Republic of the Philippines Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."8 The
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @
"Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972. 1 The information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one
another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another
eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08
grams in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the
North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received
information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in
Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As
arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on
December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of
P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other
policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua
as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of
the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2, 000. 00 to cover operational expenses.
From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 — a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred
peso bills 3 — as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then
P1,600.00. P03 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police
blotter.4 The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in
buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun"
instructed P03 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got
the marijuana from his associate.5 An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03
Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped
in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to
help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun"
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth.6 "Jun" led the police team
to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as
his associate.7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He
saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside
the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the
marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police
learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1)
brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's"
house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.9 The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried
marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 10
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio
Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the
gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain
"Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers,
accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and
accused him of being a pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men
led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes,
accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as
P03 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house
for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out
of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy"
was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding
them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then
still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them,
Doria saw box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside. P03 Manlangit ordered
him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to police headquarters
where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.11
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she
was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5)
children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged
3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's
breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her
children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she
carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving
the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in
the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian
well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly
appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later
that the man was P03 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on
top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of
green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything
about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her
husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied
the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.12
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial
court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-
appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and
VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, they are both
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
 According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which
cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively
discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case
is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of
Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two
or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission
of any crime.
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO
DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the
Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for
accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women,
Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court
for mandatory review.
SO ORDERED. 13
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:
I It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT
WITH DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE
MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA
FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH
A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE. 14
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
I nature of a confession and avoidance.29 It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE
INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
WAS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM
ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER
TO DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE
EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT
WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE
THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 15
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence
obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense.16 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard
to constitutional and legal safeguards.17
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine
that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes,
particularly liquor and narcotics offenses.18 Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the
public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal
law.19 It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to
beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.20
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is
understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose
of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.21 The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated
by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,22 the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the
concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of
its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, percuasion or fraud of
the officers."23 It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law
enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the
criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such
that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer.24
violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person
into a criminal career.25 Where the criminal intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping
person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him,
there is entrapment and no conviction may be had.26 Where, however, the criminal intent originates in
the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy
for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or
that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to
prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.27 The law tolerates the use of
decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense28 that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the
providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established,
the burden shifts to the governmet to show otherwise.30 When entrapment is raised as a defense,
American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid
down in Sorrells v. United States 31 to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the
inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and
inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant facts such as the accused's
mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his
reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.33 The predisposition test
emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and
reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal."35 If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any
favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive
inducement.36 Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. 37 This test was first
authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. State 38 rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska.
Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here,
the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct.39 The
inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the
accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful
police conduct.40 The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely
to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the
offense;41 for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the
temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official
conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as
badgering, cajoling or importuning,43 or appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas
of desperate illness, are not.44 Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an
entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his
guilt has been established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime
"cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become
tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties.45 Hence, the transactions leading up to the
offense, the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to
the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its
commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal
person.46
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that
the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e, if the court determines that an accused was
predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory
practices will be deemed impermissible.47 Delving into the accused's character and predisposition
obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally.
It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused
might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements.48 On the
other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular
accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important
bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and and their agents was proper. 49 The
undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and
active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.50
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United
States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective"51 In Cruz v. State,52 the Florida Supreme Court
declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is
satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime.53 In Baca
v. State,54 the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a
criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of
predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of
proper investigation.55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests
alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused
caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,56 we acquitted the accused from the offense of
smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to
commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension
came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's
testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the
accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this
drug.57 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible."58 In People v. Abella,59 we
acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of the
apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting
price, . . . a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was
inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony,
there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused.60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we
convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement
officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium
from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug.
We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely
entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better
assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.62
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the distinction
between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,64 we held:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions
is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment,
has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from
being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in
his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act
were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception
by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him,
free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an
owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a
prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of
such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate
notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do
so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed.
It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor
that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there
are cases holding the contrary. 65
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Galicia,66 the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense
and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal
plan.67 In People v. Tan Tiong,68 the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the
prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.69
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v.
Tiu Ua.70Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed
contrary to public policy and illegal.71
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or
inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the
accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause.72 To determine whether
there is a entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending
officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied
in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.73 Nevertheless, adopting the
"objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v.
Boholst,74 we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation
and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous his convictions of other crimes 75 and held that his
opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him.
Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal
record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76 thereby sustaining his defense that led to his
acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to
engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-
narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.77 They are rules of convenience designed
to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala
prohibita.78 They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft,
arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral. 79 Laws defining
crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals, but against public
order.80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any
particular harm to a definite person.81 These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to
many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how
furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is
necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon
the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that
the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or
through informants, spies or stool pigeons.82
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant system
breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the
apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the
police. The informant himself maybe a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For
whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld
and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring one.83 Equally odious
is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the
informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion — harassment, extortion, vengeance,
blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice
of this ugly reality in a number of cases84 where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of
corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial
hicks.85 The use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs
may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that
inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug
cases.86 Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of
the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful
search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,87
[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and
seizures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a
type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. Each is a
substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister
sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal class,'
justifies the employment of illegal means. 88
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty
by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-
protected rights of the individual.89 It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.90 Courts should not allow
themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.91
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the
purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale.92 The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the
offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not
disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming
evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an
offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.1âwphi1.nêt
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted
accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3
Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-
appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was
apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to P03 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, P03 Manlangit's
testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-
presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police.93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and
there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers,94 or there are reasons to
believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant,95 or that only the
informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,96 the testimony of the
informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers'
eyewitness testimonies.97 There is no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.98
The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The
source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that
the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he
sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit
was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension,
the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the
carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained
eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from
appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked in court
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at
the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic
wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-l," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy
(970) grams. 100
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team waited for almost
one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains
credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case
at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires
that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the
prohibited drug between the poseur- buyer and the pusher.101 Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-
buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant. 102
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests
are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx xxx xxx 103
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria
 was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound
to arrest him even without a warrant. 104
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of
the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is, however, not
absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may
be admissible in the following instances: 106 (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; 108 (3) search in violation of customs laws; 109 (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view; 110 (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 111
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search
and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It
is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit"
and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct
testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise:
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of
the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her
arrest in "hot pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on
her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."115 The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based an actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested.116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.117
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-
accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-
accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was.118 Appellant
Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with
whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the
money in her house,119 with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-
appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged
in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his
own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense,
the arrest is legally objectionable.120
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal
as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that
the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence.121 The "plain view"
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.122 The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a
position from which he can particularly view the area.123 In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.124 The object must be open to eye
and
hand125 and its discovery inadvertent.126
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.127 In other
words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.128 It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure.129
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led
there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on
appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria name her and led them to her.131 Standing by the door
of appellant Gaddao's house, P03 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and
a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was
partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents.132 On cross-examination, however,
he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic
wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper
was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10)
bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags
— white, pink or blue in color.133 PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the
contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box
contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.134 It was not immediately apparent to
PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its
seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.135 It was
fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.136
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana137 was found in the house of accused-
appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.138 Apropos is
our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,139 viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those
who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the
mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply
not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself. 140
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a
prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10 million, to wit:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
 distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of
proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the
presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.141 The prosecution has
clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-
appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3
Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-
appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be
imposed.142
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special
Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring opinion;
I fully concur with the exhaustive and incisive ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. This Decision
rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have
seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.1 I just wish to outline some
guidelines on when an arrest or a search without a warrant is valid. Hopefully, they would be of help,
especially to our law enforcers who are often faced with actual situations that promptly call for their
application.
Valid Arrests
Without Warrants
Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an arrest without a warrant is
lawful. It states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx xxx xxx
I shall focus my discussion on the first two rules, which have been most frequently misapplied and
misinterpreted, not only by law enforcers but some trial judges and lawyers as well.
At the very outset, I wish to underscore that in both cases the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself is a
witness to the crime; under Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. Let
me elaborate.
1. In Flagrante
Delicto Arrests
Sec. 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests.2 The accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the
presence of the arresting officer. There are two elements that must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.3
It is not sufficient that the suspect exhibits unusual or strange acts or simply appears suspicious. Thus, in
the recent en banc case of Malicat v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court, through now Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr., held that the fact that the appellant's eyes were "moving very fast" and looking at every
approaching person were not sufficient to suspect him of "attempting to commit a crime," much less to
justify his arrest and subsequent search without a warrant. The Court said that "there was nothing in
[Malacat's] behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion" that he was
armed with a deadly weapon. In other words, there was no overt physical act on the part of the suspect,
positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was committing or attempting to commit one.
There was, therefore, no valid reason for the police officers to arrest or search him.
The same was true in People v. Mengote,5 where the arresting police tried to justify the warrantless
arrest of the appellant on the ground that he appeared suspicious. The "suspicious" acts consisted of his
darting eyes and the fact that his hand was over his abdomen. The Court, rejecting such justification,
stated: "By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had
just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their
presence.6
In other words, the behavior or conduct of the person to be arrested must be clearly indicative of a
criminal act. If there is no outward indication at all that calls for an arrest, the suspect cannot be validly
apprehended under this paragraph, notwithstanding a tip from an informant that he would at the time
be undertaking a felonious enterprise.
This doctrine found strength in People v. Aminnudin 7 and again in People v. Encinada.8 In both cases, the
appellants were arrested while disembarking from a ship, on account of a tip received from an informant
that they were carrying prohibited drugs. The Court invalidated their warrantless arrests, explaining that
at the moment of their arrests, the appellants were simply descending the gangplank, without
manifesting any suspicious behavior that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. To all
appearances, they were not committing a crime; nor was it shown that they were about to do so or had
just done so. There was, therefore, no valid reason for their arrests.
Adhering to (and having faith in) the above rules, I respectfully disagreed with the distinguished Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado in People v. Montilla,9 when he upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest
of the appellant while the latter was merely alighting from a passenger jeepney. I opined that Montilla
could not have been perceived as committing a crime while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying a
traveling bag and a carton. He did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably
arouse in the minds of the police suspicion that he was embarking on a felonious undertaking. There was
no outward manifestation that he had just committed or was committing or attempting to commit an
offense. Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montilla's arrest was valid because he was caught in
flagrante delicto was only an obiter, for what finally nailed him down was his implied waiver of any
objection to the validity of his arrest.
2. "Hot Pursuit"
Arrests
Sec. 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on "hot pursuit" arrests.10 Here, two elements must also concur
prior to the arrest: (1) and "offense has in fact been committed," (2) the arresting officer "has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested . . . committed [the offense]." In effecting
this type of arrest, "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. . . . The fact
of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.11
Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts constituting the offense,
they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its commission. They should know for a
fact that a crime was committed. AND they must also perceive acts exhibited by the person to be
arrested, indicating that he perpetrated the crime. Again, mere intelligence information that the suspect
committed the crime will not suffice. The arresting officers themselves must have personal knowledge of
facts showing that the suspect performed the criminal act. Personal knowledge means actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the crime.12
In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain individuals or groups
were engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed information was not deemed equivalent to
personal knowledge of the lawmen. In People v. Burgos,13 a certain Masamlok informed police
authorities that the appellant was involved in subversive activities. Acting on the strength of such
information and without securing a judicial warrant, the police proceeded to appellant's house to arrest
him. There, they also allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and subversive materials.
