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1.

FACTS:

2. November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-
emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won
3. November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia,
William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic
tank.
1. The bodies were removed by a fireman.
2. The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the
Regional Hospital but he expired there.
4. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank
without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master.
1. Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the
ones who did the re-emptying.
5. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" -
diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas
6. November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order
7. RTC: Dismissed the case
8. CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant
and the indigent
9. ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for
damages
10.
11. HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

12. test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:


1. Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence
1. standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the Roman law
13. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his
foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences
1. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the facts involved in the particular case
2. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist
14. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury
1. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
can not recover
2. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence
15. Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil
Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public
1. While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and
sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements

Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after
the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier
was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

16. accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers
17. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not
been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the
attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in
this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore,
and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate
cause of the accident.
18. proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own

negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.

Urbano v. IAC
Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his
ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming
from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what
happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass.
Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued,
and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with
the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable
settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November
14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which
infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was
charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the
affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching
fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied;
hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the
latter’s death

hoenix Construction v. IAC


Facts:

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from
cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a
Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning
reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner
company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries
and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance.
Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high
speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondent’s own
negligence

Held:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew
pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he
did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio
purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be
detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was
not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible
explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights
on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way
malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright"
split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is
sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute
his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from
the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the
night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have
been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and
sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal
and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already
been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made
the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned,
in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably
the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause"
and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is
important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was
rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening
or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and
important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come
to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the
defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which
fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant
who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be
exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car,
even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway
without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into
it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"
and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are
subject to mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly,
it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction
where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff,
has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article
2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the
defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time
of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may
be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of
each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to
allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken
the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the
damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate
court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's
fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs
to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the
former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne
exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from
Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made
by the respondent appellate court.

Vda. DE BATACLAN vs. MEDINA

FACTS:
Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus,
Cavite, crashed and fell into a ditch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle into the ditch.
Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the passengers were able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others
were trapped. It appears that the bus drivers and the passengers who already got out did not try to help
Bataclan et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to their aid, they were carrying a burning
torch for illumination, but then a fierce fire started and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears
that there was a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch the would-be rescuers were using.

The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.

The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage where Medina undertook to take Bataclan
to his destination safely. The trial court also found that there was negligence on the part of Medina since at the
time of the blow-out, the bus was speeding. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant
carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court argued that Medina is only liable for the
injuries suffered by Bataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of which was the fire, which was not
caused by Medina.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus company, which was the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan.

HELD:
Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the bus, because of the overturning,
it leaked gas which is not unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of the trapped passengers was
most likely because the driver and the conductor went out looking for help. It is only natural that the would-be
rescuers bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM and the place was unlit. The fire could also be
attributed to the bus driver and conductor because he should have known, from the circumstances, and because
he should have been able to smell gasoline and therefore he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the
torch. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-
reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

Proximate Cause – “‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. ’ And more
comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. ’”

ercury Drug v. Baking


MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN BAKING
2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision and resolution
The cause > Different categories > Proximate
Sebastian Baking went to Dr. Cesar Sy’s clinic for a medical check-up. The next day, after undergoing several
tests, Dr. Sy found that Baking’s blood sugar and triglyceride levels were above normal, so he gave him 2
medical prescriptions—Diamicron (blood sugar) and Benalize (triglyceride). Baking went to Mercury Drug
Alabang branch to buy the medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription as Dormicum, a
potent sleeping tablet, so that was what was sold to Baking. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine,
Baking took one Dormicum pill a day for 3 days.
On the 3rdday of taking the medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular accident, as his car collided with Josie
Peralta’s car. Baking fell asleep while driving, and he could not remember anything about the collision nor felt
its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his state at the time of the collision, he
returned to Dr. Sy, who was shocked to find that what was sold to Baking was Dormicum.
Baking filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. RTC rendered its decision in favor of Baking. CA
affirmed RTC.
MERCURY DRUG EMPLOYEE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN SELLING DORMICUM
To sustain a claim based on NCC 2176, the following requisites must concur:
• Damage suffered by plaintiff
• Fault or negligence of defendant
• Connection of cause and effect between A & B
The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into
jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of care and diligence in selling
medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.

Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the
employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified WON the
medicine she gave was what was prescribed by Dr. Sy.
MERCURY DRUG ALSO LIABLE UNDER NCC 2180
It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of the employee
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT – NEGLIGENCE OF DRUGSTORE EMPLOYEE
• Proximate cause – any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise; determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent
• Vehicular accident could not have occurred had the drugstore employee been careful in reading the
prescription; without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that Baking would
fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision
AWARD – 50k moral damages, 25k exemplary damages
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October, 1998

FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino, who was
assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the safe berthing,
boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the
vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and
its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International
Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the
landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already
about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew
of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not
take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew
members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern.
Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov
likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the
right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the
pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by the
vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence of
the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation of
the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the
master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring,
towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his
duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of
foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the adviser of the
master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It
is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been
enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly
licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with
the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of
navigation. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted
high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in
respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be
trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have
and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in
his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case,
Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the
performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly
followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for the
allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A perusal of
Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties as master of
the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over
this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory
pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may
be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in
the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from
liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the
negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem
does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved
of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their
liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the
negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or
those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages
caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

2. Negligence as Proximate Cause


Proximate Cause –that cause which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficientsupervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the injury would not have
occurred.Subido v. CAThis case involves an accident between a
truck [or bus] belonging to Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (LTB)
anddriven by Mudales and a truck owned by Sabido and driven by
Lagunda.The two vehicles were going in opposite directions when
they met at a curve in the road. Custodio, a passenger ofLTB was
hanging [sabit] on the left side of the vehicle. He died after being
sideswiped by Sabido’s truck.The CFI held the vehicle owners and
the drivers solidarily liable. LTB and its driver were liable for
violating thecontract of carriage; Sabido and his driver were liable
for quasi-delict.ISSUE: Whether Sabido and his driver were guilty
of negligence; whether they should be held solidarily liable
withLTB.HELD: They are both guilty of contributory
negligence.Though LTB and its driver were guilty of negligence for
allowing Custodio to hang from the left side of the bus,Sabido and
his driver were guilty of contributory negligence because the truck
was running at a considerablespeed, despite the fact that it was
negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right
side of theroad, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so
near the passenger bus coming from the oppositedirection as to
sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.Though the
negligence of LTB and its driver are independent from the
negligence of Sabido and his driver,bothacts of negligence are
the proximate cause of the deathof Custodio. In fact, the
negligence of the first two would not have produced this result
without the negligence of Sabido and his driver. What is more,
Sabido’sdriver’s negligence was the last, in point of time, for
Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bussometime
before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that,
in this sense,Sabido’s truck hadthe last clear chance.Even
though LTB’s liability arises from breach of contract and Sabido’s
arises from quasi-delict, they are solidarilyliable because the rule
is thatwhere both negligent acts, in combination, are the
direct and proximatecause of a single injury to a third
person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion
eachcontributed to the injury, either is responsible for the
whole injury, even though his act alone mightnot have
caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have
resulted from the acts of the othertort-feasor

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