Version 1.

1 Released: 11 Jul 2006

EXWS Study Guide Information
- This user guide is NOT designed to be an end all. This guide is essentially a “cut-and-paste” of the references
listed in the NAVEDTRA 43296. It is designed to facilitate availability of the information to the end-user
without needing to plow through the 46 or so references.
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will happily review them and update the guide.
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EXW Specialist Study Guide

101 Safety Fundamentals
101.1 Concept of ORM
Concept. The Operational Risk Managment (ORM) process:
a. Is a decision making tool used by personnel at all levels to increase operational effectiveness by identifying,
assessing, and managing risks. By reducing the potential for loss, the probability of a successful mission is
increased.
b. Increases our ability to make informed decisions by providing a formal operational risk management process.
c. Minimizes risks to acceptable levels, commensurate with mission accomplishment. The amount of risk we
will accept in war is much greater than what we should accept in peace, but the process is the same. Correct
application of the ORM process will reduce mishaps and associated costs resulting in more efficient use of
resources.
Principles of ORM. ORM incorporates the following four principles:
a. Accept Risk When Benefits Outweigh The Cost. Naval Doctrine Publication 1 states, "Risk is inherent in war
and is involved in every mission. Risk is also related to gain; normally greater potential gain requires greater
risk." Our naval tradition is built upon principles of seizing the initiative and taking decisive action. The goal of
ORM is not to eliminate risk, but to manage the risk so that the mission can be accomplished with the minimum
amount of loss.
b. Accept No Unnecessary Risk. Naval Doctrine Publication 1 also states, "We should clearly understand that
the acceptance of risk does not equate to the imprudent willingness to gamble. Only take risks that are necessary
to accomplish the mission.
c. Anticipate And Manage Risk By Planning. Risks are more easily controlled when they are identified early in
the planning process.
d. Make Risk Decisions At The Right Level. ORM decisions are made by the leader directly responsible for the
operation. Prudence, experience, judgment, intuition and situational awareness of leaders directly involved in
the planning and execution of the mission are the critical elements in making effective ORM decisions. When
the leader responsible for executing the mission determines that the risk associated with that mission cannot be
controlled at his or her level, or goes beyond the commander's stated intent, he or she shall elevate the decision
to their chain of command.
101.2Explain following as applied to ORM
a. Identify Hazards (Step 1) - Begin with an outline or chart of the major steps in the operation (operational
analysis). Next, conduct a Preliminary Hazard Analysis by listing all of the hazards associated with each step in
the operational analysis along with possible causes for those hazards.
b. Assess Hazards (Step 2) - For each hazard identified, determine the associated degree of risk in terms of
probability and severity. Although not required, the use of a matrix may be helpful in assessing hazards
described further in paragraph 6c.
c. Make Risk Decisions (Step 3) - First, develop risk control options. Start with the most serious risk first and
select controls that will reduce the risk to a minimum consistent with mission accomplishment. With selected
controls in place, decide if the benefit of the operation outweighs the risk. If risk outweighs benefit or if
assistance is required to implement controls, communicate with higher authority in the chain of command.
d. Implement Controls (Step 4) - The following measures can be used to eliminate hazards or reduce the degree
of risk. These are listed by order of preference:
1) Engineering Controls - Controls that use engineering methods to reduce risks by design, material selection or
substitution when technically or economically feasible.
2) Administrative Controls - Controls that reduce risks through specific administrative actions, such as:
(a) Providing suitable warnings, markings, placards, signs, and notices.

(b) Establishing written policies, programs instructions and standard operating procedures (SOP).
(c) Training personnel to recognize hazards and take appropriate precautionary measures.
(d) Limiting the exposure to a hazard (either by reducing the number of assets or personnel, or the length of
time personnel are exposed).
3) Personal Protective Equipment - Serves as a barrier between personnel and a hazard. It should be used when
other controls do not reduce the hazard to an acceptable level.
e. Supervise (Step 5) - Conduct follow-up evaluations of the controls to ensure they remain in place and have
the desired effect. Monitor for changes, which may require further ORM. Take corrective action when
necessary.
101.3 Functions of Safety Councils and Committees
SAFETY COUNCILS AND COMMITTEES
0401. Discussion
a. Regional and activity safety committees and councils provide opportunities for various groups and
individuals to express multiple viewpoints and interests. Their purpose is to identify, define and assess issues,
problems and needs, and to recommend corrective measures. New or revised policies, procedures and practices
may develop from these
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the Navy Safety and Occupational Health program.
b. Councils or committees have three basic functions:
(1) Create and maintain an active interest in safety.
(2) Serve as a means of communications regarding safety.
(3) Provide program assistance to commanding officers, including proposing policy and program objectives.
101.4 Mishap Investigations
CHAPTER 14
MISHAP INVESTIGATION, REPORTING, AND RECORD KEEPING
1401. Discussion
a. Mishaps that result in damage to Navy facilities and equipment or occupational injuries, illnesses, or deaths to
Navy personnel degrade operational readiness and increase operational costs. Investigation of such mishaps to
identify causes and preventive actions as well as establishing accurate record keeping are essential to the
success of the Safety and Occupational Health program. Mishap investigations aimed at determining how and
why the event occurred are necessary to prevent future occurrence of similar events. Accurate records are
necessary to establish trends, to conduct analyses, and to assess the effectiveness of the overall program. Certain
records are necessary to comply with Department of Labor (DOL) Federal agency record keeping and reporting
requirements. Certain records for foreign national employees may also be necessary to meet host country
standards. These records should be part of the mishap record keeping program.
1402. Types of Mishap Investigations
A complete comprehensive mishap investigation is an essential tool in identifying the root causes of a mishap
and thereby preventing recurrence. The reports required by reference 14-2 are separate and independent of
investigations required by the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAG). JAG investigations are used to
determine accountability and culpability. The sole purpose of the safety investigation is mishap prevention, not
the determination of accountability.
a. Safety Investigation. Mishap investigations and reporting procedures are
outlined in reference 14-2.
b. Judge Advocate General (JAG) Manual Investigations. Conduct JAG investigations, including claims
investigations, as required by the JAG Manual. The safety investigator(s) and the JAG Manual investigator(s)
shall not be the same person(s). Nothing in reference 14-2 prevents JAG Manual investigator(s) from access to
the same non-privileged factual material or witnesses available to the safety investigator(s). Conduct the JAG
Manual investigation independently and separately from the safety investigations mentioned above. Reports of
these investigations shall not be made a part of JAG investigations.
c. Criminal and Security Investigations. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) shall investigate any
death occurring on a Navy installation, per SECNAVINST 5520.3B, except when the cause of death is
medically attributable to disease or natural causes. When notified, NCIS will investigate the circumstances until

criminal causality can reasonably be excluded. The investigations noted above must not compromise nor
otherwise impede the NCIS investigation.
1403. Mishap Investigation Requirements
a. Shore regions and activities shall conduct a safety investigation of every mishap, major or minor, and handle
the investigation as a search for facts as outlined in reference 14-2. The severity or significance of the mishap
determines the extent of the investigation. The region or activity shall establish guidelines delineating roles and
responsibilities for reporting and investigating all classes of mishaps. Military or civilian safety and
occupational health professionals trained per Section 1405 shall conduct mishap investigations of Class A and B
mishaps. The safety office shall ensure proper investigation of all mishaps and review all investigation reports.
Management personnel may assist in mishap investigations, however, regions and activities shall not use
information they obtain through the safety investigation for administrative or disciplinary action.
b. Safety departments shall notify the Injury Compensation Program Administrator (ICPA), medical, and/or
industrial hygienists as needed, of their mishap investigation, which should include a request for specific
support. The safety departments are to document the notification and specific results or any support received.
c. The investigator shall complete a written report with firm, factual findings of mishap root causes and
recommendations for specific corrective action to be taken to prevent recurrence.
(1) For mishaps involving civilian personnel, the mishap investigator shall release to the ICPA all factual
information regarding the mishap. The investigator is specifically forbidden to release any privileged safety
information, including the analysis, findings, and recommendations of the investigator or mishap investigation
board.”
(2) For all mishaps, the safety departments shall forward safety recommendations to appropriate department
heads and/or supervisors, follow up with the appropriate department heads and/or supervisor to verify progress
in implementing the corrective action, and notify command personnel of the department’s progress in
implementing recommendations for corrective action.
1404. Requirements to Ensure Reporting of All Mishaps and Hazards
At all levels, the immediate supervisor has the greatest influence on mishap and hazard reporting. Regions and
activities shall take the following action to ensure that they report all mishaps and applicable hazards:
a. Indoctrinate all subordinates, especially new arrivals, to report all mishaps no matter how small, as well as the
"near misses" as hazards where only chance prevented a mishap. Ensure personnel fully appreciate that
activities cannot correct hazardous conditions unless personnel conscientiously report them.
b. Ensure supervisors report all mishaps to the region or activity safety office immediately so the safety office
can initiate the appropriate action for the investigation.
1405. Mishap Investigation Training
Personnel who conduct Class A, B, C and other mishap investigations shall complete formal training in mishap
investigation procedures and techniques. Safety professionals responsible for investigating region or activity
level mishaps or Class A and B mishaps shall attend the Naval Occupational Safety and Health and
Environmental Training Center (NAVOSHENVTRACEN) course, Mishap Investigation and Prevention
(Ashore), course A-493-0078, or an equivalent course (as determined by the cognizant Echelon 2 headquarters).
Safety professionals with formal mishap investigation training may provide formal classroom training to others
in the region or activity (e.g., supervisors) that may perform Class C and other mishap investigations.
101.5 Safety Responsibilities of all Personnel
0207. Regional and Activity Programs
General. An SOH program is an inherent responsibility of command and therefore, implementation, direction
and control of the program shall be through the chain of command with line managers and supervisors being
primarily responsible for ensuring safe and healthful operations and working conditions. For additional
guidance, see paragraph 0207.d regarding responsibilities, paragraph 0303.a on organization, and paragraph
1202 on process-related and facility related hazards. Shore regions, activities and commands, commanders,
commanding officers, directors and officers in charge shall implement the items below:
a. Implement PR&MS contained in appendix 2-B or an equivalent management system (e.g. OSHA Voluntary
Protection Program (VPP)). Conduct an aggressive, continuing program that is integrated throughout the
regions and activities and post and disseminate program information to all personnel. Additional guidance on
PR&MS is available at: http://safetycenter.navy.mil/. Guidance on OSHA VPP is available at:
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/vpp/index.html

b. Issue a policy statement adopting and enhancing/expanding the policy established in Section 0104. Issue a
new policy statement within three months after assumption of command, disseminated to all personnel. Regions
and activities shall accomplish this by posting the policy statement on all official bulletin boards and by other
means as appropriate, such as publication in base newspapers, new employee indoctrination, safety videotapes,
etc. The policy statement shall reflect the commander's commitment to safety and to programs that prevent or
minimize
occupational mishaps.
c. Organize, staff, and maintain a safety function or safety office as required by chapter 3. Regional safety
offices shall be established in accordance with paragraph 0304.
d. Ensure all personnel are fully aware of their obligations and personal responsibilities to the safety program.
Establish clear lines of accountability.
e. Establish safety councils and committees at appropriate command levels per chapter 4 of this manual. Chair
the council, or ensure it is chaired by the executive officer or equivalent, and ensure minutes are issued and
maintained.
f. Establish and maintain liaison between the local safety office and other DOD regions or activities for
coordination of specialty functions such as medical, fire, security, etc.
g. Ensure compliance with the mishap investigation reporting procedures reference 2-14. Review lost time
mishaps or ensure they are reviewed as stated in section 1406. Fully investigate all mishaps and take appropriate
corrective action. Provide timely reports of findings and actions to NAVSAFECEN.
h. Ensure that all workplaces are inspected at least annually or more frequently based on the level of risk (see
chapter 9).
i. Establish a hazard abatement program as required by chapter 12.
j. Establish procedures to protect all Navy personnel from coercion, discrimination, or reprisals for participation
in the safety program. Ensure that employees are aware that they may file, through their appropriate grievance
processes, allegations of reprisals for having filed a complaint of unsafe or unhealthy working conditions.
k. Provide employees and their representatives with access to exposure and medical records per chapter 8.
l. Develop procedures consistent with Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Naval Personnel Command,
and PR&MS guidance to measure and recognize superior and deficient safety performance. Performance
evaluations shall include personal accountability consistent with the duties of the position and the SOH
Program. Include recognition of superior performance or conversely deficient performance, as appropriate.
m. Establish education and training programs per chapter 6.
n. Coordinate occupational health and industrial hygiene field support with the cognizant
medical command per chapter 8.
o. Ensure compliance with applicable Navy regulations and Federal statutes governing the control of classified
and sensitive unclassified information (refer to section 1106).
p. Establish a comprehensive self-assessment program for the command per chapter 5 and appendix 2-B.
q. Ensure that senior management, middle management and first line supervision support the safety program to
the extent of their authority and responsibility by:
(1) Setting the example for subordinates.
(2) Promptly correcting recognized hazards.
(3) Clearly defining and assigning individual safety responsibilities to subordinates.
(4) Documenting safety performance in evaluation of subordinates.
(5) Ensuring employees receive appropriate training, participating in committees or meetings, and conducting
stand up safety meetings where required.
(6) Conducting or participating in worksite inspections, including those made by region or activity safety
personnel.
(7) Encouraging safety awareness through incentives and awards programs.
(8) Receiving training appropriate to their level of responsibility and authority, per chapter 6. Orientation
training does not need to be repeated with subsequent assignments to other levels of management unless
significant safety-related changes have occurred.
(9) Acquiring, maintaining, requiring and enforcing the use of approved personal protective equipment,
approved safety equipment, and other devices necessary to protect employees.
(10) Encouraging a free flow of information and ideas from employees on methods of improving the safety of
their workplaces, work practices, and work processes. Developing a reward process for outstanding safety
contributions.

r. Review all safety citations and findings from external authorities (i.e., Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), NAVINSGEN and internal sources), as warranted, to ensure the underlying causes of
the problems are identified and that corrective actions address the underlying causes and not merely the
symptoms.
s. Develop and implement cross-reference linkage among employment records, medical records and industrial
hygiene surveillance data.
t. Ensure that personnel are aware of the formal procedure for processing written reports of unsafe or unhealthy
working conditions per chapter 10. Commands shall include provisions to preserve the individual anonymity of
those reporting unsafe conditions when requested. The reporting procedures should encourage employees to
make beneficial suggestions as a positive means of correcting potential hazards.
u. Ensure support of Field Federal Safety and Health Councils and coordinate mutually beneficial accident
prevention and safety programs with local communities to the maximum extent feasible and per applicable laws
and regulations.
v. Designate appropriate officials to consult with representatives of labor organizations recognized under
reference 2-15 with respect to the safety program.
w. State the location(s) where personnel can review copies of the safety standards, records of safety and health
committees and their actions and recommendations, the region or activity hazard communication plan, and
documentation on the region/command/activity/unit safety program (shore only).
x. Make available a copy of the region or activity's annual summary report of occupational injuries and illnesses
for the preceding year, signed by the CDR, CO, or OIC. Post this summary no later than 45 days after close of
the calendar year, for at least 3 months. In addition to posting, region or activities may publish it in appropriate
written media, such as the region or activity’s newspaper.
y. Post form DD 2272, Department of Defense Occupational Safety and Health Protection Program (appendix
2-A) in prominent locations such as all official bulletin boards (shore only).
z. Establish local agreements to clearly define the respective roles and responsibilities of the BUMED/non-
BUMED industrial hygienists, when, where appropriate, due to the nature and complexity of local operations,
non-medical regions or activities have established industrial hygiene staffs to assist in implementation of the
region or activity's safety program.
0208. Individual Civilian and Military Personnel
Commands can only achieve safe and healthful workplaces through the full participation and cooperation of all
employees. Accordingly, each employee shall:
a. Comply with standards and all applicable rules, regulations, and orders issued under this manual. Violators of
safety regulations or instructions are subject to disciplinary action prescribed in reference 2-15 for civilians:
Civilian Human Resources Manual Subchapter 752 (Appendix B-Schedule of Offenses and Recommended
Remedies), or for military: The Uniform Code of Military Justice. The command shall also consider such
actions in personnel performance evaluations (refer to section 0207.l).
b. Report observed workplace hazards following procedures outlined in chapter 10.
c. Immediately report to his/her supervisor injuries or occupational illnesses or property damage resulting from
mishaps or any near-mishaps
101.6 Maintenance and Use of PPE.
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
2001. Discussion and Policy
a. The best means of protecting personnel from hazard exposure in the workplace is to eliminate the hazard.
When this is not possible, engineering controls shall be the method of choice to eliminate or minimize hazard
exposure in the workplace. When neither of these methods can be employed, activities shall implement a
personal protective equipment (PPE) program to reduce or eliminate personnel exposure to hazards.
b. Navy policy is that activities provide, use and maintain PPE when competent authority determines that its use
is necessary and that such use will lessen the likelihood of occupational injuries and/or illnesses. Activities shall
provide necessary protective equipment where there is a reasonable probability that the use of the equipment
will prevent or reduce the severity of injuries or illnesses. PPE procurement and enforcement of proper use and
maintenance is the responsibility of the activity.
c. Activities must recognize that personal protective devices do nothing to reduce or eliminate the hazard itself.
They merely establish a last line of defense, and any equipment breakdown, failure or misuse immediately

exposes the worker to the hazard. Many protective devices, through misapplication or improper maintenance,
can become ineffective without the knowledge of the wearer and can have potentially serious consequences. For
this reason, proper equipment selection, maintenance, employee training (including equipment limitations) and
mandatory enforcement of equipment use are key elements of an effective PPE program.
2002. Basic Program Requirements
Each activity shall ensure that an assessment of all workplaces is conducted to determine if hazards are present
that necessitate the use of PPE. If such hazards are present, or likely to be present, activities shall accomplish
the following actions:
a. Select, and have each affected employee use, the types of PPE that will protect the affected employee from
the hazards identified in the hazard assessment.
b. Communicate selection decisions to each affected employee.
c. Document that the required workplace hazard assessment has taken place with a written certification,
identifying the workplace evaluated, the person performing the evaluation and the date(s) of the hazard
assessment. Activities shall retain this document as proof of hazard assessment.
NOTE:
Reference 20-1 contains an example of procedures that would comply with the requirement for a hazard
assessment.
2003. Equipment Specifications and Requirements
All personal protective clothing and equipment shall be of safe design and construction for the work to be
performed. Federal agencies and standards organizations have developed standards and specifications for the
design and use of PPE and devices. Activities shall only use those items that have been recognized and
approved. This approval can be met through the use of:
a. Federal specifications.
b. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) specifications.
c. Recognized approval authority, such as Underwriter's Laboratories (UL), Factory Mutual (FM), or American
Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM).
2004. Eye and Face Protection
Employees shall wear approved eye and/or eye and face protection when there is a reasonable probability that
wearing such equipment will prevent injury. They shall use eye protection at all times in a designated eye
hazard area. Flying particles and chips; splashes from liquids such as acids, caustics and solvents; and
operations that generate hot slag or molten metal, welding glare, etc., can cause eye and/or face injury. The
activity shall provide the required approved protective equipment and enforce usage as recommended by their
hazard assessment. Reference 20-2 provides the requirements for design, construction, testing and use of
devices for eye and face
protection. Chapter 19 of this manual contains additional information on the sight conservation program.
2005. Hearing Protection
See chapter 18 for hearing protection requirements.
2006. Respiratory Protection
See chapter 15 for respiratory protection requirements.
2007. Head Protection
Helmets and hats for the protection of Navy employees from the impact of falling and flying objects and from
limited electric shock and burn shall meet the specifications of reference 20-3. Employees shall wear head
protection at all times in a designated hardhat area.
2008. Foot Protection
a. Foot Hazardous Operations. Foot and toe hazardous operations are those that have a high incidence of, or
potential for, foot or toe injuries. Examples of trades or ratings generally associated with foot or toe hazardous
operations are construction, materials handling, maintenance, transportation, ship repair and operation, aircraft
overhaul and repair and explosives manufacturing and handling. Employees shall wear foot and toe protection
at all times in a designated foot hazard area.
b. Foot Protective Devices
(1) Safety shoes, with a built-in protective toe box, primarily provide protection from heavy falling objects.
These shoes shall conform to the requirements of reference 20-4, and be appropriately labeled per reference 20-
4. General-purpose safety shoes (Chukka style) are available through normal supply channels. In cases where
standard stock general-purpose safety shoes do not properly fit the employee, the Navy authorizes procurement
from commercial sources.
2009. Hand Protection

a. Activities shall select, provide and require appropriate hand protection whenever employees’ hands are
exposed to, or are likely to be exposed to, such hazards as those from skin absorption of harmful substances;
severe cuts or lacerations; severe abrasion; punctures; chemical irritants; thermal burns; and harmful
temperature extremes.
b. Activities shall base selection of hand protection on an evaluation of the performance characteristics of the
hand protection relative to the task(s) to be performed, conditions present, duration of use and the hazards and
potential hazards identified by the Safety Office.
2010. Electrical Protective Devices
Navy activities shall provide appropriate rubber protective equipment for electrical workers who perform work
on energized or potentially energized electrical systems. Equipment shall conform to references: American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D 120-87, Specifications for Rubber Insulating Gloves. ASTM D
178-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Matting. ASTM D 1048-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating
Blankets.
ASTM D 1049-88, Specification for Rubber Insulating Covers. ASTM D 1050-90, Specification for Rubber
Insulating Line Hose. ASTM D 1051-87, Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
2011. Safety Clothing. Special clothing may consist of flameproof coveralls, disposable coveralls, impervious
chemical spill coveralls, personal floatation devices (PFDs), welding leathers, and chemical aprons.
a. Activities shall base selection of special, protective clothing on an evaluation of the performance
characteristics of the clothing relative to the task(s) to be performed, conditions present, duration of use, and the
hazards and potential hazards identified by the Safety Office.
b. Navy activities shall provide appropriate special protective clothing whenever employees are exposed to, or
are likely to become exposed to, such hazards as those from skin absorption of harmful substances, chemical
irritants, thermal burns, and harmful temperature extremes.
c. Whenever personnel are required to wear life jackets in open sea operations, the life jackets must be
inherently buoyant. Jacket-type life preservers may be used in lieu of inherently buoyant PFDs, by personnel in
exposed pier locations, when working over the side, working on floating camels or barges, and during tug and
small boat operations
2012. Personal Fall Protection Equipment.
Fall protective equipment is discussed in Chapter 13.
2013. Training
a. Activities shall provide training to each employee who is required to use PPE to include at least the
following:
(1) When PPE is necessary.
(2) What PPE is necessary.
(3) How to properly don, doff, adjust and wear PPE.
(4) The limitations of the PPE.
(5) The proper care, maintenance, useful life, storage and disposal of the PPE.
(6) Ability to recognize that defective or damaged PPE shall not be used.
b. Each affected employee shall demonstrate an understanding of the training specified in paragraph 2011a, and
the ability to use PPE properly before being allowed to perform work requiring the use of PPE.
c. When a supervisor has reason to believe that any affected employee who has already been trained does not
have the understanding and skill required by paragraph 2011b above, the supervisor shall ensure retraining is
accomplished for each such employee. Circumstances where retraining is required include, but are not limited
to, situations where:
(1) Changes in the workplace render previous training obsolete.
(2) Changes in the types of PPE to be used render previous training obsolete.
(3) Inadequacies in an affected employee's knowledge or use of assigned PPE indicate that the employee has not
retained the requisite understanding or skill.
d. Activities shall maintain documentation verifying that each affected employee has received and understands
the required training. Documentation shall be in accordance with paragraph 0605 of chapter 6.
101.7 Safety Standown
Cover various topics applicable to employees including mishaps, compensation, MSDSs, work procedures,
smoking, stress, plans and goals, radiation, etc. The supervisor can provide these at "stand-up" safety meetings
at industrial regions or activities, safety stand-downs or through routed handouts/publications in offices. Formal
classroom training is not required, however, where meetings or informal classroom training are conducted,
document training by roster with subject, date, instructor and attendees; electronic media can be used to
document such training. For

non-industrial (office) regions or activities, or personnel, the supervisor should use monthly or periodic
"captain's call" or other meetings or methods to distribute information to promote safety.
101.8 Ergonomics
ERGONOMICS PROGRAM
2301. Background and Discussion
a. Ergonomics is the field of study that involves the application of knowledge about physiological,
psychological and biomechanical capacities and limitations of the human body. This knowledge is applied in
the planning, design, and evaluation of work environments, jobs, tools and equipment to enhance worker
performance, safety, and health. Ergonomics is essentially fitting the workplace to the worker.
b. This program seeks to prevent injuries and illnesses by applying ergonomic principles to identify, evaluate,
and control ergonomic risk factors for work-related musculoskeletal disorders (WMSDs). WMSDs are defined
as a class of disorders involving damage to muscles, tendons, tendon sheaths, and related bones, and nerves.
They may also be known more specifically as repetitive strain injuries (RSI); Cumulative Trauma Disorders
(CTDs) and Overuse Syndrome. WMSDs result from the cumulative effect of repeated traumas associated with
specific workplace risk factors. Risk factors include but are not limited to:
(1) Force - the amount of physical effort required to maintain control of equipment or tools or perform a task
such as heavy lifting, pushing, pulling, grasping, or carrying.
(2) Repetition - performing the same motion or series of motions continually or frequently for an extended
period of time with little variation. Examples include prolonged typing, assembling components and repetitive
hand tool usage.
(3) Awkward or static postures - awkward posture refers to positions of the body (limbs, joints, back) that
deviate significantly from the neutral position while performing job tasks. For example, overhead work,
extended reaching, twisting, and squatting or kneeling. Static postures refer to holding a fixed position or
posture. Examples include gripping tools that cannot be set down or standing in one place for prolonged
periods.
(4) Vibration - Localized vibration, such as vibration of the hand and arm, occurs when a specific part of the
body comes into contact with vibrating objects such as powered hand tools (e.g., chain saw, electric drill,
chipping hammer) or equipment (e.g., wood planer, punch press, packaging machine). Whole-body vibration
occurs when standing or sitting in vibrating environments (e.g., operating a pile driver or driving a truck over
bumpy roads) or when using heavy vibrating equipment that requires whole-body involvement (e.g.,
jackhammers).
(5) Contact stress - results from occasional, repeated or continuous contact between sensitive body tissues and a
hard or sharp object. Examples include resting the wrist on a hard desk edge, tool handles that press into the
palms or using the hand as a hammer. When present for sufficient duration, frequency, magnitude, or in
combination, these risk factors may cause WMSDs. In addition, personal risk factors, such as, physical
conditioning, existing health problems, gender, age, work technique, hobbies and organizational factors (e.g. job
autonomy, quotas, deadlines) may contribute to but do not cause the development of WMSDs. Additionally,
environmental conditions such as working in temperature extremes may contribute to the development of
WMSDs.
2303. Employee Involvement
Employee involvement and feedback are essential to identify ergonomic hazards and develop an effective
means for their abatement.
102 Administrative/Command and Control Fundamentals
102.1 Responsibilities of President, SecDef, SecNav, CNO and FCINC
A. PRESIDENT (COMMANDER IN CHIEF)
Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that the executive power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America. The President shall hold office for a term of 4 years, together with the vice president,

chosen for the same term. In addition to the powers set forth in the Constitution, the statutes have conferred
upon the President specific authority and responsibility covering a wide range of matters. The President is the
administrative head of the executive branch of the government, which includes numerous agencies, both
temporary and permanent, as well as the 14 executive departments. The President’s power as the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces is extensive. That power increases in war or any other national emergency. For
example, the President may declare an emergency and call out the military reserves. He or she may even order
the armed forces into military action before Congress actually declares war. Often in cases of national
emergency of vital American interests, a President has referred a matter to Congress after the fact.
B. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 redesignated the National Military Establishment as the
Department of Defense and established it as an executive department with the SECDEF as its head. Since that
time, many legislative and administrative changes have occurred, evolving the department into the structure
under which it currently operates. Under the President, the SECDEF, by virtue of an executive order, has
responsibility for all the President’s functions involving the DoD. Those functions include the President’s
powers, duties, and authorities. As the President’s principal assistant in DoD matters, the SECDEF reports to
the President on all DoD military matters. SECDEF authority includes the separately organized military
departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the unified combatant commands; and
various defense agencies established for specific purposes. The SECDEF is the principal defense policy adviser
to the President. SECDEF is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy related to
DoD, for the execution of approved policy, and for exercising direction, authority, and control over the DoD.
Under the SECDEF, each military department (the Department of the Navy [DoN] includes naval aviation and
the United States Marine Corps) is separately organized under its own secretary and functions under the
authority, direction, and control of the SECDEF. The secretary of each military department is responsible to the
SECDEF for the operation and efficiency of his or her respective department. Orders to the military
departments are issued by the SECDEF through the secretaries of these departments, or their designees, under
authority specifically delegated in writing by the SECDEF, or provided by law. The commanders of the unified
combatant commands are responsible to the President and the SECDEF for accomplishing the military missions
assigned to them and exercising command authority over forces assigned to them. The operational chain of
command runs from the President to the SECDEF to the commanders of the unified combatant commands. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of command by transmitting the orders of the
President or the SECDEF to the commanders of the unified combatant commands.
C. SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) is appointed by the President as the head of the DoN and is responsible
to the SECDEF for the operation and efficiency of the Navy. The DoN includes the U.S. Coast Guard when it is
operating as a Service in the Navy. The SECNAV is responsible for the policies and control of the DoN,
including its organization, administration, functioning, and efficiency. The DoN has two tasks. The first task,
directed by the President or the SECDEF, is to organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain the readiness of
Navy and Marine Corps forces to perform military missions. The second task, directed by the SECDEF, is to
support Navy and Marine Corps forces, as well as the forces of other military departments assigned to the
unified combatant commands. Support includes administrative, personnel, material, funding, and technological
support through research and development. The SECNAV assigns department-wide responsibilities essential to
the efficient administration of the DoN to civilian executive assistants. These assistants consist of the Under
Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and the General Counsel of the Navy. They are
SECNAV’s principal advisors and assistants on DoN administrative affairs. Each civilian executive assistant
has a certain area of responsibility. The civilian executive assistants carry out their duties in cooperation with
the Chief of Naval Operations, the principal naval advisor and executive to the SECNAV. The DoN has many
functions and needs a large contingent of personnel, both civilian and military, and offices to adequately run the
enormous department. The following describes a few of those offices.
D. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (CNO)
OPERATIONS.—The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), under the direction of SECNAV, takes precedence
above all other officers of the naval service. The CNO is the Navy member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
CNO, under the Secretary of the Navy, exercises command over certain central executive organizations,
assigned shore activities, and the Operating Forces of the Navy. The CNO plans for and provides the
manpower, material, weapons, facilities, and services to support the needs of the Navy, with the exception of
the Fleet Marine Forces; maintains water transportation services, including sea transportation services for the
DoD; directs the Naval Reserve; and exercises authority for matters of naval administration, including matters
related to customs and traditions of the

naval service, security, intelligence, discipline, naval communications, and naval operations. The CNO
exercises area coordination authority over all shore activities of the DoNto ensure that total efforts afford
adequate support to the combatant forces and are coordinated among them to assure economy and efficiency of
operation. In addition, the CNO has the following specific responsibilities:
� To organize, train, equip, prepare, and maintain the readiness of Navy operational forces
� To determine and direct the efforts needed to fulfill current and future Navy requirements for
manpower, material, weapons, facilities, and services.
� To exercise leadership in maintaining a high degree of competence among Navy officers and
enlisted and civilian personnel
� To maintain the morale and motivation of Navy personnel and the prestige of a Navy career
� To plan and provide health care for personnel of the naval service and their dependents
� To direct the organization, administration, training, and support of the Naval Reserve
� To monitor the DoN to determine and maintain efficiency, discipline, and readiness
� To determine the need for and to provide for the conduct of research, development, test, and
evaluation that meet long-range goals, immediate requirements, and fiscal limitations
� To devise Navy strategic plans and policies and help devise joint and combined strategic plans
and policies
� To budget for commands, bureaus, and offices assigned to the CNO’s command and for other
activities and programs as assigned The Vice CNO and the Vice CNO’s Assistant,
Directors of Major Staff Offices (DMSOs), and Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations help the CNO
carry out these responsibilities. Of particular interest to the enlisted community is the master chief petty
officer of the Navy (MCPON).
E. FLEET COMMANDER IN CHARGE
Commanders in chief (CINCs) have dual chains of command. Administratively, they report to the CNO to
provide, train, and equip naval forces. Operationally, as naval forces, they report to the appropriate unified
commander in chief. The units of a fleet also have dual chains of command. As units enter an area of
responsibility for a particular Navy CINC, they are operationally assigned to the appropriate numbered fleet.
Ships provided by type commanders make up the operational (numbered) fleets. The Pacific Fleet includes the
Third and Seventh Fleets, the Atlantic Fleet has the Second Fleet, the Fifth Fleet is under the U. S. Naval Forces
Central Command, and Naval Forces Europe mainly consists of the Sixth Fleet. The Navy units also have an
administrative chain of command in which the various ships report to the appropriate forward-area
commanders, known as type commanders.
102.2 Roles of MCPON, Fleet CMC, Force CMC, CNOCM and CMDCM
A. MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE NAVY.—In 1966 the SECNAV’s Task Force on
Navy/Marine Corps Personnel Retention recommended the creation of the office of the master chief petty
officer of the Navy (MCPON). The function of the office is to provide a direct, unofficial channel of
communication between enlisted personnel and the senior policy level of DoN. The office was formally set up
on 1 March 1967 with a tour length of 4 years. The MCPON performs the following duties:
• The MCPON’s assignment is to the immediate office of the CNO. The MCPON serves as the senior enlisted
representative of the Navy and acts as the primary enlisted advisor to the CNO. The MCPON advises the Chief
of Naval Personnel (CHNAVPERS) in all matters regarding active-duty and retired enlisted members and their
dependents.
• The MCPON serves in an advisory capacity on various boards pertaining to enlisted members, including the
following boards.
− Board of Managers of theNavy Relief Society
− Board of Administrators of the BUPERS
Central Nonappropriated Funds
− Board of Equal Opportunity for Women − Rating Review Board − Navy Wives Club of America (Liaison) −
Fleet Reserve Association (Liaison)
− Navy Resale System Advisory Board
• The MCPON, when called upon, testifies beforecongressional committees and subcommittees. The MCPON
occasionally accompanies the CNO and CHNAVPERS on official trips and the Navy Inspector General on
selected

inspection trips. The MCPON travels extensively throughout the fleet and serves as the Navy enlisted
representative of the DoN at special events, celebrations, and ceremonies.
• The MCPON recommends ways to develop effective leadership and training at all enlisted levels and to attain
high standards of conduct and general appearance within the enlisted community. The MCPON acts always to
maintain and promote the chain of command and its associated chain of communications. Further, the MCPON
advises the CNO about existing or potential situations, procedures, and practices affecting the morale, retention,
career enhancement, human goals, and general well-being of the Navy enlisted personnel and their dependents.
• The MCPON does not work alone. In addition to a staff, the MCPON relies on the quality and experience of
the fleet, force, and command master chiefs to carry out the duties of the office.
B. Fleet Master Chief ,
C. Force Master Chief
D. CNO Directed CMC
E. CMDCM
Section B – FLEET MASTER CHIEF, FORCE MASTER CHIEF, CNO-DIRECTED
COMMAND MASTER CHIEF, AND COMMAND MASTER CHIEF REQUIREMENTS
1. Fleet Master Chief (FLTMC), Force Master Chief (FORMC), and Chief of Naval Operations-Directed
Command Master Chief (CNOMC) requirements are limited to the activities listed in tab A.
2. FLTMC, FORMC, and CNOMC requirements and the composition of the CNO/Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Navy Senior Enlisted Leadership Forum are made at CNO’s discretion. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) review these requirements annually.
3. CNOMCs may be assigned to designated Commanders who, 1) report directly to the CNO, or 2) whose
command responsibilities include significant regional area coordination or other unique dimensions (see tab A
of enclosure (1)).
4. Command Master Chief requirements not directed by CNO are determined as follows:
a. All commands with enlisted manpower authorization of 250 or greater will have a Command Master Chief
billet requirement. A CMDMC billet authorization will not normally be programmed against the requirement
until total enlisted authorizations are 250 or greater. Major manpower claimants or resource sponsors will
provide a CMDMC billet for Commander In Chiefs’ staffs with less than 250 manpower requirements.
Additionally, the following activities will be allocated a CMDMC billet regardless of size:
Aviation Type Wing staffs, Carrier-based Air Wing (CVW) squadrons and staffs, deployable Helicopter
Antisubmarine Warfare Light (HSL) squadrons, Helicopter Combat Support (HC) squadrons, Maritime Patrol
(VP) squadrons, Naval Construction Training Centers/Regiments (Gulfport, MS and Port Hueneme, CA), Naval
Construction Battalion Centers, Naval Transient Personnel Units, Submarine Squadron Support Units, Dry
Docks, Regional Support Organizations, Submarine Groups and Squadrons, Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activities (SIMA), Regional Support Groups (RSG), Fast Frigates (FFG), Naval Special Warfare Groups, Naval
Special Warfare Center, Special Boat Squadrons, SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Teams, Special Boat Units, and
Shipyards. Fleet Logistics Support Squadrons with 200 or more enlisted billets, will also have a Command
Master Chief billet. All naval facilities where ships or submarines are homeported or overhauled who have
major host-tenant responsibilities and a manpower base of less than 250 may request a waiver to obtain a
Command Master Chief billet. Component activities (Activity Unit Identification Codes (AUICs)) within a
common Primary Unit Identification Code (PUIC) which are geographically collocated may be included at the
PUIC level to make the determination. In the submarine force, CMC responsibilities are assumed by the Chief
of the Boat (COB) (NEC 9579). The COB must meet the qualification and suitability requirements outlined in
this instruction.
b. Commands having manpower requirements of less than 250 enlisted shall assign a Command Master Chief
from within command resources on a collateral duty basis. In the absence of a Master Chief Petty Officer
(MCPO), a Senior Chief Petty Officer (SCPO) or Chief Petty Officer (CPO) may be assigned. All collateral
duty Master, Senior, or Chief Petty Officers must meet all requirements contained in Section C, paragraph 1.a.
Collateral Duty Command Master Chiefs will retain their source rating designation.

c. Naval Reserve Echelon 1 through 5 commands with active duty and selected reserve manpower requirements
of 750 billets or greater (determined by command manpower documents and reserve unit assignment
documents) have a requirement for a fulltime CMC billet.
d. Requests to establish a new CMDMC billet must be submitted per OPNAVINST 1000.16J. Advance liaison
with MCPON and CNO (N132D) is required. Requests must identify billet, grade, end-strength, and
management headquarters ceiling point compensation, as appropriate.
102.3 Purpose of OPORDS and OPLANS

Operation Orders (OPORD)

An OPERATION PLAN (OPLAN) is a detailed statement l of a course of action to be followed to accomplish a
future mission. An OPERATION ORDER (OPORD) (See fig. 11-35.) puts an OPLAN into effect. The OPORD
is a formal statement issued by the senior commander to subordinate commanders that outlines the coordinated
execution of a future operation in the field.
In five paragraphs, OPLANs and OPORDs detail the complete information and orders necessary to carry out the
decision of the commander. They are written so understanding of the part each is to play in the operations.
OPORDs maybe oral, dictated, or in written form. The most important determining factor of the form and
method of issuing an OPORD is the time available for its preparation and distribution. An order should reach its
destination in enough time to avoid halting troops while they wait for further instructions. Even the lowest
subordinate commander needs time to reconnoiter, place his troops in position, make other necessary
arrangements, and issue his own orders before the hour set for beginning the action.
Oral and dictated orders are similar because both are spoken orders. When oral orders are issued, notes are
made by the persons receiving them. Dictated orders are recorded verbatim by the receiver. A complete copy of
the order or notes is kept by the staff of the issuing commander.
Written orders may be in a message or other convenient form. The use of accompanying maps, photomaps,
overlays, and tables saves time and words and minimizes errors. In many cases, an entire OPORD can be placed
on a map or overlay.
102.4 Duties and Responsibilities of CO, XO and CMC

A. 301. THE COMMANDING OFFICER

a. BASIC FUNCTION. As set forth in U.S. Navy Regulations, the Commanding Officer is charged with the
absolute responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of his or her command, except when and to the
extent he or she may be relieved therefrom by competent authority. b. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
AUTHORITY. The duties and responsibilities of the Commanding Officer are established by U.S. Navy
Regulations, general orders, customs, and tradition. The authority of the Commanding Officer is commensurate
with his or her responsibility, subject to the limitations prescribed by constitutional, statutory, international, and
regulatory law including U.S. Navy Regulations (NAVREGS).

B. 302. THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER

a. BASIC FUNCTION. The Executive Officer is the direct representative of the Commanding Officer. All
orders issued by him/her will have the same force and effect as though issued by the Commanding Officer. The
Executive Officer will conform to and carry out the policies and orders of the Commanding Officer and shall
keep him/her informed of all significant matters pertaining to the command. The Executive Officer shall be
primarily responsible under the Commanding Officer for the organization, performance of duty, and good order
and discipline
of the entire command. He/she will recognize the right and duty of a Head of Department to confer directly with
the Commanding Officer on matters specifically relating to his/her department. An officer acting as Executive
Officer during the temporary absence or disability of that officer will have the same authority and responsibility
as the Executive Officer; but he/she will make no change in the existing organization, unless ordered to do so,
and will endeavor to have the routine and other affairs of the unit carried out in the usual manner.

C. THE COMMAND MASTER CHIEF

BASIC FUNCTIONS. The C M/C is the enlisted advisor to the command on the formulation and
implementation of policies pertinent to morale, welfare, job satisfaction, discipline, utilization and training of all
enlisted personnel and as such the C M/C has direct access to the Commanding Officer. The C M/C
takes precedence over all other enlisted members within a command.
b. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY
(1) Maintain and promote effectiveness and efficiency of chain of command.
(2) Assist the Commanding Officer in all matters pertaining to welfare, health, job satisfaction, morale,
utilization,
and training of enlisted personnel in order to promote traditional standards of good order and discipline.
(3) Advise the Commanding Officer on formulation and implementation of changes in policy pertaining to
enlisted
members.
(4) Attend meetings as directed by the Commanding Officer to keep apprised of current issues and provide a
representative enlisted input.
(5) Participate in ceremonies honoring command members.
(6) When appropriate, represent or accompany the Commanding Officer to official functions, inspections, and
conferences.
(7) Participate in reception and hosting of official visitors to the command.
(8) Upon invitation and as approved by the Commanding Officer, represent the command and Navy at
community and civic functions.
(9) OPNAVINST 1306.2A (NOTAL) provides additional guidance.
102.5 EDVR
1.1 Discussion.
a. The EDVR is a monthly statement of an activity's enlisted personnel account. It lists all individuals
assigned and provides:
(1) A summary by distribution community of the present and future manning status of the activity.
(2) A common reference for communicating manning status between an activity and its Manning Control
Authority (MCA).
(3) A statement of account for verification by the Personnel and Pay Services Unit Identification Code
(PPSUIC) activity.
(4) A permanent historical record of an activity's enlisted personnel account.
1.3 Organization of EDVR. The EDVR is organized into twelve sections:
a. EDVR sections 1 through 3 contain information that has been extracted from the account because it requires
special attention or action by the activity. To assist activities in managing enlisted personnel, these sections also
identify future personnel events. Additionally, EDVR section 3 contains an alphabetic listing of all enlisted
members assigned to the activity.
b. EDVR section 4 contains the total personnel account of the activity, including those members reflected in
sections 1 through 3.
c. EDVR section 5 contains the Personnel Status Summary.
d. EDVR section 6 contains Distribution Navy Enlisted Classification Code (DNEC) Management.
e. EDVR section 7 contains NEC Billet and Personnel Inventory.
f. EDVR section 8 contains a list of individuals who are qualified in Navy Enlisted Classification Codes
(NECs).
g. EDVR sections 9 and 10 contain the Diary Message Summary and Duty Preference Listing, respectively.
h. EDVR section 11 contains individual security data, citizenship code, involuntary extension months,
Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD), Time in Rate (TIR), Advancement Effective Date, and FORMAN Status and
Action Date.
i. EDVR section 12 contains a listing of both officer and enlisted personnel in an embarked or Temporary
Additional Duty (TAD) status to augment normal manning. This listing also includes commands that are
embarked onboard another command.
j. Exception. The EDVR for activity accounts with a MCA code of "X" (Others, Patients and Students) will not
contain information in EDVR sections 1, 2 and 5 through 8. This type of account will only contain information
in EDVR sections 3, 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12.

102.6 Naval Message and Email

MESSAGES
This portion of the chapter will introduce you to basic message traffic format (MTF). Although there are many
types and modes of communications, the basic naval message must conform to a standard format with few
exceptions. As a YN, you need to be familiar with all of them.

COMMON MESSAGE ELEMENTS

Before covering the basic format of military messages, we will first discuss the time system, precedence
categories, and speed-of-service objectives used in naval communications.

Time
Time is one of the most important elements in communications. Messages are normally identified and filed by
either a date-time-group (DTG) or a Julian date, depending on the method of transmission.

Date-Time-Group
The DTG is assigned for identification and file purposes only. The DTG consists of six digits. The first two
digits represent the date, the second two digits represent the hour, and the third two digits represent the minutes.
For example, 221327Z AUG 00 means the 22nd day of August, plus the time in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).
The dates from the first to the ninth of the month are preceded by a zero. This designation is followed by a zone
suffix and the month and year. The month is expressed by its first three letters, and the year by the last two
digits of year of origin; for example, 081050Z AUG 00 The zone suffix ZULU (Z), for GMT, is used as the
universal time for all messages.

Greenwich Mean Time

In naval communications, the DTG is computed from a common worldwide standard. To meet the need for
worldwide time standardization, the international GMT system was developed. Greenwich, England, is the
location from which all worldwide time is determined. The GMT system uses a 24-hour clock instead of the
two 12-hour cycles used in the normal civilian world.

Julian Date
The Julian date consists of three digits. They represent the day of the year. The first day of the calendar year is
Julian 001, and each day is numbered consecutively thereafter. For example, in Julian, “032” would be the 32nd
day of the calendar year (February 1).

Precedence
The message drafter indicates the desired writer-to-reader delivery time through the assignment of a message
precedence. Although the drafter determines the precedence, the releaser should either confirm or change it.
The following paragraphs list the various precedence categories, their indicators, and basic definitions:
ROUTINE ®. Processed within 6 hours. This category is assigned to all types of traffic that justify electrical
transmission but which are not of sufficient urgency to require a higher precedence. PRIORITY (P). Processed
within 3 hours. This category is reserved for messages that furnish essential information for the conduct of
operations in progress. This is the highest precedence normally authorized for administrative messages.
IMMEDIATE (O). Processed within 30 minutes. This category is reserved for messages relating to situations
that gravely affect the national forces or populace and that require immediate delivery to addressees.
FLASH (Z). Processed as fast as possible with an objective of less than 10 minutes. This category is reserved
for initial enemy contact reports or operational combat messages of extreme urgency; message brevity is
mandatory.
Precedence is assigned according to urgency, based solely on writer-to-reader time, not according to the
importance of the subject matter or the text. For example, an unclassified message may be assigned an
IMMEDIATE

precedence, whereas a Secret message may be assigned a ROUTINE precedence. In this situation, the
unclassified message requires fast action or response, whereas the Secret message may not require any action at
all.

Address Component
The address component contains the designation of the originating station identified by the originator prosign
FM (meaning “from”). Prosign TO contains the designation(s) of the action addressee(s), if any. Prosign INFO
contains the designation(s) of the information addressee(s), if any.
Addressee designations in the address component may be call signs, address groups, plain language designators,
or a combination of routing indicators and plain language designators.
The separation sign BT, meaning “break,” provides a distinct separation between the heading and the text and
between the text and the ending.

Text
The text is the part of the message that contains the thought or idea that the drafter desires to communicate. In
drafting the text for transmission, the drafter should strive for brevity through the proper choice of words and
good writing technique. However, brevity must never be achieved at the expense of accuracy or clarity.
Uncommon phrases and modes of expression can render the meaning of a message ambiguous or obscure.
The text must be worded so that it unmistakably expresses the thoughts to be conveyed. All abbreviations must
be limited to those meanings that are self-evident or those that are recognizable by virtue of long-established
use. We will now discuss some of the more important requirements concerning the text of a message.
CLASSIFICATION LINE.—The classification line is the first line of the text and immediately follows the BT
that separates the heading and text. This line indicates the message classification and, when applicable, special-
handling markings, codes, or flag words. This line also provides the SSIC. For United States use, the three
security classification designators are Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. The acronyms FOUO (For Official
Use Only) and EFTO (Encrypt For Transmission Only) are not classification designators. They are used with
the designation UNCLAS in the classification line.

Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data

are similar except that they are used with classification designators. You can find information concerning the
criteria and handling of FOUO and EFTO messages in the Telecommunications Users Manual, NTP 3.

SPECIAL-HANDLING MARKINGS.—
Certain types of messages require special handling in addition to that provided by the security classification.
These special markings are placed in the classification line immediately following the classification. Some of
the more common special-handling markings that you will see are the following:
• Special Category (SPECAT)
• Limited Distribution (LIMDIS)
• PERSONAL FOR
SPECAT messages come in two variations. One type includes both the general SPECAT and the SPECAT
Single Integrated OperationalPlan—Extremely Sensitive Information (SPECAT SIOP-ESI). The other type of
SPECAT message is SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR (SEF). SEF is used only within the naval community for
highly sensitive matters, high-level policy, or when politically sensitive information is to be passed only to a
particular individual. The classification line would then contain the name of that individual. For example, a
Secret message destined exclusively for Admiral W. T. Door would read:

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR

ADM W. T. DOOR //N00000//

SEF messages are reserved for use by flag officers and officers in a command status. These messages are not
intended for use in operational matters, and they may not be readdressed or referenced in other narrative
messages.

Only those personnel who are authorized to view them, as approved in writing by the CO, handle SPECAT
messages.
LIMDIS messages are associated with special projects, cover names, or specific subjects. These messages
require limited distribution within the addressed activity to those personnel with a need to know and who are
specifically authorized by the command to have access to the information. Only classified messages qualify for
the special-handling marking LIMDIS. However, the classification is still assigned according to the subject
matter. The classification line of a Secret LIMDIS message would read SECRET LIMDIS.
PERSONAL FOR messages may be unclassified or classified and are reserved for flag rank and command
status officers. Distribution of these messages is limited to the named recipient (who may direct further
distribution). In PERSONAL FOR messages, the classification line always shows the name or title of the
intended recipient and may show the name or title of the originator.
PERSONAL FOR messages are used only by and addressed only to Navy commands.

STANDARD SUBJECT IDENTIFICATION

CODE.—The SSIC identifies the subject matter of the message. The SSIC is preceded and followed by two
slant signs. For example:

UNCLAS E F T O FOUO //N02000//

The SSIC always contains five digits corresponding to the particular subject matter, preceded by the letter N.
With few exceptions, an SSIC is required on all naval messages. Those messages without SSICs are normally
returned to the drafter. Many automated systems route message traffic by the SSIC.

SSICs are contained in Department of the Navy

File Maintenance Procedures and Standard Subject
Identification Codes, SECNAVINST 5210.11 series.

PASSING AND DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS.—

The majority of naval automated message processing systems rely on specific elements at the beginning of the
text. These elements may be flag words, code words, subject lines, and outgoing/incoming message references.
These elements serve as guides and assist the automated internal routing of messages. Special delivery
instructions, such as FOR, FROM, and PASS TO are additional means of indicating that the text of the message
is to receive the attention of the indicated individual or office without necessarily limiting the normal
distribution.
Special delivery instructions, when used, follow the SSIC. These instructions are used for exceptional cases not
covered by use of office codes in the address. Passing instructions must not be separated into an individual
paragraph of the text. They should follow the SSIC and can continue on the line immediately following the
classification and SSIC. SUBJECT LINE.—The subject line indicates the basic contents of the message.
Internal message routers and Navy automated message processing systems key on the subject to determine
internal message distribution. Therefore, messages containing similar information should be assigned a standard
subject whenever possible to facilitate message identification and internal distribution. The subject line of a
message begins at the left-hand margin immediately following the classification line with the characters SUBJ.
REFERENCE LINES.—Reference lines are
used to avoid repeating lengthy quotations or references within the text of a message. A reference may be any
message, document, correspondence, or telephone conversation that is pertinent to the message. When a
reference is referred to in the text, it would be called REF A, REF B, or REF C, as applicable.
INDENTING.—The classification, subject, and
reference set lines will always begin at the left-hand
margin. Textual material may be indented a maximum of 20 spaces for clarity.

REMARKS.—The RMKS (remarks) set begins the actual text. The message may contain several subjects or
several aspects of one subject. For this reason, textual material is divided into paragraphs and subparagraphs
(numbered and lettered consecutively).