The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officers, since the
information came in its entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. We pointed out that at the time of his arrest,
appellant was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document; neither was he
committing a subversive act.14 His warrantless arrest, therefore, could not be allowed under any of the
instances in Rule 113, Section 6 (now 5) of the Rules of Court.
Also in Encinada, the appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the justification that the arresting
officer "received an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next
morning aboard M/V Sweet Pearl." The Court categorically stated that such "[r]aw intelligence
information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest."15 And since, at the time of his arrest, no
act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant, there was no valid
justification for his arrest.
To be distinguished from the above cases are those involving continuing offenses for which the culprit
could be arrested any time in flagrante delicto. In Umil v. Ramos,16 there were strong objections to the
warrantless arrest of a suspected member of the New People's Army (NPA), while he was being treated
for a gunshot wound in a hospital. He alleged that there was no valid justification for his arrest without a
warrant, because he was not then committing any offense nor were there any indications that he had
just committed or was about to commit one; he was in fact confined in a hospital.
The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and subsequently charged, was a continuing
offense. For purposes of arrest, the Court said, the NPA member "did not cease to be, or became less of
a subversive, . . . simply because he was, at the time of his arrest, confined in the . . . [hospital]." "Unlike
other so-called 'common' offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition
of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding object of overthrowing organized
government is attained.17
In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so were the searches
conducted subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent to the invalid search, though clearly
prohibited by law (e.g. marijuana or unlicensed firearm), were considered inadmissable as evidence
against the person wrongfully arrested. Important to bear in mind always is that any search conducted
without a judicial warrant must be prcceded by a lawful arrest, whether with or without a warrant duly
issued therefor.
To underscore the rationale behind these strict rules, I deem it quite apt to quote these inspiring words
from the precedent-setting case of People v. Burgos:18
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body
and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute
or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We
cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving
of full protection.
Valid Searches
Without Warrant
The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search and seizure may be
conducted. The only allowable instances in which a search may be conducted without a warrant are: (1)
search incident to lawful arrest, (2) search pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, (3) search of moving
vehicles, (4) searches incidental to violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a "stop and
frisk.19
1. Search Incident
to Lawful Arrest
Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a warrant for
dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense. Such incidental search
is, however, limited to the person of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be
extended to or made in a place other than the place of the arrest.20
2. The "Plain View"
Doctrine
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is
in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2)
said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plainview) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it
is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a
contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.21
3. Search of
Moving Vehicles
The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is justified by
practicability, viz.:22
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it
is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
xxx xxx xxx
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as covered vehicles
to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling
express trains they furnish for successful commission of crime a distinguishing
means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world
before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on
highways or other public place is a serious question far deeper and broader than
their use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which in itself is no small
matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a
vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is
not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially
guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they
are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those
against morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a
matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory,
confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and
seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search
warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial
question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.
4. Customs Searches
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even without warrants,
for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a
judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to "enter, pass through or search any
land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop
and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.23
5. Search With Consent
Waiver of any objection to the unresonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized exception to the
rule against a warrantless search.24 The consent to the search, however, must be express knowing and
voluntary. A search based merely on implied acquiescene is not valid, because such consent is not within
the purview of the constitutional gurantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given under
intimidating and coercive circumstances.25
6. Stop and Frisk
The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being Terry v.
Ohio.27 The idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and making initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check,
the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this notion should
be applied has been laid down as follows:28
. . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behaviour, he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a crime, mere
suspicious behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk." There must be a genuine reason, in accordance
with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him.29
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 30 and in Manalili v.
Court of Appeals.31 In Manalili, the law enforcers who were members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a
wobby manner along the city cemetery which, according to police information, was a popular hangout of
drug addicts. Based on police experience, such suspicious behaviour was characteristic of persons who
were "high" on drugs. The Court held that past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the
police sufficient reason to stop the suspect and to investigate if he was really high on drugs. The
marijuana that they found in the suspect's possession was held to be admissible in evidence.
Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the necessity of a judicial
warrant for any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly construed. Foremost in our minds must still
be every person's prized and fundamental right to liberty and security, a right protected and guaranteed
by our Constitution.
WHEREFORE, I vote to ACQUIT Appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama, as well as to REDUCE the penalty of
Appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring opinion;
I fully concur with the exhaustive and incisive ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. This Decision
rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have
seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.1 I just wish to outline some
guidelines on when an arrest or a search without a warrant is valid. Hopefully, they would be of help,
especially to our law enforcers who are often faced with actual situations that promptly call for their
application.
Valid Arrests
Without Warrants
Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an arrest without a warrant is
lawful. It states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
xxx xxx xxx
I shall focus my discussion on the first two rules, which have been most frequently misapplied and
misinterpreted, not only by law enforcers but some trial judges and lawyers as well.
At the very outset, I wish to underscore that in both cases the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself is a
witness to the crime; under Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. Let
me elaborate.
1. In Flagrante
Delicto Arrests
Sec. 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests.2 The accused is apprehended
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the
presence of the arresting officer. There are two elements that must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.3
It is not sufficient that the suspect exhibits unusual or strange acts or simply appears suspicious. Thus, in
the recent en banc case of Malicat v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court, through now Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr., held that the fact that the appellant's eyes were "moving very fast" and looking at every
approaching person were not sufficient to suspect him of "attempting to commit a crime," much less to
justify his arrest and subsequent search without a warrant. The Court said that "there was nothing in
[Malacat's] behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion" that he was
armed with a deadly weapon. In other words, there was no overt physical act on the part of the suspect,
positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was committing or attempting to commit one.
There was, therefore, no valid reason for the police officers to arrest or search him.
The same was true in People v. Mengote,5 where the arresting police tried to justify the warrantless
arrest of the appellant on the ground that he appeared suspicious. The "suspicious" acts consisted of his
darting eyes and the fact that his hand was over his abdomen. The Court, rejecting such justification,
stated: "By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had
just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their
presence.6
In other words, the behavior or conduct of the person to be arrested must be clearly indicative of a
criminal act. If there is no outward indication at all that calls for an arrest, the suspect cannot be validly
apprehended under this paragraph, notwithstanding a tip from an informant that he would at the time
be undertaking a felonious enterprise.
This doctrine found strength in People v. Aminnudin 7 and again in People v. Encinada.8 In both cases, the
appellants were arrested while disembarking from a ship, on account of a tip received from an informant
that they were carrying prohibited drugs. The Court invalidated their warrantless arrests, explaining that
at the moment of their arrests, the appellants were simply descending the gangplank, without
manifesting any suspicious behavior that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. To all
appearances, they were not committing a crime; nor was it shown that they were about to do so or had
just done so. There was, therefore, no valid reason for their arrests.
Adhering to (and having faith in) the above rules, I respectfully disagreed with the distinguished Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado in People v. Montilla,9 when he upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest
of the appellant while the latter was merely alighting from a passenger jeepney. I opined that Montilla
could not have been perceived as committing a crime while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying a
traveling bag and a carton. He did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably
arouse in the minds of the police suspicion that he was embarking on a felonious undertaking. There was
no outward manifestation that he had just committed or was committing or attempting to commit an
offense. Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montilla's arrest was valid because he was caught in
flagrante delicto was only an obiter, for what finally nailed him down was his implied waiver of any
objection to the validity of his arrest.
 2. "Hot Pursuit"
Arrests
Sec. 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on "hot pursuit" arrests.10 Here, two elements must also concur
prior to the arrest: (1) and "offense has in fact been committed," (2) the arresting officer "has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested . . . committed [the offense]." In effecting
this type of arrest, "it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. . . . The fact
of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.11
Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts constituting the offense,
they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its commission. They should know for a
fact that a crime was committed. AND they must also perceive acts exhibited by the person to be
arrested, indicating that he perpetrated the crime. Again, mere intelligence information that the suspect
committed the crime will not suffice. The arresting officers themselves must have personal knowledge of
facts showing that the suspect performed the criminal act. Personal knowledge means actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the crime.12
In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain individuals or groups
were engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed information was not deemed equivalent to
personal knowledge of the lawmen. In People v. Burgos,13 a certain Masamlok informed police
authorities that the appellant was involved in subversive activities. Acting on the strength of such
information and without securing a judicial warrant, the police proceeded to appellant's house to arrest
him. There, they also allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and subversive materials.
The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officers, since the
information came in its entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. We pointed out that at the time of his arrest,
appellant was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document; neither was he
committing a subversive act.14 His warrantless arrest, therefore, could not be allowed under any of the
instances in Rule 113, Section 6 (now 5) of the Rules of Court.
Also in Encinada, the appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the justification that the arresting
officer "received an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next
morning aboard M/V Sweet Pearl." The Court categorically stated that such "[r]aw intelligence
information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest."15 And since, at the time of his arrest, no
act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant, there was no valid
justification for his arrest.
To be distinguished from the above cases are those involving continuing offenses for which the culprit
could be arrested any time in flagrante delicto. In Umil v. Ramos,16 there were strong objections to the
warrantless arrest of a suspected member of the New People's Army (NPA), while he was being treated
for a gunshot wound in a hospital. He alleged that there was no valid justification for his arrest without a
warrant, because he was not then committing any offense nor were there any indications that he had
just committed or was about to commit one; he was in fact confined in a hospital.
The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and subsequently charged, was a continuing
offense. For purposes of arrest, the Court said, the NPA member "did not cease to be, or became less of
a subversive, . . . simply because he was, at the time of his arrest, confined in the . . . [hospital]." "Unlike
other so-called 'common' offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition
of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding object of overthrowing organized
government is attained.17
In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so were the searches
conducted subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent to the invalid search, though clearly
prohibited by law (e.g. marijuana or unlicensed firearm), were considered inadmissable as evidence
against the person wrongfully arrested. Important to bear in mind always is that any search conducted
without a judicial warrant must be prcceded by a lawful arrest, whether with or without a warrant duly
issued therefor.
To underscore the rationale behind these strict rules, I deem it quite apt to quote these inspiring words
from the precedent-setting case of People v. Burgos:18
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body
and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute
or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We
cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving
of full protection.
Valid Searches
Without Warrant
The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search and seizure may be
conducted. The only allowable instances in which a search may be conducted without a warrant are: (1)
search incident to lawful arrest, (2) search pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, (3) search of moving
vehicles, (4) searches incidental to violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a "stop and
frisk.19
1. Search Incident
to Lawful Arrest
Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a warrant for
dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense. Such incidental search
is, however, limited to the person of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be
extended to or made in a place other than the place of the arrest.20
2. The "Plain View"
Doctrine
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is
in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2)
said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plainview) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it
is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a
contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.21
3. Search of
Moving Vehicles
The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is justified by
practicability, viz.:22
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it
is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
xxx xxx xxx
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as covered vehicles
to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling
express trains they furnish for successful commission of crime a distinguishing
means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world
before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on
highways or other public place is a serious question far deeper and broader than
their use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which in itself is no small
matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a
vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is
not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially
guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they
are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those
against morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a
matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory,
confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and
 seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search
warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial
question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.
