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G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM
and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant
Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang
V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy
Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the
factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in
this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ
of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration,
"restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative
from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the
Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the
confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so."
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the
complaint, having been denied, the case was heard on the
merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated
by the Solicitor General are these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a
passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant.
In the interrogation made in connection with her application
for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she
stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching
Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2").
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March
13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date
of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen
Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or
before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay
in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On
January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya
Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent
to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after
her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the
considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition
for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as
set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962,
the pertinent portions of which read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law
provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import
unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean what it
plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The
clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
incontestably implies that an alien woman may be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a
Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications specified in the law,
because these are the explicit requisites provided by law
for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan
and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855).
However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the
complaint, to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who
might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen

(not being disqualified to become such by naturalization),
is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25,
1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO
AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the
Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and
cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to
be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted
as a temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious
at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of
residence in the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law,
Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to
a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the
Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who
herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the
Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman
visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after
repeated extensions thereof, was to expire last February
28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January
25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the expiry
date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was
effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then
impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation.
This cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted
as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate
and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay
only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa,
cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently
without first departing from the Philippines as she had
promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong
Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017,
September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration
Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well
buttressed not only by the decided cases of the Supreme
Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very
provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:
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An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot
remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the
appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by
Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is
charged with the administration of all laws relating to
immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the
performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants,
the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide
discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases
presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of
Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that
his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted
with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung,
while she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog
and English, she admitted that she cannot write either
language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His
Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of
this appeal is the allegation in the brief of
petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief,
that "in the hearing ..., it was shown thru the testimony of
the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess
any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course,
as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also
emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in
the lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged
marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already
carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her
husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed
by the court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY
NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED
NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES
 Page 3 of 89

THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR
OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962.
TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .
ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW. We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In
effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of
II objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court
below, viz:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A
WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as
OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and
WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only
CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa,
MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently
OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE without first departing from the Philippines as she had
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940. promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong
III Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017,
Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN
YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien
ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine
SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the
BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen
STAY. by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee
Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R.
IV
No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND

It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their
THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED
proper resolution would necessarily cover all the points
WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will
JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED
base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU
YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO I
DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND,
ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the
OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A matters dealt with in appellants' second and fourth
FILIPINO CITIZEN. assignments of error does not require any lengthy
discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the
V Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been
admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN
country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat
REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE
from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and
COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU
thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of
YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination
TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by
VI
Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the

court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were
the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said
petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her
marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her
as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident
without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9
(g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that
portion of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot
remain in the Philippines permanently. To
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the
appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of this Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the
Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become
Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such
change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the right
to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may
choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration
authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their
bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed
disapproval of convenient ruses employed by alien to
convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent
residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by
the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong
Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020,
wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court,
reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands
on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and
thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law
will not allow him subsequently to go back on his
representation and stay permanently, without
departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No
officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of
section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of
"change" or "correction", for the law makes no distinctions,
and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as
stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter
the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to
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enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to
permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should
be, and thereby compel our government to spend time,
money and effort to examining and verifying whether or not
every such alien really has a right to take up permanent
residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able
to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence
he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he
entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are
self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason
obtain why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but
who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be
required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country,
only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the
process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when
after all, such right has become incontestible as a
necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality
by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon
him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor
children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that
they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it
be the law that before they can be allowed permanent
residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they
may be processed to determine whether or not they have a
right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties
and hardships which such a requirement entails and its
seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather
absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok
Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our
present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino,
Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines.
Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that,
in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized
as such citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from
would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on
whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be
cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the
first
depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than
implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a
Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring
upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including
that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines

outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of
Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very
nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a
law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the
Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore,
appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well
taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General
sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen
Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not
denied did not have the effect of making her a Filipino,
since it has not been shown that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that
she does not possess all the qualifications required of
applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization
Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly
concedes that had it been established in the proceedings
below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the
qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the
respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without
requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for
naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in
accord with what used to be the view of this Court
since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R.
No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil.,
706,713,1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic,
G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30,
1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice
Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman
who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to
apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in
said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in
the law but also that she has complied with all the
formalities required thereby like any other applicant for
naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our
jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its
reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in
effect urging Us, however, in their first and second
assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to
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even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is
the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all
subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent
judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one
almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of
Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose
authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She
filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8,
1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to
stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto
Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the
Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and,
contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason
of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her
bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the
Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure
to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner
confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of
the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she
had no obligation to leave, because she had become
Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned.
The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said
appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief
Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is
whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least,
excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from
the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In
maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners alleged that,
upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also,
a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were
correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her
marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and,
hence, the decision appealed from would have to be
affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613
provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a
Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond
deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an
alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines
follows ipso facto his political status.
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she
"herself may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in
an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series
of 1950),* this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the
benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified
from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under
section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for
the success and predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ...
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the
United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the
right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in
the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of
the classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties
who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the
Philippines within the period specified in the bond in
question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners
have the burden of proving her alleged change of political
status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners
have not made out, therefore a case against the
respondents-appellants.
Page 6 of 89
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative
proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties
seemingly felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok
Ha may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of
first impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in
the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should
be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have
any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many
words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards
the following propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself
might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from
being naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in the
decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified
may be presented in the action to recover her bond
confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as
Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the
law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry
need be made as to qualifications,5 specially considering
that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of
the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the
Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which
are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended,
(now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided
that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of
the United States has been construed as not requiring the
woman to have the qualifications of residence, good
character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons
who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7

Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914]
215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940
of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that
the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized",
should be construed as not requiring the woman to have
the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in
cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely
that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized.
(Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by
the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman
who married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after
June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been
dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses
none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her
husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad
Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that
the only material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of
Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the
Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall
likewise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to
the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473,
which reads in part as follows:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as
contained in the above provision, means that the woman
who is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any
of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No.
43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940).
Under the facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura
does not appear to be among the disqualified classes
mentioned in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio
Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother,
he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in
consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate
child follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized
parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s.
1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs.
Page 7 of 89
Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the
Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op.
No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as
they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five
days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board
of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following
facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on
November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was
forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for
her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December
20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and
because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry
considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case,
however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners
insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings
and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus
proceedings. The lower court denied the petition. Although
this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand,
that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the
recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that
the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not
suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of
the Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who
marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As
construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires
proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not
disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of
assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon
her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court,
therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with
the deportation proceedings, where she can anyway
establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of
Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her
Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of
Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22,
1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases,
this Court expressly gave the parties concerned
opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering
from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need

of undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may
be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions,
the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of
marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby
becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of
such marriage, she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any
naturalization proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made
no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not
they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact
that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that
such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven.
Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later
became a distinguished member of this Court,6 so ruled in
opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the
most illustrative of which held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of
the statute, such as those relating to the qualifications of
an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings,
is not necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27
Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s.
1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v.
Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17,
1957, where the Supreme Court, construing the
abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that
"marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage,
those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No.
473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor
that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine
citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these
groups The Commissioner of Immigration does not say so
but merely predicates his negative action on the ground
Page 8 of 89
that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending
against the petitioner.
We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the
grounds for disqualification for naturalization are expressly
enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based
on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of
those specified causes may not be invoked to negate
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a
Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s.
1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must
file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that she is
married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified
from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified
by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v.
Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17,
1957), where the Supreme Court, construing the
above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law,
held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself
may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of
Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by
marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in
section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the
right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to
acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice
Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in
the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the
Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15
Of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male
Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign
wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and,
quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice,
namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941;
No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section
15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage,
those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No.
473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S.
Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one
respect, the above construction of the law was importantly
modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the
facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized
period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March
1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration
asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of
Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice,
otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For
failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order,
on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered
the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was
an order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration
confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in forfeiture
of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court
must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the
bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his
principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do
so, before final judgment may be entered against the
bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil.
1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of
an alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is
necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of
the undertaking in the bond is committed, the
Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and
conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the
Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee
Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in
marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court
which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had
penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
Page 9 of 89
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a
Filipino citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his
liability on the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April
1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of the
undertaking in the bond — failure to depart from the
Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of
temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and
failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within
24 hours from receipt of notice — were committed before
the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to
an alien does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant
Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided for by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be
sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now
before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement
therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization" makes reference to Section 15,
Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha
v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in
the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted
by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176,
Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n
a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that
the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized",
should be construed as not requiring the woman to have
the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in
cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely
that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized.
(Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the
obviously significant modification of the construction of the
law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of
the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for
such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al.
vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790,
October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra,
which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently
seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of
the particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely
raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything
said on the said matter would at best be no more

than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding
that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is
deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of marriage
to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer
citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok
Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is
here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or
absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without
explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from
Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who
wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely
lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan
Ay and opined that both qualifications and
non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating
on what seemed to be departure from the said first two
decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice
Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's
position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775,
November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply
these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the
Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with
authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a
Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the
expiry date of her permit, and when she was requested to
leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to
do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage,
and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit
stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court,
the trial judge held for the government that in addition to
not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there
was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed
all the qualifications of residence, moral character,
knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by
the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed
upon was whether or not the possession of all the
qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from
non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for
the Court, reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim
for citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the
case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the
Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that
the woman "should be a person of the class or race
Page 10 of 89
permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in
respect of the qualifications arising out of her conduct or
opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded
as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a
citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If,
whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the
question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the
party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage
with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also
that the woman then possessed all the further
qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under
existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not
a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have
existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a
controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or
difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that
she was a free white woman or a woman of African
descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an American
citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the
qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she was
presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization
Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448)
specified the classes of persons who alone might become
citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were
disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law
provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens —
Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the
Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones
Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United
States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who
under the laws of the United States may become citizens
of said country if residing therein.
Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following cannot
be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed
to organized government or affiliated with any association
or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending
or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in
the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or

subjects of nations with whom the United States and the
Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.
Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in
subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able
to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than
twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their
petition.
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said
section one shall, in addition to being not less than
twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition, have all and each of the following qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous
period of not less than five years, except as provided in the
next following section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of their
residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in
which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth
not less than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or
have some known trade or profession; and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some
native tongue.
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides,
declare in writing and under oath his intention of
renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and
allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of
which he was a native, citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant
supra, to our law as it then stood, alien women married to
citizens of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed
citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the
Philippines who were not citizens thereof under the Jones
Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the
United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or
foreigners who under the laws of the United States might
become citizens of that country if residing therein. With
respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the
former law, they were deemed to have the same for all
intents and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress
Page 11 of 89
has since discarded class or racial consideration from the
qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to
its proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration
was, first, to remove the features of the existing
naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the
Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors,
and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to
foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502
— 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in
question. The result is that the phrase "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" must be understood in the context
in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in
which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or
racial consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points
out, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must now be understood as referring to those who under
Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the
Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must
not belong to the class of disqualified persons under
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a
proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v.
Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily
qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because
the law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications" in
separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that
even under the interpretation given to the former law, it
was to be understood that the alien woman was not
disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant
did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not
belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that she
may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband:
What that case held was that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she
belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become
citizens by naturalization — the assumption being always
that she is not otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section
15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is
married to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the
citizenship of her husband only if she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by
law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has
all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her

marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make
her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is
not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of this
country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the
same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784,
December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the
preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her
minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino
citizenship of her husband two years after the decision
granting him nationalization and required her to leave and
this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of
Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November 30,
1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790,
promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that
the husband became a naturalized citizen does not
automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It
must also be shown that she herself possesses all the
qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become
a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less
showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a
Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a
decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition
of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband)
would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the
extension of her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No.
L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice
Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo
San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong
Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung,
Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before
the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6,
1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came
here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the
necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required
by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the
matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a
reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R.
No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King
Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on
January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the
same year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in
Page 12 of 89
1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong
since then, her last visa before the case being due to
expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her
husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel
her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's,
for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the
request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was
sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the
issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not
only reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San
Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in
line with the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship.7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R.
No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P.
Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower court
granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the
Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria's
wife, while admitting she did not possess all the
qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an
affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor.
So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later
in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965,
14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J.
B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of
Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of
relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications,
without taking into account the other affirmative
requirements of the law."9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided
on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that
an alien woman who is widowed during the dependency of
the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order
that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must,
aside from proving compliance with the requirements of
Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the
qualifications and does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the
process the decision to such effect discussed
above, 11even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling
in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2
SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his
opinion on the assumption that the point now under
discussion is settled law.