CLASSIFICATION AND PARAGRAPH

MARKINGS.—When a message is classified, the subject line, all paragraphs, and subparagraphs are marked
with the appropriate classification symbol. This eliminates any doubt in the reader’s mind as to the
classification of a particular paragraph. PUNCTUATION.—Punctuation is used within the text of a message
when essential for clarity. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.—During an actual or simulated emergency, it may
become necessary to reduce the volume of record and/or voice communications ordinarily transmitted over U.S.
military telecommunications circuits. This action, known as MINIMIZE, is designed to clear communications
networks of messages that are not considered urgent. Only those messages that affect the accomplishment of a
mission or safety of life are considered essential and, therefore, require electronic transmission during
MINIMIZE periods. The releasing officer must review messages that have not been released during MINIMIZE
periods. The releasing officer must determine if a message can be sent via another means or if it must be sent
electrically via telecommunications circuits. If the releasing officer releases a message for transmission, the
words MINIMIZE CONSIDERED and RELEASED BY must be included. DOWNGRADING
INSTRUCTIONS.—All classified messages must contain a downgrading or declassification instruction with the
exception of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data messages.

GENERAL MESSAGES
General messages provide a standard distribution to a large group of addressees and are identified by a
repetitive short title (for example, ALNAV, NAVOP, JAFPUB).
All commands to whom general messages are distributed are action addressees. However, each command
receiving a general message is responsible for determining what action, if any, it needs to take on the message.
Although general messages have a wide, standardized distribution, all addressees may not need to take action.
However, commands are required to keep a continuous numerical file of all general messages for which they are
on the distribution list and that they receive. Consequently, the general message files should contain every
general message received during the calendar year, in numerical order. The general message files are separate
from all other files and are subdivided according to identifying title or type.

PRO FORMA MESSAGES

Pro forma messages are messages whose subject matter and sequence of textual content are preset and cannot
be changed by the originator.

MINIMIZE MESSAGES
Minimize means, “It is nowmandatory that normal message and telephone traffic be reduced drastically so that
vital messages connected with the situation indicated will not be delayed.”
A message ordering MINIMIZE consists of the word MINIMIZE, followed by the area affected (scope), reason,
and duration of the MINIMIZE condition (when known).
COMMUNICATIONS GUARD SHIFT

MESSAGES
Communications guard shift (COMMSHIFT) messages are required when a command shifts its guard from one
broadcast or servicing communications center to another. When possible, the shift takes effect at 0001Z of the
new radio day. When broadcasts are shifted, an overlap period before and after the effective time is observed to
ensure continuity of traffi c . Detailed information concerning communications guard shift messages and
formats is contained in Naval Telecommunications Publication 4 (NTP-4).

MESSAGE AND ROUTING ADDRESSEES

Messages may be divided into types, according to the way they are addressed, as follows:

SINGLE-ADDRESS. A message that has only one addressee, which may be either for action or information.
MULTIPLE-ADDRESS. Amessage that has two or more addressees, which may be either action or information
and where each addressee is informed of all other recipients.
BOOK. A message destined for two or more addressees but where the drafter considers it unnecessary that each
addressee be informed of other addressees. Book messages are routed according to each addressee’s relay
station. All unnecessary addressees are deleted from the face of the message before being sent to the
addressee(s) served by that particular relay station.
GENERAL MESSAGE. A message that has a wide, predetermined, standard distribution. General messages are
normally titled with a sequential number for the current year; for example, ALCOM 28/01, NAVOP 30/01. The
title indicates distribution and serves as the address designator.

Address Indicating Groups

The purpose of address indicating groups (AIGs) is to increase the speed-of-traffic handling. They shorten the
message address by providing a single address group to represent a large number of addressees. This eliminates
individual designators for each address used in the heading.

Message Addresses
Absolute consistency in the format and spelling of a plain language address (PLA) was not critical before the
implementation of automated message-processing systems. Because communications personnel processed all
messages, deviations in address spelling were tolerated. This is no longer true. Message drafters must now
verify the PLA for each addressee in the Message Address Directory (MAD) and not rely on memory or copy
PLAs from incoming messages.

Message Address Directory

The MAD contains authorized message addresses and is divided into sections: Joint Department of Defense
(JDOD PLAD); U.S. Military Communications—
Electronics Board Publication (MCEB Pub 6), Army, Air Force, and Navy. The Navy section, “U.S. Navy Plain
Language Address Directory (USN PLAD 1),” includes message addresses for Marine Corps and Coast Guard
activities. MAD updates are published four times a year to ensure all addresses are current. Plain Language
Addresses The PLAs listed in USN PLAD 1 are the only designators authorized for use in message addressing
to Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard activities. Deviations from USN PLAD 1 in spelling, spacing, or
formatting cannot be tolerated because automated message-processing systems are keyed to USN PLAD 1
entries.

Office Codes
Office codes are required for all Navy shore activity PLAs. Office codes follow the PLA and are enclosed in
double slants; for example, CNO WASHINGTON DC//094//. There is no limit on the number of office codes
that can be used with a PLA. When multiple office codes are used with a PLA, the first code is the action code.
A single slant separates multiple codes. For example:

CNO WASHINGTON DC//094/611//

If an office code is not known, the code //JJJ// is used after the PLA. Office codes are not used with AIGs,
CADs, or PLAs in pro forma messages. NTP-3 has further information concerning office codes used with
PLAs.

MESSAGE USER RESPONSIBILITIES

A message user is any individual authorized to draft, release, and/or process electronically transmitted
messages. There are certain responsibilities associated with the origination of a message. These responsibilities
are separate and distinct and concern the following parties:
• Originator
• Drafter
• Releaser

Occasionally, the responsibilities may overlap, especially if one person is serving a dual capacity. For example,
administrative officers may occasionally draft and release messages, thus making them both drafters and
releasers.

Originator
The originator is the authority (command or activity) in whose name the message is sent. The originator is
presumed to be the CO of the command or activity. Most often, the originator and the releaser are one and the
same. In some cases, the drafter, releaser, and originator are all the same person. For example, if the CO drafts a
message for transmission, he or she is the drafter as well as the releasing authority for the activity in whose
name the message is sent.

Drafter
The drafter is the person who actually composes the message. According to NTP-3, the drafter is responsible for
the following:
• Addressing and using PLAs correctly
• Ensuring clear, concise composition
• Selecting the precedence
• Ensuring the proper format
• Assigning the proper classification
• Ensuring the application of proper downgrading and declassification instructions to classified messages,
except those containing Restricted
Data or Formerly Restricted Data
Releaser
The releaser is a properly designated individual authorized to release messages for transmission in the name of
the command or activity. The releasing individual makes sure that the drafter has complied with the
requirements contained in the NTP-3. In addition to validating the contents of the message, the signature of the
releaser affirms compliance with message-drafting instructions. The signature of the releaser authorizes the
message for transmission.

MESSAGE FORMAT
General administrative (GENADMIN) is the format used for most narrative messages. The exceptions are those
narrative messages for which a publication, instruction, or other directive requires a different format. There are
other formats for special-purpose messages. These messages include casualty reports (CASREPs), movement
reports (MOVREPs), and Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). Instructions for preparing these
messages are found in appropriate publications.
EMAIL: Ref (h) unavailable at this time
102.7 Service Record Entries Pg 2, 4 and 13
1. Policy. NAVPERS 1070/602 is used for both officer and enlisted members.
a. Part I serves as an application for dependency allowances and is used to capture military spouse data.
b. Part II provides an immediately accessible, up-to-date record of emergency data and is the official document
used to determine the following:
(1 Person(s) to be notified in case of emergency or death.
)
(2 Person(s) to receive the death gratuity when no spouse or child exists.
)
(3 Person(s) to receive unpaid pay and allowances (arrears of pay) including money accrued
) during a missing or captured status, unused leave, travel, per diem, transportation of family
members, transportation of household goods, and savings deposits found due from
Department of the Navy.
(4 Dependents of member to receive allotment of pay if member is missing or unable to
) transmit funds.
(5 Commercial insurance companies to be notified in case of death.
)
(6 National Service Life Insurance, Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance, and Veterans Group
) Life Insurance in effect.

Rule. DD 93, prepared at the Military Entrance Processing Stations for enlisted members required to undergo
recruit training, serves the same purpose as NAVPERS 1070/602, Part II.
2. When to Prepare. Prepare NAVPERS 1070/602 as follows:
Prepare... when...
Parts I and II (complete a member with dependents enters or reenters the Navy or Naval
set) Reserve.
there is a change in dependent status or number of dependents for a member on active duty.

a reservist is on active duty, active duty for training, or temporary active duty for more than 30
days. (See Verification below.)
 Part II a member without dependents enters or reenters the Navy or Naval
(partial set) Reserve.
a reservist is on active duty for training or temporary active duty less than 30 days. (See
Verification below).
there is a change in
1• name or address of a dependent;
2• next of kin other than a dependent;
3• name or address of a beneficiary, allottee, or insurer;
4• citizenship of spouse;
5• religion; or
6• any remarks on reverse side of the form.

3. When Not Required to Prepare. Do not prepare NAVPERS 1070/602 (complete or partial sets) when there is
a change in the member’s
(1 status;
)
(2 grade;
)
(3 rate;
)
(4 beneficiary designation on SGLV-8286, Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance and Certificate
) (Nov 1992);
(5 duty station; or
)
(6 military spouse data.
)

4. Preparation and Distribution. Prepare and distribute per DJMS PTG.

Rule. Do not send copies of birth, death, divorce, or marriage certificates to Navy Personnel Command (PERS-
312C).
5. Verification
a. Active Duty. NAVPERS 1070/602 is verified when a
(1 member reports, permanent change of station.
)
(2 member detaches, permanent change of station.
)
(3 member’s unit deploys.
)
(4 member applies for a dependent’s DD 1173, Uniformed Services Identification and
) Privilege Card (Mar 1961) (except when that dependent can be verified as enrolled in the
Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) with a valid future expiration
date).
(5 member applies for Government housing.
)
 (6 member claims reimbursement for dependents’ travel.
)

b. Inactive Duty. NAVPERS 1070/602 is verified when feasible, but in any event, upon each occasion that the
member comes on active duty including active duty for training.
c. If correct, the member will so indicate by signing and dating NAVPERS 1070/602 under “Certification of
Designator.”
d. If incorrect, prepare a new NAVPERS 1070/602.

6. Other Change Reporting Requirements. Update DEERS whenever there is a change of address of a
dependent.

NAVPERS 1070/604, Enlisted Qualifications History

1. Policy. NAVPERS 1070/604 for USN and USNR enlisted members is a chronological history of their
occupational and training related qualifications and their awards and commendations.
2. Preparation
a. Enter and verify the following information on the bottom of the form:
(1) Members name
(2) Social security number
(3) Branch and class
b. Make entries as events occur. Entries will be initialed by an authorized individual per MILPERSMAN 1070-
190.
c. Personnel Qualifications Standards (PQS) section has been approved for automation. The electronic and
preprinted pages are interchanged and integrated into the form.
d. A new page shall be prepared whenever one section becomes filled with entries and additional entries are
required in that section, except for Section 1, Educational Experience Level.
e. When a member immediately reenlists, prepare a new NAVPERS 1070/604 for the reenlistment U.S. Navy
Enlisted (Field) Service Records (FSR).
3. How to Make Entries. Make entries as follows:
Section Title Description
1 Educational Experience Enter in the date issued block the date the member
Level (Exhibit 1) passed the completed General Educational
Development (GED) tests or all parts of the College
Level Examination Program-General Examinations
(CLEP-GE). In the case of partial completion of the
CLEP-GE, record in section 3 the date the last test was
taken and the numbers of all the test parts satisfactorily
completed.
Entries for partially completed GED batteries will not
be recorded.
Enter the state that issued diploma or certificate.
Present Level of Education is the number of years of
education. Enter the highest grade completed, not the
one being attended.
 2 Classification/ASVAB Enter test form identification, date the test was
Testing Qualifications administered, and computed AFQT. Record the
(Exhibit 1) individual Navy Standard scores for each ASVAB
subtest.
Enter the activity name and geographical location of the
activity that administered the ASVAB test/retest.
Complete the special test scores section as necessary to
record data related to one or more of the tests shown on
Exhibit 1. No other test score data will be recorded in
this section.
1• This section is to be completed by enlisted classifiers
only.

1• Record test score data on the original NAVPERS

1070/604 only, never on the reproduced copies.

Section Title Description

3 Record of Off-Duty
Education/ VOC/Tech
Training and Non-required
Correspondence (Exhibit 1)
4 Other Training Courses/
Instructions Completed
(Exhibit 1)
Record the completion of Navy correspondence
courses, other than those required for advancement.
Record the completion of educational testing, i.e.,
CLEP, DANTES, SAT, LSAT, DSST, ACT, ACT
PRP, GRE, GMAT, and NTE.
Record formal education achieved after entry into
naval service, including courses that are non-
degree/diploma.
Enter the abbreviated course or exam title, school
completion date, and grade.
Record courses qualifying the member to operate or
maintain specific types of equipment, driver
improvement training and refresher courses, and
short term instruction received at fleet and naval
shore (field) activities which are not included in
section 6.
Enter the completion date, the type of equipment
qualified to operate or maintain (AN/SAS-10,
AN/USQ-6, etc.) and/or course title, duration of
course, and name and location of activity were the
course was conducted.
 5 Navy Service
Schools/Military Training
Courses (Exhibit 2)
For each Navy school the member attends, enter the
complete course title (do not abbreviate) and location
of the school (abbreviated), Navy Enlisted
Classification Code (NEC) earned when applicable,
the date enrolled and completed, the course length,
and grade.
In MANNER OF COMPLETION, check:
1• “GRADUATED” if member successfully
completes the course.
2• “DROPPED” if member did not successfully
complete the course.

Section Title Description

6 Correspondence Courses Record data of only those Navy courses for which
Required for completion is mandatory prior to taking the Navy-wide
Advancement (Exhibit 2) examination. Other Navy courses are to be entered in
sections 3 and 4, as appropriate.
For each required Navy training course or enlisted
correspondence course, enter the name of the course,
rate if applicable, NAVEDTRA number if any, and the
course completion date.
7 Navy Enlisted Enter the NEC codes and the effective date of
Classifications (Exhibit assignment or removal in chronological order.
2) RULE: Precede the date of entry with “R” to indicate
code removal, revocation, or disqualification.
8 Personnel Advancement Record completion of mandatory training requirements
Requirements (Exhibit 2) to establish enlisted advancement eligibility, e.g.,
Military/Leadership Examination, Personnel
Advancement Requirement (PAR) and Performance
Test.
Enter the training reference by abbreviated title,
number, and

completion date.
9 Enlisted Enter the standard rate abbreviation for advancements, reductions,
Rate/Rating corrections, or changes in rate/rating in chronological order.
(Exhibit 2) Enter the effective date of the advancement, reduction, or change in
rate/rating and the computation date for time in rate (TIR) eligibility
for advancement to the next higher pay grade.
1 Designator Enter the effective date of assignment or removal in chronological
0 Record (Exhibit order and the designation code for enlisted special qualifications.
2) Enter abbreviation for qualification or revocation of qualification.

Section Title Description

 11 Awards (Exhibit 3) Record awards and commendations including personal
military decorations, unit awards, campaign and service
awards, marksmanship awards, good conduct awards, and
military-related letters of commendation.
Enter award name, award date or meritorious period,
awarding authority and reference correspondence, and, if
applicable, the number of points credited toward
advancement.
Record Good Conduct Medal or Naval Reserve reeligibility
start date as a result of disciplinary action or substandard
performance per SECNAVINST 1650.1F.
Enter “Eligibility restarts for (award name), date eligibility
restarts (e.g., day after date of offense),
“conduct/performance,” “N/A” for advancement points.
12 Personnel Enter the training reference by abbreviated title and number.
Qualification Record the completion of watchstation or workstation
Standards (PQS) qualifications required under the PQS Program and
(Exhibit 4) completion date.

4. Where to File. NAVPERS 1070/604 shall be maintained and filed in the field service record per
MILPERSMAN 1070-100.
5. Active Duty Member Retested With ASVAB. The enlisted classifier must complete section 2 of the current
original NAVPERS 1070/604 in the member’s field service record. For a special test not administered in
conjunction with an ASVAB, record the special test score on the current original NAVPERS 1070/604 only.

NAVPERS 1070/613, Administrative Remarks

1. Policy. NAVPERS 1070/613 services as a chronological record of significant miscellaneous entries which are
not provided for elsewhere or where more detailed information may be required to clarify entries on other pages
of the U.S. Navy Enlisted (Field) Service Record (FSR).
2. Preparing the Form. NAVPERS 1070/613 is prepared as follows:
Block Entry
SHIP OR STATION Enter the complete name and designation of the ship or station at
which the member is serving.
Remarks area
1• One entry per page.
2• Use single spacing.

NAME, SSN, BRANCH Enter the member’s full name, social security number, and
AND CLASS

branch and class of service.

Block in lower right corner Enter the consecutive page number.

3. Making Entries
a. Entries shall be dated and signed by an authorized official per MILPERSMAN 1070-190.
b. Entries shall be dated and signed by the member as required by the governing directive.
c. Entries which require a copy to be forwarded immediately to Navy Personnel Command Personnel
(NAVPERSCOM) must:
(1) cite the authority at the end, e.g., MILPERSMAN 0000-000, BUPERSINST 0000.00. Copies received
without authority cited will not be filed in the permanent personnel record.
(2) contain only the entry concerned.
4. Civil Conviction and Nonjudicial Punishment.
a. The following entries are required, even if an appeal has been filed:
Entry for... shall include...
civil conviction (or action taken by civil authorities which is
equal to a conviction), whether it is a misdemeanor or felony, 1• date of conviction or action.
which comes to the command’s attention
1• final charge and specific
action for which member was
found guilty.

1• court in which convicted.

1• sentence of the court.

nonjudicial punishment (NJP) where pay is not affected

1• date of offense.

1• nature of offense (cite

Uniform Code of Military
Justice article).

1• date of NJP.

1• punishment awarded.

b. All entries must be dated and signed by the authorized official per MILPERSMAN 1070-190.
c. A copy of the entry shall be sent to NAVPERSCOM (PERS-313C1) for inclusion into the permanent
personnel record.
d. In the event the civil conviction is overturned or the NJP appeal is granted, remove the original entry from
FSR. Notify NAVPERSCOM (PERS-83) by official naval letter with copies of supporting documentation.
5. Adverse Material. Adverse material must be acknowledged in writing by the member, except under
MILPERSMAN 1070-100.
6. Disposition. NAVPERS 1070/613 will be retained in the FSR until either of the following events occur:
a. When a member transfers, entries of a transitory nature or applicable to the local command shall be removed
and given to the member. Examples of these entries are as follows:
(1 Volunteered for special duty.
)
(2 Member has read and understands regulations.
)
 (3 Member has attended or briefed on Navy’s policies, e.g., sexual harassment, security,
) hazing, indoctrination, liberty.

b. When a member immediately reenlists or when closing an FSR, the following types of entries shall be
forwarded for inclusion in the permanent personnel record following MILPERSMAN 1070-070 for officers and
MILPERSMAN 1070-130 for enlisted:
(1 Disciplinary
) 1• Captain’s mast
2• Civil conviction
3• Nonjudicial
punishment
4• Unauthorized absence

(2 Enlisted performance evaluation report/adverse report

)
(3 Exposure to chemicals/potential health hazard
)
(4 Medals/unit commendation/Battle E/ribbons, not listed on NAVPERS 1070/604, Enlisted
) Qualifications History
(5 Physical readiness standards
) 1• Completed weight reduction program
2• Failure to meet

(6 Retain in service
) 1• Performance/conduct deficiencies

(7 Sea duty counter/credit

)
(8 Time-in-Rate date change
)

102.8 Purpose and Rules of OPREP’s, LOGREQ’s, SORTS and SITREP’s

LOGISTICS REQUIREMENT (LOGREQ) REPORT
Unless otherwise directed by operation orders, area commanders, or SOPA instructions, prior to the arrival of a
commissioned naval or fleet auxiliary ship at any U.S., British, or Canadian port, the CO shall make known to
appropriate naval authority the logistic requirements (LOGREQ) of his ship during the period in port. This
information is submitted by speedletter where possible, but is usually sent by message so as to be received at
least three working days prior to ships ETA. Ships proceeding in company will furnish this information to the
senior commander embarked who will coordinate the data and submit it as a single message. These requests
may be for stores that are needed, number of brows, number of cars on the pier, etc.
SORTS
The Status of Resources/Training Systems (SORTS) Report is the principal report within the U. S. Navy and
Military Sealift Command (MSC) to provide combat readiness data to the National Command Authority
(NCA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), fleet commanders-in-chief (e.g.
CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCLANTFLT), and other operational commanders.
The SORTS is constructed in a computer-readable format to enable automated updating of the Navy Status of
Forces (NSOF) data base within the Navy Command and Control System (NCCS)/World Wide Military
Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
SITREP
a. The Commander’s SITREP is a multipurpose, narrative report submitted IAW US Message Text Formatting
(USMTF) instructions found in Military Standard (MIL STD) 6040. It keeps addressees informed and enables
the
commands and Services concerned to expect and prepare for potential effects. Message instructions in MIL
STD 6040 identify unit (tactical)-level SITREP information requirements as well as the CJCS-level content
requirements
identified below. The sender must keep the receiver in mind in order to select the correct reporting format.
b. Duplicate reporting is not required, but information already given in another Joint Reporting Structure (JRS)
report may be referenced to ensure operational impacts are noted.
7. Report Content
a. Combatant command SITREPs will be arranged using the CJCS-level USMTF format (Record Message
Example in MIL STD 6040). The following topics (explained in paragraph 8) will be addressed in the SITREP
as applicable.
(1) Own situation, disposition, and/or status of forces.
(2) Situation overview.
(3) Operations.
(4) Intelligence and reconnaissance.
(5) Logistics.

102.9 Laws of Armed Conflict

YOUR CONDUCT UNDER THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT

The laws of armed conflict tell you what you can and cannot do in combat situations. With the training you
receive, you will have the necessary discipline to do the right thing. But if you do not learn how to conduct
yourself in combat, you will be punished for mistakes. All persons in uniform, carrying a weapon or
participating in any way in military operations or activities, are known as combatants. Under the laws of armed
conflict, only combatants are considered proper targets and may be fired upon. All others are called
noncombatants. Noncombatants include civilians, medical personnel, and chaplains. Knowing the difference
between combatants and noncombatants in guerrilla war situations may sometimes be difficult and require great
care. Humane treatment of noncombatants may help you in obtaining valuable intelligence to better pursue your
mission. If you are in doubt about the differences between combatants and noncombatants, consult your
superior before pursuing a course of action.
103 NAVY EXPEDITIONARY HISTORY FUNDAMENTALS
103.1 Formation of the U.S. Navy
In both war and peace, the oceans and coastal waters of the world have been the lifelines of supply and
communications. Recognizing the strategic importance of British resupply by sea during the American
RevolutionaryWar, General GeorgeWashington initiatedAmerica’s first sea-based offensive against the
British.Washington’s armed vessels provided significant support to colonial efforts, demonstrating the value of
military operations at sea.
We assembled the initial continental fleet from converted merchantmen. As Congress continued to commission
ships, notable leaders such as John Paul Jones helped to develop a proud and capable Navy. It was not long
before that force was able to capture the world’s attention by displaying its ability to carry the fight overseas, far
from American shores.
In manning their early fleets, American commanders provided for Marines as part of their ships’ crews. In
essence, the first Marines were soldiers detailed for sea service. Convinced that crews with Marines could fight
successfully at sea and also mount military operations ashore, Congress passed an Act stating “That, in addition
to the present military establishment, there shall be raised and organized a Corps of Marines.” Congress
continued to provide for Marines as long as there was one Navy ship still at sea. After the Revolutionary War,
however, both the Continental Navy and Marine Corps were disbanded.
The government of the United States soon recognized new threats to our young nation. Smuggling was
diverting desperately needed tax money from our almost empty treasury. Alexander Hamilton, the first
Secretary of the Treasury, proposed, and the Congress authorized in 1790, a fleet of “ten boats for the collection
of revenue.” It became commonly known as the Revenue Marine, precursor to the U.S. Coast Guard.1 Another
threat was the seizure of U.S. merchant shipping by predatory French privateers and pirates from the
Mediterranean’s Barbary coast. In addition to their Treasury duties, the ten boats, or “Revenue Cutters,”
constituted the sole seaborne defense of the United States until Congress exercised its constitutional power and
voted to “establish and maintain a Navy.” For the next few years, struggling with postwar debts, the nation still
was not united in supporting the costly venture. In 1794, however, Congress authorized the Department of War
to construct six frigates, for the protection of American merchantmen against the Barbary corsairs. Four years
later, in response to renewed aggression by France during its war against Great Britain, Congress finally
established the Department of the Navy, authorized the Marine Corps, and began the first significant buildup of
naval forces2 as we know them today.
“The palpable necessity of power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution
against a spirit of censure which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest
blessings of

America that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of
her security against danger from abroad.”
— James Madison, The Federalist Papers, 1788
Our three maritime Services—Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard — conduct operations in the world’s
oceans and littoral regions.3 With such capable naval forces, we view the oceans not as an obstacle, but as our
base of operations and our maneuver space, which we either can control or deny to an opponent. Whenever we
face an adversary without a blue-water fleet, the oceans serve as barriers for our defense. As important though,
the oceans provide the United States avenues of world trade and military lines of communication with allies and
friends — when they are protected by our strong naval forces. To appreciate operations in the maritime
environment, it is necessary to understand the distinctive character of naval forces.
103.2 Qualities and Characters of Navy/Marine Corps

The Character of Naval Forces

We are, first, American fighting men and women. We take ships and submarines to sea, fly aircraft, land on
foreign shores, stand watches around the clock and around the world and, when required, engage the enemy at
sea and ashore. Our people are our most valued resource and provide the element of will against adversity,
supply essential creativity amid the uncertainties of conflict, and combine inspiration, reason, and experience to
achieve our national objectives in peace and in war.
Every day, dedicated Sailors and Marines make countless sacrifices while supporting our national objectives. At
the heart of this selflessness are core values that drive personal standards of excellence and moral strength. Our
nation places special trust and confidence in these men and women while giving them the sobering
responsibility of properly exercising military power that is greater than any in history. This trust is warranted by
our continued competence in carrying out roles, absolute integrity in actions and relationships, and personal
courage that overcomes moral dilemmas and physical obstacles through an unyielding sense of duty and
commitment. This professional ethic, shared by every member of our naval forces, enhances cohesion and
promotes teamwork. It establishes an environment in which we are able to share and delegate responsibilities in
working toward a common goal.
Naval forces reflect the partnership among our active, reserve, and civilian components. Our planning is
predicated on each component contributing its part in day-to-day support operations, mobilization, and force
augmentation. Our reservists and civilian employees share the same sense of dedication and purpose, and fill
critical positions in carrying out our operations. Working and training together, the active, reserve, and civilian
components permit naval forces to maintain readiness to respond effectively to a wide array of demands on
short notice Naval forces have been organized for fighting at sea—or from the sea—for more than two thousand
years. The qualities that characterize most modern naval forces as political instruments in support of national
policies are the same as those that define the essence of our naval Services today. These qualities are readiness,
flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. They permit naval forces to be expeditionary—that is, being able to
establish and maintain a forward-based, stabilizing presence around the world. Naval expeditionary operations
are offensive in nature, mounted by highly trained and well-equipped integrated task forces of the Navy and
Marine Corps, organized to accomplish specific objectives. Naval expeditionary forces draw upon their
readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility to provide the National Command Authorities4 the tools
they need to safeguard such vital national interests as the continued availability of oil from world producers and
maintenance of political and economic stability around the globe. Through these qualities, naval forces reassure
allies and friends, deter aggressors, and influence uncommitted and unstable regimes. To be effective
instruments of power, our naval forces must be available and credible—not just when crises occur but daily,
wherever our allies and friends rely on our presence and wherever potential adversaries must perceive our firm
commitment to defend our interests. Since the early 1800s, the United States consistently has made naval forces
readily available to defend its vital interests abroad by maintaining a forward naval presence. Naval forces first
deployed to South America, the Mediterranean, the Far East, and the Caribbean to protect our sea lines of
commerce from pirates. Today, our national economic interests are still tied directly to sea-based commerce,
and the United States accepts certain responsibilities with respect to the health of the global economy. Our
ready force promotes regional stability and safeguards the flow of resources among trading partners, helping
preserve our national well-being.

We are operational; in keeping with the National Military Strategy,5 forward-deployed naval forces help deter
conflict and attain a rapid, favorable end to hostilities if conflict should occur. A strength of our naval forces
lies in their immediate availability to respond to contingencies through tangible readiness. Our deploying forces
certify their proficiency in their advertised capabilities by demonstrating their ability to carry out specific tasks
and missions prior to departure. When they arrive in the operating theater, they are ready to operate; trained and
organized to function as a cohesive force. It is no coincidence that naval operations in war — especially in
supporting roles such as construction, medical functions, and logistics — are similar to peacetime operations.
To maintain our readiness, we design many peacetime operations to parallel wartime operations as closely as
possible.
Operating in forward regions of the world enables us to maintain a situational awareness that is critical in
gaining the upper hand during any conflict’s early stages. By training in the places and climates where we
expect to fight, we also gain familiarity with the operational environment and its effects on our people and
equipment. Because the transition from peace to conflict in an unstable theater can occur quickly, the
Commander-in-Chief ’s assets in the region are likely to form the core of the initial response. The readiness and
presence of deployed naval forces provide the Commander-in-Chief the enabling force he needs to respond
decisively and without the limitations of lengthy transit times.
Operating forward from the sea has long been a characteristic of the Navy-Marine Corps team. With limited
overseas basing, naval forces become especially relevant in meeting national forward presence requirements.
National policymakers rely upon forward presence to display U.S. commitment and resolve to allies and friends.
This presence is called upon to deter aggression, to participate in regional coalition-building and collective-
security efforts, to further regional stability, to promote U.S. access and influence over critical areas, and to
provide initial crisis response wherever necessary. Forward deployed naval forces, including selected Coast
Guard forces, demonstrate that the United States is involved and committed to shaping events in the best
interests of itself, its friends, and its allies.
103.3 Conditions that led to creation of Seabees
1.2.2 History of the Seabees
1.2.2.1 The Seabee/Marine Partnership. Seabees of the naval construction force have been working and fighting
alongside Marines ever since the early days of World War II. The Seabee/Marine partnership that has been
fostered over the years is based primarily on shared geographic locations and complementary missions. If
Marine engineers are known as “Fighters Who Build,” then Seabees can best be described as “Builders Who
Fight.” In nearly every major island assault in the Pacific theater, Marines were closely followed by Seabees to
support and sustain the invasion. It is interesting to note that although their combat mission was strictly
defensive, World War II Seabee battalions were more heavily armed than their Marine engineer counterparts.
As soon as the amphibious operation’s general unloading began, Seabee battalions came ashore to augment and
expand upon the construction or repair work begun by Marine engineers. Until creation of the Marine engineer
battalions (also known as aviation engineer battalions) later in World War II, it was the Seabees who provided
nearly all construction support to Marine aviation.
Today, the Seabee/Marine partnership is underscored by the fact that Seabees train at Marine bases; have
adopted Marine training tactics, techniques, and procedures; are fielding weapons and communications systems
similar to those used by Marines; participate in exercises with Fleet Marine Forces; and provide mission-
enhancing construction support aboard Marine installations.
1.2.2.2 World War II. Created by Admiral Ben Moreell in 1942, the Navy’s
Seabees were founded on the premise that experienced, armed construction workers were critically needed in
the combat areas of World War II.
THE CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS
No discussion on the history of the Seabees is complete without first explaining the origin and purpose of the
Civil Engineer Corps (CEC). The CEC is composed of dedicated staff corps officers who are specialists in the
field of civil engineering. A CIVIL ENGINEER is a professional engineer who performs a variety of
engineering work in planning, designing, and overseeing construction and maintenance of structures and
facilities, such as roads, airports, bridges, harbors, pipelines, power plants, and water and sewage systems. Civil
engineers have been an integral part of the Navy since its very beginning. Our first “fleet” consisted of less than
10 ships. However, our
forefathers realized that to survive as a nation, the United States must have a Navy powerful enough to counter
the naval threat from pirates and other great powers, such as England, France, and Spain. To meet this threat,
Congress authorized the hiring, purchasing, and building of several additional vessels. Suitable land for use as
navy yards had to be located, surveyed, and purchased. Logically, civil engineers were delegated to perform
these tasks. By the time Thomas Jefferson became President, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Stoddert, had
established six Navy Yards. All were managed by civil engineers, although they were not yet known as Civil
Engineer Corps officers. In the following years, the number of ships increased sharply as well as the need for
more dry docks and repair facilities. The United States was emerging as a great sea power and governmental
functions were becoming more complex. As a result, on 31 August 1842, Congress established the “Bureau”
system. The Bureau of Yards and Docks (BUDOCKS)–known now as the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC)–was created, and the chief of this bureau was a civil engineer. It was not until 25 years
later, however, that the Civil Engineer Corps was officially named and authorized. At that time, the officers in
the corps were the forerunners of the CEC officers who lead the variety of Seabee units today. As naval
technology advanced in the modern era, the navies of the world ranged far over the great oceans. Ships grew
more and more dependent upon an ever-increasing chain of sophisticated shore bases for their support, both at
home and abroad. The construction of these bases necessitated a new and large organization of seafaring
fighter-builders.
Before 1941, the Civil Engineer Corps used private contractors to accomplish all overseas construction. The
contractors, in turn, hired steelworkers, electricians, carpenters, draftsmen, and mechanics from private
industry. However, the Navy realized that, in the event of war, civilian contractors and construction workers
could not be used very well outside our own country. If they were attacked and attempted to defend themselves,
these civilians could be regarded as guerrillas. Also, since most of them had never received any type of combat
training, there was reason to believe that they could not adequately defend themselves, even if their lives
depended on it. These fears soon became realities. As World War II drew near, there was an urgent need for
more overseas bases. Airfields and landing strips had to be rushed into existence on far away islands. Clearly,
we needed a combat MILITARY ORGANIZATION trained to construct these advance bases. Even before the
outbreak of hostilities, the Bureau of Yards and Docks had conceived the idea of naval construction battalions.
The first construction units were organized early in January 1942. Highly skilled construction workers were
recruited, and whole construction companies volunteered men and equipment.

THE FIRST SEABEES

The name Seabees is derived from these first construction units, or construction battalions (CBS) as they were
called. Officially, permission to use the name “Seabee” was granted on 5 March 1942. Each year March 5th is
observed as the anniversary of the Seabees. Because of the urgent need for these men, the first Seabees had no
time for military training. They were given medical shots, handed equipment, and sent off to pick up where the
civilian contractors left off. One month after the first units were organized, Seabees were at work constructing
roads on Bora Bora, one of the Society Islands, thousands of miles out in the Pacific Ocean.
Little time was given to training the next group of recruits, who were old hands in the construction trades,
averaging 31 years of age. Since they were experienced in their respective skills, they needed and received
mostly military training. Some additional instruction in technical matters peculiar to the Navy, such as pontoon
assembly, was also given these men.
Throughout World War II the Seabees were without construction ratings as we know them now. They were
given the most appropriate existing Regular Navy rating on the basis of their civilian vocation and experience;
for example, an experienced steelworker or plumber who had achieved a position of responsibility–perhaps
as a foreman or owner of a small business–was rated first class or chief Shipfitter. Seabees who held this and
other ratings, such as Boatswain’s Mate, Machinist’s Mate, and Electrician’s Mate, were easily distinguished
from those who held corresponding shipboard ratings by the Seabee insignia shoulder patch. This now famous
insignia consists of a flying bee–fighting mad–with a “white hat” on his head, a spitting “tommy gun” in his
front hands, a wrench in his middle hand, and a carpenter’s hammer in his rear hand.
103.4 Significance of March 5th, 1942:
The name Seabees is derived from these first construction units, or construction battalions (CBS) as they were
called. Officially, permission to use the name “Seabee” was granted on 5 March 1942. Each year March 5th is
observed as the anniversary of the Seabees.

103.5 Importance of Conflicts:

At the Battle of Coral Sea, the two fleets never saw each other—the battle was fought entirely with aircraft
launched from carriers. The USS Lexington and USS Yorktown, jointly under the command of Admiral F. J.
Fletcher, launched 93 attack planes against the Japanese carriers Shoho, Shokaku, and Zuikaku. Within 5
minutes, the Shoho was hit with 10 heavy bombs and 15 torpedoes. The USS Lexington’s radio crackled with
the voice of Lieutenant Commander Dixon of the air group, “Scratch one flattop. Dixon to carrier, scratch one
flattop!” The other two enemy carriers were so badly damaged that their services to the Japanese fleet were lost
for weeks. The United States suffered the loss of an oiler, an escort, and the USS Lexington. Even though
American losses were heavy in tonnage and men, Australia had been saved from invasion. The turning point of
the war in the Pacific came the next month at the Battle of Midway. The Japanese had concentrated on the
central Pacific with the intention of occupying Midway Island. The four-carrier Japanese task force was met by
a U.S. carrier force. The U.S. force included the carriers USS Yorktown, USS Hornet, and USS Enterprise, plus
Navy, Marine, and Army air units from Midway.
Dive bombers proved to be the downfall of the Japanese carrier force. When the battle ended, the Japanese had
lost four carriers, one heavy cruiser, and 258 aircraft. The United States had lost 132 aircraft, the destroyer USS
Hammann (DD 412), and the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV 5). In April 1943, another USS Yorktown was
commissioned; and it continued in the proud tradition established by its predecessor. The Navy’s most notable
Atlantic action may have been its part in the June 6, 1944, invasion of Normandy—the largest amphibious
operation in history. The greatest armada ever assembled carried out minesweeping, shore-bombardment,
amphibious operations, and transported supplies and troops. Those operations let the Allies complete D-Day
landings successfully and eventually push on to Germany. Widespread fighting on the oceans brought about the
building of a fleet unlike any in history. This was a swift striking force. It had the advantages of speed, mobility,
and surprise, yet it possessed the firepower and protective armor to stand and slug it out with enemy forces.
Such a fleet was made up of ships with names synonymous with heroism, such as the USS Tarawa, USS
Missouri (fig. 5-12), USS Tucson, USS Higbee, and USS O’Bannon.
103.6 Conditions that led to creation of Navy EOD.
U.S. Combat Swimming. There were two groups of U.S. combat swimmers
during World War II: Naval beach reconnaissance swimmers and U.S. operational swimmers. Naval beach
reconnaissance units did not normally use any breathing devices, although several models existed.
U.S. operational swimmers, however, under the Office of Strategic Services, developed and applied advanced
methods for true self-contained diver-submersible operations. They employed the Lambertsen Amphibious
Respiratory Unit (LARU), a rebreather invented by Dr. C.J. Lambertsen (see Figure 1-11). The LARU was a
closed-circuit oxygen UBA used in special warfare operations where a complete absence of exhaust bubbles
was required. Following World War II, the Emerson-Lambertsen Oxygen Rebreather replaced the LARU
(Figure 1-12). The Emerson Unit was used extensively by Navy special warfare divers until 1982, when it was
replaced by the
Draeger Lung Automatic Regenerator (LAR) V. The LAR V is the standard unit now used by U.S. Navy
combat swimmers (see Figure 1-13).
Today Navy combat swimmers are organized into two separate groups, each with specialized training and
missions. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team handles, defuses, and disposes of munitions and other
explosives. The Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) special warfare teams make up the second group of Navy combat
swimmers. SEAL team members are trained to operate in all of these environments. They qualify as
parachutists, learn to handle a range of weapons, receive intensive training in hand-to-hand combat, and are
expert in scuba and other swimming and diving techniques. In Vietnam, SEALs were deployed in special
counter-insurgency and guerrilla warfare operations. The SEALs also participated in the space program by
securing flotation collars to returned space capsules and assisting astronauts during the helicopter pickup.
1-3.5.3 Underwater Demolition. The Navy’s Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs)
were created when bomb disposal experts and Seabees (combat engineers) teamed together in 1943 to devise
methods for removing obstacles that the Germans were placing off the beaches of France. The first UDT
combat mission was a daylight reconnaissance and demolition project off the beaches of Saipan in June 1944. In
March of 1945, preparing for the invasion of Okinawa, one underwater demolition team achieved the
exceptional record of removing 1,200 underwater obstacles in 2 days, under heavy fire, without a single
casualty.

Because suitable equipment was not readily available, diving apparatus was not extensively used by the UDT
during the war. UDT experimented with a modified Momsen lung and other types of breathing apparatus, but
not until 1947 did the Navy’s acquisition of Aqua-Lung equipment give impetus to the diving aspect of UDT
operations. The trail of bubbles from the open-circuit apparatus limited the type of mission in which it could be
employed, but a special scuba platoon of UDT members was formed to test the equipment and determine
appropriate uses for it.
Through the years since, the mission and importance of the UDT has grown. In the Korean Conflict, during the
period of strategic withdrawal, the UDT destroyed an entire port complex to keep it from the enemy. The UDTs
have since been incorporated into the Navy Seal Teams.
103.7 Purpose and Evolvement of NCW.

1.1 PURPOSE
This chapter provides doctrinal and background information about naval coastal warfare (NCW). It discusses
missions, force employment, tasks, threats, and command and organization. Chapter 1 discusses expeditionary
operations (i.e., those operations conducted outside the continental United States (OCONUS)) and maritime
homeland defense (M-HLD) operations (i.e., those operations conducted within the continental United States
(CONUS)). For the purpose of this doctrine, CONUS includes the states of Alaska and Hawaii and all United
States territories.
It should be noted that M-HLD is a mission assigned the Department of Defense (DOD). It is not to be confused
with maritime homeland security (M-HLS), for which the responsibility is assigned the United States Coast
Guard (USCG). M-HLS is addressed in this publication only where it has importance in understanding how the
Coast Guard could support DOD in fulfilling its mission of M-HLD.
1.2 INTRODUCTION
NCW forces consist of two naval coastal warfare groups (NCWGRUs), one on each coast, each with associated
subordinate commands composed of mobile security squadrons (MSRONs) with their subordinate mobile
security detachments (MSDs), and naval coastal warfare squadrons (NCWRONs) with their embedded
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) detachments and subordinate mobile
inshore undersea warfare units (MIUWUs) and inshore boat units (IBUs). In some circumstances, the NCW
force may also include USCG port security units (PSUs). The force just described is considered core to NCW
and is further described in Appendix A. Other USCG and United States Navy (USN) forces that may provide
support for NCW core forces are described in Appendices B and C.
NCW forces are primarily employed for expeditionary operations and secondarily, when directed, to support
USCG forces in homeland security operations and DOD in homeland defense operations. NCW capabilities
include traditional NCW roles and missions as well as the recently defined capability to provide a rapidly
deployable security augmentation force to assist a supported unit in point defense (i.e., the defense or protection
of special vital elements and installations (joint publication (JP) 1-02).

1.3 GENERAL
Strategic mobility, maintaining deployed forces through the unimpeded movement of supplies and equipment,
is critical to US warfighting strategy. Sea lines of communication (SLOCs) carry more than 95 percent of the
logistic support for forward-deployed forces. This requires the US to be able to move military and commercial
vessels safely and without interference or disruption from the seaport of embarkation (SPOE) to the seaport of
debarkation (SPOD). Although vessels are vulnerable throughout their voyage, this vulnerability is greatest in
the transition area between blue water (deep oceans and seas) and brown water (littoral regions) and at points of
origin and destination. These transition areas and points are where SLOCs converge and through which every
vessel must eventually pass.
The NCW mission is to protect strategic port facilities, strategic commercial shipping and naval ships operating
within the littoral, at anchorages and in harbors, from bare beach to sophisticated port facilities, in order to
ensure the uninterrupted flow of cargo and units to the combatant commander. NCW operations protect these
transition areas and points from waterborne threats. NCWRONs are deployable assets that provide the
supported commander with C4I, inshore surveillance, integrated waterborne security, and vessel traffic control
capabilities that can

significantly increase force protection and port security. The C4I capability, delivered by the NCWRON’s
embedded C4I detachment, provides a detailed near-real-time tactical picture of the littoral. The inshore
surveillance capability, delivered by the MIUWU, provides the necessary sensors to facilitate traffic control,
force protection, harbor defense, and harbor approach defense (HAD) operations. The integrated waterborne
security provided by armed IBU, PSU, and MSD patrol boats, if assigned, round out the NCW force
capabilities. MSRONs are nondeployable assets that provide highly mobile, fully capable and equipped
deployable detachments to perform physical security and force protection for naval assets in ports or harbors
where a port security infrastructure does not exist, or the quality of the security infrastructure necessitates
augmentation of the protected unit’s security forces. For the purposes of this mission statement, naval assets
include all USN ships and submarines (less Trident fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)), and Military
Sealift Command (MSC) ships.
103.8 Discuss Riverine Operations
1.1 CONCEPT OF RIVERINE OPERATIONS
Riverine operations in full concept integrate and employ various types of ships, craft, aircraft, weapons, and
Marine Corps and naval special warfare forces in a concerted effort to achieve and/or maintain control of a
riverine, coastal, or delta areas. Riverine operations will be conducted under the command of a single mobile
riverine force commander as joint or uni-service operations designed to accomplish the objectives of a riverine
campaign.
The riverine area is an inland, coastal, or delta area comprising both land and water, characterized by limited
land lines of communication (LOCs), with extensive water surface and/or inland waterways that provide natural
routes for surface transportation and communications. Where navigable waterways exist and roads do not, or
where forces are required to use waterways, an effective program to control the waterways and/or interdict
hostile movement becomes a decisive factor. The riverine area requires unique capabilities and tactics to
achieve success against hostile forces.
The primary advantage of a mobile riverine force (MRF) is its ability to concentrate a mix of forces effective
for operations in the riverine area, including the ability to attack selected targets throughout the riverine area.
Riverine operations exploit the advantages of the waterways for movement, capitalizing on mobility to find, fix,
and destroy hostile forces. Surface mobility is achieved primarily by specialized riverine craft maintaining
control of water lines of communication and providing transportation and combat support to Marine Corps and
naval special warfare forces. Because of the inherent waterborne mobility of a riverine force, and the continuing
need for its capabilities
throughout the conduct of riverine operations, it is appropriate to use these forces in their primary riverine role,
rather than diverting them to a role of maintaining territorial control beyond the limits of a riverine area.
However, riverine forces can contribute to wide area territorial control by performing the riverine operations set
forth in paragraph 1.1.4 in support of other forces.
Environmental factors which can affect the composition and employment of the MRF may include:
1. Shallow water
2. Large tidal range
3. Currents
4. Narrow waterways
5. Natural or man-made obstacles
6. Bridges
7. Lack of suitable areas for Marine Corps force maneuver, staging, and/or resupply.
8. Concentrations of population (friendly, hostile, or neutral) along the waterways.
Riverine operations are operations conducted by forces organized to cope with and exploit the unique
characteristics of a riverine area, to locate and destroy hostile forces, and/or to achieve or maintain control of
the riverine area. Joint riverine operations combine land, naval, and air operations, as appropriate, and are suited
to the nature of the pecific riverine area in which operations are to be conducted.
1.1.1 Definition and Characteristics. Riverine operations are conducted in a riverine area to achieve and/or
maintain control of a waterway system and its adjoining land areas, or to deny their use to the enemy. They
include operations conducted on, across, along, or emanating from a waterway system. They combine the
characteristics of ground, naval, and air operations which require the employment of tactics, techniques,
organization, and equipment particularly adapted to the nature of the riverine area. Riverine operations may be
conducted in an area where political or security considerations prohibit or make undesirable a lodgement of
U.S. forces ashore and establishment of base support areas. Control of waterway systems must then be achieved
from afloat bases with

logistic and operational support being provided from Navy sources. Under these conditions, the MRF would
normally be introduced into the riverine area by amphibious shipping. Riverine operations are separate and
distinct from amphibious operations even though common techniques may be employed. However, the riverine
operations
may be initiated by or adjunctive to amphibious operations.
1.1.2 Purpose. There are many varieties of riverine operations. The principle ones will be described in
subsequent
chapters. In general, riverine operations are conducted to:
1. Establish and maintain control of riverine lines of communications
2. Deny, by interdiction, barrier, or surveillance operations, use of riverine LOCs by hostile forces
3. Locate and destroy hostile forces, bases, and supplies contained within a riverine area.
1.1.3 Scope. The entire riverine campaign may include:
1. Intelligence collection
2. Planning
3. Embarkation of troops and equipment
4. Patrol/barrier and interdiction and surveillance operations
5. Riverine assault operations
6. Naval riverine close fire support
7. Close air support
8. Naval gunfire or firebase support
9. Repositioning of forces
10. Resupply of the riverine force until termination of the campaign
11. PSYOP/civic action programs
12. Re-embarkation/withdrawal.
A riverine campaign may include helicopterborne operations conducted by elements of the MRF, or
helicopterborne, airborne, and ground operations conducted by other forces in conjunction with mobile riverine
force operations.
1.1.4 Types of Riverine Operations. The mobile riverine force conducts operations in areas where local
response may range from hostile action to friendly welcome. The two general types of operations which may be
conducted are:
1.1.4.1 Assault. These operations employ Navy and Marine Corps forces to achieve one or more of the
following
objectives:
1. Establish control of water lines of a geographical area which includes water lines of communication
2. Establish control of land areas and/or population and resources
3. Locate and destroy hostile forces, installations, and supplies
4. Establish and secure an area for a combat support base, as required.
1.1.4.2 Surveillance, Interdiction, and Security.
These operations employ Marine Corps and Navy forces to achieve one or more of the following objectives:
1. Protect friendly lines of communication
2. Deny hostile forces the use of waterways
3. Collect intelligence information
4. Perform security missions
5. Enforce population and resources control.
1.1.5 Supporting Operations. Operations in support of the MRF may be required. Although these supporting
operations normally will be at the request of the riverine force commander, they will be directed by higher
authority, and may be conducted in or outside the MRF area of operations. The commander of forces
conducting supporting operations will coordinate with the riverine force commander. Examples of supporting
operations are:
1. Feints or demonstrations intended for purposes of deception
2. Isolation of the area of operation by interdiction of enemy forces
3. Operations to assist the gaining or maintenance of air, ground, or naval supremacy
4. Air, surface, or special operations to secure information
5. Psychological and unconventional warfare operations.
Operations conducted by elements of the mobile riverine force in the riverine area (or en route to an objective
area) prior to the arrival of riverine assault forces are considered pre-assault operations rather than supporting
operations. Examples of such operations are waterway patrol and interdiction, mine countermeasures,
obstruction clearance, and swimmer detection and defense.