4. Customs Searches
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even without warrants,
for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a
judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to "enter, pass through or search any
land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop
and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.23
5. Search With Consent
Waiver of any objection to the unresonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized exception to the
rule against a warrantless search.24 The consent to the search, however, must be express knowing and
voluntary. A search based merely on implied acquiescene is not valid, because such consent is not within
the purview of the constitutional gurantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given under
intimidating and coercive circumstances.25
6. Stop and Frisk
The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being Terry v.
Ohio.27 The idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and making initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check,
the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this notion should
be applied has been laid down as follows:28
. . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behaviour, he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a crime, mere
suspicious behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk." There must be a genuine reason, in accordance
with the police officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him.29
A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 30 and in Manalili v.
Court of Appeals.31 In Manalili, the law enforcers who were members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Caloocan City Police, observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a
wobby manner along the city cemetery which, according to police information, was a popular hangout of
drug addicts. Based on police experience, such suspicious behaviour was characteristic of persons who
were "high" on drugs. The Court held that past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the
police sufficient reason to stop the suspect and to investigate if he was really high on drugs. The
marijuana that they found in the suspect's possession was held to be admissible in evidence.
Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the necessity of a judicial
warrant for any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly construed. Foremost in our minds must still
be every person's prized and fundamental right to liberty and security, a right protected and guaranteed
by our Constitution.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, I vote to ACQUIT Appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama, as well as to REDUCE the penalty of
Appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.
G.R. No. 121572 March 31, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL ELAMPARO y FONTANILLA, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On May 31, 1995 the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, 1 convicted appellant of the crime of illegal
possession of drugs, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay a fine
of P9,000,000.00.
As summarized by the Solicitor General, the facts of this case which we find to be supported by the
records are as follows:2
On February 12, 1995, at about 5:00 in the morning, prosecution witness Police Officer
Romeo Baldonado, while attending to his duties as supervising policeman of the Kalookan
Police Station, received a report from an informant that "some people are selling shabu and
marijuana somewhere at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City" (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 3, TSN, April 4,
1995, p. 3). Said informant stated that he himself succeeded in buying said drugs (ibid., p 3).
Hence, Police Officer Baldonado formed a "buy-bust" operation team with himself as team
leader and Police Officers Ernesto Andala, Ronielo Reantillo and Bismark Gaviola as members
(TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 4). Said team proceeded to the area reported to at Progreso P. Gomez,
Bagong Barrio, Kalookan City at around 5:45 in the morning of the same day (ibid., p. 3).
Upon arrival at the area, prosecution witness Gaviola, together with the informant "asset"
stood at the corner of P. Gomez Street, Bagong Barrio, Kalookan City, since the said spot was
identified to be the "market" or where the buyers of marijuana await a runner (seller).
Thereafter, a runner later identified to be Erwin Spencer approached the poseur-buyer,
Gaviola, who was asked "Iiscore ba kayo" (TSN, April 5, 1995, p. 22) Having answered, "Iiscore
kami", Spencer then left and returned after five minutes with the marijuana (ibid., p. 22).
Gaviola then handed over the marked money and arrested Spencer, but who freed himself
and ran (TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 7)
Then, the "buy-bust" team pursued Spencer, who ran inside a bungalow-type house with
steel gate (ibid., p. 8). Having trapped Spencer inside the house, the police officers frisked him
and recovered the marked money (ibid., p. 9). The police officers likewise found appellant
repacking five (5) bricks of "marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper on top of the round table
inside the house's sala (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 7). Appellant was then arrested and he
confessed that the source of the "marijuana" was Benguet (TSN, April 4, 1995, p. 10).
Spencer and appellant were later taken to the precinct where they were delivered to the
inquest fiscal for further investigation (TSN, April 11, 1995, p. 8). The arresting officers then
executed an affidavit on the incident and made a request for the National Bureau of
Investigation to conduct examination of the drugs seized (TSN, May 3, 1995, p. 2). The NBI
Report confirmed the drugs seized to be "Marijuana" weighing five (5) kilos (ibid., p. 3).
On February 15, l995, the City Prosecutor charged appellant with the crime of illegal possession of drugs
under the following Information:3
That on or about the 12th day of February 1995 in Kalookan City, M.M. and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control 5.208 kgs. of Marijuana, knowing the same to be a prohibited
drugs (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On March 1, 1995, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.4
During trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses (1) PO2 Bismark Gaviola, the poseur-buyer, (2)
SPO2 Romeo Baldonado, one of the police officers who took part in the buy-bust operation, and (3) Juliet
Gelacio Mahilum, a forensic chemist at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Mahilum testified that
she conducted three types of examination on the five (5) bricks of marijuana flowering tops (chemical
examination, microscopic examination, and chromatographic examination) and that each of the five (5)
bricks gave positive results for marijuana.5
For the defense, appellant and Angelo Bernales, a boarder at appellant's house, testified. Their version of
the incident is as follows:6
 JOEL ELAMPARO y FONTANILLA, the accused herein, gave a very different version of the
incident. At around 6:00 to 7:30 in the morning of February 12, 1995, he was at their house
when somebody knocked at their door. His father opened the same and was informed that
somebody was looking for him. He went out and saw Erwin Spencer with handcuffs and being
held by an arresting officer. He likewise sighted PO3 Bismarck Gaviola holding a big box.
When he persistently questioned Erwin Spencer as to why he was arrested, the arresting
officers got mad at him prompting them to likewise bring him to the police station where he
was detained. The arresting officers demanded the amount of P15,000.00 for his release. He
remained in jail as he refused to accede to their demand. On the other hand, Erwin Spencer
was released two (2) days after they were jailed for the latter gave money to the police
officers. (TSN, pp. 1-8, May 9, 1995).
ANGELO BERNALE (sic), a student, testified that he is renting a small room at the accused' (sic)
house located at No. 2 P. Gomez St., Bagong Barrio, Kalookan City. On February 12, 1995, at
about 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning he was about to go out of the accused' (sic) house
to bring breakfast to his father when he sighted Erwin Spencer in handcuffs, in the company
of three policemen one of whom was holding a box. Then he saw the policemen knocked at
the door of the accused' (sic) house. Shortly thereafter, the accused was taken away by the
policemen.
After trial, the court rendered its decision,7 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused JOEL ELAMPARO Y FONTANILLA,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of NINE MILLION
(P9,000,000.00) PESOS, pursuant to Section 17 of the Death Penalty. With Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant now contends that the trial court erred in —8
I. . . . GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND
DISREGARDING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.
II. . . . FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 4 [SHOULD BE SEC. 8] OF R.A. 6425.
III. . . . CONTENDING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF MINORITY.
In his brief, appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. He contends that it is highly
unusual for arresting officers to act on an "information" of an unknown source without confirming the
veracity of the report, and that it is incredible that a peddler of marijuana would be so brazen as to
approach total strangers and offer to sell them marijuana. Appellant insists that he was charged with
illegal possession of marijuana because he failed to pay the police officers the amount of P15,000.00 for
his release, unlike Spencer, who paid said amount. Appellant assails the legality of his arrest inside the
house of his father for failure of the apprehending officers to secure a search warrant. Lastly, appellant
contends that if found guilty, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in
his favor.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, contends that further surveillance was unnecessary
because the police "asset" had personal knowledge of the open buying and selling of "marijuana" in the
area, having purchased his "marijuana" a few hours before reporting the matter to the police. Appellant
also misrepresented himself in saying that Spencer was released without charges considering that a
separate investigation was conducted against the latter. The OSG contends that appellant's arrest was an
incident to a lawful hot pursuit made against Spencer. Appellant, in the course of the pursuit was
surprised in plain view to be repacking the five (5) bricks of marijuana. The OSG concedes, however, that
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in favor of appellant.
Considering the assigned errors and the foregoing contentions, we find that here the issues pertain, first,
to the assessment of credibility of witnesses; second, the validity of appellant's arrest; and third, the
correctness of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
As to the first issue, it is well-settled that the assessment of credibility of witnesses is within the province
of the trial court which had an opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during their
testimonies. Unless the trial court overlooked substantial facts which would affect the outcome of the
case, we accord the utmost respect to their findings of facts. As compared to the baseless disclaimers of
appellant, the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses appears worthy of belief, coming as
it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary.9
Appellant claims that it is highly suspect that Spencer would offer to sell marijuana to total strangers.
However, in many cases, drug pushers did sell their prohibited articles to prospective customers, be they
strangers or not, in private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, some drug pushers
appear to have become exceedingly daring, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the
existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of
agreement as well as the act constituting sale and delivery of prohibited drugs.10 As found a quo, it was
the consummated sale between PO2 Gaviola and Spencer which led to the eventual arrest of appellant.
As to the warrantless search, Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibits a search and seizure
without a judicial warrant. Further, Section 3 thereof provides that any evidence obtained without such
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
However, not being absolute, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is subject to
exceptions. Thus, for example, Section 12 of Rule 126, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides that
a person lawfully arrested may be searched for "dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have also been
judicially formulated, viz: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure
in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure.11
Considering its factual milieu, this case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine. In People v. Doria,
301 SCRA 668, 710-711 (1999), we held that —
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and
its discovery inadvertent.
When Spencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of PO2 Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the
house of appellant. The members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after him and entering
the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once inside the
house, the police officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust money from him. They also
caught appellant in flagrante delictorepacking the marijuana bricks which were in full view on tap of a
table. PO2 Gaviola testified as to the circumstances of appellant's arrest as follows —12
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, JR.
Q: Now how were you able to enter the house?
PO2 GAVIOLA:
A: Because the door was already open.
Q: When you entered the house, what happened inside the house?
A: We saw Joel Elamparo, sir. He was then repacking five (5) bricks of marijuana wrapped
in a newspaper.
Q: Where was it placed, this five (5) packed (sic) of marijuana?
A: It was placed on top of the table, sir.
Q: Was Joel Elamparo alone when you saw him repacking these five (5) bricks of
marijuana?
A: He has some companions in the house, his wife, 2 other women, his father and there
was one man there who was a boarder.
 Q: Now you said that you saw Joel Elamparo repacking five bricks of marijuana, now who
was his companion in repacking the same?
A: He was alone, sir.
Hence, appellant's subsequent arrest was likewise lawful, coming as it is within the purview of Section 5
(a) of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. — Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
Sec. 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrest.13 Here two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.14 Thus, when appellant was seen repacking the marijuana, the
police officers were not only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
Although the caption of the Information charges the appellant with violation of Section 4 of Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,15 otherwise known as the death penalty
law, which refers to the sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited
drugs, the body of the Information charges appellant with the crime of illegal possession of prohibited
drugs under Section 8 of Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. We have held that it is
not the designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but the allegations therein which
directly apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.16 Appellant having
been fully apprised of the elements of the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, he may
properly be convicted of the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
In drug cases, the quantity of the prohibited drugs involved is determinative of the imposable
penalty.1âwphi1 Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides that
when the quantity of indian hemp or marijuana is 750 grams or more, as in this case, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Appellant having been born on January 9, 1978,17 was only 17 years, 1 month, and 3 days old, at the time
of the commission of the crime on February 12, 1995. Beginning with our decision in People
v. Simon,18 and reiterated in a number of decisions thereafter, the Court has recognized the suppletory
application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to the Dangerous Drugs Act after the
amendment of the latter by Republic Act No. 7659. Appellant being a minor over fifteen and under
eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime, he is entitled to a reduced penalty due to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Article 68
(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period. Applying the provisions of Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code which prescribes the rules for graduating penalties, the imposable penalty on appellant is the
penalty next lower in degree immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale. The penalty next lower in degree than reclusion perpetua is reclusion
temporal. There being no generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor. No fine is
imposable in this case, for it is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death.19
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 121, in Criminal Case No. C-
48478 (95) finding appellant JOEL ELAMPARO Y FONTANILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal possession of drugs is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, and seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Costs against appellant.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused,
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado
V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No.
