#1

Abobon vs Abobon
G.R. No. 155830
15 Aug 2012

FACTS:
Respondents filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner
claiming that they were the registered owners of that parcel of unirrigated rice land which they
inherited from their father and covered by transfer certificate of title (TCT). That they had allowed
their first cousin, the free use of the land out of benevolence and that they now immediately needed
the parcel of land for their own use and had accordingly demanded that petitioner should vacate
and return it to them but he had refused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are the true owners of the land.

HELD:
Yes. A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. The certificate of title thus becomes the best proof
of ownership of a parcel of land; hence, anyone who deals with property registered under the
Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond the title. This reliance on the
certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title, which has long been well-
settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad
faith that the doctrine of indefeasibility finds no application. The respondents had the preferential
right to the possession of the land in question. Their having preferential right conformed to the
age- old rule that whoever held a Torrens title in his name is entitled to the possession of the land
covered by the title. He may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an
actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

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#2
SPS. AGGABAO V. PARULAN, JR. AND PARULAN
G.R. No. 165803
September 1, 2010

DOCTRINE(S):
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after Au-gust 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that
any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code
is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
According to Article 256 of the Family Code, the pro-visions of the Family Code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, 330 SCRA 718
(2000), the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply because
the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
and pointed out that Article 256 pro-vided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the
application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the
Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property
acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of
the Family Code.

FACTS:
 In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K.Atanacio offered 2 lots located in Parañaque
to the petitioners. On February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of
the property and showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner’s original copy of the TCT of
the 2 lots; (b.) tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991
executed by Dionisio authorizing Elena to sell the property. The petitioners paid P200,000.00 as
earnest money for which Elena executed a handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money which stipulated
that the petitioners would pay an additional payment of P130, 000.00 on February 4, 1991;
P650,000.00 on or before February 15, 1991 and P700, 000.00 on March 31, 1991 once Elena turned
over the property.
On February 4, 1991, the petitioners, accompanied by the broker, went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds to verify the TCTs shown by Elena. There they discovered that one of the lots
had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but that the encumbrance had been cancelled due to the
full payment of the obligation. They noticed that the loan was effected through and SPA executed
by Dionisio in favor of Elena. The other lot on the other hand had an annotation of an existing
mortgage in favor of Los Baños Rural Bank, with the same SPA with a court order authorizing
Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the loan.
The petitioners and the broker next inquired about the mortgage and the court order at the
Los Baños Rural Bank. There, they met with Atty. Zarate, related that the bank had asked for the
court order because the lot involved was conjugal property.
Following their verification, the petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additional down
payment on February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baños Rural Bank on February 12,
1991, which then released the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT to them.
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who
executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner’s
duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then
in Hongkong. She assured them that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after
a week.
On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the
petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT as promised. In due time,
the petitioners learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT had been all along in the custody of
Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio
authorizing him to sell both lots. At Atanacio’s instance, the petitioners met on March 25, 1991
with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They
recalled that Atty. Parulan “smugly demanded P800,000.00” in exchange for the duplicate owner’s
copy of TCT, because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be P1.5
million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined,
giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide. Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty.
Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully
paid to Elena.
Thus, on April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, commenced an action (Civil Case
No. 91-1005 entitled Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., represented by Jeremy Z. Parulan, as attorney in
fact, v. Ma. Elena Parulan, Sps. Rex and Coney Aggabao), praying for the declaration of the nullity
of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the
petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for
specific performance with damages against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated for trial
and judgment in the RTC.
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City annulled the
deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners covering two parcels of registered land
the respondents owned for want of the written consent of respondent husband Dionisio Parulan,
Jr. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
 Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply
to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?

HELD:
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of
the Family Code.