104 Navy Expeditionary Organization Fundamentals

104.1 SECNAV, CNO, MCPON, FLTCM, FORCM, CNOCM, CO, XO, CMDCM, N1, N3, N4, COMMO
A 0301. Responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense. (The Honorable Mr. Donald Rumsfeld)
The Secretary of the Navy is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for:
a. the functioning and efficiency of the Department of the Navy;
b. the formulation of policies and programs by the Department of the Navy that are fully
consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President or the Secretary of
Defense;
c. the effective and timely implementation of policy, program and budget decisions and instructions of the
President or the secretary of Defense relating to the functions of the Department of the Navy
d, carrying out the functions of the Department of the Navy so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable)
the current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands,
e. effective cooperation and coordination between the Department of the Navy and the other military
departments and agencies of the
Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient and economical administration and to eliminate
duplication;
f. the presentation and justification of the position of the Department of the Navy on the plans, programs and
policies of the Department
of Defense,
g. the effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of the Department of the Navy and
h. such other activities as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
0302. Responsibilities Within the Department of the Navy.
The secretary is the head of the Department of the Navy. The Secretary is responsible for, and has the authority
necessary to conduct, all
affairs of the Department of the Navy, including the following functions:
a. recruiting,
b. organizing,
c. supplying,
d. equipping (including research and development);
e. training,
f. servicing,
g. mobilizing,
h. demobilizing
i. administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel);
j. maintaining.
k. the construction, outfitting and repair of military equipment and
1. the construction, maintenance and repair
of buildings, and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this article.
B ADM Mike Mullen

C. MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER OF THE NAVY (MCPON Terry Scott soon to be MCPON Joseph
Campa) .—In 1966 the SECNAV’s Task Force on Navy/Marine Corps Personnel Retention recommended the
creation of the office of the master chief petty officer of the Navy (MCPON). The function of the office is to
provide a direct, unofficial channel of communication between enlisted personnel and the senior policy level of
DoN. The office was formally set up on 1 March 1967 with a tour length of 4 years. The MCPON performs the
following duties:
• The MCPON’s assignment is to the immediate office of the CNO. The MCPON serves as the senior enlisted
representative of the Navy and acts as the primary enlisted advisor to the CNO. The MCPON advises the Chief
of Naval Personnel (CHNAVPERS) in all matters regarding active-duty and retired enlisted members and their
dependents.
• The MCPON serves in an advisory capacity on various boards pertaining to enlisted members, including the
following boards.
− Board of Managers of the Navy Relief Society
− Board of Administrators of the BUPERS

Central Non-appropriated Funds

− Board of Equal Opportunity for Women − Rating Review Board − Navy Wives Club of America (Liaison) −
Fleet Reserve Association (Liaison)
− Navy Resale System Advisory Board
• The MCPON, when called upon, testifies before congressional committees and subcommittees. The MCPON
occasionally accompanies the CNO and CHNAVPERS on official trips and the Navy Inspector General on
selected inspection trips. The MCPON travels extensively throughout the fleet and serves as the Navy enlisted
representative of the DoN at special events, celebrations, and ceremonies.
• The MCPON recommends ways to develop effective leadership and training at all enlisted levels and to attain
high standards of conduct and general appearance within the enlisted community. The MCPON acts always to
maintain and promote the chain of command and its associated chain of communications. Further, the MCPON
advises the CNO about existing or potential situations, procedures, and practices affecting the morale, retention,
career enhancement, human goals, and general well-being of the Navy enlisted personnel and their dependents.
• The MCPON does not work alone. In addition to a staff, the MCPON relies on the quality and experience of
the fleet, force, and command master chiefs to carry out the duties of the office.
D. Fleet Master Chief ,
E. Force Master Chief
F. CNO Directed CMC (CNOCM Tony Santino NECC)
I. CMDCM (CMDCM Fred Barton)
Section B – FLEET MASTER CHIEF, FORCE MASTER CHIEF, CNO-DIRECTED
COMMAND MASTER CHIEF AND COMMAND MASTER CHIEF REQUIREMENTS
1. Fleet Master Chief (FLTMC), Force Master Chief (FORMC), and Chief of Naval Operations-Directed
Command Master Chief (CNOMC) requirements are limited to the activities listed in tab A.
2. FLTMC, FORMC, and CNOMC requirements and the composition of the CNO/Master Chief Petty Officer of
the Navy Senior Enlisted Leadership Forum are made at CNO’s discretion. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
and Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) review these requirements annually.
3. CNOMCs may be assigned to designated Commanders who, 1) report directly to the CNO, or 2) whose
command responsibilities include significant regional area coordination or other unique dimensions (see tab A
of enclosure (1)).
4. Command Master Chief requirements not directed by CNO are determined as follows:
a. All commands with enlisted manpower authorization of 250 or greater will have a Command Master Chief
billet requirement. A CMDMC billet authorization will not normally be programmed against the requirement
until total enlisted authorizations are 250 or greater. Major manpower claimants or resource sponsors will
provide a CMDMC billet for Commander In Chiefs’ staffs with less than 250 manpower requirements.
Additionally, the following activities will be allocated a CMDMC billet regardless of size:
Aviation Type Wing staffs, Carrier-based Air Wing (CVW) squadrons and staffs, deployable Helicopter
Antisubmarine Warfare Light (HSL) squadrons, Helicopter Combat Support (HC) squadrons, Maritime Patrol
(VP) squadrons, Naval Construction Training Centers/Regiments (Gulfport, MS and Port Hueneme, CA), Naval
Construction Battalion Centers, Naval Transient Personnel Units, Submarine Squadron Support Units, Dry
Docks, Regional Support Organizations, Submarine Groups and Squadrons, Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activities (SIMA), Regional Support Groups (RSG), Fast Frigates (FFG), Naval Special Warfare Groups, Naval
Special Warfare Center, Special Boat Squadrons, SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Teams, Special Boat Units, and
Shipyards. Fleet Logistics Support Squadrons with 200 or more enlisted billets, will also have a Command
Master Chief billet. All naval facilities where ships or submarines are homeported or overhauled who have
major host-tenant responsibilities and a manpower base of less than 250 may request a waiver to obtain a
Command Master Chief billet. Component activities (Activity Unit Identification Codes (AUICs)) within a
common Primary Unit Identification Code (PUIC) which are geographically collocated may be included at the
PUIC level to make the determination. In the submarine force, CMC responsibilities are assumed by the Chief
of the Boat (COB) (NEC 9579). The COB must meet the qualification and suitability requirements outlined in
this instruction.
b. Commands having manpower requirements of less than 250 enlisted shall assign a Command Master Chief
from within command resources on a collateral duty basis. In the absence of a Master Chief Petty Officer

(MCPO), a Senior Chief Petty Officer (SCPO) or Chief Petty Officer (CPO) may be assigned. All collateral
duty Master, Senior, or Chief Petty Officers must meet all requirements contained in Section C, paragraph 1.a.
Collateral Duty Command Master Chiefs will retain their source rating designation.
c. Naval Reserve Echelon 1 through 5 commands with active duty and selected reserve manpower requirements
of 750 billets or greater (determined by command manpower documents and reserve unit assignment
documents) have a requirement for a fulltime CMC billet.
d. Requests to establish a new CMDMC billet must be submitted per OPNAVINST 1000.16J. Advance liaison
with MCPON and CNO (N132D) is required. Requests must identify billet, grade, end-strength, and
management headquarters ceiling point compensation, as appropriate.

G. 301. THE COMMANDING OFFICER

a. BASIC FUNCTION. As set forth in U.S. Navy Regulations, the Commanding Officer is charged with the
absolute responsibility for the safety, well-being, and efficiency of his or her command, except when and to the
extent he or she may be relieved therefrom by competent authority. b. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
AUTHORITY.
The duties and responsibilities of the Commanding Officer are established by U.S. Navy Regulations, general
orders, customs, and tradition. The authority of the Commanding Officer is commensurate with his or her
responsibility, subject to the limitations prescribed by constitutional, statutory, international, and regulatory law
including U.S. Navy Regulations (NAVREGS).

H. 302. THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER

a. BASIC FUNCTION. The Executive Officer is the direct representative of the Commanding Officer. All
orders issued by him/her will have the same force and effect as though issued by the Commanding Officer. The
Executive Officer will conform to and carry out the policies and orders of the Commanding Officer and shall
keep him/her informed of all significant matters pertaining to the command. The Executive Officer shall be
primarily responsible under the Commanding Officer for the organization, performance of duty, and good order
and discipline
of the entire command. He/she will recognize the right and duty of a Head of Department to confer directly with
the Commanding Officer on matters specifically relating to his/her department
. An officer acting as Executive Officer during the temporary absence or disability of that officer will have the
same authority and responsibility as the Executive Officer; but he/she will make no change in the existing
organization, unless ordered to do so, and will endeavor to have the routine and other affairs of the unit carried
out in the usual manner.
c. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY. The Executive Officer, subject to the orders of the
Commanding Officer and assisted by subordinates, will:
(1) Ensure the Commanding Officer is advised of casualties, deficiencies, and anticipated difficulties which
may affect operational readiness or administrative efficiency of the command.
(2) Make frequent inspections in company, when practicable, with the subordinates concerned; and take
remedial action to correct defects.
(3) Maintain high morale within the command. The discipline, welfare, and privileges of the individuals of the
command will be chief concerns of the Executive Officer; and, he/she will administer these and related matters
in a just and uniform manner.
(4) Pursue a program of economy and conservation, and promote cost consciousness within the command.
(5) Keep command advised of the status of the ship's damage control readiness. Carry out the requirements of
command regarding damage control training and the ship's readiness to combat all casualties which threaten the
ship.
(6) Prepare and maintain the bills and orders for the organization and administration of the command.
(7) Assign the personnel who have completed indoctrination to departments or other major subdivisions of the
command.
(8) Maintain the records of personnel, except those records assigned as the responsibility of some other officer.
Monitor, review, and maintain the command's private interest disclosure system, as required by DOD
Regulation 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER).

(9) Supervise and coordinate the work, exercises, training, and education of the personnel command of the
command.
(10) Supervise and coordinate the operational plans and schedules of the command.
(11) Prepare and issue a daily schedule of employment and such other advance schedules as may aid
subordinates in planning their work.
(12) Ensure that all prescribed or necessary security measures and safety precautions are understood and strictly
observed.
(13) Evaluate the performance of officers and enlisted personnel and make recommendations to the
Commanding Officer concerning their promotion and advancement.
(14) Regulate liberty and leave.
(15) Carry on a program of recreation and athletics.
(16) Direct the investigation of alleged violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, U.S. Navy
Regulations,
unit's regulations, and other military and civil laws; and recommend appropriate disciplinary action to the
Commanding Officer when necessary.
(17) Act on personal requests (which may be addressed to the Commanding Officer) that do not involve policy
formulation or require action of higher authority.
(18) Ensure adequate supplies and services are available to the executive assistants within the allotment of
maintenance and operating funds.
(19) Direct the unit's public affairs program.
(20) Supervise the reception of unit visitors.
(21) Serve as the senior member of the Planning Board for Training.
(22) Supervise the organization and operation of the unit's Maintenance and Material Management System (3-
M) program.
(23) Establish a management control program as described in paragraph 142.1. Establish management controls
to provide reasonable assurance that programs and functions meet mission objectives and operate effectively.
Continuously monitor, document, and evaluate the implementation of management control systems to include
assessable units, management control assessments, training, and tracking systems.
(24) Serve as a senior member of the Safety Council.
(25) Administer the Command Retention Program.
(26) Perform such other duties as may be assigned.
d. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. The Executive Officer is directly responsible to the Commanding
Officer. All Department Heads and Executive's Assistants report to the Executive Officer regarding internal
administration of the command. The prescribed duties of the Executive Officer will not be construed to relieve
a subordinate from any part of his/her assigned responsibilities
I. THE COMMAND MASTER CHIEF
BASIC FUNCTIONS. The C M/C is the enlisted advisor to the command on the formulation and
implementation of policies pertinent to morale, welfare, job satisfaction, discipline, utilization and training of all
enlisted personnel and as such the C M/C has direct access to the Commanding Officer. The C M/C
takes precedence over all other enlisted members within a command.
b. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY
(1) Maintain and promote effectiveness and efficiency of chain of command.
(2) Assist the Commanding Officer in all matters pertaining to welfare, health, job satisfaction, morale,
utilization,
and training of enlisted personnel in order to promote traditional standards of good order and discipline.
(3) Advise the Commanding Officer on formulation and implementation of changes in policy pertaining to
enlisted
members.
(4) Attend meetings as directed by the Commanding Officer to keep apprised of current issues and provide a
representative enlisted input.
(5) Participate in ceremonies honoring command members.
(6) When appropriate, represent or accompany the Commanding Officer to official functions, inspections, and
conferences.
(7) Participate in reception and hosting of official visitors to the command.
(8) Upon invitation and as approved by the Commanding Officer, represent the command and Navy at
community and civic functions.

(9) OPNAVINST 1306.2A (NOTAL) provides additional guidance.

J. N-1 ADMIN ASST OFFICER
a. BASIC FUNCTIONS. The Administrative Assistant is an aide to and may be delegated to act for the
Executive Officer in specific functions of administration. He/she serves as the X-Division Officer.
b. DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY
(1) Observe and report to the Executive Officer on the effectiveness of administrative policies, procedures, and
regulations of the command.
(2) Review correspondence prepared for the signature or review of the Executive Officer, ensuring that it
conforms with the Navy Correspondence Manual, SECNAVINST 5216.5C (NOTAL), and pertinent command
directives.
(3) Screen correspondence and directives routed to the Executive Officer. Initiate administrative actions where
appropriate, as in the case of Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA) instructions and other administrative
directives.
(4) Schedule visitor interviews with the Executive Officer and other officers as appropriate.
(5) Coordinate the assignment of enlisted personnel to Executive Assistants.
(6) Exercise budgetary control of expenses of Executive Assistants. Approve requisitions for operating supplies,
equipment, and services within the budget allowances for X-Division.
(7) Supervise preparation of the plan of the day, and its review, prior to submission for signature.
(8) Exercise administrative direction of the print shop and associated duplicating equipment (except in units that
have a repair department).
(9) Coordinate the indoctrination of newly reported personnel.
(10) Supervise the professional training and education of enlisted personnel assigned to the administrative and
personnel offices.
(11) Coordinate the division safety program with the unit's Safety Officer and supervise the division Safety
Petty
Officer.
c. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. Within his/her delegated authority, the Administrative Assistant is
the direct representative of the Executive Officer. He/she will report to the Executive Officer and receive
reports as follows:
(1) From Executive Assistants regarding routine administration.
(2) From enlisted personnel assigned to his/her direct supervision.
(3) From the Bandmaster when embarked.
K. N-3 OPERATIONS OFFICER
324. OPERATIONS OFFICER
a. GENERAL DUTIES. The head of the Operations Department of a unit will be designated the Operations
Officer. In addition to those duties prescribed by regulations for the head of a department, he/she will be
responsible, under the Commanding Officer, for all operational aspects of the assigned mission. As such, he/she
is charged with maintaining operational readiness in support of battle plans or other instructions as may be
directed by higher authority.
b. SPECIFIC DUTIES. The Operations Officer is responsible for the proper performance of the functions of
his/her department which include:
(1) The conduct of surface and air search.
(2) The execution of anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW),
electronic warfare (EW), strike warfare (STW), and intelligence/cryptologic operations as directed, including
the maintenance/dissemination of intelligence data, except on those platforms where any of the above functions
and responsibilities are assigned to another officer.
(3) The control of assigned aircraft when airborne, except when this control is assigned to other authority or
under
the land-launch control of the Air Officer.
(4) The management and maintenance of battle group command and control systems and associated equipments
in support of an embarked flag.
(5) The preparation of operation plans and orders and other reports and directives.
(6) The maintenance and repair of all electronic equipment except as assigned to another department.
(7) The collection, interpretation, display, and dissemination of meteorological and oceanographic information.
(8) In units not having a Communications Department, the functions prescribed in these regulations for the
communications department.

(9) In units having a Combat Systems Department and not a Deck Department, the functions prescribed in these
regulations for the Deck Department.
(10) The collection and transmission of requests for operational and logistic services required by the command
in
support of operations.
(11) The obtaining of clearance and operating assignments incident to the movements and operations of the
unit.
(12) The preparation and issuing of training schedules.
(13) Providing photographic services.
(14) The maintenance and dissemination of the ship or unit's operating schedule.
(15) In units not having an Air Department, the functions prescribed elsewhere in these regulations for that
department.
(16) In units not having a Deck Department, the functions prescribed elsewhere in these regulations for that
department.
c. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. The Operations Officer will report to the Commanding Officer
concerning operations, intelligence, and tactical employment of the unit and assigned aircraft. He/she will report
to the Executive Officer for the administration of the Operations Department. The following officers, when
assigned, will report to the Operations Officer:
(1) Administrative and training assistants of the Operations Department (Subparagraphs 311.1 and 311.2
respectively).
(2) Air Operations Officer (supplied by the appropriate type commander)
(3) Combat Information/Direction Center (CIC/CDC) Officer (Subparagraph 324.1)
(4) Communications Officer (when not a department head) (Subparagraph 317.)
(5) Electronics Material Officer (EMO) (Subparagraph 324.2)
(6) Electronic Warfare (EW) Officer (Subparagraph 324.3)
(7) Intelligence Officer (Subparagraph 324.4)
(8) Oceanography Officer (Subparagraph 324.5)
(9) Photographic Officer (Subparagraph 305.18)
(10) Strike Operations Officer (supplied by the appropriate type commander)
(11) First Lieutenant when the ship has a Combat Systems Department but not a Deck Department
(12) Cryptologic Officer on those ships which have CESM capabilities (Subparagraph 324.6).
L. SUPPLY OFFICER
328. SUPPLY OFFICER
a. GENERAL DUTIES. The head of the Supply Department will be designated the Supply Officer. In addition
to those duties prescribed elsewhere by regulation for the head of a department, he/she will be responsible,
under the Commanding Officer, for procuring, receiving, storing, issuing, shipping, transferring, selling,
accounting for, and, while in his/her custody, maintaining all stores and equipment of the command, except as
otherwise prescribed in these regulations. The Commanding Officer is the Contracting Authority for the
command. On ships without Supply
Corps officers assigned, contracting responsibilities may be delegated to the Supply Officer per NAVSUP 560
(SUBPARS) (NOTAL).
b. SPECIFIC DUTIES. The Supply Officer, under the Commanding Officer, will be responsible for the proper
performance of the functions of his/her department, which include:
(1) Inspecting material received under orders and contracts requiring inspection on delivery. For material of a
technical nature the Supply Officer may be assisted by qualified inspectors appointed by cognizant department
heads.
(2) The operation of:
(a) The general mess, including preparation and service of food, except at shore activities with separate messing
facilities.
(b) The wardroom mess on ships with an established billet for a Supply Corps officer as Wardroom Mess
Officer.
(c) The ship's store, Navy exchange, commissary store, and any subsidiary activities and services, except at
activities with separate facilities.
(d) Stores for sale and issue of clothing and small stores.
(e) Ship's stores ashore.
(f) Fuel plants and annexes ashore.
(g) The ship's laundry.

(3) Disbursing Government funds, except where there is an Assistant for Disbursing who would have the
responsibility for procurement, custody, transfer, issue of, and accounting for funds. In such case, the Supply
Officer will exercise general supervision over and inspect the accounts of the Assistant for Disbursing.
(4) When there is an Assistant for Food Service Afloat or Ship's Store, the Supply Officer may be relieved by
that officer from responsibility for the procurement, receipt, storage, custody, issue, transfer, maintenance of
proper records, accounting for, and submission of returns for food service or ship's store material. Such relief is
subject to written request by the Supply Officer and approval by the Commanding Officer and is terminated
upon relief or detachment of the Supply Officer or the Assistant for Food Service Afloat or Ship's Store. The
Supply Officer will continue to be responsible to the Commanding Officer for the overall administration of the
Supply Department,
including food service afloat and ship's store; and in turn the Assistants to the Supply Officer for Food Service
Afloat or Ship's Store are responsible to the Supply Officer for the efficient operation of their areas, as required
by the Naval Supply Systems Command publications.
(5) Accounting which, where applicable, will include:
(a) Allotment accounting.
(b) Cost accounting.
(c) Appropriation accounting.
(d) Property accounting.
(e) Preparation of civilian payrolls.
(6) The coordination in ships and at other activities not operating under the plant account of the periodic
inventories of equipment, including repair parts, in the custody of the several heads of departments.
(7) The administration of the ship's supplies and equipage funds so that all essential material requirements are
met.
(8) The coordination, preparation, and submission of department operating budgets, if desired by the
Commanding
Officer.
(9) Training of selected food service personnel in shipboard pest control and coordinating control procedures
with the Medical Department.
(10) Operating the information systems equipment aboard ship. During General Emergency/Abandon Ship, the
Supply Officer is responsible for ensuring destruction/salvage of ADP material.
c. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. The Supply Officer will report to the Commanding Officer on
matters which may adversely affect the operational readiness of the ship and to the Executive Officer for the
routine administration of the Supply Department.
The Assistant Supply Officer and the Assistant for Disbursing will report to the Supply Officer.
M. COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER

317. COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER

a. GENERAL DUTIES. In units which have a Communications Department, the head of that department will be
designated the Communications Officer. In addition to those duties prescribed elsewhere by regulation for the
head of a department, he/she will be responsible, under the Commanding Officer (or the Operations Officer in
units which do not have a Communications Department), for visual and electronic exterior communications and
for the administration of the internal systems pertaining thereto.
b. SPECIFIC DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND AUTHORITY. The Communications Officer, under the
Commanding Officer (or the Operations Officer in units which do not have a Communications Department),
will be responsible for the proper performance of the functions of his or her department, which include:
(1) The receipt, transmission, and internal distribution of all visual and electronic messages. Handling
responsibilities begin with the receipt of an incoming message or computer diskette, or upon the delivery of an
originator's draft outgoing message to the Communications Department/Center.
(2) The proper handling, control, and accountability of all material issued to the department/division through the
communications security material (CMS) system.
(3) The maintenance and direction of a communications security program which includes cryptological security,
transmission security, and physical security of communications security materials (COMSEC), computer
diskettes and automated data, and information.

(4) The operation and preventive maintenance of all visual and electronic exterior communications equipment
assigned to the Communication Department. He or she will ensure that the necessary liaison exists with the
Operations Department for the repair of assigned electronic equipment.
(5) Ensure observance of the restrictions on transmissions as required by emission control (EMCON) condition
in effect.
(6) Ensure proper separation and control of classified material and information in the radio spaces. Control
access to radio spaces and classified material. Enforce ADP security and proper handling procedures and
accountability of computer diskettes and automated information systems.
c. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. The Communication Officer will report to the Commanding
Officer (or the Operations Officer in units which do not have a Communications Department) for the readiness
and employment of all visual and electronic exterior communications equipment and for the proper functioning
of all associated internal systems and procedures. He/she will report to the Executive Officer for the
administration of the Communications Department.
104.2 MISSION, CAPABILITIES AND PROJECTED OPERATING AREAS FOR NECC COMMANDS
A. Navy Expeditionary Command (NECC)
Background and Mission. This establishment will provide a functional command that will provide oversight and
command and control of Anti-Terrorism Force Protection (ATFP) and expeditionary-type forces within the
Navy. Its mission will be as a functional commander in control of manning, training, equipping and organizing
forces that will execute force protection, shore-based logistical support, and construction missions across the
joint operational spectrum. 3. Organizational Changes. Effective 1 October 2005, establish
COMNAVEXPDCMBTCOM. The following applies:
a. Establishment Commander

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

2200 Gator BLVD BLDG 3890
Norfolk VA 23521-3024
(SNDL: 26V) (UIC: 4582A)
(PLA: COMNAVEXPDCMBTCOM)
(PDS: Norfolk, VA
b Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW). Harbor approach defense (i.e., coastal sea control), port security, and harbor
defense are executed both in coastal areas outside the United States in support of national policy, and within the
United States as part of this nation’s defense. NCW includes force protection and seaward security during
expeditionary warfare operations, to ensure uninterrupted flow of strategic cargo and units to the combatant
commander. NCW force protection operations are also conducted in established water terminal facilities and
Joint Logistics-Over-the Shores (JLOTS) staging areas to support Amphibious Warfare (AMW) operations,
Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) operations (including JLOTS and Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE)
offload operations), Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) and submarine security missions. NCW units can
operate as a supporting element to the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), Amphibious Task Force (ATF),
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), a Joint Task Force (JTF) or a Joint Rear Area Commander (JRAC).
In accordance with NWP 3-10 (Rev. B), core NCW Forces are comprised of Naval Coastal Warfare Groups
(NCWGRU), Naval Coastal Warfare Squadrons (NCWRON), Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units
(MIUWU), Inshore Boat Units (IBU), Mobile Security Squadrons (MSRON), Mobile Security Detachments
(MSD) and United States Coast Guard (USCG) Port Security Units (PSU).
C Naval Coastal Warfare Group (NCWGRU). Commissioned, Echelon 4 staff comprised of active and reserve
component personnel responsible for standardization and certification of training, strategic concepts, long range
operational planning, exercise support planning, intelligence dissemination, administrative support and general

logistics support to NCWRON and MSRON staffs and their subordinate units. NCWGRUs provide
administrative, reserve management, financial and supply management, and readiness oversight of their
subordinate units. They are organized to be non-deployable, however, NCWGRU staff qualified personnel may
be selectively ordered to support local, regional, littoral or wartime NCW tasks.
Subordinate NCWRONs provide immediate superior in command (ISIC) support for their squadron units
(MIUWUs and IBUs) and add embedded command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I)
capability, harbor management, intelligence analysis and logistics support to units and detachments.
Subordinate MIUWUs add surveillance and reconnaissance capability to the NCW (C4I) force package to
provide an integrated C4I-SR asset capable of self-sustained coastal warfare support. Subordinate IBUs add
armed small boats to provide quick reacting interdiction support for coastal warfare. Supporting PSUs add
limited command and control capability, harbor management, intelligence analysis and inshore armed
Transportable Port Security Boats (TPSB) to provide quick reacting surveillance and interdiction support and
point defense for coastal warfare. Subordinate MSRONs provide ISIC support for MSDs and add administrative
and logistics support, training and readiness oversight of MSDs. Subordinate MSDs add force protection,
waterborne security, surveillance, interdiction, and point defense of high value assets (HVAs).
COMNCWGRU ONE is located in San Diego, CA; COMNCWGRU TWO is located in Portsmouth, VA.
NCWGRUs are OPCON to COMSECONDFLT or COMTHIRDFLT and ADCON to COMNAVSURFLANT
or COMNAVSURFPAC. NCWGRU staffs are comprised of both USN and USCG personnel with personnel
being Active Duty or Full Time Support (FTS) and Selected Reservists.
D Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron (NCWRON). Commissioned, Echelon 5, operating unit responsible for
deploying command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I) and operational support
detachments and units to form an ashore operations center. NCWRONs contain an embedded C4I detachment
and have the capability to provide C4I support for all facets of NCW. NCWRONs provide administrative,
reserve management, financial and supply oversight and readiness of their subordinate units. Squadron staffs are
manned by USN and USCG personnel, primarily SELRES.
E Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit (MIUWU). Commissioned, Echelon 6, deployable operating unit
equipped with the Radar-Sonar Surveillance Center (RSSC) van system, and associated support equipment.
MIUWUs provide surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for an integrated C4I-SR asset capable of self-
sustained coastal warfare support. MIUWUs routinely operate with Inshore Boat Units (IBU) and Port Security
Units (PSU) to provide a force package with command, control, communications, surveillance and interdiction
capability. MIUWUs are manned primarily with USNR SELRES.
F Inshore Boat Unit (IBU). Commissioned, Echelon 6, deployable operating unit equipped with armed patrol
craft and associated supporting equipment. IBUs routinely operate with other NCW assets such as MIUWUs
and C4I detachments to provide an enhanced force package for conducting small craft security and support for
NCW operations in the littoral environment. Inshore Boat Units are manned primarily with USNR SELRES.
G Mobile Security Squadron (MSRON). Commissioned, Echelon 5, administrative staff comprised of active
component personnel and responsible for providing centralized planning, coordination and integration of
subordinate MSDs relating to movement, control (when not assigned to other OPCONs), readiness and training,
administration and logistics. They are organized to be non-deployable. However, MSRON staff qualified
personnel may be selectively ordered to support local, regional, littoral or wartime Mobile Security Force tasks.
Each MSRON supports assigned detachments and coordinates deployment and redeployment activities with
supported numbered fleet commanders and theater commanders.

H Mobile Security Detachments (MSD). Deployable operating detachments equipped with security boats
provide force protection, waterborne security, surveillance, interdiction, and point defense of high value assets
(HVAs) at both ends of the U.S. Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). MSDs also provide force protection for
submarine and Military Sealift Command (MSC) security missions and military air assets at inland airfields.
MSDs may operate independently, in close coordination with other naval security assets or with NCW assets in
the inshore harbor environment against Level I or Level II Joint Rear Area threats.
I Port Security Unit (PSU). Commissioned deployable USCG operating unit equipped with Transportable Port
Security Boats (TPSB) that provides waterborne security, surveillance, interdiction and point defense for the
protection of high value assets (HVAs) at both ends of the U.S. SLOCs. PSUs may operate independently or
with other NCW assets in the inshore harbor environment against Level I or Level II Joint Rear Area threats.
Refs J-N currently not available
105 EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION FUNDAMENTALS
105.1 Equipment preparation for air/sea/rail movement
S, CONTAINERS, AND EQUIPMENT
This chapter provides guidance to pack, crate, mark, and manifest unit vehicles, containers, and equipment for
embarkation. See Joint Publication (JP) 3-02.2, Joint Doctrine for
Amphibious Embarkation, and Department of Defense Regulation (DODR) 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation
Regulation, Part I, Passenger Movement; Part II, Cargo Movement; and Part III, Mobility.
The unit embarkation officer will ensure that adequate quantities of the following are on hand for unit
deployments:
_ Standard embarkation boxes.
_ Serviceable crates, pallets, and containers. The unit is required to maintain sufficient quantitites of dunnage,
shoring, banding material, and banding accessories to properly configure embarkation containers and pallet
loads. Units maintain sufficient quantities of the above to enable embarkation of all T/E items, special
allowances, supplies, and remain-behind equipment (RBE). Garrison property should not be considered for
deployment.

Standard Embarkation Boxes,

Crates, Pallets, and Containers

Standard embarkation boxes, crates, pallets, and containers will be used to the maximum extent possible. Where
practical, use embarkation boxes and containers to store T/E assets in the workspace (reduces overall stowage
space).
Standard Publication Box (40 by 16 by 15 inches)
This box has may applications but is primarily used for publications, directives, and unit files. Its compact and
lightweight design facilitates mobile loading and palletization of unit cargo and equipment.
Standard Medium Unitized Cargo Box (48 by 40 by 44 inches)
This box is for unitizing equipment, mobile loading, containerization, and 463L pallet building. It fills in for
any unit palletized container (PALCON) deficiencies.

Standard Tent/Utility Crate (102 by 42 by 44 inches)

This box is for unitizing equipment, mobile loading, containerization, and 463L pallet building.
Standard Warehouse Pallet (48 by 40 by 96 inches)
Made of a hard wood stringer construction, this pallet was designed primarily for delivery of palletized unit
loads by surface or aerial means. The normal load usually does not exceed 2,800 pounds.

United States Marine Corps

Standard Container Family

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) standard container family consists of watertight, prefabricated,
standard sized, and reusable cargo containers to stow unit property and consumable supplies. These containers
are designed to meet shipping and ground transportation standards. They can be handled by an array of
materials handling equipment (MHE), tactical vehicles, and transport helicopters.

International Organization for

Standardization Container
Twenty-foot International Organization for Standardization (ISO) containers measuring 240 by 96 by 96 inches
are maintained in the MEF container pools.

PALCON
The PALCON (Table of Authorized Materiel Control Number [TAMCN] C4431) measures 48 by 40 by 41
inches. It is designed with a standard pallet base, four-way forklift entry, has a cargo capacity of 1,000 pounds,
and can accommodate up to six inserts.

Quadruple Container
The quadruple container (QUADCON) (TAMCN C4433) measures 58 by 82 by 96 inches. By its double door
entry on both ends, it can be filled with bulk items or fitted with 36 inserts. Maximum load should not exceed
6,500 pounds.

Insert
The insert is designed to fit into a rack within the PALCON or QUADCON to serve as a drawer-bin storage
container for supply activities in garrison or the field. It may also be employed separately as a portable,
watertight covered field box. The insert measures 45 by 17 by 10 inches and is designed to carry 120 pounds.

Half Container
The half container (HALFCON) (TAMCN C4906) measures 120 by 96 by 96 inches. It is designed primarily
for use with the reverse osmosis water purification unit system. Other uses may include mobile loading of hose
reels, engines, transmissions, and other oversized cargo. Maximum load weight should not exceed 10,000
pounds.

Water Pump/Storage Module

The water pump/storage module (six containers together [SIXCONS]) (TAMCNs B1580, B1581, B2085,
B2086) measures 96 by 80 by 48 inches. It is designed primarily to transport, store, and dispense bulk liquids
with the associated pump module.

Tactical Markings
All units will ensure that vehicles, containers, and equipment are marked IAW Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic
Order (MARFORLANTO) 4035.2/Marine Corps Forces, Pacific Order (MARFORPACO) 4035.1, Tactical
Marking
Procedures for Equipment and Embarkation Containers. This standardized marking system for vehicles,
equipment, pallets, and containers identifies the owning organization, general contents, stowage location, size,
weight, and, when required, source and destination of the equipment and cargo.

UIC Markings
UIC markings identify organizational ownership. All units will use UICs to identify their vehicles, containers,
and equipment. The UIC marking can be engraved, affixed on a dog tag, embossed on unit equipment or
painted on all unit embarkation boxes and containers. Raised letter and number decals obtained through the
supply system will be
used on vehicles, containers, and equipment painted with chemical agent resistant coating paint in lieu of spray-
painting the UIC. See figure 4-1 for placement of markings. For vehicles, containers, generators, and other
items requiring square foot stowage areas, UIC markings will be black, 2-inch, and centered. Where designated
marking locations coincide with black paint (camouflage scheme), the marking will be painted earth brown or
green. For embarkation boxes, pallets (pallet boards), and crates, UIC markings will be black, 1-inch, and
placed on one end, one side, and on the top.

Stowage Designators
A 3-inch white or yellow painted disk (circle) indicates where the cargo is to be stowed aboard ship. Stowage
designators are not required on vehicles, QUADCONS, generators or other square foot stowed equipment.
Stowage designators will be placed on each pallet board and in the upper left-hand corner of the top, on one
side, and on one end of each embarkation box or crate.

White Disk
A white disk indicates cargo that is hold-stowed on the ship that the owning unit is embarked. However, that
cargo does not have to be readily accessible during the ship’s transit.
Yellow Disk
A yellow disk indicates cargo that is stowed within the troop office/berthing spaces that must be accessible to
unit personnel during transit.
Unit Personnel and Tonnage Table Number
The unit personnel and tonnage table (UP&TT) number categorizes containers by stowage or handling
requirements. JP 3-02.2 provides additional information and uses of the UP&TT number. It will be
superimposed and centered on the stowage designator in 1-inch black numbers. Appendix E lists applicable
numbers.

Package ID Numbers
The package ID number is commonly referred to as a serial or box number and identifies unit vehicles,
containers, boxes, pallets, and equipment. It is a required entry in a UDL that enables tracking of vehicles,
cargo, and equipment during transit. The package ID number will not be duplicated within the unit.

Vehicles, Generators, and other Items

Requiring Square Foot Stowage Areas

The assigned USMC or manufacturer serial number will be used as the package ID number. Package ID
numbers will be black, 2 inches high, and placed on the item per applicable technical manuals (TMs). Where no
TM guidance is provided, the upper left-hand corners (each side, end, and top) are marked. All vehicles and
generators will contain the entire serial number preceded by the letters “USMC.” When placement locations
coincide with black paint (camouflage scheme), the marking will be painted earth brown or green. For North
Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) operations, a solid black five-point star marking will be placed on the
front and rear of the vehicle to indicate US ownership. (Per STANAG 2454-AMovP-01A, Regulations and
Procedures for Road Movements and Identification of Movement Control and Traffic Control Procedures and
Agencies.)

ISO Container and QUADCON Markings

ISO containers are marked IAW ISO Standard 6346, Freight Containers Coding, Identification and Marking,
and ISO Standard 1496-1, Series 1 Freight Containers-Specifications and Testing. ISO containers and
QUADCONs are manufactured with two data plates attached. The first data plate contains the manufacturer’s
contract date, number, and serial number. The manufacturer’s serial number is the principal means to track the
container in the Marine

Corps Supply System. It is used for Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR) codes documentation,
developing MDSS II garrison UDL records, and in load planning and templating functions with the joint AIS
load planning tools. The second data plate is the CSC safety approval data plate. It contains the date of
manufacture, ID number (ISO Registry Number), maximum gross weight, allowable stacking weight, and
racking test load value. It also has a
space on its right side to apply the CSC inspection/ reinspection decal. All ISO containers (including Marine
Corps T/E items equipped with ISO fittings) must be recertified for serviceability. The manufacturer delivers
the container or QUADCON with a 5-year certification. Upon expiration of the initial certification, the unit is
responsible to recertify the container or QUADCON. Details for container operations can be found in JP 4-01.7,
Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations, and STANAG
2236, Multimodal
Movement and Transport Matters-AMovP-5, Multimodal Transport Issues. AMovP-5 provides details on ISO
characteristics and load planning. It addresses inspecting ISOs, planning loads, packing (to include HAZMAT),
and documentation and data plate requirements for use of containers in a NATO operation. See figure 4-2. Each
end of the ISO container or QUADCON is marked in the upper right corner of the right door with the ISO
Registry Number. This number is in 4-inch letters/numbers and has a “USMC” prefix. The ISO Registry
Number, typically
located on the left door, consists of 2-inch letter markings that reflect the maximum gross, tare (empty), and net
weights of the container in kilograms and pounds. These markings are required to move the container within the
Defense Transportation System (DTS), and must be properly maintained for readability. These markings must
not be removed or painted over. The top of the container or QUADCON is also marked with the ISO Registry
Number. Both ends of the top are marked in 4-inch letters so they can be read from the nearest end of the
container. The UIC markings will be black and 2-inch high as indicated above. When designated locations
coincide with black paint (camouflage scheme), the markings may be moved to allow for painting on a
contrasting color background or may be painted earth brown or green

Embarkation Boxes, Crates, and Pallet Boards

Package ID numbers will be 1-inch high and marked on the top, one end, and one side, in the upper left-hand
corner to the right of the stowage designator on each box and crate and in the same position for each pallet
board. Units will use a unit-assigned four-digit consecutive number system as a package ID number for its
boxes, pallet boards, and container markings. For self-contained items with serial number plates (such as
AN/PRC-114 radio), the last four digits of the serial number can be used in place of a unit assigned package ID
number.

Capability Sets
A capability set is a T/E asset that requires packing or crating of its components in more than one container or
pallet, which must be shipped together to maintain its operational capability; e.g., B1226 laundry units.
Capability
sets may be identified and manifested on the unit’s garrison database by using an alpha character following the
package ID number; e.g., 001A or 001B.

Cubic Feet and Weight

These markings reflect the cubic foot volume (vol) and weight of each item. When computing the cubic foot
and weight, results will always be rounded up to the next higher whole number. The item marking will reflect
the rounded number. Cubic feet are computed by multiplying the length, width, and height (inches) of a
container
or piece of equipment and dividing by 1,728 (Formula: LxWxH÷1,728 = cubic feet). Vehicles, containers,
generators, and other items requiring square foot stowage do not require cubic feet and weight markings. For
boxes, pallets, and crates, cubic feet and weight markings will be 1-inch high, marked on the top, one end, and
one side, and placed in the upper right-hand corner.

Expeditionary Cans
Expeditionary cans will be marked with the UIC in black 1-inch numbers, and centered on both sides. If
expeditionary cans are black, the marking will be painted in a contrasting color; e.g., white. Petroleum, oils, and
lubricants (POL) cans will be marked with the contents in 2-inch yellow letters on the spout end of the can.
Water cans require only the UIC marking since the word “water” is already imprinted on the sides.

Other T/E Assets

Small items that are mobile-loaded, hand-carried or over-packed in protective boxes or containers should be
marked with only the UIC; e.g., night vision goggles (NVGs) and small toolboxes. For small boxes where
marking is

required and 1-inch markings are too large, smaller markings are authorized.

Administrative Markings
Administrative markings provide amplifying information such as source, content, and destination of the cargo
and equipment. Common forms include placarding and labeling.

Placards
Placards provide unit personnel, in-transit agencies, and transportation coordinators with information that
expedites handling and throughput of vehicles, containers, and equipment during embarkation/debarkation. See
figure 4-3.

Figure 4-3. Sample Vehicle/Cargo Placard.

Bar Code Labels
Scannable encoded bar code labels provide unit personnel and transportation agencies with an automated means
of building databases, conducting inventories, and providing ITV of cargo and equipment.

AIT Labeling
AIT labels provide personnel and transportation agencies with an automated means of building databases,
conducting inventories, and providing ITV of cargo and equipment. The appropriate labels or RFID tags must
be applied per the references governing the type of movement. Generally, labeling should be applied for each
major
end item, serialized items (less individual weapon/components; e.g., NVGs or compasses that move separately
within a deployment process), vehicles, ISO containers, boxes, pallets or crates. When LOGMARS labels are
used, they should be placed 2 inches above the UIC.

Symbolic Markings
Symbolic markings such as unit logos or mascots are not authorized.

Packing and Crating

To save stowage space and lessen cargo damage—
_ To the maximum degree possible, maintain uniformity in boxes, crates, pallets, and containers.
_ Pack like items within the same box/container to facilitate ID and accountability.
_ Pad and reinforce containers to protect fragile items and prevent damage to the container and its contents.
_ Waterproof boxes or crates containing items subject to moisture damage/deterioration.
_ Apply corrosion preventive materials or other appropriate preservatives to items requiring such protection.
_ Ensure wood is NMWP-compatible and meets all federal and international standards.

Waterproofing and Corrosion Control

Waterproofing protects those supplies and equipment subject to weather and moisture deterioration during
movement.

Plastic Bags
The preferred method of waterproofing is the use of plastic bags and duct tape. Consideration should be given
to condensation that may occur through the use of plastic bags. Use of a moisture absorbent material with the
plastic
bag is highly recommended.

Corrosive Preventive Materials/Preservatives

Before an amphibious operation or when wet landings are anticipated, certain vehicles, equipment, and
communications-electronic items will require waterproofing. Use of authorized corrosive preventive
materials/preservatives will be applied per applicable TMs.

Palletizing
To prevent damage to embarkation boxes, containers, and equipment during movement, the palletizing
techniques listed in Military Handbook (MIL-HDBK)-774, Palletized Unit Loads, must be used. Each pallet
must be able to
withstand inclement weather and rough handling. This pertains to loading equipment on warehouse pallets
(wood or metal) and does not pertain to 463L pallets. See chapter 8 and DODR 4500.9-R, Part III for further
information on
463L pallet loading. The following guidelines are provided to assist in properly palletizing a unit’s standard
cargo containers, boxes, and equipment. See figure 4-4.
_ Maintain a sufficient quantity of serviceable standard pallets on hand for all supplies and equipment that will
be embarked or remain behind in storage.
_ Pallets will have four-way forklift access for loading and handling.
_ Pallets will have a stringer construction with a 4-inch overhang on both ends for using lifting slings during
crane on/offloading.
_ Pallet construction will include banding recesses for the banding straps. Place banding straps through the slots
on the pallet stringer so they do not interfere with forklift tines.
_ Use only 1 ¼-inch banding when palletizing cargo. Band in both directions to ensure the load is secure.
_ Pallets will be squared off as much as possible to allow stacking or overstow. Depending on their weight,
pallets may be stacked three high during staging and while in transit. A 40-inch height is recommended for
maximum stowage of pallets. However, 52 inches is considered to be the maximum height allowable for
unitized cargo while embarking aboard amphibious shipping and should not be exceeded.
_ Maintain three pallet boards for each pallet. The pallet board will be of sufficient size (not to exceed 12 by 18
inches) to accommodate all required markings.
_ Tentage and poles not used for on-going field operations will be palletized and or crated in garrison to
maintain embarkation readiness.
_ Band expeditionary cans to pallets in three rows of seven. Care must be taken in the banding of plastic
expeditionary cans to prevent damage.

Preparing HAZMAT for Shipment

Units often overlook packing and packaging of hazardous cargo. All units use and often embark HAZMAT
such as—
_ Explosives.
_ Flammable liquids and solids.
_ Oxidizers.
_ Corrosive materials.
_ Compressed gasses.
_ Poisons.
_ Irritating materials.
_ Etiologic agents.
_ Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense testing and neutralizing substances.
_ Commercial lantern fuel; e.g., Coleman™.
_ Cleaning agents.
_ Lithium batteries.
_ Radioactive materials and other regulated materials and substances whose properties can be considered
dangerous.
Units will review supplies and equipment on hand, those planned for embarkation, and identify those known to
be HAZMAT. Any questionable items will be identified to the embarkation section for guidance on packaging
and handling/ shipping instructions. Items identified as hazardous are required to have the proper HAZMAT ID
labels placed on three sides of the container for shipment. This ID label is used to assign the stowage location
aboard the
designated transportation asset (ship, aircraft, truck or rail). Title 49 (Transportation) of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) provides specific requirements and shows label examples. Embarkation personnel (0431
NCO per the current ITS) must be certified in preparing HAZMAT for shipment to ensure that unit hazardous
cargo has been properly identified, packed, packaged, and certified for transportation. HAZMAT certifiers will
use a
generic Shipper’s Declaration for Dangerous Goods format to document hazardous cargo. The format describes
the HAZMAT and provides handling information; e.g., some HAZMAT cannot be moved on a passenger
aircraft so the
format would have “Cargo Aircraft Only” annotation, where required. This would affect load planning to adjust
loading of an aircraft without personnel. Units are required to have MCO P4030.19H, Preparing Hazardous
Materials for Military Air Shipments, readily available. Additional references include—
_ DODR 4500.9-R, Part II, chapter 204.
_ CFR Titles 46 (Shipping) and 49.

_ International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code.
_ NATO STANAGs.
_ International Air Transport Association (IATA) International Standards and Recommended Practices and/or
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations.

DD Form 1387-2, Special Handling

Data/Certification
See figure 4-5. Per DODR 4500.9-R, Part II the shipper (unit movement or traffic management personnel) must
complete DD Form 1387-2, Special Handling Data/Certification, for all cargo and equipment identified with
special characteristics and handling requirements regardless of the mode of transportation. An example may be
the S-2 intelligence section wants to ship a three drawer combination safe. The embarkation representative
would ensure that a DD Form 1387-2 is completed and attached to the safe to track it through transit. The DD
Form 1387-2 will inform all concerned in the DTS of the requirement to ensure the safe is secured at all times.
The DD Form 1387-2 is considered an additional shipper documentation requirement. Note: DD Form 1387-2 is
no longer used to certify HAZMAT.

Recommended Embarkation

Supplies and Equipment

Embarkation supplies and equipment must be readily available to conduct short notice embarkation operations
and provide the unit with the equipment to train its personnel. See appendix F. Typical uses of the most
important items follow.

Banding Wire and Banding Tools

Units should maintain a minimum of two sets of crimpers, cutters, stretchers, and a sufficient quantity of 1 ¼-
inch steel banding wire and clips to meet the unit’s pallet building and overall embarkation requirements. A
nylon or plastic banding wire system can be substituted if it can safely secure the pallet load.

Tool Kit
Unit embark personnel should have hammers, nails, pliers, saws, and various screwdrivers readily available
during embarkation.
Tape Measure and Calculator
Each embarkation representative should have a tape measure and calculator to determine and verify square foot
and cube requirements and dimensions of vehicles, cargo, and equipment.

Portable Wheel Scales

Each unit should be authorized (check the unit T/E) to possess scales to weigh and determine the centerof-
balance of unit vehicles, cargo, and equipment.

Administrative Supplies
The unit embarkation section should maintain enough supplies to conduct a unit move. Examples include—
_ Airlift/sealift placards.
_ Document protectors.
_ Staple guns/staples.
_ Grease pencils.
_ Chalk.
_ Duct tape.
_ 1-, 2-, and 4-inch stencil sets.
_ Spray paint.
_ Waterproofing materials.

Safety Equipment
Each unit should maintain a sufficient quantity of safety equipment to meet mobility requirements. At a
minimum, each embarkation representative should maintain the required personal protective safety equipment.
Safety equipment should at a minimum include plastic hard hats, safety boots or boot caps, work gloves, ear/eye
protection, and flashlights with wands and lens filters.

Special Ramps and Lifting Slings

Unit embark sections should maintain special ramps and or lifting slings to support loading requirements; e.g.,
ramps for loading helicopters aboard transport aircraft and slings for 155 millimeter [mm] howitzers.

Tie-Down Material (1/2-inch Rope/Cargo Straps)

Units should maintain tie-down material to secure mobile loads. Sufficient quantities of ½-inch rope or 500-
pound capacity cargo straps should be maintained within each unit to accommodate all planned mobile loads for
contingency and routine deployments.

Padding and Reinforcing Materials

A sufficient quantity of padding (bubble wrap) and reinforcing materials should be maintained within each unit
to pack its supplies and equipment requiring such protection.

Vehicle Preparation
The term “vehicle” pertains to trucks, trailers, forklifts, road graders, bulldozers, tanks, amphibious assault
vehicles (AAVs), light armored vehicles (LAVs), and other rolling stock and tracked equipment. To ensure all
vehicles are prepared for embarkation, the following tasks must be accomplished:
_ Check engines, fuel lines, and mobile-loaded fuel cans for leaks. Ensure any defects are corrected before
moving to embarkation points.
_ Vehicles are clean, to include engine compartments, tracks, road wheels, and under carriages.
_ Vehicles are at full operational capability.
_ Based on the mode of transportation, bows for canvas tops are removed from cargo compartments and
attached to the vehicle’s body. Canvas tops are folded and placed in the vehicle storage compartment, when
required. Exhaust
stacks/tire racks are removed and placed in the bed of the vehicle to reduce vehicles to their minimum height.
_ Identify in advance all cargo to be mobile loaded.
_ Stow mobile-loaded cargo no higher than the highest fixed point of the vehicle (no higher than the cargo
compartment side-rack unless containerized in a QUADCON or other type storage container).
_ Inspect vehicles and trailers to ensure lifting points, shackles, and pintle hooks are in serviceable condition.
All lifting shackles/pintle hooks must have cotter pins regardless if the vehicle has a towed load associated to it.
_ Embark vehicles with fuel tanks filled not to exceed ¾ of a tank-full. However, depending on the mode and
location of the vehicle on a particular mode of transportation, there may be a specific fuel limitation according
to the applicable loading manual.
_ Secondary loads are mobile loads carried in the vehicle cargo compartment or bed. Mobile loads may be
individual equipment or supplies properly palletized on a standard warehouse pallet. Secure secondary loads to
the vehicle with a minimum of ½-inch rope, cargo straps or chains, and tie-down devices.
_ Determine an accurate vehicle weight during embarkation planning. Each mode of transportation has its own
specific weight restrictions. Vehicles must be mobile-loaded so they do not exceed cross-country weight
limitations,
thereby avoiding frustrated cargo at staging areas and APOEs/SPOEs. Chapters 6 through 8 cover the specific
weighing and marking procedures for overland, sealift, and airlift transportation of vehicles.
_ The unit is responsible for providing all approach, rolling, parking, sleeper shoring, dunnage, chocking, and
blocking and bracing material for safe containerization and loading and transport of vehicles, supplies, and
equipment.
105.2 Types of Air Mobility Command organic aircraft

AMC's mobility aircraft include the C-5 Galaxy, KC-10 Extender, C-17 Globemaster III, C-130 Hercules, KC-
135 Stratotanker and C-141 Starlifter. Operational support aircraft are the VC-25 (Air Force One), C-9, C-20,
C-21, C-32, C-37, C-40 and UH-1.
C-5 GALAXY Mission The gigantic C-5 Galaxy, with its tremendous payload capability, provides the Air
Mobility Command intertheater airlift in support of United States national defense. The C-5, the C-17
Globemaster III and the C-141 Starlifter are partners of AMC's strategic airlift concept. The aircraft carry fully
equipped combat-ready military units to any point in the world on short notice then provide field support
required to help sustain the fighting force. Features The C-5 is one of the largest aircraft in the world. It can
carry outsize and oversize cargo intercontinental ranges and can take off or land in relatively short distances.
Ground crews can load and off load the C-5 simultaneously at the front and rear cargo openings. Other features
of the C-5 are:
1• Able to take off fully loaded within 8,300 feet (2,530 meters) and land within 4,900 feet (1,493 meters).
2• High flotation landing gear with 28 wheels sharing the weight. Nose and aft doors that open the full width
and height of the cargo compartment to permit faster and easier loading.
3• A "kneeling" landing gear system that permits lowering of the parked aircraft so the cargo floor is at truck-
bed height or to facilitate vehicle loading and unloading.
4• Full width drive-on ramps at each end for loading double rows of vehicles.
5• A system that records and analyzes information and detects malfunctions in more than 800 test points.
6• The C-5 is similar in appearance to its smaller sister transport, the C-141 Starlifter, although the C-5 is much
larger. Both aircraft have the distinctive high T-tail, 25-degree wing sweep, and four turbofan engines mounted
on pylons beneath the wings.