15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies; the
appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas
and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those
sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No.
15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings; the accused
are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr.
withdrew his appeal.
The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they
had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as
well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082,
14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and
also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and
their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise
affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged
in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore
committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the
Philippines, and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or
formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command
the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly
and take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed
public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the
allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by
then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then
and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction
of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of
thirteen attacks on government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946,
April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950,
August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated
the said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several
others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or
maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on
Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or
associated labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines,
as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize
its activities — as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained by the herein
accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized its
activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other
organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to
 thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of the above-
mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres Baisa, Jr.
and Teopista Valerio, alleges:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto
and continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and
the place chosen for that purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the
different parts of the country, the said accused being then high ranking officials and/or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (HUKS),
the latter being the armed forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines; having come to
an agreement with the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270,
14315, 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and decided to commit the crime of
rebellion, and therefore, conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused in said
criminal cases, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof,
together with many others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the
filing of this information, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promote maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan", (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly and take Arms against the
Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of overthrowing the same, as in
fact, the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen publicly
and taken arms against the Government, by then and there making armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachment, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,
by then and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, kidnappings,
planned destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism in order to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit: (Enumeration of
thirteen attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946. August 6, 1946,
April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950,
August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950).
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present
appeals.
APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following: (1)
that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely, Victor or
Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other
publications of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor
Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held
continuous communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he furnished a mimeographing
machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and supplies for the military operations of the
Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the Philippines and had gone abroad
to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by
the court that Hernandez made various speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in
the provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress of
Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was organized by
Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo Capadocia,
etc.
We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence, independently of each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of the court.
Testimonial Evidence
Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October, 1947,
at the offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of Guillermo
Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was given the
pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis". He made
various speeches on the following dates and occasions:
(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in
which he announced that the people will soon meet their dear comrade in the person of
Comrade Luis Taruc.
(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which
occasion Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM
are the peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and
the CLO falls under the TUD of the Communist Party. 1äwphï1.ñët
(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the World
Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by the
people of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he preferred to
go with the Huks because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the
Government.
(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the
frauds in the 1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections and that if improvement
cannot be made by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go
to the hills and join Luis Taruc the head of the dissidents in the Philippines.
(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the
World Peace at the CLO headquarters at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and
incited the people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join four
comrades under the leadership of Luis Taruc.
(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the unemployed at 330
P. Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Government to give
them jobs. In conclusion he said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the only way
out was to join the revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse
Tung, leader of the People's Army in China, drove Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and that
Luis Taruc was also being chased by Government forces run by puppets like Quirino, etc.
(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez
expressed regret that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to
the field to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming
heroes by fighting in the fields against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.
The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of the CLO
since August, 1948.
On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a Huk
from 1942 to 1950, explained:
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by
force of aims and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called
dictatorship of the proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow
of the present government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as
the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the CLO was
organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.
(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee
of the CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by
the TUD - the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the
organizational bureau of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially the
Executive Committee. And it is a fact that since a good majority of the members of the
Executive Committee are party members, there is no time, there is no single time that those
directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are being objected to
by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how the CLO will conduct its
functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V.
Hernandez.
(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the
present government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of
propaganda - by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing,
 medicine and other forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very
constitution of the CLO itself which expounded the theory of classless society and the
eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained
in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO Exh. "V-1579"). Thru
propaganda, the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and disseminated Communist
ideas by:
(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh.
V-1662), founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO
headquarters at 2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;
(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World
Federation of Trade Union Magazine, International Union of Students magazine,
Voice magazine of the marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the
Defenders of the Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine, Soviet Russia Today
magazine and World Federation of Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-911, V-
907, V-910, V-899, V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);
(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as
the "Titis", "Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The Philippine
Labor Demands Justice" and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V.
Hernandez;
(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by
means of organization of committees in the educational department as well as
researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.
(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist Party thru infiltration of
party members and selected leaders of the HMB within the trade unions under the control of
the CLO. The Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and organizers
to different factories in order to organize unions. After the organization of the union, it will
affiliate itself with the CLO thru the Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will register said
union with the Department of Labor; and the orientation and indoctrination of the workers is
continued in the line of class struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of the Communist
Party members and selected leaders of the HMB with the trade unions under the control of
the CLO is already achieved and the group made strong enough to carry out its aims, they will
begin the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and anti-Communist
elements and will create a so-called revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis will be done
for the party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the countrysides and made
them come to the city gates. The entry of the HMB is being paved by the simultaneous and
sporadic strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru the management of the CLO.
Important Documents Submitted at Trial
1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was
referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman".
(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the
latter of his sympathies for other communists, describing his experiences with
Communists abroad, telling Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by
Victor. (Exh. D-2001-2004)
(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." — mentions different groups of labor unions of
which Victor heads one group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and
IRWU (Exh. C-2001-2008) Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)
(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado
Hernandez as Victor from co-party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL)
(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to
Victor. (Exh. 1103)
(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not
published in the newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however published by
Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.
(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to
Victor. (Exh. D-463-64)
(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at
Pampanga St. to bring to the latter communications from the Communist Party.
(Exh. D-1203) That Soliman was given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with
Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-92-93. SEC)
(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has
"tendencies of careerism and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the party";
that he should be asked to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)
(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going
underground. (Exh. V-87) (1) His election as councilor until December, 1951. (Exhs.
V-42, W-9) (2) His election as President of CLO until August of following year.
(Exhs. V-42, W-9)
2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.
(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting. (Exh. V-80)
(b) To SOBSI Jakarta — that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the
East. (Exh. V-82)
(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh.
W-116-120)
(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 — Extends greetings to National Union of
Marine Cooks and Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle — "the
liberation of all the peoples from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism".
(Exh. V-259)
(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)
(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)
(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)
(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted,
like Taruc. Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)
(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker — condemns Wall Street maneuvers;
corruption and graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)
(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh. V-79)
(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO — Praises Balgos and
Capadocia for joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289)
(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" — Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army
and Government. (Exh. V-94) .
(m) Letter to Taruc — June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among the CLO Huks and
PKM. Attacks North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung (contained in Exh. V-94)
(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" — States of a delegation to Roxas attacking
unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93)
(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" — (Exh. V-287)
(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" — (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)
(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38)
(r) Press statement of Hernandez — opposes acceptance of decorations from
Greece by Romulo. (Exh. V-72)
3. Other Activities of Hernandez.
(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he
sent to the field. Letters show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)
(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which he did furnish to
Huks. (Exh. C-364)
(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to
Bulosan for inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)
(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed
forces. (Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)
(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs,
Exhs. T-1, RR-136-138A)
 (f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued
press release about their going underground. (Exh. F-91)
(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C-362)
(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh.
D-451-451-A)
(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.
The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was fully
organized as a party and in order to carry out its aims and policies a established a National Congress, a
Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau (OB), and National Courier
or Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions indicated in their respective names;
(2) that in a meeting held on August 11, 1950 the SEC discussed the creation of a Military Committee of
the Party and a new GHQ, under which on September 29, 1950 the SEC organized a special warfare
division, with a technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a body known as the National Intelligence
Division was created, to gather essential military intelligence and, in general, all information useful for
the conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National Finance Committee was also organized as a part of
the Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the country was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco
comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6) that since November, 1949 the CPP had declared the
existence of a revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground and the CPP is
leading the armed struggle for national liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and
coordinate with the HMB on the decisive struggle and final overthrow of the imperialist government; (7)
that in accordance with such plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and development not only of the
Party but also of the HMB; the expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September
1951, the HMB from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et seq.
Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify HMB military operations for
political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of the
HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made in May, 1946;
June, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; October 15
and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; April 29, 1949;
August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950; March 29, 1950.
The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:
The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had
taken a direct part in those raids and in the commission of the crimes that had been
committed. It is not, however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct
participation in the commission of the same but rather that the defendants in these cases
have cooperated, conspired and confederated with the Communist Party in the prosecution
and successful accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the said Party thru the
organization called the CLO (Congress of Labor Organizations).
The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the same
pattern as the CPP, having its own National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the absence of
and in representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts when the National
Congress and the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven permanent Committees, namely,
of Organization, Unemployment and Public Relations, Different Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing,
Legislation and Political Action. Members of the Communist Party dominate the committees of the CLO.
The supposed tie-up between CPP and the CLO of which Hernandez was the President, is described by
the court below in finding, thus:
Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it operates was
explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the Communist Party and the
CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from a handwritten draft of Capadocia, which is one of
the texts used in the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays its role by means of
propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other material forms of help to the HMB, which
constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is done by lectures, meetings, and the
organization of committees of the educational department as well as researches at the CLO Worker's
Institute.
Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist
Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories in forming a union. These Party
Members help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and
ultimately effect the total emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the
so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party members to
indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the union to become proselytes of the Communist Party
ideology. After the right number is secured and a union is formed under a communist leader,
this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn registers the same with the Department of
Labor. The orientation and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the help of the CLO.
The primary objective of the CLO is to create what is called a revolutionary crisis. It seeks to
attain this objective by first making demands from the employers for concessions which
become more and more unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to grant the
same. Then a strike is declared. But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate
attainment of the Communist goal of armed overthrow of the government. After the workers
in the factories have already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party thru the
CLO a critical point is reached when a signal is given for the armed forces of the Communist
Party, the HMB, to intervene and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within
the city.
On the basis of the above findings, the court below found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime
charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories
provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its
decision and by the Solicitor General in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently
exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes against
capitalism and more specifically against America and the Quirino administration, which he dubbed as a
regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of Communistic Theory there
appears no evidence that he actually participated in the actual conspiracy to overthrow by force the
constituted authority.
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If, as
testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by lectures, meetings
and organization of committees of education by Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely allowed
Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate the CLO members
into the Communist Party and proselytize them to the Communist ideology; if, as also indicated by
Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate overthrow of the Government first by making demands
from employers for concessions until the employers find it difficult to grant the same, at which time a
strike is declared; if it is only after the various strikes have been carried out and a crisis is thereby
developed among the laboring class, that the Communist forces would intervene and carry the
revolution — it is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the preparation of the laborers
for the Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words, the CLO had no function but that of
indoctrination and preparation of the members for the uprising that would come. It was only a
preparatory organization prior to revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the CLO therefore,
namely Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the actual uprising subject
of the accusation. Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his presidency and leadership of the
CLO cannot be considered as having actually risen up in arms in rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines, or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the rebellion as charged against him in the present
case; he was merely a propagandist and indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist
conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.