In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to
rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing
that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.
— Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to
a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who
have been born in the Philippines shall be considered
citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at
the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall
automatically become a Philippine citizen, and
foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time
the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine
citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the
naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a
Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching the
age of majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine
citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he
resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a
Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently
becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself,
that, aside from not suffering from any of
disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also
possess all the qualifications required by said law? if
nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im
Ty, as recounted above, were to be considered, it is
obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would
be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case
was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964
yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun
Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King
Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances,
however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the
Court take up the matter anew. There has been a
substantial change in the membership of the Court since
Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already
when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal
Page 13 of 89
and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely,
according to them, because (they wanted to leave the
point now under discussion open in so far as they are
concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments
discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the
motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum
of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken
lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the
most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical angles
of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects
thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands
of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades,
considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived
and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on the
long standing continuous recognition of their status as
such by the administrative authorities in charge of the
matter, as well as by the courts. Under these
a
circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an
opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who
took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this
opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter.
After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo
San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly
Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok
Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the
deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the
premises of the later cases can still bear further
consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the
legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted,
of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied
and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more
the accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment
of the American provision. A brief review of its history
proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by
the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was
that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a
consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws
were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of
1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23,
1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No.
2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted
by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines
gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and
immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine
Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for

our laws on said subject to have any perspective or
orientation of our own; everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended
by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a
provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of other insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States,
under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others
as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided
for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the
Page 14 of 89
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the
said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a
Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit
under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship,
Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon
the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the
citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband.
Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the
effect of naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of
his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with
a native born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino
before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided
thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who
have died. — In case a petitioner should die before the
final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The decision
rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor
children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if
it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of
Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions
were added to the above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby
inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act
Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of
the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly
naturalized under this law, being under the age of
twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their
parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be
considered citizens thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law
who have been born in the Philippine Islands after the
naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens
thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization
law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13

became its Section 15 which has already been quoted
earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a)
abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word in
the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change
of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have
been on any other basis than this legislative history of our
naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions
of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty,
discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice
Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that
for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become
herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any
naturalization proceeding because she becomes a of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on
Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided
she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated
in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention
being made of whether or not the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was
only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of
qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until
1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out
why the possession of the qualifications provided by the
law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien
wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by
Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in
the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the
classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even
as it provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as
Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since
1939 did not reenact the section providing who might
become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial
discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics,
"the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as
referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are
qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there
is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must
not belong to the class of disqualified persons under
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee,
which for ready reference may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this
Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino
Page 15 of 89
citizen must first prove that she has all the qualifications
required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before
she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v.
Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang v.
Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27,
1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963).
The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew
to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling
in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in the United
States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law
was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of
February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes
November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former
Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was
approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization
Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to
three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines
who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other
insular possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of
the United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the
United States, may become citizens of the latter country if
residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to
foreigners who may become American Citizens is
restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified
races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far
as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time
a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two
countries and hence there was reason to accord here
persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United
States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship
of alien women marrying American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has
ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised
Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June
17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in
this Act, but the provision found in Act No. 3448 has been
maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress
chose to retain the said provision — that to be deemed a
Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is
no longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs,
for class or race has become immaterial, but to the
qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as
enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise
the requirement that the woman "might herself be lawfully

naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to
settled norms of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases
heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to
those who are found worthy thereof, and not
indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of
marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines,
irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and
identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the
qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has
none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to
recognition as a Philippine citizen.
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the
arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish
that: (1) she has been residing in the Philippines for a
continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.);
(2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and
write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages
(pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends
that the words emphasized indicate that the present
Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who
marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified
under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our
citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court
below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that
the law demands is that the woman be not disqualified
under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of
origin (1960) the question at issue could be regarded as
not conclusively settled, there being only the concise
pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No.
L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter.
She must possess the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Page 16 of 89
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this
Court has firmly established the rule that the requirement
of section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization
Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be
one who "might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not
only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in
section 4 of the Act but also one who possesses the
qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth
Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963;
Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27,
1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963;
Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King
Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of
Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The
qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in
its section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were
to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not
disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that
citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of
the policy of the statute. For example, section 4
disqualifies only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy
houses, not previously convicted by a competent court
would not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the
law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen
in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for
citizenship "must be of good moral character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in
racial supremacy, in government by certain selected
classes, in the right to vote exclusively by certain
"herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not
be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not
"opposed to organized government," nor affiliated to
groups "upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all
organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their
ideas." Et sic de caeteris.

The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the
danger of relying exclusively on the absence
disqualifications, without taking into account the other
affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the case at
bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" was derived from the U.S. Revised
Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the same
territorial and racial significance given to it by American
courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang
v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King
Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the
foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof
cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which
adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated,
thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely
unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating
Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for
Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act
473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the
racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the
door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing
the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from
lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with,
that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole
Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. —
Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of
the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the
Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of
the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or
foreigners who under the laws of the United States may
become citizens of said country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole
provision was there any mention of race or color of the
persons who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship.
What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected
the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the
pre-Commonwealth American regime to
understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a
territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris.
In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved
pursuant to express authority without which it could not
have been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of
Page 17 of 89
the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the
of United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was
reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent
provisions of which have already been footed earlier. In
truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the
Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of our
legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the
Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927
was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial
discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The
Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our
Naturalization Law from the impositions of American
legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination
was removed was one of the effects rather than the
intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that
"the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927)
to foreigners who may become American citizens is
restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified
races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact
import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the
said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of
Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons
therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the
United States and, corollarily, persons who could be
American citizens under her laws. The words used in the
provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any
particular race or color and of excluding others, but more
accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of
foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the
United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long
before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the
naturalization, laws of the United States already provided
for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress
of June 29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is
opposed to organized government, or who is a member of
or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching
such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or
who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety
of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers,
either of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the
Government of the United States, or of any other
the
organized government, because of his or their official
character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or
be made a citizen of the United States.

and all these disqualified persons were, therefore,
ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act
2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More
importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which
was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for
Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States"
contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as
to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among the
expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when
Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1
could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion
necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the
Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already
mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the
rationalization in the qouted decisions predicated on the
theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by
Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end
than the abolition of racial discrimination in
naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no
cogent reason why the construction adopted in the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first
Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail.
It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a)
of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is
nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section
1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as it
stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in
said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction
uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that
had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must
be considered, as if it were written in the statute itself. It is
almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said
section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the
United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the
American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the
provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by
the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the
United States and all administrative authorities, charged
with the implementation of the naturalization
immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77
Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952];
Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55
S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L
ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds
Page 18 of 89
Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423
[1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction
by the American courts and administrative authorities is
contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora
Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration,
Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L.
R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2
Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the
Act of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604,
chap. 71), which in its second section provided "that any
our
woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen
of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a
citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of
the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844,
which provided that "any woman married, or who shall be
married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized,
shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and
have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L.
1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno.
Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the
Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2,
provides "that any woman who marries a citizen of the
United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not
become a citizen of the United States by reason of such
marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised
Statutes ... are repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not
and terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of
such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of
September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the
present case, as the marriage of the relator took place
prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon
the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised
Statutes.

In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496,
498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found
in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might
lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits
the application of the law to free white women. The
previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only
required that the person applying for its benefits should be
"a free white person," and not an alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those
aliens who belonged to the class or race which might be
lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other
provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or
moral character, or to any of the provisions of the
immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of
aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District
Judge Deady also construed the Act of 1855, declaring
that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the United States, and might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." He held
that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the
necessity, of the case," the statute must be construed as in
effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or
race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing
laws, and who marries a citizen of the United States, is
such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it should
appear affirmatively that she possessed the other
qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to
naturalization.
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan,
sitting in the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed.
82. An alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the
United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr.
Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held
that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen of
the United States as fully as if she had complied with all of
the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United,
States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283." The
alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might be
lawfully naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839,
an alien woman came to the United States from France
and entered the country contrary to the immigration laws.
The immigration authorities took her into custody at the
port of New York, with the view of deporting her. She
Page 19 of 89
applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and
pending the disposition of the matter she married a
naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals
for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court below, that she
was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court
declared: "The rule is well settled that her marriage to a
naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be
discharged. The status of the wife follows that of her
husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's
domicil became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in
Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had before it the application
of a husband for his final decree of naturalization. It
appeared that at that time his wife was held by the
immigration authorities at New York on the ground that she
was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease.
Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the
husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship
upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge
Brown declined to pass upon the husband's application for
naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was
determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He
placed his failure to act on the express ground that the
effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At
the same time he express his opinion that the husband's
naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she
was not one who could become lawfully naturalized. "Her
own capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is
a prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking
in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon
her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that case,
and the views expressed therein are really nothing more
than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something
more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for
the learned judge, unable to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173
Fed. 626, District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien
woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an
American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to
the United States, could not be excluded, although she
had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the
immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her
exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The
case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911
was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that
case, however at the time the relators married, they might
have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we
assume the contention of the district attorney to be correct

that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who
would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not
affect these relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as
aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent with the
policy of our law that the husband should be a citizen and
the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and
the one now before the court is that, in the former case, the
marriage took place before any order of exclusion had
been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated after
such an order was made. But such an order is a mere
administrative provision, and has not the force of a
judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The
administrative order is based on the circumstances that
existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the
circumstances change prior to the order being carried into
effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of
exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien
was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it
should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual
deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the
disease, we think it plain that the order could not be carried
into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the order
of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to
remain, she in good faith marries an American citizen, we
cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she
thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994
of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased
to be an alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost
their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to
aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188
Fed. 694, sustained the right of the officials to deport a
woman under the following circumstances: She entered
this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been
born in Turkey. She was taken into custody by the
immigration authorities in the following September, and in
October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending
hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in
the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her
deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous
and contagious disease at the time of her entry. One of the
reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the
woman had married a citizen of the United States pending
the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge
declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under
such circumstances "is capable of having the effect
claimed, in view of the facts shown." He held that it was no
Page 20 of 89
part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the
immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the
country of the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise
entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class
of persons excluded by law from admission to the United
States does not come within the provisions of that section.
The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the
Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215
Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that where, pending
proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien
prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States,
she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to
deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due
process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended,
her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be
established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an action
commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and
the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed.
1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed
upon the language of the statute by the Department of
Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held
that residence within the United States for the period
required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in
order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she having
married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she
never resided in the United States, she and her husband
having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the
Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by
Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried
woman, twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium,
arrived in New York and went at once to a town in
Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen
months after her arrival she was taken before a United
States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings
under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134,
Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her
deportation, on the ground that she had entered this
country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found
an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing the
same within three years after landing. It appeared,
however, that after she was taken before the United States

commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by
the Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a
native-born citizen of the United States. The woman
professed at the time of her marriage an intention to
abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her
husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her
mode of life had been, but professed to believe in her good
intentions. The question was raised as to the right to
deport her, the claim being advance that by her marriage
she bad become an American citizen and therefore could
not be deported. The Attorney General ruled against the
right to deport her as she had become an American citizen.
He held that the words, "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully
naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions
of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not
escaped our observation that Congress, in enacting the
Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the
marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually
immoral classes ... shall not invest such female with United
States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall
be solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of
acts which make her liable to deportation under this act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above
change in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent
women of the immoral class avoiding deportation through
the device of marrying an American citizen.
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American
citizen with an alien woman of any other of the excluded
classes, either before or after her detention, should not
confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her
to enter the country, its intention would have been
expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to
women of the immoral class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American
decisions on the subject and We have found no warrant for
the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose
statements in some decisions and other treaties and other
writings on the subject would seem to give such
impression. The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which
Page 21 of 89
appears to be the most cited among the first of the
decisions 19 simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of
citizenship upon women married to citizens of the United
States, if they are of the class of persons for whose
naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The
terms "married" or "who shall be married," do not refer in
our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage
is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that,
whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be
naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether
his citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or
subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she
becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship,
whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon
her. The construction which would restrict the Act to
women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are
citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose
benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our
opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her
husband, without the necessity of any application for
naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there
is no reason for the restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws," only limit the application of the law to free
white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at
the time only required that the person applying for its
benefits should be "a free white person," and not an alien
enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of
Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373;
and is the one which gives the widest extension to its
provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who
might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit
the application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add
that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ...
required that the person applying for its benefits should be
(not only) a "free white person" (but also) ... not an alien
enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization
Law of the United States at the time the case was decided,
the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been
removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in
the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if
in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was
mentioned, the reason was that there was no other
non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy

disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by the
fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the
previous naturalization law, there was also such
requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since as
stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression
used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms
"who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws"
only limit the application of the law to free white women,
must be interpreted in the application to the special facts
and to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p.
982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a
citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her
race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not
there were other disqualifications under the law in force at
the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her
husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and
the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the evidence that
because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by
Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said
eliminated section particularly its subdivision (c), being the
criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully
naturalized," what should be required is not only that she
must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must
also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2,
such as those of age, residence, good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine
Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment
or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write
English or Spanish and one of the principal local
languages, education of children in certain schools, etc.,
thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been
purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act
2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises,
We have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not
sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history,
which We have already explained above of the mentioned
provisions has been shown or can be shown to indicate
that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather,
what is definite is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act
473 had already a settled construction by American courts
and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of
pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can be
Page 22 of 89
no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded
provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States,
(Section 1994, which was taken, from the Act of February
10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are
unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence,
good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc.
are not supposed to be considered, and that the only
eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or
class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope
of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case
of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in
Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the
American authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994
Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855, supra, "shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that
the person to whom it relates has not actually become a
citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the
judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application
and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that
account practically any the less a citizen. The word
"deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged";
and, therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be
"deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing, must,
in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning "such person or thing, and have
force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress
declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the
effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her
being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the
usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of
statutory construction that in a situation like this wherein
our legislature has copied an American statute word for
word, it is understood that the construction already given to
such statute before its being copied constitute part of our
own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a
different connotation or meaning to the provision in
question. At least, We have already seen that the views
sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on
in accurate factual premises related to the real legislative
background of the framing of our naturalization law in its
present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated
in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility
requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close

scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less
substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other
words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with
practically the same provision as Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase
"who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act
2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called
racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without
regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the
elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the
reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the
American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time
Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such qualifications
as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their
counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are
not supposed to be taken into account and that what
should be considered only are the requirements similar to
those provided for in said Section 1 together with the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who
might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have
been intended to convey a meaning different than that
given to it by the American courts and administrative
authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained
said phrase and from which it was taken by
Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that,
time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States was no longer in force because it had been
repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which
did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of
American citizens and required, instead, that they submit
to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more
liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other words,
when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which,
as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in
American law, the Americans had already abandoned said
phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien
wives to be natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to
dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the
approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the
phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction
and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of
requiring judicial naturalization and it appears that they
have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to
conclude that our law still follows the old or previous
American Law On the subject. Indeed, when
Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the
Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the
Page 23 of 89
American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the
old American law and make one of our own, or, at least,
follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922,
but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of
the old law. What then is significantly important is not that
the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1
of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting
on using it even after the Americans had amended their
law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the
construction that should be given to the phrase in question.
Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase
from an American statute before the American courts had
given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those
given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us
to adopt a construction here different from that of the
Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our
legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a
settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears
that our legislators even ignored the modification of the
American law and persisted in maintaining the old
phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be in
defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory
construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and
selective orientation and that it should be construed
independently of the previous American posture because
of the difference of circumstances here and in the United
States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of a
statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or
perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of
view seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to
emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so called racial
requirements, whether under the American laws or the
Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as
qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in
Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have
always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense
that those who did not possess them were the ones who
could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were
suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section 2
of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically
identical to those in the former law, except those in
paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the
clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all
the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited
in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp.
598-602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter,

Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval
the opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the
case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were
always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the
other disqualifications under the law, why should their
elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction
from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should
such elimination have instead the meaning that what were
previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have
become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the
holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same
language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as
amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of
Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the
legislature had in mind making the phrase in question "who
may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial
disqualification but to the qualification under Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act
2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be
naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and
those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of
one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not
have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of
increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications
that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by
what alchemy of logic such elimination could have
convicted qualifications into disqualifications specially in
the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications
clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately
from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in
American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been
considered to be of any relevance in determining "who
might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in
the statute governing the status of alien wives of American
citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied
verbatim from the American statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable
legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in
the United States, there are practical considerations that
militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in
the motion for reconsideration of counsel for
petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the
case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove
"qualifications" —
Page 24 of 89
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates
against a construction that Section 15 of the law requires
that an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that
she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section
2, before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if
imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably
onerous and compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The
unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the
following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for
naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the
applicant "must have resided in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than ten years." If this
requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino
citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at least,
she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband.
If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law
declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she
automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the
citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a
period of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And
even after having acquired continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her
petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she
would remain stateless for an indefinite period of time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for
naturalization that he "must own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation." Considering the
constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of
real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art.
XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire
the citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she
has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade,
profession or occupation. The income requirement has
been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must
be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic,
L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605,
June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912,
November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove
that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other
than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of
common knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of
the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have
gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law,
recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the husband,
imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former.

(Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that
universally, it is an accepted concept that when a woman
marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and
housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty,
how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own
to qualify her for citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for
naturalization "must have enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the public schools or private schools
recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government and
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum during the entire period of residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an alien
woman has minor children by a previous marriage to
another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor
children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during
her period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify
for naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The
reason behind the requirement that children should be
enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they
follow the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v.
Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88
Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668
[1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim
Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950).
Considering that said minor children by her first husband
generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the
basis for such requirement as applied to her does not
exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous
residence prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as
reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to
a Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien male married
to a Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five
years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas
an alien woman married to a Filipino husband must reside
for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more
difficult for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino
citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is
not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the
general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was
obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her
marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to
other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of
Page 25 of 89
Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old
Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special
privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as
any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this
situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No.
3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary
of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code,
the wife follows the nationality of the husband; but the
Department of State of the United States on October 31,
1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a
Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the
leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315)
held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being political
have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the stated taken
by the Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act No.
3448, was that marriage of alien women to Philippine
citizens did not make the former citizens of this counting.
(Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was
enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2927
which provides that "any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s.
1941; emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be
interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require
that the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed
in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would
become illusory. It is submitted that such a construction,
being contrary to the manifested object of the statute must
be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest
object, and if the language is susceptible of two
constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat
such manifest object, it should receive the former
construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051;
Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See
also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio,
15 Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will cause objectionable results
should be avoided and the court will, if possible, place on
the statute a construction which will not result in injustice,
and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a

construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or
inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction
which will prejudice public interest, or construction
resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction
which will result in absurd consequences.
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the
result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative
intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or
which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion
not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should
adopt that construction which will be the least likely to
produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the
intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would
render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague
is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the
legislature an intent to confer an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S.,
Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis
was laid on the need for aligning the construction of
Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission
to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked,
is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy,
the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult if not
practically impossible in some instances, for an alien
woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any
ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been
demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to
assume that Section 15 was intended to extend special
treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino
irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their
fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen
of this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there can
and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and
benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate
such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are
bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of
law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining
a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to
assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos
among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but
surely, no one should expect her to do so even before
marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the
extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so
much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the
following observations anent the national policy
rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the
second) to be quite persuasive:
Page 26 of 89
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national
policy begs the question. The avowed policy of "selectives
admission" more particularly refers to a case where
citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding
for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no
doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who
are worthy to become citizens. There is here a choice
between accepting or rejecting the application for
citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases
where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such
cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the
individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in
legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory
requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to
declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an
individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine
citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of his
moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with
Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions." A minor child of a
person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove the
fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen,
regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he
adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with
an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to
prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e.,
that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated
in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship
status as a fact.
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should
not be overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies
the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally
accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of
citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have
had no other objective than to maintain a unity of
allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v.
Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also
"Convention on the Nationality of Married Women:
Historical Background and Commentary." UNITED
NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be
satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire
citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is
particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law
has placed the husband as head of the family, whose
personal status and decisions govern the life of the family
group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the
unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in
whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring
interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said

that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic identity
of person and interest between husband and wife, and
from the nature of the relation, the home of one is that of
the other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It
should likewise be said that because of the theoretic
identity of husband and wife, and the primacy of the
husband, the nationality of husband should be the
nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be
the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v.
Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held:
"The status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and
by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile became
her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law
being that the property relations of husband and wife are
under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil
Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions
of family unity and identity that a husband should be a
citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national
treatment of one should be different from that of the other.
Thus, it cannot be that the husband's interests in property
and business activities reserved by law to citizens should
not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to
the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own
efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such
interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of
husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit
that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in
the instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs.
Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded
that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15
of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way
as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who
may be lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute
from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was
applied by the American courts and administrative
authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that
Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of
Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to
our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in
the circumstances between the United States, as the
so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the world,
and the Philippines as a developing country whose
Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly,
the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather
Page 27 of 89
passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak
our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be
sure, entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be
regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still,
We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the
provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and
orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily
from American law when the Philippines was under the
dominating influence of statutes of the United States
Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of
our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given
the opportunity to break away from the old American
pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after
America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of
September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans
cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing
naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to
adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as
embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of
1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and
uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to
alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without
having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and
without having to prove that they possess the special
qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to
American ideals and American constitution, provided they
show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the American Naturalization Law.
Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this
Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section
4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an
alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section
4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming
under it, doubtless there will be instances where
unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of
this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious
marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a
matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities,
the construction of the provision should be otherwise than
as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant
considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can

always be means of discovering such undesirable practice
and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a
re-examination of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra,
regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings
before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be
considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as
already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had
only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing
discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it.
The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack
of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made
her a Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization
proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that
she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as
things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We
have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina
without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the
answer to this question must necessarily be in the
affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in
Burca has not yet become final because there is still
pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which
vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious
consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the
reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as
good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a
Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must
apply therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting
that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section
2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of
the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be
filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has
resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing
of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office,
agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise —
other than the judgment of a competent court of justice —
certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino
citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and
void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization.
Or, in the words of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is
Page 28 of 89
as it should be. Because a reading of the petition will
reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein,
and to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4
of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself
apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization,
and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the
Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien
woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino
citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the
qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none
of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over
and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole
process of judicial naturalization apparently from
declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can
become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino
is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis
that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the national
of the country to which she owed allegiance before her
marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with
her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any
other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the
required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge
of English or Spanish and one of the principle local
languages, make her children study in Filipino schools,
acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation
of her own independently of her husband, file her
declaration of intention and after one year her application
for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible
witnesses of her good moral character and other
qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her
favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of
probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath
as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to
be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a
Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being
quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of
the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell
out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and
children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and
inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly
conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife
is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner
to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second
hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the
Court might have overlooked any relevant consideration
warranting a conclusion different from that complained

therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave
importance, considering its consequences upon tens of
thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein made
by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever
possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any
adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the
law or by the national policy it seeks to endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and
impressive by their number and standing in the Bar and
well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity,
legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive
resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the quality of
the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite
Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the
first time in the present case -- that an alien woman who
marries a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso
facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such
citizenship only through ordinary naturalization
proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and
that all administrative actions "certifying or declaring such
woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" — has
consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the
present case. Considerably more people are affected, and
affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The
newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women
married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision
of the Court. These are women of many and diverse
nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American,
Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These
members of the community, some of whom have been
married to citizens for two or three decades, have all
exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to
Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately or
in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real
property, and they will have sold and transferred such
property. Many of these women may be in professions
membership in which is limited to citizens. Others are
doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in
companies engaged in business activities for which a
certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed
by law. All these married women are now faced with
possible divestment of personal status and of rights
acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete
good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been
accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very
agencies of government charged with the administration of
that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial
Page 29 of 89
doctrines which would visit such comprehensive and
far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of
Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and
reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court
attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819,
Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 — when Chief Justice
Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto
and Delgado cases — although referring to situations the
equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the
case at bar — may have contributed materially to the
irregularities committed therein and in other analogous
cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe,
although erroneously, that the procedure followed was
valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue
under consideration, the Solicitor General was required,
not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to state "how
many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which
certificates of naturalization have been issued after notice
of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been
published in the Official Gazette only once, within the
periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in
Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957"
(when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29,
1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the
present case was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons
adduced in appellant's motion for reconsideration and in
the reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data
contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid
down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the
validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on
or before May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan
Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective
application of its construction of the law made in a previous
decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the
ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not
have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in
Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee
Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that
followed them have at the most become the law of the
case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds
 Page 30 of 89

therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said country provided that they shall lose said status if they
rulings and clarify or modify them. transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country
before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born
For ready reference, We requote Section 15: outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall
also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.
expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at
— Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to
the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where
a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
(d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized". 26
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who
have been born in the Philippines shall be considered
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very
citizens thereof.
correctly, as to the point that the minor children, falling
within the conditions of place and time of birth and
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at
residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with
the time of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically
Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force
become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child,
of the law itself and without the need for any judicial
who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed,
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only
the language of the provision, is not susceptible of any
during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently
other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same
in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will
expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in
continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of
reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the
age.
vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat

A child born outside of the Philippines after the because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be

naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that

Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the such status is intended to attach only after she has

age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization

citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he required of any person desiring to become a Filipino.

resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section
15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the minor children, the same section deliberately treats the
the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial
Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a naturalization.
complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the
status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within

such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful the constitutional authority of the Congress of the

inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by

undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L

carefully but categorically states the consequence of the ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of

naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for

prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his particular individuals, like two foreign religious

wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for

it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been classes or groups of persons under general conditions

born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like

(b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or

but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or

automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions

the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G.

such naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law

in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A
special form of naturalization is often observed by some
states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a
foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso
facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who
may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws."
(Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954];
emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in
the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo
Cua, supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in
construing the provision of the United States statutes from
which our law has been copied, 28a the American courts
have held that the alien wife does not acquire American
citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the
Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The
effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries
a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen
herself, without the formality of naturalization, and
regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601
[1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713,
165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed.
297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in
question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13,
by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of
November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was
copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, which by that time already had a long
accepted construction among the courts and
administrative authorities in that country holding that under
such provision an alien woman who married a citizen
became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of
law and as a consequence of the marriage itself without
having to undergo any naturalization proceedings,
provided that, it could be shown that at the time of such
marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under
the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We
already made of these undeniable facts would
unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The
only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this
juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American
Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it
desirable to avoid the effects of such construction,
approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly
requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial
naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than those for
Page 31 of 89
other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the
Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and
adopting such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on
November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the
aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes,
thereby indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and
its settled construction rather than the reform introduced by
the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much
as this Court may feel that as the United States herself has
evidently found it to be an improvement of her national
policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to
discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of
her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of
a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it
seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial
mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines
adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which
our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject,
as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe
said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the
American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in
judicial legislation which it is not institutionally permissible
for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going
precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court
before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied
that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the
Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant
for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not
have to submit themselves to another naturalization
proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the
proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who
have died. — In case a petitioner should die before the
final decision has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The decision
rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor
children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if
it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2
SCRA 383, this Court held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor,
petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16,
the widow and minor children are allowed to continue the
same proceedings and are not substituted for the original

petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original
petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow
and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies
whether the petitioner dies before or after final decision is
rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the
second sentence of said Section 16 contemplate the fact
that the qualifications of the original petitioner remains the
subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that
"The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the
same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life
of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the intent
of the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased
as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it
would have been unnecessary to consider the decision
rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor
children.
xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee,
declared that a dead person can not be bound to do things
stipulated in the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a
personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be
allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the deceased. In
the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she
be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper
certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization
proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been
completed, not on behalf of the deceased but on her own
behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits of
his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner
proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the
Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who
have been born in the Philippines shall be considered
citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473).
The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record
of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow
could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee
Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor
children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the
Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of
the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex
Page 32 of 89
A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua
Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to
Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization
as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order
to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the
same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is
absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to
treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments
advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and
We see no reason to disagree with the following views of
counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative
declaration of who may be considered citizens of the
Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that
Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or
manner under which foreigners may acquire citizenship,
but also the very power of conferring citizenship by
legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L.
Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law
of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself
recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are
naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV,
Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under
this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in
accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of
citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by
"derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for
example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra,
at 152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967
ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines"
found in Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law
clearly manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing
a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law
(Revised Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly
taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman
becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United States
as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the
statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller,
13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated

June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507],
December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op.
2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994
Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was
in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2),
"shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens" while it may
imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually
become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual
way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a
proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that
such person is on that account practically any the less a
citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of
"considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of
any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having
been duly adjudged or established concerning such
person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly.
When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman
shall, under certain circumstances, be "deemed" an
American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs,
is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of
Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van
Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965
ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine
legislature when it enacted the first paragraph of Section
15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual
analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety,
Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and
"shall automatically become" as used in the above
provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea
or purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine
citizenship by operation of law upon certain classes of
aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by
blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of
the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the
persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact
of citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the
effect is for said persons to become ipso factocitizens of
the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean
that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine
citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily
become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the
Page 33 of 89
statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens;
they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such
status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect
of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the
relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative
fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines
the point of time at which such citizenship commences.
Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a minor
child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born
in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the
Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs
with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time when
the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time
that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines.
The child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization
of his father that he was born in the Philippines and should,
therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not
mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later
time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a Philippine
citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her
marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the
marriage that her citizenship status became in question),
that she is one who might herself be lawfully naturalized." It
is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine
citizenship only after she had proven that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to
conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after
she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in
adopting the very phraseology of the law, the legislature
could not have intended that an alien wife should not be
deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves
that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it,
the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a
condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of
citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary
to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as
a fact established and proved in evidence. The word
"might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the
time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien
woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself
under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191
[1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869).
That she establishes such power long after her marriage

does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a
citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen
may not acquire the status of a citizen of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be
lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view,
the "acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife depends on
her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is,
she is not a citizen unless and until she proves that she
may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the
words of the law that the proviso does not mean that she
must first prove that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by Congress, not
by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited
by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule
that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has
proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those
decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those cases
failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they failed
to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to
the lower court for determination of whether petitioner,
whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was
disputed by the Government, "might herself be lawfully
naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her alleged
change of political status from alien to citizen" (at 464).
In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who
was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine citizen
by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was
no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such
evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of
Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her
marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will be
observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the
lack of proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be
lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did
not become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their
marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was
that these wives failed to establish their claim to that
status as a proven fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation
of law, the time when citizenship is conferred should not be
confused with the time when citizenship status is
established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in
issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for
instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in
Page 34 of 89
order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His
citizenship status commences from the time of birth,
although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a
subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might
herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen
at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the
time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by
showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory
declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the
Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a
declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of
law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the
later ipso facto upon marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she
might herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that
she has established her status as a proven fact. But
neither can it be said that on that account, she did not
become a citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship status
is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she obviously
has no obligation to establish her status as a fact. In such a
case, the presumption of law should be that she is what
she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado
v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption
that a representation shown to have been made is true.
(Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738,
74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence
of the foregoing views is, what substitute is them for
naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship
settled and established so that she may not have to be
called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act
or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right
reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such
question is that as the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such
procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship
under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage
or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case
may be, for the truth is that the same situation objections
even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship
of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,

hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in
which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding"
in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good
sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into
the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the
persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent
official findings, even if these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to
have a good starting point and so that the most immediate
relevant public records may be kept in order, the following
observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then
Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be
considered as the most appropriate initial step by the
interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must
file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that she is
married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified
from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified
by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the
subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be
less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any
other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance
and vigor of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third
issue We have passed upon was not touched by the trial
court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court
prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the
Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is
hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration
and/or his authorized representative is permanently
Page 35 of 89
enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the
confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who
is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya
Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on
January 25, 1962. No costs.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE
PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935
Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years
after he has reached the age of majority? This is the
question sought to be resolved in the present case
involving the application for admission to the
Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses
Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay,
a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La
Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has
resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a
Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University
in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998
Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court,
dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he
must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching
submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the
Board of Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a
certified public accountant;
 Page 36 of 89

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3)
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the may be extended under certain circumstances, as
said place; and when a (sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos.
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued
355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after
elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
over seven (7) years was not made within a
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
reasonable time.
synchronized elections.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar
formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he
Examinations were released and Ching was one of
does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable
the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of
time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However,
the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5
due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding
May 1999. However, because of the questionable
Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation
status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to
of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to
Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A.
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
Philippine Bar.
was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for
admission to the bar and on the documents On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation,
evidencing his Philippine citizenship. attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance,
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating
both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching
that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese
states:
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to 1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently
elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance
declared myself as one in my school records and
with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625
other official documents;
entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which
the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be 3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the
best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship
time I was eligible to vote;
which he could perfect by election upon reaching the
age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies 5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a
that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to
election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, 1995;
namely: (a) the mother of the person making the
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in
election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b)
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
said election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of 7. My election was expressed in a statement signed

the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:" and sworn to by me before a notary public;

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has 8. I accompanied my election of Philippine

been construed to mean a reasonable time after citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the

reaching the age of majority which had been Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my
oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao
La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as
filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine
citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within
a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his
citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took
the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter
was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine
citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution
when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise,
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973
and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as
having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the
1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person
was subject to challenge under the old charter, it
remains subject to challenge under the new charter
even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section
1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to
make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship
expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
Page 37 of 89
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625
did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching
twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of
election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the decisions
of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on
the pronouncements of the Department of State of
the United States Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a "reasonable time"
after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that
this the election should be made within three (3) years
from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco
vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year
period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean
a reasonable period after reaching the age of
majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled
that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when the
person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension
of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February
16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on
May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28)
by years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said
election has not been made "upon reaching the age

of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11
April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years
after he had reached the age of majority. Based on
the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the
age of majority," Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable
period within which to exercise the privilege. It
should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his
being a certified public accountant, a registered voter
and a former elected public official, cannot vest in
him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances
cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a
refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were
(sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise
of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928,
and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22
years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s].
These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts
and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the
1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him.
Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not
necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine
citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he
Page 38 of 89
being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this
regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other
act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights
and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship
(U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543,
Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy
Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953;
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954).
Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous
belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further
elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as
both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right
of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court,
we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he
came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine
citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely
exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent
who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply
the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is
a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time
to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical
 Page 39 of 89

acts of similar nature are themselves formal admission to the Philippine Bar.
manifestations for these persons.
SO ORDERED.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
doubtful because he is a national of two countries.
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
Footnotes
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship
on the part of the private respondent would not only
have been superfluous but it would also have
resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
elect Philippine citizenship? 19
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the vs.
plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
having lived in the Philippines all his life and his JR., respondents.
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling
statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently,
we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,

citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that vs.

lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF

until he finally expressed his intention to elect REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,

Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the JR., respondents.

contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for
offered no reason why he delayed his election of
respondent Ong, Jr.
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required
of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
be simply glossed over. Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a second district of Northern Samar was held.
result. this golden privilege slipped away from his
grasp. Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the second legislative district of Northern
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves
Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co
to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found
for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues
raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members.
(See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168
SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution,
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by
the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has
been described as "intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the
legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full,
Page 40 of 89
clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended
1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed
upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear
and complete as that previously granted the Legislature
and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA
140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987
Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the
Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives,
any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this
Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any
authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp.
403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral
Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990])
the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the
Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the
exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power
as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429
[1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous
area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has
to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been
given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the
government to determine whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII,
Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check
whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not
that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET
alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA
668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power,
the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite
scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their
functions independent organs — independent of Congress
and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by
the Constitution is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
(Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and
careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this
exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the
Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the
present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists
today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political
composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is
nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET
because of its composition any less independent from the
Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The
degree of judicial intervention should not be made to
depend on how many legislative members of the HRET
belong to this party or that party. The test remains the
same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of
power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET
which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial
review by the Supreme Court.
Page 41 of 89
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private
respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence
in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was
born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to
Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of
Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring
relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside
community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values
and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the
years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got
married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private
respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this
country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared
and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As
a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the
meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of
his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where
he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on
February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared
Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar
issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as
final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already
take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization
was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private
respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his
elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private
respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's
family constructed another one in place of their ruined
house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang
was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila
in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the
family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in
Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still
another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two
doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and
thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the
respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the
Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later,
however, he worked in the hardware business of his family
in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status
as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically,
the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed
the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the
basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural
born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be
aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it
was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang,
Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named
Desiree Lim.
Page 42 of 89
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr.
registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several
years in the management of their family business decided
to be of greater service to his province and ran for public
office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran
in the elections for representative in the second district of
Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of
Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even
if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong
would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article
IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship.
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as
applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that
date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an
unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women.
There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4,
would this refer only to those who elect Philippine
 Page 43 of 89

citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or xxx xxx xxx
would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973
Constitution? Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an
inequitable situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected when we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of
Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born
Constitution whether the election was done before or after Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien
January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied) reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they
become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino
xxx xxx xxx citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1,
p. 356)
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights,
Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers.
more or less decided to extend the interpretation of who is To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987
a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable
Constitution by adding that persons who have elected situation. It must also be retroactive.
Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be
natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer? It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are
not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its
Fr. Bernas: yes. language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail
over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter
xxx xxx xxx
would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of
Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the
Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to
the decision was designed merely to accommodate former
give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at
delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on
which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision
natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that
which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v.
the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention
Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
by supporting the amendment?

In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v.

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been
LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189) To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our
Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed
xxx xxx xxx
narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein
contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important
mathematical formulas having their essence in their form
because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him
but are organic living institutions, the significance of which
not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen
is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
entitling him to run for Congress. . .

The provision in question was enacted to correct the

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
reason we will leave it to the body to approve that provision
and an alien mother was automatically granted the status
of section 4.
of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine

because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier

was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the

Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers
and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father
were placed on equal footing. They were both considered
as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born"
cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time
or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the
same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted,
that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and,
therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either
before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore
curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the
inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and
thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at
the time had it not been for the curative provisions.
(See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a
natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution accords natural born status to children
born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural
born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have
divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of
his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been
a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a
formal and an informal process.
Page 44 of 89
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came
of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his
right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they
were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of
Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial
distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino
since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the
child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has
worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession
requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting
a license. He has participated in political exercises as a
Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino
citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing
to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of
Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage.
They should know him better than any member of this
Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming
numbers to have him represent them in Congress.
Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered
him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to
elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to
Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public
office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful

because he is a national of two countries. There is no
doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he
turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the
part of the private respondent would not only have been
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.
How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how
Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as
such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not,
validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature
taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death
and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father
through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v.
Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run
against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak.
To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have
long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously
he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie
to defend himself were this matter to be made a central
issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of
citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to
determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the
respondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
Page 45 of 89
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino
when he came of age. At that time and up to the present,
both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent
Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless
he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of
a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his
father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET
as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion.
The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already
been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971
and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of
the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full
blood brother of the respondent, was declared and
accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the
Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and
the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the
HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's
declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of
April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the
status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish
subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who
were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even
though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization
papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired
domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)

The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual
residence. This domicile, once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of
Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of
Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that
certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of
his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the
Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued
until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the
19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his
business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te
falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of
the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he,
nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact
that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact
that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a
Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having
established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of
Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the
Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who
has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a
domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II)
A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the
provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in
concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born
Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that
document presented to prove it were not in compliance
with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that
the private respondent failed to present the original of the
documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the
transcript of the proceedings of the body which the
Page 46 of 89
aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private
respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence
rule.
the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes
of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention
held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo,
Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by
Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law
Center, in their respective testimonies given before the
HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency
which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp.
30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1,
1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty.
Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to
such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was
also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty.
Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to
produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be
of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that
after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found.
(see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to
produce were adequately established, the contents of the
questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or
by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the
documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the
former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty.
Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the
hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents
presented during the hearing of the election protest against
the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1,
1989, pp. 8-9)
 Page 47 of 89

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a
vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that
he was presiding officer of the plenary session which
deliberated on the report on the election protest against
Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice
Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could
have presented any one of the long list of delegates to
refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born
citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
contents of the documents presented by the private
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular
members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, and a
resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p.
87)
xxx xxx xxx

respondent. They merely relied on the procedural

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7,
objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence
page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same
presented.
point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a

The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the matter of intention rather than actual residence.

qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is
the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider
member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on
at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather
the controversies over which they were sole judges.
than mere intention to reside?
Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all
relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty
assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we especially considering that a provision in the Constitution
cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad
discretion. We have to keep clear the line may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the
between error and grave abuse. original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)

The petitioners question the residence qualification of

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier
respondent Ong.
definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it
as having the same meaning as domicile.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence"
under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
to which when absent for business or pleasure, one
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA
Constitution.
966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent
residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal
continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of
domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v.
a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as
Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
that of domicile, to wit:

The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in
the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar.
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt
Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
to require residence in the place not less than one year
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my
to the present.
question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence
of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

The private respondent, in the proceedings before the
HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted
their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their
house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their
family, two doors of which were reserved as their family
residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private
respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot,
therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name
of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his
parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to
the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a
co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in
the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own
any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case
of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it
is not required that a person should have a house in order
to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that
he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in
that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order
to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that
the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and
residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in
order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil.
294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in
Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to
practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon
the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the
periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that
he always had the animus revertendi.
Page 48 of 89
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has,
rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our
history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays,
Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other
nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our
country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded
nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To
mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the
late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese,
and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also
part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud
were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest
wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must
forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship,
we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have
to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its
richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our
antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent
backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the
indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often
corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and
whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical
traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised
to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful
examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A
more humane, more indubitable and less technical
approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr.
is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and
Gancayco, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
These separate petitions
for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision* of
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November
1989 which declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a legal resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution of the
tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners'
motions for reconsideration.
In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the
Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a
Member of the House of Representatives and to declare
him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest
number of votes among the qualified candidates, the duly
elected representative of the second legislative district of
Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner
Balanquit prays that the Court declare private respondent
Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not
qualified for membership in the House of Representatives
and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected
representative of said district.
Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and
private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the
candidates for the position of Representative or
Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar
during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private
respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987
with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes
over petitioner Co who obtained the next highest number
of votes.
Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election
protests against private respondent with the tribunal,
docketed as HRET Cases Nos. 13 and 15 respectively.
Both protests raised almost the same issues and were thus
considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.
The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:
1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of
Page 49 of 89
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and
2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar, in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of
the same Constitution, for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the congressional elections of
May 1987.
The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November
1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and was a legal resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to
the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore,
declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the
House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines,
representing the second legislative district of Northern
Samar.
The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated
proceedings in the tribunal are the following:
1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the
legal spouses Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan
and Agrifina E. Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is
now one of the municipalities comprising the province of
Northern Samar (Republic Act No. 6132 approved on
August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution).
2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China
and arrived in Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz)
Subsequently thereafter, he took up residence in Laoang,
Samar.
3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their
wedding was celebrated according to the rites and
practices of the Roman Catholic Church in the Municipality
of Laoang (Exh. E).
4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina
E. Lao was a natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents
at the time of her birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E &
I)
5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to
acquire Philippine citizenship, filed his petition for
naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Samar,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known
as the Revised Naturalization Law.

6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar
rendered a decision approving the application of Jose Ong
Chuan for naturalization and declaring said petitioner a
Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties,
liabilities and obligations inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh.
E)
7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:
(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955
final and executory;
(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding
Certificate of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong
Chuan who prefers to take his oath and register his name
as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath as
Filipino citizen under Ms new christian name, Jose Ong
Chuan. (Exh. F)
8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the
corresponding oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines as prescribed by
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization. (Exh. G)
9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the
protestee and a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang,
Samar to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E.
Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the
1971 Constitutional Convention.
10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that
he had attended grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he
went to Manila where he finished his secondary as well as
his college education. While later employed in Manila,
protestee however went home to Laoang whenever he had
the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as
frequent as twice to four times a year.
11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal
resident of Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and
correspondingly voted in said municipality in the 1984 and
1986 elections.
12. Again in December 1986, during the general
registration of all voters in the country, Protestee
re-registered as a voter in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay
Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee
indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since birth. (Exh.
7)1
Page 50 of 89
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's
decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present
petitions.
In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of
the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House
Electoral Tribunal, considering the constitutional provision
vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives.2
On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present
controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents'
contentions, the Court has the jurisdiction and competence
to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to
decide the present controversy.
Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held
in Morrero vs. Bocar,3 construing Section 4, Article VI of
the 1935 Constitution which provided that ". . . The
Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the National Assembly," that:
The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in
the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the
power as will constitute a denial of due process of law."
(Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law.
ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35 Off. Gaz.,
23.)
And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-bound
to determine whether or not, in an actual controversy,
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
 Page 51 of 89

The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more public office which is specifically reserved by the
than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.
congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots,
in which cases, it may be contended with great legal force After a careful consideration of the issues and the

and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent

should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned

matters. The present controversy, however, involves no decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently stated.

less than a determination of whether the qualifications for

The Constitution5 requires that a Member of the House of
membership in the House of Representatives, as
Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the
prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and,
its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely
thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year
because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to
immediately preceding the day of the election.
be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines
jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its
natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:
power of judicial review.

