give the notice required by section 687.
 The application of the plaintiff was presented fourteen months after the expiration of the period
fixed for the filing of claims. And while it was presented before the final settlement of the estate
of Antonio Tampoco, yet, it having been proved that the committee had published in the
newspaper La Nacion the notice required by law, there was no possible ground for granting
said application. Even considering this application under section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, we believe that the lapse of fourteen months is an unsurmountable barrier
opposing the granting of said application.

Based upon such facts, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.

29. Edmands vs Phil Trust Co.

Facts:
Howard J. Edmands having died in Baguio, testate proceedings are instituted in the CFI of that city
for the administration and settlement of his estate.

Notice to creditors was ordered published requiring such creditors to file their claims within six months
form the date of first publication of notice. The notice was published for 3 consecutive weeks in the
Manila Post, a daily newspaper said to be of general circulation in the Phil, in the Mountain Province,
and in the City of Baguio.
After the 6th Month Period having expired and no claims had been filed, the ancillary administrator
filed his final inventory, project of partition, and list of liabilities which consist of the expenses
advanced by the petitioner, estate and income taxes, and attorney’s fees.
The Court had issued order authorizing the ancillary administrator to pay the mentioned liabilities and
to make and file a final report of accounts and deliver to Jane Edmands, the decedent’s widow, the
residue of conjugal estate.
After disbursements, an amount was set aside for the payment of new income taxes.
On Dec. 22, 1947, the ancillary administrator filed a petition to close the estate.
On Aug. 12, 1948, Phil. Trust Co. filed a motion to allow representation of claim accompanied by a
copy of the claim. They explained that they had just come to know about the demise of Howard
Edmands and that they ask inquiry from the Clerk of Court about the status of the testate proceedings
of the decedent.
Issue: WON the CFI has discretion to admit claims after the entry of order of distribution.
Ruling:
No. It will be seen from Sec. 2 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court that there’s a time limit for the exercise
by the court of discretion to allow claims presented beyond the period previously fixed. The limit is
one month from the expiration of the order of distribution and in no case beyond the date of entry of
order.
It is manifest from the above facts that the court properly declared appellants claim barred.

30. In the Matter of Estate of Telesforo De Dios

FACTS:
Tomas Osmeña claims to have had a claim against the estate of Telesforo De Dios but the former did
not present the alleged claim within 6 months specified by the court for the presentation of claims to
the Commissioner.
Osmeña asked for a motion to extend the time within which he would present said claim for the
reason that the heirs of the estate of De Dios was making proposition with Osmeña pay his account
the debt which he had against the property. Under the belief that the said heir would pay the debt,
settlement would terminate satisfactorily. Unfortunately, heirs of De Dios did not pay Tomas Osmeña.
The Court denied the motion to extend as the rule stands that claims against the estate must be filed
within 6 months. Also, no details or facts were presented by Osmeña to prove such failure or
opportunity. Most importantly, Osmeña resides in Cebu; ergo, it would be impossible to not know the
death of De Dios.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court erred in refusing to extend the period for the presentation of claims
against the estate of Telesforo de Dios.
RULING:
Article 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that claim must be presented within the period
fixed by law and that the time of filing be not extended without just cause.
To effectuate the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and early delivery of the property
of the estate into the hands of the person entitled to revive it, the abovementioned rule stands if there
be no showing to rule on the contrary.
In the case at bar, the Court ruled that there is no valid reason to rule in favor of Osmeña as they
failed to provide a just cause in their belated filing. Ergo, the motion must be dismissed.

38. VALERA VS. OFILADA

FACTS:
Civil Case No. 64, R-1 of the Court of First Instance of Abra is a special proceeding for the settlement
of the intestate estate of Francisco Valera.
Virgilio Valera was the administrator of the estate, he died on March 21, 1961. He was survived by his
widow, Angelita Garduque Vda. de Valera and their ten (10) children. Adoracion Valera Bringas, who
claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Francisco Valera, was appointed administratrix. She
filed on April 16, 1964 in the intestate proceeding a petition to require "Celso Valera and family and
Angelita de Valera and family to pay P100.00" as monthly rental for the one-third pro-indiviso portion
of the Valera residence.
Mrs. Bringas filed in the intestate proceeding a pleading known as "Motion for Execution and for an
Order Directing Delivery of the Fruits of the Properties or Value and Monies of the Estate to the
Administratrix.” That the heirs be ordered to deliver to her the fruits of the properties of the estate of
Francisco Valera, which, according to her calculation, amounted to P100,000 for twenty years, plus
legal interest supposedly amounting to P5,000; that the heirs be ordered to deliver the sum of
P4,684.98 representing the insurance and war damage monies collected by Virgilio Valera; and that
the Sheriff be ordered to "to seize such properties of Virgilio Valera and his heirs" "to be sold
according to law for the payment of double the value of the fruits and the amount of monies alienated
and embezzled".
The petitioners attack Judge Ofilada's order of on the following grounds xxx (c) that Section 8, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court contemplates that "double the value of the fruits and monies" should be
recovered in an "action" and not in an intestate proceeding. As to the execution sale, the petitioners
contend: (a) that the orders sought to be executed are void; (b) that the probate court ordinarily has
no jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution and that the instant case is not among the exceptional
cases wherein the probate court can authorize an execution, and (c) that execution for a money claim
cannot be had against a decedent's estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court, sitting as a probate court in the intestate proceeding for the
estate of Francisco Valera, could hold the heirs of Virgilio Valera answerable for certain supposed
monetary liabilities of the latter to the estate and enforce said liabilities against the properties of the
deceased Virgilio Valera.
RULING: No, the trial court, as a probate court, erred in adjudging in the said intestate proceeding
the monetary liabilities of the late Virgilio Valera to the estate of Francisco Valera and in issuing a writ
of execution against his properties to enforce the supposed liabilities.
The controlling principle, which should govern this case, was announced by Justice Torres in 1907 in
Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70, a case which is on all fours with the instant case. This Court ruled in
that case:
Administrators or executors; Code of Civil Procedure; Heirs. — The heir legally succeeds the
deceased from whom he derives his right and title but only after the liquidation of the estate, the
payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and
in the meantime the only person in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the
deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court.
Furthermore, there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot issue
a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to
the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without
the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any
judgment enforceable by execution.
The circumstance that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue
execution (a) to satisfy the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the
decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule
90), and (e) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec.
13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that those are the
only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.
With particular reference to the sum of P4,784.96, which represents the insurance and war damage
monies allegedly embezzled by Virgilio Valera, the lower court, sitting as a probate court, had no
jurisdiction to enforce, by execution, the payment of double the value of that amount. The alleged
embezzler was dead. Execution was not warranted under Sections 7 and 8, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court, which both refer, to a living person, meaning a person entrusted with a part of the decedent's
estate "by an executor or administrator", and to a person who committed "embezzlement before
letters (were) issued". Section 8 explicitly provides that the embezzler's liability shall be determined in
"an action", and not in the intestate proceeding.