The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had
declared the existence of the revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground,
with the CPP leading the struggle for national integration and that in the month of January 1950, it was
decided by the said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for political purposes. The court
implicates the appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the Communist Party
by his mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion unwarranted. The seditious speeches of
Hernandez took place before November, 1949 when the CPP went underground. The court below has
not been able to point out, nor have We been able to find among all acts attributed to Hernandez, any
single fact or act of his from which it may be inferred that he took part in the deliberations declaring the
existence of a revolutionary situation, or that he had gone underground. As a matter of fact the
prosecution's evidence is to the effect that Hernandez refused to go underground preferring to engage
in what they consider the legal battle for the cause.
We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the trial
and which were confiscated from the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches of
Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state of revolutionary
situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive Committee, or of
the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist Party; so NO presumption can arise that he had taken part
in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no evidence, direct or
indirect, to relate or connect the appellant Hernandez with the uprising or the resolution to continue or
maintain said uprising, his participation in the deliberations leading to the uprising being inferred only
from the fact that he was a communist.
The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court appears to have been for
important members, if they intend actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant leaving
the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.
The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of
September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which reads:
11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside.
Present problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom,
retain him to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and
other relatively exposed mass leaders.
And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground
forces outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of propaganda, making
speeches and causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders directed him to
publish.
That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following
reasons (excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of the
City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of the CLO for a
term which was to end the year 1951.
As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista Rebels,
and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism, and tending to want to deal
with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational procedures."
The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field. But
the very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p. 49), is to
the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent have not been received. It is
true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had come from a crew
member of a ship of the American President Lines. He also, upon request, sent a portable typewriter to
the SEC or Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine received by Hernandez from
one Rolland Scott Bullard a crew member of the SS President Cleveland, appease later to have been
forwarded by him to the officers of the SEC or the Politburo.
Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez,
who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect
belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of propaganda,
but do not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the Communist Party in the
uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the information. And his refusal to go
underground because of his political commitments occasioned by his term of election as president of the
CLO and the impressions caused by his acts on the Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct
communication or understanding with the Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated, creates in Us the
reasonable doubt that it was not his Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his
speeches sympathizing with the Huks. For which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he has conspired in the instigation of the rebellion for which he is
held to account in this criminal case.
The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist
Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the
provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision reads:
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and
by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal
act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of
things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action,
immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to
use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize
the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the
Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist
does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not
yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the
Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy
to commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court of the United States:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or
on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to
other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship
must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand
attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in
an organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been
recognized by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .
What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the
elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in
the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed
be recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that
"act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and
activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement
which comes from the knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may
indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical
impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part
of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from a
conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his
membership without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course
of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)
The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of
conditions of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and
active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and
cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in
the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor leader
and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and
other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his
political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he was the head
was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to advance his
political aspirations.
Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor has
any particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had advocated action or
the use of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the leaders of the
Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding, evidence is
wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with said leaders in
planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof. Insofar as the furnishing
of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an
intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It does not appear that he himself
furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the rebellion or to the forces of the
rebellion in the field.
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the
chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster the
rebellion or the uprising.
We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of propaganda
in favor of Communism and in favor of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy to
commit rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches
favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the
hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of
obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the principles of Communism.
To this effect is the following comment of Viada:
CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia que
se anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque fuera
preciso acudir a la fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera responsable de un
delito de conspiracion para la sedicion? — El Tribunal Supreme ha resuelto la negative al
casar cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio lo contrario: "Considerando
que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del Codigo Penal, hay conspiracion cuando dos o
mas personas se conciertan para la execution de un delito y resuelven cmeterlo; y no
constando que existiera ese concierto en cuanto a los hechos que se refieren en la tercera
pregunta del veredicto, pues en ella solo se habla de los actos de induccion que el procesado
realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la mismo produjo en el animo de las personas a quienes se
dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso, resulta evidence que faltan los
clementos integrantes de la conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de
Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I, Codigo Penal, p. 152)
In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of
conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these
circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the crime
charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the
information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, with
the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations. — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed
useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their criminal
responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in
relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party
or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion,
because mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle
without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled
with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts
conducive thereto or evincing the same.
On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or
rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom.
By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such
membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such
membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion punishable by law.
And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of the
rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of conspiracy,
unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he commits
rebellion.
In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the "Katipunan",
the purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force. Each of the defendants on various
times solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held that the defendants were
guilty of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and not of rebellion or insurrection
itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:
From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are
guilty, not of inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the
crime of conspiring to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each
of them, did, together with others, in the months of February and March, 1903, in the
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to overthrow, put down, and to destroy by
force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et al., 3
Phil. 432, 434.)
JUAN J. CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee of the
CLO member of the Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the establishment of the
dictatorship of the proletariat To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He
should therefore be absolved of the charges contained in the information.
AMADO RACANDAY
The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member of the
CLO a communications center of the Communist Party, having been found in possession of letters from
Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.
Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the
Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the
Regional Committee of the Communist Party.
The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950, before the Communist Party went
underground. We have been unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its conclusion that
he received contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced beyond
reasonable doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among the officials of the
Communist Party to take part and support the rebellion of the Huks.
We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.
GENARO DE LA CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch in
Pasay City, a member of the Central Committee and Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his membership
and his position as member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO these facts being
corroborated by the witness Guillermo Calayag.
His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist, Genaro de
la Cruz received quotas and monetary contributions coming from the areas under his jurisdiction, and
one time he made a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO headquarters at Azcarraga signing
the receipt as "Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies of the "Titis" magazine. `
While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party
indicate that he is an active member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received from
Communist Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of the
Communist Party had already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk rebellion.
Under these circumstances We cannot find him guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion because of the
lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
JULIAN LUMANOG
The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for the
HMB and Central Committee member of the CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party is for
the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of the CLO
Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the Lumber Unions
and attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.
Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the money collected by him to one
Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the use of
the said unit.
Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident that by
giving his contributions he actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government and
should, therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced accordingly.
FERMIN RODILLAS
The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities
consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB,
turning over said collections to the Party; that he has given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his house
at Juan Luna St., Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post. The above findings of the court are
fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.
Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with the
cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court was fully
justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a co-conspirator in
the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced accordingly.
BAYANI ESPIRITU
This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the
Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the National
Finance Committee, assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he accompanied the
purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the Huks; that he is a
member of the Communication Division of the CPP in Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or
communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz, courier of the Communist Party, when
he asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc.
The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the communications and evidence submitted
by the prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the communists;
serving them as courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was submitted in court and in it
he admits obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of the PKP.
Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government and that
Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication with the Communist Party and served it as courier, We
believe that the court was fully justified in finding him guilty. However, We believe that not having
actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
TEOPISTA VALERIO
The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga, under
Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella" and
"Star"; that she was found in possession of various documents written to top Communists like
Alejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well as a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a son.
Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva Ecija,
later Chairman of the Finance Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the Central Luzon
Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letter from the mountains to
Teopista Valerie, who was in turn also a courier.
Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We are
satisfied that she herself was, aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB from
1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the HMB, and considering
that the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there cannot be any
question that she was in conspiracy with the other members of her Party against the constituted
government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion.
DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION
In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P. Balgos,
Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was dismissed because they have not been apprehended at the time
of the trial.
PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED
In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking aims
against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws,
the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code; whereas Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under Art. 138,
Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act No. 292). As the specific charge against appellants is that of
rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the Government, they cannot be held guilty of inciting the
people to arms under Article 138, which is a different offense.
On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership in any
organization or association committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the appellants
because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at the time of the commission of
the acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act punishes
participation or membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly constituted
Government, a crime district from that of actual rebellion with which appellants are charged.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez,
Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the
information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The defendants-appellants Julian
Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and the defendants-
appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) are hereby
found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the
Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five
years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the costs. So
ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Barrera and Regala, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more
takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its
doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar
cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where
season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of
arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau
of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed
and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr.,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February
28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge
who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6,
1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this
case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it
very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et
al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito
complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to
in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and
the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued
its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for
Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued
without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the
petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members
of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the
Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition,
G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent
of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious
crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly
be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written
pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in
the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less
grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced
by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986
Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime
which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into
the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes
penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses
upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense
in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by
legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less
than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be,
limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion
and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other
common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the
Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that
they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited
clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our
Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this
could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the
movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the
words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a
que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932),
esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina
Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el
caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o
cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el
otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al
delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que
represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se
sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its
maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the
penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of
said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the
 spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there
can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one
of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense
be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no
other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent
spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of
a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the
more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into,
much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact
charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus,
in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the
perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of
this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said
defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in
the filing of the questioned information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing
against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory
complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has already
ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued
barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly
gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right
to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail
rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a
petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this
Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a
non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense,
would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious
recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent
Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present
petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error
or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges
against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been
brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less
than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental
importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would
justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy
of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against
the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct
its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though
it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital
offense is charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been
recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or
weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a
similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed
to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it
has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court
cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression
of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief
appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to,
pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of
issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is
equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is
virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same
principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued
against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared
before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and
detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional
rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in
the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless
killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often
perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even
claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our
capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies
every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on
rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be
considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort
of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only
interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully,
Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within
its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before
final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge
to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of
the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS
PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated
because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering
the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they
should not be set at liberty without further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue
of valid informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and,
that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null
and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds
that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional
right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas
corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The
occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale
behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a
large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas
corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when
apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further,
detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person,
who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January
1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined
thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman
who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal
who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an
information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault
Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and
no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the
parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them,
and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does
not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for
his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed
in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in
the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were
initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes
of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of
the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing
jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the
rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in
the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt
acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by
the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence
against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of
the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of
invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr.
for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August
1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly.
Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas
corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains
that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29,
when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he
pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty
pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in
bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ
of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who
arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are
not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
and after a trial free from error.
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without
warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other
hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance,
and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She
was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or
authority to possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of
the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He
identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and
Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from
Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by
Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and on 12
August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined
team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following articles were found and taken under
proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS
Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although
he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member
of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at
the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the
military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver
letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other members of the rebel group. On further
questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro,
Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11,
1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August
11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled telephone
number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City.
Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the
given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the
morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the
place, which was granted, the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the
house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers,
journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well
as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live
ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other
occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to
her and that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other
occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after which an
information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City,
which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque
and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire
to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition for habeas
corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for
resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or members of
the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said
petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP,
their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural.
The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension,
in possession of ammunitions without license to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple,
without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing
committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag
containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no
license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August 1988,
Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights,
Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging
objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and
Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they
could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their
possession were the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal.
7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1)
magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of
the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were forwarded to
the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387,
respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested
without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed
without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ
of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no
previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were
apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void for
want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of
the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right
to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against them,
the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule
112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was
conducted because the accused has not made and signed a waiver of the
provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that based on the
evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed against them
in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due
process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the
Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case
shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP
Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In
the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and
several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky
Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could
not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and
Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the
right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a
warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a
warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to
Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
V that at the time of petitioner's arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms,
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the
firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession when
they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their
illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the
other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said
arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting
officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the
inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their
heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a
product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the
military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St.,
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence,
was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a
result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by
former members of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced
positive results. to date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of
Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment, firearms and
ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that
other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a
"stake-out" operation whereby some members of the raiding team were left
behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's
arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted
suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his
person were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would
show. Not only that, Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there
to deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and
Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place.
Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino's residence
considering that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to
that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the
military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of
Constantino, such as petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable
Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went to
visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested
thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect
her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the
leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection with
Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity
of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from
Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any
plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under
the time, place and circumstances of the events in question, especially considering
ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting
a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from which one
can reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost
secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu,
who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang
Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public
service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was sleeping
in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic
who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them,
he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col.
Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his
sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and
hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila where he
was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before
the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was
thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police
District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his
liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the
Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to
Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest
since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to
go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give
into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the
immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang
Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu
taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the
formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on
November 23, 1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but he gave
the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and
symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was
heard to say:
 Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi
tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba
ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka
Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning
and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised
Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113,
Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed
with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon
posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00)
excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso
Nazarenothat he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at
about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of
the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon
questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo
Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought
him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong
because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others,
with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The
case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused,
Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno
and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January
1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said
Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in
fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of
the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts
and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected
by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively
implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime,
does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the
indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a
crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be
detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper
courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process or make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing
that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of
any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of
an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its
pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an
information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is
issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the said ruling,
which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has
no place under the present democratic dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental, and
constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest
and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after
a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal
information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine.
This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits
lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision
of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not
really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment,
of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit
the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained person is charged, had
jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather,
as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken into
custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth
be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty
should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the
bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 17748 March 4, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Vicente Sotto for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee
MALCOLM, J.:
As one outcome of the tumultous uprising of certain members of the Philippine Constabulary to inflict
revenge upon the police of the city of Manila, charges of sedition were filed in the Court of First Instance
of the city of Manila against the participants in the public disturbance. Convicted in the trial court of a
violation of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, and sentenced either to the maximum penalty or
a near approach to the maximum penalty provided by the punitive provisions of that law, all of the
defendants have perfected an appeal to this court. A statement of the case and of the facts, an opinion
on the pertinent issues, and a judgement, if no reversible error be found, regarding the appropriate
penalty, will be taken up in the order named.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS
On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the
household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of the
woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by the
policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila police department and
member of the Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policemen named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle Real,
in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various Constabulary soldiers which
resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private Macasinag was seriously, and
as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.
The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private
Macasinag and other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a Constabulary
soldier endangered a deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa Lucia Barracks. This
resentment was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the police force of the city of Manila.
The officers of the Constabulary appear to have been aware of the state of excitement among the
soldiers the shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the commanding officer of the Barracks,
increased the number of guards, and confined all the soldiers in the Barracks.
During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in Santa
Lucia Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the streets of
Intramuros and that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he received the night
before. This rumor contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal by the
Constabulary soldiers against the policemen.
At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth
Company approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked him
to let the soldiers out through the window of the quarters of the Fourth Company. Private Torio was
easily persuaded to permit private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company to saw out the window bars
of the quarters, in his charge, and to allow soldiers to escape through the window with rifles and
ammunition under the command of their sergeants and corporals. When outside of the quarters, these
soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city police force.
One platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real,
Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an American
policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was taking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk in the
United States Army. These two men were shot and died soon afterwards. To the credit of policeman
Driskill be it said, that although in a dying condition and in the face of overwhelming odds, her valiantly
returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was killed notwithstanding that in response to the command
of Constabulary, "Hands up!," he elevated both arms.
A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without considering
that the passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a volley into the
car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor de Torres and gravely wounding three other civilian
passengers, Gregorio Cailes, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father Jose Tahon, a priest of the
Cathedral of Manila, proved himself a hero on this occasion for, against the command of the
Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing and advanced in order that he might
administer spiritual aid to those who had been wounded.
The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman,
assistant chief of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived
at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers
resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the death shortly afterwards of patrolman
Saplala.
About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle Real near
Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed themselves in the
courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of patrolmen Trogue and Sison.
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had in the meantime,
arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gradens on the east side of Calle General Luna
opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle
occupied by Sergeant Armada and driven by policeman Policarpio who with companions were passing
along Calle General Luna in front of the Aquarium going in the direction, of Calle Real, Intramuros. As a
result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle, policeman Policarpio, was mortally wounded. This
same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired several volleys indiscriminately into the Luneta police
station, and the office of the secret service of the city of Manila across Calles General Luna and Padre
Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured.
General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain Page, commanding officer of the Santa
Lucia Barracks, and other soldiers in the streets of Manila, and other soldiers one after another returned
to the Barracks where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these soldiers was, however, made.
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel, Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary
officers, and later by the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation of the events of the
night before. He first ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks at that time, numbering some
one hundred and eighty, be assembled on the parade ground and when this was done, the soldiers were
separated into their respective companies. Then Colonel Sweet, speaking in English with the assistance
of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted his remarks into Tagalog, made to all of the soldiers two
statements.
What occurred on the occasion above described can best be told in the exact language of Colonel Sweet:
"I assembled all four companies in Santa Lucia Barracks and asked them to tell me which ones had been
out the night before and which ones had participated in the shooting, which they did, and to tell me the
names of those who were with them and who were not then present, which they did. I think there were
seventy-two (seventy-three) present and they named five (four) others." Again the witness said: "At first
I asked all those who went out on the previous night for any purpose whatever to signify the fact by
stepping forward and gave them five minutes to think it over before doing so. To those who stepped
forward that had gone out for any purpose whatever I asked those who took part in the shooting the
night before that in justice to themselves and to the other men who had not taken part in it, and for the
good of all concerned, that they step forward and they did." The names of the four who took part (not
five as stated by Colonel Sweet), but ho were taken to present, were noted by Captain Gallardo.
The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in writing during the afternoon of the same
day, December 16. The questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the city of Manila was in English or
Spanish. The questions and answers were, however, when requested by the soldiers, translated not their
dialects. Each statement was signed by the soldier making it in the presence of either two or three
witnesses.
Although the answers to the questions contained these statements vary in phraseology, in substance
they are the same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of Sergeant Graciano L. Cabrera, taken
in Spanish and interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected into Tagalog, may be selected as typical of the
rest, and is here literally transcribed:
1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence. — Graciano I. Cabrera, 254 years
of age, single, sergeant of the first company of the General Service of the Constabulary,
residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.
2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you belong? — First Company, General
Service of the Constabulary.]
3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday afternoon December 15,
1920? — In the Santa Lucia Barracks.
4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? — Yes, sir.
5. For what reason, and where did you go? — We went in search of the policemen and secret
service men of Manila. It has been sometime now since we have been having standing grudge
against now since we have been having a standing grudge against the police of Manila. The
wife of one of our comrades was first arrested by the policemen and then abused by the
same; and not content with having abused her, they gave this woman to an American; after
 this incident, they arrested two soldiers of the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of keeping
women of bad reputation; after this incident, came the shooting of Macasinag, a shooting not
justified, because we have come to know that Macasinag did nothing and the policemen
could have arrested him if they desired. Moreover, the rumor spread among us that the
police department of Manila had given orders to the policemen to fire upon any Constabulary
soldier they found in the streets, and we believe that the rumor was not without foundation
since we noticed that after the Macasinag affair, the policemen of Manila, Contrary to the
usual practice, were armed with carbines or shotguns. For this reason we believe that if we
did not put an end to these abuses of the policemen and secret service men, they would
continue abusing the constabulary. And as an act of vengeance we did what we had done last
night.
6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? — I saw that almost all
the soldiers were jumping through the window and I was to be left alone in the barracks and
so I followed.
7. Who asked you to join it? — Nobody.
8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the Manila police the
night before last on Calle Real? — Yes, Sir, I know him because he was our comrade.
9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said soldier? — Indeed, yes,
not only was I offended, but my companions also were.
10. State how many shots you fired, if nay, during the riot last night. — I cannot tell precisely
the number of shots I fired because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I can assure you is that I
fired more than once.
11. Do you know if you hit any policeman or any other person?-If so state whether the victim
was a policeman or a civilian. — I cannot tell whether I hit any policeman or any civilian.
12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. — I cannot given an exact account of
the streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession of my faculties until I reached Calle
Victoria; afterwards, I became aware that I was bathed with perspiration only upon reaching
the barracks.
13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many cartidge did you
use? — I Carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the number of cartridges I used; however, I
placed in my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me and I must have lost.
14. How did you manage to leave the barracks? — By the window of the quarter of the Fourth
Company, through the grating which I found cut off.
15. Are the above statements made by you, voluntarily, freely, and spontaneously given? —
Yes, sir.
16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is made to you? —
Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.
(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA.
Witnesses:
S. GALLARDO.
LAURO C. MARQUEZ.
The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila
with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same, court, with the crimes of murder
and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different judges of first
instance.
All of the accused, with the exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E. Vallado.,
Dionisio Verdadero, and Paciano Caña, first pleased guilty to the charge of sedition, but later, after the
first witness for the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty were permitted, with
the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. the prosecution, in making out it
case, presented the seventy-seven confession of the defendants, introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to
C-76, conclusive, and with the exception of those made by Daniel Coralde, Nemesio Gamus, and
Venancio Mira, all were identified by the respective Constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who
intervened in taking them. The prosecution further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the
uprising.
The attorneys for the accused presented two defenses. The first defense was in favor of all the
defendants and was based on the contention that the written statements Exhibits C to C-76 were not
freely and voluntarily made by them. The second defense was in favor of the defendants Vicente
Casimiro, Salvador Gregorio, Roberto Palabay, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Roque Ebol,
Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla, Paciano Caña, Juan Abarques, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibabar, P. E.
Vallado, Patricio Bello, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Nemesio Deceña, Venancio Mira, Baldomero
Rodriguez, Juan Noromor, Maximo Perlas, and Victor Atuel, and was to the effect these men did not take
part in the riot.
The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the defendants were sentenced to serve the maximum imprisonment
of ten years provided by section 6 of Act No. 292. The court, however, distinguished fines from that of a
defendants Francisco Garcia, a private and the eight corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente
Manigdeg, Juan Abarques, Pedro V. Matero, Juan Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, upon
each of whom a fine of P5,000 was imposed, and of the three sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual
Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, upon each of whom a fine of P10,000 was imposed. The costs were
divided proportionately among the defendants.
For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we are indebted in large
measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Honorable George R. Harvey who
presided in the sedition case and of the Honorable Carlos Imperial who presided in the murder case. As
stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the defendants, the proof is substantially the same in
both cases.
In all material respects we agree with the findings of fact as made by the trial court in this case. The rule
is again applied that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of the trial court in passing
upon the credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstances of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. vs. Remegio [1918], 37 Phil.,
599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such fact or circumstance appears.
OPINION
An assignment of five errors is made by counsel for the defendants and appellants. Two the assignment
of error merit little or no consideration. Assignment of error No. 2 (finding its counterpart in assignments
of error 5 and 6 in the murder case), in which it is attempted to establish that Vicente Casimiro, Salvador
Gregorio, Paciano Caña, Juan Abarquez, Mariano Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello,
Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay, Juan Noromor, Roque Ebol, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano
Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibalar, P. M. Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Benigno
Tagavilla, did not leave the Santa Lucia Barracks in the night of the tragedy, is predicated on the special
defense raised in the lower court for these defendants and three other and which was found untenable
by the trial court. Any further discussion of this question falls more appropriately under consideration of
assignment of error No. 4, relating to the conspiracy between the accused.