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the

Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
private respondent for the office of Member of the House of
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
Representatives, are here controverted by petitioners who,
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office
(3), Section I hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizen,
illegally held by private respondent. From this additional
direction, where one asserts an earnestly perceived right Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987
that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is Constitution provides that:
clearly a justiciable controversy proper for this Court to
consider and decide. Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision xxx xxx xxx
of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention
of the time-honored principle of constitutional separation of (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
function entrusted and assigned to it by the Constitution of the age of majority.
interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent
The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting
provisions of the Constitution with finality.
the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first
It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, sentence of Section 2 of Article IV states the basic
correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private
the context of the interactions of the three branches of the respondent fall within said definition?
government, almost always in situations where some
To the respondent tribunal,
agency of the State has engaged in action that stems
ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental
Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of
power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B. Sevisher,
the Philippines under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article
1958, p. 36).4
IV of the 1987 Constitution because he did not have "to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest
citizenship." It bears to repeat that on 15 May 1957, while
and concern to determine whether or not private
still a minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen
respondent is qualified to hold so important and high a

by declaration of law. Since his mother was a natural-born
citizen at the time of her marriage, protestee had an
inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the moment of his
birth and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15
of CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the
moment of his birth without his having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.6
I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such
kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private
respondent was born on 19 June 1948 to the spouses
Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a
natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern Samar. In
other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese
citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his
father was then a Chinese citizen (not a naturalized
Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was
enforced at the time of private respondent's birth on 19
June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the
Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose
mothers were citizens of the Philippines had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in
order to be considered Filipino citizens.7
Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a
natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution,
private respondent is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the
Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to
elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother,
but only upon his reaching the age of majority.
While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law
(C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father),
who were born in the Philippines prior to the naturalization
of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens,8 this
does not alter the fact that private respondent was not born
to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA
473 did not confer upon him the status
a natural-born citizen merely because he did not have to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as
a Filipino citizen.
But even assuming arguendo that private respondent
could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the
operation of CA 473, petitioners however contend that the
naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid
and void from the beginning, and, therefore, private
respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.
Page 52 of 89
Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that
only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a
Filipino citizen is permissible, and, therefore, a collateral
attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an
electoral contest which does not even involve him (Ong
Chuan).
Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that
the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must
emanate from the Government and must be made in a
proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for
de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who in
such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.
A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however,
afforded the character of impregnability under the principle
of res judicata.9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion
made in the proper proceeding by the Solicitor General or
his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.
In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,10 this Court held that:
An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the
privilege of citizenship. He may accept the offer and
become a citizen upon compliance with the prescribed
conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of
right. He can only become a citizen upon and after a strict
compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this
high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the terms
upon which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is
his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional
facts upon which the grant is predicated actually exist and
if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.
xxx xxx xxx
Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class
of persons, no other person is entitled to such privilege,
nor to a certificate purporting to grant it, and any such
of
certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive it
must be treated as a mere nullity, which confers no legal
rights as against the government, from which it has been
obtained without warrant of law.
"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most
discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature,
affecting public interest of the highest order, and which
may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions
prescribed by law therefor."11

Considering the legal implications of the allegation made
by the petitioners that the naturalization of private
respondent's father Ong Chuan, is a nullity, the Court
should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization
proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more
inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat
for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public
office.12
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the
citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father.
If his father's Filipino citizenship is void from the beginning,
then there is nothing from which private respondent can
derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship. For a spring
cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private
respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship
by virtue of a void naturalization of his father, would
constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against
the Constitution.
The records show that private respondent's father, Jose
Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Philippine Government, as prescribed by Section
12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI
issued its order directing the clerk of court to issue the
corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the
applicant to take the oath of allegiance.
However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to
take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has
previously obtained a decision favorable to his application
for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper
and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the
issuance of said order and before the expiration of the
reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said
order.13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,14 this Court held that:
Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day
as issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular and
makes the proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic
vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So
vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).
It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the
naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's
father) was null and void. It follows that the private
respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void
naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be
Page 53 of 89
considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing
the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization to
Ong Chuan and for the latter to take the oath of allegiance
was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of
Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an automatic
naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a
Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or
perfection of the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Let us now look into the question of whether or not private
respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino
citizen by reason of the undisputed fact that his mother
was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to
an examination of the second sentence in Article IV,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner
of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the
same Article IV, the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen
to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. The right or privilege of election is
available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers
under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973
Constitution took effect on 17 January 1973.
The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted
in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion
as to exceed its jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment
by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born"
Filipino citizen on those who elect Philippine citizenship —
all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support
private respondent's qualification to be a Member of the
House of Representatives.15
Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of
section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
contemplates that only the legitimate children of Filipino
mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973
and who would reach the age of majority (and thus elect
Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born
Filipino citizen.16
The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the
constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to
refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its

(sic) framers to be endowed, without distinction, to all
Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is
more than persuasively established by the extensive
interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the
official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. 17
Although I find the distinction as to when election of
Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at
bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of
the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship,
as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to settle the
controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional
provisions in question.
I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates,
interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the
1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even
nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus —
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also
be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered
by the framers.18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of
the same Article, appear to negate the contention of
petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before
17 January 1973 and who would elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are
to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship,
Commissioner Treñas specifically asked Commissioner
Bernas regarding the provisions in question, thus:
MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of
Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights
has more or less decided to extend the interpretation of
who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided in Section
4 of the 1973 Constitution, by adding that persons who
have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I right,
Mr. Presiding Officer?
Page 54 of 89
FR BERNAS: Yes.
MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills
addition to Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be
contrary to the spirit of that section?
FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to
the letter really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is
something that has been debated before and is being
debated even now. We will recall that during the 1971
Constitutional Convention, the status of natural-born
citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was
challenged precisely because he was a citizen by election.
Finally, the 1971 Constitutional Convention considered him
a natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a
Member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The
reason behind that decision was that a person under his
circumstances already had the inchoate right to be a
citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a
matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention
formalized that recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of
Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the entire purpose
of this proviso is simply to perhaps remedy whatever
injustice there may be so that these people born before
January 17, 1973 who are not naturalized and people who
are not natural born but who are in the same situation as
we are considered natural-born citizens. So, the intention
of the Committee in proposing this is to equalize their
status.19
When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born
citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner
Azcuna thus:
MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4,
would this refer only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or
would it also cover those who elected it under the 1935
Constitution?
FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected
Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935
Constitution, whether the election was done before or after
17 January 1973.20
And during the period of amendments. Commissioner
Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as
Section 2 and Section 1, paragraph (3) of Article IV of the
1987 Constitution, thus:

MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy
an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we
were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino
fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.
However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers
would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born
of Filipino mothers and those born of Filipino fathers. So
that from January 17, 1973 when the 1973 Constitution
took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien
fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also, those who
are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are
natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born
of a Filipino mother and that born of a Filipino father, why
do we not give a chance to a child born before January 17,
1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in
the same status as one born of a Filipino father — namely,
natural-born citizen.
Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father
and a mother vis-a-vis the child. I would like to state also
that we showed equalize the status of a child born of a
Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a
child born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24
hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien
father one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen,
if he elects Philippine citizenship, but he is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who
luckily was born 24 hours later — maybe because of parto
laborioso — is a natural-born Filipino citizen.21
It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen
was to equalize the position of Filipino fathers and Filipino
mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino
citizens. In other words, after 17 January 1973, effectivity
date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino
fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien
spouse) are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born
to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect
Philippine citizenship upon their reaching the age of
majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino
citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of
the age of majority, may be made before or after 17
January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in
consonance with the fundamental purpose of the
Page 55 of 89
Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's
individual interests,22 and to foster equality among them.
Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or
before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien
spouse) and should have elected Philippine citizenship on
19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or
soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a
natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution,
the vital question is: did private respondent really elect
Philippine citizenship? As earlier stated, I believe that
private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship,
contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.
The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:
Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien
father had exercised the right of suffrage when he came of
age, the same constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts
of the petitioner in registering as a voter, participating in
elections and campaigning for certain candidates were
held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even
without complying with the formal requisites for election,
the petitioner's Filipino citizenship was judicially upheld.23
I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be
patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion. For it is settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be
made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 224 of the Act mandate that the option to
elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not
impliedly.
The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio
Mallare25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the
right of suffrage when he came of age, constituted a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the
doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not
applicable to the case at bar. The respondent tribunal
failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of
majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA 625
was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years
before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of
election) took effect.
To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:
 Page 56 of 89

Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a for at least one (1) year in the district in which he shall be
formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the elected.
enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no
particular proceeding was required to exercise the option The next question that comes up is whether or not either of

to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party the petitioners can replace private respondent as the

by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Representative of the second legislative district of Northern

Constitution.26 Samar in the House of Representatives.

Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the

because he was an illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the

mother and thus followed her citizenship. I therefore agree House of Representatives representing the second district

with the petitioners' submission that, of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L.

in citing the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

engaged in an obiter dictum. EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,27 is controlling. There we

held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo
The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by warranto petition, could not replace Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as
operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he
providing for private respondent's acquisition of Filipino obtained only the second highest number of votes in the
citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of
law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him. Baguio City for mayor of that City.
For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private
respondent's father was valid, and that there was no A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified

further need for private respondent to elect Philippine for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even

citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino if it is labelled an election protest.28 It is a proceeding to

citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily

Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by to install the protestant in his place.29

him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the

The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority
Constitution. Besides, election of Philippine citizenship
of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an
derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching
election does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
the age of majority, not during one's minority.
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a

There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the

respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon election is a nullity.30

reaching the age of majority in 1969 or within a reasonable

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled
time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he
by those who have the highest number of votes cast in the
cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under
election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
republican forms of government that no one can be

Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I declared elected and no measure can be declared carried

am constrained to state that private respondent is not a unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal

natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.

Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to 676).

Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence is

As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the
disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of
candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the
Representatives.
winner in the event that the candidate who won is found

At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was

issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —

requires that a Member of the House of Representatives

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not
must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident
entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the

election is quite different from that produced by declaring a
person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it be found
that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and
that another candidate was the real victor, the former must
retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not,
strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving
a plurality of the legally cast ballots. . . .31
The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention as a natural-born Filipino citizen, in relation to
the present case.
Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of
Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and
mother.
Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong
was a natural-born Filipino citizen, alleged before the
House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a
natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while initially
impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not
supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision
of the electoral tribunal adopted the same as the basis of
its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in
reference to this submission, said:
Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's
disposition of protestee's citizenship based on an entirely
different set of circumstances, apart from the indisputable
fact that the matters attempted to be brought in issue in
connection therewith are too far removed in point of time
and relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the
Tribunal, we view these two issues as being already
inconsequential.33
The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate
its decision on the alleged citizenship by naturalization of
private respondent's father (Ong Chuan) and on the
alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private
respondent.
Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers
EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by Leonardo D. Galing and
Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his
citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election
Protests Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention
Page 57 of 89
heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a
report dated 4 September 1972, the dispositive portion of
which stated:
It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a
Filipino citizen under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, thus
conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong Chuan,
Philippine citizenship at birth, the conclusion is
inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-born citizen,
and is therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to
the Constitutional Convention.34
On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed
against Emil L. Ong were dismissed, following the report of
the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials.35
It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971
Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to
say the least, inconclusive to the case at bar, because —
a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil
L. Ong case involved the 1935 Constitution; the present
case, on the other hand involves the 1987 Constitution:
b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of
a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987
Constitution contains a precise and specific definition of a
"natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV
thereof and private respondent does not qualify under such
definition in the 1987 Constitution;
c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the
case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not
a court of law. And, even if we have to take such a decision
as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body
exercising quasi-judicial functions), said decision in the
Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or character
of res judicata in the present judicial controversy, because
between the two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties
(one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves private
respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of
causes of action because the first involves the 1935
Constitution while the second involves the 1987
Constitution.
But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on
procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before
the electoral tribunal and, therefore, also before this Court,
does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong

before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and inferentially
adopted by private respondent in the present controversy.
This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L.
Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under
the 1935 Constitution laid stress on the "fact" — and this
appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L.
Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino citizen under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants
like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent)
became natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention said:
Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject
residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was
therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens
of the Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill
of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 as well as
their children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section 4,
Philippine Bill of 1902).36
The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te
private respondent's and Emil L. Ong's grandfather was
"an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside
therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he
met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then,
Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a
Filipino citizen.
Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA,
BB, CC, DD and EE which are copies of entries in the
"Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show
that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of Samar
where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners
(protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence
before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a
certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records
and Management and Archives Office, stating that the
name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central
de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These
exhibits prove or at least, as petitioners validly argue, tend
to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close
to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue residing
in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to
private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs
Page 58 of 89
or evidence, private respondent FAILED TO PRESENT
ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE,
except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.
It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the
majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted
any reliance on the alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of
Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not
surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong Te and father or
private respondent, did not even attempt to claim Filipino
citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino
citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead
applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.
Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the
House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed
the factual question or issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the
light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to
look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had
become a Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902
was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held
in Lee vs. Commissioners of Immigration:37
. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding Court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court
in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8
May 1984.1âwphi1 In connection with said resolution, it is
contended by private respondent that the resolution of the
1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case
was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L.
Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the
Batasang Pambansa and that, according to private
respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee
Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it
would help to look into the circumstances of the case
brought before this Court in relation to the Court's action or
disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both
candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14 May
1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification with
the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed

as SPC No. 84-69 contending that Ong is not a
natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the judgment of the 1971
Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines bars the petitioner from raising
the Identical issue before the COMELEC. (G.R. No.
67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the
COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this
Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the
COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.
In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent
COMELEC from holding any further hearing on the
disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil
Ong (SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R.
Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)
This Court, in explaining its action, held that:
Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and considering that at the
hearing this morning, it was brought out that the 1971
Constitutional Convention, at its session of November 28,
1972, after considering the Report of its Committee on
Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest
questioning the citizenship of the protestee (the petitioner
herein) was groundless and dismissed Election Protests
Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner (p.
237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session
as well as of the said Committee's Report having been duly
admitted in evidence without objection and bears out, for
now, without need for a full hearing, that petitioner is a
natural-born citizen, the Court Resolved to ISSUE,
effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any further
hearing on the disqualification case entitled Edilberto Del
Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00
o'clock this afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss
the same. This is without prejudice to any appropriate
action that private respondent may wish to take after the
elections. (emphasis supplied)
It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No.
67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on the
merits either by the Court or by the COMELEC and merely
on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and this is
quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action
Page 59 of 89
that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the
elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the
resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-born citizen under the
1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further
proceeding in regard to the same question and that,
consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to
such recognition. How much more when the Constitution
involved is not the 1935 Constitution but the 1987
Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all
such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was still
inexistent.
A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private
respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest
number of votes for the elective position of Representative
(Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the
second district of Northern Samar, would have had to
cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full
membership of the Court had participated in this case, with
the result that the legislative district would cease to have,
in the interim, a representative in the House of
Representatives. But the fundamental consideration in
cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the
Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when
the electorate in the second legislative district of Northern
Samar cast the majority of their votes for private
respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully
eligible and qualified for the office because he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption
and belief can not prevail over, but must yield to the
majesty of the Constitution.
This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the
Constitution mandates that members of the House of
Representatives should be "natural-born citizens of the
Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says,
"Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough. What is
worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even
aliens will do as well."
WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private
respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore NOT
QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of
Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.
Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the majority.
(1)
I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a
question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves
facts to the tribunal that determined them. I am quite
agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating
to the membership in the House, as follows:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.1
is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute
its judgment because it thinks it knows better.
In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections,2 it was
held that this Court can not review the errors of the
Commission on Elections (then the "sole judge" of all
election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and
unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is
to see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of
discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred
expanded powers on the Court,3 but as the Charter states,
our authority is "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."4 It is not to review
facts.
"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical
exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or
otherwise, to denial of due process of law.5
I find none of that here.
As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a
matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly,
Page 60 of 89
it is quite another thing to say that the respondent Tribunal
has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has
begged to differ. It does not form part of the duty of the
Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the
Government.
The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the
Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently,
is possessed of the qualifications to be a member of the
House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the
Court can not be more popish than the pope.
(2)
I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in
question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be
noted that Jose Ong had relied on the Report dated
September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Committee6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in which
the Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained the
qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full
blood brother. According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs'
grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied
with the requirements on Filipinization by existing laws for
which his successors need not have elected Filipino
citizenship. I quote:
xxx xxx xxx
There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be
any doubt that Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was a
Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11,
1899, and was therefore one of the many who
became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects
on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born
subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of
1902). Excepted from the operation of this rule were
Spanish subjects who shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the
Treaty of Paris, only Spanish subjects who were natives of
Peninsular Spain had the privilege of preserving their
Spanish nationality.7
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx

As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established
residence in the Philippines in 1895, as shown by
the Registro Central de Chinos. He was also issued a
certificate of registration. He established a business here,
and later acquired real property. Although he went back to
China for brief visits, he invariably came back. He even
brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the
Philippines when the latter was only 10 years old. And Ong
Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly
noted on his landing certificate, his father, Ong Te had
been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 — i.e., as a
permanent resident. Indeed, even when Ong Te went back
to China in the 1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong
Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines —
obviously because he had long considered the Philippines
his home. The domicile he established in 1895 is
presumed to have continued up to, and beyond, April 11,
1899, for, as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired
is not lost until a new one is gained. The only conclusion
then can thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled
in the Philippines as of April 11, 1899, within the meaning
of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 — and was,
consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902.8
It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father,
subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he
was, all along, a Chinese citizen, but as the Report held:
Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both
Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father),
appear to have been registered as Chinese citizens even
long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan
himself believed the was alien, to the extent of having to
seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization
proceedings. The point, to our mind, is neither crucial nor
substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter of law,
rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides,
and not what one thinks his status to be, which determines
whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere
mistake or misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has
been held, is not a sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture
of Philippine citizenship; it does not even constitute
estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too,
estoppel applies only to questions of fact and not of law
(Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957).9
It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved
by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972, approved
Page 61 of 89
without any objection by the Convention in plenary
session.10
I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as
mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from
experience, because when the Convention approved the
Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the
presiding officer.
It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this
Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to
sit as member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa) 11 in
which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.
Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit
that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled matter.
Let it rest.
It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of
the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court,
involved Emil Ong and not his brother; I submit, however,
that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or
not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates,
indeed, also of this Court.
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect
of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and
assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the
League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter,
League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye,
who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he

was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated
May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in
the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced
upon himself as a means of survival against the
unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the
Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the
restoration of democracy. He also argued that the
challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality
a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within
ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover,
was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so
could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative
defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections
decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set
the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be
set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the
petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing
on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the
same time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their
assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen
and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of
the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also
argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections
was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to
prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his
candidacy and election being null and void ab
initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to
be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have
been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation
because it was only in September 1988 that they received
proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League
itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was
suing not only for the League but also in his personal
Page 62 of 89
capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself
alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General
supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of
the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was
disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His
election did not cure this defect because the electorate of
Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local
Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He
also joined in the private respondent's argument that
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not
applicable because what the League and Estuye were
seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation
and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also
asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the
Philippines because his naturalization as an American
citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support
he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L.
396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in
Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been
obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he
could not have repatriated himself before the 1988
elections because the Special Committee on
Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had
not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a
sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
participation in the 1987 congressional elections had
divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the
United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He
ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move
to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question
herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly
instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after
all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long
delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be
inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of
public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary
jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications

of the members of the Congress and elective provincial
and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's
citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC
through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who
categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We
assume this stance was taken by him after consultation
with the public respondent and with its approval. It
therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself
that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to
interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall
consider the present petition as having been filed in
accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution,
to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan
G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of
his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of
Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are
merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI,
Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance
at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of
the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines
and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,
Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19,
1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen
of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss
of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Page 63 of 89
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO,
born on October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on
January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization
No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he
expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as
earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a
measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos
government through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner
was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even
so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was
coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble
suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his
own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and
must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States
similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to
greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do
they claim to have been coerced — to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of
allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who
solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely
renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or
which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen,"
meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The
martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those

Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their
Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance
to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which is
clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on
the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without
prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal
status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of
the nationalities which any such person possesses,
recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of
the country in which he is habitually and principally
resident or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely
connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of
Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired
naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the
outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and
his business interests were in Germany. In 1943,
Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested
Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the
ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he
was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because
it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two
states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved
in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not
actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question
presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the
Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other
nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as
sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of
the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to
determine under its law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his
naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case
Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
Page 64 of 89
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have
done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under
CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two
methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the elections in this
country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship
under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and
the United States as his adopted country. It should be
obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what
might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless
individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated
himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee
provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to
suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation
unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious Such a
conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would
allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim
back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting
their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these
categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is
hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that
cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet
been convened, what that meant simply was that the
petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek
naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission
on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not
well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to
prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of
governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing
 Page 65 of 89

requirements and must be possessed not only at the time decision becomes final and executory. The temporary
of appointment or election or assumption of office but restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably SO ORDERED.

challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a

foreigner during her term and by her act or omission
acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
office simply because the challenge to her title may no
longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It
has been established, and not even denied, that the ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO
evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
eight months after his proclamation and his title was ELECTIONS, respondents.
challenged shortly thereafter.
DECISION
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
MENDOZA, J.:
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent
by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other
employment only to the citizens of this country. The
one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be were as follows:
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of The proclamation of private respondent was
the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
other state. respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our
Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril
laws, which is all the more reason why it should be
and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be
citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division
Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager
said:
arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act,
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for
the renewal of his loyalty and love.
disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate
for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner
1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that
JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the
the respondent is an American citizen based on the record
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as
of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is
as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the
duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the
respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner

with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino
citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he
did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that
respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In
other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is
disqualified from the position for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he
seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those
holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the
respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.[3] The motion remained pending even until
after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No.
3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of
canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of
Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the
case for disqualification.[4] Petitioners motion was opposed
by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31,
1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining,
the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second
Division and declared private respondent qualified to run
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was
born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US
citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution
and laws under the principle of jus soli.
Page 66 of 89
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of
the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother
were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6),
his parents brought him to the Philippines using an
American passport as travel document. His parents also
registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the
United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the
age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of
the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet
final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number
of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati
City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred
fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S.
Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight
hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two
thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel
Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two
hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular
choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before
the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby
REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to
be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of
vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City
Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to
reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis
Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor
of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31,
1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the
City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the
aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of
vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S.
citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the
age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely)
registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective
office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution
of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet
final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the
winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run
for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of
Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue
raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner
Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that
he was not an original party in the case for disqualification
filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for
leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of
Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in
support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene
and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling
denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to
intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or
proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its
Page 67 of 89
discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he
has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
such action or proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or
disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or
the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be
fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal
interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect
because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty
post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the
Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent
be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the
time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings
before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice
mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which
petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The
fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest
in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he
sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC,[6]reiterated in several cases,[7] only applies to
cases in which the election of the respondent is contested,
and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave
to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified from
running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A.
No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati
City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner
since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any
less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May
20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to
have garnered the highest number of votes among the

candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6
of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there
has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve
petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a
denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead
decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion
for intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on
the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether
private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship
and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is
being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from
running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with
dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as
well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this
case, contends that through 40(d) of the
Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit
Page 68 of 89
terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual
allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both
states.Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers
and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a
citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the
Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This
provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the
instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its
necessity as follows:[10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance
is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to
the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and
Local more threatening than that of mere double citizenship
which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed

marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not
question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take
constitutional cognizance of the problem of
allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600
chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the
Filipino-Chinese community is represented in
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And
until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China
in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the
Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese
wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European
and Latin countries were represented, which was
dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also
represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of
this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who
are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to
be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or
Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by
some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner
Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially
Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried
about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital
to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is
already happening. Some of the great commercial places
in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by
Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It
can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure
a capital famine which also means economic stagnation,
worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee
kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably
Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as
follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL
CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT
ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on
the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: [11]
Page 69 of 89
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their
concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a
double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some
of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
dual would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the
Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a
uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is
defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
the Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for
national security. In the course of those debates, I think
some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in
1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted
that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a
foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the
occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen
Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a
genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with
its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant
to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what
the Committee said that this could be left to the
determination of a future legislature. But considering the
scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this
country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers
of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper
time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double
citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their
TO
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
WITH
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting
laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the