The Galaxy carries nearly all of the Army's combat equipment, including such bulky items as its 74-ton mobile
scissors bridge, from the United States to any theater of combat on the globe. Four TF39 turbofan engines
power the big C-5, rated at 43,000 pounds thrust each. They weigh 7,900 pounds (3,555 kilograms) each and
have an air intake diameter of more than 8.5 feet (2.6 meters). Each engine pod is nearly 27 feet long (8.2
meters). The Galaxy has 12 internal wing tanks with a total capacity of 51,150 gallons (194,370 liters) of fuel --
enough to fill 6 1/2 regular size railroad tank cars. A full fuel load weighs 332,500 pounds (150,820 kilograms).
A C-5 with a cargo load of 270,000 pounds (122,472 kilograms) can fly 2,150 nautical miles, offload, and fly to
a second base 500 nautical miles away from the original destination -- all without aerial refueling. With aerial
refueling, the aircraft's range is limited only by crew endurance. General Characteristics Primary Function:
Outsize cargo transport Cargo Compartment: height , 13.5 feet (4.11 meters); width, 19 feet (5.79 meters);
length, 143 feet, 9 in (43.8 meters) Pallet Positions: 36 Maximum Cargo: 270,000 pounds (122,472 kilograms)
Maximum Takeoff Weight: C-5B 769,000 pounds (348,818 kilograms) (peacetime), 840,000 pounds (381,024
kilograms) (wartime) Speed: 518 mph (.77 Mach) Range: 6,320 nautical miles (empty)
KC-10 EXTENDER
Mission The KC-10 Extender is an Air Mobility Command advanced tanker and cargo aircraft designed to
provide increased global mobility for U.S. armed forces. Although the KC-l0's primary mission is aerial
refueling, it can combine the tasks of a tanker and cargo aircraft by refueling fighters and simultaneously carry
the fighter support personnel and

equipment on overseas deployments. The KC-10 is also capable of transporting litter and ambulatory patients
using patient support pallets during aeromedical evacuations. Features The KC-10 can transport up to 75 people
and nearly 170,000 pounds (76,560 kilograms) of cargo a distance of about 4,400 miles (7,040 kilometers)
unrefueled. In addition to the three main DC-10 wing fuel tanks, the KC-10 has three large fuel tanks under the
cargo floor, one under the forward lower cargo compartment, one in the center wing area and one under the rear
compartment. Combined, the capacity of the six tanks carry more than 356,000 pounds (160,200 kilograms) of
fuel - almost twice as much as the KC-135 Stratotanker. Using either an advanced aerial refueling boom, or a
hose and drogue centerline refueling system, the KC-10 can refuel a wide variety of U.S. and allied military
aircraft within the same mission. The aircraft is equipped with lighting for night operations. The KC-10's boom
operator controls refueling operations through a digital, fly-by wire system. Sitting in the rear of the aircraft, the
operator can see the receiver aircraft through a wide window. During boom refueling operations, fuel is
transferred to the receiver at a maximum rate of 1,100 gallons (4,180 liters) per minute; the hose and drogue
refueling maximum rate is 470 gallons (1,786 liters) per minute. The Automatic Load Alleviation System and
Independent Disconnect System greatly enhances safety and facilitates air refueling. The KC-10 can be air-
refueled by a KC-135 or another KC-10A to increase its delivery range. The large cargo-loading door can
accept most air forces' fighter unit support equipment. Powered rollers and winches inside the cargo
compartment permit moving heavy loads. The cargo compartment can accommodate loads ranging from 27
pallets to a mix of 17 pallets and 75 passengers. General Characteristics Primary Function: Aerial tanker and
transport Speed: 619 mph (Mach 0.825) Ceiling: 42,000 feet (12,727 meters) Maximum Takeoff Weight:
590,000 pounds (265,500 kilograms) Range: 4,400 miles (3,800 nautical miles) with cargo; 11,500 miles
(10,000 nautical miles) without cargo Maximum Cargo Payload: 170,000 pounds (76,560 kilograms) Pallet
Positions: 27 Maximum Fuel Load: 356,000 pounds (160,200 kilograms)
C-17 GLOBEMASTER III
Mission The C-17 Globemaster III is the newest, most flexible cargo aircraft to enter the airlift force. The C-17
is capable of rapid strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main operating bases or directly to
forward bases in the deployment area. The aircraft can perform tactical airlift and airdrop missions and can also
transport litters and ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations when required. The inherent flexibility
and performance of the C-17 force improve the ability of the total airlift system to fulfill the worldwide air
mobility requirements of the United States. The ultimate measure of airlift effectiveness is the ability to rapidly
project and sustain an effective combat force close to a potential battle area. Threats to U.S. interests have
changed in recent years, and the size and weight of U.S.-mechanized firepower and equipment have grown in
response to improved capabilities of potential adversaries. This trend has significantly increased air mobility
requirements, particularly in the area of large or heavy outsize cargo. As a result, newer and more flexible airlift
aircraft are needed to meet potential armed contingencies, peacekeeping or humanitarian missions worldwide.
The C-17 is capable of meeting today’s demanding airlift missions. Features Reliability and maintainability are
two outstanding benefits of the C-17 system. Current operational requirements impose demanding reliability
and maintainability. These requirements include an aircraft mission completion success probability rate of 92
percent, only 20 aircraft maintenance man-hours per flying hour, and full and partial

mission availability rates of 74.7 and 82.5 percent, respectively. The Boeing warranty assures these figures will
be met. The C-17 measures 174 feet long (53 meters) with a wingspan of 169 feet, 10 inches (51.75 meters).
The aircraft is powered by four, fully reversible, Federal Aviation Administration-certified F117-PW-100
engines (the military designation for the commercial Pratt & Whitney PW2040), currently used on the Boeing
757. Each engine is rated at 40,440 pounds of thrust. The thrust reversers direct the flow of air upward and
forward to avoid ingestion of dust and debris. Maximum use has been made of off-the-shelf and commercial
equipment, including Air Force-standardized avionics. The aircraft is operated by a crew of three (pilot, copilot
and loadmaster), reducing manpower requirements, risk exposure and long-term operating costs. Cargo is
loaded onto the C-17 through a large aft door that accommodates military vehicles and palletized cargo. The C-
17 can carry virtually all of the Army's air-transportable equipment. Maximum payload capacity of the C-17 is
170,900 pounds (77,519 kilograms), and its maximum gross takeoff weight is 585,000 pounds (265,352
kilograms). With a payload of 169,000 pounds (76,657 kilograms) and an initial cruise altitude of 28,000 feet
(8,534 meters), , the C-17 has an unrefueled range of approximately 2,400 nautical miles. Its cruise speed is
approximately 450 knots (.76 Mach). The C-17 is designed to airdrop 102 paratroopers and equipment. The
design of the aircraft allows it to operate through small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on
runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters). Even on such narrow
runways, the C-17 can turn around using a three-point star turn and its backing capability. General
Characteristics Primary Function: Cargo and troop transport
Cargo Compartment: length, 88 feet (26.82 meters); width, 18 feet (5.48 meters); height, 12 feet 4 inches (3.76
meters) Speed: 450 knots at 28,000 feet (8,534 meters) (Mach .76) Service Ceiling: 45,000 feet at cruising
speed (13,716 meters) Range: Global with in-flight refueling Maximum Peacetime Takeoff Weight: 585,000
pounds (265,352 kilograms) Load: 102 troops/paratroops; 36 litter and 54 ambulatory patients and attendants;
170,900 pounds (77,519 kilograms) of cargo (18 pallet positions)
C-130 HERCULES
Mission The C-130 Hercules primarily performs the tactical portion of the airlift mission. The aircraft is capable
of operating from rough, dirt strips and is the prime transport for air dropping troops and equipment into hostile
areas. The C-130 operates throughout the U.S. Air Force, serving with Air Mobility Command, Air Force
Special Operations Command, Air Combat Command, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Pacific Air Forces, Air
National Guard and the Air Force Reserve Command, fulfilling a wide range of operational missions in both
peace and war situations. Basic and specialized versions of the aircraft airframe perform a diverse number of
roles, including airlift support, Antarctic ice resupply, aeromedical missions, weather reconnaissance, aerial
spray missions, firefighting duties for the U.S. Forest Service and natural disaster relief missions. Features
Using its aft loading ramp and door the C-130 can accommodate a wide variety of oversized cargo, including
everything from utility helicopters and six-wheeled armored vehicles to standard palletized cargo and military
personnel. In an aerial delivery role, it can airdrop loads up to 42,000 pounds or use its high-flotation landing
gear to land and deliver cargo on rough, dirt strips. The flexible design of the Hercules enables it to be
configured for many different missions, allowing for one aircraft to perform the role of many. Much of the
special mission equipment added to the Hercules is removable, allowing the aircraft to revert back to its cargo
delivery role if desired. Additionally, the C-130 can be rapidly reconfigured for the various types of cargo such
as palletized equipment, floor-loaded material, airdrop platforms, container delivery system bundles, vehicles
and personnel or aeromedical evacuation.

The C-130J is the latest addition to the C-130 fleet and will replace aging C-130E's. The C-130J incorporates
state-of-the-art technology to reduce manpower requirements, lower operating and support costs, and provides
life-cycle cost savings over earlier C-130 models. Compared to older C-130s, the J model climbs faster and
higher, flies farther at a higher cruise speed, and takes off and lands in a shorter distance. The C-130J-30 is a
stretch version, adding 15 feet to fuselage, increasing usable space in the cargo compartment. C-130J/J-30
major system improvements include: advanced two-pilot flight station with fully integrated digital avionics;
color multifunctional liquid crystal displays and head-up displays; state-of-the-art navigation systems with dual
inertial navigation system and global positioning system; fully integrated defensive systems; low-power color
radar; digital moving map display; new turboprop engines with six-bladed, all-composite propellers; digital auto
pilot; improved fuel, environmental and ice-protection systems; and an enhanced cargo-handling system.
General Characteristics Primary Function: Global airlift Cargo Compartment: C-130E/H/J: length, 40 feet
(12.31 meters); width, 119 inches (3.12 meters); height, 9 feet (2.74 meters). Rear ramp: length, 123 inches
(3.12 meters); width, 119 inches (3.02 meters) C-130J-30: length, 55 feet (16.9 meters); width, 119 inches (3.12
meters); height, 9 feet (2.74 meters). Rear ramp: length, 123 inches (3.12 meters); width, 119 inches (3.02
meters) Speed: C-130E: 345 mph/300 ktas (Mach 0.49) at 20,000 feet (6,060 meters) C-130H: 366 mph/318
ktas (Mach 0.52) at 20,000 feet (6,060 meters) C-130J: 417 mph/362 ktas (Mach 0.59) at 22,000 feet (6,706
meters) C-130J-30: 410 mph/356 ktas (Mach 0.58) at 22,000 feet (6,706 meters) Ceiling: C-130J: 28,000 feet
(8,615 meters) with 42,000 pounds (19,090 kilograms) payload C-130J-30: 26,000 feet (8,000 meters) with
44,500 pounds (20,227 kilograms) payload. C-130H: 23,000 feet (7,077 meters) with 42,000 pounds (19,090
kilograms) payload. C-130E: 19,000 feet (5,846 meters) with 42,000 pounds (19,090 kilograms) payload
Maximum Takeoff Weight: C-130E/H/J: 155,000 pounds (69,750 kilograms) C-130J-30: 164,000 pounds
(74,393 kilograms) Maximum Allowable Payload: C-130E, 42,000 pounds (19,090 kilograms) C-130H, 42,000
pounds (19,090 kilograms) C-130J, 42,000 pounds (19,090 kilograms) C-130J-30, 44,000 (19,958 kilograms)
Maximum Normal Payload: C-130E, 36,500 pounds (16,590 kilograms) C-130H, 36,500 pounds (16,590
kilograms) C-130J, 34,000 pounds (15,422 kilograms) C-130J-30, 36,000 pounds (16,329 kilograms) Range at
Maximum Normal Payload: C-130E, 1,150 miles (1,000 nautical miles) C-130H, 1,208 miles (1,050 nautical
miles) C-130J, 2,071 miles (1,800 nautical miles) C-130J-30, 1,956 miles (1,700 nautical miles) Range with
35,000 pounds of Payload: C-130E, 1,438 miles (1,250 nautical miles) C-130H, 1,496 miles (1,300 nautical
miles) C-130J, 1,841 miles (1,600 nautical miles) C-130J-30, 2,417 miles (2,100 nautical miles) Maximum
Load: C-130E/H/J: 6 pallets or 74 litters or 16 CDS bundles or 92 combat troops or 64 paratroopers, or a
combination of any of these up to the cargo compartment capacity or maximum allowable weight.

C-130J-30: 8 pallets or 97 litters or 24 CDS bundles or 128 combat troops or 92 paratroopers, or a combination
of any of these up to the cargo compartment capacity or maximum allowable weight.
KC-135 STRATOTANKER
Mission The KC-135 Stratotanker's principal mission is air refueling. This unique asset greatly enhances the Air
Force's capability to accomplish its primary missions of Global Reach and Global Power. It also provides aerial
refueling support to Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aircraft as well as aircraft of allied nations. The KC-135
is also capable of transporting litter and ambulatory patients using patient support pallets during aeromedical
evacuations. Features Four turbofans, mounted under 35-degree swept wings, power the KC-135 to takeoffs at
gross weights up to 322,500 pounds (146,285 kilograms). Nearly all internal fuel can be pumped through the
flying boom, the KC-135's primary fuel transfer method. A special shuttlecock-shaped drogue, attached to and
trailing behind the flying boom, may be used to refuel aircraft fitted with probes. Some aircraft have been
configured with the Multipoint Refueling System or MPRS. MPRS configured aircraft are capable of refueling
two receiver aircraft simultaneously from special “pods” mounted on the wingtips. One crewmember, known as
the boom operator, is stationed in the rear of the plane and controls the boom during in-flight air refueling. A
cargo deck above the refueling system can hold a mixed load of passengers and cargo. Depending on fuel
storage configuration, the KC-135 can carry up to 83,000 pounds (37,648 kilograms) of cargo. General
Characteristics Primary Function: Aerial refueling and airlift Ceiling: 50,000 feet (15,240 meters) Range: 1,500
miles (2,419 kilometers) with 150,000 pounds (68,039 kilograms) of transfer fuel; ferry mission, up to 11,015
miles (17,766 kilometers) Maximum Takeoff Weight: 322,500 pounds (146,285 kilograms) Maximum Transfer
Fuel Load: 200,000 pounds (90,719 kilograms) Maximum Cargo Capability: 83,000 pounds (37,648
kilograms), 37 passengers Pallet Positions: 6
C-141 STARLIFTER
Mission The C-141 Starlifter fulfills the vast spectrum of airlift requirements through its ability to airlift combat
forces over long distances, deliver those forces and their equipment either by air, land or airdrop, resupply
forces, and transport the sick and wounded from the hostile area to advanced medical facilities. Features The C-
141B is a "stretched" C-141A with in-flight refueling capability. The stretching of the Starlifter consisted of
lengthening the planes 23 feet 4 inches (7.11 meters). The added length increased the C-141 cargo capacity by
about one-third, for an extra 2,171 cubic feet (62.03 cubic meters). The lengthening of the aircraft had the same
overall effect as increasing the number of aircraft by 30 percent. The C-141A, built between 1963 and 1967,
was Air Mobility Command's first jet aircraft designed to meet military standards as a troop and cargo carrier.
The development of the B model was the most cost-effective method of increasing AMC's airlift capability. The
C-141C includes the addition of advanced avionics. A universal air refueling receptacle on the C-141, with the
ability to transfer 23,592 gallons (89,649.6 liters) in about 26 minutes, means longer non-stop flights and fewer
fuel stops at overseas bases during worldwide airlift missions. With more than 40 years of service and nearly
nine million flying hours, the C-141 force has a proven reliability and long-range capability. In addition to
training, worldwide airlift and combat support, the C-141 has amassed a laudatory record in response to
humanitarian crises. The C-141, with its changeable cargo compartment, can transition from rollers on the floor
for palletized cargo to a

smooth floor for wheeled vehicles to aft facing seats or sidewall canvas seats for passengers, quickly and easily,
to handle over 30 different missions. General Characteristics Primary Function: Cargo and troop transport
Cargo Compartment: Height, 9 feet 1 inch (2.77 meters); length, 93 feet 4 inches (28.45 meters); width, 10 feet
3 inches (3.12 meters) Cargo Door: width, 10.25 feet (3.12 meters); height, 9.08 feet (2.76 meters) Speed: 500
mph (Mach 0.74) at 25,000 feet Ceiling: 41,000 feet (12,496 meters) at cruising speed Range: Unlimited with
in-flight refueling Maximum Takeoff Weight: 323,100 lbs (146,863 kilograms) Load: Either 200 troops, 155
paratroops, 103 litters and 14 seats, or 68,725 lbs (31,239 kilograms) of cargo
C-20 Mission The C-20 is a twin-engine, turbofan aircraft acquired to fill the airlift mission for high-ranking
government and Department of Defense officials. The 89th Airlift Wing, Andrews Air Force Base, Md.,
operates five C-20B's for worldwide special air missions. The 86th Airlift Wing, Ramstein Air Base, Germany,
operates two C-20H's for operational support airlift missions.
C-21 Mission The C-21 is a twin turbofan engine aircraft used for cargo and passenger airlift. The aircraft is the
military version of the Lear Jet 35A business jet. In addition to providing cargo and passenger airlift, the aircraft
is capable of transporting one litter or five ambulatory patients during aeromedical evacuations.
C-32
Mission The C-32 provides safe, comfortable and reliable transportation for our nation's leaders to locations
around the world. The primary customers are the vice president, using the distinctive call sign "Air Force Two,"
the first lady, and members of the Cabinet and Congress.
C-37A
Mission The C-37A is a twin-engine, turbofan aircraft acquired to fill the worldwide special air missions for
high-ranking government and Defense Department officials.
C-40B/C
Mission The C-40 B/C provides safe, comfortable and reliable transportation for U.S. leaders to locations
around the world. The C-40B's primary customers are the combatant commanders and C-40C customers include
members of the Cabinet and Congress. The aircraft also perform other operational support missions.
UH-1N HUEY
Mission The UH-1N is a light-lift utility helicopter used to support Air Force Space Command missile wings
and groups. The helicopter has a number of uses. Its primary mission includes:
1• Airlift of emergency security and disaster response forces,
2• Security surveillance of off-base movements of nuclear weapons convoys and test range areas during launch
conditions
3• Space shuttle landing support, priority maintenance dispatch support, and emergency positive control
document changes

1• Response to search and rescue operations Other uses include airlift of missile support personnel, airborne
cable inspections and distinguished visitor transport.

105.3 Discuss MPF Operations

The maritime prepositioning force (MPF) Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) can directly support our
national maritime strategy of protecting key naval chokepoints and sea lines of communications (SLOCs). An
MPF operation includes the airlift of MAGTF and Navy elements, the Navy support element (NSE), and naval
coastal warfare (NCW) units with selected equipment into an arrival and assembly area (AAA) to join with
equipment and supplies carried aboard maritime prepositioning ships (MPSs).

Echelon of Forces
Maritime prepositioning provides a combatant commander with deployment flexibility and an increased
capability to respond rapidly to a crisis or contingency with a credible force. An MPF operation may consist of
one ship interacting with a forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); a maritime prepositioning
ships
squadron (MPSRON) and a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) fly-in echelon (FIE); or a Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) falling in on all three MPSRONs. The MPF is one component of the Marine Corps’
rapid response capability triad, which also includes the air contingency MAGTF (ACM) and forward-deployed
amphibious forces (AFs). Each triad component can be used separately or integrated to further enhance a
combatant commander’s options. An MPF operation is an economy of force measure that allows deployment of
an appropriate force if a crisis arises. The MPF offers an augmentation capability for amphibious operations, but
is not a substitute due to an inherent lack of forcible entry capability. An MPF operation provides a method to
rapidly augment a forward-deployed MAGTF, an ongoing amphibious operation or other joint, multinational or
combined force operations.

Concept
An MPF operation extends from marshalling through arrival and assembly of the MAGTF to reconstitution of
the MPF. The geographic reach of the operation may vary, but the MPF is inherently a strategic or intertheater
capability. Execution involves the following:

__ Supporting forces such as the United States Transportation

Command (USTRANSCOM), specifically the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
(SDDC) or the Air Mobility Command (AMC). The SDDC is formerly the Military Traffic Management
Command.
__ The host nation (HN) and supported/supporting combatant commander’s organizations.
___ Other deployment support agencies that the situation may demand.
While an MPF operation is conceptually simple, the strategic dimensions, the number of major
commands involved as the force transits from theater to theater (from and to combatant commanders),
and the intricacies of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) make the operation
extremely complex. The overlap of phases and geographic separations places heavy demands on command
elements (CEs).
The scope of the operation may require activating Navy reserves to conduct the offload and Marine Corps
reserves to conduct civil affairs and MAGTF operations. Conflicting demands of deployment and employment
will dictate a dynamic planning process that must remain responsive to the current situation. Operational
planning must begin with a risk/ threat assessment to determine if an MPF operation is the appropriate force
deployment option. Some planning factors will be determined late in the decisionmaking process because of the
remoteness of the deployment area and uncertainty of the situation. Subsequent operations will impact
significantly onexecution planning. Commanders must visualize
their concept of operations (CONOPS) ashore to determine their arrival and assembly plans, which determine
their deployment plans.

The Initiating Directive

An MPF operation begins with the decision to employ the MPF MAGTF. Typically, a combatant commander—
in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the subordinate component
commanders, and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef)— initiates an MPF operation
and subsequent

MAGTF operations. An initiating directive provides essential information. It is issued by and at the discretion
of the establishing authority, a common superior commander of the Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force
(CMPF), and MPF MAGTF commander (see ch. 3). The CMPF; MPF MAGTF commander; and the
commander, Navy support element (CNSE) must quickly determine the requirements and work with higher
headquarters to ensure sufficient information and guidance is provided for rapid and efficient execution. If an
MPF operation augments
an amphibious operation, the MPF mission and appropriate command relationship guidance is included in the
amphibious operation initiating directive. Planning is continuous, but the execution phase actually begins with
assigning a specific mission. Terminating the arrival and assembly phase occurs when all prerequisites in the
initiating directive are met and the MAGTF is established ashore. The MAGTF is established ashore when
adequate equipment and supplies are offloaded and issued to arriving units; the MAGTF’s command and
control (C2) capabilities are established; and the MAGTF commander is ready to
execute the mission. The MAGTF commander will report mission readiness to the establishing authority upon
termination of the arrival and assembly phase. Subsequent MAGTF operations ashore are separate from an MPF
operation. After the MAGTF mission is completed, the MPF focus shifts to the reconstitution of maritime
prepositioning equipment and supplies (MPE/S) aboard the effected MPSRON.
If a separate initiating directive is not published; e.g., during crisis situations or if issued late in the planning
process, naval commanders involved in MPF operations will have to act upon information given in
alert/warning/execution orders. From this information an initiating directive may be formulated and
recommended to the establishing authority for approval and promulgation.
These orders often do not contain detailed information specific to the MPF. (App. A is a sample format that
contains the “who, what, when, and where” guidance.)

Forward Presence and Crisis Response

Development of the naval force structure derives from the national military strategy (NMS), two tenets of which
are forward presence and crisis response. Reinforcing US forward-deployed forces and multinational partners
and projecting combat power across the range of military operations is an essential ingredient of the NMS.
MPSRONs are strategically based around the
globe (see fig. 1-1). Naval forces can link-up with them in an operational area in a matter of days. This
capability demonstrates commitment, reinforces alliances, enhances regional stability, promotes US influence
and access, and is especially responsive to regional crises or natural disasters. The MPF is designed to respond
independently
or with other forces to a variety of regional crises. The MPF provides a quick and credible response to deter an
escalation in hostilities or engage decisively if deterrence fails. The essential contribution of an MPF operation
is mobility and flexibility, allowing a quickconcentration of forces in a specific area. The MPF permits rapid
deployment into secure areas where force introduction is essentially unopposed and is expected to remain so
through
the arrival and assembly phase. The MPF enables MAGTF employment as follows:
__ Augment an amphibious deployment or operation.
__ Occupy or augment an advanced base.
__ Defend key chokepoints along SLOC.
__ Establish a blocking position for offensive and defensive operations.
__ Reinforce multinational partners with a credible force before hostilities, and sustain relations with routine
exercises and operations.
__ Establish a sizable force ashore to enable closure of additional forces.
__ Deter potential adversaries by positioning MPSs and alerting Marine and Navy forces (NAVFOR).
__ Provide a rapid peacetime response in support of foreign humanitarian assistance and civil support.
__ Provide economy of force through reduction of strategic airlift requirements, and reduction or elimination of
the need to employ AFs capable of forcible entry to a contingency that does not require such force.
___ Augment fleet defense by providing tactical air support from ashore.

Establishing the MPF MAGTF Ashore

The essential requirement for an MPF operation is a secure environment that allows for the arrival and offload
of ships and aircraft and joining personnel and materials for force standup. To establish the MPF MAGTF
ashore, the following conditions are required:
__ A secure environment from initiation of strategic deployment through completion of arrival and assembly.
__ Adequate strategic airlift and aerial tanker support.
__ Adequate offload forces; i.e., MAGTF and NSE.

__ Sufficient airfield space for Marine Corps tactical aircraft, AMC aircraft and civil reserve air fleet (CRAF)
operations, and throughput capability to support the intended airflow.
__ An ample port and/or beach area for timely offload and throughput. The port must have sufficient water
depth, overhead clearance, and maneuver room to admit MPSs. Beaches andapproaches ship-to-shore (STS)
must be evaluated for hydrographic support and swept for mines and other hazards.
__ A suitable transportation network between the port and/or beach, airfields, and assembly areas to permit
timely arrival and assembly of airlifted units with sealifted equipment and supplies. This may include railroads,
barge traffic, and pipelines.
___ Adequate force protection capabilities to meet any potential threat in the AAA.

NMS
MPF is a key asset in the NMS by providing regional focus, an adaptive planning capability; i.e., tailoring
forces for a particular circumstance, and force presence options. Through regional focus, each MPSRON and
the forces from the associated MEF can respond worldwide, but remain especially responsive to the theaters
that are designated as
those of a possible major theater war (MTW) or small scale contingencies (SSCs) or those supported by
operation plans (OPLANs) or contingency plans (CONPLANs). The purpose of this adaptive planning process
is to
provide leaders with a range of preplanned options to clearly demonstrate US resolve, deter potential
adversaries, and deploy and employ forces to fight and win, quickly and decisively. As a military component of
these options, the MPF provides a combatant commander with a wide range of capabilities to size the force for a
particular mission. Force presence options exist because the
MPSRONs are forward-deployed and serve as an ever-present reminder of US capability and resolve. When
teamed with amphibious or other forwarddeployed naval forces, the MPF can enhance a force presence with
potent complementary capabilities easily recognized by a potential adversary.

Rapid Response
The goal of an MPF operation is to establish a MAGTF ashore as rapidly as possible and for it to be fully
operational within 10 days or less following initiation of the offload. Achieving this goal requires positioning
the MPF in areas of concern so that the chief constraint on force deployment is airlift, not sealift closure.

Flexible Command Relationships

The establishing authority will promulgate command and supporting/supported relationships. Relationships
should be as consistent as possible to ensure continuity and reduce potential confusion.
However, relationships must be flexible to support all MPF phases and respond to new requirements.

Sustainment of the MPF

Sustainment of the MAGTF comes from a combination of prepositioned and airlifted materiel. An MPF MEB is
a capable force of Marines, Navy, and naval support personnel that, using a full MPSRON, can be sustained for
30 days. The MAGTF may be sustained ashore longer or less depending on the size of the force, the number of
MPSRONs supporting that force, and the following variables:
__ Inclusion of an aviation logistics support ship (T-AVB).
__ Follow-up shipping.
__ SLOCs length.
___ Host-nation support (HNS).

Types of MPF Operations

Independent
Independent operations are those where the MPF MAGTF becomes part of a joint task force (JTF) that involves
no other Marine Corps forces (MARFOR) or those where the MPF as the JTF supports allies. The key identifier
is that the MPFMAGTF remains an independent entity that is not subsumed into another MARFOR, although
the
MPF MAGTF commander may be dual designated as the MARFOR commander in the area of operations (AO).

Augmentation
Augmentation, as defined in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, is the transfer of forces to the operational control of a supported commander
during execution of an operation. MPF augmentation operations are those where the MPF MAGTF supports an
existing MARFOR or AF. Phases

Planning
The planning phase begins upon receipt of the alert/warning order and is characterized by two planning
methodologies: deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP). Deliberate planning is ongoing, preparing
for future, hypothetical military operations. CAP is conducted to respond to present situations that might require
a US military response (see ch. 5).

Marshalling
Units organize and complete final preparations to deploy, including preparing personnel and equipment, moving
to an aerial port of embarkation (APOE), staging, and loading aboard aircraft. The marshalling phase begins on
arrival of the first unit at a designated marshalling point and ends on departure of the last unit from a departure
airfield (see ch. 6).

Movement
The movement phase entails moving forces by air and sea to the AAA. It begins on lift-off of the first aircraft
from the departure airfield or when the first MPF ship transits to the AAA. This phase ends when the last FIE
aircraft
arrives in the AAA and the last ship arrives at the offload point.

Arrival and Assembly

The arrival and assembly phase begins on arrival of the first MPF ship or first aircraft of the main body at the
designated AAA. This phase ends when adequate MPE/S are offloaded and issued to awaiting units, C2 is
established, and the MAGTF commander reports that all essential MAGTF elements of the MPF are combat-
ready
(see ch. 7). The arrival and assembly phase includes the following:
__ Prepare the AAA.
__ Receive MAGTF, US Navy (USN), and US Coast Guard (USCG) personnel and equipment at nearby
airfields.
__ Coordinate arrival and offload of equipment and supplies from MPSs.
__ Issue MPE/S to arriving units.
__ Provide local force protection for arrival and assembly.
__ Establish the MAGTF’s combat capability (force standup).
___ Prepare the MAGTF mission; e.g., moving the MAGTF to the tactical assembly area (TAA) or the line of
departure (LD).

Reconstitution
The MPSRON is methodically restored to its original strength or properties and full operational capability.
Reconstitution is conducted as rapidly as possible after the MAGTF completes its mission (see ch. 8).
105.4 Purpose of Shipper’s Declaration of Hazardous Goods

Preparing HAZMAT for Shipment

Units often overlook packing and packaging of hazardous cargo. All units use and often embark HAZMAT
such as—
_ Explosives.
_ Flammable liquids and solids.
_ Oxidizers.
_ Corrosive materials.
_ Compressed gasses.
_ Poisons.

_ Irritating materials.
_ Etiologic agents.
_ Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense testing and neutralizing substances.
_ Commercial lantern fuel; e.g., Coleman™.
_ Cleaning agents.
_ Lithium batteries.
_ Radioactive materials and other regulated materials and substances whose properties can be considered
dangerous.
Units will review supplies and equipment on hand, those planned for embarkation, and identify those known to
be HAZMAT. Any questionable items will be identified to the embarkation section for guidance on packaging
and handling/ shipping instructions. Items identified as hazardous are required to have the proper HAZMAT ID
labels placed on three sides of the container for shipment. This ID label is used to assign the stowage location
aboard the
designated transportation asset (ship, aircraft, truck or rail). Title 49 (Transportation) of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) provides specific requirements and shows label examples. Embarkation personnel (0431
NCO per the current ITS) must be certified in preparing HAZMAT for shipment to ensure that unit hazardous
cargo has been properly identified, packed, packaged, and certified for transportation. HAZMAT certifiers will
use a
generic Shipper’s Declaration for Dangerous Goods format to document hazardous cargo. The format describes
the HAZMAT and provides handling information; e.g., some HAZMAT cannot be moved on a passenger
aircraft so the
format would have “Cargo Aircraft Only” annotation, where required. This would affect load planning to adjust
loading of an aircraft without personnel. Units are required to have MCO P4030.19H, Preparing Hazardous
Materials for Military Air Shipments, readily available. Additional references include—
_ DODR 4500.9-R, Part II, chapter 204.
_ CFR Titles 46 (Shipping) and 49.
_ International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code.
_ NATO STANAGs.
_ International Air Transport Association (IATA) International Standards and Recommended Practices and/or
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulations.
DD Form 1387-2, Special Handling
Data/Certification
See figure 4-5. Per DODR 4500.9-R, Part II the shipper (unit movement or traffic management personnel) must
complete DD Form 1387-2, Special Handling Data/Certification, for all cargo and equipment identified with
special characteristics and handling requirements regardless of the mode of transportation. An example may be
the S-2 intelligence section wants to ship a three drawer combination safe. The embarkation representative
would ensure that a DD Form 1387-2 is completed and attached to the safe to track it through transit. The DD
Form 1387-2 will inform all concerned in the DTS of the requirement to ensure the safe is secured at all times.
The DD Form 1387-2 is considered an additional shipper documentation requirement. Note: DD Form 1387-2 is
no longer used to certify HAZMAT.
105.5 Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD)
The JFC must ensure
the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) reflects the priorities and requirements of the joint force.
Planners must ensure the COA developed adheres to deployment considerations across the force and does not
assume away potential mobility pitfalls. (12) During COA development, the JFACC staff helps the commander
identify risk areas that require attention. These will vary based on the specific mission and situation and may be
divided into two broad areas: combat support and operational. Combat support considerations include TPFDD
planning that will critically affect the joint force strategy and execution. Also considered with the TPFDD are
basing, access, logistic support available, and defenses required (see Figure III-8). However, since TPFDD
execution, basing, and logistic support are the responsibility of the JFC and Service components, the JFACC’s
planning effort needs to focus on the limitations and constraints imposed.
Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The
CONPLAN can be published with or without a timephased force and deployment data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN
— An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an
operation

order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the combatant commander’s
strategic concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and
supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is
prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also called
OPLAN. b. CONPLAN —An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable
expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the combatant
commander’s strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant
commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support
requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD — A
CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for phased
deployment of forces. Also called CONPLAN. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its
definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
105.6 Military Sealift Command Mission
3.4.2 Military Sealift Command. As noted previously, Military Sealift Command is one of the three
Transportation Component Commands of USTRANSCOM. As such, MSC is tasked with providing strategic,
common-user sealift transportation services to U.S. Forces to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy those forces
on a global basis. However, MSC is also a major command within the Navy, reporting administratively to the
Chief of Naval Operations regarding Navy strategic sealift matters. A third chain of command exists for MSC;
an operational
one for Navy-unique functions such as combat-ready logistics and special mission support. This third chain of
command ultimately leads to the CJCS and in this instance MSC functions as a type commander much like
other type commanders in the Navy. As such, MSC’s assets are fully integrated into the operational fleet
structure, however, operational control remains with MSC so that they may better operate their unique assets in
support of those fleets. A brief description of some of those assets is provided in the following paragraphs.
3.5 NAVAL SEALIFT ASSETS
3.5.1 Introduction.
The movement of cargo in the amounts required to support our operating Forces requires
a large number ships of various configurations in both peacetime and wartime conditions. During peacetime,
as part of the MSC Strategic Sealift Force, the Military Sealift Command operates over 50 dry cargo ships and
tankers under long-term contracts to support DoD’s peacetime mission. That number grows significantly
during contingency or wartime conditions as additional dry cargo and tanker fleets are augmented, in particular
with several special mission-configured vessels. Some of these ships and their missions are described below.
3.5.2 Strategic Sealift Force.
The Strategic Sealift Force, MSC’s largest force of ships, is a combination of various ship types designed to
support both peacetime and contingency operational support. To perform its mission, the Strategic Sealift Force
utilizes three strategies: pre-positioning of assets at strategic locations, surge sealift capability of critical
weapons and equipment, and sustainment sealift capability. MSC operates a fleet of approximately 20 dry cargo
ships and tankers under contract to support their peacetime mission. This fleet lifts over 95 percent of DoD’s
dry cargo requirements on a regularly scheduled basis. For contingencies and wartime support, MSC augments
this fleet with well over 100 additional vessels of various configurations. The paragraphs below briefly describe
these augmentation vessels.
3.5.2.1 Afloat Prepositioning Force.
As an alternative to land-based storage, the strategy of afloat prepositioning is to position ships preloaded with
equipment and supplies, including ammunition and petroleum, at various strategic locations. There are currently
over 30 ships in the APF separated into two mission categories: Maritime Pre-positioning Ships and Afloat
Prepositioned Ships.
3.5.2.1.1 Maritime Prepositioning Ships.
AnMPF is a task organization of units under one commander formed for the purpose of introducing an MAGTF
and

its associated equipment and supplies into a secure area. The maritime prepositioning force is composed of a
command element, a Maritime Pre-positioning Ship squadron (MPSRON), an MAGTF, and a Navy support
element (NSE). The purpose of an MPF operation is to rapidly establish a MAGTF ashore so that it is prepared
to conduct subsequent operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to all levels of armed conflict. MPF
operations are economy-of-force measures that allow the deployment of an appropriately sized force using a
minimum of lift.
To provide the maximum flexibility, 13 ships in total have been assigned to 3 MPSRONs, with each MPSRON
of 4 or 5 ships homeported in separate locations. When not in the maintenance cycle or their homeport, the
MPSRONs spend much of their time afloat in their respective areas of operations. MPSRON 1 is based in the
Mediterranean Sea; however, safety concerns because of the net explosive weight of embarked Class V
materiel,
and the population density of most Mediterranean seaports, prevent the squadron from being assigned to a
specific homeport. Therefore, it operates in both the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. MPSRON 2
operates in the Indian Ocean and is homeported in Diego Garcia, south of Sri Lanka/India. MPSRON 3 operates
in the Pacific Ocean and is homeported in the Marianas Islands at Guam and Saipan. OneMPSRON provides
enough equipment and supplies to support a brigade-sized MAGTF for up to 30 days of combat operations.
MPSs may be offloaded either at a pierside facility or in-stream, using embarked lighterage and shipboard
cranes. The in-stream option
provides access to many more potential landing areas, including beaches; however, this evolution takes
considerably more time and is much more weather dependent than a pierside offload.
3.5.2.1.2 Afloat Prepositioned Ships.
The second category of prepositioned ships operated by MSC is the Afloat Prepositioned Ships. Similar in
concept to the MPS ships described above, PREPO ships, which number about 21 in total, are also preloaded
and prepositioned overseas. However, they are maintained in a state of immediate readiness for deployment.
While the MPS ships are preloaded and dedicated to Marine Corps contingency and combat support, ships in
the PREPO force are preloaded with materiel and supplies more suitable for joint forces operations and, as such,
carry supplies for not only Navy contingency operations support, but Army and Air Force support as well. All
PREPO assets may revert to
USTRANSCOM control once they are offloaded to become part of the common user sealift pool. Any decision
made to retain PREPO assets in theater or allow them to revert to common user status is made in consultation
with the combatant CINC. Again, PREPO ships enhance a combat force’s capability to react to a crisis, as a
result of reduced reaction time.
3.5.2.2 Fast Sealift Ships.
This specialized fleet, which is basically configured to support the Army’s rapid deployment requirements,
consists of eight Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) configured ships equipped with on-board ramps and cranes that
allow these ships to be self-sustaining. With an underway speed of almost 30 knots, these eight ships combined
can carry equipment that is the equivalent of a full Army mechanized division of about 20,000 personnel. Kept
in a reduced operating status, Fast Sealift Ships can normally be activated and ready for loading within 96 hours
or less. It is important to note that Fast Sealift Ships are the only MSC ships kept in a reduced operating status
that can be solely activated by MSC without prior approval or coordination with MARAD.
3.5.2.3 Ready Reserve Force.
Maintained by the Maritime Administration, this force of ships consists of almost 95 ships of various
configurations that can be activated at various readiness levels; i.e., 4, 5, 10, 20, or 30 days. Upon activation,
operational control of the ships shifts to MSC. Normally cargo ships, the Ready Reserve Force consists of dry
cargo ships and tankers, as well as miscellaneous others, including breakbulk, heavy lift, and troop ships.
3.5.2.4 Aviation Logistics Support Ships.
MARAD maintains two aviation support ships (T-AVB) in “RRF-like” condition for direct support of the
Marine Corps. These are specifically configured for the support and maintenance of the air support element of a
MAGTF. These Aviation Logistics Support Ships are capable of carrying about 300 logistics and maintenance
support vans that provide support for Marine Aviation Combat Elements providing direct support of Marine
ground task forces.
As with other ships discussed earlier, Aviation Logistics Support Ships are kept in a state of reduced readiness,
but they can be activated for use within 5 days. If they can be released by the Marine Corps, the T-AVBs
are capable of use as common-user sealift assets.
3.5.2.5 Hospital Ships.

Two ships within the MSC Strategic Sealift Force are configured as hospital ships. These ships, capable of
providing medical support to U.S. Forces, consist of a 1,000-bed medical facility, 20 trauma stations, and 12
operating rooms. One is homeported on the West Coast and one on the East Coast. Kept in a reduced operating
status, these ships can be activated within 5 days.
3.5.3 Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force.
Navy-unique Fleet operations dictate that deployed units be logistically supported while in an underway status.
And,
because the ultimate goal of Navy logistics support is leet readiness, we must be able to provide that support;
anytime, anywhere. To meet these support demands, the Navy employs a variety of ships from both the Navy-
crewed Combat Logistics Force (CLF), which will be briefly discussed later in this chapter, and the MSC,
civilian-crewed Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF). A unique characteristic of many of the ships assigned to
these support
forces is their capability of performing replenishmentat- sea operations, an evolution that demonstrates both
the flexibility and uniqueness of total logistics support in the Navy. It is the replenishment-at-sea evolution
that allows battle groups, amphibious groups, individual ships, etc., to receive materiel while at sea.
Replenishment at sea can take several forms; i.e., vertical-on-board replenishment using organic helicopters to
ferry supplies and materiel between ships, and connected replenishment that is a process of physically
connecting ships together with transferring lines and hoses to transfer supplies, ammunition, and fuel
respectively. It is not unusual for both a VERTREP and CONREP to be performed simultaneously, allowing
these logistics support ships to resupply/refuel a number of ships in company at the same time. Additional
services may include towing and salvage, transport of
sophisticated weapons, and operating surveillance systems. In normal operations, several of these support ships
accompany a battle group, task force, etc., while underway, providing necessary supplies during a 20- to 30-day
period. As they must remain on station, other ships designated as shuttle ships bring resupply materiel to the on-
station ships from advanced support bases or even from U.S. ports. In this way, on-station support remains
constant. The responsibility of coordinating these functions in order to maintain a ready force falls to the theater
and battle group commanders. Crewed by civilian merchant mariners with a small U.S. Navy detachment on
board, the NFAF (over 30 ships) includes ammunition ships, fleet oilers, combat stores ships, and fast combat
stores ships, as well as
other support ships required to meet specific fleet mission requirements.
3.5.4 Special Mission Support Force.
The third force employed for Navy sealift support by MSC includes a number of vessels designed for
specialized and unique military missions. These ships, which are in a Full Operating Status, are crewed by
civilian merchant mariners and appropriate technicians. The Special Mission Support Force is comprised of the
following ship types: oceanographic and hydrographic survey programs support; deep ocean survey programs;
Defense Mapping Agency support; undersea cable operations; and direct support of the Navy’s ballistic missile
testing, guidance, and navigation programs.
106 Command, Control, Communications and Intel
106.1 Proper use of Phonetic alphabet and numerals
A. PHONETIC ALPHABET AND NUMERALS
When necessary to identify a letter of the alphabet,bthe standard phonetic alphabet should be used. This helps to
prevent the receiving operator from copying your words or groups of words incorrectly. Bs, Ps, Ts, and other
letters that sound alike can be confusing when heard on radio telephone nets. Learn the phonetic alphabet listed
below and the proper pronunciation as spoken over radio nets.
Lette Phonetic Equivalent Pronounced
r
A ALFA AL fah
B BRAVO BRAH voh
C CHARLIE CHAR lee or
D DELTA SHAR lee

E ECHO DELL tah

F FOXTROT ECK oh
G GOLF FOKS trot
H HOTEL GOLF
I INDIA hoh TELL
J JULIETT IN dee ah
K KILO JEW lee ett
L LIMA KEY loh
M MIKE LEE mah
N NOVEMBER MIKE
O OSCAR no VEM ber
P PMA OSS cah
Q QUEBEC pah PAH
R ROMEO keh BECK
S SIERRA ROW me oh
T TANGO see AIR rah
U UNIFORM TANG go
V VICTOR YOU nee form
W WHISKEY VIK tah
X XRAY WISS key
Y YANKEE ECKS ray
Z ZULU YANG key

USE OF THE PROWORD “I SPELL.” Difficult words or groups within the text of the message maybe spelled
out using the phonetic alphabet and should be started with the proword “I SPELL.” EXAMPLE:
CATENARY . . . . . “I SPELL” CHARLIE, AMA, TANGO, ECHO, NOVEMBER, ALFA, ROMEO,
YANKEE. . . CATENARY Where
the text is composed of easily pronounced words, they can be spoken.
USE OF PROWORD “FIGURES.” In order to distinguish numerals from words similarly pronounced, you may
use the proword “FIGURES” before numbers.
TRANSMITTING NUMERALS. When numerals are transmitted by radiotelephone, the rules for their proper
pronunciation are as follows:
TRANSMITTING NUMBERS. Numbers are transmitted digit by digit except that exact multiples of hundreds
and thousands may be spoken as such; however, there are special cases when the normal
pronunciation of numerals is as follows:

B. Prowords
PROWORDS
The following prowords and their meanings, authorized for general use, are those that are commonly used on
the Seabee battalion radio nets.
ALL AFTER: The portion of the message to which I have reference is all of the message which follows .
ALL BEFORE: The portion of the message to which I have reference is all of the message which precedes .
BREAK: I hereby indicate the separation of the text from other portions of the message.
CORRECTION: An error has been made in this transmission. I will continue with the last word I transmitted
correctly.
DISREGARD THIS TRANSMISSION: The transmission is an error. Disregard it. This proword shall not be
used to cancel a message that has been completely transmitted and for which receipt or acknowledgement has
been received.
DO NOT ANSWER: Stations called are not to answer this radio call, receipt for this message, or otherwise
transmit in connection with this transmission. When this proword is used, the transmission shall be ended with
the proword OUT.
EXEMPT: The addressee call signs immediately following are exempted from the collective call or net call.
FIGURES: Numerals or numbers to follow.
FROM: The originator of this message is indicated by the call sign immediately following.
INFO: The addressee(s) immediately following is/are addressed for information.
I SAY AGAIN: I am repeating transmission or portion indicated.
I SPELL: I shall spell the next word phonetically.
MESSAGE FOLLOWS: A message that requires recording is about to follow. Transmitted immediately after
the radio call. (This proword is intended for use when messages are passed on tactical or reporting nets. It is not
used on nets intended primarily for conveying messages.)
NUMBER: Station serial number of messages sent. Normally run in sequence for one 24-hour period.
OUT: This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is required or expected.
OVER: This is the end of my transmission to you and a response is necessary. Go ahead; transmit.
PRECEDENCE PROWORDS: Four precedence designations are used in handling radio messages. These
precedence prowords indicate the order in which one message is handled relative to other messages. The
originator of the message assigns the precedence of the message. The precedence prowords in order of their
importance are as follows:
1. FLASH
2. OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
3. PRIORITY
4. ROUTINE
READ BACK: Repeat this entire transmission back to me exactly as you received it.
RELAY Transmit this message to each of the addressees immediately following.
ROGER: I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.
SAY AGAIN: Repeat all of your last transmission. When followed by identification data means “Repeat
portion indicated.”
THIS IS: This transmission is from the station whose call sign immediately follows.
TO: The addressee(s) immediately following is/are to take action on this message.
WAIT: I must pause for a few seconds.
WAIT OUT: I must pause longer than a few seconds.
WILCO: I have received your message, understand it, and will comply. To be used only by the addressee.
Since the meaning of ROGER is included in that of WILCO, the two prowords are never used together.
WORD AFTER: The word of the message to which I have reference is that which follows .
WORD BEFORE: The word of the message to which I have reference is that which precedes .
WORDS TWICE: Communication is difficult. Transmit each phrase (or each code group) twice. This proword
may be used as an order, request, or as information.
WRONG: Your last transmission was incorrect. The correct version is
106.2 Three Methods of non-oral communications.

COMBAT SIGNALS
Oral (that is, voice) communication is often difficult or impossible under combat conditions. At times, complete
silence must be maintained. Under such conditions, signals are used to transmit commands or information.
Three types of combat signals are used:
1. Whistle signals
2. Special signals
3. Arm and hand signals
Understanding combat signals is important for a fire team. Make sure you become thoroughly familiar with
each signal described in this section. Bear in mind, too, that practice in the use of combat signals is essential if
the signals are to be used effectively.

Whistle Signals
As a rule, only three whistle signals are used, since a large variety could cause confusion. The following three
are commonly used whistle signals:
1. ATTENTION TO ORDERS is indicated by one short blast on the whistle. It is used to fix the attention of
unit members on the unit leader who gives the signal and means that other signals, orders, or commands are to
follow.
2. CEASE FIRING is indicated by one long blast on the whistle. This signal is verified immediately by an arm
and hand signal or by some other means.
3. HOSTILE AIRCRAFT or MECHANIZED VEHICLE is indicated by three long blasts repeated several
times.

Special Signals
Special signals cover all the special methods and devices used to transmit commands or information. Rifle shots
or automatic rifle bursts maybe used when the entire command knows their meanings and the sound is distinct
enough to be heard easily. A squad leader In daylight, an individual giving the signal should operating at night
may find the use of raps on his helmet or rifle effective. Signals must be determined and practiced before they
are used. Various pyrotechnic and smoke signals may be chosen as signals to attack, withdraw, mark front lines,
or indicate targets. Certain special signals are standard for all branches of the armed forces to indicate the
approach or presence of hostile aircraft or mechanized vehicles. They are as follows:
1. Three long blasts of a whistle, vehicular horn, siren, or Klaxon repeated several times.
2. Three equally spaced shots with rifle or pistol.
3. Three short bursts of fire from automatic small arms.
In daylight, an individual giving the signal should point towards the danger; at night, the alarm should be
supplemented by voice warning to indicate the direction–for example, ENEMY TANKS APPROACHING
BY THE NORTH ROAD or HOSTILE
AIRCRAFT APPROACHING FROM THE WEST. Unit leaders should devise special signals whenever they
appear to be useful in a particular situation. Before devising a special signal for the unit, the leaders should
make certain that higher authority has not assigned some other meaning to the same signal.

Combat Arm and Hand Signals

Signals are used to transmit commands or information when voice communication is difficult or impossible or
when silence must be maintained. Leaders should repeat signals to their units whenever necessary to ensure
prompt and correct execution of orders. Leaders giving arm and hand signals should remember that these are an
order of command. The signal is given smartly. Leaders must be aware of their location to ensure the signal can
be seen by the intended unit. When a movement is to be executed by particular unit(s), a signal appointing the
unit(s) precedes the signal for the actual movement. If a movement is to be executed in unison, the signal for the
movement should be followed by the signal READY. After the READY signal is acknowledged, the movement
is executed at the same time that the arm is lowered. Signals requiring a change of direction have no connection
with the direction in which the person giving the signal is facing. The direction of movement is shown by the
direction in which the arm of the signaler points. Standard arm and hand signals are explained in figure 11-28.

106.3 Factors that affect capabilities of radio Communications

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
Radios are a frequently used means of communications. Radios are particularly suited for use when you are on
the move and need a means of maintaining command and control. Small handheld or backpacked radios that
communicate for only short distances are found at squad and platoon level. As the need grows to talk over
greater distances and to more units, the size and complexity of radios are increased.
-
To put these radios to good use, you must first look at some of the things that affect radio communications. To
communicate with each other, radios must have a common frequency. They must also be able to transmit and
receive the same type signal. Most infantry radios are FM (frequency modulated) and will not communicate
with AM (amplitude modulated) radios. Squelch settings on the radios must also be used correctly.
Factors that affect the range of radio equipment are weather, terrain, antenna power and the location of the
radio. Trying to communicate near man-made objects such as bridges and buildings may also affect radio
transmis sions. Interference in the form of static often occurs when you use radios near powerlines or electrical
generators. Interference may also come from other radio stations, bad weather, or enemy jamming.
Many of the things that may cause poor radio communications can be corrected by using common sense. Such
things as making sure that you are not trying to communicate from under a steel bridge or near generators and
powerlines, using the best available antenna for your needs, and selecting the best site for your radio help insure
more reliable communications. You can also reduce the effects of enemy jamming by employing antijamming
techniques. Radio is one of the least secure means of communicating. Each time you talk over a radio, the sound
of your voice travels in all directions. The enemy can listen to your radio transmissions while you are
communicating with other friendly radio stations. You must always assume that the enemy is listening to get
information about you and your unit, or to locate your position to destroy you with artillery fire. Everyone who
uses radios must know the defensive techniques available to prevent the enemy from getting information.
106.4 Terms related to Command and Control
A. Nature and Purpose
As defined in Joint Publication 142, command and control is “the exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission.” Command and control, therefore, refers both to the process
and to the system by which the commander decides what must be done and sees that his decisions are carried
out. As defined, the process of command and control includes the “planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling of forces and operations,” whereas the system of command and control includes the “personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander.” The commander himself is
thus part of both the process and the system. As both a process and a system, command and control provides
insight into the nature of the military problem facing us. It promotes understanding of enemy capabilities,
intentions, and vulnerabilities. It also seeks to convey understanding of our own situation- to include
recognizing our own vulnerabilities. Next, it provides
a vision of what needs to be done, identifying suitable and meaningful goals, and adapting those goals as the
situation changes. Still more important, it helps the commander devise appropriate actions to attain those goals,
and to focus and adapt efforts that create vigorous and harmonious action among the various elements of the
force. It
also provides security to deny the enemy knowledge of our true intentions. Above all, since we recognize that
speed is a weapon, it enables us to generate a rapid tempo of operations. In summary, effective command and
control allows a commander to make effective decisions and direct the successful execution of military
operations. The principal element of command and control is command. Command is a function of authority,
responsibility, and accountability. Formally defined, it is “the authority that a commander in the Armed Forces
lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and
responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing,
directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces

for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and
discipline of assigned personnel. Command in the naval Services also implies leadership-the art
of motivating people toward a common objective. Leadership is the foremost quality of command, instilling
unit cohesion and sense of purpose. It is the catalyst that inspires effort, courage, and commitment. Leadership
is the cornerstone of effective command.
The second element of command and control is control. Control is the means by which a commander guides the
conduct of operations. A commander commands by deciding what must be done and exercising leadership to
inspire subordinates toward a common goal; he controls by monitoring and influencing the action required to
accomplish what must be done. Feedback is a vital element of control; it gives the commander a way to monitor
events, adapt to changing circumstances, adjust the allocation of resources, and harmonize the efforts of the
force. Control can range from the broad control of military operations-such as the policies issued by a theater
commander-to the specific, procedural control of individual weapon systems. We usually think of control as
being exercised concurrently with the action undertaken, but it also may occur beforehand. For example, a well-
conceived plan based on an accurate
assessment of the situation, which clearly indicates what needs to be accomplished and why, provides a certain
amount of control. Similarly, effective training, education, and doctrine, which make it more likely that
subordinates will take the proper action in combat, provide control before the fact. The commander’s intent-
expressed clearly before the operation begins-also exerts control throughout the operation. Control must
sometimes be directive, but naval commanders normally strive to use less restrictive forms of control-seeking
willing cooperation rather than coercion-to avoid stifling the initiative of subordinates. Initiative is crucial to the
successo f a maneuver warfare
strategy, which is characterized by the high operational tempo generated when commanders at the lowest level
are free to recognize and exploit enemy vulnerabilities as they present themselves during combat. Naval forces
use initiative to shape and, where possible, exploit rapid changes within the battlespace. Given the disorderly
and chaotic nature of war, each naval commander must balance his desire to orchestrate events with an
understanding that success in combat demands freedom of action for subordinates. The naval commander
monitors and guides the actions of his forces through a command and control system that extends his influence
through the chain of command. A command and control system encompasses the facilities, equipment,
communications, procedures,
and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces
pursuant to the missions assigned. Such an integration of people, doctrine, technology, and information allows a
commander to gain situational awareness, reach decisions about courses of action, and implement those
decisions by means of plans and orders. Here we use “system” in its broadest sense. That is, the naval command
and control system encompasses not only the equipment and technology that support command and control, but
also the leadership, training, organization, and doctrine that guide it. Thus, the commander is an integral part of
the command and control system, not just a user of it.
B. Process
In learning to deal with the unavoidable friction and disorder of military operations, a naval leader must under
stand the process of command and control. It is this process that translates idea into action, enabling the naval
commander to coordinate the actions of his forces throughout the battlespace. Understanding this process entails
understanding the cyclic nature of command and control, the role of information, the strategies people use in
making decisions, and the various ways commanders control the actions of their subordinates. This
understanding, in turn, will serve as the basis for creating an effective system for command and control.
The Decision and Execution Cycle
Command and control is a continuous, cyclical process by which a commander makes decisions and exercises
authority over subordinate commanders in accomplishing an assigned mission. Each naval commander’s
decision and execution cycle-or “OODA Loop”- can be seen as having four sequential phases, as illustrated by
the
model in Figure 2-l .4 This model applies to any two-sided conflict, whether the antagonists are two individuals
locked in hand-to-hand combat or two large naval formations in combat on the open ocean. Although it vastly
simplifies an extremely complex process, the model is useful in showing how command and control works.
First, the
model recognizes the decision maker as the crucial element in the entire process of command and control.
Accordingly, a commander first observes the environment (using sensors, information systems, and situation
reports from his subordinates) to collect data about his surroundings and the status of enemy and friendly forces.
These data
are typically correlated, fused, and displayed in a common tactical picture-a representation or image of the
battlespace that is shared

Figure 2-l. The Decision and Execution Cycle

among commanders at various levels. Next, a commander orients himself to the environment-that is, he forms a
mental picture of the situation-by converting sensor data and other information into estimates, assumptions, and
judgments about what is happening. The intelligence process plays a key role in supporting the commander’s
ability to orient. From his orientation the commander derives his understanding of the battlespace, or situational
awareness. Based on this understanding, he then decideso n a course of action and comes up with a plan.
Finally, he sets forth his intent and issues orders to put that plan into action. During the action, the commander
monitors
the execution of operations and gauges their results, bringing him full circle to the observation phase, from
which he begins the cycle again. Throughout the entire cycle, the friction and fog of war continually hinder the
commander’s ability to observe, orient, decide, and act. In general, we base our decision making on our
orientation to the situation. Orientation is the result of a cognitive process that turns data gathered from the
environment into knowledge and understanding. It is the key to the entire decision and execution cycle, because
it influences the way we observe, decide, and act. The orientation process shapes the character of the current
decision and execution
cycle; in turn, present cycles shape the character of future cycles. Our experience, expectations, culture, and the
unfolding circumstances of war all influence our ability to orient. The commander’s orientation, however, is
rooted in what he believes to be the current “reality” of the battlespace. This image of reality is derived from his
direct
observation, sensors, intelligence systems, and situation reports from subordinate commanders. Since the
sources of information are imperfect
and may be manipulated by the opposing side, his perception of reality will inevitably be something other than
absolute reality. Accordingly, a commander shouId constantly strive to build, validate, update, and disseminate
his image of the battlespace. At the same time he should recognize the unavoidable uncertainty inherent in this
image. He also should recognize the advantages to be gained by increasing the level of uncertainty existing in
his opponents image of the battlespace. Since the decision and execution cycle is a continuous process, all
phases of the cycle are active at each echelon of command. Each commander will gather information, develop
situational awareness, and plan for future operations at the same time he is conducting current operations.
Meanwhile, senior and subordinate commanders are gathering information and working through decision and
execution cycles at their respective levels. However, the essential lesson of the decision and execution cycle is
the absolute importance of generating tempo. Maintaining rapid decision and execution cycles-and thus a rapid
tempo of operations-requires that seniors and subordinates alike have an accurate image of the battlespace and a
shared vision of what needs to be done. With this common perspective, commanders are able to experience
superior situational awareness and make more effective decisions, enabling them to exercise initiative during
combat. To exercise initiative successfully, a subordinate must understand his senior’s intent. lhs, a key tenet of
naval warfare is that commanders a
every level must understand their seniors’ intent, so they can exploit rapid
decisiona nd execution cycleins harmony with the broader, more general
efforts at higher

106.5 (a) Nature and Purpose

NATURE:
Naval intelligence is a system of personnel, procedures, equipment, and facilities, both afloat and ashore. It
supports both naval and joint operations. It is embedded in all major echelons of command and is deployed
continuously with naval forces. Naval intelligence includes centers ashore for maritime, scientific and technical
intelligence, training, administration of intelligence programs, and systems acquisition. Naval intelligence is a
part of the joint intelligence architecture in current theaters of operations, connecting naval forces to theater
joint intelligence centers, national intelligence agencies, service intelligence centers, and cooperative foreign
governments.
Naval intelligence is broken down into three levels for the support of warfare:
Strategic Intelligence is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international
levels. At the strategic level, intelligence is oriented toward national objectives and supports the formulation of
policies and determination of priorities. Strategic intelligence focuses first on discerning the capabilities and
intentions of potential adversaries as well as considering the strategic intentions of allies and other potential
multinational partners. Strategic intelligence plays a central role in identifying an adversary’s centers of gravity.
Operational Intelligence is required for planning operations within regional theaters or areas of operations. It
concentrates on intelligence collection, identification, location, and analysis to support the operational level of
warfare, which includes identifying an adversary’s operational critical vulnerabilities. Further, it assists the
commander in deciding how best to employ forces while minimizing risk.
Tactical Intelligence is required for planning and conducting tactical operations at the component or unit level.
It focuses on a potential adversary’s capabilities, his immediate intentions, and the environment. It is oriented
more toward combat than long-range planning. Far more than at any other level, tactical intelligence support is
the primary focus of naval intelligence.
PURPOSE:
Supporting the Commander. Commanders require intelligence as a tool to evaluate the feasibility of, or
determine risk factors associated with, objectives, plan and direct operations, and evaluate the effects of their
actions. As the commander’s primary advisor for intelligence matters, the intelligence officer must support the
commander, his staff, and lateral and subordinate commands— not only with tailored intelligence, but by
accurately conveying the capabilities and limitations of the intelligence system as well. The commander and his
forces must have a clear understanding of what intelligence can and cannot provide, and how it will support the
operation.
To be effective, intelligence support must have credibility which is attained by gaining the trust of the
commander. This trust is usually gained over time, after a track record of accurate intelligence assessments has
been established. Intelligence allows the commander to fight smarter by supporting his selection of the best
courses of action. This includes advising the commander when an objective or planned course of action is
probably not obtainable, even if this advice goes against the conventional wisdom. Each intelligence estimate
should reflect clear analysis and sound judgment. The ultimate goal is to provide the commander and his forces
the intelligence support needed to prevail in combat.
Identifying Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Naval intelligence strives to provide an accurate
picture of the battlespace from which we can identify clear and attainable objectives. For instance, at the
operational level, the force commander may decide that to accomplish his objective, a particular target set—
such as enemy command and control facilities—must be destroyed. At the tactical level, intelligence support is
needed to plan an effective strike against a specific element of that target set, such as a radio-relay site. This
tactical intelligence may consist of detailed, analyzed target photographs from tactical reconnaissance or
national collection systems, pinpointing essential aim points for the strike leader.
Supporting Planning and Execution of Operations. Naval intelligence provides staff support in both deliberate
and crisis action planning. During planning, collection resources are identified and tasked to meet intelligence

requirements in support of the operation. Gaining knowledge of an adversary’s capabilities and intentions may
alter operational plans significantly. Similarly, changing operational tasking may in turn modify intelligence
requirements. A close partnership between the intelligence and operations officers will keep operations efforts
focused on the mission and ensure that intelligence requirements are met. Throughout all phases of planning
and execution, intelligence and operations are critically interdependent.
Protecting the Force. Naval intelligence provides early warning of impending hostile action and reduces risk by
detecting adversary actions that have an impact on friendly planning assumptions. Effective force protection
enables us to limit the adverse effects of deception and surprise. Force protection efforts, supported by vigorous
counterintelligence operations, can limit or distort the adversary’s assessment of friendly capabilities and
intentions. Further, naval intelligence provides the information needed to conduct successful deception
measures against the adversary. These measures require detailed knowledge of the adversary’s perceptions,
vulnerabilities, intelligence-gathering capabilities and limitations, tactics, techniques and procedures, and the
physical characteristics of the battlespace. Moreover, intelligence can reduce the likelihood of fratricide by
helping to clear the fog of war.
Supporting Combat Assessment. Naval intelligence is essential in developing combat assessments that can help
the commander decide whether to redirect friendly forces or end operations. Combat assessment is the
procedure by which the commander weighs the effectiveness of military operations by considering battle
damage assessment, munitions effectiveness, and reattack recommendations. Analysis of the enemy’s reaction
to friendly operations gives us insights into his morale, materiel status, and ability to continue hostilities.
1106.5 (b) Support to Operating Forces

Support to operating forces is the cornerstone of naval intelligence. Because of their mobility and forward
deployment, as well as the unique nature of surface, subsurface, air, special and landing force operations, naval
forces have special requirements for tailored intelligence on potential threats in both the maritime and littoral
environments. Naval intelligence is designed to support operations at sea, from the sea, and ashore—through an
organization closely linked with joint and national intelligence centers.
Naval forces engaged in operations are supported by theater Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). The theater JIC
serves as a focal point to ensure that operating forces receive intelligence support from national and service
intelligence centers such as DIA, CIA, NSA and the National Maritime Intelligence Center. Naval forces also
maintain such organic intelligence capabilities as photographic interpretation, communications intelligence
analysis, and finished intelligence production, which support not only the commander and embarked forces, but
theater and national decision-makers as well.
Communications are key to ensuring that intelligence is available to the commander and his forces at every
level throughout the battle-space. Relevant intelligence must be pushed to the commander on the basis of
preplanned essential elements of information; similarly, because naval forces must be able to respond quickly to
any crisis, the commander must be able to pull timely and relevant intelligence at any time, from any location as
well. Rapid, concurrent dissemination of intelligence ensures that an accurate, complete, and common picture of
the battlespace is available to all tactical users. The commander can improve the effectiveness of his forces by
exercising his intelligence and cryptologic capabilities realistically, and by ensuring that reliable
communications deliver the product to the user.
Naval intelligence personnel and systems are co-located with decisionmakers at nearly every echelon of
command. Similarly, cryptologic personnel and systems are woven into the fabric of operating forces—from
specially configured surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft to Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
(MAGTF). Embedding intelligence and cryptologic personnel, equipment, and communications at the unit,
afloat staff, theater and national levels contributes to effective intelligence support under virtually all
circumstances. That said, effective intelligence support can be assured only when the commander and the
members of his intelligence organization have a clear understanding of the fundamentals of intelligence.
106.5 (c) Fundamentals of Naval Intelligence
The fundamentals of naval intelligence, distilled from years of operational experience, guide both the
commander and the intelligence officer. The fundamentals of naval intelligence include principles, key
attributes, intelligence sources and the process of the intelligence cycle. They apply across the spectrum of
military operations—from peacetime, to operations other than war, to combat.

Principles
— Know the Adversary. Since the time of Sun Tzu, knowing the adversary has been the paramount principle.
Identifying the adversary is the first step in gaining this knowledge. Knowing how the adversary thinks
(especially how the adversary perceives success and failure) is essential in forecasting his likely courses of
action. We know our adversary better by understanding his goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities,
methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and values. We gain this understanding by studying his character, culture,
social mores, customs and traditions, language, and history. Only then will the intelligence officer be able to
provide the commander a full assessment.
Because naval forces often will be first on the scene in a crisis, naval intelligence must identify potential
adversaries in peacetime and prepare intelligence for anticipated crises. We will not always have the luxury of
planning against a single adversary. Naval forces may be called into action in a variety of contingencies—
against a conventional armed force, a terrorist group, or in response to civil or natural disasters. Under these
conditions, we must seek to know all potential adversaries, while focusing our intelligence efforts against the
most likely one.
— Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort. In any theater of operations, unity of effort ensures that intelligence
supports the commander’s objectives. Clearly stating and prioritizing information requirements are important
steps in ensuring unity of effort. This becomes a particular challenge in multinational operations, where naval
forces may encounter major differences in language and culture, limitations imposed by bilateral agreements,
and differing strategic objectives. In building unity, we should recognize national differences, promote
complementary intelligence operations and— most importantly—enable the exchange of intelligence. We can
achieve all of this through the coordinated efforts of a joint or multinational intelligence center and the
exchange of intelligence liaison personnel and systems.
— Plan for Combat. Forward deployed naval forces can be thrust into combat with little warning; thus, naval
intelligence resources must be able to function continuously in diverse operational environments. Realistic and
continuous intelligence planning and training must support the full range of naval operations. Naval and
national intelligence systems must be reliable and give commanders timely access to the intelligence they need.
At the same time, the commander must understand the essential nature of this support and prioritize resources to
satisfy his needs. For example, automated data processing interoperability should be a key goal, so that own-
service systems can talk to other-service, other-theater or national systems via common protocols and formats.
Intelligence personnel must ensure that all databases and communications are in place (or readily surged) to
support combat operations, afloat and ashore.
— Use an All-Source Approach. Developing an intelligence assessment is comparable to completing a jigsaw
puzzle without all the pieces. To develop the full picture, the intelligence analyst should seek as many pieces as
possible. This is known as the principle of “all-source” analysis.
Rarely will a single source or sensor provide the entire picture of the battlespace. Historical examples exist in
which a single source provided the key intelligence, such as the communications intercept that led to the
shootdown of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s aircraft during World War II. However, even that key
intercept was fused with other known data—location of enemy airfields, likely course and speed of the aircraft,
and other current intelligence—to plan the shootdown. The most useful and complete intelligence assessments
usually emerge after a fusion of data from multiple sources. To preclude being deceived by our own analytical
errors or by adversary deception, we use an all-source technique that permits the development of corroborating
data. Further, all-source analysis can disclose conflicting data, which demand additional analysis to discern a
more accurate picture. Most often, however, the all-source approach develops complementary data, where
information from one source confirms information provided by another.

Key Attributes
— Timeliness. Intelligence should be timely enough to support policymaking or decisionmaking, to enhance the
prospect of mission accomplishment. Timeliness is most essential during the formulation of the commander’s
estimate and when handling highly perishable data normally called Indications and Warning intelligence. To
ensure that timeliness requirements are met, the commander must prioritize his information needs. —
Objectivity. From the facts on hand, the intelligence analyst must be free to assess and report the situation
without the influence of bias, distortion, or political constraint. Intelligence analysts should be meticulous in
their efforts to discount preconceived notions and not allow these to influence, much less drive, the intelligence
effort.
— Usability. A commander needs intelligence that is easy to understand and apply to operational decisions.
Usability demands timeliness, relevance, and proper format or form. The speed and complexity both of modern
threats and our own telecommunications systems place a premium on rapid intelligence dissemination.
Commanders need this intelligence in time to react to threats and make better decisions.
— Availability. To support the commander’s planning and operations, intelligence should be available when
and where needed. Availability requires foresight, an ability to predict, a clear understanding of objectives, and
thorough intelligence training. In order to respond to rapidly emerging intelligence requirements, the
intelligence officer should anticipate, collect, evaluate, produce, and store information. In naval operations, we
depend on reliable, interoperable, up-to-date, on-line intelligence databases. We must be able to receive current,
meaningful, appropriately classified intelligence to support changing operational requirements rapidly.
Recognizing the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods, we must guard against excessively
restrictive classification of intelligence, which would deny it to the commander or operator who truly needs it.
Many intelligence items can be “sanitized” by removing references to the highly-classified source of the data,
and released at a lower classification.
— Thoroughness. Thorough intelligence contributes directly to successful combat planning and execution.
Proper identification and prioritization of the commander’s essential elements of information help to clarify the
scope and detail of the intelligence required. The intelligence effort should give us the information we need—
nothing more, nothing less. Since the intelligence picture never will be complete, the commander should be
aware of gaps in available information. By recognizing both the known and the unknown, a commander can
apply appropriate judgment to reduce risk.
— Accuracy. Intelligence should be factually correct and convey sound estimates of the adversary’s intentions
and capabilities. Accurate intelligence reduces uncertainty, thus increasing the commander’s confidence in his
understanding of the battlespace. Comparison of information received from multiple sources improves the
ability to verify information and reduces susceptibility to deception. The dissemination process must not reduce
accuracy.
— Relevance. Intelligence should pertain directly to the operations at hand and to the level of command for
which it is intended. For example, the commanding officer of a destroyer conducting maritime interdiction
operations would find it important to learn that a merchant ship with a history of arms smuggling is entering his
area of responsibility. The National Command Authorities might find the same intelligence somewhat less
relevant. If intelligence does not support the needs of the intended user, it has little value.
Sources of Intelligence
Intelligence sources vary greatly in capability, method, sophistication, and utility, ranging from a local
informant to a billion-dollar reconnaissance satellite system. All sensors possess capabilities that make them
unique. All have limitations as well. For instance, reconnaissance satellites may provide broad area coverage
not available from any other sensor, yet collection over the desired area may be affected by adverse weather or
orbital geometry. As a rule, however, the utility of the source is not a function of its sophistication; the best
intelligence often can come through the simplest collection means. To be effective, intelligence must use all
available sources; it cannot simply concentrate on the most familiar. Further, naval intelligence must be ready to
function in an environment where some sensor data may be missing.

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
Counterintelligence CI
Imagery Intelligence IMINT
Photographic Intelligence PHOTINT
Human Intelligence HUMINT
Measurement and Signature Intelligence MASINT
Acoustic Intelligence ACINT
Electro-optical Intelligence ELECTRO-OPTINT
Infrared Intelligence IRINT
Laser Intelligence LASINT
Nuclear Intelligence NUCINT
Unintentional Radiation Intelligence RINT
Open Source Intelligence OSINT
Radar Intelligence RADINT
Signals Intelligence SIGINT
Communications Intelligence COMINT
Electronic Intelligence ELINT
Foreign Instrumentation
Signals Intelligence FISINT
Scientific and Technical Intelligence S&TI
Medical Intelligence MEDINT

Intelligence collection is naturally constrained by resource allocation, the nature of the threat, technology, and
the environment. Collection resources are normally managed so that they remain focused on areas perceived as
enduring threats. Refocusing the intelligence system on emerging threats may take time.
Intelligence assets are necessarily finite and competition for them can be extremely keen, thus, they should be
managed carefully. Sensor selection and employment, processing, and timeliness depend on the nature and
characteristics of the target. For example, electronic intelligence (ELINT) may provide us little information
when directed against an adversary with unsophisticated weapons; on the other hand, human intelligence
(HUMINT) might bring some results in the same case. A proper mix of sensors and sources is the key. Another
important factor is the rapid processing of sensor data. The intelligence effort must have enough trained
personnel to interpret data within the context of ongoing operations. Finally, we must carefully and continually
assess the timeliness of sensor data.
Sensor data can be corrupted and erroneous; therefore, we should not be mesmerized by a display of data on a
screen. Such data requires careful analysis and ambiguity must be resolved. Some sensors produce data
enabling weapons or tactics to be employed directly, such as ELINT data used to guide an anti-surface missile
attacking an enemy ship. In such cases procedures should be in place to disseminate data immediately and
ensure that forces acting upon that information will understand what it is, how it will arrive, and what it will
look like. Other intelligence sources, however, often produce information that requires careful consideration and
analysis before forces can be committed on the strength of it.
106.5 (d) Intelligence Cycle
The Intelligence Cycle
Intelligence products result from a series of interrelated activities termed the intelligence cycle. Figure 1
illustrates the process through which the commander levies intelligence requirements, information is collected
and converted into intelligence, and intelligence is disseminated to users. This cycle normally consists of five
steps: planning and

directing, collection, processing, production and dissemination. This cycle greatly simplifies a dynamic and
complex process, but it is useful to illustrate how the intelligence process works. Naturally, intelligence efforts
do not always flow sequentially through the cycle. For example, a request for imagery generates planning and
direction, but may not involve new collection if the request can be satisfied from archival imagery.
Figure 1
— Planning and Direction. During this phase of the cycle, the commander must identify and prioritize his
information requirements. This phase is instrumental to the cycle’s success. Because a great number of
intelligence requirements may have to be satisfied, planning and directing determines the effort required to meet
our needs. After the commander identifies his requirements, the intelligence officer formulates a collection plan,
taking into account the collection assets available and the commander’s essential elements of information. One
of the key elements in the planning phase is assessing current intelligence to ensure that it meets our
requirements. Early discovery of any requirements that cannot be satisfied through organic, theater or national
intelligence collection resources will highlight potential intelligence gaps. Planning further includes the
identification of personnel, transportation and communications requirements.
— Collection. Collection involves tasking organic, attached, and supporting collection resources to gather
information. The collection process determines what will be and what will not be available to support decision-
making. Since few collection requirements can be met fully by organic assets alone, collection resources
available at the theater and national level will normally be tasked as well. To do this effectively, the intelligence
staff must know the capabilities and limitations of available collection resources, must understand the
requirements validation process to obtain desired collection approval, and must identify the collection resources
that can contribute to fulfilling mission requirements.
— Processing. Processing is the conversion of collected information into a form suitable for producing usable
intelligence, such as translating foreign languages, developing film from tactical reconnaissance aircraft,
generating hard or soft-copy images provided by electro-optical or infrared sensors, and converting raw
electronic intelligence data into a standard message format suitable for automated handling. Timeliness and
accuracy are especially relevant during processing.
— Production. Intelligence production is the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of information
from all available sources into tailored, usable intelligence. A key principle in production is the fusion of
information from various sources to form a complete and accurate product. Fusion is essential for an effective
intelligence production process that accurately reflects and supports the commander’s prioritized essential
elements of information (EEI). Because of the uncertain nature of combat, the commander, operations officer
and intelligence officer should review EEIs periodically to ensure that intelligence assets are supporting mission
needs.

— Dissemination. The goal of the dissemination process is to provide the right amount of appropriately
classified intelligence when, where, and how it is needed. Getting the product to the user is the last step in the
intelligence cycle; but, because the cycle is dynamic, the process does not end with dissemination. First,
intelligence personnel must ensure that the product is actually used. This is a particular obligation of
intelligence personnel who are members of operational staffs. They are in the best position to demonstrate the
value of intelligence products to commanders and other staff members. Second, intelligence personnel must see
to it that dissemination is refined by gathering feedback from the commander or other users to ensure that
intelligence requirements have been satisfied and the finished intelligence products are usable. If not, the
intelligence staff must take corrective measures to meet the needs of the commander. The dissemination process
should not overwhelm the tactical user with massive amounts of data. Instead, intelligence dissemination should
follow established procedures designed to push time-sensitive, threat-warning data to the commander, while
allowing him to pull less time-sensitive intelligence required for his mission.
An accurate display of intelligence data is essential to achieving effective employment of intelligence products.
Increasingly, tactical commanders prefer to view crucial data in the context of the larger scenario in progress.
Effective display of intelligence information is essential in order to translate usable products into modern
command and control, and weapons targeting systems. This process should include, as necessary, sanitization of
classified data and reformatting into specific compatible data fields.
Intelligence lays the groundwork for naval operations in peace and war. By understanding the fundamentals of
naval intelligence, the commander is best able to ensure that intelligence is fully integrated into operations. This
integration enables intelligence to support both planning and execution effectively.
106.5 (e) Support for Expeditionary Forces
Support for Expeditionary Forces
Forward deployed naval forces will continue to be the National Command Authorities’ force of choice to
remain engaged overseas. Unrestricted by host nation access, naval forces continue to provide a strong and
flexible overseas presence to deter potential aggression or respond to crises. Naval forces may be called upon
for forcible entry into areas defended by integrated air, sea, and ground weapon systems. Some defenses will
consist of forces in fixed positions; others will include mobile combined-arms units backed by naval forces and
aircraft. A future adversary may employ the newest missiles, mines, and military technology against our
aircraft, ships, submarines, and landing forces. The proliferation of these modern weapons and the spread of
emerging technologies have made these threats more lethal, placing U.S. and multinational forces at greater
risk. As the lessons of military history show, we cannot afford to discount the Third World threat.
Intelligence requirements in littoral regions are significantly different from those of open-ocean operations. Our
proximity to littoral threats will mean less warning and reaction time for friendly forces. Any potential
adversary’s acquisition of advanced technology is a significant concern as well. Consequently, naval
intelligence must maintain detailed databases on potential threats and develop methods to exploit each
adversary’s weaknesses.
Identifying those areas where military operations may be conducted is vital. Detailed information on the
environment and local infrastructure (bathymetry, weather, topography, ports, air facilities, etc.) will be
required to support the full range of expeditionary operations. Nontraditional intelligence sources, collection
means, and dissemination methods must be explored and employed. Open-source intelligence may be especially
important. In addition, forces deploying to areas known for infectious diseases must have advance information
about local medical conditions. Forward deployed expeditionary forces must incorporate medical intelligence as
a force protection measure.
The naval command and control architecture must ensure connectivity between naval forces afloat and ashore
(including theater and national support agencies)—and must be useable by the warfighter. Intelligence
databases and

communications must be interoperable with other services, non-DOD government agencies, and joint
intelligence centers to ensure the uninterrupted flow of intelligence to the commander. Naval intelligence must
be prepared to support amphibious operations during sustained operations ashore, while simultaneously
supporting requirements of the ships, submarines, and aircraft that maintain battlespace dominance in the littoral
area of operations. To be most effective in expeditionary operations, naval intelligence personnel should be
integrated into national, theater, and service intelligence organizations to articulate naval capabilities and
operational philosophies, influence decisions, and optimize intelligence support to naval forces. This support
requires extensively trained naval intelligence professionals.
106.6 Discuss the maximum transmission ranges for each of the following settings: [ref.g, p. 1-6]
1106.6 (a) LO (low power)

VOICE TRANSMISSION MAXIMUM PLANNING RANGES:

Manpack/Vehicular LO (low) 200 M - 400 M
1106.6 (b) M (medium power)

VOICE TRANSMISSION MAXIMUM PLANNING RANGES:

Manpack/Vehicular M (medium) 400 M - 5 KM
106.6 (c) HI (high power)
VOICE TRANSMISSION MAXIMUM PLANNING RANGES:
Manpack/Vehicular HI (high) 5 KM - 10 KM
106.6 (d) PA (power amplifier)
VOICE TRANSMISSION MAXIMUM PLANNING RANGES:
Vehicular Only PA (power amplifier) 10 KM - 40 KM
106.7 Discuss Communications Security (COMSEC) and the role of the Communications Security Material
System (CMS) custodian: [ref. h, ch. 2,pg. 2-10]
Communications Security Material System (CMS) Custodian
The CMS custodian is responsible to the commanding officer for:
Managing the CMS account in accordance with the instructions contained in the Communications Security
Material System (CMS) Policy and Procedures Manual, EKMS 1; Advising the commanding officer on matters
concerning the physical security and handling of CMS publications and materials; Stowage of CMS
publications and materials, as well as the drawing, correcting, and authorized destruction; and submitting all
reports concerning the accountability and issuance of CMS publications and materials.
106.8 What is meant by the term Two-Person Integrity (TPI)? [ref. h, ch. 3, pg. 3
9 thru 3-10]
TWO-PERSON INTEGRITY
Two-person integrity (TPI) is the security measure taken to prevent single-person access to COMSEC keying
material and cryptographic maintenance manuals. TPI is accomplished as follows:

The constant presence of two authorized persons when COMSEC material is being handled; The use of two
combination locks on security containers used to store COMSEC material; and the use of two locking devices
and a physical barrier for the equipment. At no time can one person have in his or her possession the
combinations or keys to gain lone access to a security container or cryptographic equipment containing
COMSEC material. Neither can one person have sole possession of COMSEC material that requires TPI
security.
106.9 Discuss the following terms:
106.9 (a) Access [ref. m, Annex A, pg. A-1]
Access
The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. An individual, in fact, may have
access to classified information by being in a place where such information is kept, if the security measures that
are in force do not prevent the individual from gaining knowledge of such information.
106.9 (b) Classification [ref. m, Annex A, pg A-2]
Classification
The determination that official information requires, in the interests of national security, a specific degree of
protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that such a determination has
been made.
106.9 (c) Compromise [ref. m, Annex A, pg A-4]
Compromise
A security violation which has resulted in confirmed or suspected exposure of classified information or material
to an unauthorized person. A compromise is considered confirmed when conclusive
evidence exists that classified material was compromised. A compromise is considered suspected when some
evidence exists that classified material has been subjected to compromise.
106.9 (d) Need to know [ref. m, Annex A, pg A-10]
Need to Know
A determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires
access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in the performance of a lawful and
authorized government function essential to the fulfillment of an official U.S. Government program.
Knowledge, possession of, or access to, classified information will not be afforded to any individual solely by
virtue of the individual’s office, rank, position, or security clearance eligibility.
106.9 (e) Clearance [ref. m, Annex A, pg. A-3]
Clearance
A formal determination that a person meets the personnel security standards and is thus eligible for access to
classified information other than that protected in a special access program. There are three types of clearances:
Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. A Top Secret clearance makes an individual eligible for access to Top
Secret, Secret, and Confidential classified material; a Secret clearance to Secret and Confidential material; and a
Confidential clearance to Confidential material.
106.10 Define the following terms:
106.10 (a) Minimize [ref. h, ch. 2, pg. 2-23]
MINIMIZE MESSAGES
Military telecommunications systems tend to become overloaded during an emergency. Naturally, it becomes
necessary to reduce unnecessary traffic volume to clear user circuits for essential traffic. This reduction in
traffic is accomplished by use (usually by message) of the word “MINIMIZE.” Minimize means “It is now
mandatory that normal message and telephone traffic be reduced drastically so that vital messages connected
with the situation indicated will not be delayed.” A message ordering minimize consists of the word
“MINIMIZE”

followed by the area affected (scope), reason, and duration of the minimize condition (when known). Minimize
messages must be brought to the immediate attention of the leading communications petty officer (LPO) and the
communications officer. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), fleet commanders in chief, and area
coordinators are authorized to impose minimize conditions on users of naval communications systems.
Subordinate commanders may impose minimize over elements of their commands only with prior permission
from one of the three authorities just mentioned. During minimize conditions, FLASH and IMMEDIATE traffic
should be restricted to a maximum of 100 and 200 words, respectively. Message releasers are also kept to a
minimum and must be specifically designated in writing.
106.10 (b) EEFI [ref. n, ch. 2, pg. 2-8]
Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).
EEFI’s are established by operational commanders. EEFIs identify specific items of information which, if
revealed and correlated with other information, would degrade the security of military operations, projects, or
missions in the applicable areas. EEFIs can, therefore, vary from operation to operation or from area to area.
106.10 (c) BEADWINDOW [ref. n, ch. 2, pg. 2-8]
BEADWINDOW is a real-time procedure used to alert circuit operators that an unauthorized disclosure has
occurred over a non-secured circuit. BEADWINDOW also warns other operators on the net of the disclosure.
This serves as an educational aid. The long-term benefits of the BEADWINDOW procedure
include an increased awareness of the proper use of voice circuits throughout the fleet and better security of
uncovered Navy voice communications. The only authorized reply to the BEADWINDOW message is
“ROGER-OUT.” This method allows the reported unit to take immediate action to correct the insecure practice.
01 POSITION 05 PERSONNEL
02 CAPABILITIES 06 COMSEC
03 OPERATIONS 07 WRONG CIRCUIT
04 ELECTRONIC WARFARE
106.11 Discuss the following with respect to radio communication frequencies: [ref o, ch 1, pg. 1-11 thru 1-14]
106.11 (a) HF 3 Mhz – 30 Mhz
High-Frequency Communications
The Navy began using HIGH FREQUENCIES for radio communications around World War I. One of the
prominent features of high-frequency, long-distance communications is the variable nature of the propagation
edium.
m
106.11 (b) VHF 30 Mhz – 300 Mhz
Very-High-Frequency Communications
Frequencies above 30 megahertz are not normally refracted by the atmosphere and ground-wave range is
minimal. This normally limits our use of this frequency spectrum to line of sight. (The VERY-HIGH-
FREQUENCY (vhf) and The line-of-sight characteristic makes the vhf band ideal for amphibious operations
(beach landing from sea craft).
106.11 (c) UHF 300 Mhz – 3 Ghz
ULTRA HIGH-FREQUENCY (uhf) bands are known as line-of-sight transmission bands.) Because this is line-
of-sight communications, the transmitting antenna is in a direct line with the receiving antenna and not over the
horizon. (The ULTRA HIGH-FREQUENCY (uhf) is well suited for tactical voice transmissions (maneuvering
of ships traveling together).

106.12 Discuss the factors that affect the capabilities of radio communications.
[ref. o, ch. 1, pg. 1-11 thru 1-14]
Successful transmission of HF signals over a long distance is dependent upon refraction of radio waves by
layers of the ionosphere. The height and density of these layers is formed mainly by ultraviolet radiation from
the sun. They vary significantly with the time of day, season of the year, and the eleven-year cycle of sunspot
activity. In the VHF and UHF bands, certain atmospheric and ionospheric conditions can also cause the normal
line-of-sight range to be extended. Frequencies at the lower end of this band are capable of overcoming the
shielding effects of hills and structures to some degree; but as the frequency is increased, the problem becomes
more pronounced. Reception is notably free from atmospheric and man-made static.
All Radio Communications depends on location, sighting, weather, surrounding noise level, among other
factors at the receiving terminals.
107 EXPEDITIONARY CAMP FUNDAMENTALS
107.1 Explain fundamentals of Camp Layout.
GENERAL INFORMATION
3-1. A FP module is the basic building block for larger FP systems. One 550-person FP unit is termed a module.
As many as six modules may be joined depending upon the mission. The major FP subsystems may also be
rearranged to hold a particular terrain, mission, local utility support, or area constraint.
3-2. The FP module consists of existing and new CSS equipment. It is built around specific subsystems, some
of which are only found in a FP module (containerized latrine, water, the all-electric kitchen, and the
containerized batch laundry). Not all modules are identical. Throughout the production cycle of the planned 36
modules, modifications and improvements have been made to the module under production at that time. Module
configurations are listed in Appendix B. A sample layout of the FP system is shown in Figure 3-1.
3-3. Aside from efficiency, a major factor in the design of the module was storage and ease of transportation.
The system is packaged in about 100 TRICONs. Each TRICON’s outside dimensions of are 8 by 8 by 6½ feet.
It weighs under 10,000 pounds. Containerized latrines and batch laundry subsystems are housed and shipped in
20-foot containers. Modules are Army pre-positioned stock, available for deployment/placement, by air, land or
sea, from either CONUS depots or pre-positioned ships.
3-4. A FP module contains 11 major functional areas, also known as FP module subsystems. In some cases, a
subsystem may be located at more than one site, such as the latrine and shower; or may be large and dispersed,
such as graywater collection. The major subsystems of a FP module are:
• Billeting TEMPER with ECU for heating and cooling
• Administrative facility
• Morale, welfare, and recreation facility
• Portable field shower assembly (12-head) or containerized shower (depending on the module)
• Containerized batch laundry
• Containerized latrine
• Food service subsystem (all electric)
• Bulk fuel storage and distribution systems
• Potable water storage and distribution system
• Graywater collection system
• PDISE
MAST
3-5. Current initiatives underway by the FP PM office include development of the Maintain, Account, Sustain
and Train informational database system for FP. The MAST system will use AIT to support asset inventory by
tagging durable and non-expendable components. The automated asset inventory will enhance the maintenance,
accounting,
sustaining, and training capabilities of FP modules, with specific emphasis on operator/camp manager
requirements. It is being designed to interface with GCSS-Army database. (GCSS-Army web site:
http://www.cascom.army.mil/automation/gcssarmy_ global_combat_support_system-army). Specific MAST
capabilities will include the following:
• Enhance inventory speed and accuracy for both deployment and retrograde.
• Enhance maintenance by providing additional links and information resources for identification of FP
validated substitutes and spare parts.
• Provide inventory management and operational status tracking.
• Provide technical and operational data for both the overall system and appropriate subsystems.
• Provide early data reporting to FP PM of maintenance and inventory status of retrograde material.
TEMPER
3-6. The heart of the FP module is the TEMPER. It provides climate controlled billeting and supports facilities
for customer/tenant functions. The TEMPER is equipped with Bruce lights, convenience outlets, fabric flooring,
heating and air-conditioning, as well as vestibules and bumpthrough doors. Each billet TEMPER is equipped
with 15 cots and footlockers, chairs and cleaning supplies. TEMPERs are constructed in 8- foot sections. A 32-
foot TEMPER has four 8-foot sections, and requires 11 soldiers to erect (leader and two soldiers per arch).
Table 3-1 shows

Tempers in a typical FP module:

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STEWARDSHIP GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS
4-2. The Army no longer merely complies with the laws and regulations of environmental protection
stewardship. It leads in environmental protection by setting goals and requirements for its leaders. The goals of
the Army’s environmental stewardship protection program are:
• Compliance. Ensure that all Army sites and operations attain and sustain 100 percent compliance with
environmental laws and regulations in a climate of changing requirements. Army sites or operations will not be
subject to a notice of violation or a fine for not following host nation, local, state, or federal environmental
directives.
• Prevention. Adopt and use integrated management approaches in all Army mission areas to reduce the volume
and toxicity of all categories of environmental pollution.
• Conservation. Conserve, protect, and enhance environmental and cultural resources entrusted to the Army’s
stewardship of future generations using all practical and available means consistent with the Army mission.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF PERSONNEL
4-4. Each member of the QM FP Company must comply with the environmental protection stewardship
program.
4-5. The QM FP Company Commander's responsibilities include:
• Comply with all applicable environmental protection laws and regulations.
• Know the NEPA, HM, HW, HAZCOM efforts, and spill contingencies.
• Set up the unit’s HM/HW management policy.
• Ensure that personnel comply with the provisions, laws, and regulations outlined in the program.
• Appoint and ensure that the ECO, the HM/HW coordinator, and senior personnel have received appropriate
training.
• Ensure that all personnel who may be exposed to HM or HW when performing their duties receive training
about potential hazards and relevant precautions within 90 days of assignment.
• Ensure personnel receive annual refresher training about potential hazards and relevant precautions.
• Commit subordinate leaders to environmental protection.
• Analyze the influence of the mission on the environment.
4-6. The QM FP Company Executive Officer's responsibilities include:
• Serve as the unit’s ECO.
• Serve as the commander’s eyes and ears for environmental protection matters.
• Conduct periodic assessment of the unit’s environmental protection program and the unit’s level of
compliance.
• Act as liaison between the unit and the higher headquarters responsible for managing environmental protection
compliance programs and that provides information on training requirements and certifications needed by unit
personnel.
• Commit subordinate leaders to environmental protection.
• Analyze the influence of the environment on the mission.
4-7. The Maintenance Officer and/or Motor Sergeant's responsibilities include:
• Serve as the unit HM/HW coordinator.
• Serve as the unit spill coordinator.
• Maintain accountability for all HM and HW.
• Ensure that HM and HW are stored and disposed of properly.
• Ensure that HM and HW spills are immediately contained and reported to the fire department and to the ECO.
• Report inoperative treatment and collection facilities (oil/grease interceptors, floor drains, catch basins, waste
tanks) to the ECO.
4-8. The Section Leaders and Noncommissioned Officers' responsibilities include:
• Environmental protection in day-to-day decisions.
• Ensure soldiers are aware of the Army’s environmental protection ethic.
• Train soldiers to be good environmental protection stewards.
• Environmental protection.
• Identify environmental risks associated with the tasks they and their soldiers perform.

• Plan and conduct environmental sustainability actions and training.

• Protect the environment during training and other activities.
• Analyze the influence of the environment on the mission.
• Integrate environmental considerations into unit activities.
• Train peers and soldiers to identify the environmental effects of plans, actions, and mission.
• Counsel soldiers on the importance of protecting the environment and the results of not complying with
environmental laws.
• Incorporate environmental considerations into AARs.
• Report spills of HM or HW immediately.
• Provide ideas through the chain of command concerning the improvement of the unit’s environmental
protection program.
• Support the Army recycling program.
4-9. Soldiers' responsibilities include:
• Follow the unit’s environmental protection stewardship policies, unit SOPs, Army regulations, and
environmental laws and regulations.
• Make environmentally sound decisions in day-to-day activities.
• Identify environmental risks in individual and team tasks.
• Report spills of HM or HW immediately.
• Provide ideas through the chain of command concerning the improvement of the unit’s environmental
protection program.
• Support the Army recycling program.
SECTION II – SAFETY
PROMOTING SAFETY AWARENESS
4-22. Safety in the field is not all common sense. Soldiers should be encouraged to continually conduct their
work safely and to assist others in working safely. Leaders must be the example. They must train soldiers in the
techniques and procedures for working safely and avoiding unnecessary accidents or injury. ARs 385-10 and
385-40 gives information on the Army’s safety program, and FM 21-11 outlines actions to take if an injury
occurs.
4-23. The commander sets up procedures to identify all personnel performing safety in their job. He must also
ensure that their job descriptions clearly show these responsibilities. All supervisors and soldiers will receive
safety training. Supervisors should be trained to recognize and eliminate hazards and to develop other required
skills to
implement the Army’s safety program to the working level. Soldiers will receive specialized job, safety, and
health training. This training will include OSHA criteria and the hazards associated with any materials or
operations in the workplace.
SITE SELECTION CONSIDERATIONS
5-11. Mission. Consider what units or groups FP will be supporting. Remember that FP operations will not
relocate, so it is paramount that the module(s) be placed in an area that will provide convenient, longterm
service to the units to be supported.
5-12. Security. The QM FP Company can defend against a Level I threat and requires assistance from tenant
and/or theater assets for Level II/III threats. In determining the security level of the FP module(s), consider the
METT-T and the units and organizations to be supported. A FP module will typically be located in the corps
area and not farther forward than the division support area. A set of six FP modules will not be placed forward
of the corps rear area. The security of supply routes and heavily traveled roadways in the FP AO should also be
considered in the security assessment.
5-13. Safety. Safety hazards such as flooding, landslides, or avalanches may exist. Consider previous land uses
and slope, such as landfills or other contaminated sites. Since FP consists mainly of tent structures, avoid high
wind areas. Consider whether the current or previous occupants may have mined the area under consideration.
Use satellite area is free of mines and unexploded ordnance.
5-14. Geographical, Terrain, and Geological Considerations. Careful selection reduces overall site work,
climate control effort, and drainage requirements. In most cases, flat, gently sloping (7 percent maximum
grade), featureless terrain is preferred. However, security or prevailing climate may favor a wooded area.
Selecting a site with some vegetation will lessen erosion in a rainy or windy environment and reduce dust in a
dry climate. Avoid the low points of valleys or other depressed areas where water may collect. Consider the
total hydrology of the area

including the water table throughout the time of the mission. Soil stabilization requirements should also be kept
to a minimum to reduce the overall earthwork required.
• Terrain and soil analysis should be performed in two distinct phases. First, maps, aerial photos, climate
records, and other available data should be used to extract and analyze basic terrain, weather, and climate
factors. Second, these factors should be synthesized to predict their influence on site layout, installation of
facilities, utilities, camouflage, and the operation and maintenance of the FP module(s).
• A ground reconnaissance should be done to verify all information collected. It is also needed to obtain data
which would not otherwise be available. A site that appears suitable based on aerial mapping may be not
suitable for use due to ground conditions or water table.
5-15. Political Considerations. Political factors, including national sentiment and visibility may also influence
which sites are available for FP. In some cases, you may be denied use of an ideal site. Consider the impact that
FP and the presence of U.S. soldiers will have on the community. When engaged in SASO, consider whether
the site you select appears to benefit a particular group or faction more than another.
5-16. Logistical Supportability. Sustained FP operations require tons of consumable resources such as electrical
power, fuel, and potable water. These resources may be available through theater resources or through HNS.
• Electrical Power. The preferred source of electrical power for FP operations is existing commercial power. To
determine the compatibility of existing commercial power with the demands of FP operations, the following
information must be researched:
_ Voltage, phase, and frequency of existing commercial power
_ Ability of the existing electrical utility to consistently meet the electrical power demands of FP operations
over the projected timeframe
_ Predicted reliability and stability of the power source (outages and voltage fluctuations)
_ Cost of power lines and step-down transformers. FP requires direct high voltage lines from substations with
step down transformers. Simply tapping into low voltage service lines will not provide adequate power.
If commercial power is appropriate to support FP operations, still plan for diesel-powered generators to serve as
backup or emergency power for critical subsystems.
• Fuel Resources. Consider where appropriate supplies of fuel may be obtained and the convenience and
appropriateness of receiving fuel from available alternatives. Supplies of JP8 and MOGAS will need to meet
Army fuel standards. Also, fuel consumption will be considerably higher if diesel-powered generators are to be
used as
the main source of electrical power generation.
• Potable Water. The average consumption of potable water per person can range from 20 to 35 gallons per day
dependent on conditions. The preferred source of potable water to support FP operations is existing commercial
water. Since FP has the capability to test and treat water, existing commercial water need only meet standards
which certify its appropriateness as a water source. If an appropriate source of commercial water is not
conveniently available, general water support may be utilized or engineering assets may be requested to
evaluate the feasibility of
drilling wells to extract ground water.
5-17. Effective lines of communication will be required. Existing lines of communication may be used, if
available, and adequate to provide uninterrupted communication services to and from key elements.
5-18. Adequate roads to and from the FP AO will be needed to deliver materials and allow access to the FP site
by tenant units. These roads should be adequate for travel by a variety of military and civilian vehicles.
Consider the types of vehicles which will use the roads in and around the FP AO. The weights, heights, and
turning radii of: the
waste-water collection trailer, the water delivery truck, the fuel delivery truck, the tank and pump unit, the 4K
and 10K forklifts, customer unit (tactical) vehicles, and fire-fighting and emergency vehicles.
5-19. Environmental protection impact, short term and long term, must be considered before erecting a facility
the size of FP is erected, therefore, an environmental baseline survey must be completed before construction
begins. Also, you must ensure that the site meets all applicable environmental laws and regulations, even if the
local
population does not. Seek environmental compliance program guidance through the chain of command to
ensure that local environmental concerns are properly.
5-20. Approximately 70 percent of the potable water consumed will be returned as graywater or blackwater.
Graywater and blackwater are hazardous waste and effects to personnel and the environment must be
considered. Graywater will be stored using the graywater collection subsystem supplied as part of the FP
module. Blackwater from the latrines will be stored in the holding tanks of the containerized latrines. It will be
collected for disposal

using the WWVT/T. Disposal of graywater and blackwater will be considered in the Civil Engineering Support
Plan for the theater in which FP is operating. Disposal options include the use of a host nation sewer system
(first choice), local contractor haul to a commercial facility, government haul to a commercial facility, or
lagoon/field-expedient method.
5-21. If the host nation sewer system or local contractor is selected, the persons responsible for the source of the
wastewater must ensure it is safely and properly disposed. FP personnel must verify the integrity of the sewer
system before allowing a contractor to dispose of wastewater. Periodic inspections should be done to ensure that
wastewater disposal is IAW the environmental provisions of the disposal contract and other provisions. If a host
nation sewer system is not available, then other choices must be found. Hauling wastewater to existing facilities
is an option and a logistical issue. On-site collection, treatment, and release of wastewater is an engineering
issue which should be done IAW FM 5-163, local directives, and host nation laws and regulations on waste
disposal.
5-22. Solid waste must be collected and disposed of properly to keep the area sanitary land protect the
environment. Solid wastes are nonhazardous items. They are usually disposed of in a CONUS landfill. The
preferred method of disposal for solid waste is an existing landfill near the operating area. If an existing landfill
is not available, engineering assets need to prepare an appropriate landfill. The ultimate fate or disposal of these
items should be known prior to generating them. There may be special, local management procedures required
prior to turn-in of these items. Consult the chain of command to determine specific requirements, and ensure
that they are incorporated into the unit environmental program.
SITE PLANNING AND PREPARATION
5-31. Site planning is the process of changing a prospective site into a workable layout for a FP module.
Preparing a FP site will likely involve many personnel from several military and/or contract agencies. To avoid
confusion and speed the collective effort, ensure that the tasks assigned to each organization are well defined.
Define them in terms of scope, standards of work, and when work must be started and tasks completed. Monitor
the progress of tasks. Correct problems immediately and include changes in consideration of work completed.
5-32. Baseline Environmental Survey. The first step in the preparation process should be a baseline
environmental survey. This survey will determine and document the existing conditions of the site. The reasons
for the survey are twofold. First, it assesses the site’s environmental state before FP use. This can then be used
as evidence of the Army’s environmental protection program. Second, it gives a to use to restore the site after it
is not longer needed.
5-33. Layout. In most cases, the recommended site layout should be used. See Figure 5-1 for a typical FP
module layout. Note that the recommended layout shows only organic FP subsystems and equipment. Consider
what other resources, tentage, and equipment your site may need. Make necessary adjustments to the layout
plan. These may
include billets and spaces for firefighters, utility teams, MWR personnel, and hazardous waste accumulation
areas. Deviations may be necessary to fit FP to a particular site or mission. When an alternative layout will be
used, maintain minimum spacing and elevation relationships between subsystems. See Table 5-1 for minimum
spacing requirements between subsystems. Engineer units have the necessary knowledge to develop alternate
plans.
5-34. Earthwork. The supporting Combat Engineer Battalion, Heavy; US Air Force RED HORSE Squadron;
Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (SeaBees); LOGCAP; or the theater of operations CCA can prepare the FP
site. During site preparation, consider site restoration and environmental impact. Make every effort not to
disturb the site more than absolutely needed. To gauge whether a site is “good,” “fair,” or “poor,” use Table 5-2
to determine a baseline assessment. If your site does not fall entirely into one category, use your best judgment
and experience to estimate site preparation time. If possible, cut and fill should be balanced on the site to
facilitate site restoration. Depending on local conditions, dust abatement may be required during setup.
Engineers have this capability and should be consulted, as necessary. Attempts should be made to minimize
removal of existing grass and vegetation to reduce dust and erosion. Table 5-3 shows the estimated site
preparation times for various Army engineering assets for three categories of existing site condition. This
information is estimated and should be used only as an estimate. These estimates are for a standard FP module.
If the current mission involves more equipment, space, or services,

site preparation times will increase accordingly.

SECTION III – MAIN BODY MOVEMENT
CONUS ACTIVITIES
5-46. Movement of the main body of the QM FP Company begins with a nontactical road march from home
station to the port(s) of embarkation. This nontactical road march will be done using organic vehicles to
transport company personnel and required organic equipment. See TOE 42-424L000 for a complete listing of
authorized organic equipment. Dependent on time requirements and appropriateness, the nontactical road march
will proceed to a seaport and/or an aerial port of embarkation. Upon arrival at the port(s) of embarkation, the
company will prepare equipment and personnel for overseas movement and await departure. At this time, the
AMC LSE Advance Quartering Party should already have arrived in country. If possible, the commander of the
QM FP Company should make arrangements to maintain communication with the advance quartering party so
up-to-date information can be used to begin immediately planning the occupation of the FP operational area.
OVERSEAS MOVEMENT
5-47. Upon arrival at the port(s) of debarkation, the equipment reception team will receive the QM FP
Company’s organic equipment. Final planning for the occupation of the FP AO should be conducted and
company personnel and equipment should be readied for a tactical road march to the AO. The tactical road
march may or may not be conducted with other units. The road march should be planned to take advantage of
available resources and a security posture appropriate to the threat identified should be maintained throughout
the march. If needed,
members of the advance quartering party can help guide the main body into the FP AO.
OCCUPATION OF THE FP AO
5-48. The AMC LSE Advance Quartering Party will have secured the FP AO before the main body arrives.
Upon arrival of the QM FP Company main body, the FP module(s) may or may not have reached the AO.
Preparations should immediately begin to occupy the operational area and plan a reinforced defense. The
commander and platoon leaders should perform terrain analysis and plan a defense against air, ground, and
NBC attack which integrates the support of available resources including those of the visiting tenant units.
107.2 Purpose of Leach Fields

Septic tanks, cesspools, and leaching fields are used for sewage treatment processes where common sewers are
not available. These facilities are for the most part underground receptacles. If properly designed, constructed,
located, and operated, these receptacles work without objectionable odors over long periods of time with a
minimum amount of attention.
LEACHING FIELDS
Leaching fields are an integral component of a septic tank individual sewage disposal system. Leaching field
may be referred to as tile fields or absorption trenches. Whichever term is used, the function, testing,
construction, and maintenance techniques of this component remain the same. The lines in a leaching fields are
built of 4-inch PVC perforated pipe. Many types of perforated pipe are commercially available for use in
leaching-field construction
Leaching fields are commonly laid out either in a herringbone pattern (fig. 10-6) or with the laterals at right
angles to the main distribution pipe. Little or no maintenance is required for leaching fields. Preventive
measures, such as excluding all vehicle traffic and not planting trees or shrubs in the field area, should ensure
trouble-free operation for many years. When a leaching field becomes inoperable, you must replace it with a
new system. Tree or shrub roots are a major factor in leaching-field failure. This requires the replacement of
field components and complete root removal.
107.3 Discuss the following as it pertains to Camp Maintenance
a. Trouble Desk
Trouble Desk Attendant
The trouble desk attendant receives all customer trouble calls, enters this information into the trouble desk log
and fills out emergency/service authorization (ESA) forms. The attendant makes sure that ESA forms are
properly routed and that outstanding ESAs are completed within the required deadlines. Normally, all facility
history jackets are maintained at the trouble desk.
The following is a summary of the action taken when an ESA is submitted:
1. Requestor Action
a. An individual identifying service work requirements reports the problem to the camp maintenance trouble
desk.
2. Trouble Desk Action
a. Trouble desk personnel collect the information required for the ESA form (fig. 6-6).
b. Desk personnel provide the requestor with the service call identification number assigned from the service
call log book. The first digit of the number indicates the last digit of the current fiscal year. The remaining digits
give the chronological order in which the form was issued. For example, the 52nd form issued in FY93 would
have the number 3/52.
c. Trouble desk personnel complete five copies of the service form and enter the required information in the
service call log.
d. Desk personnel forward all copies of the form to the maintenance chief for review and approval. The
maintenance chief initials the form in the top right corner. In case of an emergency, the desk personnel
immediately notify the appropriate shop or individuals! Notification is done before completing the form, so that
emergency work may begin immediately.
e. After approval by the camp maintenance chief, the trouble desk personnel forward the white and green copies
to the work center performing the task. The white copy goes to the craftsman doing the work, and the green
copy is retained by the work center supervisor. The blue copy is pulled and forwarded to the customer as proof
there is an active ESA. The pink copy is retained by the trouble desk and filed in the work center categories in
the “outstanding form” file. The yellow
copy is an extra copy. In the 3rdNCB, this yellow copy can be retained in a file of ESA-funded host command
MRP funds.
f. When work is completed, the trouble desk personnel log the service form as complete in the service call log,
destroy the pink copy, and file the white form in the appropriate facility history jacket. If the ESA form has
been canceled or converted to a work request, enter the reason for cancellation or the work request number
under the Remarks section.
g. The trouble desk also maintains a pink copy on file for all ESAs referred to other companies for
accomplishment. The desk personnel file the ESA form in the facility file when completed.

b. Four Priority Work Classifications

The priority matrix lists work classifications shown below.
- Safety. Work required primarily for safety reasons.
- Function. Work primarily identified with the mission of the activity.
- Preventive. Work primarily required to prevent significant deterioration of the plant property or equipment
caused by continued use or from natural forces.
- Appearance. Work done primarily for preservation or upgrading the appearance of a facility.
Each of these work classifications has three levels of importance. You base the importance level of a particular
job on its impact on other jobs in the same classification.
1. High.
2. Routine. Most work falls into this category.
3. Low.
The PWO or the APWO must give approval for assignment of priority 1 to work. This priority states an
overriding emergency, or urgent priority. This priority is an overriding requirement that will insert the final
estimated work into the schedule at any point.
c. Operator Insection
Operator inspections consist of examining, lubricating, and making minor adjustments. Operator inspections of
constantly attended equipment are another form of PM, but they are performed by the operator assigned to the
equipment as part of the day-to-day responsibilities.
107.4 Discuss Camp Water related Terms
a. Potable Water
Potable and palatable (water that is safe to drink, being free of harmful characteristics that could cause odor,
foul taste, bad color and/or disease).
Potable water is a critical element in the operational functioning of the Seabees. The 600 GPH reverse Osmosis
Water Purification Unit (ROWPU) purifies water by reducing the dissolved and suspended solids in water. The
unit processes raw water, brackish water, and seawater into potable water. Additionally, the ROWPU can treat
water contaminated with CBR agents.
b. Chlorination
Disinfection
Except in rare instances, all water supplies require disinfection. Disinfection is the chemical destruction of
bacteria. Because of its economy, dependability, efficiency, and ease of handling, chlorine is almost always
used for this purpose. For this reason, the term chlorination generally means the same as DISINFECTION.
Disinfection is a necessary step in ensuring a safe water supply. Ali new, altered, or repaired watersupply
facilities must be disinfected before they are placed in service. Water from surface supplies may be disinfected
before filtration or before coagulation and sedimentation to prevent the growth of organisms. This procedure is
known as

precholorination. The water must also be disinfected after filtration to destroy organisms that still remain and to
provide a safeguard against recontamination. This procedure is known as postchlorination.
Chlorine is the disinfectant specified for Navy use. In’the form of chlorine gas or of hypochlorites that yield
chlorine in water, chlorine is presently the only widely accepted agent that destroys organisms in the water and
leaves an easily detectable residual that serves as an indicator of the completeness of treatment. The sudden
disappearance of residual chlorine may signal contamination in the system. Under ordinary temperatures and
pressures, chlorine gas is greenish yellow and is heavier than air. Its effectiveness as a disinfectant depends on
the temperature and the
hydrogen-ion concentration (pH) of the water to which it is added. Disinfecting action is faster at higher
temperatures, but is retarded by pH. When the pH is above 8.4, the rate of disinfection decreases sharply.
c. Super chloronation (Ref b, pg 9-32 thru 9-33)
Superchlorination is the application of more chlorine than needed for the chlorine residual essential to marginal
chlorination. The surplus, which is used to control odors and tastes, is later removed by dechlorination. This
method is particularly valuable in surface waters with variable ammonia and organic content. Sulfur dioxide
reacts with chlorine to form acids that are neutralized by the natural alkalinity of the water. Sulfur dioxide is fed
by equipment similar to that used for chlorine feeding. Activated carbon absorbs the excess chlorine, while
aeration removes it by dissipating it to the atmosphere.
108 Expeditionary Tactics Fundamentals
108.1 Standard issue and use of 782 gear
STANDARD ISSUE (782 GEAR)
The standard issue of 782 gear is divided into three categories: fighting load-carrying equipment, bivouac
equipment, and protective equipment. Normally, this equipment is issued to you on a full-time basis whether
you are in a combat area or in the United States for training.
Standard issue of 782 gear items are listed below:
Pistol belt
Pack combat medium
Suspenders
Two ammo pouches
Canteen cover, canteen, and canteen cup
First-aid packet*
Entrenching tool and cover
Poncho
Shelter half with one tent pole, five tent pins,
and guy line
Mess kit with knife, fork and spoon
Bayonet or K-Bar*
Kevlar helmet
Camouflage cover
Hat and mosquito net
*These items may or may not be issued.
FIGHTING LOAD EQUIPMENT
Fighting load equipment consists of the itemsbeen designed to make the job of carrying the
equipment you need easier and more comfortable. There are certain rules, however, that must be
followed when the equipment is to do the job for which it is intended. When the rules listed below are followed,
individual loads can be carried with more ease and comfort.
Rules for carrying equipment. Keep your load as light as possible. Know your equipment.
Assemble the equipment correctly. Keep every item in its proper place shown in figure 2-2 and described
below. Each item hasbeen designed to make the job of carrying the equipment you need easier and more
comfortable.

There are certain rules, however, that must be followed when the equipment is to do the job for which it is
intended. When the rules listed below are followed, individual loads can be carried with more ease and comfort.
Rules for carrying equipment.
Keep your load as light as possible.
Know your equipment.
Assemble the equipment correctly.
Keep every item in its proper place.
108.2 Describe the construction and the elements of dug in emplacements
a. Hasty/skirmishers’s position
The simplest type of dug-in emplacement is the SKIRMISHER’S TRENCH, as shown in figure 7-1. This
shallow pit type of emplacement provides a temporary, open, prone firing position for the individual rifleman.
When the situation demands immediate shelter from heavy enemy fire and when existing defiladed firing
positions (positions which provide protection from fire or observation, such as ridges, eand ravines) are not
available, each man lies prone or on his side. With his entrenching tool, he scrapes and piles the soil in a low
parapet between him and the enemy. Thus a shallow, body-length pit can be formed quickly in all but the
hardest ground. The trench should be oriented with respect to the line of fire of the enemy so it is least
vulnerable to enfilade fire (fire from the flanking or side position). In a skirmisher’s trench, a man presents a
low silhouette to the enemy and is afforded some protection from small-arms fire.
b. Improved one-man fighting position
The internal construction of a ONE-MAN
FIGHTING HOLE is shown in figure 7-5. It is made as
small as possible to present the smallest target to the
enemy, but wide enough to accommodate a man’s
shoulders, and deep enough to use entrenching tools at
the bottom. A sump should be built below the firing step,
atone end, to catch rainwater. The firing step should be
deep enough to protect most of a man’s body while
firing. A circular grenade sump, large enough to accept
the largest known enemy grenade, is sloped downward
at an angle of 30 degrees and is excavated under the fire
step. Hand grenades thrown into the fighting hole are
exploded in this sump, and their fragmentation is
restricted to the unoccupied end of the fighting hole. The
soil from the hole is used to build a parapet. The edge
of the hole is used for an elbow rest while firing. Be sure
to camouflage the soil used for your parapet to help
avoid detection.

c. Improved two-man fighting position

Figure 7-6 shows a TWO-MAN FIGHTING HOLE that is essentially two one-man holes. The two-man fighting
hole provides some advantages over the one-man fighting hole. By being in such close proximity, each man
gains a feeling of more security, and it allows one man to rest while the other man is observing the area. One
disadvantage is since it is longer than a one-man hole, it provides less protection from tanks, bombing, strafing,
and shelling.
108.3 Explain the general rules of Camouflage and how they apply to:
Camouflage is a general term applied to measures (either natural or artificial) taken to conceal yourself, your
position, and your equipment from enemy observation. Three general rules for camouflage are as follows:
1. Take advantage of all available natural concealment.
2. Camouflage by altering the form, shadow, texture, and color of objects.
3. Camouflage against both ground and air observation.
a. Camouflaging a Position
To avoid detection by the enemy, use the following methods of camouflaging a position:
1. Before constructing your position, study the terrain and vegetation in the area so after your position is
completed, by the use of camouflage, you are able to restore the area as near as possible to its original
appearance.
2. Do not use more material than you need. Too much camouflage can reveal a position as quickly as too little
camouflage.
3. Obtain natural material from a wide area. When you strip a small adjacent area of foliage, the stripped area
gives the position away.
4. Always conceal excavated soil by covering it with leaves or grass or by dumping it under bushes, into
streams, or into ravines.
5. After camouflaging, inspect the position carefully from the viewpoint of the enemy. Check it
repeatedly to ensure that it remains natural in appearance and continues to conceal the position.
6. Practice CAMOUFLAGE DISCIPLINE. Avoid doing anything, such as scattering cans or boxes around the
camouflaged position, that may give the position away. When possible, use old, established paths to and from
your position Do not create new paths that can be seen from the air. If necessary, vary the route to and from the
position so there is no beaten path into the position.
b. Camouflaging Personal Equipment
The color of field uniforms and web equipment– pack, belt, and canteen cover–blends well with most
terrain unless the equipment is badly faded. If it is faded, color it to blend with the surrounding terrain. When no
paint is available, use mud, charcoal, or crushed grass. Color in bold, irregular patterns. Alter the distinctive
outline of your helmet with a cover of cloth or burlap colored to blend with the terrain. Let foliage stick over the
edges, but do not use too much of it. Use a camouflage band, string, burlap strips, or rubber bands to hold the
foliage in place. Use mud or dirt to dull shiny surfaces of weapons, being careful not to foul working parts.
c. Camouflaging the Person
Exposed skin-even dark skin–reflects light. To prevent this, you should use camoflage face paint sticks. They
are issued and used in a two-color combination. Although these sticks are called face paint sticks, they are used
on any exposed skin and are issued and used in the following combinations:
1. Loam and light green for light-skinned personnel in other than snow regions

2. Sand and light green for dark-skinned personnel in other than snow regions
3. Loam and white for all personnel in snow regions. Apply face paint sticks or other materials as follows:
1. Paint the shiny areas (forehead, cheeks, nose, chin, exposed skin on the back of your neck and your hands
and wrists) with the darker color. Paint the shadow areas (around the eyes and under the nose and chin) with the
lighter color.
2. When applying face paint, use the buddy system with one man working on and checking another.
3. When face paint is not available, burnt cork, charcoal, or lampblack may be used. Mud should be used only
when nothing else is available. Mud changes color as it dries, and when dry, it may flake off and leave exposed
skin. Also, mud may contain harmful bacteria and should be used only on approval of a medical officer.
d. Camouflaging of Vehicles
A badly concealed vehicle can lead to much more than just a lost vehicle; it may mean discovery of your unit or
complete destruction of an installation. As is always the case in camouflage, the aim should be to occupy a
position without altering its appearance. To do this, you should park the vehicle under natural cover whenever
available. When cover is inadequate, the vehicles should be parked so their shape will disappear into the
surroundings. Better concealment can be
obtained by using natural rather than artificial material to breakup the shape and shadow of the vehicles. This
type of material is always available near a parking site or motor pool and can be erected and removed quickly.
When cut foliage is used, be sure it is put up as it was growing because the underside of the leaves is much
lighter than the topside, and the difference in color could give your position away. In addition, cut foliage
should be replaced as soon as it starts to wither. The principal artificial materials used to conceal vehicles are
drape nets. They are easy to use, quickly erected, and quickly removed. Drape nets give complete concealment
against direct observation, but, as with most artificial camouflage materials, they can frequently be detected by
photographic observation because they often fail to blend with the background properly. In any case, drapes do
conceal the identity of a vehicle, even though the drape net itself may be detected.
e. Camouflaging of Buildings
The basic methods of concealment–blending, hiding, and deceiving–can be applied either to existing buildings
or new construction. However, concealment is much easier when the camouflage scheme is incorporated into
the designs for new construction and site selection.
Buildings can be concealed by screens of garnished nettings. Another method is to have disruptive patterns
painted over the netting, roof, and gable-end walls. Where concealment from close observation is required, the
netting should be sloped gradually to the ground. For structures with roofs steeper than 30 degrees, the netting
must cover the whole building. When the terrain permits, a new structure can be partially dug-in to reduce the
height and, in turn, its shadows. The nature and size of buildings can be disguised in many ways, such as the
following:
1. Placing trees between the buildings
2. Painting the roofs to match the surrounding terrain
3. Varying roof lines with wooden framework, then covering them with burlap or fine-mesh wire netting to
simulate sloping hip roofs
4. Erecting superstructures over existing buildings and covering them with burlap, plastic, or other material to
alter their appearance so they resemble the surrounding native buildings
f. Camouflaging of Supply Points
From a camouflage viewpoint, the large concentration of materials is the main problem. Huge amounts of
equipment and supplies of all kinds are usually brought up at the same time. They must be unloaded and
concealed quickly and yet be easily accessible for redistribution. Therefore, natural cover and concealment must
be used at supply points whenever possible. Dispersal of these supplies is a must to minimize damage from a
single attack. Existing overhead cover should be used when new access roads are planned. When the supply
point is to be permanent, the tracks running in and out of the installation can be concealed by overhead nets
slung between trees. Traffic
control should include measures to conceal activity and movement at, to, and from the installation. When
natural cover is sparse or nonexistent, be sure the natural terrain features are used to advantage. Maintain
camouflage discipline at supply points including a minimum of changes in the appearance of the terrain.
Control the debris so it does not accumulate and attract enemy attention.
g. Camouflaging of Water Points
Water points must have adequate concealment, either artificial or natural, for operating personnel,
storage tanks, pumping, and purification equipment. When the surrounding terrain foliage is not thick enough
for perfect concealment, it can be supplemented by natural or artificial camouflage materials.
To keep the enemy from observing the shine of water in the tanks, place canvas covers or natural foliage over
them. By using foliage or artificial materials, you can distort their features. Small, open areas that must be
crossed by
vehicles or personnel operating in the area can be concealed with natural or artificial materials. A water supply
schedule must be instituted and maintained. Without camouflage discipline or with a violation of the schedule, a
concentration of waiting vehicles that cannot be readily concealed could occur.
108.4 Actions if caught in the light of a ground or ovhd flare
When you are caught in the open by an overhead flare, you should immediately hit the deck Since the burst of
light is temporarily blinding to the enemy also, there is a chance that you may not have been seen. If you hear
the flare being fired, try to get down before it bursts. Resume movement as soon as the flare burns out. When
you are caught in the light of a ground flare, move out of the area of light as quickly and quietly as possible.
Keep moving until you are well away from the area; then reorient yourself and continue on. If you are caught by
a flare when crossing an
obstacle, such as barbed wire, crouch low and remain motionless until the flare burns out. When you are
assaulting a position and a flare bursts, continuing your assault is imperative.
108.5 Military aspects of terrain applied to defensive force using KOCOA.
Maneuvers that are possible and dispositions that are essential are indelibly “written on the ground.”
Unfortunate indeed is the platoon commander or assistant company commander who is unable to read
this “writing.” The intelligent leader knows that terrain is a major ally and that it virtually decides the
positioning of platoons and squads in the defense. The defender retains control of terrain features essential to
observations, communications, and maneuver of reserves. Denying the enemy the use of terrain that
might jeopardize the mission of the battalion is the major role of a defender. To read the “writing on the
ground,” you can organize the analysis of weather and terrain primarily around the following set of military
considerations
(KOCOA):
Key terrain
Observation and fields of fire
Concealment and cover
Obstacles to movement
Avenues of approach
These considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs. While the discussions of these considerations
focus on terrain, weather and terrain are inseparable. Terrain that offers good traffic conditions when dry may
be impassable when wet. A hill that provides good observation on a clear day may not provide any visibility on
a rainy day or at night.
Key Terrain
Key terrain features must be considered in formulating defensive tactics. Their selection is based on the mission
of the command. Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the ability to apply combat power. Also
considered is channeling the enemy into the beaten zone of organic weapons maintained by the battalion. The
selection of key terrain varies with the following:
Level of command
Type of unit
Mission of the unit
Seabees are normally a service support unit for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Service support
units need roads over which to move supplies and secure areas in which to construct facilities. Aviation units
need high terrain on which to set up radars and communication facilities and large, flat areas for airfields.
Observation and Fields of Fire
Observation and fields of fire are so closely related that they are considered together. Fields of fire are based on
observation because a target must be seen to bring effective fire upon it. The observation considerations are as
follows:
Weather conditions
Time of day
Vegetation
Surrounding terrain

The highest terrain features are generally ideal for observation. However, during times of poor visibility,
positions in low areas that the enemy must pass through may provide better observation. The field of fire is the
area a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively with fire from a given position. When you are
selecting a field of fire for a
weapon, it is critical to know the capabilities of the weapon. Positioning an M60E3 machine gun with a 400-
meter field of fire is poorly using the weapons capability considering the weapon has a maximum effective
range 1,100 meters.
The object is to engage the enemy as far out as possible. Cover and Concealment
Cover and concealment is used together to provide protection from the effects of fires and observation.
1. Cover is protection from the effects of fire. Examples of ideal cover are as follows:
Rocks
Shell craters
Ditches or quarries
Buildings
Caves
Sunken roads
River banks
Walls
Folds in the ground
Highway fills
Areas that provide cover from direct fire may or may not protect against the effects of indirect fire.
2. Concealment is the protection from observation or surveillance both air and ground. Some examples that
provide ideal concealment are as follows
Woods
Underbrush
Snowdrifts
Tall grass
Cultivated vegetation
Other features that deny observation
Terrain that provides concealment may or may not provide cover.
Obstacles to Movement
Obstacles are anything, including a natural or artificial terrain feature, that stops, impedes, or diverts
military movement. Entanglements are set up as obstacles along the FEBA or the defensive perimeter
to channel the enemy into the beaten zone of various weapons held by the defending unit.
Avenues of Approach
Avenues of approach are routes the enemy is likely to travel to reach its objective. When setting up the defense
positions, the platoon commander visualizes all possible enemy avenues of approach into the area. An
evaluation of the avenues of approach, together with key terrain features, serves as the basis for positioning
platoons or squads for planning fire support. The area selected for defense should afford good observation,
fields of fire, and adequate cover and concealment to the defending forces. The defender applies the principles
of camouflage and continuously improves camouflage throughout the defensive operation.
108.6 Explain procedures for basic Land Nav using a Map, lensatic compass and associated equipment.
See reference, this is a large and in-depth topic.
108.7 Describe planning process using BAMCIS for 5 paragraph order

Troop-Leading Steps (BAMCIS). Troop-leading steps are a sequence of events which unit leaders use in most
tactical operations. These steps do not always occur in a specific order; many times, two or more may occur
concurrently. Troop-leading steps (BAMCIS) are simply a tool, which aids leaders in formulating initial plans
and time schedules upon receipt of a mission: To
1• Begin planning
2• Arrange for reconnaissance
3• Make reconnaissance
4• Complete the plan
5• Issue the order
6• Supervise

Begin Planning. The receipt of a mission triggers the entire BAMCIS cycle; however, tactical planning is
anticipatory and continuous. To make effective use of available time, the leader issues a warning order to his or
her subordinates.
Estimate of the Situation (METT-T). Like troop-leading steps (BAMCIS), the estimate of the situation (METT-
T) is a tool, which aids a commander as he plans tactical operations and means
1• Mission analysis
2• Enemy forces
3• Terrain/weather analysis
4• Troops and support available
5• Time

This tool is especially helpful to a decision maker as a frame of reference, which serves to remind him or her of
various factors normally considered during tactical planning.
During this lesson, you will be exposed to a modified version of the factors normally considered in the estimate
of the situation. Once you master the basics on the squad level, several additional factors, which will aid in
tactical planning on the platoon level and above, will be introduced to you during subsequent tactical planning
classes.
Mission analysis. The first step in the estimate is mission analysis, which begins upon receipt of the mission.
Mission analysis means the unit leader gains an understanding of the mission:
1• Task analysis: The unit leader must identify and understand all that is required for the successful
accomplishment of the mission, including tasks received in the unit’s task statement and coordinating
instructions from the higher commander’s operations order.

1• Limitations: These are restrictions

1ο On the freedom of action of the friendly force

2ο That prohibit the commander from doing something specific
Examples of limitations are
1ο Tactical control measures
2ο Rules of engagement (ROE)
3ο Statements such as

1− Be prepared to…
2− Not earlier than…
3− On order…

Enemy forces. The objective of an analysis of the enemy situation is to deduce the enemy’s most probable
course of action. Its development comes from sources including enemy

1• Doctrine
2• Historical data
3• Current activities as indicated in the higher commander’s operation order

Ideally, the information is used to analyze the enemy situation includes

1• Composition, disposition, and strength:

1ο Describe your enemy

2ο Identify the forces and equipment the enemy can bring to bear within your unit’s zone or sector
3ο Consider known and suspected enemy locations and strength estimates relative to personnel, equipment, and
support capabilities. The elements of the acronym SALUTE are helpful when developing and organizing this
information.

1• Capabilities and limitations. What can and cannot the enemy do to me? Analyze the information listed under
composition, disposition, and strength. Analyze strength relative to the enemy’s ability to conduct operations
against your unit—its ability or inability to conduct various operations against your unit under any reasonably
foreseeable situation. Is the enemy force capable of defending, reinforcing, attacking, withdrawing, or delaying?
The acronym DRAW-D serves as a reminder of the minimum factors to consider. For example,

1ο Can the enemy effectively attack at night?

2ο Can the enemy conduct a deliberate defense against us or does he lack sufficient forces and equipment?
3ο Will the enemy be reinforced by elements of other units as a result of our attack? How long will this
reinforcement take? Can reinforcement be done at night—is it a vehicular transported reinforcement force, or
will it be traveling on foot?

1• Enemy most probable course of action (MPCOA). What will the enemy try to do to me? Analyze the
information under composition disposition, strength relative to the enemy’s ability to conduct operations against
your unit. Deduce the enemy’s most probable course of action in relation to your action. For example, “the
MPCOA is to withdraw to the northwest (as a result of our attack) to attempt to join other enemy forces west of
objective Alpha.”

Terrain/weather analysis. The logical sequence for rapidly analyzing terrain and weather is OCOKA-W. Always
consider these factors from the friendly and enemy perspectives:
1• Observation (the influence of terrain on reconnaissance and target acquisition) and fields of fire (the
influence of terrain on the effectiveness of weapon systems)

1ο What can and cannot be seen from where?

2ο What can and cannot be hit by fire?

1• Cover (protection from effects of firepower) and concealment (protection from observation or target
acquisition)

1ο Where can fires not hit me?

2ο Where can I not be seen?

The analysis of cover and concealment is often inseparable from the consideration of observations and field of
fire. Weapons systems must have cover and concealment to be most effective and to increase survivability.
1• Obstacles. Obstacles are any natural or man-made obstructions that canalize, delay, restrict, or divert the
maneuver of movement of a force. You will learn more details about obstacles in subsequent engineering
lessons.

1• Key terrain. Key terrain is any area whose seizure, retention, or control affords a marked advantage to either
combatant. Using the map and information already generated, the unit leader must identify terrain that could be
used as positions for weapons or for units to dominate friendly or enemy approaches into or within the objective
area. Remember, you do not need to occupy key terrain to control it. You can use direct or indirect fire to
control access to key terrain.

1• Avenues of approach. Avenues of approach are movement routes to an objective; they permit friendly and
enemy forces to advance or withdraw and to capitalize on the principles of

1ο Mass momentum
2ο Shock
3ο Speed

A viable avenue of approach usually offers mobility corridors, which are areas within the avenue of approach
that permit movement and maneuver. When friendly forces are attacking, friendly avenues of approach to the
objective must be identified along with enemy avenues of approach that could affect friendly movement (for
example, counterattack avenues).
1• Weather. Analyze weather using the five military aspects of weather:

1ο Temperature and humidity

2ο Precipitation
3ο Wind
4ο Clouds
5ο Visibility (day and night)

To determine the weather’s cumulative effect on the operation, you must consider it in conjunction with the
terrain associated with the unit’s mission. Weather affects
1ο Equipment (including electronic and optical)
2ο Terrain (trafficability)
3ο Visibility
4ο Individual Marines (its greatest effect)

During inclement weather or in extreme heat or cold, the amount of time spent on leadership and supervision
must increase as the severity of the weather increases. Inclement weather affects
1ο Visibility and movement
2ο Unit efficiency and morale
3ο Command and control (makes it more difficult)

Poor weather conditions can be as much of an advantage to a unit as it is a disadvantage, depending upon
1ο Unit capabilities
2ο Equipment
3ο Level of training

The unit leader analyzes these five military aspects of terrain and the weather relevant to the mission. Certain
situations may elevate one element of OCOKA-W to a level of importance above that of one or more of the
remaining elements (extreme weather, for example). Having received the higher commander’s analysis, a unit
leader can more easily analyze his or her sector or zone with respect to friendly and enemy capabilities. For
example, in offensive operations, the unit leader analyzes terrain/weather from the objective area working back
to the assembly area.
Troops and support available. Any course of action the unit leader considers must take into account the number
of Marines and support assets available for the operation. Consider the
1• Mental and physical condition of the Marines
2• Marines’ level of training
3• Status of the Marines’ equipment
4• Fire support assets
5• Logistics

Time. The ability to appreciate the aspects and effects of time and space is one of the most important qualities
in a leader. Time is vital to all operations; it drives planning and execution. The unit leader gets his or her
indication of time available from his or her commander. The amount of time a unit has to prepare for or to
execute an operation determines the detail possible during the planning process. Use initial estimates of time to
identify any critical timing in the operation, which may include
1• Planning time
2• LD time
3• Movement time
4• Defend-no-later-than time
5• Time available to prepare and rehearse the attack or defense
6• Time available for reconnaissance
7• Transportation means (helo, vehicular, foot-mobile, etc.)

Consider opposed and unopposed rates of movement.

Arrange for Reconnaissance. Initially the unit leader asks, “What information am I lacking?” If possible, the
unit leader arranges for a physical reconnaissance of his or her
1• Objective
2• Route
3• Defensive position

The unit leader considers the

1• Route
2• Security
3• Subordinates to accompany him or her
4• Time available for reconnaissance

If a physical reconnaissance is impossible, the unit leader should at least conduct a leader’s reconnaissance
using a map, aerial photo, or visual reconnaissance from a vantage point.
Make Reconnaissance. The commander now acts to answer his or her questions, through a reconnaissance. The
recon will either confirm the plan or cause him or her to adjust it. On a physical reconnaissance, selected
subordinate leaders normally accompany him or her. The personnel who accompany the leader will vary
according to the tactical situation. The leader should take as many subordinate leaders as the situation requires
while other subordinate leaders supervise the preparations necessary for the upcoming mission.
Complete the Plan. After updating his or her estimate of the situation (METT-T) with information gained during
the reconnaissance, the leader decides how to accomplish the mission and completes the operation order.
Issue the Order. The leader issues the order orally to subordinate leaders. The lesson on combat orders
introduces operations orders and order-issuing techniques.
Supervise. The leader ensures that his or her plan is adhered to by
1• Listening to subordinate leaders as they issue orders
2• Inspecting Marines and their equipment
3• Observing Marines as they conduct rehearsals

The leader also ensures adherence to any established time line. If any changes to the original plan are required,
due to recent changes in the situation, the commander must adjust the plan accordingly.
108.8 Discuss the five paragraph order.
Format for OPORD
The HEADING contains the security classification, a statement about changes from oral orders, copy number
(handwritten), issuing headquarters, the place of issue, date and time of issue, file notation, title and serial
number of the order, references (maps, charts, and photomaps), and the time zone to be used throughout the
order. When a code name for the operation is used, it is written on the same line as the OPORD title and
number. The BODY contains the task organization (when too complicated or lengthy to be contained in
paragraph 3) and the five main numbered paragraphs. The five paragraphs cover the following topics in the
order listed: (1) SITUATION, (2) MISSION, (3) EXECUTION, (4) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS,
and (5) COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS. The acronym SMEAC (using the first letter of each topic)
helps you remember these topics. Remember that the
five main topics of an operation order must be covered whether the order is from a battalion commander,
platoon commander, squad leader, or fire team leader. Naturally, battalion operation orders are quite lengthy,
and a patrol leader’s order is usually brief. The format of a patrol leader’s order is shown in figure 11-36. The
orders of a patrol leader are usually given orally. Each patrol member should take accurate notes. The task
organization of an
operation order includes the task subdivisions or tactical components that make up the command together with
the names and grades of the commanders. (See fig. 11-35 again.) Support units are shown under the
headquarters of the major unit that commands them–not under the headquarters of the unit they support.
Attached units are shown under the headquarters of the unit to which they are attached. Units should be listed
under paragraph letters that correspond
to those in paragraph 3. Only the task subdivisions in the echelon of command just below the issuing unit are
normally shown.
Paragraph 1. SITUATION always has three subparagraphs: Enemy Forces, Friendly Forces, and Attachments
and Detachments. This paragraph contains information only. It does not include plans or instructions.
Paragraph 1.a. Enemy Forces contains information about the enemy that affects the operation, such as their
locations, dispositions, strength, activities, and capabilities.
Paragraph 1.b. Friendly Forces contains a statement of the mission of the next higher unit; the location and
planned actions of the unit on the right and left; the fire support available for the patrol; and the mission and
route of other patrols.
Paragraph 1.c. Attachments and Detachments contains a list of nonorganic units attached to, and organic units
detached from, the command for the specific operation. It includes the date/time the attachment or detachment
is to take place.
Paragraph 2. MISSION contains a concise statement of the mission, its purpose, and of the command as a
whole. It
includes “what,” “how,” “where,” and as much of “why” as maybe proper. There are no subparagraphs.
Paragraph 3. EXECUTION assigns definite tasks to each element of the command, organic and attached, that
contributes to carrying out the overall mission. No restrictions are set on the number of subparagraphs.
Paragraphs 3.a. Concept of Operations is a clear, concise summary of how the commander visualizes the
operation should be conducted. This is an enlargement of the decision contained in the commander’s estimate.
This paragraph should be as brief as possible; but it may be published as an annex or shown on an operation
overlay when it is lengthy or detailed. When an overlay is used, it need not be written. When an overlay or
annex
is used, this paragraph makes reference to it.
Paragraphs 3.b., 3.c., and so forth (tasks for subordinate units) are assigned separate subparagraphs lettered in
alphabetical sequence to each major subordinate element. These subparagraphs correspond to the alphabetical
listings in the task organization. Except as outlined below, all instructions to any unit having a tactical mission
should appear in the subparagraph of paragraph 3 about that unit. Subparagraphs that assign tasks to other
combat and combat support elements (if applicable) should follow. The final subparagraph of paragraph 3,
always
entitled Coordinating Instructions, contains the details of coordination and the control measures that apply to the
command as a whole; for example, objectives, comments, qualifying time of attack line of departure,
boundaries, beaches, bombline, and reference to march table annex. Many of these and other instructions that
apply to two or more elements of the command maybe indicated in an attached overlay. In this case, they need
not be repeated here. In this paragraph essential elements of information might be included (unless an
intelligence annex is issued). Examples are operational reports to be submitted, if not set forth elsewhere by
written order, preparatory fire information, and the effective time of the order.
Paragraph 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS contains administrative and logistic instructions, when an
administrative order is not issued. When an order is issued, this paragraph refers to that order. In a small
command, such as a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, this paragraph contains all the necessary information
and instructions about supply, evacuation, hospitalization, transportation, service, personnel, and similar
matters.
Paragraph 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL contains instructions about the command, command relationships,
and the operations of communications and electronics.
Paragraph 5.a. Signal may refer to a standard plan or to a communications annex if one has been issued. When a
communications annex has not been issued, paragraph 5a should contain references to the index of
communications instructions (COI) currently in effect, instructions on the use of radio and pyrotechnics, and
restrictions on the use of any means of communication.
Paragraph 5.b. Command gives the location of the command post of the issuing unit and those of subordinate
units, when they are known. When the location of the command post or subordinate units is unknown,
instructions about the reporting of command posts when opened maybe included.

Paragraph 5.c. This subparagraph shows the axis of communications (indicated by successive tentative
command post locations) and the location and time of opening of the message centers. Also, subparagraphs may
be included about recognition and identification instructions, electronic policy, code words, liaison, and
command relationships.
Most items in paragraph 5 can usually be shown graphically on the operation map or overlay. When this is
done, they need not be repeated in writing.
The ENDING of an operation order contains the signature, a list of annexes (if any), the distribution, the
authentication (except on the original), and the classification.
108.9 Discuss the following reports:
a. SALUTE/ b. SPOT
The rule of thumb for reporting tactical information is to remember the following acronym SALUTE.
Size of enemy unit
Activity of enemy unit
Location of enemy unit(s)
Uniform worn by the enemy
Time of each activity noted
Equipment used or carried by the enemy
A SALUTE report is used when the observed activities of the enemy do not pose a threat to the company. This
gives the platoon commander and the company CP time to evaluate the situation and to send the COC a formal
SALUTE report.
The platoon commander relays the information to the company CP, using the acronym SALUTE (Size,
Activity, Location, Unit, Time, Equipment). The company CP relays the information to the COC with a
SALUTE report. A SPOT report is a hastily modified SALUTE report containing less detail. An example of the
difference between the two reports is when the company is engaged in a fire fight on the lines. The platoon
commander must concentrate on the fire fight and has little time to send a formal SALUTE report to the
company CP. Several SPOT reports are used to maintain communication with the company CP. The company
CP is also busy concentrating on the fire fight and will relay several SPOT reports to the COC. When the fire
fight is over, the company CP will send
the COC a formal SALUTE report based from the SPOT reports.
The important thing is to keep the COC informed of everything and maintain the top priority of defending the
company’s area of responsibility. What may not seem like vital information to you may be vital information to
someone else. When in doubt send a SPOT or SALUTE report.
108.10 Describe the purpose of:
a. Security Patrol
A patrol is a detachment of troops sent out from a larger body on a mission of combat, reconnaissance, security,
or contact with friendly units. There are two general classes of patrols–reconnaissance and combat-either of
which could have a mission of security. The classification is derived from the mission assigned to a patrol. In
the Seabees you are primarily concerned with defensive combat; therefore, when training your men in
patrolling, your emphasis should be on security patrolling, rather than aggressive patrolling. In security
patrolling, both reconnaissance (recon)
and combat patrols are used. The typical Seabee defense is a static defense; therefore, the recon patrol is mainly
used to detect enemy movement toward your position The combat patrol is used to destroy enemy recon patrols
and to delay and confuse an enemy attack.
b. Reconnaissance Patrol
Reconnaissance patrols are sent out to gain information about the enemy or the terrain. These patrols engage in
combat only when it becomes necessary to accomplish their mission or to protect themselves. In general, they
should avoid combat and accomplish their mission by stealth. Reconnaissance patrols have a variety of
missions,
but their primary mission is to obtain and report information in a timely manner to the commander who desires
it.
A reconnaissance patrol might be dispatched to do the following:

1. Locate and observe the characteristics of a hostile position or installation

2. Reconnoiter a possible route of march for an enemy force.
3. Reconnoiter a certain terrain feature or the general nature of the terrain in a given locality.
4. Patrol the perimeter of the defense area in a static defense. Of primary importance is enemy troop buildup or
movement and the type of weaponry in their possessions.
The missions mentioned above are by no means all-inclusive and are provided merely as examples.
108.11 State the twelve Patrol Planning and Preparation Steps.
1. Study the mission.
2. Plan use of time.
3. Study terrain and situation.
4. Organize the patrol.
5. Select men, weapons, and equipment.
6. Issue the warning order.
7. Coordinate (continuous throughout the patrol).
8. Make reconnaissance.
9. Complete detailed plans.
10. Issue patrol order.
11. Supervise (at all times), inspect, rehearse and reinspect.
12. Execute the mission.
108.12 Priorities of Establishing a Defense
1. Establish security.
2. Hastily set up a communication network.
3. Position automatic and crew-served weapons.
4. Clear fields of fire.
5. Assign sectors of fire and PDFs.
6. Prepare fighting positions.
7. Plan, coordinate, and plot available fire support.
8. Install tactical and supplementary wire.
9. Lay and bury wire for the final communication network.
10. Prepare other obstacles including claymores and protective wire.
11. Prepare alternate positions.
12. Prepare supplementary positions.
108.13 Describe the Battalion Defensive Areas
DEFENSIVE AREAS
defensive areas, established at the defensive perimeter or FEBA, include the security area, the forward defense
area, and the reserve area. Each of these areas is allocated forces and fires as a part of the complete defense plan
(fig. 4-1).
Security Area
The battalion security area begins at the FEBA or the defensive perimeter and normally extends 500 meters to
the front and to the flanks of the battalion. Depending on where battalion security elements are used, this area
can be increased. Seabee forces in the security area include the listening post, the observation post, and the
patrols that furnish information about the enemy; delay, deceive, and disrupt the enemy as much as possible.
Division forces, operating deep in the security area (beyond 500 meters), will consist of general outposts
(GOPs), combat outposts, flank security forces, division aerial surveillance elements, and patrols. As a platoon
commander or patrol leader, you must be aware of all forces operating in the security area.
Forward Defense Area (FDA)

The forward defense area extends rearward from the defensive line or FEBA to the rear boundaries of the
frontline companies that are used as the forward defense echelon of the battalion. The composition of the
forward defense echelon depends upon the form of defense used.
Reserve Area
Extending from the rear boundary of the forward defense echelon (frontline companies) to the rear boundary of
the defense of the battalion is the reserve area. The reserve forces and those uncommitted forces under battalion
control occupy positions in the reserve area and add depth to the defensive position. The reserve is the principal
means by which the battalion commander influences the defensive battle and regains the initiative.
108.14 Discuss the elements of a Fire Plan Sketch
FIRE PLAN
The fire team leader formulates a fire plan to cover the entire sector assigned by the squad leader with the
heaviest possible volume of fire (fig. 4-6 and appendix II).
Figure 4.6.—Fire team fire plan.
The fire plan includes the following:
• Individual sectors of fire
• Individual fighting positions
• Automatic riflemen PDF assigned by the
squad leader or platoon commander
• Crew-served weapon positions
• Key terrain features
• Position of the fire team leader
INDIVIDUAL SECTORS OF FIRE
If practical, each member in the fire team should cover the entire sector of fire of the fire team. The same terrain
features are used to show the limits.
INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING POSITIONS
Each member of the fire team is located so as to occupy an assigned position that allows the team to cover, by
fire, the assigned sector. Positions maybe prepared as single-or double-fighting holes; however, double holes
are preferred. If doublefighting holes are prepared, the automatic rifleman and assistant automatic rifleman will
pair off. Crew-served weapons fighting positions are more detailed and will be discussed further in this chapter.
The interval between fighting positions within a fire team varies between 5 to 20 meters. In dense terrain,
single-fighting positions are usually prepared and are 5 meters apart, In open terrain, single holes may be 10
meters apart; doublefighting positions, 20 meters apart.
AUTOMATIC RIFLEMAN
Since the automatic rifles are the backbone of the defense of the squad, the squad leader selects the exact
fighting position. The remainder of the fire team is then positioned around the automatic rifles. The PDF of the
automatic rifles are selected by the platoon commander or the squad leader.
RIFLEMAN
A rifleman is positioned so he can cover the entire fire team sector. The position must provide support and
protection for the automatic rifleman.
GRENADIER
The squad leader positions the grenadier where the M203 grenade launcher is most effective. In combat, the
grenadier is usually close to the squad leader. The squad leader may choose to use the grenadier to cover dead
space in the defense.
FIRE TEAM LEADER
Usually the position of the fire team leader is at the center of the fire team from which he can perform the
following:
l Observe the entire fire team and its sector of fire.
. Direct the fire of the automatic rifle.
. Observe the squad leader.

FIRE PLAN SKETCH

A sketch of the fire plan is submitted by the fire team leader to the squad leader. The magnetic North line
provides a reference to show the direction the fire team is facing. Figure 4-7 shows the meaning of the various
symbols.
SQUAD FIRE PLAN SKETCH
Based upon the fire plan sketch received from the fire team leaders, the squad leader prepares a squad fire plan
sketch. Two copies are prepared-one for the squad leader and the other for the platoon commander (fig. 4-10
and appendix II). The sketch should include the following:
Fire team positions and sectors of fire
Position and PDF of the automatic rifles
Crew-served weapons position
Primary fire missions (FPL or PDF)
Approved on-call targets
Squad leader position
Terrain features and estimated ranges to them
Direction of magnetic North
108.15 Discuss sectors of fire and fire discipline.
SECTOR OF FIRE
A sector of fire (fig. 4-3) is an area of responsibility assigned to a squad, a platoon, or a crew-served weapon to
be covered by fire. The squad sector of fire is divided into fire teams and individual sectors of fire to cover the
entire squad sector by fire. Sectors of fire ensure mutual support by overlapping the individual and fire team
sectors. Normally, the squad leader is not assigned an individual sector of fire since the primary duty in the
defense is directing and controlling the squad. Located within each sector of fire are lateral and forward limits.
1. Lateral Limits: Readily identifiable terrain features are selected to show the line of sight along each side of
the sector. Two stakes are firmly placed near the position of a weapon to show the lateral limits for periods of
reduced visibility.
2. Forward Limits: The forward limit is established at the range at which the weapon will open fire. When
possible, a terrain feature is selected to locate the forward limit. This allows the squad leader a method of
control to open fire on the enemy at a precise time to maximize effectiveness.

FIRE TEAM IN THE DEFENSE

A primary duty of a squad leader is to organize the fire teams in the defense. This is accomplished by specifying
a sector of fire for the squad and PDF for each automatic rifleman. The squad leader must inform the fire team
leader of any crew-served weapons, augmented from the weapons platoon, which will help in covering the
assigned sector of fire. The squad leader and the fire team leader will select terrain features to show lateral and
forward limits of the assigned sector of fire. The mission of the fire team is to stop the enemy forward of the
FEBA or to repel the enemy by close combat if the enemy reaches the FEBA.
INDIVIDUAL SECTORS OF FIRE
If practical, each member in the fire team should cover the entire sector of fire of the fire team. The same terrain
featues are used to show the limits.
INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING POSITIONS
Each member of the fire team is located so as to occupy an assigned position that allows the team to cover, by
fire, the assigned sector. Positions maybe prepared as single-or double-fighting holes; however, double holes
are preferred. If doublefighting holes are prepared, the automatic rifleman and assistant automatic rifleman will
pair off. Crew-served weapons fighting positions are more detailed and will be discussed further in this chapter.
The interval between fighting positions within a fire team varies between 5 to 20 meters. In dense terrain,
single-fighting positions are usually prepared and are 5 meters apart, In open terrain, single holes may be 10
meters apart; doublefighting positions, 20 meters apart.
SQUAD IN THE DEFENSE
The platoon commander assigns each squad a defensive mission specifying a sector of fire and a primary
position. Terrain features are selected to show the lateral and forward limits of the sector of fire of the squad.
The platoon commander designates the general firing positions and the PDF for specific automatic rifles or
crew-served weapons, which are critical to the defense of the entire platoon. Designated on-call targets are
established and
coordinated with the Combat Operation Center (COC). Supplementary positions are assigned to the squads for
all-around defense and to protect the flanks or the rear of the platoon (fig. 4-8 and appendix II).
PLATOON IN THE DEFENSE
Located within the assigned company battle area is the platoon defense area. The company commander assigns
the platoon a frontage. The frontage left and right limits are taken from a reference point on the terrain or the
flank of an adjacent platoon. A distance from the FEBA to the rear is also described
MACHINE GUN TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
The basic unit of machine gun employment in defense is the squad. Machine gun squads consist of a squad
leader and two four-man machine gun teams. Machine guns used on the FEBA are normally used by squads.
Employment of Machine Guns
Machine gun squads used on the FEBA are normally assigned a final protective line (FPL) and a sector of fire
or a principal direction of fire (PDF). Both machine guns of the squad fire the same general FPL and sector of
fire from positions a minimum of 35 meters apart. Based on terrain, it may be necessary to split some squads to
provide effective machine gun coverage. A machine gun squad is split when each of its guns has been assigned
a different firing mission; that is, a different final protective line or principal direction of fire and sector of fire.
A machine gun squad is split only when necessary. If the squad is split, the two guns should be used as close to
each other as the
machine gun fire plan will allow. This action ensures interlocking fire, ease of control, and supplies (fig. 4-15).
Machine Gun Final Protective Lines
Effective final protective fire is characterized by the following:

1. Flanking: Maximum flanking fire is desirable. The more frontal the fire, the less effective the coverage of the
company front.
2. Interlocking: Interlocking fire adds to the effectiveness of the fire plan. Such fire reduces the number of gaps
in the final protective lines and provides mutual support between adjacent units.
3. Grazing: Final protective lines are located to obtain maximum grazing fire. Grazing fire is fire in which the
trajectory of the bullets does not rise above the height of a man, standing. On flat or uniformly sloping terrain,
machine gun fire grazes to a maximum range of 700 meters from the gun. Figure 4-16 shows a proper technique
for graphically displaying final protective fire and gaps in its grazing fire on an overlay or sketch.
Machine Gun Sector of Fire
A sector of fire is assigned to each machine gun squad. A machine gun sector of fire does not normally exceed
800 roils (45 degrees). Adjacent machine gun squad sectors should overlap. Preferably, the final protective line
comprises the near boundary of the sector. It maybe located within the sector when the grazing fire is slightly
more frontal than desirable and machine gun fire coverage closer to the FEBA is required.
Machine Gun Principal Direction of Fire
When the terrain does not allow for an effective final protective line, machine guns on the FEBA may be
assigned principal directions of fire for covering dangerous avenues of approach. In such situations, the
principal direction of fire may fall within the sector of fire or comprise either of its boundaries. NOTE: A
machine gun cannot be assigned a final protective line (FPL) and a principal direction of fire (PDF).
RANGE CARDS
Once a machine gun team is deployed in a defensive position and the gun laid, the squad leader must ensure that
range cards have been completed. Two sets of range cards must be made for every fighting position. Range
cards are very important and are used for several purposes. The squad leader forwards one copy as soon as
possible to the platoon commander. The platoon commander ensures the card is accurate and then forwards it on
to the company CP. Range cards are the basis for the fire plan of the company. All supporting fire, security
sectors, and defensive coordination are planned using machine gun fire as the base from which to build. The
second copy of the range card will be kept by the gun team. The card is used by members of the gun team to fire
at predetermined targets or to help in range estimations to other targets. Range cards may be passed on to a
relieving battalion. Patrols from companies or other units may want to look at the range cards to identify final
protective lines. Patrols need to know of any dead space to ensure that they are clear of infiltrators and where to
take cover during an FPF.
COMPLETING A RANGE CARD
Range cards must be neat, clear, and prepared using a universal format. Observe the range card symbols and
sample range card shown in figures 4-17 and 4-18 as each component is explained below. (see appendix II
108.16 Describe Duties and Responsibilities of the members of a rifle squad
Squad Leader
The squad leader is generally a first class petty officer (E-6). He carries out the orders of the platoon
commander and is responsible to him for the discipline, appearance, training, control, and conduct of his squad
at all times. He must pay particular attention to the care and maintenance of the weapons and equipment of the
squad. In combat, he has the important responsibilities of fire discipline, fire control, and maneuvering his
squad. He takes a position where he can best observe and control his squad and carry out the orders of the
platoon commander. He controls his squad by voice and visual commands. The squad leader is primarily a
leader; therefore, he only fires his own weapon in critical situations. He is armed with the service rifle.
Grenadier
The grenadier, generally a third class petty officer (E-4), carries out the orders of the squad leader and is
responsible to him for the effective care, maintenance, and employment of his weapon-the M203 grenade
launcher. In combat, the grenadier always moves with or is close to the squad leader. Usually, another E-4 in
the squad is trained to replace the grenadier should he become a casualty. On the jobsite, the grenadier has no
special authority unless specifically designated.
Fire Team Leader
The fire team leader, generally a second class petty officer (E-5), carries out the orders of his squad leader and
is responsible to him for the effective employment of his fire team. His primary responsibility is to control his
fire

team in combat. In addition, he is responsible forthe care and condition of the weapons and equipment of the
fire team. The fire team leader stations himself where he can best control the fire of the automatic rifles of the
team. He usually controls his men through real and visual communications, since there are normally no radio or
telephone communications below the platoon commander’s level. Although he is armed with the service rifle,
his primary duty as a leader comes first; and he serves as a rifleman only when absolutely necessary. The senior
fire team leader serves as assistant squad leader and is prepared to take over the squad in the event that the
squad leader becomes a casualty.
Automatic Rifleman
The automatic rifleman, generally a third class petty officer (E-4), provides heavy firepower and is the
backbone of the fire team. He is responsible to the fire team leader for the effective employment of his
automatic rifle as well as its condition and care. The automatic rifleman acts as the fire team leader’s assistant
and takes over in his absence.
Rifleman Number 1
Rifleman number 1, generally a constructionman (E-3), carries extra ammunition for the automatic rifleman.
The automatic rifle must be kept in action at all times; if the automatic rifleman becomes a casualty, rifleman
number 1 moves up and replaces him. In addition, rifleman number 1 is armed with the service rifle and acts as
a rifleman and a scout. He assists rifleman number 2 in protecting the flank (exposed side) of the fire team.
Rifleman Number 2
Rifleman number 2, a constructionman (E-3) or an apprentice (E-2), serves as a rifleman and protects the flank
of the fire team. He is point man for all team formations and may also serve as a scout. If more than four men
are assigned to the fire team, the additional men have the same general duties as rifleman number 2. All are
armed with the service rifle.
108.17 Individuals Responsibility under the Code of Conduct
The Code was prescribed by the President of the United States in 1955 as a simple, written creed applying to all
members of the armed forces of the United States. The words of the Code, presented in six articles, state the
principles that Americans have honored in all the wars this country has fought since 1776. The Code is not
intended to provide guidance on every aspect of military life. For that purpose there are military regulations,
rules of military courtesy, and established customs and traditions. The Code is in no way connected with the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The UCMJ has punitive powers; the Code does not.
Article I
I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my
life in their defense.
It is a long-standing tradition of American citizens to answer the call to arms willingly when the peace and
security of this nation are threatened. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never
surrender the members o f my command while they still have the means to resist. This is an American tradition
that dates back to the revolutionary war. An individual may never voluntarily surrender himself. If isolated and
unable to fight the enemy, he is obligated to evade capture and rejoin friendly forces at the earliest possible time
Article III
If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid
others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
Article IV
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part
in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey
the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.
Article V
When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and
date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written
statements disloyal to my country and its Allies or harmful to their cause.
The misfortune of being captured by the enemy does not end a Seabee’s usefulness to his country. His duty is to
continue to resist the enemy by all possible means and to escape and assist others to escape. A Seabee may not
accept parole from the enemy or special favors, such as more food, warm clothes, less physical restrictions, and
so forth, in return for promises not to escape or for informing or providing information to the enemy. Informing,
or any other action endangering the well-being of a fellow prisoner, is forbidden. Prisoners of war must not help
the enemy

by identifying fellow prisoners who may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy and who may,
therefore, be made to suffer brutal interrogation.
Article VI
I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the
principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America. Article VI
and Article I of the Code are quite similar.
The repeated words I am an American, fighting forfreedom, are perhaps the most important words of the Code,
because they signify each American’s faith and confidence in his God, his country, and his service. Since John
Paul Jones made his defiant reply, “I have not yet begun to fight,” to the present, Americans have traditionally
fought the enemy wherever they were found and with whatever weapons were available. When captured, the
American, fighting for freedom, has continued the battle in a new arena. When facing a Communist
interrogator, they have been under fire just as though bullets and shell fragments were flying about them.
Disarmed, the POW has fought back with mind and spirit, remaining faithful to their fellow POWs, yielding no
military information, and resisting every attempt of indoctrination. Every Seabee has the responsibility to honor
these traditions by carefully adhering to the meaning of each article of the Code. The many Americans who
have accepted this responsibility are heroes in the finest sense of the word.
108.18 Describe Procedures for Handling EPW.
Never attack enemy soldiers who surrender or enemy soldiers who are captured, sick, or wounded. When you
have prisoners of war (POWs), you should follow the six Ss: search, secure, silence, segregate, safeguard, and
speed the prisoners to the rear. You must never kill, torture, or mistreat a prisoner because such actions are a
violation of the law. Besides, prisoners may provide you with vital information about the enemy. Treating a
prisoner badly also discourages other enemy soldiers from surrendering, and it strengthens their will to resist.
But if you treat prisoners well, your fairness encourages the enemy to treat their prisoners (your buddies) well.
Humane treatment of POWs is right, honorable, and required under the laws of armed conflict. Improper
treatment of prisoners by you is
punishable by court-martial. Let enemy soldiers surrender. The enemy may use different signals to convey they
are surrendering, but all of the signals should be noticeable. It is illegal to fire on an enemy that has thrown
down their weapons and offered to surrender. You should also provide medical care to the wounded whether
friend or foe. You are required under the laws of armed conflict to provide the same medical care to the sick and
wounded as you would provide for your own personnel. When someone is captured, you may not be certain
whether the person is an enemy. That determination is made by specifically trained personnel at a higher
headquarters. You may question captives about military information of immediate value to your mission, but
you may never use threats, torture, or other forms of coercion to obtain information. You may not take personal
property from a prisoner, except those items that are clearly of a military or intelligence value (weapons, maps,
or military documents). You do this only after the prisoner has been secured, silenced, and segregated. You take
nothing that is not of military value. Only an officer may take custody of the personal effects of a prisoner.
Captives may perform some types of work but the
work must not relate to assisting your war effort. The acceptable work performed must be limited to allowing
captives to dig foxholes or build bunkers only for their own protection. Under the laws of armed conflict, you
may never use captives as a shield for your attack or defense against the enemy; to search for, clear, or place
mines or booby traps; or to carry your ammunition or heavy gear.
108.19 Describe Force Protection Threat Conditions
Threatcons are no longer used. We use FPCONS now.
B-2. The four THREATCONS (above normal)
a. THREATCOIV ALPHA. This condition applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity
against personnel and facilities. the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not
justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement
certain measures from higher THREATCONS resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The
measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

b. THREATCON BRAVO. This condition applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist
activity exists. The measures in [his THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without
causing undue hardship. affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.
c. THREATCON CHARLIE. This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received
indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel facilities and is imminent. Implementation of
measures in this THREATCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the
peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.
d. THREATCON DELTA. This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or
when intelligence has been received that temorist action against a specific location or person is likely.
There are five FPCONs. The circumstances under which they apply, and the purpose of each protective measure
are as follows:
1. FPCON Normal applies when a general global threat of possible terrorist activity exists and warrants a
routine security posture.
2. FPCON Alpha applies when there is an increased general threat of possible terrorist activity against
personnel or facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable. Alpha measures must be capable
of being maintained indefinitely.
3. FPCON Bravo applies when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. Sustaining
Bravo measures for a prolonged period may affect operational capability and relations with local
authorities.
4. FPCON Charlie applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of
terrorist action or targeting against personnel or facilities is likely. Prolonged implementation of Charlie
measures may create hardship and affect the activities of the unit and its personnel.
5. FPCON Delta applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence is
received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is imminent. This FPCON is normally
declared as a localized condition. FPCON Delta measures are not intended to be sustained for substantial
periods.
108.20 Rules of Engagement, how applies, who defines, etc….
Except as augmented by supplemental ROE for specific operations, missions, or projects, the policies and
procedures established herein remain in effect until rescinded.
c. US forces operating with multinational forces:
(1) US forces assigned to the operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of a multinational
force will follow the ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by the NCA. US
forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for unit and individual self-defense in
response to a
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
(2) When US forces, under US OPCON or TACON, operate in conjunction with a multinational force,
reasonable efforts will be made to effect common ROE. If such ROE cannot be established, US forces will
operate under these SROE. To avoid misunderstanding, the multinational forces will be informed prior to US
participation in the operation that US forces intend to operate under these SROE and to exercise unit and
individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. For additional guidance
concerning peace operations, see Appendix A to Enclosure A.
(3) Participation in multinational operations may be complicated by varying national obligations derived from
international agreements; e.g., other coalition members may not be parties to treaties that bind the United States,
or they may be bound by treaties to which the United States is not a party. US forces remain bound by US
international agreements even if the other coalition members are not parties to these agreements and need not
adhere to the terms.
d. Commanders of US forces subject to international agreements governing their presence in foreign countries
(e.g., Status of Forces Agreements) retain the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means
available and take all appropriate actions for unit self-defense.
e. US forces in support of operations not under OPCON or TACON of a US CINC or that are performing
missions under direct control of the NCA, Military Departments, or other USG departments or agencies (e.g.,
Marine Security Guards, certain special security forces) will operate under use-of-force policies or ROE

promulgated by those departments or agencies. US forces, in these cases, retain the authority and obligation to
use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in unit self-defense in accordance with
these SROE.
f. US Naval units under USCG OPCON or TACON conducting law enforcement support operations will follow
the use-of-force and weapons policy issued by the Commandant, USCG, but only to the extent of use of
warning shots and disabling fire per 14 USC 637 (reference w). DOD units operating under USCG OPCON or
TACON retain the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate
actions in unit self-defense in accordance with these SROE.
g. US forces will comply with the Law of War during military operations involving armed conflict, no matter
how the conflict may be characterized under international law, and will comply with its principles and spirit
during all other operations.
Definitions
a. Inherent Right of Self-Defense. A commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means
available and to take all appropriate actions to defend that commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity
from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. Neither these rules, nor the supplemental measures
activated to augment these rules, limit this inherent right and obligation. At all times, the requirements of
necessity and proportionality, as amplified in these SROE, will form the basis for the judgment of the on-scene
commander (OSC) or individual as to what constitutes an appropriate response to a particular hostile act or
demonstration of hostile intent.
b. National Self-Defense. Defense of the United States, US forces, and, in certain circumstances, US nationals
and their property, and/or US commercial assets. National self-defense may be exercised in two ways: first, it
may be exercised by designated authority extending protection against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile
intent to US nationals and their property, and/or designated US commercial assets [in this case, US forces will
respond to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent in the same manner they would if the threat were directed
against US forces]; second, it may be exercised by designated authority declaring a foreign force or terrorist(s)
hostile [in this case, individual US units do not need to observe a hostile act or determine hostile intent
before engaging that force or terrorist(s)].
c. Collective Self-Defense. The act of defending designated non-US forces, and/or designated foreign nationals
and their property from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unlike national self-defense, the authority to
extend US protection to designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property may not be exercised
below the NCA level. Similar to unit self-defense and the extension of US forces protection to US nationals and
their property and/or commercial assets, the exercise of collective self-defense must be based on an observed
hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
d. Unit Self-Defense. The act of defending a particular US force element, including individual personnel
thereof, and other US forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
e. Individual Self-Defense. The inherent right to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate
actions to defend oneself and US forces in one’s vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile
intent is a unit of self-defense. Commanders have the obligation to ensure that individuals within their
respective units understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense.
f. Elements of Self-Defense. Application of force in self-defense requires the following two elements:
(1) Necessity. Exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force or terrorist(s) exhibits hostile intent.
(2) Proportionality. Force used to counter a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent must be reasonable in
intensity, duration, and magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat based on all facts known to the
commander at the time (see Glossary for amplification).
g. Hostile Act. An attack or other use of force against the United States, US forces, and, in certain
circumstances, US nationals, their property, US commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US forces,
foreign nationals and their property. It is also force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or
duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel and vital US Government property (see Glossary
for amplification).
h. Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US forces, and in certain
circumstances, US nationals, their property, US commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US forces,
foreign nationals and their property. Also, the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of
US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property (see Glossary for amplification).
i. Hostile Force. Any civilian, paramilitary, or military force or terrorist(s), with or without national designation,
that has committed a hostile act, exhibited hostile intent, or has been declared hostile by appropriate US
authority.
Declaring Forces Hostile.
Once a force is declared hostile by appropriate authority, US units need not observe a hostile act or a
demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that force. The responsibility for exercising the right and
obligation of national selfdefense and as necessary declaring a force hostile is a matter of the utmost
importance. All available intelligence, the status of international relationships, the requirements of international
law, an appreciation of the political situation, and the potential consequences for the United States must be
carefully weighed. The exercise of the right and obligation of national self-defense by competent authority is
separate
from and in no way limits the commander’s right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense. The authority to
declare a force hostile is limited as amplified in Appendix A of this Enclosure.
Authority to Exercise Self-Defense
a. National Self-Defense. The authority to exercise national selfdefense is outlined in Appendix A of this
Enclosure.
b. Collective Self-Defense. Only the NCA may authorize the exercise of collective self-defense.
c. Unit Self-Defense. A unit commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available
and to take all appropriate actions to defend the unit, including elements and personnel, or other US forces in
the vicinity, against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. In defending against a hostile act or
demonstrated hostile intent, unit commanders will use only that degree of force necessary to decisively counter
the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of US forces (see
subparagraph 8a of this enclosure for amplification).
d. Individual Self-Defense. Commanders have the obligation to ensure that individuals within their respective
units are trained on and understand when and how to use force in self-defense.
108.21 Deadly Force Authorization
E2.1.2.3.1. Self-Defense and Defense of Others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary against
a hsotile person(s) to protect law enforcement or security personnel who reasonably believe themselves or
others to be
in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm by the hostile person(s).
E2.1.2.3.2. Assets Involving National Security. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent the
actual theft or sabotage of assets vital to national security. DoD assets shall be specifically designated as "vital
to national security" only when their loss, damage, or compromise would seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of
a national defense mission. Examples include nuclear weapons; nuclear command, control, and communications
facilities; and designated restricted areas containing strategic operational assets, sensitive codes, or special
access programs.
E2.1.2.3.3. Assets Not Involving National Security But Inherently Dangerous To Others. When deadly force
reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of resources, such as operable
weapons or
ammunition, that are inherently dangerous to others; i.e., assets that, in the hands of an unauthorized individual,
present a substantial potential danger of death or serious bodily harm to others. Examples include high-risk
portable and lethal missiles, rockets, arms, ammunition, explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear
material.
E2.1.2.3.4. Serious Offenses Against Persons. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent the
commission of a serious crime that involves imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm (for example,
setting fire to an inhabited dwelling or sniping), including the defense of other persons, where deadly force is
directed against the person threatening to commit the crime. Examples include murder, armed robbery, and
aggravated assault.
E2.1.2.3.5. Protect Public Health or Safety. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent
the destruction of public utilities or similar critical infrastructure vital to public health or safety, the damage to
which, would create an imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.
E2.1.2.3.6. Arrest or Apprehension. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to arrest or
apprehend a person who, there is probable cause to believe, has committed one of the serious offenses referred
to in subparagraphs E2.1.2.3.2. through E2.1.2.3.5., above.
E2.1.2.3.7. Escape. When deadly force has been specifically authorized by the Heads of the DoD Components
and reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided there is probable cause to
believe that such person:
E2.1.2.3.7.1 Has committed or attempted to commit one of the serious offenses referred to in subparagraphs
E2.1.2.3.2. through E2.1.2.3.5., above; and
E2.1.2.3.7.2 Would pose an imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to law enforcement or security
personnel or to any other person.

108.22 Describe the three classes of wire entanglement

CLASSIFICATION
You should classify entanglements according to use and depth and whether they are fixed or portable. They are
classed by use as tactical, protective, or supplementary. The use of these types of entanglements in a defensive
area is shown schematically in figure 8-1.
Tactical-Wire Entanglements
Establish tactical-wire entanglements parallel to and along the friendly side of the final protective line. Use
them to breakup enemy attack formations and to hold the enemy in areas covered by the most intense defensive
fire. Extend tactical entanglements across the entire front of a position, but you need not make them continuous.
Protective-Wire Entanglements
Locate protective-wire entanglements to prevent surprise assaults from points close to the defense area. As with
all antipersonnel obstacles, they are close enough to the defense area for day-and-night observation. They are
also far enough away to prevent the enemy from using hand grenades effectively from points just beyond the
obstacle, normally 131 to 328 feet. Surround the individual units of a command, usually the platoon (fig. 8-1),
with protective wire. Connect these entanglements to entanglements around other platoons by supplementary
wire to enclose the
entire defensive positions. Erect protective entanglements around rear-area installations in ehe same manner to
serve the same purpose as protective wire around defensive positions in forward areas. You should also include
the entanglements of protective wire over the tops of installations provided with overhead cover (fig. 8-2).
Supplementary-Wire Entanglements
Use supplementary-wire entanglements in front of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) to conceal the
exact line of the tactical wire. To the rear of the FEBA, use supplementary wire to enclose the entire defensive
position by connecting the protective-wire entanglements. Use supplementary-wire entanglements to break up
the line of tactical wire. These supplementary- wire entanglements should be identical to the tactical-wire
entanglements and constructed simultaneously with them whenever possible.
Depth of Entanglements
You should classify entanglements by depth as belts, bands, or zones. A BELT is an entanglement one fence in
depth. A BAND consists of two or more belts in depth, with no interval between them. The belts maybe fences
of the same type, or the band maybe composed of two or more fences of different types. A ZONE consists of
two or more bands or belts in depth with intervals between them.
108.23 State the purpose of the following:
a. Triple Standard Concertina fence
As an obstacle, in most situations, the triple standard concertina fence is better than the double-apron fence. The
material for it weighs about 50 percent more, but it is erected with about one half of the man-hours. Every
concertina fence is secured firmly to the ground by driving staples at intenvals of not more than 6.6 feet. The
staples are used on the single concertina fence and on the front concertina of the double and triple types. The
two types of fence areas follows:
1. SINGLE CONCERTINA. This is one line of concertinas. It is erected quickly and easily but is not an
effective obstacle in itself. It is used as an emergency entanglement or for the temporary closing of gaps
between other obstacles. It is for such purposes that one roll of concertina maybe habitually carried on the front
of each vehicle in combat units.
2. DOUBLE CONCERTINA. This consists of a double line of concertinas with no intend between lines. The
two lines are installed with staggered joints. As an obstacle, the double concertina is less effective than a well-
emplaced, double-apron fence. It is used in some situations to supplement other obstacles in a band or zone.
TRIPLE STANDARD CONCERTINA FENCE
This fence consists of two lines of concertinas serving as a base, with a third line resting on top, as shown in
figure 8-23. All lines are installed with staggered joints. Each line is completed before the next is started, so a
partially completed concertina entanglement presents some obstruction. It is erected quickly and is difficult to
cross, cut, or

crawl through b. Double-Apron Fence

There are two types of double-apron fence: the 4- and 2-pace fence and the 6- and 3-pace fence. The 4- and 2-
pace fence (fig. 8-20) is the better obstacle of the two and is the type more commonly used. In this fence, the
center pickets are 4 paces apart and the anchor pickets are 2 paces from the line of the center pickets and
opposite the midpoint of the space between center pickets. The 6- and 3-pace fence follows the same pattern
with pickets at 6- and 3-pace intervals. For this fence, less material and construction time are required, but the
obstacle effect is substantially reduced, because with the longer wire spans, it is easier to raise the lower wires
and crawl over or under them. Except for picket spacing, the 4- and 2-pace and the 6- and 3-pace fences are
identical. Only the 4- and 2-pace fence is discussed in detail.
Double-Apron Fence
The standard double-apron fence is one of the best obstacles that can be made with barbed tape. The
effectiveness of this obstacle is increased by (1) raising the top wire to preclude crossing the obstacle by
stepping over it and (2) placing low wires 4 inches above the ground to prevent personnel from crawling under
the obstacle.
c. Low-Wire Entanglement
This is a 4- and 2-pace double-apron fence in which medium pickets replace long pickets in the fence center
line (fig. 8-29). This results in omission of wire Nos. 6, 7, and 8, and in bringing all the apron and diagonal
wires much closer to the ground, so passage underneath this fence is difficult. This fence may be used
advantageously on one or both sides of the double-apron fence. The low-wire entanglement is used where
concealment is essential. In tall grass or shallow water, this entanglement is almost invisible and is particularly
effective as a surprise obstacle. However, a man can pick his way through this low-wire fence without much
difficulty; therefore, for best results, it must be used in depth. Except for the omission of three wires and the
substitution of medium pickets, this fence is constructed in the same reamer as the double-apron fence.
d. Tanglefoot
Use tanglefoot (fig. 8-34) where concealment is essential and to prevent the enemy from crawling between
fences and in front of emplacements. Use the obstacle in a minimum depth of 32.8 feet. Space the pickets at
irregular intervals of 2.5 to 10 feet. The height of the barbed wire should vary between 9 and 30 inches. Site
tanglefoot in scrub, if possible, using bushes as supports for part of the wire. In open ground, use short pickets.
Control the growth of grass to help prevent the enemy from secretly cutting lanes in, or tunneling under, the
entanglement.
108.24 Discuss Fire Team Formations
a FIRE TEAM COLUMN
The fire team column formation (fig. 4-7, view 1) is used when speed and control are governing factors, such as
moving through woods, fog, smoke, and along roads and trails. This formation is favorable for fire and
maneuvers to either flank but is vulnerable tfire from the front because its own fire in that direction is limb.
FIRE
The fire team wedge formati
enemy situation is unknown but contact is possible. When the terrain and the visibility require dispersion of the
men, the wedformation provides all-around protection and flexibility and is easyto control. c. FIRE T
Fire team skirmishers right or left (fig. 4-7, view 3) can b
most effectively when you are assaulting a known enemy positioIt is also useful for “mopping up” operations
(searching for enemy stragglers) and crossing short, open areas. Because the fire team is in a line, skirmishers
right or left provides maximum firepower to the front. However, the formation is difficult to control. d. FIRE
TEAM ECHELON RIGHT OR LEFT
Fire team echelon right or left (fig. 4-7, view 4) is us
to protect an exposed flank. This formation permits heavy firepower to both the front and the direction of
echelon. Asskirmishers, the formation is difficult to control; therefore,

movement is generally slow, especially during conditions of reduced visibility.

108.25 Immediate Actions during Enemy Contact in a Convoy
IM
The guerrilla normally seeks contact
ambushes. When contact is made under less favorable circumstances, the guerrilla attempts a rapid withdrawal.
In either case, small-unit encounters with guerrillas are likely to be sudden, violent, and of short duration. Slow
reactions to an ambush can result in excessive losses or the loss of an opportunity to punish the guerrilla unit.
Contact is often made at close range, particularly when operating in jungle, temperate zone forests, woods, or
heavy brush. Immediate action drills aid small units in reacting quickly and properly. Immediate action drills
are
predrilled, prerehearsed reactions to contact or anticipated contact with the enemy. Immediate action drills are
most frequently used by rifle platoons and squads. They are used during the conduct of foot patrols and dismou
movements in close terrain against guerrillas. The variety of drills is limited only by the imagination and
initiative ofthe unit leader and the state of training of the unit. It is impractical to develop drills covering every
contingency; however, it is important to develop a drill for each of the most frequently occurring situations. The
response to a given situation must not be stereotyped, as the enemy may ultimately capitalize upon rigid
adherence to the same
tactics. Immediate action drills stress simplicity, aggressiveness, and rapid execution. They demand alertness
and ahigh state of individual training. Drills are of little value to a unit in which the individual Seabee lacks
proficiency inthe fundamental combat skills. VEHICLE UNLOADING DR
When a vehicle is forced to halt in the
and predrilled. On order or signal, the response must be immediate and each person must act swiftly to move to
the proper position. Confusion is thus overcome and immediate offensive action against the enemy is more
likely to be effective. When the vehicle is halted, the actions are as follows: 1. If the vehicle is hardened, the
vehicle commander act
cder then commands “DEPLOY RIGHT (OR LEFT),” to show the direction in which the occupants are to
assemble after dismounting. 2. Sentries throw sm
if aboard the vehicle, fires on the ambush position.
3. Occupants, under cover of fire from the sentrie
sihe vehicle indicated in the command. As few occupants as possible attempt to dismount over the tailgate of
the vehicle. 4. W
g
6. When all occupants are out of the vehicle, action is taken as previously mentioned in this chapte
FE AND HASTY AMBUSH DRILL
The freeze and hasty ambush is a drill designed
the unit has sighted guerrillas approaching but has not yet been seen by them. Immediate action is taken to
ambush the guerrillas when their approach is moving on a trail different or the same used by the unit. 1. Freeze
—When the guerrillas are sighted, the unit is halted by silent signal, such as
oarranged special signal. The signal is relayed to each member of the unit, and each member freezes in
theirtracks with their weapons in the firing position. 2. Different trails—If the guerrillas are
uains on the trail in a freeze position. The unit leader signals Commence Firing when the guerrillas present
suitable target. 3. Sam
indi the number of enemy by silent signal and then moves off the trail. Each individual relays the signal and
moves off the trail on the same side used by the originator. It is essential that the entire unit move to the same
sidethe trail. Speed of execution and silent movements are mandatory. Any unnatural sound may cause the
guerrillas to turn and flee. Each member of the unit takes up a firing position facing the direction of enemy
approach. The unit leader initiates the ambush by firing his or her weapon. In the event the guerrillas sight and
fire upon a unit member

IMMEDIATE ASSAULT DRILL The immediate assault is a tactic used during an unexpected encounter a
situations in which the guerrillas and
assault drill is a rapidly executed frontal assault. 1. The drill is usually initiated by the first member of the unit
who sights the enemy. He or she fires at theenemy and shouts a prearranged signal showing th
riarge.”
2. The signal is repeated by each individual. 3. The u
suate unit is withheld from the line to protect the
4. The unit leader sounds a prearranged assault signal.
5. The assault is pressed forward until halted by the unit leader,
in
CER AMBUSH DRILL
There is
security in avoiding an ambush is
required to prevent annihilation. Units must have a prearranged plan, known to every troop, which allots a
specifimmediate action to each individual according to his or her location and function in the formation. Entire
Unit in Killing Zone It is seldom possible to find covered or concealed positions within the killing zone from
which to ex
the enemy. The unit may exec
shown is normally the weakest point in the ambush and is a prearranged counter ambush drill. The unit may
initially execute a preplanned movement to a position outside the killing zone indicated by the unit leader.
Normally, theposition is one that provides cover and concealment and is the location from which a subsequent
drill is undertaken to eliminate the enemy. Leading Element in Killing Zone
When only the foremost
executed and actions are taken as fol
1. Elements within the ambush indicate the nature and location of the ambush by prearranged signal; foexample,
by voice “ambush front (left, right
2. Previously determined ambushed elements, execute an immediate assault.
3. Previously determined base of fire elements from personnel not ye
bire positions. These fires simultaneously support encircling maneuver elements
kone.
4. The encircling attack units move out in a prearranged envelopment of the enemy flank and/or rear (fig5-7).
NTake care in assaulting the main ambush force, as mines are commonly used to protect its flanks.
into the fires of the base of fire elements.
1
COUNTERSIGNS
T
but countersigns are pri
By Whom Authorized When a countersign is prescribed, the highest headquarters within a zone or area devises
i
designate a countersign m
these units must notify higher headquarters of such action without delay. Only one countersign can be used
wcommand during a specified period. Selecting the Countersign The choice of words or sounds for the co
difficult for the enemy to pro
word selected for the password. Doing this minimizes the possibility of an unauthorized person guessing the
password. (For example, the secret challenge, ATOMIC, suggests the password BOMB.)

Using the Countersign The initiative for use of the countersign rests with the challenging sentry. Positive
recognitio
claiming authority to pass
challenged person or party, he uses the countersign to make a positive recognition. When there is any doubt
asauthority of the challenged person to pass, even if he gives the correct password, he is detained for further
athe corporal of the guard. When the sentry recognizes the challenged person or party before using the
countersign and there is no doubt the person or party has authority to pass, the sentry does not use the
countersign. Mutual identification is essential. If the person challenged does not recognize the secret
countersign, he should not give thepassword. When a secret challenge and password are prescribed, the secret
challenge is given by the sentry afteperson is advanced to be recognized. The person challenged should then
give the password. Both the secret challenge and the password are given in a low tone to prevent them from
being heard by others. For example, a sentry observes a person approaching his post during the time for
challenging. When the person is still far enaway from the sentry’s post for the sentry to take effective measures
should the person rush him after being challenged, he commands, “HALT! WHO IS THERE?” After receiving
an answer (such as, “Lieutenant Jones, Company B“) indicating the person is friendly and may be authorized to
pass, the sentry says, “Advance, Lieutenant Jones to be recognized.” When Lieutenant Jones reaches a point
where the secret challenge, spoken
in a low tone, can be heard only by him, the sentry again commands, “HALT!” then he gives the secret ch
or countersign, in a low tone (for example, “SNOWFLAKE”). After receiving the correct password from Lieute
Jones (for example, “ROOSTER”) and otherwise satisfying himself that the Lieutenant is authorized to pass, the
sentry says, “Advance, Lieutenant Jones” and salutes, if appropriate. If Lieutenant Jones is one of a party
challenged and is the person advanced according to the procedures discussed here, the sentry then tells
Lieutenant Jones to bring up his men and identify each individual before he passes.
1
LANDING ZONE/SITE/POINTS A helicopter landing zone (LZ) is a specified ground for landing helicopters
to embark or
A landing zone is designated by a cod
and the size of the Seabee unit, you can divide the LZ into several landing sites. A landing site is a specific
location within a landing zone in which a single flight of helicopters may land to embark or disembark troops or
cargo. Landing sites are designated by color, such as landing site red. A landing site contains one or more
landing points
(fig. 3-1). A helicopter landing point is an area within a landing site where an individual helicopter can land.
Landing points are designat
identified by the use of smoke or air panels. For night operations, you can mark the landing points with some
type olow-intensity light. A general rule is to position landing points ten times as far from an obstacle as the
obstacle high (10:1 ratio). NOTE: In most cases, a Seabee unit will be required to construct a landing zone with
one landing site and one landing point for r
PREPARATION OF THE LANDING ZONE When planning the preparation of an LZ, you should take several
factor
what type of helicopters will be using the landing zon
of information. Second, you must consider the Seabee unit’s position in relation to the enemy. Security troops
must establish a 360-degree perimeter around the landing zone to defend the LZ. A third factor is the time it
will take to prepare the landing zone. And a fourth factor considered is the equipment needed to prepare the LZ.
Approaches and Exits
The ground approaches to the LZ and exits from the LZ must be free of major obstacles that might obstr
or takeoffs, such as tall tr
obstructions that are 10 meters or higher, extending at least 50 meters in the direction of approach and exit
paths. The rule of thumb for determining the distance required between the landing point and a high obstruction
is aratio. This means that the distance a landing point is located from a tree is ten times the height of the tree.
Example: A helicopter landing or taking off near a 30-foot tree needs at least 300 feet of horizontal clearance
(fig. 3-2).
Ground Obstacles Obsta
less on sloping groun

Gradient (Slopes) Ground slope has a cons

cannot land safely in
prefer to land uphill because of the tail down attitude of the helicopter. Surface Conditions Mud, excessive dust,
and loose debris are considered undesirable surfac
helicopter to become b
Loose debris is dangerous because they are sucked up into the rotor blades or turbine intakes, causing serious
damage. Shallow water, less than 18 inches deep and with a firm bottom, can be used as a landing site. Winds
When the wind at ground level exceeds 10 knots, the helicopter must land into the wind.
LANDI
Landing site dimensions vary, depending on the number of landing points required. For ea
fuselage safe circle is cleared of all obstacles, such as st
obstacles that could obstruct the rotor blades (fig. 3-3). When there is to be more than one landing point within
the landing site, separate the landing points so the helicopters can simultaneously land safely in the landing site.
Use figure 3-4 as a guide in selecting the appropriate size landing zone.
MARKING THE LANDING ZONE
Once you have established the LZ, the landing sites, and the landing points, you need
location of the LZ. The proper marking
LZ and for guiding a helicopter to an LZ are as follows: 1. Daylight landing: The landing zone is equipped with
a means of showing wind direction and velocity. This is usually accomplished by the use of smoke or by verbal
ra
direction and velocity are as follows: a. Grass drop method. Extend your arm straight out and drop the grass
from your hand. Point the extended arm at the dropped grass on the ground. The a
knots. b. Angle of smoke method. Observe the angle at which smoke blows. The wind speed is as follows: —If
sm
—If smoke blows at a 30-degree angle, wind is 3-5 knots.
—If smoke blows at a 60-degree angle
—If smoke blows along the ground, wind exceeds 8 knots.
Use smoke and landing zone panels to mark a landing zone
of the landing zone. This will aid the pilot in locating the lan
within the landing zone with single red panels staked to prevent uprooting by rotor wash. SECURITY
CAUTION: If smoke is used to mark the landing zone, use only as needed and do not tell the pilot the color of
smoke; ask the pilot to acknowledge the color after the smoke grenade i
2. Night landing: The organization and use of an LZ at night or during periods of low visibility is more complex
compared to daytime operations. Special lighting equipment or field expedients as required.
a. You must indicate outlines of landing zones by low-intensity markers. b. You must show obstacles near the
landing zone by low-intensity markers or voice radio inst
method of guiding the aircraft to the zone is vector instructions. This is sim
radio. For example, the radio operator spots the helicopter. Using a compass, the radio operator shoots an
azimuth135 degrees from the LZ to the helicopter and quickly computes a back azimuth of 315 degrees. The
radio operatorthen transmits the following message: “HOME WISH, THIS IS FLIGHT BEE . . . VECTOR
THREE ONE FIVE TO LANDING ZONE HAWK . . . OVER.”
The pilot then acknowledges the message and takes up the correct heading of 315 degrees. The term vector is
alused in a
probably be necessary. These are given as corrections to the original heading b y the following: “HOME WISH,
THIS IS FLIGHT BEE. . . COME RIGHT FIVE DEGREES OF PRESENT COURSE. . . OVEWhen the
tactical situation does not allow the use of a compass, you can vector the helicopter to an
clock system:
“HOME WISH, THIS ISFLIGHT BEE . . . MY POSITION IS AT YOUR NINE O’CLOCK . . . OVER.” The
aircraft wo

108.28 Discuss the purpose of Comb

Field COMBAT SIGNALS Oral (that
silence must be maintain
types of combat signals are used: 1. Whistle signals 2. Special signals
3. Arm and hand si
Understanding com
signal described in this se
are to be used effectively. Combat Arm and Hand Signals Signals are used to transmit
silence must be maintained. Leader
correct execution of orders. Leaders giving arm and hand signals should remember that these are an order of
command. The signal is given smartly. Leaders must be aware of their location to ensure the signal can be seen
by the intended unit. When a movement is to be executed by particular unit(s), a signal appointing the unit(s)
precthe signal for the actual movement. If a movement is to be executed in unison, the signal for the movement
should be followed by the signal READY. After the READY signal is acknowledged, the movement is executed
at the same time that the arm is lowered. Signals requiring a change of direction have no connection with the
direction in which the person giving the signal is facing. The direction of movement is shown by the direction in
which the aof the signaler points. Standard arm and hand signals are explained in figure 11-28.

1
09.1 Discuss Security Zones
1 7.
The outermost defense zone is not typically patrollerity forces first detect and i
case of an incident. Secu
area (if they approach the warning zone), and create a visible deterrent presence in the assessment zone. Unlike
the warning zone, access to the assessment zone is not challenged.
7.6.2 Warning Zone ile security boats passively observe craft in
In the warning zone, access by unauthorized craft is challenged. Whn the warning zone they actively interact
with
the assessment zone, i
threat or nonthreat, to determine hostile intent and to ensure unauthorized vessels do not approach closer to the
HVA (using a continuum of force described in Chapter 6). The size of a warning zone is determined after
consultation with local civilian, military, or HN authorities since it requires security boats to interact with local
urity
craft. The warning zone is typically divided into two or more sectors, based on the number of available sec
boats.
7.6.3 Threat Zone e innermost layer around the HVA. No hostile craft should be permitted to enter this zone.
The threat zone is th
Hostile intent should
from approaching the protected asset or area. Predetermined ROE/RUF guidelines will specify what lethal actio
can be taken by security forces once hostile intent is determined.
109.2 Discuss the Different types of Wa
demarcation lines dividing the high seas from harbors, rivers, and other inland wawaters of
the Great Lakes on the United States side of the International Boundary; (p) “Inland Rules” or “Rules” mean the
Inland Navigational Rules and the annexes thereto, which governthe conduct of vessels and specify the lights,
shapes, and sound signals that apply on inland waters; and (q) “International Regulations” means the
International Regulations for Pre
venting Collisions at Sea, 1972including annexes currently in force for the United States.
109.3 Discuss the sections of a patrol brief
7.5.1 Brief and Inspection
Pr
The COG, or designated sup1. ROE/RUF guidelines
2. Status-of-forces agreement 3. Intelligence update
4. Previous watch events 5. Current FPCON
6. Post-specific orders 7. Chain of command
8. Communications pro

9. Location of available
10. Location of medical personnel
11. Location of key personnel
12. Location of HN and friendly for
13. Weapon issue/return, armor
14. Meal and water resupply.
109.4 Discuss the
a. SORTS
T
U.S. Navy fo
readiness and general status data to the National Command Authorities (NCA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), fleet commanders, and other operational commanders.
1. Ensure the accurate and timely submission of SORTSREPNV reports in accordance with the requirements of
this publication.
2. Except for OPREP-3 reports, ensure that SORTSREPNV reports are the first report of any status changes and
that unit degradat
in the SORTSREPNV.
3. Maintain accurate SORTSREPNV records, including worksheets and messages which, at a minimum, should
be maintained for the pa
4. Validate and submit, at a minimum, one ‘Replace All’ SORTSREPNV each quarter.
5. Initiate requests to the appropriate
and required to report in accordance with item 3 of paragraph 2.2.
6. Utilize the TYCOM Readiness Management System (TRMS) SORTSREPNV Input Tool for message
generation.
b. CASREP
2.3.4 Casua
A casualty rep
essential for the performanc
material readiness status reporting. CASREP categories are assigned to reflect mission readiness posture taking
into
account system or requirement redundancy and the impact of a casualty on primary or secondary mission areas.
c. LOGREQ
Unless otherwise directed by operation orders, area commanders, or SOPA instructions, prior to the arrival of a
commissioned
appropriate naval authority the logistic requirements (LOGREQ) of his ship during the period in port. This
information is submitted by speedletter where possible, but is usually sent by message so as to be received at
leathree working days prior to ships ETA. Ships proceeding in company will furnish this information to the
sencommander embarked who will coordinate the data and submit it as a single message. These requests may be
for stores that are needed, number of brows, number of cars on the pier, etc. d. SITREP a. The Commander’s
SITREP is a multipurpose, narrative report submitte
(USMTF) instru
commands and Services concerned to expect and prepare for potential effects. Message instructions in MIL
STD 6040 identify unit (tactical)-level SITREP information requirements as well as the CJCS-level content
requirement
identified below. The sender must keep the receiver in mind in order to select the correct reporting format. b.
Duplicate reporting is not required, but information already given in another Joint Reporting Structure (JRS)
report may be referenced to ensure operational impacts are noted.
7. Report Content a. Combatant command SITREPs will be arranged using the CJCS
in MIL STD 6040)
(1) Own situation, disposition, and/or status of forces. (2) Situation overview.
(3) Operations.
(4) Intelligence and reco

(5) Logistics.
(6) Communications and connectivity
(7) Personnel.
(8) Significant political, military, and di
(9) Commande
109.6 Discuss the High Seas AT/FP Program
Self-Defense outside of the United States
the inherent right of self-defense and provid
The SROE are the fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions of U.S. force commanders in the
eveof a military attack against the United States and during all military operations, contingencies, terrorist
attacks or prolonged conflicts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. U.S. Navy ships and forces
on the high seas should use appropriate antiterro
k
platforms. Ships and aircraft require specific and advance entry permission (usually referred to as diplomatic
clearance) for entry into internal waters or airspace of a foreign country, unless other bilateral or multilateral
arrangements have been made. When U.S. forces are operating within internal waters or territory of a foreign
nation, the foreign nation has primary responsibility for antiterrorism and law enforcement. Notwithstanding t
foreign nation’s primary responsibility, the U.S. commander remains ultimately responsible for unit self-defen
Moreover, U.S. Navy ships and aircraft have sovereign immunity from interference by local authorities. Police
and port authorities may never legally board a U.S. Navy ship or aircraft to conduct an onboard search or
inspection without the permission of the Commanding Officer. If such an inspection or search is desired,
commanders should contact the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and the chain of command for guida
1
6.3 SMALL BOAT THREAT
a lethal weapon. In a matter of m
approached the port side of the COLE, exploded and left a gaping hole in the ship, causing the death of 17
sailors
and many injuries.
6.4 DEEP DRAFT THREAT
The potential for de
and to the difficulty friendly forces will face
hostile small craft by shouldering, ramming or shooting them; while the same measures could be employed
against an approaching hostile ship, the likelihood of stopping it is minimal.
6.5 SUBSURFACE THREAT
The third waterborne threat occurs at the subsurface level, carried out by eithe
combination of the two. Both thr
options for terrorists because of their relatively low cost and simplicity. The most difficult aspect when pl
to defend against subsurface threats is employment of capability to detect them. Small boats and deep draft
vessels are clearly visible and thus provide at least some time to determine hostile intent; security forces may
not
see a swimmer or mine until it is in the threat zone, if at all. While a mine is clearly a threat and should be ac
upon immediately, a swimmer or bubbles in the water are not necessarily indicative of a hostile threat.
109.8 Discuss Security Boat terms
a. Procedure: Reference is no good

b. Blocking and Shouldering a block

re
Tactically block the contact. The intercepting boat should approach head-on to the contact, presenting a
minimum target. (The speed of approach and distance
intercept.) As the contact turns to avoid a collision, the security boat should turn in the same direction onto
a parallel course, maintaining a position between the contact and HVA on the contact’s quarter. A positio
on the quarter prevents the contact from slipping behind or surging past the security boat.
Shouldering. Maneuvering a vessel in contact with an opposing vessel to cause the opposi
S
c. Equipment: Tools required to perform a job
109.9 Discuss waterborne war
Small Boat Continuum of Force Any craft has the potential to be terrorist-driven; security boats must use a
prepla
determine hostile intent and neutral
1. Show a waterborne presence. Patrol randomly at various speeds throughout assigned sectors.
2. Detect and report contact. Detect by visual or radar means. M
command.
3. Intercept contact approaching the warning zone. Boat closest to contact intercepts contact at high speed at the
outer bound
4. Assume a blocking position between the contact and the HVA, thus reducing the contact’s ability to attack
the HVA.
Note: It is not necessary to start at step 1 and proceed in a linear fashion. Personnel shall use the appropriate
level of force b
5. Classify contact as unknown, friendly, or hostile. Commanders need to designate who will make this
determination (e.g., boat officer,
6. Conduct radio hail. Warn to remain clear in the appropriate language (by HN liaison if onboard). For exam
“Inbound vessel (identify by type, markin
(directly ahead, on your port/starboard bow/quarter). You are entering a restricted area, under authority of ___.
Stoyour vessel (turn north, etc.) and clear the area immediately.” 7. Sound the boat’s horn or siren or use visual
devices (e.g., flares, spotlights, flashing law enforcement lights) to gain craft’s attention.
8. Conduct verbal hail. Warn to remain clear and display warning placard. Note
Verbal warnings should be used in conjunction with radio warnings since m
monito
9. Aggressively shoulder the contact out of the warning zone by physically bumping it forward of its pivot
point10. Train weapons on the contact.
11. Fire warning shots, if authorized.
12. Ram the contact to deflect it aw
13. Warn the contact that it will be fire
14. As ROE/RUF permit and with proper authorization
15. If contact evades the security boat and continues toward the HVA, security boat will c
other security boats and crew-served weapons on the HVA
09.10 Discuss tactical use of waters
1
1
SECURITY BOAT TACTICS The principal task of security forces, with respect to waterborne vessels, is to

the HVA as possible. Using defen

intent early because of their capability to interdict contacts at a distance from the HVA.
Waterborne defense in depth around an HVA is established by creating assessment, warning and threat zones.
Commanders should create zones large enough to determine hostile intent and, if necessa
threat as far away as possible from the HVA. Ideally, zones that are 500 meters in width allow for effective
small
boat engagement and prevention of standoff attacks from RPGs.
Zone size is also dependent upon the capability and number of friendly security boats, and the type and speed of
potential threats. For example, if four boats are patrolling, interdic
smaller. Or, if a threat analysis reveals the presence of high-speed craft in the area, zones should be widened to
allow for engagement farther from the HVA.
It will not always be practical to establish large defensive layers because of channel width, port size, traffic
patterns, nearby friendly shore facilities, HN r
restrict a U.S. ship’s security boat to patrol only 200 meters around the anchored ship so as not to interfere w
commercial vessel traffic lanes. Or, a pierside ship in a river may be only 100 yards from the far side of the ri
1
The MK 3A2 concussion grenade is an offensive weapon designed to counter and repel threats,
producecasualties during close combat and minimize fragmentation hazards to friendly troops. Concussion gren
are effective against enemy personnel located in bunkers, buildings, fortified areas and against hostile
underwate
swimmers.
The MK 3A2 produces a large shock wave on the ground and in the air. An even greater shock wave is
produced
under water.
bleeding as it passes through open air voids in the body of a swimmer (ear drum, lungs, stomach). Internal
injuries force the swimmer to surface, thereby neutralizing a potential threat and permitting apprehension by
security personnel.
1
PROCEDURES Warning shots are authorized in accordance with established PPRs or when directed by the C
designated tactical
The PPR for a small boat attack will include:
1. Layout of the assessment, warning, and threa
2. Procedures to identify potential threats
3. Means to classify potential threats
4. Weapons and gun mounts/positions emp
is made
5. Batteries release procedures.
The CO,
gun mount or post is authorized t
weapon posts since machine-gun rounds tend to ricochet upward upon impact with the water.
Note
When ships are pierside, COs will coordinate with host installation commanders to ensure laye
deconf
Prior to assuming a watch, applicable armed watchstanders and crew-served weapon gunners will be briefed in
detail on the PPR for a small boat attack. The brief provided by the CDO/COG
shots. Each watchstander designated to fire warning shots shall have written orders that contain the small-boat
PPR and assigned sectors of fire.
1
Small Boat Continuum of Force Any craft has the potential to be terrorist-driven; security boats must use a
preplanned continuum of force
determine hostile intent and neutral

1. Show a waterborne presence. Patrol randomly at various speeds throughout assigned sectors.
2. Detect and report contact. Detect by visual or radar means. M
of command.
3. Intercept contact approaching the warning zone. Boat closest to contact intercepts contact at high speed at
the outer boun
4. Assume a blocking position between the contact and the HVA, thus reducing the contact’s ability to attack
the HVA.
Note It is not necessary to start at step 1 and proceed in a linear fashion. Personnel shall use the appropriate lev
force based on circum
5. Classify contact as unknown, friendly, or hostile. Commanders need to designate who will make this
determination (e.g., boat officer,
6. Conduct radio hail. Warn to remain clear in the appropriate language (by HN liaison if onboard). For
example, “Inbound vessel (identify by ty
security boat (directly ahead, on your port/starboard bow/quarter). You are entering a restricted area, und
authority of ___. Stop your vessel (turn north, etc.) and clear the area immediately.”
7. Sound the boat’s horn or siren or use visual devices (e.g., flares, spotlights, flashing law enforcement ligh
gain craft’s attention.
8. Conduct verbal hail. Warn to remain clear and display warning placard. Note Verbal warnings s
monitor marine band radio frequencies.
9. Aggressively shoulder the contact out of the warning zone by physically bumping it forward of its pivot
point. 10. Train weapons on the contact.
11. Fire warning shots, if authorized.
12. Ram the contact to deflect it aw
13. Warn the contact that it will be fire
14. As ROE/RUF permit and with proper authorization
15. If contact evades the security boat and continues toward the HVA, security boat will c
of other security boats and crew-served weapons on the HVA.
109.15 Discuss the three zones that add structure to Defense in Depth and factors that affect zone size/location
SECURITY BOAT TACTICS
The principal task of security forces, with respect to waterborne vessels, is to determine hostile intent as far
from
the HVA as possible. Using defense in depth, security boats, more than any other AT asset, can determine
hostile
intent early because of their capability to interdict contacts at a distance from the HVA.
Waterborne defense in depth around an HVA is established by creating assessment, warning and threat zones.
Commanders should create zones large enough to determine hostile intent and, if necessary, engage a small boat
threat as far away as possible from the HVA. Ideally, zones that are 500 meters in width allow for effective
small
boat engagement and prevention of standoff attacks from RPGs.
Zone size is also dependent upon the capability and number of friendly security boats, and the type and speed of
potential threats. For example, if four boats are patrolling, interdiction times should be shorter so zones could be
smaller. Or, if a threat analysis reveals the presence of high-speed craft in the area, zones should be widened to
allow for engagement farther from the HVA.

It will not always be practical to establish large defensive layers because of channel width, port size, traffic
patterns, nearby friendly shore facilities, HN restrictions and other considerations. For example, a HN might
restrict a U.S. ship’s security boat to patrol only 200 meters around the anchored ship so as not to interfere with
commercial vessel traffic lanes. Or, a pierside ship in a river may be only 100 yards from the far side of the
river.
7.6.1 Assessment Zone
The outermost defense zone is not typically patrolled, thus allowing security boats to remain close to the HVA
in
case of an incident. Security forces first detect and identify contacts, notify craft that they are nearing a
restricted
area (if they approach the warning zone), and create a visible deterrent presence in the assessment zone. Unlike
the warning zone, access to the assessment zone is not challenged.
7.6.2 Warning Zone
In the warning zone, access by unauthorized craft is challenged. While security boats passively observe craft in
the assessment zone, in the warning zone they actively interact with unknown craft for classification as either a
threat or nonthreat, to determine hostile intent and to ensure unauthorized vessels do not approach closer to the
HVA (using a continuum of force described in Chapter 6). The size of a warning zone is determined after
consultation with local civilian, military, or HN authorities since it requires security boats to interact with local
craft. The warning zone is typically divided into two or more sectors, based on the number of available security
boats.
7.6.3 Threat Zone
The threat zone is the innermost layer around the HVA. No hostile craft should be permitted to enter this zone.
Hostile intent should have been determined in the warning zone after repeated attempts to deter the unknown
craft
from approaching the protected asset or area. Predetermined ROE/RUF guidelines will specify what lethal
actions
can be taken by security forces once hostile intent is determined.
109.16 Discuss Security Boat Tactics
Single-Boat Defense
When a single boat is on patrol, its crew will be required to exercise sharp judgment, because interdicting every
craft that comes into the warning zone will leave the HVA vulnerable to a diversionary attack. As a result, the
security boat should maintain a static position, close to the HVA, facing out toward potential waterborne threats
(see Figure 7-4). The boat’s task is to assess all craft near the HVA and only react to vessels that are deemed
potential threats (e.g., coming directly toward the HVA at a high rate of speed). Commanders can post
additional
watchstanders high on the HVA to aid in contact assessments.
When the HVA is underway or at anchor, the security boat should be positioned to face the most likely threat.
For
example, while transiting a chokepoint where the area to the port side of the HVA is considered hostile, the
security boat would take position on the HVA’s port quarter. From this position, the security boat can respond
quickly to inbound contacts. Communication between the security boat and the HVA’s bridge, which can warn
of
inbound contacts, is essential. A single boat cannot maintain full coverage for a ship underway or at anchor and
must, therefore, be responsive to perceived potential threats.
7.6.5 Multiple-Boat Defense
When two or more security boats are on patrol, as shown in Figure 7-5, sectors must be assigned. To protect
pierside, anchored, or underway HVAs, boats will randomly patrol near the outer edge of the warning zone
sectors and assess all vessels in their vicinity. Their physical presence should deter craft from approaching the
HVA. Since diversions are a standard tactic in the asymmetric environment, security boat personnel must be
aware of, but not distracted by, a contact in another sector.
When the HVA is at anchor or underway, security boats should position themselves to maintain 100 percent
visual coverage around the HVA. In Figure 7-6, boat A will focus ahead of and down the starboard side of the
HVA; boat B will focus up the port side and astern of the HVA. In Figure 7-7, boats around an anchored HVA
will actively patrol their sectors, synchronizing their movements to maintain full visual coverage around the
HVA. Three security boats would be positioned as follows: one ahead of the HVA and one on each quarter;
with
four boats, one boat would be stationed on each bow and quarter of the HVA.
Intrusion Response Tactics
The following tactics should be employed when responding to contacts nearing the warning zone:
1. Intercept contact while maintaining full protective coverage. When there are multiple boats on patrol,
the nearest security boat should intercept the contact at high speed while the others take up position in the
threat zone to provide full coverage of the remaining area around the HVA (see Figure 7-8).
2. Tactically block the contact. The intercepting boat should approach head-on to the contact, presenting a

minimum target. (The speed of approach and distance could require an approach ahead of the contact to
intercept.) As the contact turns to avoid a collision, the security boat should turn in the same direction onto
a parallel course, maintaining a position between the contact and HVA on the contact’s quarter. A position
on the quarter prevents the contact from slipping behind or surging past the security boat.
Note
Security forces need to maintain awareness of the contact crews’ actions; such crews
can be capable of heaving explosive devices into security boats.
3. Shadow contacts near the warning zone. To neutralize potential threats, security boats should maintain
the quarter position and either switch sectors or hand off the contact if it passes into another patrol sector.
4. Deconflict friendly fire. Security boats and crew-served weapons watchstanders on the HVA or pier need
to closely coordinate actions to prevent a friendly fire incident. If a contact evades an intercepting security
boat or displays hostile intent, the security boat should announce a preplanned proword over the radio and
rapidly clear the fields of fire of friendly weapons. At night, use of flashing or steady colored lights (e.g.,
blue one night, green the next, amber the next) on friendly boats is a method to discern friends from foes.
Note
A small boat is an inherently unsteady platform from which to fire automatic weapons
or a shoulder-fired RPG. An aggressor may slow or stop when preparing to open fire
on an HVA or defending boats.
5. Allow contacts to disengage and retreat. A security boat should not pursue an aggressive contact that
suddenly disengages and clears out of the warning zone. The contact could be a diversion attempting to
draw off security in preparation for an attack.
6. Shoot to stop forward motion. When engaging a hostile craft, fire should be directed at the engines, not
the coxswain. A boat’s forward motion can continue even if no one is at the helm, but a boat with disabled
engines will stop quickly.
109.17 Discuss the following Terms in relation to waterway operations
a. Selection of River Landing Areas and River Landing Sites. A river landing area includes a segment of river
bank or similar features along a waterway over which troops, supplies, or equipment can be landed by
watercraft. A river landing area contains one or more river landing sites, within which are contained one or
more points at which individual craft land and disembark troop units. Whenever possible, river landing areas are
selected to avoid opposition and facilitate the rapid and orderly debarkation of ground combat units. Primary
considerations in the selection of river landing areas are:
1. Scheme of maneuver
2. Enemy situation
3. Hydrography
4. Obstacles
5. Terrain/river bank.
b. Selection of Waterway Routes. The primary consideration in selection of waterway routes between the
mobile riverine base and the selected landing areas are:
1. Hydrography
2. Enemy capabilities
3. Capabilities to support primary and alternate plans
4. Terrain/bank characteristics.
If not prescribed by the mobile riverine force commander, waterway routes are selected by the Navy component
commander, in coordination with the Marine Corps component commander.
c. Selection of Base Sites
Criteria. Riverine base sites must contribute to accomplishment of the mission and meet the following
criteria:
1. Be within an area which can be defended by available forces without jeopardizing offensive capabilities of
the MRF.
2. Provide for mooring assigned ships and craft and, when necessary, sufficient area and facilities to
accommodate forces ashore.

3. Be within operational and communication range of deployed elements of the MRF and facilitate their logistic
support.
4. Potential for deployment of combat service support area
109.18 Discuss the following Riverine Operations
a. Assault. The movement phase of riverine assault operations begins with the start of tactical loading at the
riverine base of operations and ends with the arrival of the main body of the assault force in the river landing
area. When transiting waterways to an area of operations, riverine assault forces must be prepared for
unforeseen situations. As rivers and canals narrow or shoreline vegetation increases, so increases the danger
from hostile fire, ambush, and mining. During movement to an area of operations, unit commanders will
maintain a readiness posture consistent with the enemy capabilities and threat. The landing attack phase begins
with the arrival of the main body of the riverine assault force in the landing
area and ends with the seizure of initial objectives. It encompasses preparation of the landing area, landing,
initial ground and waterborne maneuver, and special operations in support of the landing attack.
Following seizure of initial objectives, subsequent operations are conducted by Marine Corps and Navy
forces in accordance with the concept of operations.
b. Waterway Interdiction, surveillance, barrier and security Waterway interdiction, surveillance, barrier, and
security operations are conducted by specially configured craft and aircraft in the waters of the riverine area.
These operations may be used to gain control of waterways preparatory to subsequent riverine assault
operations or they may be conducted by Navy forces alone, with Marine Corps elements provided only as a
reaction or security element. Waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operations serve five basic
purposes:
1. Protect friendly lines of communication
2. Deny hostile forces the use of waterways
3. Collect intelligence information
4. Perform security missions
5. Enforce population and resources control.
To be effective, waterway interdiction and surveillance and security forces must include both surface craft and
aircraft. The type of craft selected will depend on the environment, the enemy threat, and the assigned mission.
The air and surface operations are mutually supporting and may be conducted independently or concurrently.
During waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operations, close coordination is required between
airborne and waterborne patrols in the employment of mutually supporting fires.
c. Special Riverine special operations are ancillary or supporting operations conducted by the MRF as adjuncts
to a
riverine assault operation or a waterway interdiction and surveillance and security operations. Special
operations are normally characterized by employment of procedures and techniques which require special
training and equipment. The capability to conduct these operations is generally limited to specific units which
have been assigned primary mission responsibility within the service organization. The special operations set
forth in this chapter represent
the minimum capability required by the mobile riverine force commander to conduct sustained operations in a
riverine environment. The magnitude of a particular operation, the enemy threat, or terrain considerations may
make it necessary to augment assigned units and provide specialized units in support.
109.19 Discuss Maritime Interception Operations
MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS MISSION
Historically, MIO is a peacetime measure designed to enforce embargoes sanctioned by the UNSC, national
authority, or other regional organization. However, the line between peacetime MIO and belligerent rights
during
international armed conflict can become blurred. Purely peacetime MIO share many operational characteristics
with the exercise of belligerent rights; however, they are conceptually different. The use of force is closely
controlled during MIO and is used where necessary as a measure of last resort when all other means of embargo
enforcement have failed.
2.2.1 Legal Bases for MIO
Traditionally the primary mechanism for initiation of MIO was a United Nations Security Council resolution
(UNSCR); however, other bases exist that may legally justify MIO. These other bases include the consent of a
coastal state or flag state, the consent of the Master, an interception as a condition of port entry, the belligerent

right of visit and search, the interception of a stateless vessel, or an interception made pursuant to the right of
selfdefense.
The authority to engage in MIO is based on international law and is given by the UNSC, national
authority, or other regional authority. Authorization for U.S. forces to conduct MIO comes from the Secretary
of
Defense (SecDef) after approval from the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) designate the appropriate
combatant commander to perform MIO based on the geographic location of operations.
2.2.2 Definitions and Characteristics
MIO characteristics vary depending on the purpose and authority. The following are common characteristics for
traditional MIO that enforces an embargo:
1. Interception terms are publicly announced, usually in a Notice to Mariners/Notice to Airmen. These
notices specify start date, location, prohibited items, and cargo access inspection requirements.
2. Use of minimum force required for mission accomplishment.
3. An embargo may encompass virtually all imports and exports even though specified items are prohibited.
4. Ships and aircraft not carrying prohibited items are permitted to pass.
5. Ships carrying prohibited items are turned back, diverted to a neutral port requested by the detainee, or
diverted to a port selected by the cognizant commander. They are not seized as a prize. However, MIO
may permit the seizure and sale of ships (and their cargo) that refuse to comply.
The provisions of the embargo are usually promulgated in the form of a UNSCR that establishes the parameters,
objectives, prohibited items, and geographic area of MIO. It may also designate the C2 structure and amount of
force authorized.
The enforcing nations ensure that MIO responses are proportional to the violation of international norms by the
target state. Proportional response means taking the minimum measures necessary to enforce compliance and
ensure the security of the MIO force. MIO is generally tailored to create the least impact on freedom of
navigation
for nations not targeted by MIO. While all merchant ships transiting a defined area may be subject to
interception,
actual implementation may result in the targeting of specific ships based on intelligence or historical violations.
Not all ships need to be stopped and inspected. Effectiveness is related to compliance with the sanctions,
reduction in the flow of contraband, and prevention of escalating hostilities.
109.20 Discuss NCW Operations
LITTORAL SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
LSSO refers to the synergy developed between the capabilities of an MIUWU and those of the LSS operated
and
manned by the Naval Space Reserve Program. The combined capabilities of the MIUWU and LSS resources
provide a naval tactical commander with timely receipt of all weather, day/night maritime and littoral
intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance data from selected national, theater, and tactical systems. The MIUWU’s role
in
this operation is one of support only. MIUWU personnel do not man or operate the equipment of the LSS. That
task falls to personnel assigned to a LSS/NFN unit.
HARBOR APPROACH DEFENSE OPERATIONS
HAD ensures the unimpeded use of designated offshore coastal areas by friendly forces and denies the use of
these
areas to enemy forces. HAD operations are an extension of HD/PS operations into the littoral area. This area is
also referred to as a defensive sea area (DSA). HAD operations are performed by NCW forces, freeing up
theater
forces for employment elsewhere. HAD is a focused NCW operation that complements broader naval
operations
designed to maintain SLOCs.
HARBOR DEFENSE/PORT SECURITY OPERATIONS
There is a difference between harbor defense and port security that centers on the orientation of the expected
threat. In JP 1-02, DOD defines the two as:
1. Harbor defense (HD) — “the defense of a harbor or anchorage and its water approaches against external
threats such as: a. submarine, submarine-borne, or small surface craft attack; b. enemy minelaying
operations; and c. sabotage.”
2. Port security (PS) — “the safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from
internal threats such as destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts; accidents; thefts;
or other causes of similar nature.”
NCW forces are suited to address both of these threat orientations simultaneously and, when doing so, the
operation is referred to collectively as HD/PS.
1. HD operations involve conducting surveillance, employing defensive measures, and monitoring ship
movement within the harbor and port. IBUs, MIUWUs, PSUs (if assigned), and NCWRONs comprise the

force package that the HDC uses to conduct HD operations. This force package, utilizing organic sensors,
C4I, and waterborne interdiction capabilities, develops and maintains a near-real-time, multidimensional
operational picture of the harbor and port, which also comprises a vital part of the overall littoral COP.
2. NCW forces are also employed for the protection of ships and support craft involved in joint logistics
over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations (i.e., bare beach water terminal). These operations are discussed in
detail in JP 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).
3. For PS operations, the size of the NCW force, the operational structure, and the manner of employment are
based on the operational situation. NCW forces form an appropriate resource mission match for the
waterborne protection of port areas. PS operations are not law enforcement operations in that security
forces are not charged with maintaining order within a port area.
4. Point defense is the last line in the layered concept of defense employed in NCW. All NCW forces, except
the NCWRON, have the capacity for providing for their own point defense.
ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION OPERATIONS
AT/FP is a core competency and therefore a critical part of every mission area. Planning for all NCW
operations
must include considerations for AT/FP in order to maintain the readiness and effectiveness of units within the
NCW AO as well as own force. It must be understood that AT/FP efforts are conducted as part of and not
separate
from the NCW tasks of LSSO, HAD, HD/PS, and point defense.
POINT DEFENSE
In the case of a ship or aircraft using a port or airfield where security is a concern and the HN security
infrastructure (in the case of expeditionary operations) or CONUS port security measures (in the case of
homeland defense operations) are inadequate, the employment of various components of the NCW force for
point
defense may be appropriate.
109.21 Discuss Host Nation and U.S. Interagency Support
Host-Nation Support
In general, HNS is highly situational and heavily dependent on the operational capabilities of the HN and its
political acceptance of US policies. The type and amount of support to be provided by the HN is specified in
signed agreements and detailed in the plans of all the nations concerned.
Maximum use of HN capabilities is especially critical in crisis response situations when US forces may not be
in
place or have outpaced their logistics support lines of communications. The amount of civil or military support
provided by an HN will depend on its national laws, industrial capability, and willingness to give such support.
Some of the planning factors taken into consideration when planning for HNS are:
1. HN international agreements and treaties that specify US involvement in the AO
2. Capability, dependability, and willingness of the HN to provide and sustain resources
3. Shortfalls in NCW forces supplemented by HNS
4. Implications of HNS on the political structure both within the host nation and the region
5. Effects on security, to include operations security (OPSEC)
6. Availability of HNS in the type and quantity agreed upon and its applicability across the range of NCW
operations
7. Availability of US liaison (DOS, attaché, etc.) amd language interpretation support, if necessary.
HNS can involve the following examples:
1. Government agencies
a. Police
b. Fire
c. Translators/liaison personnel
d. Customs/immigration.
2. Civilian Contractors
a. Support services.
3. HN civilians
a. Labor pool.
4. HN military units
a. Coast guard/navy
b. Maritime police
c. Border guard
d. Army and marine corps.

5. HN facilities
a. Harbor entrance control towers
b. Boathouses
c. Checkpoints/hardened guard mounted posts.
6. Selected functions
a. Rail operations
b. Air traffic control
c. Harbor pilot services.
7. Logistics support
a. Supplies
b. Equipment
c. Laydown and material staging areas.
8. Community security materiel system (CMS) and other classified material stowage and handling.
9. Intelligence support
a. Devices
b. Facilities
c. Intelligence products.
UNITED STATES INTERAGENCY SUPPORT
NCW operations generally involve a close relationship with and support from US governmental agencies. For
example, when expeditionary NCW forces are deployed, interagency support is arranged through the embassy.
The ambassador speaks and acts with the full authority of the US government and can bring other governmental
agency capabilities to bear in support of NCW missions.
Homeland defense operations provide another example of NCW and US governmental interagency support and
interaction. Both NCW forces and other governmental agencies are assigned as supporting forces under
USNORTHCOM. Effective accomplishment of the overall mission requires that all supporting commands and
agencies coordinate efforts.
109.22 Discuss the mission and role of Coast Guard Captain of the Port and Marine Safety Office
MISSION
The marine safety office (MSO) ensures the safety, security, and environmental protection of CONUS ports and
surrounding areas. MSOs fulfill this mission by enforcing marine safety standards, responding to environmental
and military threats, and planning and coordinating with other agencies. MSOs are headed by a COTP who is a
USCG O6. By law, the COTP has the statutory authority within their respective areas for port safety, security,
and
marine environmental protection regulations, including without limitation, regulations for the protection and
security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront facilities; anchorages; security zones; safety zones; regulated
navigation areas; deepwater ports; water pollution; and ports and waterways safety.
110 Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Warfare Fundamentals
110.1 Explain the following [ref. e, ch. 9, pg 9-1]
a. Chemical Warfare [pg 9-1]: Chemical agents are used to produce death, injury, temporary incapacitation, or
irritating effects.
b. Biological Warfare [pg. 9-2]: Biological operations use living organisms to cause disease or death.
c. Radiological effects [pg. 9-3]: Their effects are divided into three categories: blast, heat, and nuclear
radiation.

d. Routes by which agents enter the body [pg. 9-1]: They enter the body by the victim’s breathing or
swallowing or through the skin of the victim.
110 .2 Describe the purpose of the following:
a. MCU-2/P [ref. m, ch. VI, pg. VI-4]: The MCU-2/P protective mask is designed to provide full protection and
is intended to replace other previously used masks, in-cluding the Mk V and M17A1. This new mask has
improved performance and storage characteristics. It provides protection against tactical concentrations of
chemical and bio- logical agents, toxins, and radiological fallout particles. The MCU-2/P mask also
accommodates the use of the tri-service/NATO canisters.
b. Chemical Protective Overgarment [ref. m, ch. VI, pg. VI-1]: The CPOG is a plain OD green expendable two-
piece overgarment consisting of one coat and a pair of trousers. The jacket has a full length zipper opening
covered by a protective flap. The trousers have a fly front, and zipper closure on the lower outside section of
each leg. The CPOG is made of material having an outer layer of nylon cotton and an inner layer of charcoal
impregnated polyurethane foam. Due to the heavy impregnation of charcoal, some charcoal will be deposited on
the skin and clothing under the overgarment; however, this will not detract from the chemical protective
characteristics of the suit nor harm the wearer. The CPOG comes sealed in a vapor-barrier bag that protects
against rain, moisture, and sunlight.
c. Wet-weather clothing [ref. m, ch. VI, pg. VI-2]: To be worn over the CPOG to protect the protective qualities
of the CPOG.
d. Atropine/Pralidoxime Chloride (Oxime) [ref. m, app. A, pg. A-12):
e. Pocket dosimeter [ref. m, app. A, pg. A-1]
110.3 Explain the three types of chemical warfare agents and their physical symptoms. [ref. e, ch.9, pg. 9-3]
CASUALTY AGENTS are highly poisonous and are intended to kill or seriously injure.
Included in this group is nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents.
Nerve agents are probably the most effective because only small doses are needed to produce death. Some
agents are so persistent (when dispersed as a liquid) that they can remain effective for several days.
Blister agents cause severe burns, blisters, and general destruction of body tissue. When they are inhaled, the
lungs are injured.
Choking agents inflame the nose, throat, and particularly the lungs.
Blood agents interfere with the distribution of oxygen by the blood.
NONLETHAL INCAPACITATING AGENT renders personnel incapable of performing their duties by
interfering with the mental processes that control bodily functions. Reactions vary among individuals. One
person might go into shock, and still another might have a feeling of extreme fatigue.
HARASSING AGENTS include tear and vomiting gases that cause temporary disability. Without a gas mask,
the individual is rapidly incapacitated, but the effects disappear in 5 to 10 minutes after the person dons a
protective mask or gets to fresh air. Vomiting gases cause extreme nausea and vomiting, requiring those who
have been exposed to remove their masks, thus exposing personnel to the casualty agents.

110.4 Describe the following types of nuclear explosions: [ref. b, ch. 10]
a. Air burst [pg. 10-2 thru 10-3]: An airburst is a burst where the point of detonation is below an altitude of
100,000 feet, and the fireball does not touch the surface of the earth. Air blast, thermal radiation (heat and light),
electromagnetic pulse, and initial nuclear radiation (neutron and gamma rays) are produced around the point of
detonation. There will be no significant residual nuclear radiation (gamma and beta radiation) from the resulting
radioactive material unless rain or snow falls through the radioactive cloud.
b. Surface burst [pg. 10-3]: A surface burst is a burst where the point of detonation is on, or above, the surface
of the earth and the fireball touches the surface of the earth producing air blast, thermal radiation, and
electromagnetic pulse. Initial nuclear radiation around surface zero (SZ) and residual (transit and deposit)
nuclear radiations around SZ and downwind from SZ. Transit radiation is airborne radioactive material from a
base surge and/or fallout. Deposit radiation is radioactive material from a base surge and/or fallout that settles
on exposed surfaces.
Bursts over water will also produce underwater shock and surface water waves, but these effects will be of less
importance except to submarines. Over land, earth shock will be produced but will not be an important effect at
any significant distance from the point of detonation.
c. Underwater burst [pg. 10-3 thru 10-4]: An underwater burst is a burst where the point of detonation is below
the surface of the water. It produces underwater shock and a water plume which then causes a base surge.
Bursts with very shallow points of detonation can also produce air blast, initial nuclear radiation, fallout, and
possibly some thermal radiation. These effects will be reduced in magnitude from those of a water surface burst
and will become rapidly insignificant as the depth of the point of detonation is increased. The range of damage
due to shock is increased as the depth of the point of detonation is increased. For a given weapon yield, greater
hull and machinery damage will be produced by shock from an underwater burst than by air blast from an
airburst or a surface burst. The reverse is true for topside equipment, such as antennas and missile launchers.
When a high-yield weapon is detonated in deep water adjacent to a continental shelf, large breaking waves can
be generated by the upsurge along the shelf slope. These waves will appear on the shallow-water side of the
shelf edge. They are characterized by a long period with a sharp, possibly breaking, crest. They dissipate in
amplitude as they progress toward the shore. Calculations and simulation experiments were conducted with the
continental shelf off the east coast of the United States. They indicate that in the near vicinity of the shelf edge
(shallow-water side only), these waves may be large enough to damage the largest combatant ships and to
swamp or capsize smaller ships.
110.5 Describe the following effects of nuclear explosions: [ref. b, ch. 10]
a. Blast [pg. 10-5]: Air blast is the shock wave that is produced in the air by an explosion. The shock wave
initially travels outward at a velocity of approximately seven times the speed of sound at high overpressures. It
will then gradually slow down to a sonic speed of about 1,000 fps at low overpressures. An air blast produces a
rapid increase in the normal atmospheric (static) pressure and creates high wind (dynamic) overpressures. The
high static overpressures produced cause damage by squeezing
b. Burns [pg. 10-6]: As the weapon yield is increased, the range at which thermal radiation can cause skin burns
and eye injuries to exposed personnel increases.
c. Nuclear radiation [pg. 10-6]: The four types of nuclear radiation released as the result of a nuclear explosion
are alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, and neutrons.
Alpha particles travel only a few centimeters in air before they are stopped. They cannot penetrate even a thin
sheet of paper.
Beta particles can travel several feet in air, but they cannot penetrate a sheet of aluminum that is more than a
few millimeters in thickness. Beta particles cannot penetrate the normal combat uniform.
Gamma rays are a form of electromagnetic radiation, indistinguishable from X rays.
Neutrons are electrically neutral particles. Both gamma rays and neutrons can travel great distances in air.
Gamma rays and neutrons have greater penetrating power than the other forms of nuclear radiation. Their
injurious effects on personnel are also quite similar.
Nuclear radiation does not affect most materials in any visible manner. Thus ships, vehicles, electronic
equipment (except transistors), and other equipment are not damaged by radiation. However, radioactive
contamination does pose a danger to operating personnel. The term contamination is used to mean radioactive

material that has been deposited where it is not wanted. All radioactive contamination presents a hazard to
personnel.
d. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) phenomenon [pg. 10-7]: An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) will be produced by
high-altitude bursts, airbursts, and surface bursts. The initial nuclear ionizing radiation ionizes the atmosphere
around the point of detonation. This action produces an EMP, which will contain frequency components in the
range from a few to several hundred kilocycles per second. The EMP has magnetic and electric field
components that exist for only a fraction of a second. The magnetic field component is significant inside the
radius of the ionized atmosphere. It can induce large currents in cables and long-lead wires. These large
transient currents can burn out electronic and electrical equipment. The electric field component can also
produce transient signal overloads and spurious signals on communication nets and in computer-driven systems.
At ranges where ships suffer minor damage from other weapon effects, the major effect of the EMP is expected
to be the tripping of circuit breakers and blowing of fuses in protective circuitry. At closer ranges, there is a
high probability of permanent damage to the electronic and electrical equipment.
110.6 Define Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and discuss the levels. [ref. e, ch. 9, pg. 9-17 thru 9-
18]:
Mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) is a flexible system of protection against chemical agents, used to
facilitate mission accomplishment in chemical warfare. MOPP requires the individual to wear protective
equipment consistent with the chemical threat, the work rate imposed by the mission, and the temperature.
MOPP LEVEL OVERGARMENT OVERBOOTS MASK WITH HOOD GLOVES
1 WORN, OPEN OR CARRIED CARRIED CARRIED
CLOSED BASED
ON TEMPERATURE
2 SAME AS MOPP-1 WORN CARRIED CARRIED
3 SAME AS MOPP-1 WORN HOOD OPEN
OR CLOSED
BASED ON
TEMP
4 WORN, CLOSED WORN WORN, HOOD WORN
CLOSED
110.7 Describe the correct procedures for inspecting, maintaining, and donning the chemical protective
ensemble. [ref. c, ch. 6, pg. 9-14]
REFERENCE NOT AVAILABLE
110.8 Describe the colors and markings on the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) Biological,
Chemical, and Radiological (CBR) marker signs. [ref. e, ch. 9, pg. 9-18 thru 9-19]: The markers, or signs, are
used in areas containing radiological, biological, and chemical contamination. The colorings and markings of
the signs are according to STANAG 2002. The base of the triangle should be about 11 inches (28 cm) and the
opposite sides about 8 inches (20 cm). The signs are in the shape of a right isosceles triangle (90 degrees by 45
degrees by 45 degrees) and are made of plastic, wood, metal, or other rigid material, with holes or “ears” that
are used for hanging them about the ground. They are placed on wire boundary fences, poles, trees, or rocks.
BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION MARKERS- The triangle is blue on both sides. The letters BIO in red
(fluorescent paint, if available) 2-inch (5 cm) block letters are placed on the side of the marker facing away
from the

contamination (front). The name of the agent, if known, and the date and time of detection are also placed on
the front of the marker at the time of emplacement.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION MARKERS- The triangle is white on both sides. The word ATOM in
black 2-inch (5 cm) block letters is placed on the side of the markers facing away from the contamination
(front). The dose rate, date, and time of reading, and the date and time of burst, if known, are also placed on the
front of the marker at the time of emplacement.
CHEMICAL MINEFIELD MARKERS- The triangle is red on both sides. On the side facing away from the
contamination (front) appear the words GAS MINES in yellow 1-inch (2.5 cm) block letters (fluorescent paint,
if available) with a horizontal yellow l-inch (2.5 cm) stripe underneath the lettering. The chemical agent in the
mines and the date of emplacement may also be inscribed on the front of the marker if desired by the
commander.
110.9 Describe the color that the M-9 paper turns after it comes in contract with a liquid, nerve or blister agent.
[ref. b, ch. 9, pg. 9-11]: The M-9 detector paper has no agent specificity; the red color appears for all detectable
agents.
110.10 Describe the colors that M-8 paper turns after it comes in contact with a liquid nerve or blister agent.
[ref. b, ch. 9, pg. 9
11]: When the M-8 paper is brought in contact with the suspected
chemical agent, the chemicals in the paper react with the agent to
produce specific color changes. The sheet of paper is then matched
to the color comparison chart printed on the inside front cover of the M-8 book.
110.11 Explain the following as it applies to nerve agents: [ref. g, ch. 2]
a. Symptoms [sec. I, pg. 2-5]: (1) MILD poisoning (self-aid). Casualties with MILD symptoms may experience
most or all of the following:
(a) Unexplained runny nose.
(b) Unexplained sudden headache.
(c) Sudden drooling.
(d) Difficulty in seeing (dimness of vision and miosis).
(e) Tightness in the chest or difficulty in breathing.
(f) Wheezing and coughing.
(g) Localized sweating and muscular twitching in the area of the contaminated skin.
(h) Stomach cramps.
(i) Nausea with or without vomiting.
(j) Tachycardia followed by bradycardia.
(2) SEVERE symptoms (buddy aid). Casualties with SEVERE symptoms may experience most or all of the
MILD symptoms, plus most or all of the
following:
(a) Strange or confused behavior.
(b) Increased wheezing and increased dyspnea (difficulty in breathing).
(c) Severely pinpointed pupils.
(d) Red eyes with tearing.
(e) Vomiting.
(f) Severe muscular twitching and general weakness.
(g) Involuntary urination and defecation.
(h) Convulsions.
(i) Unconsciousness.
(j) Respiratory failure.
(k) Bradycardia.
Casualties with severe symptoms WILL NOT be able to treat themselves and MUST RECEIVE prompt buddy
aid, CLS aid, and prompt follow-on medical treatment if they are to survive.

c. Casualties with MODERATE poisoning will experience an increase in the severity of most or all of the
MILD symptoms. Especially prominent will be fatigue, weakness, and muscle fasciculations. The progress of
symptoms from MILD to MODERATE indicates either inadequate treatment or continuing
exposure to the agent.
b. Contents of Nerve Agent Antidote kit (NAAK) MK 1 [sec. Iii, pg. 2-12]: The MARK I kit consists of four
separate components: the atropine autoinjector, the 2 PAM Cl autoinjector, the plastic clip, and the foam
carrying case.
c. Treatment (self and buddy aid) [sec. Iv, pg. 2-14]: The following are principles to be followed in the
administration of the MARK I.
a. Self-Aid. If you experience most or all of the MILD symptoms of nerve agent poisoning, you should
IMMEDIATELY hold your breath (DO NOT INHALE) and put on your protective mask. Then administer one
set of MARK I injections into your lateral thigh muscle (or buttocks). (1) Wait 10 to 15 minutes after giving
yourself the first set of injections since it takes that long for the antidote to take effect. If you are able to
ambulate, know who you are, and where you are, you WILL NOT need a second set of MARK I injections.
WARNING Giving yourself a second set of injections may create a nerve agent antidote overdose, which could
result in incapacitation.
(2) If symptoms of nerve agent poisoning are not relieved after administering one set of MARK I injections,
seek someone else to check your symptoms. A buddy must administer the second and third sets of injections, if
needed.
b. Buddy Aid. If you encounter a service member suffering from SEVERE signs of nerve agent poisoning,
render the following aid: (1) Mask the casualty, if necessary. Do not fasten the hood. (2) Administer, in rapid
succession, three sets of the MARK I.
NOTE Use the casualty’s own antidote autoinjectors when providing aid. Do not use your injectors on a
casualty. If you do, you may not have any antidote available when needed for self-aid.
110.12 Describe the steps and procedures in utilizing the M-295 and M-291 decontamination kits. [ref. i, ch. 2]:
Once a soldier is aware of chemical or biological contamination on his bare skin, he initiates immediate decon
techniques, without command, by using his personal SDK. He decontaminates his hood, mask, gloves, and
weapon using the IEDK or an additional SDK. To remove radiological contamination from equipment and
personnel, brush it off and/or use soap and water.
NOTE: Throughout this manual, SDK refers to the M291 kit and IEDK refers to the M295 kit.
SKIN DECON 2-1. Start the skin-decon techniques within 1 minute of becoming contaminated. Some toxic
chemical agents, especially nerve agents, kill in minutes. CHEMICAL 2-2. Use the SDKs within 1 minute of
contamination (see Figure 2-1). Instructions for use are listed on the outside of the kit itself, on the individual
packet within the kit, and in STP 21-1-SMCT. Figure 2-1. M291 SDK 2-3. If an SDK is not available, chemical
contamination may be pinch-blotted from the skin with a cloth and flushed with water from a canteen. Soap, if
available, can also be used to wash the agent from the skin. Washing with soap and water (or hot water) is the
next best method for toxic-agent decon if SDKs are not available, but this method is not as effective as using the
decon kits.
110.13 State how long the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) suit will provide
protection from chemical agents once they are removed from the packaging under the following conditions:
[ref. k, ch. 1, pg. 1-22]
a. Exposed to chemical agents:

b. Not exposed to chemical agents: The JSLIST suit has a five-year shelf life, with an estimated total life of 15
years. Once a production lot of suits has reached five years of age, samples from that lot are visually inspected
and chemical agent tested to determine whether the shelf life of that lot should be extended an additional five
years with sound confidence of quality / durability. Once the suit reaches ten years of service life it is chemical
tested, inspected, and if qualified, is extended annually thereafter. Equipment Assessment Program personnel
will perform the visual inspection. The chemical testing will be performed by the Battelle Memorial Institute.
Inspection and testing of the JSLIST suits will begin in FY02 (first five year period) for shelf life extension.
Representative samples from FY97 production lots will be inspected at that time.
JSLIST suits in packages with some loss of vacuum, but no clearly visible holes or tears, are considered fully
mission-capable. If a bag is opened or accidentally torn, and has not been exposed to any petroleum, oil, or
lubricant (POL) products or possible contaminants and not damaged in any way, it can be immediately re-
packaged or carefully repaired with high quality adhesive tape, "duct tape", or some similar product to re-create
the seal, and it will maintain its original shelf life. Repair procedures to the inner bag should not obliterate
surveillance data. If a package is visibly torn or punctured with no determination as to when it was damaged or
to what contaminants the suit was exposed, the suit should be used for training only. The words training only
must be stenciled 2.5 inches high or larger on the outside of a sleeve or leg of the item, in a contrasting colored
permanent ink.
110.14 Discuss laundering procedures for the JSLIST. [ref. k, ch. 1, pg. 1-22]
110.15 Discuss the following types of decontamination: [ref. c, ch. 6, pg. 6-6 thru 6-7]
a. Immediate: The aim of immediate decon is to minimize casualties, save lives, and limit the spread of
contamination. Immediate decon is carried out individuals upon becoming contaminated. Thre immediate decon
techniques are used today: Skin decon, Personal wipe down, Operator’s spray down
b. Operational: The aim of operational decon is to sustain operations, reduce the contact hazard, and limit the
spread of contamination. Operational decon will also eliminate the necessity or reduce the duration of wearing
MOPP gear. Operational decon is done by individuals and/or units. It is restricted to specific parts of
operationally essential equipment, material, and/or working areas. Operational decon minimizes contact and
transfer hazards. Further decon may be required to reduce contamination to negligible risk levels. Two
operational decon techniques are used today: Vehicle washdown, MOPP gear exchange
c. Thorough: The aim of thorough decon is to reduce or eliminate the need for individual protective clothing.
Thorough decon is carried out to reduce contamination on personnel, equipment/material, and/or working areas
to the lowest possible level (negligible risk). This permits the reduction or removal of individual protective
equipment and maintains operations with the least degradation. Thorough decon reduces CBR contamination
levels to a negligible risk. There are two thorough decon techniques that Seabees use:
Detailed Troop Decon and Detailed Equipment Decon
110.16 Discuss the procedure for setting up a personnel decontamination line. [ref. i ch. 4, pg. 4-1 thru 4-33]:
You need to read the entire chapter. The below information is a bare essential for minimal understanding of the
personal decon line.
Thorough-decon operations reduce and sometimes eliminate contamination. They restore combat power by
removing nearly all contamination from unit and individual equipment so that troops can operate it safely for
extended periods at reduced MOPP levels. Since a small risk of contamination remains, periodic checks with
the

CAM, the M8/M9 detector paper, or the M256A1 detector kit must be performed after each operation. A
thorough decon can be done as part of reconstitution, or it can be done to support operations throughout the
battlefield. After a thorough decon, the unit moves out of the decon site into a tactical AA. The unit, while in
this tactical assembly, may undergo reconstitution or prepare for future operations. Combat-service-support
(CSS) elements replenish combat stocks, refit equipment, and replace personnel and equipment, as required.
The contaminated unit, with some assistance from a chemical unit, does the DTD. A supporting chemical unit
does the DED or DAD. The planning considerations that are required to conduct thorough-decon operations and
the methods that various chemical units (decon and smoke/decon) use to conduct DTD/DED are discussed in
this chapter. The exact layout of a thorough-decon site is determined by METT-TC.
110.17 Discuss the procedure for setting up a detailed equipment decontamination line. [ref. i, ch. 4, pg. 4-1
thru 4-33]: Same as above. You need to read chapter 4 for understanding.
110.18 State the purpose and the optimum location of the M-22 chemical alarm. [ref. a, ch. 1, pg. 1-1]:
Automatic chemical alarm system capable of detecting and identifying standard blister and nerve agents.
110.19 Discuss the following as it relates to CBR: [ref. j, ch. 3] (ch 2, 11-7 to 11-8)
a. Pre-attack actions [pg. 111-7 thru 111-8]: Nuclear Preattack actions are critical because they will increase the
unit’s survivability to the greatest possible extent. These actions range from selecting the right shelters,
fortifying those shelters, and protecting vital equipment to using equipment to increase survivability. Whenever
the tactical situation permits, units prepare defensive positions. These will vary from individual fighting
positions to improved defensive positions. These actions and good prior planning protect against nuclear effects.
One primary concern should be protection from gamma and neutron radiation. Gamma radiation protection
requires thick layers of dense or heavy shielding material, such as lead, iron, or stone. On the other hand, light,
hydrogen-based material gives good neutron radiation protection. Some examples are water, paraffin, and oil.
Note: The balance of the information in paragraphs 2 through 4 applies to land forces. See
NWP 3-20.31 (Revision A), Surface Ship Survivability, for TTP on maritime CBR defense
measures.
Biological preattack Preparations before an attack can be accomplished long before a biological attack happens.
Personal health maintenance and realistic training are just two ways in which commanders can minimize their
biological casualties. All personnel and leaders must adhere to the basic principles of good health; this applies
especially under NBC conditions. Up-to-Date Immunizations, Good Hygiene, Area Sanitation, Physical
Conditioning, DOD Insect repellant system,
Chemical Preattack: Preattack Actions.
(1) Assess chemical threat, potential risk, and likelihood of attack.
(2) Implement coordinated chemical defense plan.
(3) Prepare to provide first aid for unit personnel.
(4) Determine and implement appropriate MOPP levels.
(5) Minimize skin exposure.
(6) Continue good hygiene and sanitation methods.
(7) Deploy and activate detectors.
(8) Designate and prepare shelters.
(9) Watch for attack indicators (e.g., a chemical cloud, a distinctive odor, and release of an agent).
(10) Cover unprotected mission-essential equipment.
b. Attack [pg. 111-8]: b. During-Attack Actions.

Nuclear attack indicators are unmistakable. The bright flash, enormous explosion, high winds, and mushroom-
shaped cloud clearly indicate a nuclear attack. An enemy attack would normally come without warning. Initial
actions must, therefore, be automatic and instinctive.
During-Attack Actions. If threat forces attack with biological agents, there may be little or no warning. This will
depend on the IPB assessment. Units automatically assume MOPP4 to protect themselves against contamination
when there are high probability indicators of an attack.
Biological-Attack Indicators. Biological agents may be disseminated as aerosols, liquid droplets, or dry powder.
Attacks with biological agents can be very subtle or direct, if favorable weather conditions prevail. In nearly all
circumstances, an individual will not know a biological attack has occurred. Symptoms can appear from
minutes to days after an attack has occurred. Indicators may include: Mysterious illness (many individuals sick
for unknown reasons), Large numbers of vectors, such as insects or unusual insects, Large numbers of dead or
strange-acting (wild and domestic) animals, Mass casualties with flu-like symptoms (fever, sore throat, skin
rash, mental abnormalities, pneumonia, diarrhea, dysentery, hemorrhaging, or jaundice), Artillery shells with
less powerful explosions than high-explosive (HE) rounds, Aerial bombs that pop rather than explode, Mist or
fog sprayed by aircraft or aerosol generators, Unexploded bomblets found in the area.
Immediate Actions. Assuming MOPP provides protection against biological agents. However, an agent can gain
entry through openings such as buttonholes; zipped areas; stitching; poor sealing at ankles, wrists, and neck; or
through minute pores in the clothing fabric. Some toxins, however, require the same amount of protection as
chemical agents. Since no wide-scale immediate-warning, biological-agent detection device is fielded, consider
any unknown agent cloud as a sign of a biological attack and take the same actions prescribed for a chemical
attack.
Chemical During Attack: Give Attack Warnings. Detection and warning of the attack are critical to the
implementation of protective measures. The warning signal for the attack directs personnel to take cover and
use protective measures. Take Cover. Taking cover protects personnel against blast, shrapnel, heat, liquid, and
particulate contamination. After taking cover, personnel don their masks and other protective gear, as
appropriate. Use MOPP4. All personnel should assume MOPP4 (full IPE) in the absence of any other
information and remain in MOPP4 until directed to reduce their MOPP level. The use of the MOPP ensemble
could also be supplemented by the use of protective clothing—such as wet-weather clothing; an air crewman’s
cape; or the suit, contamination avoidance, and liquid protective.
c. After-attack [pg. 111-8]: Nuclear Postattack Actions. Protection must not stop when the attack ends.
Immediately after an attack, postattack recovery begins (1) Personnel must check for radioactive contamination
and, then, must reduce the hazard with basic decontamination. Decontamination techniques to reduce
radioactive contamination are to brush, scrape, or flush radiological contamination from surfaces. (2) As a
minimum, unit personnel cover positions and shelters, and radiac meter operators begin continuous monitoring.
IPE reduces the amount of contaminants that can enter the lungs and the potential for skin burns from beta and
alpha particles. (3) For the commander, poststrike actions include damage assessment and the
restoration of combat power. (4) Commanders and NBC personnel must also monitor schedules for pieces of
NBC equipment having filters. Exchange is based on service equipment directives or when the following
conditions are applicable: Physical damage occurs. Filters have become waterlogged or wet. High resistance to
airflow is observed. Directed to exchange filters by higher HQ. Listed as unserviceable in applicable directives.
d. Nuclear Casualties. Blast, thermal radiation, and nuclear radiation all cause nuclear casualties. Except for
radiation casualties, treat nuclear casualties the same as conventional casualties. Wounds caused by blast are
similar to other combat wounds. Thermal burns are treated as any other type of burn. First aid cannot help
radiation casualties. These casualties must be referred to medical facilities.
Biological Postattack Actions. Actions after a biological attack include submitting NBC reports, beginning post
attack recovery, and other actions—such as taking samples, identifying casualties by the symptoms they exhibit,
and treating those symptoms. Early recognition of symptoms and treatment is essential in trying to limit the
effects. Additionally, personnel should decontaminate immediately after an attack by using decontamination
kits or washing with soap and water.
Agent Exposure. It is necessary to isolate individuals showing symptoms of contagious disease. This isolation
helps prevent possible spread to others if the disease is communicable. Treatment of biological-agent casualties
requires medical assistance as soon as possible. Further, symptoms associated with some toxins mimic other
illness or chemical-casualty symptoms. Agent symptoms may include: Dizziness, mental confusion, or double
or blurred vision. Skin tingling, numbness, paralysis, or convulsions. Formation of rashes or blisters. Coughing.
Fever,

aching muscles, fatigue, and difficulty in swallowing. Nausea, vomiting, and/or diarrhea. Bleeding from body
openings or blood in urine, stool, or sputum (spit). Shock (symptoms appear in minutes or hours after the toxin
attack).
Unmasking Procedures. Unless prior warning is received from higher HQ to mask in advance of the arrival of a
biological attack, units will likely not be aware that they have been exposed to a biological agent. However, if a
unit has received prior warning of an advancing cloud, there are procedures that can be implemented. For
example, a biological agent point detector can indicate (through its air-monitoring capability) when an aerosol
cloud has passed the point detector. Once that occurs, units use devices, such as hand-held assays, to conduct
testing to determine if positive test results are received. The report information is passed to the NBC center
(NBCC). The commander, with the advice from the intelligence officer/noncommissioned officer (NCO), NBC
officer/NCO, and the command surgeon considers this data as well as data from other sources (e.g., weather,
time of day, threat, etc). Based on the multiple sources of data, the commander considers whether to reduce
protective levels. (3) Filter Exchange. When assessing filter exchange criteria several factors must be
considered. Exchange criteria for filters is based on service equipment directives or when the following
conditions are applicable: Physical damage occurs. Filters have become waterlogged or wet. High resistance to
airflow is observed. Directed to exchange filters by higher HQ.
Chemical Postattack: (1) Begin post attack recovery. If an adversary uses an air-bursting chemical munition,
mission permitting, personnel will avoid outside activities to the maximum extent possible after an attack during
the chemical droplet fall phase. Additionally, the chemical droplet fall phase could last up to approximately 60
minutes. The length of time depends on factors such as meteorological data and the weapon’s height of burst.
Outside activities could result in erroneous initial reconnaissance results and unnecessarily contaminated
personnel and equipment.
(2) Avoid potentially contaminated surfaces/areas. All personnel should minimize contact with potentially
contaminated surfaces until there are indications that surface contamination is no longer a hazard. (3) Obtain
and report observations or evidence of an attack. Personnel provide
reconnaissance and assessment information for all types of damage, hazards, and chemical agents. (4) Survey,
control, and mitigate health hazards (treat and evaluate casualties). The HSS provides treatment for casualties
according to established medical protocols. (5) Adjust MOPP. Commanders should adjust MOPP to the lowest
possible level consistent with identified hazards.
(6) Document exposure. Medical staffs should clearly document exposure in the medical records of those
personnel who have been exposed. (7) Sample, monitor, and analyze for residual hazard. Once the situation
permits, the detection efforts determine the extent and duration of the residual hazards. (8) Plan and implement
decontamination and contamination containment actions. These actions are planned and implemented to
minimize the operational impacts of contamination.
(9) Conduct unmasking procedures (all-clear). Commanders should revert to an appropriate MOPP level based
on the current threat in conjunction with the all-clear signal. Personnel engaged in passive-defense functions
should repair and resupply defense equipment in preparation for follow-on attacks. All personnel should return
their IPE to a ready status in anticipation of the next attack warning.
111 Supply/Logistics Fundamentals
111.1 Explain importance of COSAL/COSBAL in relation to mission and sustainability
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) establishes equipage allowances for the ship and the
storeroom allowance of repair parts for installed equipment. It covers all electronic, ordnance, electrical, and
mechanical equipment on board your ship. You must learn to use the COSAL since it is one of the most
important publications used in identification of material and inventory management. It is a technical and supply
management document
designed to enable ships to achieve maximum operating capability for extended periods of time, independent of
external logistics support. Before we go any further, let’s examine that opening paragraph and see just what it
means to you. The COSAL is a technical document because it provides the
• nomenclature,
• operating characteristics,
• technical manuals,

• specifications,
• parts lists,
• technical data for installed equipment and machinery, and
• equipage and tools required to operate and maintain the ship and its equipment.
The COSAL is a supply management document because it tells the supply officer how much and what type of
material to stock. It also tells the quantity of each item of equipage that must be carried aboard ship. Computers
have analyzed the failure frequency of parts used aboard ships, and based on the equipment aboard your ship,
have developed an allowance of repair parts that you should stock.
The key word in COSAL is COORDINATED.
Computers assemble a list of the allowed parts from the hundreds of APL/AELs into lists of repair parts to be
stocked by the ship. These lists are prepared by the activities and cover the equipment supported by them. The
preparation of these lists takes into account the
• installed equipment on board
• quantity of each item of that equipment
• failure rate of parts, and the
• relative importance of these parts to the operation of the equipment.
Thus, the COSAL, aided by experience and advice from technical ratings, enables the supply officer to stock the
items that should be carried to meet the requirements for repair parts.
Coordinated Shore-Based Allowance List
The Coordinated Shore-Based Allowance List (COSBAL) is essentially the same design as the COSAL but is
provided to selected shore activities based on mission essentiality, special operational requirements, remoteness
from normal sources of supply, and/or a combination of all three.
111.2 Discuss the following processes in reference to COSAL/COSBAL
a. Validating/b. Updating
GENERAL. Proper maintenance of the ship's COSAL(s) is vital to adequate support of installed shipboard
equipment. Once a ship's installed equipment have been validated, reported, and reflected in an updated
COSAL, it is incumbent upon the ship's Supply Officer to ensure that any subsequent equipment installations,
removals, or modifications are reported to the ICP and Type Commander, and that the ship's COSAL is revised
accordingly. When equipment population or configuration changes are accomplished during the ship's regular
overhaul (ROH)
or a complex overhaul (COH), the ILO team or the shipyard will be responsible for initiating the required
reports and COSAL revisions in accordance with NAVSEAINST 4441.3. When such changes are accomplished
between overhauls, the ship will be responsible for initiating the reports and COSAL update in accordance with
the following subparagraphs and Volume 4 of the SECAS Program Manual (TMINS Number T0752-AA-
MAN-O4O/SECAS).
111.3 Explain how frequently ordered parts affect demand processing
GENERAL. This file provides the using ship with the capability to perform an automated review of demand and
frequency accumulated by the ship over a given period of time. The intent is to provide increased inventory and
financial efficiency within a given set of operational parameters set by the ship according to TYCOM directives
for operation schedules. Stock record high and low limits, monthly demand POS flags, allowance type code,
insufficient
demand, zero quantity on hand, no dues, and changes to depth of load contingent on day to day processing (RO
set between 10% and 90% sensitivity factor) are evaluated through data formulated from entries through the
SFM subsystem.
111.4 Discuss the purpose of the Material Obligation Validation Program
MATERIAL OBLIGATION VALIDATION (MOV). Invalid requisitions and MOV processing are ongoing
problems that require close attention at all management levels. Stringent procedures are necessary to prevent the
loss
of critically short O&MN dollars, to improve requisition validity, and to ensure sound financial management
practices are in effect in all TYCOM commands.
a. External MOV Program. Quarterly, Inventory Control Points (ICP) review centrally held overage material
obligations and forward MOV requests to the activities concerned. Proper and timely response to MOV requests
per NAVSUP P-485, paragraphs 3590-3599, is vital.
b. Internal MOV Program. The internal MOV program is also mandatory. The internal MOV process
maximizes limited OPTAR funds. The following procedures apply:
(1) Conduct a monthly validation of all outstanding DTO, stock, and ROV obligations. Research and clear
requisitions with overaged shipping (AS or BA) status. Prepare RODs/SDRs and surveys if needed.
(2) Send the MOV report (RPT 073 or RPT 165) containing pertinent requisition information to the appropriate
Work Centers (W/C) for screening. Supply Department personnel will automatically cancel requisitions on this
form unless subparagraph (3) and (4) actions below are completed and returned to the Supply Officer within 10
working days.
(3) W/C Supervisors must review and determine continuing requirement for material, validate priority assigned,
and quantity required.
(a) Cancel Equipment Maintenance Related Material (EMRM)/repair parts requisitions for closed or invalid
JCNs unless the Department Head provides written justification to the Supply Officer to retain the requisition.
(b) Check each JCN for multiple requisitions for the same NSN. Take the total quantity of these requisitions and
check against the quantity per application. Initiate cancellation action for any excess material.
(c) Department Heads must validate and concur by signing the form.
(4) The Stock Control Supervisor must review storeroom stock requisitions for validity. Cancel all outstanding
stock requisitions for AT code 5, 6, and 8 material.
(5) After Supply Department personnel have taken appropriate cancellation or follow-up action on the
requisitions, keep the completed forms, listings, worksheets, and outgoing copies of cancellation messages for
the last 12 months in monthly folders. Units transmitting via SALTS must have a hard copy of the cancellation
file sheet signed and dated by the person transmitting the cancellations. Annotate dollar values of cancellations
on the file copy of the message. This information is needed for the Supply Officer's Monthly Report to the
Commanding Officer.
111.5 Explain the difference between the two components of the operating target (OPTAR)
OPTAR COMPOSITION. OPTARs for ships will be comprised of two parts, "EMRM (Equipment
Maintenance Related Material)/Repair Parts" (includes fund codes (2nd position) "R," "B," and "3")
and "OTHER" for funding organizational level equipment maintenance and all other requirements,
respectively. Do not exceed assigned ceilings, except for CASREP situations, without prior
TYCOM approval.
a. "Other" OPTAR Funds
(1) Medical/dental supplies and services.
(2) Damage control.
(3) Life saving and personnel safety.
(4) Required general use consumables.
(5) Equipage, not included above, to fill allowance or replace surveyed equipage.
(6) Self-help habitability improvement projects.
b. EMRM (Equipment Maintenance Related Material) OPTAR Funds
(1) Direct Turn-Over (DTO) Repair Parts.
(2) Storeroom replenishment – DLRs.
(3) Storeroom replenishment – SIM.
(4) Storeroom replenishment - Non-SIM.
(5) General Purpose Electronic Test Equipment (GPETE).
111.6 Discuss the following
a. Departmental budget The Departmental Budget is the base for the AFMP. Distribution of funds in an AFMP
should be based on factual data to the maximum extent possible. It is emphasized, however, that whereas past
usage serves as a basis for estimating normal future requirements, forecasts of requirements based on the
forthcoming

fiscal year's operating schedule must also be used. The projected allocation of funds for the procurement of
material requirements not carried in shipboard storerooms is important.
b. CHRIMP The Consolidated Hazardous Material Reutilization and Inventory Management Program
(CHRIMP) serves as a fundamental element of the Navy's life-cycle control and management of Hazardous
Materials (HM). The first program of its type in the Department of Defense (DoD), CHRIMP promotes
compliance with the broad range of Federal, State, and local environemental rules and regulations. It mandates
procedures to control, track, and reduce the variety and quantity of HM in use, both ashore and afloat. CHRIMP
requires a certain realignment and consolidation of responsibilties throughout a Command and the
establishment of an organizational structure devoted to the management of HM and Hazardous Waste (HW).
Since its inception in 1990, this program has resulted in significant reducitons in HM procurment and associated
HW disposal costs.
c. DRMO All Navy activities are encouraged to take advantage of excess material which has been turned in to
defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs). This material can be a way to save valuable ship’s
resources by routinely screening requirements against DRMS available assets via the DRMS webpage at:
http: //www.drms.dla.mil. Strict controls must exist for material requisitioned. All screening for and
requisitioning of DRMS material must be authorized by the Supply Officer in accordance with the Defense
Material Distribution Manual (DOD 4160.21-M) Chapter V.
111.7 State how Credit is distributed for returned parts
It doesn’t matter. The reference is no good.
111.8 Define Plant and Minor Property
Minor Property. Personnel property acquired for immediate use and having a unit cost of less than $5,000 (and
having a useful life of less than two years if costing over $5,000). This category includes, but is not limited to,
furniture, fixtures, office or industrial equipment and personnel support equipment. Subcategories within minor
property include classified, sensitive and pilferable equipment. All Navy commands are required to have
internal controls to manage minor property. The controlled equipage program is the primary shipboard control
mechanism.
Plant Property. Property with a unit cost of $5,000 or more and useful life over two years. This term includes all
Navy-owned real property and that realty not owned, but for which accountability is the responsibility of the
Navy; personal property of a capital nature located in activities of the Naval shore establishment or used by
shore-based units of the operating forces under specified circumstances; such real or personal property out-
granted to other entities not under Navy Department command, provided that title remains with, or reverts to,
the Department of the Navy when the out-grant is canceled. It does not include equipment designated as minor
property, special tooling or special test equipment, or personal property of a capital nature that is reported in a
financial inventory account.
111.9 Explain the purpose of the Allowance Change Request
Except as otherwise provided in par. 2105-3 - 4, the NAVSUP Form 1220-2 is the prescribed document for
requesting item additions/deletions or quantity increases/decreases in all published allowance lists (an item may
be an equipment/component, repair part or equipage).
111.10 Discuss the following Forms
When required, one of the following documents will be used for manual MILSTRIP requisitioning:
a. NAVSUP Form 1250-2 - Non-NSN Requisition (4491); NAVSUP Form 1250-2 is a seven part multipurpose
form used for procuring non-NSN material.
b. DD Form 1348-6 - DOD Single Line Item Requisition System Document (Manual Long
Form). The DD Form 1348-6 is a six part form which is carbon interleaved. It is used for requisitioning non-
NSN items.
c. NAVSUP 1149 A DD Form 1149 will be prepared for procurement of only that material which is excluded
from MILSTRIP, and for only that excluded material for which another procurement document is not specified
(see par. 3022). It also may be used to requisition repairs or rentals of labor saving devices, repairs of other
equipage items,

dry cleaning/renovation services, etc., when use of the DD Form 1149 for such requirements is prescribed by
the supply source or repair facility.
d. DDFORM 200 The Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss (FLIPL), DD Form 200, is used to
document the report of survey and certify the survey process when government property is lost, damaged, or
destroyed. This form is the official document to support establishment of debts, relief from accountability, and
adjustment to accountable records for Supply System Stock and Property Book Material.
111.11 Define the following Acronyms
a. ARP Automotive Repair Parts
b. CTR Central Toolroom
c. CSR Central Storeroom
d. MLO Material Liaison Office
e. CUU Camouflage Utilty Uniform
111.12 Define the following Abbreviations and Acronyms
a. NSN National Stock Number
b. COG Cognizance
c. APL Allowance Parts List
d. AEL Allowance Equipage List
e. NC Not Carried
f. NIS Not in Stock
g. SIM Selected Item Management
111.13 Discuss the purpose of a Report of Deficiency and the Quality Deficiency Report
Material discrepancies are divided into two categories. The first category includes discrepancies, such as
overages, shortages, damages, incorrect or non-receipt of material. These discrepancies are normally
attributable to the activity that shipped the material or the transportation system. Reporting and resolving
shipping and transportation discrepancies is covered in pars. 4268-4273, these discrepancies will be reported as
a Supply Discrepancy Report (SDR (Report of Discrepancy)). The second category includes material quality
discrepancies. In this second category the material received cannot be used for its intended purpose because it
does not meet form, fit, or function requirements. Faulty electron tubes or incorrect valve mounting plates are
examples of quality deficiencies. These discrepancies are attributable to the manufacturing or repair activity or,
in some cases, incorrect specifications. Product Quality Deficiency Report (PQDR) requirements are covered in
par. 4274. The purpose of discrepancy reporting in either category is to identify, correct and prevent further
discrepancies (see par. 4269-2 on Reporting Exceptions).
111.14 Discuss the Depot Level Repairables program
DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLES (DLRs)
1. Objective. This Appendix provides guidance concerning the issue, turn-in, requisitioning, and inventory
management of Depot Level Repairables (DLRs). The primary objective of this program is to improve
availability of DLRs, resulting in improved fleet readiness. This program is designed to provide financial
incentives for end-users, improve carcass tracking procedures, and provide a valuable resource to base decisions
about the procurement and repair of DLRs.
2. Background. The migration of DLRs from APA to the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) increases
flexibility in funding procurement and repair of DLRs and provides for shorter budget lead-time. Individual
OPTAR holders receive an economic incentive to provide effective management via a two price system.
Additionally, the program provides a carcass tracking system
111.15 Explain the procedures on NRFI in regards to:
b. Remain in Place The following refers to the Remain-in-Place (RIP) program for NAVICP-M managed
DLRS:

(1) NAVICP-M validates all 5S requisitions for NAVICP-M managed DLRs, and changes the Advice Code
from 5S to 5G for non-RIP worthy items. NAVICP will notify the requisitioner and TYCOM via message of the
change, and carcass tracking will start immediately for those requisitions. Requisition processing by NAVICP-
M will continue uninterrupted. After submitting a requisition for a RIP-worthy item that is assigned RIP code
"N" in the Master Repairable Item List (MRIL), a message justification must be submitted to NAVICP
Mechanicsburg, Attention: Code M01424, Subject: Request for Change to NAVICP RIP Listing.
NAVSUPINST 4440.182 provides the format and technical information required by NAVICPM to update the
MRIL. In addition, provide the document number of the requisition. Send message justification within 48 hours
of requisitioning (See Figure D-1).
(2) When a replacement DLR is required before turning-in the NRFI item, the following criteria will apply:
(a) Item must be RIP worthy (assigned RIP Code M, P, S, V, or X in the Master Repairable Item List (MRIL)).
(b) A repairable item turn-in certification must be prepared.
(c) A skeletonized DOD single line release/receipt document (DD 1348-1A) will be prepared and filed with the
RIP certification by Department/ Work Center in document number sequence and will serve as a tickler to make
sure that the NRFI carcass is received from the requesting work center. See paragraph 12 for information on the
use of FACTS to prepare DD 1348-1A turn-in documents. c. Other than valid RIP items, turn in DLR carcasses
to the Supply Department before issuing or requisitioning the material.