Assignment of error No. 3, relating to the finding of the trial court that it had not been shown that the
policemen were not aware of the armed attack of the Constabulary, However, we find that the evidence
supports this conclusion of the trial court.
The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) the Admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the
prosecution (assignment of error No. 2, murder case); (2) the conspiracy between the accused
(assignment of error No. 4, sedition case; assignment of error No. 3, murder case); and (3) the conviction
of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law (assignment of error No. 5, sedition case).
1. The admission of exhibits C to C-76
Appellants claim that fraud and deceit marked the preparation of the seventy seven confessions. It is
alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those who had
taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact so
participate, affirmed that they because of a desire to leave Manila; that other stepped forward "for the
good of the service" in response to appeals from Colonel Sweet and other officers; while still others
simply didn't understand what they were doing, for the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English
and only translated into Tagalog, and their declarations were sometime taken in al language which was
unintelligible to them. Counsel for the accused entered timely objection to the admission in evidence of
Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-General is worn in stating otherwise.
Section 4 of Act No. 619, entitle "An Act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines
Constabulary," and reading: "No confession of any person charged with crime shall be received as
evidence against him by any court of justice unless be first shown to the satisfaction of the court that it
was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace or of
promises or offers of reward or leniency," was repealed by the first Administrative Code. But the same
rule of jurisprudence continues without the law. As he been repeatedly announced by this and other
courts, "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily, and without
compulsion or inducement of any sort". If the confession is freely and voluntarily made, it constitutes
one of the most effectual proofs in the law against the party making it. (Wilson vs. U. S.[1896], 162 U. S.
613.)The burden of proof that he confession was not voluntarily made or was obtained by undue
pressure is on the accused. (U. S. vs Zara [1912, 42 Phil., 308.)
What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the records. The
source of the rumor that the defendant would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the confession
is not established. One the contrary it is established that before the declaration were taken, Lieutenant
Gatuslao in response to a query had shown the improbability of such a transfer. With military orders
given in English and living in the city of Manila where the dialect is tagalog, all of the defendants must
have understood the substantial part of Colonel Sweet's remarks. What is more important, there could
be no misunderstanding as to the contents of the confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-nine
of the defendants reiterated their guilt. The officers who assisted in the investigation were of the same
service as the defendants in their own men.
It must also be remembered that each and everyone of the defendants was a member of the Insular
Police force. Because of the very nature of their duties and because of their practical experience, these
Constabulary soldiers must have been aware of the penalties meted out for criminal offenses. Every man
on such a momentous occasion would be more careful of his actions than ordinarily and whatever of
credulity there is in him, would for the moment be laid aside. Over and above all desire for a more
exciting life, over and above the so called esprit de corps, is the instinct of self preservation which could
not but be fully aroused by such stirring incidents too recent to be forgotten as had occurred in this case,
and which would counsel prudence rather than rashness; secretiveness rather than garrulity.
These confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without any
promise of immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose
credibility has not been successfully impeached.
We rule that the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.
2. The conspiracy between the accused
The contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of any supposed connivance between the
accused. Counsel emphasizes that in answer to the question in the confession, "who asked you to join
the riot," each of the accused answered, "Nobody." The argument is then advanced that the appellants
cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so called psychology of crowds theory. In other
words, it is claimed that at the time of the commission of the crime the accused were mere automatons
obeying the insistent call of their companions and of their uniform. From both the negative failure of
evidence and the positive evidence, counsel could deduce the absence of conspiracy between the
accused.
The attorney-General answers the argument of counsel by saying that conspiracy under section 5 of Act
No. 292 is not an essential element of the crime of sedition. In this law officer for the people may be on
solid ground. However, this may be, there is a broader conception of the case which reaches the same
result.
It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act, each is responsible for
all the acts of the other done in furtherance of the common design; and " the result is the same if the act
is divided into parts and each person proceed with his part unaided." (U. S. vs Maza [1905], 5 Phils., 346;
U. S. vs. Remegio [1918] 37 Phil., 599; decision of supreme court of Spain of September 29, 1883; People
vs. Mather [1830], 4 Wendell, 229.)
Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which
vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. It be proved that the defendants pursued by their
acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a
view to the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were
engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to the facts before us, it is
incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge
themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all. A
common plan evolved from their military training was followed.
The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the face of
actualities. The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the facts proved. Not along
are the men who fired the fatal shots responsible, not along are the men who admit firing their carbines
responsible, but all, having united to further a common design of hate and vengeance, are responsible
for the legal consequences therefor.
We rule that the trail court did not err in declaring that there a c conspiracy between the accused.
3. The conviction of the accused of a violation of the Treason and Sediton Law
Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The
Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of vie objects, including
that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the
Insular Government or of Provincial or Municipal Government. The trial court found that the crime of
sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been committed, and we believe that such finding is
correct.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292
it is and necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public
functionary, and that what really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the
Philippine Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivison 3 of section 5 of the Treason and
Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. In one scene there was a
fights between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government, but it was an unequal fight brought on
by the actions of the accused.
We rule that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused of the violation of section 5, paragraph
3, of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
JUDGEMENT
The Treason and Sedition Law provides as a penalty for any person guilty of sedition as defined in section
5 of the law, punishment by fine of not exceeding P10,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years,
or both. In this connection, it will be recalled that the court sentenced each of the private soldiers
Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Patricio Bello, Nemesio Deceña, Baldomero Rodriguez, P. E. Vallado,
Pedro Layola, Felix Liron (Cenon), Dionisio Verdadero, Lorenzo Tumboc, Casiano Guinto, Victor Atuel,
Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway, Quintin Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Timoteo Opermaria,
Maximo Perlas, Cornelio Elizaga, Roberto Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto
Salgo, Francisco Lusano, Marcelino Silos, Nicanor Perlas, Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayngco,
Guillermo Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin Mesalucha, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Petronilo Antonio,
Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Paciano Caña, Domingo Canapi, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel Coralde,
Nemesio Camas, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Marcos Marquez, Victorino Merto,
Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julian Acantilado, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia,
Rafael Nafrada, Zacarias Bayle, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Graciano Zapata,
Felisardo Favinal, Gaspar Andrade, Felix Lamsing, and Vicente Casimiro, to suffer imprisonment for ten
years, and to pay one seventy-seventh part of the costs; the private Francisco Garcia, who sawed the
bars of the window through which the defendants passed from Santa Lucia Barracks and each of the
corporals E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan
Regalado, Hilario Hibalar and Genaro Elayda, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of
P5,000 and one seventy-seventy of the costs; and each of the sergeants Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual
Magno, and Bonifacio Eugenio, to suffer imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of P10,000 and
one seventy-seventy of the costs. The trial judge appears to have made a reasonable exercise of the
discretion which the law reposes in him.
We cannot bring to a close this disagreeable duty without making our own the pertinent observations
found in the decision of the trial court in this case. Therein, along toward the closed of his learned
opinion, Judge Harvey said:
Rarely in the history of criminality in this country has there been registered a crime so
villainous as that committed by these defendants. The court is only concerned in this case
with crime of sedition. The maximum penalty prescribed by Act No. 292, imprisonment for
 ten year and a fine P10,000, is not really commensurate with the enormity of the offense.
Impelled by hatred, employing their knowledge of military sciences which is worthy of a
better cause, and in disregard of the consequences to themselves and their innocent loved
ones, and using the means furnished to them by the Government for the protection of life
and property, they sought by force and violence and outside of legal methods to avenge a
fancied wrong by an armed and tumultuous attack upon officials and agents of the
government of the city of Manila.
Although in view of the sentence which is being handed down in the murder case, affecting these same
defendants and appellants, it would seem to be a useless formality to impose penalties in this case, yet it
is obviously our duty to render judgement appealed from, with one seventy-seventh of the costs of this
instance against each appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J. Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants.
NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO CAPINO, defendants-appellants.
Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag, Manuel Concordia, P.M. Stuart Del Rosario, Tomas R.
Umali, Eufemio E. De Mesa and Edmundo T. Zepeda for appellants.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing directly to this Tribunal from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and sentencing each of them to
"life imprisonment, other accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial Punsalan in
the amount of P24,023; Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the amount of P700;
Claro Robles in the amount of P12,800; Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan
in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro Lacorte
in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo in the amount of P300;
Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the
amount of P90, each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency due to the nature of the principal penalty that is imposed upon them."
The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed during the
raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951,
by armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete
destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of
Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo
Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro
Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in
looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and
driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation in Tiaong
not only shortly before that raid but one year or two years before it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan
were old time friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the general elections of 1947 Umali
campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of 1949 Punzalan in his
turn campaigned and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as Congressman.
However, these friendly relations between the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso
Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as the political head and leader in that region including
Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong
who looked to him instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors. In time the strain in
their relations became such that they ceased to have any dealings with each other and they even filed
mutual accusations. According to Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six special
policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the mountains with their arms and join the Huks, this is in order
to discredit Punzalan's administration; that he was later able to contact two of his twenty-six policemen
and tried to persuade them to return to the town and to the service, but they told him that they and
their companions would not surrender except and with through the intervention of Congressman Umali,
and so Punzalan had to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the surrender of the 26 men with
their firearms; that thereafter Umali wanted to have their firearms, claiming that they all belonged to
him from his guerrilla days when he was a colonel, and that after liberation he had merely loaned them
to the municipal authorities of Tiaong to help keep peace and order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to
grant Umali's request further strained their relations, and thereafter Umali would not speak to him even
when they happened to meet at parties.
On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of Umali's men, including his
bodyguard Isidro Capino who were then charged with illegal possession of firearms. Umali interceded for
his men and Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram stating that the firearms taken away
from the men were licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This incident was naturally
resented by Umali and spurred him to have a showdown with Punzalan.
Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him,
and to clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in
Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.
The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions — Punzalan and Pasumbal, was intense and
bitter, even ruthless. The election was to be a test of political strength and would determine who was
who in Tiaong, — Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political meetings, extolling the virtues of Pasumbal
and the benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town if he was elected, at the same time
bitterly attacking Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in office, abuse of power, etc. At one
of those meetings he told the audience not to vote for Punzalan because he would not be elected and
that even if he won the election, he would not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had already
prepared a golden coffin for him (Punzalan). After denying the charges, in retort, Punzalan would say
that Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he did not even attend the sessions and that his chair
in Congress had gathered dust, even cobwebs.
To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later was to play the role of star witness
for the prosecution, was drafted. He was a compadre of Pasumbal and had some experience in political
campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model citizen, being sometimes given to drunkenness,
still, he had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various political meetings he delivered speeches for
Pasumbal. He was ever at the back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and naturally he frequented the
latter's houses or headquarters. The result of the elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political
master and leader in Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally,
Umali and Pasumbal were keenly disappointed, and according to the evidence, adopted measures
calculated to frustrate Punzalan's victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his pre-election
speeches about blood flowing and gold coffin.
Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well to make a short narration of the
happenings shortly before it, established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of the
reason or purpose of said raid, the persons, behind it, and those who took part in it. According to the
testimony of Amado Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that is, on the eve of the election, at
the house of Pasumbal's father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct
Pasumbal to contact the Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal
complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the mountains which were quite near the town
and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling
that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his death was the surest way to
eliminate him from the electoral fight.
The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and
testified to by Nazario Anonuevo, a Huk who was under Commander Abeng, and who later took an active
part in the raid. In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal report to Umali about his
conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and had
even outlined the manner of attack, that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under Commander
Lucio and Aladin, the latter to lead the sector towards the East; but that Commander Abeng had
suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal may yet win the election the following day,
thereby rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of Punzalan.
Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of Umali he
went to the house of the latter, in the evening of November 14th, the day following the election, with
the result of the election already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan over Pasumbal. He was
told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with Pasumbal at the
wheel. They drove toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left at the
school premises with instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to
them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty,
armed with garands and carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and his mission to Abeng, he
had led the dissidents or part of the contingent in the direction of Punzalan's house and on arriving in
front of the bodega of Robles, he pointed out Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home,
leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal. Before reaching his house, he already heard shots,
so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. While doing so he and his wife Catalina Tinapunan
saw armed men in the lanzones grove just across the street from their house, belonging to the father of
Umali, and among those men they saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of Huk
Commander Torio and about 20 armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the
direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.
It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a diversionary measure, part of the
attacking force was deployed toward the camp or station of the Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs
and the camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that Army unit but to keep it from going
to the rescue and aid of the main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding party went toward
Punzalan's house and attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with bottles filled
with gasoline (popularly known as Molotov's cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of the attack on
Punzalan's house was to kill him. Fortunately, however, and apparently unknown to the attackers and
those who designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning of November 14th Punzalan and his Chief of
Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital, to report the results of the election to the Governor.
The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by several persons, including
policemen who happened to be near the house. Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of the
house saw Epifanio Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali) and Moises Escueta enter
the gate of Punzalan's house and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who was stationed as
guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of those firing at
the house. Lacorte said that he was guarding the house of Punzalan when he suddenly heard shots
coming from the sides of the house and going over to the place to investigate, he saw armed men in
fatigue and shouting "burn the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he was hit on the left check and later
Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right forearm and in the right eye and
became permanently blind in said eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a jeep parked in
front of the house of Punzalan recognized defendant Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in the
yard said ina loud voice as though addressing somebody in the house "Pare, come down." Mrs. Punzalan
who was then inside the house related to the court that at about eight in the evening while she was
resting she heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution she took her children to the bathroom. Then she
noticed that her house was being fired at because the glass window panes were being shattered and she
heard the explosion of a hand grenade inside the house, followed by flares in the sala and burning of
blankets and mosquito nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke of gasoline. Realizing
the great danger, she and the children ran out of the house and went to hide in the house of a neighbor.
Nazario Añonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer and was picked up and seized by Huk
Commander Tommy sometime in August 1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and mustered
in the ranks of the Huks; that just before the elections of November 13, 1951, he saw Pasumbal come to
the mountains near Tiaong and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November 14th by order of
Commander Abeng he with other Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the Osiw
River already near Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal and Capino; that when they were at the outskirts
of the town, he and the party were told by Commander Tommy to attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to
prevent the sending of army help to the town proper; that he took part in firing on the camp which
returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded; and that because of his wound he could not
escape with his companions to the mountains when the Army soldiers dispersed and drove them out of
the town and so he was finally captured by said soldiers.
As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly
established not only by the going of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following
instructions of Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan,
but also by the fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November 14th met the
Huks at the Osiw River as the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino
were seen in the yard of Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand grenades.
What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the
testimony of Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and
ask him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less circumstantial, but
nonetheless strong and convincing. No one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house of
Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. Because of his important position as
Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he would
seem to have already given out all the instructions necessary and he could well stay in the background.
However, during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in the lanzonesan of his father,
holding a revolver and in the company of about 20 armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently
observing and waiting for developments. Then he and his companions left in the direction of Taguan.
Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan,
about seven kilometers away from Tiaong where a consolation party was being held. There is ample
evidence however to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home only around midnight. An Army
soldier named Cabalona who happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier in the evening
and who was invited to take some refreshments said that he did not see the two men until they arrived
about midnight when the Army reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to Tiaong. Thus, we
have this chain of circumstances that does not speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But
this is not all. There is the rather strange and unexplained, at least not satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali
and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th. Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two were
not in Tiaong at the commencement of the raid between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time
the raid lasted, and that they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to
their own evidence, they were informed by persons coming or fleeing from Tiaong that there was a raid
going on there, and that some houses were burning. As a matter of fact, considering the promixity of
Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about seven kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the
fire and the glow produced by the burning of three houses and the noise produced by the firing of
automatic weapons and the explosion of the hand grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must have
been seen and heard from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on the part of Umali and Pasumbal
would have been to rush to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render help and give succor
to the stricken residents, including their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses of the
fathers of Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents and relatives were residing there. And
yet, instead of following a natural impulse and urge to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction
towards Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely avoided the same and preferred to
hike through coconut groves so that upon arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and spattered and very
tired. Had they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the police authorities of
Candelaria to send a rescue party to that town. Or better still, when the army reinforcements from
Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that evening was returning to Tiaong
from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong that there was fighting in the town, he
immediately returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to relieve his town, was passing by Taguan,
where they were, Umali and Pasumbal could have joined said reinforcements and gone to Tiaong.
Instead the two continued on their way to the capital (Lucena) where before dawn, they went and
contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these
two officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for
the sending of aid or reinforcement to Tiaong but presumably to show to the prosecution officials,
specially the Army Commander that they (Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever with the
raid. Umali said he was trying to avoid and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be suspected of having
had some connection with the raid and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to
Umali himself, while still in Taguan that evening and before he went to Candelaria, somebody had
informed him that Col. Legaspi of the Army was looking for him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find
out what was wanted of him, he left in the opposite direction and fled to Candelaria and later to Lucena,
and the next day he took the train for Manila. This strange act and behaviour of the two men,
particularly Umali, all contrary to impulse and natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily
have done under the circumstances, prompted the trial court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The
guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion." We might just as well
reproduce that portion of the decision of the trial court, to wit:
. . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted as
true, for the sake of argument, that the said accused were really at the party of Pasumbal on
the night in question, that would not prevent them from being in Tiaong between 8 and 9.
Besides, why was it that night the hasag lamp was replaced with candles when the
reinforcements passed through Taguan about midnight of November 14, 1951. Why did
Congressman Umali and company instead of going to Tiaong which was the scene of the
attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the reinforcement has passed and went to the house
of Felix Ona walking through a muddy path under the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid
to pass through the provincial road and preferred a muddy road instead? Was he trying to
conceal himself? Why did Pasumbal and company also go to the house of Ona? Why did they
go to the house of Felix Ona instead of going to the house of Manalo who could have given
them better protection? And again why did Congressman Umali and the other co-accused
repaired and sought the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an early hour to the Army
authorities, did they fear any reprisal? From whom? Why did Umali go to Manila from Lucena
on November 16, 1951? "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands
bold as a lion."
At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former
should seek the aids of the Huks in order to put down and eliminate their political enemy Punzalan. It
would seem rather strange and anomalous that a member of Congress should have friendly relations
with this dissidents whom the Government had been fighting all these years. But if we study the
evidence, it will be found that the reason and the explanation are there. As already stated, during the
Japanese occupation, to further the resistance movement, guerillas were organized in different parts of
the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit known as President Quezon's Own Guerillas (PQOG)
operating in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and Laguna. Umali, Pasumbal, Commander Abeng
and even Punzalan himself were officers in this guerilla unit, Umali attaining the rank of colonel, and
Pasumbal and Punzalan that of Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then being known as "Panzer". After
Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents, and became a Huk Commander. It was not unnatural that Umali
and Pasumbal should continue their friendship and association with Commander Abeng and seek his aid
when convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that he knew Huk Commander Kasilag. Graciano
Ramos, one of the witnesses of the prosecution told the court that way back in May 1950, in a barrio of
San Pablo City he saw Umali confer with Commander Kasilag, which Commander after the conference
told his soldiers including Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks to raid Tiaong, burn the presidencia and
kidnap Punzalan. Of course, the last part of the testimony may be regarded as hearsay, but the fact is
that Umali conferred with a Huk commander as early as 1950. Then we have the fact that on November
18 of the same year Punzalan wrote to President Quirino denouncing the congressman Umali for
fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a campaign among them in preparation for the elections the
following year. And we may also consider the fact that the town of Tiaong stands at the foothills of Mt.
Banahaw where the dissidents under Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio, Aladin, and others had their
hideout, so that it was not difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal to communicate and
even associate with dissidents in that region.
After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we are constrained to agree with the trial court
that the three appellants are guilty. Besides, the determination of this case, in great measure, hinges on
the credibility of witnesses. The learned trial court which had the opportunity of observing the demeanor
of witnesses on the stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating their testimony, decided the
Government witnesses, including Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and reliable. And we find
nothing in the record to warrant correction or reversal of the stand and finding of the trial court on the
matter. We have not overlooked the rather belated retraction of Amado Mendoza made on October 31,
1952, about a year and 9 months after he testified in court. Considering the circumstances surrounding
the making of this affidavit or retraction, the late date at which it was made, the reasons given by him for
making it and the fact that when he testified in court under the observation and scrutiny of the trial
court bearing in mind that he was the star witness for the prosecution and his testimony naturally
extremely important, and the trial court after the opportunity given to it of observing his demeanor
while on the witness stand had regarded him as a witness, sincere, and his testimony truthful, and
considering further the case with which affidavits of retraction of this nature are obtained, we confess
that we are not impressed with such retraction of Mendoza.
The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense of offenses committed. Appellants were
charged with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder,
arson and robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, etc? While the
Solicitor General in his brief claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of his
stand "asks for leave to incorporate by reference" his previous arguments in opposing Umali's petition
for bail, counsel for appellants considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or non-existence of
such complex crime, saying that the nature of the crime committed "is of no moment to herein
appellants because they had absolutely no part in it whatsoever". For that present, and with respect to
this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this important and controversial question, its
consideration and determination to another case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly
and squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity to discuss and argue the question more
adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment that there is no such complex
crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not have been legally
charged with, much less convicted of said complex crime, and the information should therefore, be
regarded as having charged more than one offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113,
section 2 (e), of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no objection thereto, they
were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate crimes charged therein,
we have decided and we rule that the appellants may properly be convicted of said several and separate
crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take,
by the result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps
in actual duration, that meted out by the Court below, which is life imprisonment.
We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime committed
here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in
rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the Government and for the purpose of doing
the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did not even
attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force,
intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a
public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was
sufficient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with which appellants were charged and
of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one of the purposes of the raid,
which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies were actually
committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the
opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of the
three houses, the articles being intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the
mountains. For these robberies, only those who actually took part therein are responsible, and not the
three appellants herein. With respect to the crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon
policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries resulting in his blindness in one eye,
may be regarded as frustrated murder; the wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector
should be considered as mere physical injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition,
multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by
evident premeditation because the premedition was for the killing of Punzalan. The result was the killing
of three others intended by the raiders (People vs. Guillen, 47 Off). The killing may, however, be qualified
by treachery, the raiders using firearms against which the victims were defenseless, with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be punished with the penalty of
death. However, because of lack of the necessary votes, the penalty should be life imprisonment.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the appellants in their brief.
In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and
physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision
correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is
sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for
the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house
of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even and
actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant
to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40
years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, we find it unnecessary to
fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however,
the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below
will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.