RATIO:
The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code,
governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code
should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property.
They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the
administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother;
and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the
sale through Atty. Parulan’s counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.
To start with, Article 254 of the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the
Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations
between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of
the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the
Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
“Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject
to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.”
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”
Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may
apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, the Court
rejected the petitioner’s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of
the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out
that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would
not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein,
however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3,
1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding
the administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the
administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to
Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition
or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot
proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised
by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article
1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to
the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the
property.
Lastly, the petitioners’ insistence that Atty. Parulan’s making of a counter-offer during the
March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family
Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was
void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified. On the other hand,
we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena
that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or
both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the
Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the
transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

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#3
ALLIED BANKING CORP vs. YUJUICO
G.R. No. 163116
June 29, 2015

FACTS:
General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) extended a credit line to YLTC on the condition
that the principals of YLTC would personally bind themselves in a Continuing Guarantee to secure
payment of obligations drawn on said credit extended by Genbank.
In order to secure punctual payment at maturity of YLTC’s obligations, defendants-
appellees and Jesus Yujuico as sureties executed a Continuing Guarantee binding themselves in
their personal capacities as required by Genbank.
The continuing guarantee contained principal provisions to the effect that: (a) he (Jesus)
had guaranteed the “punctual payment at maturity” of the loans secured by the continuing
guaranty; (b) Genbank, as the creditor bank of YLTC, could “make or cause” payments under the
terms and conditions of their loan agreement; (c) under paragraph II, Jesus had offered as security
for the loans of YLTC his own properties in the possession of Genbank or for which Genbank had
attached a lien, which, upon default by YLTC in paying the loan, Genbank, “without demand or
notice” upon respondent, would have the full power and authority to sell; (d) should YLTC incur
in default in the payment of the loans, Genbank could “proceed directly” against Jesus “without
exhausting the property” of YLTC; and (e) paragraph XII expressly stated that the liability of the
signatory or signatories to the continuing guaranty would be “joint and several.”

ISSUE:
Whether Jesus was a surety or a guarantor?

HELD:
SURETY. In guaranty, the guarantor “binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation
of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.” The liability of the guarantor is
secondary to that of the principal debtor because he “cannot be compelled to pay the creditor unless
the latter has exhausted all the property of the debtor, and has resorted to all the legal remedies
against the debtor.” In contrast, the surety is solidarily bound to the obligation of the principal
debtor.
Although the first part of the continuing guaranties showed that Jesus as the signatory had
agreed to be bound “either as guarantor or otherwise,” the usage of term guaranty or guarantee in
the caption of the documents, or of the word guarantor in the contents of the documents did not
conclusively characterize the nature of the obligations assumed therein. What properly
characterized and defined the undertakings were the contents of the documents and the intention
of the parties. In holding that the continuing guaranty executed in E. Zobel, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals was a surety instead of a guaranty, the Court accented the distinctions between them,
viz.:
“A contract of surety is an accessory promise by which a person binds himself for another
already bound, and agrees with the creditor to satisfy the obligation if the debtor does not. A contract
of guaranty, on the other hand, is a collateral undertaking to pay the debt of another in case the
latter does not pay the debt.”
Simply put, a surety is distinguished from a guaranty in that a guarantor is the insurer of
the solvency of the debtor and thus binds himself to pay if the principal is unable to pay while a
surety is the insurer of the debt, and he obligates himself to pay if the principal does not pay.
With the stipulations in the continuing guaranties indicating that he was the surety of the
credit line extended to YLTC, Jesus was solidarity liable to Genbank for the indebtedness of YLTC.
In other words, he thereby rendered himself “directly and primarily responsible” with YLTC,
“without reference to the solvency of the principal.”

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#5
Angeles v. Pascual
658 SCRA 23

Under appeal is the decision promulgated on January 31, involved a dispute about the true
location of the respective lots of the parties, with the respondents (Pascual) claiming that the
petitioner (Angeles) had encroached on their lot but the latter denying the encroachment.

Facts:
Neighbors Regidor Pascual and Pedro Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels
of land located in Cabanatuan City. Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all
the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (Metrobank), as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of an adjacent, caused
therelocation survey of foreclosed lot that the geode
tic engineer discovered that Pascual’s house had encroached on said foreclosed lot.
As a consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual. In turn, Pascual caused the
relocation survey of his own Lot 4 and discovered that Angeles’ house in turn encroached on his
lot. Of the 318 square meters comprising Lot 4, Angeles occupied 252 square meters, leaving
Pascual with only about 66 square meters.
Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area from Angeles, or the removal
of Angeles’ house. Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of
possession and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cabanatuan City. In the course of
the trial, Pascual presented Clarito Fajardo, the geodetic engineer who had conducted the
relocation survey and had made the relocation plan of Pascual’s lot, Fajardo testified that Angeles’
house was erected on said lot. On the other hand, Angeles presented Juan Fernandez, the geodetic
engineer who had prepared the sketch plan relied upon by Angeles to support his claim that there
had been no encroachment. However, Fernandez explained that he had performed only a “table
work,” that is, he did not actually go to the site but based the sketch plan on the descriptions and
bearings appearing on the TCTs of the lots in question and recommended the conduct of a
relocation survey. The RTC ruled that the ownership of the lots is not the issue, rather what was
disputed between them was the location of their respective lots; that Pascual proved Angeles’
encroachment on his lot by preponderant evidence; and that Pascual was entitled to relief. Thus
the RTC ordered the Angeles or persons claiming right through him to cause the removal of his
house insofar as the same occupies the portion of Pascual’s lot, of an area of 252 square meters.
 Angeles then appealed the case to the CA.
On January 31, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC, and held that as between the findings of
the geodetic engineer (Fajardo) who had actually gone to the site and those of the other
(Fernandez) who had based his findings on the TCTs of the owners of the three lots; those of the
former should prevail. However, the modified the ruling of the RTC stating that Angeles is a
builder in good faith as provided for in Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Thus the CA ordered Angeles to vacate, appropriate, or pay rent for the occupied portion of
Pascual’s property. Moreover, Angeles may opt to sell his property instead. Angeles sought for
reconsideration but CA denied the motion. Hence this appeal on certiorari under rule 45.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA was correct in agreeing with the RTC with respect to the testimony
of Fajardo over the testimony of Fernandez.
2. Whether or not the decision of the CA with respect to the options given was contrary to its
finding of good faith.

Held:
With regards the first issue, the Supreme Court that the credence given by the RTC to the
testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive upon this Court especially by virtue of the
affirmance by the CA of the RTC. Resultantly, the fact of Angeles’ encroachment on Pascual’s Lot
was proved by preponderant evidence
Thus it is unassailable that Angeles’ house straddled the lot of Pascual. On the second issue,
the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the RTC and the CA that Angels is a builder in good
faith which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles insisted that he built his house entirely
on his own lot.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is
his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the
application of the CA of the provisions of Article 448 of the Civil Code which spells out the rights
and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder. Consequently, the land being the
principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to
make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay
the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists
between the finding of good faith in his favor.

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#6
ARADO vs. ALCORAN
G.R. No. 163362
July 8, 2015

Facts:
Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado. The marriage produced a son named
Nicolas Alcoran who later on married Florencia Limpahan. Their union had no offspring. During
their marriage, Nicolas has an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita who gave birth to
Anacleto Alcoran.
Plaintiffs argue that Anacleto is not a recognized spurious son and is thus not entitled to
inherit. Defendant countered that he was recognized as Nicolas’ son with the birth certificate as
proof. Joaquina likewise executed a last will and testament in Anacleto’s favor.

Issues:
1. Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alorcan
2. Whether Anacleto is entitled to the properties in litigation
Ruling:
1. Anacleto is an illegitimate son as defined under the Family Code. Nicolas caused the
registration of his birth certificate and thus is tantamount to recognition. The baptismal certificate
was of no consequence in determining filiation as it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with
respect to the child's paternity. The picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina
as she stood beside the coffin of the departed Nicolas is not a proof of filiation.
2. Anacleto had an established right to inherit from the Estate of Nicolas together with
Joaquina and Florencia being a recognized illegitimate son. Anacleto could not inherit from
Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas as barred by the Iron Curtain Rule under Article
992 of the Civil Code. Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter’s
last will and testament pursuant to Article 838 of the Civil Code as there is no proof that the will
is already probated.
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#7
ASSET POOL A (SPV-AMC), INC. vs. CDC
G.R. No. 205915
November 10, 2015

Facts:
During the pendency of this appeal, the parties submitted their Urgent Joint Motion to
Render Judgment Based on a Compromise Agreement and Lift the Temporary Restraining Order
for the purpose of terminating their pending disputes, attaching the compromise agreement and
its annexes.

Issue:
Whether the compromise agreement dated November 6, 2015 be approved.

Ruling:
The Court approves the Compromise Agreement. Article 2029 of the Civil Code provides
that the court shall endeavor to persuade the parties in a civil case to agree upon some fair
compromise. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Once the parties have
entered into a compromise, their agreement has the effect and authority of res judicata, but there
shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

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#8
SPS BAYSA vs. SPS PLANTILLA
G.R. No. 159271
July 13, 2015

Facts:
Petitioners entered into a Real Estate Mortgage to secure the payment of their obligation in
favor of the respondent spouses. Upon the default of the petitioners, the respondent spouses
commenced the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM to recover from the petitioners the
outstanding liability.
 The petitioners sought to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM and the public
auction conducted pursuant to the extrajudicial foreclosure pointing out that there had been no
power or authority to sell inserted in the REM or attached thereto.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial foreclosure is valid despite the lack of provision in the
mortgage deed granting special power to sell to the mortgagee

Ruling:
The extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM and the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property
of the petitioner is void for want of the special power to sell.
The special power of attorney is necessary as firstly, the sale of the property by virtue of the
extrajudicial foreclosure would be made through the sheriff by the respondent spouses as the
mortgagees acting as the agents of the petitioners as the mortgagors-owners. And secondly Article
1878(5) of the Civil Code requires the same when entering any contract by which the ownership of
an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration
The petitioners evidently agreed only to the holding of the extrajudicial foreclosure should
they default in their obligations and is not synonymous to a special power or authority.

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#9
CALILAP-ASMERON vs. DBP
G.R. No. 157330
November 23, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner and her brother defaulted on their loan obligation and thus the real estate
mortgage over two certificate of titles was foreclosed by respondent DBP.
Petitioner sought to recover the two properties and manifested her intention repurchase
through a series of letters and telegrams. DBP agreed to the terms and have her sign a deed of
conditional sale. Petitioners again defaulted in the payments prompting DBP to rescind the deed
and sell the property.
Petitioner contends that DBP accorded her a preferential right to repurchase the property
covered by TCT No. T164117 and not the entire property. Thus the suit.

Issues:
1. Whether Article 1332 of the Civil Code applies to the petitioner
2. Whether DBP validly exercised its right to rescind the deed of conditional sale upon the
petitioner’s default

Ruling:
The petitioners’ arguments lack persuasion.
1. Article 1332 does not apply to the petitioner. She is not illiterate. She had appeared to the
trial court to be educated, having the distinctive ability to understand written and spoken English.
2. A contract is the law between the parties that should be complied with in good faith unless
there is proof to the contrary. As such, the petitioner, being one of the parties in the deed of
conditional sale, could not be allowed to conveniently renounce the stipulations that she had
knowingly and freely agreed to.
Further, Article 1191 of the Civil Code did not prohibit the parties from entering into an
agreement whereby a violation of the terms of the contract would result to its cancellation and
retention of the sums already paid.
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#10
COMSAVINGS BANK vs. CAPISTRANO SPOUSES
G.R. No. 170942
August 28, 2013

Facts:
Respondents entered into a loan agreement with the Comsavings Bank, an NHMFC-
accredited originator, to finance the construction of a residential house with GCB Builders. Among
the documents signed included a certificate of house completion and acceptance. With construction
delayed and demand for the payment of loan amortization forthcoming, respondents protested the
demand and requested NHMFC for an ocular inspection of the construction site. The ocular
inspection noted several deficiencies and was already occupied by a tenant.
Respondents thus sued GCB Builders and Comsavings Bank for breach of contract and
damages and NHMFC was impleaded praying that the demand for amortizations be paid in
abeyance until the case has been finally adjudged.

Issue:
1. Whether Comsavings Bank is liable for having the respondents sign the certificate of house
acceptance/completion notwithstanding that the construction has not yet commenced
2. Whether Comsavings Bank is liable for damages

Ruling:
1. The liability of Comsavings Bank towards respondents was not based on its purchase of loan
agreement with NHMFC but on Article 20 and Article 1170 of the Civil Code. A banking institution
like Comsavings Bank is obliged to exercise the highest degree of diligence as well as high
standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions because its business is imbued with
public interest. There is no question that Comsavings Bank was grossly negligent in its dealings
with respondents because it did not comply with its legal obligation to exercise the required
diligence and integrity.
2. Comsavings Bank is liable for damages. The award for exemplary damages is sustained.
Moral damages may be recovered by the respondents as Article 2219 of the Civil Code allows the
same for the acts or actions referred to in Article 20 of the Civil Code.
The award of actual damages is not warranted as respondents did not submit any
documentary proof, like receipts, to support their claim. Nonetheless, considering that it cannot
be denied that they had suffered substantial losses, temperate damages under Article 2224 is
warranted.
Recovery of attorney’s fees is also allowed as Article 2208 permits the same when exemplary
damages is also awarded.

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#11
DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORP. vs. CA
G.R. No. 161122
September 24, 2012

The petitioner may vindicate its rights in the property through an action for quieting of title,
a common law remedy designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or uncertainty
affecting title to real property. The action for quieting of title may be brought whenever there is a
cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In the action,
the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the plaintiff and the other
claimants, not only to put things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights
to the immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so
that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can
thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the
property.
The other proper remedy the CA suggested was an action for reconveyance of property.
According to Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, the remedy belongs to the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, and such landowner demands
the reconveyance of the property in the proper court of justice. If the property has meanwhile
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the landowner may seek damages. In
either situation, the landowner respects the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review provided the one-year period from the land coming under the operation of the Torrens
System of land registration already passed.

(In the event that the same case pops again in Remedial Law, this is the doctrine:
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it
may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through
extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and
readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has
thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that
ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final
resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability
and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the
courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to
avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land.
As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.)

x-----------------------------x
#12
NARCISO DEGAÑOS vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162826
October 14, 2013

Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the

obligation by a subsequent one that terminates the first, either by (a) changing the object or
principal conditions; or (b) substituting the person of the debtor; or (c) subrogating a third person
in the rights of the creditor. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another that
substitutes the former, it is imperative that the extinguishment be so declared in unequivocal
terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
Obviously, in case of only slight modifications, the old obligation still prevails.
Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must
appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to
be mistaken.
The extinguishment of the old obligation by the new one is necessary element of novation
which may be effected either expressly or impliedly. The term "expressly" means that the
contracting parties incontrovertibly disclose that their object in executing the new contract is to
extinguish the old one. Upon the other hand, no specific form is required for an implied novation,
and all that is prescribed by law would be an incompatibility between the two contracts. While
there is really no hard and fast rule to determine what might constitute to be a sufficient change
that can bring about novation, the touchstone for contrarity, however would be an irreconcilable
incompatibility between the old and the new obligations.
There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and thereby
produce the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. The first
is when novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. The second is when
the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The test of incompatibility is
whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence.
If they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily,
changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The
incompatibility must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object,
cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in
nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.
The changes alluded to by petitioner consists only in the manner of payment. There was
really no substitution of debtors since private complainant merely acquiesced to the payment but
did not give her consent to enter into a new contract.
Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 (on total
extinguishment) and Article 94 (on partial extinguishment) of the Revised Penal Code list down
the various grounds for the extinguishment of criminal liability. Not being included in the list,
novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the liability, and, for that reason, is not
an efficient defense in estafa. This is because only the State may validly waive the criminal action
against an accused. The role of novation may only be either to prevent the rise of criminal liability,
or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such
that the breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned
is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.

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#13
HEIRS OF MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 179987
September 3, 2013

The Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may
be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial
lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however, public
land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the
Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for
the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
An examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed
no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived
only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character
of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public
domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory
period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. In fact, by
virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the
lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying
the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for this reason that the
property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at
which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a
right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or
lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If
the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable
and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive
presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain
and has become private property.
 (b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of
private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary
or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior
to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of
the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.

x---------------------------x
#14
HEIRS OF REYES, JR. vs. REYES
G.R. No. 158377
April 13, 2010

The existence of any one of the conditions enumerated under Article 1602 of the Civil Code,
not a concurrence of all or of a majority thereof, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the
contract is an equitable mortgage.
Considering that "sa oras na silay makinabang", the period of redemption stated in the
Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, signified that no definite period had been stated, the period
to redeem should be ten years from the execution of the contract, pursuant to Articles 1142 and
1144 of the Civil Code.
The acceptance of the payments even beyond the 10--year period of redemption estopped the
mortgagee-heirs from insisting that the period to redeem the property had already expired. Their
actions impliedly recognized the continued existence of the equitable mortgage. The conduct of the
original parties as well as of their successors--in--interest manifested that the parties to the
Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli really intended their transaction to be an equitable
mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed averse to that of the cestui que trust
or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur:
1. The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the co- ownership
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners;
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or
the other co--owners;
3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and conclusive; and
4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious.
If a sale a retro is construed as an equitable mortgage, then the execution of an affidavit of
consolidation by the purported buyer to consolidate ownership of the parcel of land is of no
consequence and the constructive possession of the parcel of land will not ripen into ownership,
because only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as title for
acquiring dominion.

x---------------------------x
#15
HEIRS OF PRODON vs. HEIRS OF ALVAREZ
G.R. No. 170604
September 2, 2013

This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the removal of
any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In such an
action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants to place things in their proper place and to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who
has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter
fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. For
an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for
quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for
quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute
of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then no
doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.

(Remedial Law, Evidence:

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the
original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the
original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due
execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed.
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a
writing are brought before the court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court
the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation
in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in
the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral
testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
greater than in the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. The rule further acts
as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and
withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises
that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and
defeat. Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or
unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only
when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only
when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns
external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its
terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be
admitted even without accounting for the original.)

x---------------------x
#16
HEIRS OF FRANCO v SPS GONZALES
G.R. No. 159709
June 27, 2012
Facts:
 On November 1985, Servando and Leticia obtained a loan from Veronica, who was engaged
in the money lending business under the name “Gonzales Credit Enterprises”, in the amount of
P50,000.00, payable in two months. Veronica gave only the amount of P47,000.00, to the
borrowers, as she retained P3,000.00, as advance interest for one month at 6% per month. Servado
and Leticia executed a promissory note for P50,000.00, to evidence the loan, payable on January
7, 1986. They obtained another loan in the amount of P90,000.00 payable in 2 months at 6%
interest/month. They received only P84,000. out of the proceeds of the loan. On maturity of the two
promissory notes, the borrowers failed to pay the indebtedness. They secured another loan for
P300k and received only P275k, which they failed to pay on maturity which brings their total
indebtedness to P500k. They executed a promissory note on August 1986 on said total but failed
to pay the same. Veronica filed a case for collection suit. The trial court decided in favor of veronica
for the value of each promissory note made and not the consolidated amount. Both appealed the
case to CA which the latter modified granting the payment of the consolidated amount. Veronica
with a compromise agreement that they shall fix the amount to P775k to be payable on Feb 1992.
Veronica file a writ of execution. Servando filed MR stating that their previous agreement has
been novated by their compromise agreement.

Issue:
WON there was a novation of the August 23, 1986 promissory note when respondent
Veronica Gonzales issued the February 5, 1992 receipt.

Held:
The petitioners’ assertion is wrong.
A novation arises when there is a substitution of an obligation by a subsequent one that
extinguishes the first, either by changing the object or the principal conditions, or by substituting
the person of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. For a valid
novation to take place, there must be, therefore: (a) a previous valid obligation; (b) an agreement
of the parties to make a new contract; (c) an extinguishment of the old contract; and (d) a valid
new contract. In short, the new obligation extinguishes the prior agreement only when the
substitution is unequivocally declared, or the old and the new obligations are incompatible on
every point. A compromise of a final judgment operates as a novation of the judgment obligation
upon compliance with either of these two conditions.
To be clear, novation is not presumed. This means that the parties to a contract should
expressly agree to abrogate the old contract in favor of a new one. In the absence of the express
agreement, the old and the new obligations must be incompatible on every point.
There is incompatibility when the two obligations cannot stand together, each one having
its independent existence. If the two obligations cannot stand together, the latter obligation
novates the first. Changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely
accidental. The incompatibility must affect any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as
its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change is merely modificatory in
nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.

x-------------------------x
#17
Jardeleza v. Jardeleza
G.R. No. 167975
June 17, 2015

Facts:
On March 7, 1997, the Spouses Ernesto commenced Civil Case No. 23499 against
respondents Spouses Melecio, JMB Traders, Inc., and Teodoro respecting several parcels of their
conjugal lands. Civil Case No. 23499 was raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC. On January 2004, during
the pendency of Civil Case No. 23499, Ernesto died. Hence, administration proceedings were
commenced in the RTC Branch 38, and Teodoro was appointed as the administrator of the estate.
The other heirs questioned the appointment in the CA. Meanwhile, Teodoro, in his capacity as the
administrator, filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 23499 on the ground that because
Melecio, one of the defendants, was also an heir of Ernesto, the properties subject of the action for
reconveyance should be considered as "advances in the inheritance," and, accordingly, the claim
for reconveyance should be heard in Special Proceedings No. 04-7705 by Branch 38. Branch 33
issued the first assailed order dated January 31, 2005 granting the motion to dismiss. Gilda sought
reconsideration, arguing that she had a personal cause of action of her own distinct from that of
Ernesto; that she neither signed nor consented to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23499; and that
Teodoro should have first sought the approval of Branch 38 as the intestate court considering that
the estate could potentially recover properties belonging to it. Branch 33 issued the second assailed
order denying Gilda's motion for reconsideration. Hence, Gilda has directly appealed the adverse
rulings of the RTC.

Issue:
WON Branch 33 erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 23499

Held:
The jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not extend to the
determination of a question of ownership that arises during the proceedings. This is true whether
or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate, unless the claimants to the property are all
heirs of the deceased and they agree to submit the question for determination by the probate or
administration court and the interests of third parties are not prejudiced; or unless the purpose is
to determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the inventory, in which case
the probate or administration court may decide prima facie the ownership of the property, but such
determination is not final and is without prejudice to the right of interested parties to ventilate
the question of ownership in a proper action. Otherwise put, the determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title by a court of
competent jurisdiction.

x---------------------------------x
#18
JUSAYAN VS SOMBILLA
G.R. No. 163928
January 21, 2015

Facts:
Wilson Jesena owned four parcels of land situated in New Lucena, Iloilo. On June 20, 1970,
Wilson entered into an agreement with respondent Jorge wherein Wilson designated Jorge as his
agent to supervise the tilling and farming of his rice land in crop year 1970-1971. On August 1971,
before the expiration of the agreement, Wilson sold the four parcels of land to Timoteo. Jorge and
Timoteo verbally agreed that Jorge would retain possession of the parcels of land and would deliver
110 cavans of palay annually to Timoteo without need for accounting of the cultivation expenses
provided that Jorge would pay the irrigation fees. From 1971 to 1983, Timoteo and Jorge followed
the arrangement. In 1975, the parcels of land were transferred in the names of Timoteo’s sons,
namely; Manuel, Alfredo and Michael. In 1984, Timoteo sent several letters to Jorge terminating
his administration and demanding the return of the possession of the parcels of land. Due to the
failure of Jorge to render accounting and to return the possession of the parcels of land despite
demands, Timoteo filed on June 30, 1986 a complaint for recovery of possession and accounting
against Jorge. Following Timoteo’s death on October 4, 1991, the petitioners substituted him as
the plaintiffs. In his answer, Jorge asserted that he enjoyed security of tenure as the agricultural
lessee of Timoteo; and that he could not be dispossessed of his landholding without valid cause.
RTC uphold their contractual relationship and ordered George to deliver the possession of the
lands. On appeal to, CA reversed and dismissed the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the relationship between the petitioners and respondent is that of agency or
agricultural leasehold.

Held:
In agency, the agent binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of the principal, with the consent or authority of the latter. The basis
of the civil law relationship of agency is representation, the elements of which are, namely: (a) the
relationship is established by the parties’ consent, express or implied; (b) the object is the execution
of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (c) the agent acts as representative and not for
himself; and (d) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.[12] Whether or not an agency has
been created is determined by the fact that one is representing and acting for another. The law
does not presume agency; hence, proving its existence, nature and extent is incumbent upon the
person alleging it.

x----------------------------x
#19
Kalaw vs. Fernandez
G.R. No. 166357
September 19, 2013

Facts:
Petitioner Tyrone and respondent Malyn met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and
eventually married in Hong Kong on November 1976. They had four children, Rio, Maria Eva Ria,
Miggy, and Jay. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair
with Jocelyn, who gave birth to a son in March 1983. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home
and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him
three more children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States with Jocelyn and their children.
He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only
a house helper and a driver. The house helper would just call Malyn to take care of the children
whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children
stayed with Malyn on weekends. In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn's
permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone
brought the children to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to
live with Malyn. Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn's family returned to the Philippines and resumed
physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time
on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with
their father. On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged
that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her
psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone
and their children during their co-habitation. After summarizing the evidence presented by both
parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The trial court then declared the parties'
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Malyn appealed the trial court's
Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial court's ruling because it is not supported by the facts
on record. Both parties' allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding
of psychological incapacity. The parties' faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be
sufficient grounds for a legal separation. Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied, hence, the appeal.

Issue:
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological
incapacity

Held:
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable. In the
case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner's
experts heavily relied on petitioner's allegations of respondent's constant mahjong sessions, visits
to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner's
experts opined that respondent's alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner's allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary
evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner. What transpired between the parties is
acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but
certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

x-------------------------x
#20
LBP VS HEIRS OF SPS SORIANO
G.R. No. 178312
January 30, 2013

Facts:
The respondents are the children of the late Spouses Jorja Rigor-Soriano and Magin
Soriano, the owners of the two parcels of land covered by TCT No. NT 146092 (2839) and TCT NO.
NT-61608, both of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, containing an area of 10.9635 hectares
located in Poblacion/Talabutab, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija and 4.1224 hectares located in
Macabucod, Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, respectively. The properties became subject to Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) and were valued by the Land Bank and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
at P10,000.00/hectare. Contending, however, that such valuation was too low compared to existing
valuations of agricultural lands, the respondents commenced this action for just compensation,
claiming that the properties were irrigated lands that usually yielded 150 cavans per hectare per
season at a minimum of two seasons per year. They asked that a final valuation of the properties
be pegged at P1,800,000.00, based on Administrative Order No. 61, Series of 1992 and Republic
Act No. 6657. Land Bank disagreed, insisting that Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order
No. 228 governed the fixing of just compensation for the properties; that the Government, through
the DAR as the lead agency in the implementation of all agrarian laws, had taken the properties
in 1972 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, and had since then redistributed the properties to
farmer-beneficiaries; and that in all cases under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order
No. 228, its participation was only to pay the landowners accepting the valuations fixed by the
DAR, upon the latter’s direction and in the amounts the DAR determined. It prayed that the
valuation by the DAR be retained or that a valuation be made judicially. RTC decided against
Landbank and order it to pay. Landbank filed MR but was denied. CA sustained the ruling of the
trial court hence the petition.

Issue:
WON there is a compromise agreement between the parties.

Held:
There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely
and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under
Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a
compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or
extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by
mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties
upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment.
The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles
of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.