most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality
imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a
Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a
citizen of another country is something completely beyond
our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at
the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That
is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask
clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with
dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any
elective local position. Under the
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father
is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the
Republic. There is no requirement that such a
natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of
majority, must elect or give up
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two
passports, one belonging to the country of his or
her father and one belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it
only means that at the moment when he would
want to run for public office, he has to repudiate
one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries
Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that
nevertheless, as a citizen? No
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is
running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a
Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the
Constitution does not require an election. Under
the Constitution, a person whose mother is a
Page 70 of 89
citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen
without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr.
President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if
he does not renounce his other citizenship, then
he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really
interested to run, the first thing he should do is to
say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a
Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the
viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will
always have one citizenship, and that is the
citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But
if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will
probably fall under this disqualification.
present
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for
naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippine Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization
takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he
owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid
or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic.No foreign law may or should interfere with its
only a
operation and application. If the requirement of the
Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our
person,
Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our
one can
legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but
what a foreign government has thought or intended to
exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment
upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this
Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in
San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows
the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at
least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the
United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that,
by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and
1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that
merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient
evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the
alleged renunciation was made when private respondent
was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private
respondent renounced his American citizenship, the
COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A
person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e)
Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision
was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S.
Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in
effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27,
1998, contained the following statements made under
oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF
NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF
PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY
OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF,
OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
Page 71 of 89
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK
TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE
FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT
I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS
AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES;
AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION
UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE
FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing
any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus,
in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo
became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him from running for any elective local
position? We answer this question in the negative, as there
is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance
and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In
his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced
and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim-when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy
contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
 Page 72 of 89

such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this On the other hand, private respondents oath of
Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact
arbitrariness or abuse. that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
that the oath of allegiance contained in private election of Philippine citizenship.
respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he
constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally
will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective,
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
such renunciation should have been made upon private
the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
respondent reaching the age of majority since no law
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made
Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into
upon majority age.
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
Finally, much is made of the fact that private oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of
respondent admitted that he is registered as an American his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
that he holds an American passport which he used in his national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
of his American nationality before the termination of his
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private SO ORDERED.
respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]
Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here
of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no DECISION
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider
KAPUNAN, J.:
that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at
such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement
renunciation, either express or implied.
that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
he will defend and support the Constitution of the 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]
that he does so without mental reservation, private
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
and anything which he may have said before as a dual
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost
citizen.
his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
 Page 73 of 89

Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
among others, "rendering service to or accepting then running for reelection.
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo
provision of law reads:
Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of
may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
the House of Representatives since he is not a
events:
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6

xxx of the Constitution.[4]

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in,
the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and
the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest
a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or
offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned,
at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident
thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his
decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative
of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April
27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari
assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such
in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on
his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of

service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it

any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is considered private respondent as a citizen of the

commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire

under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) his Philippine citizenship.

or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of
election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period
Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the
excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born
Filipino citizen x x x.
status.[7]

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz,
Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a
a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
in the U.S. Marine Corps.
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic
be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his
Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the
Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the
United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of
repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the

Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he
reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he
was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV,
Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino
citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens
of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person
who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born
citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who
have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed
the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications [12] and
none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become
a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years
from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during
the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
Page 74 of 89
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63),
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially
acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other
hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes
to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;[20] (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA
Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
[Italics in the original.][25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his

Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces
of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630,
which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall
contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen,
a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation
allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no
longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act
to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly
explained by the HRET in its decision, the term
"natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section
4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be
considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen
from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to
obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two
categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered
natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those
born before January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who,
upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were
Page 75 of 89
considered natural-born obviously because they were not
Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise
not considered natural-born because they also had to
perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers
those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article
IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered
not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1)
those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as
to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law
for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the
House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the
Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is
merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor
to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for
the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for
certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of
not
discretion in this case.
 Page 76 of 89

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ, concur.
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is
he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face
with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us
of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions,
the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence
that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B.

Antecedent Case Settings
DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD
ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan

JR.) and VICTORINO X. Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter

FORNIER, respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs.
ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
RONALD
August 1939and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824,
entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated,
on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003
before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a

ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy

FERNANDO POE JR., respondents. by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those
whom the state believes are deserving of the
privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an
inestimable acquisition,[1] that cannot be taken lightly
by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those
who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of
which raise a single question of profound importance to the
nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the
highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the
judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the
COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of
his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a
copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified

photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita
Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent,
Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship
with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of
the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to
the fact that there was no record in the National Archives
that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could
be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two
documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones
being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of
the Archives Division of the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the birth
of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that no available information about the marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e)
copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No.
23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a
copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of
the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou
and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that
the records of birth in the said office during the period of
from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA
No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for
reconsideration.The motion was denied on 06 February
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before
this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65,
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition,
docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction
or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
Page 77 of 89
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No.
161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and
the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ
and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel
FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation
of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen)
before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC
expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -
Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code
which would authorize "any interested party" to file a
verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in
an action for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised
 Page 78 of 89

Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge
Constitution also reads of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has
constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
days from the date of its submission for decision or President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Commission or by the Commission itself.Unless otherwise Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." the Supreme Court to be the members of the
tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same
parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No.
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be
established by law which power includes the duty of the
deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7,
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
of the 1987 Constitution.
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests

the part of any branch or instrumentality of the consist of either an election protest or a quo

Government. warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would

have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G.
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule
R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be
12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en
be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to
banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
could or should be elected to occupy the highest Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge
government post in the land. of all contests relating to the election, returns, and

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634 qualifications of the President or Vice-President of

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and
Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987
Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by
the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An
election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the
registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President
or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the
winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a village,
post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought
before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et
al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs.
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would
have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first
give a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was
that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C.,
described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.[6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine
the constituency of the "State," which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate
in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and
be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy,
judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was
seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal
setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally
willing to submit his private interests to the general interest
of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes
over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was
limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established
Page 79 of 89
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights
to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning
expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in
the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the
next stage of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship
has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage
of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global
might well be the internationalization of
citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens"
during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
"Spanish subjects."[13] In church records, the natives were
called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of
the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became
highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however,
were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for
those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to
the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16
July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views
among experts;[15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August
1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically
defining the political status of children born in the
Philippine Islands,[17]and finally, the Ley Extranjera de
Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13
July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never
extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express
mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions
of the Ultramar among which this country was included,
would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in
this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out

with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even
if they were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town
of the Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower,
Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted
principle of international law dictated that a change in
sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political
laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which
would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December
1898 between Spain and the United States.[21] Under
Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of
the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United
States would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such
territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event
all their rights of property, including the right to sell or
dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall
also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce,
and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such
laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in
the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within
a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be
held to have renounced it and to have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be
determined by the Congress."[22]
Page 80 of 89
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation
by the United States Congress on the subject, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens,
they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American
laws and were thus issued passports describing them to
be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of
the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared
for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also
commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902,
the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the
United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th
day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one
who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish
subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant
was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an
inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11
April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in
the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during
which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States
made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of
1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine

Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of other insular possession of the United States,
and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H.
Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines
when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The
Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequently
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and
except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or
who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines
as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and,
3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on
whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship,
the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -
Page 81 of 89
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are
citizens of the Philippines -
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution,
taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time,
which provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their
Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required
illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly
found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the
framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of
the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
concerns -
Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are
citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also
further provided that
 Page 82 of 89

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus
retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced primary basis of citizenship by birth.
her citizenship."
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would
tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection
Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F.
(3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
Constitution.
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides: Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on
11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was
the adoption of this Constitution.
an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July

Philippines. 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie

Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino
reaching the age of majority; and citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939
to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to
Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old
The Case Of FPJ
and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
expresses:
respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the

"No person may be elected President unless he is only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of

a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered certainty from the documents would be that -

voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and
the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
Bessie Kelley;
at least ten years immediately preceding such election."

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include
"those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
to each other on 16 September, 1940;
Philippine citizenship."[27]

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to 4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe;

be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 and

Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal

Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record
in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for
petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
"5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported
to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date
of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo
Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima
facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made
in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the
value given to the entries made therein could be grounded
on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a
breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin
of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
Page 83 of 89
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors
as might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate
that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years,
in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that
Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when
the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would
argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during
the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that
there was no existing record about such fact in the
Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at
any other place during the same period. In his death
certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence
to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least
to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the
time of his death was also his residence before death. It
would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of
all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing
filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father
[or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the
father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in
the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day
prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the
lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5
thereof, that -
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall
be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in

the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information
by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to
prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity,
the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the
father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same
useless as being an authoritative document of
recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was
enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth
certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of
the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof
of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains
the names of both parents, there is no showing that they
signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as
required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might
have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein
voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in
such a case, there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her
own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented
by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will
apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document."In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what
could constitute such a document as proof of voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of
public documents, those executed by private individuals
which must be authenticated by notaries, and those
issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made
belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
Page 84 of 89
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was
required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full
blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory
acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases
when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove
filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would
last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the
oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic
writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as
being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The
term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent
official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules;
Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted
to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state
of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x x x x x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively
applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the
Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized
natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code
provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child
was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or
before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given
retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional
idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs
of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would
also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship
to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship"
could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be
taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil
law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double
purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of
property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of
Page 85 of 89
precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a society
for the protection of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has
held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x
x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern
Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond,
the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as
between them, the separation of their properties, the rules
governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal causes
for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it,
and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce
upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are
questions that are governed exclusively by the national law
of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil
Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a
reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil
relationships found in different parts of the Civil
Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family
relations.[40] In adoption, for instance, an adopted child
would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such
legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil
law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to
the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the
family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were
 Page 86 of 89

strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ)
these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was in one house, and as one family -
paramount.
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind,
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after
were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
that:
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such
distinction, however, remains and should remain only in 1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge
on the domain of political law. 2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando
Poe, Sr.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
known in the Philippines as `Fernando
Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien
to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on 4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20,
evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena
matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from Street, Manila.
being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code
provisions. xxxxxxxxx

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met
and became engaged while they were
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration
students at the University of the
of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred
same year.
before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had
declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship,
their first child in 1938.
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names 9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald,
intimately connected with pedigree. Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived
together with our mother at our family's
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that
house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo
(a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b)
St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in
the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant
1945, except for some months between
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
1943-1944.
question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between 10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie,
the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in were blessed with four (4) more children
question must be shown by evidence other than such act after Ronald Allan Poe.
or declaration.
xxxxxxxxx
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby
Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to
Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to
the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe
prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with

is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the
legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this
12th day of January 2004.
Ruby
Kelley Mangahas
D
eclarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely
to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue
of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the
strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies,
one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and
the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since
to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were
a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
Page 87 of 89
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making
his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than
respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents
showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child,
FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie
Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling
of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs.
de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus
curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he
states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis
mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the
Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine
under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement
was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would
not be a decision but a mere obiter dictumwhich did not
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look
closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an
illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson
of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese
mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson
did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about
the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a
legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by
election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an

illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a
Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus
sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated
case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan
who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed
that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his
father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid
proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was
not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son
Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born
Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it
followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that
even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin
would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact
assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x
x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating
the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
xxxxxxxxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would
have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not
once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate
child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was
established long ago by People vs. Cayat.[47] I would grant
that the distinction between legitimate children and
illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real
differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real
differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not
for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to
elective public service? What possible state interest can
there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from
becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
Page 88 of 89
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of
the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To
disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important
public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And
if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction,
then the distinction transgresses the equal protection
clause and must be reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza
(a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane
and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed
similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately
hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as
taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or
discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of
birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it
is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are
none provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No.
161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails
the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in
SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification
of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation
in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
 Page 89 of 89

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and 1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a Kelley Poe (a.k.a."Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X.
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled
the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan
Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the Kelley Poe, a.k.a.Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for
elections are held. want of jurisdiction.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether
grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the
petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could

only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son,
Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not

establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold
that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate
his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample
opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS