[A.C. No. 3319.

June 8, 2000]

LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship
with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City [1] and as a result of
their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later
part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child
with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations
of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent
would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime
in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit
relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his
company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos
Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with
the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged.
She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii,
USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their
Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.[4]

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to
update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised
when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of
the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with
her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm [5] she was connected with, the woman
who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating
with her.

It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988
when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never
lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived
in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00)
against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married
to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent
with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal
complaint against respondent reads:

Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents
allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent
Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by
complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast
 Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early
(sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had
been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish
the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang
house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The
statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter
support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was
dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting
document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on
file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22,
1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent
wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. [12] It is the contention of
complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 [13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the
Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document
are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), [15] respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the
marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in
good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in
an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the
practice of the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner. [17]

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did
not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos
Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he
spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. [18]

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached
such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no
compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains
that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to
Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible
for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of
Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with
Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and
portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the
garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were
taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent
presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against
respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with
Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be
considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed
to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and
reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since
the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. [23] It was thus highly improbable
that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a
married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy
of a document containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant
her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man
does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to
be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human
experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without
any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women
prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the
United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of
1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other
because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be
considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a
victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad
episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

x..........................x..........................x"

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the
complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by
passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held -

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
 implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959). [26]

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single.
Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a
rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a
far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a
higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and
been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children
with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were
indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that
is simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage,
cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community. [27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.[28]

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
[30]
This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment
of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event
as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom
how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she
has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or
intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman and Acting C.J.), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known
as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission
to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in
all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the
varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination
papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in
1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having
been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President
requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted
written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated
their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law,
which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX
UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of
Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however,
That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of
the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades
shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations
that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while
others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the
law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are
to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all
concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as
well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to
realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
 1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the
bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had
each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their
highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing
average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of
these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while
125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be
favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to
reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the administration of
justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for
admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued,
orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia,
Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's
Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente
del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet
and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine
and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal,
and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as
possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable
Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The
public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties.
To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There
were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years
and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published
continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with
revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published
since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question
would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there
any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its
lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous
judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity
of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of
Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24
Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared
them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the
law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State,
denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of
the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except
that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of
appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this
was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which
this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before
them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision"
expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the
object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word
`admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to
grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining
whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the
school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the
constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot
find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of
the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established reputation, and
having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the
preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the
court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of
substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and
hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an
intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a
diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in
order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

xxx xxx xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed what
shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the
following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to
the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice
of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law
in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and
proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous
judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had
been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as
we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe
the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always
been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands
alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing
of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority
when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the
government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and
thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney
General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our
state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any
other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of
justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring
scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts
of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with
assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by
the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a
separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally
exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which
indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control.
Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government
separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by
prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial
independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional
provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a
minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by
the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their
bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey
(In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice
law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
 The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally
held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part
of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may
reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725,
said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient
ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs.
Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with
conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice
would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would
be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this
country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial
function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is
accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the
Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department
of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those
to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking
in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality
in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts,
that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor,
and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of
state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional,
explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon
evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the
highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission
sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that
the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct.
They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not
the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was
so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and
the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions."
(pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and
this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of
one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar,
65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature
to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while
the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of
the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the government. — 16
C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to
its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. —
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment
— a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal,
concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission
to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of
this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit,
suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to
repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal
profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys
at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and
the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other,
giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine
if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any
deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice
and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation
of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper
constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would
respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the
general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the
practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking
the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the
United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under
the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or
associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor
General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City
of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination.
The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the
various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of
75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented
his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands,
without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the
bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof
that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the
 object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in
view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the
original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles
13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would
be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used
in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the
case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been practicing
attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively
appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We
conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle
him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor
of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that
office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the
Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations
prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class
legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant
license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and
presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those
who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this
law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the
applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend
section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in
force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to
the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall
be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under
the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least
36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has
studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose
course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board
in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which,
it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid
as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice,
and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning
and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4,
section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
 confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges
must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so
long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some
difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation.
Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession
cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65
N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law,
and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The
proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided
into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and,
second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law
office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the
rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is
made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon
the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in
the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although
they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be
admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of
bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to
the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely
the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be
exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue
chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626,
said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he
may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may
in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to
every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for
their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to
continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more
than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be
licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional
because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State
ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of
this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law
and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and received a
honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved
June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the
time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of
the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material
differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial
distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of
citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference
between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other
members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the
difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all
within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12
Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5
per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in
1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar,
notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is
there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has
been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not included
because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who
failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does
not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in
such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal
permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only
72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953,
those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by
reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that
could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who
did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves
what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those
candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of
the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the
years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be
admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not
the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the
Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not
included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds
to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it
does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it
may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The
system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from
1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of
the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without
any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are
certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to
the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become
members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having
examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time
for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar.
Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general
knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article
1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
 RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law
by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we,
the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under
the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said
law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of
the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the
Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are
denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After
this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar
on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 [B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND
FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot
by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty
as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three
(3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory
words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the
face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the
case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word Attorney as
they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling
in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should 
have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against 
Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the 
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an 
applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained
of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which 
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to 
escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non­disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional 
 Responsibility which states that   a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection 
 with his application for admission to the bar . [5]

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of 
the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling 
knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may 
render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the
event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until
further orders from the Court.[7]
 We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of
the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. [8] The requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that
he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude;
nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he
has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character
of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of
fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite
good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v.
Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are
not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4 th Judicial Sharia District
in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in
his private capacity. The Court declared that:

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full­fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one 
who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that
they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the 
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and 
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. [12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice
demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would
diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and
made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the
practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby
SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
24 Phil. 37

[ G.R. No. 1179, January 08, 1913 ]

IN RE APPLICATION OF MARIO GUARINA FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR.

DECISION

CARSON, J.:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the
prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

"Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands' is hereby amended to read as follows:

"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States
and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code: Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter; shall have held, under the authority of
the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor-General, Assistant Attorney-
General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney-General, prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila, assistant prosecuting
attorney for the city of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without
an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court' "
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this applicant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The
report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in
the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we
should grant him a license to practice law in the courts of these Islands,without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass
the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar
without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides
for the admission of certain candidates without examination, the clause "may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without and examination" should be construed so as to mean "shall be licensed to practice law in the Philippine Islands
without an examination." It is contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

It must be confessed that were the inquiry limited strictly to the provisions of local law touching this matter, the contentions of the
applicant would have great weight. For it is well settled that in statutory interpretation the word "may" should be read "shall" where
such construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator. In Rock Island County Supervisors vs. United
States (71 U. S., 435, 446), Mr. Justice Swayne says:

"The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities is that where power is given to public officers, in the language of the Act before us,
or in equivalent language, whenever the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise, the language used, though permissive
in form, is in fact peremptory. What they are empowered to do for a third person the law requires shall be done. The power is given,
not for their benefit, but for his. It is placed with the depositary to meet the demands of right, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is
given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be remediless. In all such cases it is held that the intent
of the Legislature, which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discretion, but to impose a positive and absolute duty."
Whether the word "may" in a statute is to be construed as mandatory and imposing a duty, or merely as permissive and conferring
discretion, is to be determined in each case from the apparent intention of the statute as gathered from the context, as well as from the
language of the particular provision. The question in each case is whether, taken as a whole and viewed in the light of surrounding
circumstances, it can be said that a purpose existed on the part of the legislator to enact a law mandatory in its character. If it can,
then it should be given a mandatory effect; if not, then it should be given its ordinary permissive effect. (Colby University vs..Village of
Canandaigua (U. S.), 69 Fed., 671, 673; Kansas Pacific By. Co. vs, Reynolds, 8 Kan., 623, 628; Kemble vs. McPhaill, 30 Pac, 1092,
1093, 128 Cal., 444; Inhabitants of Worcester County vs. Schlesinger, 82 Mass. (16 Gray), 166, 168; People vs. Sanitary Disk of
Chicago, 56 N. E., 953, 956, 184 111., 597; State vs. Withrow (Mo.), 24 S. W., 638, 641; Leavenworth & D. M. R. Co. vs. Platte County
Court, 42 Mo., 171,174.)

Applying these canons of construction to the statute under consideration, and limiting ourselves strictly to the provisions of local law
touching the admission of candidates to the bar, we might, as we have said, be inclined to give the statute the mandatory effect which
applicant claims should be placed upon it. But we are of opinion that such a construction is precluded by the provisions of the Act of
Congress enacted July 1,1902, which confirm and secure to this court the jurisdiction theretofore conferred upon it. Section 9 of that
Act is as follows:

"That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided, and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the
power of said Government to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall possess and
exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission,subject in all matters to such alteration arid amendment as
may be hereafter enacted by law; and the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court shall, hereafter be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive the compensation heretofore prescribed by the
Commission until otherwise provided by Congress. The judges of the Court of First Instance shall be appointed by the Civil Governor,
by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Commission: Provided, That the admiralty jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
Courts of First Instance shall riot be changed except by Act of Congress."
Prior to the passage of this Act the power and jurisdiction of this court in relation to the admission of candidates to the bar of the
Philippine Islands had been fixed by the provisions of the Organic Act (No. 136) and the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190); and as
we understand these provisions this court was vested thereby with authority, and charged with a duty to pass upon the "moral
character and the "qualifications and ability" of all candidates for admission to the bar.

The pertinent provisions of these statutes are as follows:

(Act No. 136.)"Sec. 2. Constitution of judiciary. The judicial power of the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, and courts of justices of the peace, together with such special jurisdictions of municipal
courts, and other special tribunals as now are or hereafter may be authorized by law. The two courts first named shall be courts of
record.

(Act No. 136.) "SEC. 16. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be of two kinds:

"1. Original; and

"2. Appellate.

"Sec. 17. Its original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear
and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law.

(Act No. 190.)"Sec. 13. Who may practice as lawyers. The following persons, if not specially declared ineligible, are entitled to practice
law in the courts of the Philippine Islands:

"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States
and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Code;

"2. Those who are hereafter licensed in the manner herein prescribed.

"Sec. 14. Qualifications of applicants. Any resident of the Philippine Islands, not a subject or citizen of any foreign government, of the
age of twenty-three years, of good moral character, and who possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled
to admission as a member of the bar of the Islands and to practice as such in all their courts.

"Sec. 15. Certificate of good character required. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character, and must satisfactorily pass a proper examination upon all the codes
of law and procedure in force in the Philippine Islands, and upon such other branches of legal learning as the Supreme Court by
general rule shall provide. * * *

"Sec. 16. Place and manner of examinations. Such examinations shall be conducted at Manila, by the judges of the Supreme Court or
by a committee of competent lawyers by them to be appointed, and shall be held at such times as the judges of that court shall provide
by general or special rules."
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be
limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above
citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any Act of the Commission which has the effect of setting
at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1,1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the Commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

The Act of Congress was the creator of the Commission and indeed of the Government of these Islands, which is the creature of its
creator. Its powers are defined, prescribed and limited by the Act which created it, and by such other lawful acts of its creator as may
further define, prescribe, limit or expand these powers. It cannot lawfully transcend or infringe upon the limits thus prescribed, and
any Act of the Commission repugnant to the Act of Congress which created it, or which is repugnant to any other lawful Act of its
creator defining, prescribing or limiting its authority is void and invalid. The various Acts of Congress conferring power upon the
Philippine Legislature, and defining, prescribing and limiting this power, especially the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, are to that
Legislature in the nature of an organic act with its amendments, binding on it in like manner as is the Constitution of the United States
upon Congress itself.

In the great case of Marbury vs. Madison (1 Cranch, 175), the Supreme Court of the United States, in a decision written by Chief Justice
Marshall, laid down the doctrine in this regard which has been followed by that court unhesitatingly ever since. In that case the court
held that an Act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution cannot become law, and that the courts of the United States are bound to
take notice of the Constitution.

Applying the reasoning of that case to the question of the validity of an Act of the Philippine Commission enacted since the date of the
passage of the Philippine Bill which is found to be in conflict with the provisions of the Act of Congress dealing with the same subject
matter, and especially with the provisions of the Philippine Bill itself,we think there can be no doubt as to the result. The Act of the
Commission in so far as it is in conflict with or in any wise repugnant to the various Acts of Congress dealing with the same subject
matter must be held to be void and of no effect. Paraphrasing slightly the language used in the early case of Kemper vs. Hawkins (1 Va.
Cases, 20-24), it may be said that the Acts of the Congress of the United States are to the Commission, or rather to all the departments
of the Philippine Government, what a law is to individuals; nay, they constitute not only a rule of action to the various branches of the
Government, but it is from them that the very existence of the power of the Government flows, and it is by virtue of the Acts of
Congress that the powers (or portions of the right to govern) which may have been committed to this Government are prescribed. The
Act of Congress was the Commission's commission; nay, it was its creator.

Section 9 of the Act of Congress, set out above, placed it beyond the power of the local Legislature to deprive this court of the
jurisdiction or power theretofore granted to it; leaving however, to local legislative authority the right to confer additional jurisdiction,
or to change the practice and method of procedure. The above cited provisions of Act No. 190, in force at the time when the Act of
Congress was enacted, conferred upon this court the power and jurisdiction to deny admission to candidates for the bar unless, in
addition to certain other prescribed conditions, they satisfy the court that they possess the necessary learning in the law,by passing an
examination prescribed by general rule. It seems clear, therefore, that the Commission, while it was undoubtedly authorized to modify
the provision requiring the holding of examinations under general rules (that being merely the prescribed mode of procedure whereby
the court was required to ascertain the qualifications of the candidate) ,had no authority to deprive this court of its power to deny
admission to any candidate Who fails to satisfy it that he possesses the necessary qualifications for admission to the bar of the
Philippine Islands.

In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be
repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the
higher law. In doing so,we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator
which would ead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious
the argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the
contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his apparent intention was
to enact an invalid law.

Black on Interpretation of Laws at page 87 says: "In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the courts will presume that it was
the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law, and one which should change the prior law no further than may
be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in question. The construction should be in harmony with this assumption
whenever possible."

The same author, at pages 93 and 94, says: "Hence it follows that the courts will not so construe the law as to make it conflict with the
constitution, but will rather put such an interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it full force and
effect, if this can be done without extravagance. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature, if the words or
provisions of the statute are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be
adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even, though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more
usual or apparent import of the language employed."

Without undue straining of the language used in the statute under consideration, the word "may" may be construed as either
mandatory or permissive in its effect. But to construe it as mandatory would bring it in direct conflict with the Act of Congress, and we
conclude therefore, despite the contentions of the applicant as to the apparent intention of the legislator, that it should be given its
permissive and not its mandatory effect, and that the true intention of the legislator was to leave it within the discretion of the court to
admit to the bar without examination the officials mentioned in the Act in any case wherein the court is otherwise satisfied that they
possess the necessary qualifications.

Ordinarily, and in the absence of any showing to the contrary, it may fairly be assumed that an applicant who has. held one of the
offices mentioned in the statute, and who, prior to his appointment, had been admitted to the practice of law in the courts of these
Islands under the former sovereign or in some other jurisdiction is duly qualified for admission to the bar of these Islands. In the case
In re Du Fresne (20 Phil. Rep., 488, 492), speaking of the provisions of this Act, we said:

"Appointments to the positions mentioned in Act No. 1597 are made either by the President of the United States by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, or by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Commission, and the legislator evidently conceived that the fact that such an appointment is made is a sufficient guaranty that after
due inquiry the appointee has been found to be possessed of at least the necessary qualifications for admission to the bar."
In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore,
we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in
all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been a practicing attorney
in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he
was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office' of provincial
fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that
this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a
license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive,
with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the
office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination
which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right,if he desires so to do,
to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, and Trent, JJ., concur.

 [A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004]

MELANIO L. ZORETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedly notarizing several documents
during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired.
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001
due to the latters failure to honor SPACs Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano
was the latters counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a duly commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications [1] issued
by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following
documents, viz:

1. Verification[2] executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of defendant SPAC, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. 
Simpliciano on February 18, 2002 as alleged notary public, in Quezon City and attached to defendants Very Urgent Motion (1) 
To Lift the Order of Default; and (2) To defer Plaintiffs Presentation of Evidence Ex­Parte dated February 18, 2002;

2. Affidavits of Merit[3] signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the pleading mentioned in par. 1 hereof, likewise notarized by Atty. 
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as alleged Notary Public in Quezon City, on February 18, 2002;

3. The Affidavit of Service[4] signed by a certain Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, and 
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 19, 2002 as alleged Notary Public in Quezon 
City. Said Affidavit of Service was attached to the pleading mentioned in Par. 1 hereof;

4. The Affidavit of Service[5] of one Nestor Abayon, another Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and 
sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 01 April 2002 at Quezon City, as Notary Public. This Affidavit of 
Service was attached to defendants Motion (1) For Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March 2002; and (2) To allow 
defendants to Present Defensive Evidence dated 27 March 2002.

5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping[6] signed this time by a certain Celso N. Sarto, as affiant, notarized on 16 
August 2002 by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano. This Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping was attached 
to defendants Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition Under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals;

6. The Affidavit of Service[7] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and Capela Law Office 
subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as Notary Public on 16 August 2002. This Affidavit of 
Service signed by Aganan was also attached to that Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition under Rule 65 before the 
Court of Appeals;

7. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping[8] executed by one Celso N. Sarto, alleged Executive Vice President and 
Claims Manager of defendant SPAC and notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, attached to the 
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, etc., filed before the Court of Appeals; and

8. Affidavit of Service[9] signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office, subscribed and 
sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, as alleged Notary Public for Quezon City with 
notarized commission to expire by December 31, 2002.

On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty. Simpliciano to submit his answer
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order. [10]
On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motion[11] for extension of time to file answer.
On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion [12] to resolve the complaint after the extension requested by respondent ended on 30
May 2003, and almost a month had lapsed from 30 May 2003, with no comment or pleading filed by respondent.
On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an order, [13] giving respondent a last chance to file his answer, otherwise
the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent failed to do so.
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and recommendation [14] dated 12 February 2004, pertinent portions of which
read:

A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed that respondent notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 
118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 and his commission expires December 31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service signed and executed by 
Joseph B. Aganan Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor G. 
Simpliciano whose commission expires December 31, 2002.
All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Book II of respondents alleged notarial book which reflected that his commission expires 
on December 31, 2002 as notary public.

However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification dated October 4, 2002 stated that as per records on file with their office respondent 
was not duly commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.

Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showed that as per records on file with their office 
respondent was commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City from January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year 2002 and 2003 
he did not apply for notarial commission for Quezon City.

It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned documents, he was not commissioned as notary public, which 
was in violation of the Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his commission as notary public without having
renewed said commission amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocation of respondents commission as notary public 
permanently if he is commissioned as such at present and his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from receipt 
hereof furnishing the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member a copy hereof for implementation should this recommendation be approved by 
the Honorable members of the Board of Governors.[15]

Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors modified the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Navarro of suspension of three (3) months to a suspension of six (6) months. [16]
We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano did not have a commission as
notary public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents as evidenced by the two (2) certifications issued by the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 04 October 2002. [17] Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP Commissioner
Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002, respondent had already notarized a total of 590 documents. [18] The evidence presented by
complainant conclusively establishes the misconduct imputed to respondent.
The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant, consisting of affidavits of merit, certifications and
verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of service, were used and presented in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in respondents petition for certiorarifiled in the Court of Appeals.
Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence. His counsel filed
an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia
A. Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut
complainants evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack of interest and indifference in presenting his
defense to the charge and the evidence against him can only mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively,
respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
[19]
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good
behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard
has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney,
and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney. [20] Elaborating on
this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting[21] that [t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. [22] Towards this end, an attorney may be
disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity. [23]
Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the
public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties. [24]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court
has characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents. [25] For such reprehensible conduct, the Court
has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from
acting as such, and even disbarment.[26]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[27] the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member
of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
 On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers for notarizing documents with an expired commission:

1. In Flores v. Lozada,[28] the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents such as the extrajudicial partition of an estate, deed of 
sale with right of repurchase, and four (4) deeds of absolute sale ­ all involving unregistered lands, after his commission as Notary 
Public expired;

2. In Joson v. Baltazar,[29] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since only one (1) instance of unauthorized notarization of a 
deed of sale was involved.

3. In Nunga v. Viray,[30] the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when he notarized an absolute deed of sale of the buyer minor, 
who was his son and, at the same time, he was a stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank, and when he entered in his notarial 
registry an annotation of the cancellation of the loan in favor of a certain bank, at a time when he was not commissioned as a Notary 
Public. What aggravated respondents unlawful notarization was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his son, who was 
then only eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.

4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,[31] the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when he notarized five (5) documents such as a complaint for 
ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale and a contract to sell, after his commission as Notary Public expired.

Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of the
Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP must be increased. Respondent must be
barred from being commissioned as a notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but hereby MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the
Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY from
being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon
receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, andGarcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
 [A.C. No. 3910. August 14, 2000]

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a verified letter-complaint [1] for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr. and
Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyers oath. Investigation proceeded only against
respondent Villalon because it was discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed
away on February 3, 1996.[2]
In the letter-complaint,[3] complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel for the family of
complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be given the title over a property owned by complainant
located in Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly
had to verify the proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however, complainant and his
family were surprised when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the companions of
complainant, the latter were told that they were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant
complained to the barangay authorities in Pinugay and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not appear before it
and continued with the construction of the piggery in the presence of armed men who were watching over the
construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about the people of respondent Canares but nothing
was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however, the latter answered that
the subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by
the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo
Ducusin. Complainant, however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor received any money
therefor, and he also denied having appeared before respondent Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Complainant discovered that respondent Villalon claimed that complainants father allegedly gave the subject
property to him (respondent Villalon) as evidenced by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant.
In his Comment,[4] respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in turn, he alleged that the
property was given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy and for past legal services
rendered. Thereafter, respondent Villalon, with the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject property
to be used by Andres Canares to start a piggery business without any monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land was then signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to evidence that he has conveyed the subject property to respondent Villalon with
the name of respondent Canares included therein as protection because of the improvements to be introduced in the subject
property. Upon presenting the title covering the subject property, it was discovered that the property was registered in the
name of Jose Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because
the land was actually owned by him and that he merely placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then
suggested that the subject property be transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat,
Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that he would return the document already signed and notarized, which he did the following
day. According to respondent Canares, the trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office demanding to know why
he was not allowed to cut the trees inside the subject property by the caretaker of respondent Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote[5] to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of Sale covering
the subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that
respondents Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for
forging his signature and selling the subject property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder[6], respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and maintained that he is a member of
good standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the high standards of the legal
profession. Respondent Villalon expressed his willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation and reiterated that the subject property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October,
1991 that the conveyance was reduced in writing. He added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was
the person who signed the said document for and in his behalf and that this was done with his consent and knowledge.
This Court referred[7] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the
complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten (10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows:

Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and
demeanor they displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More
importantly, respondent failed to impute any ill-motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute
the instant complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the
Commissions full faith and credence.

Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself the owner of the
subject property which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and
incontrovertible facts.

FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or
ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the
complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given.Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously
denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose
Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a
consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on
the basis of the verbal or oral giving of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose
Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent
prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner
of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he
said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a
lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes signature is tantamount to a
forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead
of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact
that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the
circumstances already mentioned.

FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. 2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the complainant) allegedly executed
by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of
Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said
document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never
appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00
representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property
was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in
the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew
or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead
of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense.[8]

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts and observations of
the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are
well-taken, the same being supported by the evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good
demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and
confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this
end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence
of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. [10]
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay,
Antipolo, Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists
nonetheless that the property was orally given to him by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete
knowledge of the fact that the subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance
or transfer of any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by
virtue of a proper special power of attorney and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or
ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of
Parcel of Land,[11] purportedly in favor of Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr., respondent Villalon knew that it
was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner
thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife, Maria Cabrido, under the word Conforme. As
regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991, covering the same property, this
time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that there was in fact no payment
of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a
consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and credible denial that he allegedly sold the
subject property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary
public Ducusin, convince us that respondent Villalons acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were
duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his client is
highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [12]
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed upon respondent Atty.
Villalon too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera,[13] this
Court suspended therein respondent Atty. Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main
reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his clients property merits the penalty
of suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio Licuanan as being duly
authorized by Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it was respondent who prepared the various deeds of sale over
Isabels subdivision lots; (3) Isabel was already confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deeds date
of execution; (4) respondent knew that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed; (5) he
knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon after her confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the
questioned deed of sale.[14]
Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that respondent Villalon had
any direct participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property dated December 5, 1991,[15] which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly
denied having signed the same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated this ___day of October 1991, allegedly
signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres
Canares, Jr. was not notarized. The record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and
son and that they live in the same house at 912 Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent Villalon
has been the lawyer for a number of years of the family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant
Jose Ducat Jr., the latters TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of
this Decision, at his sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalons personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact
SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to
return to them the amount they have paid him for it.

Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currently residing in Cannes, France, together with her minor children, Alexander
and Jon Alexander.

In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment. 1 For the price of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in
favor of the complainants, his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BF Homes,
Quezon City. Respondent also obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed with Crown Asia,
the townhouse developer, dated April 19, 1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price, respondent further undertook to have Crown
Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of the complainants.

Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to be paid by
complainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each. Thus, complainants issued in favor of respondent four
postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00 each. Respondent was able to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999. 2

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has not paid in full the price of the townhouse at
the time he executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent also failed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he
allegedly executed with Crown Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment on the second
check she issued to respondent in the amount of P187,500.00.

On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel, wrote respondent, informing him that they were still willing to pay the balance
of the purchase price of the townhouse on the condition that respondent work on Crown Asia’s execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
in their favor. In the alternative, complainants demanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00, plus legal interest, within ten
days.3 The amount of P937,500.00 represents the P750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly installment of P187,500.00 which
complainants paid respondent.

In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to complainants, 4 respondent claimed that he was "working now on a private project which
hopefully will be realized not long from now," and requested for "a period of twenty days from May 15, 2000 within which to either
completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at your (complainants’) option." The period lapsed but respondent did not make good
his promise to pay Crown Asia in full, or return the amount paid by complainants.

On February 21, 2002, complainants’ counsel sent respondent a second letter 5 demanding the return of the amount of P937,500.00,
including legal interest, for failing to comply with his promise. The demand was unheeded.

Hence, this administrative complaint6 that respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Allegedly,
respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the instant disciplinary case was
assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, found respondent guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9, 2003, she recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution No.
XVI-2003-226, dated October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.

We agree.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does not
refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases 7 that a lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili
representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking,
respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was
unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of
dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he
has not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said
property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to Nine
Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse
for him.

Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an
Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict
standard of morality required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a
member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.

Respondent’s culpability is therefore clear. He received a letter from complainants’ counsel demanding the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in the alternative, the return of the money paid by complainants. In reply to said letter,
respondent acknowledged his obligation, and promised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:

xxx

I am working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now but I need a little time to fix some things over.
May I please request for a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the
money at your option. (Emphasis supplied)

In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full ownership over the subject townhouse unit and lot, as he has yet
to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to produce the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia over
the subject unit, which would show the extent of his right of ownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in question.

To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to fulfill his obligation. It was only after almost two years had passed, after
respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return to complainants the amount they paid him, that complainants sent respondent a
second letter8 demanding solely the return of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this time, it was indubitable that
respondent would not be able to perform his end of their agreement.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character. 9 The Bar must maintain a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing.10 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with
their clients or the public at large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. 12

Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants’ prayer that respondent be directed to return the money he received from them in the
amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the
court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. 13 Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that
should be returned to the complainants.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3)
YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
 [A.C. No. 4748. August 4, 2000]

VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Atty. Jose O. Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 17, faces disbarment for having
penned a Decision[1] dated January 30, 1995 long after his retirement from the Judiciary on January 31, 1995 which ultimately divested
complainant Victoria V. Radjaie of her property in Panay, Capiz.
In an Affidavit-Complaint[2] filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant on April 21, 1997, [3] complainant sought the disbarment of
respondent enumerating the following particulars to support her contention that the questioned January 30, 1995 decision was
prepared after the retirement of respondent:
a) Almost all orders issued by then Judge Alovera prior to his retirement bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by Branch 17 of RTC-
Roxas City, with the initial of the one who received it for filing with the court-record except the Order of January 25, 1995
(p. 87 records) admitting, and the Decision dated January 30, 1995 (pp. 88-93, ibid.).
b) It can also be seen that all the orders issued prior to the retirement were all type-written in the same type-[writer] except
the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) and the Decision (pp. 88-93) and these two (2) documents appear to have been type-
written on the same type-[writer].
c) It is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs formally offered their evidence one year after the last witness was presented
last December 10, 1993.
xxx xxx xxx

Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer their evidence but it took them one (1) year and five (5) days to file such a simple
pleading. It goes against the normal human experience when plaintiffs who are allowed to present evidence ex-parte are usually very
quick in having things done because there is no opposition but in this case it took plaintiffs a while to formally rest which was only
fifteen (15) days prior to the retirement of Mr. Alovera. This timing is highly suspect.

d) Even plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence showed badges of fraud. It was not received by the trial court. Page 67 shows this
clearly. It would not be surprising if the same was also inserted into the records on a much later date and Atty. Alberto
Villaruz must be made to explain this too.

It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) of Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, counsel for the plaintiffs,
was issued only on January 31, 1995. This is shown on Page 71 of the records.

e) There is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) admitting the formal offer was even received by a Court staff
for filing with the records.
f) The same can be said of the January 30, 1995 Decision (pp. 88-93) which was allegedly decided five (5) days after the
Order admitting the evidence (p. 87) was allegedly issued.What a swift action from a retiring judge.
g) A copy of the Decision was not even sent to the counsel for the plaintiffs but is shown to have been received by one of the
plaintiffs only on August 1, 1995 (p. 93).
h) Again, it is beyond the normal experience for a lawyer such as Atty. Villaruz who is a practitioner in the locality and who is
in Court almost everyday that he will not follow up if there is already a decision rendered in a case where he was allowed
to present evidence ex-parte or even be told about it.
i) The records show that all orders after the retirement of Mr. Alovera bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the Court staff who
received them for filing in the court records.
Traversing the allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint as purely speculative and not based on personal knowledge, the respondent,
in his Comment[4] dated August 20, 1997, further assailed as simply self-serving complainant's Affidavit-Complaint alleging that a
careful scrutiny of the expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186 would reveal that respondent observed due process when he resolved the
said case against complainant.[5] It was only when Judge Julius Abela, who succeeded him in RTC, Br. 17, Roxas City, annulled,
through a resolution, the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which ostensibly having become final was also executed, did the
matter get out of hand.[6] His said decision, respondent argued, may only be impeached, annulled or otherwise set aside under three
(3) modes,[7] all of which were either not availed of by complainant for lapse of time, or like an action to annul the judgment, though still
available, should not have been filed in the same court, which rendered the questioned decision, but should have been filed, instead,
in the Court of Appeals. [8] As to the absence of stamp "RECEIVED" on the questioned decision, respondent shifted the blame to the
then OIC Clerk of Court of the said court, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, contending that after the decision was rendered on January 30, 1995, he
lost control of it and he surmised that Mrs. Aluad, who had the duty to receive and record the decision, might have lost it
"momentarily."[9]
 In a Resolution[10] dated October 22, 1997, this Court referred the instant case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation,
report and recommendation. While in the process of investigation, three (3) incidents occurred, namely:
1. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Capiz Chapter, approved Resolution No. 9, Series of 1997 on December 17,
1997, questioning the order, dated November 28, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, which ordered the
suspension from the practice of law of herein respondent and Atty. Alberto Villaruz;
2. The Court En Banc, in its Resolution of December 22, 1997, resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R.
No. 131505, entitled "Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius L. Abela," ordering the respondent judge therein to
cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing his questioned order dated November 28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-
6186, which ordered the suspension of Atty. Villaruz; and,
3. Respondent Alovera filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, entitled "Jose Alovera vs. Victoria Villariez-
Radjaie and Judge Julius L. Abela," under G.R. No. 131768, which, at the time was still pending, questioning the Order of
November 28, 1997 which ordered respondent's suspension from the practice of law.
Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation [11] by the Office of the Bar Confidant on January 27, 1998, inquiring from the Court
whether to proceed with the investigation of the case in view of the aforementioned incidents.
On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to proceed with the investigation of the instant case. [12]
Judge Julius Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal researcher, Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer, Concepcion Alcazar, clerk-in-
charge of civil cases and special proceedings, all of Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, Rosa Dapat, court stenographer of
Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City and the complainant herself testified as witnesses for the complainant.
The respondent presented as his lone witness, Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who merely testified on the January 10, 1993 proceedings
inside his chambers. Respondent himself did not testify and neither did any other witness testify for him, despite the issuance of
subpoena ad testificandum on Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who both failed to appear at the investigation. In lieu of their oral
testimonies, respondent offered and presented their respective affidavits. [13] Complainant chose not to object thereto and even waived
her right, through her counsel, to cross-examine them.
The established facts, as quoted from the Report dated November 17, 1999 of the Office of the Bar Confidant, are as follows:

On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, Segundina Borres, Felisa Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria Bores, and Sixto
Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs") through their counsel, Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action for Partition and Accounting, docketed
as Civil Case No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City, against herein complainant, Victoria V. Radjaie, who was
presumably an heir of the late Faustina Borres. The action sought, among others, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
24150 in the name of herein complainant covering a parcel of land with an area of 215,777 square meters situated in Panay, Capiz,
and the declaration of the said parcel of land as property commonly owned by the Borres heirs.

On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186 was re-raffled, declared herein complainant in default and ordered the Borres
heirs to present their evidence on July 30, 1993.[14]

It was only after three (3) postponements that the Borres heirs were able to start presenting their evidence ex-parte on October 8,
1993. For lack of material time, however, the presentation of evidence was again reset to November 22, 1993, which again was
postponed and reset to December 10, 1993.[15]

On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and civil actions scheduled for trial, which commenced at about 10:00 in the
morning, before Br. 17, including Civil Case No. V-6186, which was listed number four in the court calendar. Judge Alovera presided
over the hearing and Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17, took down notes of the Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz appeared for
the accused in a criminal case[16] before Br. 17 at the time. The court had a recess at 11:10 and resumed at 11:35 in the morning. After
the hearing of criminal cases was through, Civil Case No. V-6186 was called at about 11:55 in the morning, but the plaintiffs as well as
their counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were no longer inside the courtroom. The session thus adjourned at 11:57 in the morning without Civil
Case No. V-6186 being heard.[17]

At about 11:30 in the morning of the same date, Atty. Villaruz approached Rosa Dapat, who was the court stenographer at the time of
RTC, Br. 15, Roxas City, while she was in her office. Atty. Villaruz told her that Judge Alovera was requesting her to assist in the
proceedings of Civil Case No. V-6186. At first she was hesitant to accede to the request as Br. 17 had also its own court stenographer.
She relented though when told that Br. 17 as well as the other branches had no available court stenographer. She then went to Br. 17
and saw Atty. Villaruz standing by the door of the chambers of Judge Alovera. Atty. Villaruz motioned her to enter the chambers, which
is separate from the courtroom. While inside the chambers, she saw Judge Alovera behind his desk and other people whom she did
not know. Upon being told that Mrs. Dapat would be the stenographer, Judge Alovera told Atty. Villaruz to start the
proceedings. Following the manifestation made by Atty. Villaruz, a witness, whom she later recognized to be Atty. Arturo Agudo, was
called. At that instant Judge Alovera stood up and said, "All right, you just continue," and then went out of the chambers.[18] Judge
Alovera would occasionally return to the chambers in the course of the proceedings, but he would just sit down and listen while Atty.
Villaruz was conducting his direct examination of the witness and presenting documentary evidence. [19] The proceedings lasted up to
12:10 in the afternoon, with Judge Alovera making only two rulings in the course thereof, including the one he made at the end when
he ordered the plaintiffs to file their written offer of evidence on January 20, 1994. [20]

From this point on, complainant would establish how the January 30, 1995 decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case No. V-6186 came
about.

Prior to his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995, or on January 5, 1995, Judge Alovera designated his legal researcher,
Mrs. Nenita Aluad, to be the OIC Branch Clerk of Court. [21] As part of her functions as such OIC, all decisions, orders and resolutions
of Br. 17 would first be received by her from the judge, and would stamp them "RECEIVED" and put thereon the date of receipt as well
as her initial or signature.[22] This is in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. [23]

Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type the draft decision
in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge Alovera's house. When she inquired if he can still do it, Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1)
year more to decide cases. With this assurance, she typed the draft decision on a single bond paper without a duplicate as Judge
Alovera was dictating it.[24]
On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, retired Judge Alovera came to Br. 17, with a man and a woman, later identified as the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. V-6186, behind him. While he was approaching Nenita Aluad, he uttered to the latter, "Receive this,
receive this, " referring to the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which he was holding. As he spread the decision on her table, he
continued, "Because I will defend you even up to the Plaza Miranda. And give copies to these two, pointing to the plaintiffs who were
at his back.[25] Almost instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I would not receive it because it is already August 1, 1995," and she did
not argue with him anymore so as not to embarrass him for being her former superior. [26] She then went out of the office while retired
Judge Alovera, as well as the two plaintiffs were still inside. [27] At about the same time, Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, another employee of
Br. 17 and the clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special proceedings therein, saw Judge Alovera inside the office of Br. 17 while trying
to have her co-employees receive the questioned decision. Nobody, however, received the same because it was already seven (7)
months after his retirement.[28] A little later, she found the questioned decision, together with the formal offer of exhibits of January 20,
1995 and the order of January 25, 1995, on the top of her table. Although she noticed that these records were not stamped
"RECEIVED" as a matter of procedure, she went on to attach the said records to the expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186.[29] She even
gave a copy of the questioned decision to one of the plaintiffs, Ireneo Borres, and to Atty. Villaruz, which was received for him by
Ireneo Borres.[30] After keeping the expediente, she then entered the questioned decision in her logbook. [31]

The Borres heirs succeeded in having the questioned decision executed when, on January 31, 1996, the lessee of the property, which
is the subject matter of Civil Case No. V-6186, surrendered possession of the said property in favor of the Borres heirs, [32] Said transfer
of possession was made pursuant to the writ of execution issued on January 19, 1996 by the Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 17, Hon.
Delano F. Villaruz, through Clerk of Court Susan Mendoza Arce. [33]

Meanwhile, complainant, who had been working in Japan together with his husband who is employed at the Turkish Embassy in
Tokyo, Japan, learned of what happened to her property in Panay, Capiz. [34] She was thus prompted to come back to the Philippines,
which resulted in losing her job in Japan.

Back home, complainant, on March 5, 1996, filed a Petition for Relief from Order, questioning the January 30, 1995 decision and the
January 19, 1996 Writ of Execution.[35]She also prayed "that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in
the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice." [36]

Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he was the acting presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of the filing
of said petition for relief from order. [37] In the course of the proceedings thereof, he noticed that the Formal Offer of Exhibits purportedly
filed by the plaintiffs, i.e., Borres heirs, was dated January 20, 1995, while the PTR of their counsel, Atty. Alberto Villaruz, was issued
on January 31, 1995. He concluded then that the said offer could not have been filed on January 20, 1995. When he asked Atty.
Villaruz about it, the latter refused to answer and just kept quiet. [38] He likewise observed that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-
6186 submitting the same for decision, except for the order made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during the "simulated
proceedings" inside his chambers, where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer of exhibits. [39] Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who
took down notes during the said proceedings and who was not a member of the staff of Br. 17, was not even acknowledged on the
records as the official stenographer in the course thereof. [40] Thus, in his resolution of September 25, 1997, Judge Abela granted the
petition for relief filed by complainant and the latter was ordered reinstated to the possession of the property in question. In the same
resolution, Judge Abela declared the January 30, 1995 decision null and void, the same not being filed with the clerk of court and not
properly rendered in accordance with Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court. [41]

Prompted by what he considered to be anomalous proceedings, coupled with the prayer of complainant in her petition for relief "that
disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of
justice," Judge Abela conducted an investigation into the said anomaly. [42] After considering the testimonies of Misses Aluad, Dapat,
Bauzon and Alcazar during the investigation, together with the documentary evidence presented, he concluded, thus:

From the foregoing facts and circumstances the following facts are established that:

1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What transpired was a mock or simulated trial inside the
chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from
another court, were present. No Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present as there was actual court
session in open court going on at that time.
2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O. Alovera and remained with him even after his retirement
on January 31, 1995. He did not return the record to Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.
3) The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs. Alcazar together with the "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty.
Villaruz dated January 20, 1995 and the "Order" dated January 25, 1995, after the retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the
Offer and the Order admitting the exhibits were not properly filed and do not bear markings of having been received by
the court.
4) The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30, 1995, was filed with the court on August 1, 1995 by
former Judge Alovera himself and because he was no longer a judge his submission was refused.

- CONCLUSIONS -

The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though dated January 20, 1995 bears signature and PTR No. issued on January 31,
1995. This simply means that the pleadings (were) ante dated. It is impossible for Atty. Villaruz to affix his PTR No. dated January 31,
1995 or any date prior to its issuance. The Offer of Exhibits could have been made only on January 31, 1995 or later. Because this is
so, the Order of Judge Alovera dated January 25, 1995 is also ante dated and could have been made only on a date beyond the filing
of the Offer of Exhibits. So also with the decision of former Judge Alovera dated January 30, 1995.

xxx xxx xxx

The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were made after the retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no longer a judge.

The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Alovera constitute deceit, malpractice, serious and grave misconduct as lawyer
justifying their suspension from the practice of law and ultimately their disbarment. [43]
 Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidant recommended the disbarment of respondent, declaring that it found more than
sufficient evidence to sustain complainant's charge against respondent that, indeed, the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No.
V-6186, which divested complainant of her property in Panay, Capiz, was penned by respondent after his retirement from the judiciary
on January 31, 1995.
This Court finds the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to be well-taken. Respondent has thus sufficiently
demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession.
In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court
inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

" I, x x x, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor consent to its
commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will not delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a
mere ceremony or formality for practicing law [44] to be forgotten afterwards nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
every lawyer must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. [45] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the particular provisions of which are applicable to the case at bar, provide, to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When respondent took the oath as a member of the
legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge. [46] In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon and Concepcion Alcazar were all quite telling on how respondent acted in
a grossly reprehensible manner in having the questioned decision dated January 30, 1995 come to fore, leading ultimately to its
execution divesting the complainant of her property. Respondent gravely abused his relationship with his former staff, pompously
flaunting his erstwhile standing as a judge. Respondent disregarded his primary duty as an officer of the court, who is sworn to assist
the courts and not to impede or pervert the administration of justice to all and sundry. [47] In so doing, he made a mockery of the
judiciary and eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. By
swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair
and impartial administration of justice - a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure from the
path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining
authority[48] for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than
that of law.[49]
Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to present substantial defense to refute the charges against him, he failed
neither to do so nor to offer a valid explanation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him. [50]
Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court finds as appropriate the recommended penalty of the
Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report.Such gross misconduct of the respondent brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession
and calls for the severance of respondents privilege to practice law for life.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out
his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.
Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., took no part due to close relation to a party.
 [G.R. No. 133625. September 6, 2000]

REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO EDRIAL, ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN
EDRIAL, and SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO QUILAT-QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT,
ISIDRA QUILAT-QUILAT, and ESTANISLAO QUILAT-QUILAT, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Parties who prayed for and were granted several postponements and caused repeated delays cannot ask for the reopening of the
trial for the purpose of presenting additional evidence. After squandering several opportunities given them to ventilate their claims,
they can no longer complain of alleged violation of their right to due process.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the October 17, 1997 Decision [1] and the March 19, 1998 Resolution [2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA)[3] in CA-GR SP No. 42660. The CA affirmed the Order of the trial court, which had denied their Motion to
Reopen the Case and to allow them to complete the presentation of their evidence. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:[4]

"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED."

The Resolution denied reconsideration of the challenged Decision.

The Facts

Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat-Quilat -- filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land
against Petitioners Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean -- all surnamed Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-
Valenzuela. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete
City.[5] The Court of Appeals presented the facts of this case as follows:

"Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, a lawyer of the LAPIL (IBP) Negros Oriental, who was also an [e]lection [r]egistrar of the COMELEC, filed the 
complaint in 1975;

Atty. Lituanas was able to present evidence on the following dates:

July 10, 1981

First plaintiffs' witness Atilano Ramirez, 73 years old, was presented;

July 16, 1981

Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;

August 24, 1982

Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;

November 20, 1984

Continuation of the testimony of Atilano Ramirez;

February 28, 1984

Direct Examination of 2nd Plaintiffs' witness Ignacio Tomias. Cross­examination was waived.
August 21, 1985

Plaintiff Pedro Quilat­Quilat was presented on direct examination.

"On December 16, 1986, the Citizen Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) entered its appearance as new [private respondents'] counsel after Atty. 
Gerardo Lituanas has filed his withdrawal. The subsequent events are as follows:

February 23, 1987

The case was set for hearing on April 21, 1987.

April 21, 1987

The hearing was reset due to the projected amendment of the complainant to implead Primitiva Torrecampo.

June 19, 1987

The third amended complaint was admitted.

September 9, 1987

Hearing was postponed at the instance of the defendants [herein petitioners].

October 22, 1987

The hearing was suspended for the reason that the Court would require the [private respondents] to submit a 
certification from the Bureau of Forest Development that the land involved in this case [was] not a part of the public 
forest.

December 17, 1987

The hearing was postponed at the request of [private respondents'] counsel for the reason that she [would] be 
attending [a] conference in Cebu City.

March 18, 1988

The hearing was aborted due to the fact that the Bureau of Forest Development report ha[d] not yet been finished.

July 5, 1988

The hearing [was] reset upon agreement of both counsel.

September 15, 1988

The hearing [was] reset upon the Court's instance.

December 8, 1988

No hearing was held as the certification from the Bureau of Forest Development [was] being awaited.

March 16, 1989

The said certification [was] still being awaited.

May 25, 1989

The testimony of [Private Respondent] Pedro Quilat­Quilat [was] suspended after a question was [propounded] that 
would require him to use reading eyeglasses which he did not have at the moment.

December 14, 1989

Hearing [was] reset due to the illness of [private respondents'] counsel.

September 20, 1990

Atty. Eleccion, [petitioners'] counsel did not appear despite due notice. At this time, the [private respondents] rested 
their case.

October 15, 1990

Atty. Eleccion [private respondents'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to October 16, 1990.
October 16, 1990

Atty. Eleccion did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to December 10, 11 and 12.

December 10, 1990

Atty. Eleccion asked for postponement. Hearing [was] reset to December 11, 1990.

December 11, 1990

Atty. Eleccion did not appear. The case [was] submitted for decision as of th[at] day.

August 21, 1992

The transcript of stenographic notes which was taken down by stenographer Alexander Yberley, was missing. He was
ordered to produce the transcript.

October 30, 1992

Witness Atilano Ramirez was recalled for cross­examination since stenographer Yberley manifested that the record 
was burned. Despite due notice, nobody appeared for the [petitioners]. So as of this day, the cross­examination of 
Atilano Ramirez was considered waived and the case was finally submitted for decision.

December 11, 1992

Court granted the prayer of Atty. Sedillo and the case [was] set for hearing on March 22, 29 and April 5 1993.

March 22, 1993

Atty. Sedillo did not present evidence but instead moved for a resetting of the hearing to April 12, 1993. He [was] 
advised by the Court to be prepared on the next scheduled hearing.

June 4, 1993

Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to July 2, 1993.

July 2, 1993

Flaviano Umbac was presented as first [petitioners'] witness. Hearing [was] scheduled [for] August 27, 1993.

August 27, 1993

[Petitioners] moved for a resetting to October 7, 1993.

October 7, 1993

Atty. Bongaciso was presented as second witness for the [petitioners]. His testimony [was] terminated and hearing 
[was] reset to December 13, 1993.

December 13, 1993

Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to February 14, 1994.

February 14, 1994

Hearing [was] reset at the instance of Atty. Sedillo who want[ed] to recall his witness Atty. Bonganciso. Hearing 
[was] reset to March 23, 1994.

March 24, 1994

Hearing [was] postponed to May 6, 1994 to find avenue for settlement.

May 6, 1994

Due to the conflict of schedule by Atty. Sedillo and due to the absence of recalled 2nd [petitioners'] witness 
Bongaciso, hearing [was] reset to June 17, 1994.

June 17, 1994

Atty. Sedillo asked for postponement. He [would] attend a Kiwanis Training Conference. Hearing [was] reset to July 
4, 1994.
July 4, 1994

Atty. Sedillo was present but Atty. Rosalinda Ybanez [was] available at 10:00 a.m. so the case [was] reset to August 
15, 1994.

August 15, 1994

Judge [was] on leave. Hearing [was] reset to October 3, 1994.

October 3, 1994

The hearing [was] reset to November 17, 1994 due to non­availability of [petitioners'] witness Atty. Roque 
Bonganciso who [was] on recall.

November 17, 1994

There [was] talk about [a] proposed settlement, hearing [was] held in abeyance.

January 6, 1995

Since no settlement [was] realized a [private respondents'] motion to set [the] case for hearing was filed and the case 
was reset to [February] 27, 1995.

February 27, 1995

Earlier, [petitioners'] counsel, Atty. Sedillo filed a motion for postponement as he [would be] appearing in a case in 
Manila. Atty. Ybanez manifested that on February 26, 1995 Atty. Sedillo was in Dumaguete and further that this case
ha[d] been delayed by the failure of the [petitioners] to complete the presentation of their evidence.The Court then 
ordered the case submitted for decision for the THIRD TIME.

March 16, 1995

The Court issued an order reconsidering the February 27, 1995 order upon motion of Atty. Sedillo and set the case for
the [petitioners] for June 16, 1995 with a STERN WARNING TO THE [PETITIONERS].

June 16, 1995

The hearing set for [this day] was cancelled as the Judge [was] on leave and reset to September 8, 1995.

September 8, 1995

The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Hearing [was] reset to November 16, 1995.

November 16, 1995

The [petitioners'] counsel did not appear. Neither did his client. The hearing [was] reset to February 13, 1996.

February 9, 1996

The [petitioners'] counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.

February 12, 1996

The Court issued an order granting the withdrawal of the [petitioners'] counsel. The [petitioners were] directed to 
immediately engage the services of a new counsel.This notice was received personally by the wife of [Petitioner] 
Mauro Edrial, Jr.

February 13, 1996

The Court issued an order setting the case [for] April 26, 1996. This order was received by the wife of the [Petitioner]
Mauro Edrial, Jr.

April 26, 1996

There was no appearance from the [petitioners]. Hence, the case was submitted for decision for the FOURTH TIME.

July 8, 1996

Atty. Sedillo filed a motion to reopen the case and in effect reentered his appearance.

August 20, 1996
 Private respondents thru counsel filed opposition to the motion of the [petitioners].

September 6, 1996

The Hon. Judge issued an order denying the motion to reopen hereby affirming the April 26, 1996 order submitting 
the case for decision.

September 11, 1996

[Petitioners] filed a motion for reconsideration.

October 2, 1996

Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

October 23, 1996

Private respondents received a copy of the Petition for Certiorari." [6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in issuing the questioned Orders, the trial judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.In giving petitioners more than ample time to complete their presentation of evidence and in
granting their Motions for Postponement, the judge was accommodating them more than they actually deserved.
Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues

Petitioners submit that the CA erred in affirming the twin Orders of the Dumaguete City RTC, Branch 39. They contend that a
reversal thereof would have allowed them to complete their presentation of evidence. Hence, by affirming those Orders, the CA
allegedly violated their right to due process.[8]

This Court's Ruling

The Petition is without merit.

Main Issue

Due Process and Reopening of Trial

Counsel for petitioners alleges that the addresses of his clients on file in his law firm were incorrect; hence, the notices and other
forms of communication he had sent to them were not received. He allegedly discovered this fact only after he had filed his withdrawal
as their counsel. He also argues that the denial of the Motion to Reopen Trial was "plainly capricious and oppressive" because private
respondents were equally guilty of delay and procrastination. Finally, he maintains that allowing petitioners to present their remaining
evidence would be "in the interest of substantial due process and humane justice."
Respondents disagree, reasoning that the trial court thrice reconsidered its Order to submit the case for decision; that is,
petitioners were given several opportunities to present their evidence, but they squandered them. Petitioners, they further point out,
were intentionally seeking to delay the resolution of the case because they were in physical possession of the land in dispute.
Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled that petitioners were given "more than enough time" to
complete their presentation of evidence.Respondents rested their case as early as September 1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own
request, was allowed to start presenting evidence only on April 12, 1993. From that day until April 26, 1996 or for a period of three
years, counsel presented only two witnesses. The trial judge was in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But
enough was enough; when they attempted to delay the trial some more, the trial judge finally and correctly refused to go along.
True, respondents also asked for continuances, but petitioners were ultimately to blame for the inexcusable delay. The case was
submitted for decision three times -- on December 11, 1990, October 30, 1992, and February 27, 1995 - but petitioners and/or their
counsel did not appear in court each time. After having failed to take advantage of opportunities to ventilate their claims below, parties
may no longer be accorded the same chances, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, as in this
case.[9]
The Court frowns on lawyers' practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the
period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation of their failure .[10] The same principle applies
more forcefully to motions for continuance. Postponement is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. Actions thereon will
not be disturbed by appellate courts in the absence of a clear or manifest abuse of discretion, resulting in a denial of substantial
justice.[11] We concur with the CA that there is no such denial in this case.
 It is highly suspicious how the counsel for petitioners continued to represent his clients effectively for several years despite
allegedly having lost their correct addresses. It was definitely his duty to know the correct ones. Indeed, it was too late for him to do
so after he had withdrawn as their counsel. According to him, after April 16, 1996, he sent an office employee to verify the
whereabouts of Mauro Edrial Jr. The inquiry yielded the information that Mauro actually resided in San Jose, Negros Oriental, and that
Susan Edrial Valenzuela resided in Gomez St., Dumaguete City. [12] He should have undertaken the search before withdrawing as
counsel. Further, notice might not have been received by petitioners themselves, but that did not excuse counsel's failure to appear
during trials.
Counsel for petitioners further avers that he had difficulty in presenting Atty. Roque Bonganciso because of the latter's prior
commitments which conflicted with the scheduled trial dates. The last witness was Mauro Edrial Jr., but counsel had the wrong
address on file. He should just have adjusted the order of presentation of witnesses and called Edrial Jr. later. Such move could have
prevented the postponement. Besides, finding an available date in his calendar would not have taken Atty. Bonganciso three years.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, shall not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do so (Rule 12.03).
[13]
Moreover, they should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes (Rule 12.04).
For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's reminder to petitioners' counsel of his duty to his client and to
the court:

"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance 
its ends­the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer 
should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their 
realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." [14]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 131541. October 20, 2000]

THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED and JEROME O. CASTRO, petitioners, vs. LEONORA NAVAL and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This damage suit arose from a collision of vehicles based on the following facts:

"(O)n May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem[1] was driving a "Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, 
going towards Cainta. Prior to the collision, the taxicab was parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far from the Rosario Bridge, to 
unload a passenger. Thereafter, the driver executed a U­turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan 
Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with the taxicab. The point of impact was so great that the taxicab 
was hit in the middle portion and was pushed sideward, causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into the 
nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the 
incident."[2]

Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the
Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and ordered
petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and
costs of suit. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City dated September 25, 1995,
reads:

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:

1. The amount of P47,850.00 as actual damages;

2. The amount of P45,000.00 as compensatory damages for unrealized income;

3. The amount of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. The amount of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

5. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court a quo.[4] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. The
petition was denied on February 2, 1998 for failure to submit an explanation why no personal service of copies of certain pleadings
was made as required by Rule 13, Section 11 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [5]Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the
petition was reinstated and private respondent was required to file her Comment in a Resolution dated June 22, 1998. [6] A copy of the
said Resolution was sent by registered mail to private respondent's counsel but the same was returned to sender. [7] In a separate
Resolution issued on the same date, this Court ordered that a copy of the June 22, 1998 Resolution be served personally on private
respondent's counsel.[8] As the said Resolution was also returned unserved, "the Court Resolved to consider the said Resolution as
SERVED."[9] After more than a year, no Comment has been filed. Considering that private respondent was given only ten (10) days to
file her Comment, that period had already lapsed ten days after the June 23, 1999 Resolution which stated that the June 22, 1998
resolution as "served".
Service of notice or other pleadings which are required by the rules to be furnished to the parties must be made on their last
address on record. If they are represented by counsel, such notices shall be sent instead to the counsel's last given address on record
in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, [10] unless service upon the party himself is ordered
by the court.[11] It is the party and his counsel's responsibility to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them [12] just as it is
the duty of counsel to inform the court of a change in his address. In the case at bar, private respondent's counsel never notified the
Court of any change of his address or whether he no longer holds office in his last address of record. Neither was the Court informed if
his ties with his client has been severed. Insofar as the Court is concerned, the last address on record is the place where all notices
shall be served until the Court is officially informed to the contrary. What is the effect of the failure of a private respondent to comply
with a court order to file Comment?
Courts are given the option to dispense with the filing of the Comment and consider the case as deemed submitted for
decision. Under Rule 46, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, [13] when the respondent in an original action filed with the
court fails to file its comment, the case may be decided on the basis of the evidence on record without prejudice to disciplinary action
against the disobedient party. Concomitant thereto is the rule that pursuant to Rule 51, Section 1(B)(1), [14] where no comment is filed
upon the expiration of the period to comment in an original action or a petition for review, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision. Both provisions are applicable to a petition for review filed with the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 56, Section 2(a) of
the Rules.[15] Moreover, a lawyer who fails to submit the required Comment manifests willful disobedience to a lawful order of the
Supreme Court, a clear violation of the Canon of Professional Ethics.[16] Counsel must remember that his actions and omissions are
binding on his client.[17] He should not neglect legal matters entrusted to him as his negligence therefrom shall render him liable. [18]
The petition lacks merit.
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. It is a time-honored precept that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts,[19] although it has authority to review and reverse factual findings of lower courts if these do not conform to evidence. [20] It is also
settled that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is binding on the Supreme Court [21] and
generally conclusive,[22] especially if it has not been adequately shown that no significant facts and circumstances were overlooked or
disregarded which when considered would have altered the outcome of the disposition.
The driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder vehicle was liable and the driver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily
liable. Contrary to petitioners' contention, the fact that a party had no opportunity to avoid the collision is of his own making and this
should not relieve him of liability. [23] From petitioner Castro's testimonial admissions, it is established that he was driving at a speed
faster than 50 kilometers per hour because it was a downhill slope coming from the Rosario bridge. But as he allegedly stepped on the
brake, it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to the left and consequently hit the taxicab. The sudden malfunction of the
vehicle's brake system is the usual excuse of drivers involved in collisions which are the result of speedy driving, particularly when the
road is downhill.
Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event. Between the owner and his driver, on the one hand, and third parties such
as commuters, drivers and pedestrians, on the other, the former is presumed to know about the conditions of his vehicle and is duty
bound to take care thereof with the diligence of a good father of the family. A mechanically defective vehicle should avoid the
streets. As petitioner's vehicle was moving downhill, the driver should have slowed down since a downhill drive would naturally cause
the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover, the record shows that the Nissan Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when the collision
occurred. This was a disregard of traffic safety rules. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in a man of
ordinary diligence and prudence and determines liability by that. [24] Even assuming arguendo that loss of brakes is an act of God, by
reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering the Nissan driver liable for the ensuing damages. [25]
As mentioned earlier, the driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not generally advisable particularly on major
streets. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to
have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope.Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part,
making him contributorily liable. Most public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules especially during the night when traffic
enforcers manning the streets disappear with the light. In driving vehicles, the primary concern should be the safety not only of the
driver or his passengers, but also his fellow motorists.
Considering the contributory negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi, the award of P47,850.00, for the repair of the
taxi, should be reduced in half. All other awards for damages are deleted for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the assailed decision is MODIFIED. Petitioners are ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
to private respondent the amount of P23,925.00 as actual damages. All other awards are DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross
immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special
defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the
former Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by
the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and
documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified.
He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. &
Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be
married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant
that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo,
Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that
they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of
doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they
entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at
the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the
door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to
molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the
reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that
I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top
of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had
no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00
o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with
complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they
had better wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already
on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent
refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did
not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again
denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual
intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until
November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in
his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for
the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a
waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the
Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her
to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr.
and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned
that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in
trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and
she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met
the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November,
1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated
November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified
true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the
Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to
the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant.
Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's
testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to
November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a
witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a
desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December
17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the
Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that
date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always
expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest
of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily
gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of
Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the
court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only
for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan
743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28,
1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section
27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and
violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law
must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of
the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979

PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant,

vs.
DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.

The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought the aid of a legal counsel
regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the
telephone the office of Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and
volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal experience, the complainant confided her
legal problems to him: that after the termination of the divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant
and started to profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial relations between her
and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was living with another woman, his relations with said
woman were no impediment that the respondent convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage
with the woman and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married under the church laws
with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the complainant; that believing in this good faith, the complainant
accepted the proposal of the respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a
marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the respondent convinced the
complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they should act as husband and wife; that because of the confidence
which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being together,
the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the pregnancy was lost; that sometime in the third week of
April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously
referred to by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the course of
the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one
under the civil law and one under the church law; that upon being confronted by the complainant, the respondent made no explanation
whatsoever and merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having deceived the
complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of
the respondent who is a member of the Philippine Bar and an officer of the courts of justice. 1

In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the complainant and alleged that when
the complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing, the respondent advised complainant to come to the office;
that on the next day when the complainant came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty. Geronimo
Flores of the Legal Assistance Service to handle the case; that two or three days thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent
to personally handle her case; that on October 30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L.
Navales, which letter was signed by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October 1970, the complainant
borrowed from the respondent the sum of P200.00 to complete the payment for the hospitalization and treatment of her brother, Eric,
at the Makati Medical Center: that as a act of pity, the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention in November 1970, the complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked help in filing a
case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City; that the wound sustained by complainant's brother was
only superficial and he could not Identify his assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that after the trip to Olongapo, the
complainant requested the help of the respondent to recommend her admission to a hospital because of abdominal and chest pains;
that the respondent recommended complainant to be admitted to the Singian Clinic located at General Solano Street, San Miguel
Manila; that on December 20, 1970, the complainant caged up the respondent at his residence by telephone and requested him to
assist her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for disobedience; that the
respondent prepares a complaint on the same night and a sworn statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar that he accompanied
the complainant to the Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal and to the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where Criminal Case No.
23994 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was filed by her mother; that the respondent also helped the mother of the
complainant to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said
petition for habeas corpus, the mother of the complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her custody although the petition was
denied; that the respondent had never informed the complainant that he was compelled to contract a civil marriage with his wife; that
the respondent never proposed marriage to the complainant; that the respondent has no recollection of the supposed application for
the issuance of a marriage license in the latter part of November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted as husband
and wife; and that the respondent had not deceived complainant nor taken advantage of her. 2

In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 3

After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and recommendation containing the following
findings:

The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on grounds that may properly fall under the category of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct as found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual intercourse between complainant and respondent, the first
inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether respondent Paz practiced demotion on complainant by making her believe
that notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to their respective spouses, they could legally get married to each
other and based on his promise of marriage, she consented to go to bed with him.

Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liason with respondent, she was married to a certain Samuel
Navales, also a Filipino, who divorced her in the U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2, Complaint; p. 46,
t.s.n., November 18, 1971). She also admitted that before she submitted herself to his sexual desires, she was
informed by him that, he had a wife with whom he was civilly married but that the marriage was void because it was
either fake or 'forced' (sic).

Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually believed the representation of respondent that they
could legally marry. Highly intelligent that she is and with the educational background that she has, it is difficult to
accept the proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed assurances that notwithstanding full
awareness by both of the existence of each other's previous marriages, no legal impediment stood in the way of their
getting married ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the Board
Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She was licensed as a chemical engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she
taught at one time or another in different schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly
tricked into surrendering her body on a promise of marriage, she was already in her late twenties. It is improbable that
at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into
accepting respondent's proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should have pondered upon the serious legal
implications and complications of a second marriage for both of them. She could have easily asked a lawyer for
advice on the matter. Complainant's own neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose
wife testified on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant used to converse (p. 18, t.s.n.,
November 23, 1971). In these conversations complainant could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler's
husband as to the legal effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the effects of a marriage brought
about through the use of force and intimidation in order to settle whatever doubts she had in her mind.

The truth however, of the matter is that complainant did not even have to consult a lawyer to know that she could not
legally marry respondent. It is of no little significance that some persons utilized by complainant as witnesses on her
behalf because of their supposed knowledge of her relations with respondent, were themselves aware that divorce is
not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler categorically stated that she knew for a fact that divorce obtained
abroad is not recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). The same admission was elicited from
Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used to be her spiritual adviser
admitted at one point of his testimony that divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
state laws are concerned and complainant knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit
priest declared under cross-examination:

Q Do you know that complainant's husband is still alive?

A Yes.

Q Up to the present?

A Yes.

Q Do you know that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines?

A I know, but the church does not recognize divorce.

Q How about the State, do you know that the State recognize divorce?

A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that our laws permit divorce.

Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated:

Q Did not the fact that complainant's husband is still have and that divorce is not recognized in ' the
Philippines be considered an impediment to complainant's marriage to anyone?

A Yes.
 Q Did you inform her so?

A She knows about that.

(33,34, t.s.n., Id.)

Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend the existence of a legal bar to her remarriage, 'not being
steeped in the intricacies of the law'. just the mere realization that both respondent's wife and her own husband being
still have was enough to stir her mind and to impel her to make her own investigation. She could have, for instance,
made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent was married to and verified his claim whether he was
forced into the marriage. Or, perhaps, she could simply have asked Congressman Bagatsing about respondent's
personal status. After all she was competent enough to prepare, without anyone's help her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A',
and resourceful enough to make research in the Supreme Court's Library on the subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89,
t.s.n., November 18, 1971).

What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the given premises? Either complainant was so helplessly
naive as to be beguiled by respondent's blandishments or. comprehending fully the legal impossibility of the fulfillment
of his marriage proposals, she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too much enamored of him to care
about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise Pascal has so pithily stated of the profundity of human love, 'love has
reasons that reason cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide behind the camouflage of innocence, considering
her intellectual capacity and educational background, no other conclusion is possible 'except that she voluntarily
submitted to sexual intimacy with respondent without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit relations
by legal union.

The question is intriguing whether respondent ever made vehement protestations of love and actually made an offer
of marriage to complainant. If there was, the evidence adduced does not clearly show. Complainant asserted that she
had evidence in the form of love letters and the marriage application form showing respondent's sustained courtship
and offer of marriage. However, such purported documents were not presented, complainant making the excuse that
respondent tricked her into giving him the envelope containing the evidence. Such explanation, however, staggers
human credulity considering that the supposed documents were vital to establish the case. It is simply preposterous
that she would easily Dart with the documents and give them to no other than the respondent himself . Be that as it
may, if respondent had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly established that complainant's submission to his
sexual desires was not on account of the offer but for the gratification of her mundane human longings.

The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy between complainant and respondent. Complainant testified
that she acceded to his proposal that they live as husband and wife and as a matter of fact they had three sexual
intercourses that took place in the Tower Hotel and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City.
While there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except her testimony, her allegation that they
had trysts at the Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said hotels, Exhibits 'A' and 'B'.
Notwithstanding respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.' stated in the entry in said guest cards was a 'good-time' woman,
not the complainant, common sense will tell us that complainant could not have known that respondent lodged in said
hotels on those particular dates unless she was the woman whom respondent brought there. On this score, we are
inclined to believe that evidence has been sufficiently adduced to establish that intimacy between complainant and
respondent took place once in the Tower Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the Honorable Court has stated, when
the lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet
the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and to show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity which at all times he is expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967;
19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point is concerned, the evidence of the complainant as to the trysts they had in the two
hotels has not been met and overthrown by respondent. 4

Upon considering the report and recommendation filed by the Solicitor General, this Court, in a resolution dated July 29, 1972,
resolved to require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding complaint against the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to
Section 5 of Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. 5

On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding complaint against David D.C. Paz praying that the respondent be
suspended for a period of at least six months from the practice of law, with a warning that similar transgressions in the future win be
dealt with more severely.

Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified letter-petition dated March 29, 1974 to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal
wherein the complainant asked this Court to look into the suspicious activities of a certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in
connivance with the respondent, David D.C. Paz, made her sign an affidavit prejudicial to her interest. Among other allegations, the
complainant stated in her verified complaint the following.

6. That there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at present because I believed all along that he
was single and able to marry me. In fact, our relationship is above- board just like any engaged couple.

7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal Assistant Office that the tenor of the affidavit made by Mr.
Rudolfo Del Prado is such that the consideration for the illicit relationship was promissory note which to all intents and
purposes is immoral and illegal.

6
8. That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty. Paz got from me and not revenge for his deception.

The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the complainant.

In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as morally perverse. However, in the aforementioned letter, she states
that there never was an illicit relationship between her and the respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was
aboveboard just like any engaged couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the collection of the loan which the respondent
got from her and not for revenge for his deception.

It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should be exercised with caution because of its serious
consequences. 7 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against a respondent must be established by
convincing proof. 8

In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held:

The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the charge
against the lawyer must be established by convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23, 1967, 21 SCRA
439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156; in re Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No.
838, Jan. 21. 1974, 55 SCRA 139). The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise
by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The corrupt character of the act done must be clearly demonstrated. Moreover'
considering the serious consequences, of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have
consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty (De
Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554; Lim vs. Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44). This Court likewise
held that where there is no proof that respondent lawyer was guilty of any unethical conduct, harassment and
malpractice, the disbarment case against him should be dismissed (Ricafort vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26,
1967, 20 SCRA 418; Delos Santos vs. Bolanos A.C. No. 483, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763). 9

The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against the respondent. As the
Solicitor General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress
of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully
aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own private consciences."

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio- Herrera, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.

Fernando, C.J.,Teehankee, Antonio JJ., took no part.

Santos,J., is on leave
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant

vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court
to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 05093.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of
P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the
unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the
amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984
for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle
her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359,
85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:

(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and

(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of
P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in
Criminal Case No. 8538359;

to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended
respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows:

For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession
 until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy
of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.

SO ORDERED. 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9
January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme
Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the
Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for
review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal
by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period.

In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of
fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been
motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the
herein plaintiff-appellee.

We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon
the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez.

The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court
explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:

xxx xxx xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public
order.

xxx xxx xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Italics supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of
First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after
such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
(Italics supplied)

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v.
Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:

the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character.1âwphi1 This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the
practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.

[A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005]

MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and nonpayment of debts.
The complaint,[1] dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two causes of action. The first
cause of action involved Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 issued by the Land Registration Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and
indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as president of the said corporation, to Moreno, in consideration of the amount of P2,177. The
complaint alleged that almost a year later, the warrant was dishonored.
The second cause of action involved Aranetas nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000. Moreno alleged that sometime in
October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to show to his associates, with the assurance that he would return the
said amount within the shortest possible time. Again in May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same
assurance. Thereafter, since he failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate amount
of P11,000. Araneta issued two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15
July 1972 for P5,000. However, when Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked
Account Closed. She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta, however, ignored the same.
In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To accommodate her, he allegedly
endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worth P2,177, which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorneys fees, and
gave her an additional P323 in cash.
Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two undated checks in her favor, but
maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her request, only so she
could show the bank where she was working that she had money coming to her. Araneta further claims that he warned her that the
checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed account and could not be encashed. To protect himself, he asked the complainant
to issue a check in the amount of P11,000 to offset the two borrowed checks. The respondent offered this check in evidence.
Moreno, however, contended[2] that this check for P11,000 belonged to the Philippine Leasing Corporation, which she managed
when her father passed away. She claimed she signed the check in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell seriously ill and gave them
to Araneta who was then helping her in the management of the corporation. She concluded that Araneta falsely filled up the check in a
desperate bid to turn the tables on her. [3]
On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. [4]
The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine oclock in the morning, when the complainant and her counsel
appeared. Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon motion, however, of Moreno, and to give the respondent a chance to defend
himself, the hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine oclock in the morning. Service of the notice for the new dates
of hearing were effected to the respondent through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973. [5] On 23 January 1973, Araneta once
more did not appear, so the case was called again the following day, 24 January 1973.
In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973 with the complainant, Moreno,
taking the stand.[6] On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the scheduled hearing, only to ask for a postponement to prepare his
defense.[7] No further hearings appear to have been conducted thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been scheduled on 28 May
1973, however, on said date, Araneta filed a joint motion for postponement with the conform of Morenos lawyer, as he, Araneta, was
earnestly pursuing a possible clarification of complainants basic grievance.
Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the case were forwarded to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two days later, the Commission notified [8] both parties of
a hearing to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date neither of the parties nor the complainants counsel appeared despite due
notice. It appears that notice could not be served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated address, and his whereabouts
were unknown. An inquiry[9] made at his IBP chapter yielded negative results. The Commission reset the hearing to 18 November 1988
at two oclock in the afternoon. [10] Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of the evidence so far adduced,
the case was submitted for resolution on such date. [11]
On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report, [12] which reads in part:
The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may, it is worthwhile considering. The stop payment of 
Treasury Warrant No. B­02997354 was an act of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent. There was a subpoena issued for the appearance of Lilia 
Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain about why the stop payment 
of the treasury warrant was done but neither witness appeared (as evidenced by the records) before the Office of the Solicitor General to testify. At 
the dorsal portion of Exh. B, the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a signature which complainant claims to be that of the respondent beneath 
which is the word President and above the signature are the words Lira, Inc. but an ocular examination of said signature in relation to the signature 
on the checks Exhibits G and H do not show definitely that they were the signatures of one and the same person, so there is no basis to form the 
conclusion that the respondent did sign the treasury warrant as president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the] same 
treasury warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account. There is no evidence to prove that she saw him sign it.

There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the stop payment or even any written demand by the complainant
to the respondent that the payment of the treasury warrant having been stopped he should reimburse her with what he received as consideration for 
this check.

Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action.

On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 to the complainant for her to 
show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when in fact he is presumed to have been aware when he issued said checks that his account 
with the bank against which [these] checks were drawn was already closed, as was discovered from the fact that the checks were dishonored for 
said reason.

Even disregarding the complainants evidence and considering the answer of the respondent, the act of the respondent in issuing the two checks, one 
for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when 
there was none and the respondent knew such fact was an act of connivance of the respondent with the complainant to make use of these useless 
commercial documents to deceive the public. However beneficial it may have been to the complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer is 
abhorrent and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar.

The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case, committed by the respondent, belittles the confidence of the 
public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue is a necessity which the respondent lacks.

The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months 
arising from his irresponsible conduct as a member of the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the decision of suspension.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted [13] the above report, but increased its recommended period of suspension from three
months to six months.
Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted [14] the records of this
case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. [15] On 8 July 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant
filed a Report[16] regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution [17] from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. The
Resolution, which was attached to the report, states:
L­46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) Considering that the motion of petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta for reconsideration of the 
resolution of September 16, 1977 which denied the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA­G.R. No. 18553­
R which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the said petitioner of the crime of estafa thru falsification of 
commercial document, was denied in the resolution dated October 17, 1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack of merit, which denial is 
final, the Court Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta from the practice of law and (b) to require the said petitioner to SHOW 
CAUSE within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.
Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been archived on 20 November 1992.
It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondents last filed pleading dated 28 May 1973, when he
sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle matters amicably between himself and Moreno, and the
present, Araneta had been found guilty and convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and indefinitely
suspended.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we disagree with the penalty sought to be
imposed.
Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is irrelevant, because by his own
admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno knowing fully well that the same were drawn against a closed
account. And though Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this act abhorrent and
against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar, which belittles the confidence of the public in
him and reflects upon his integrity and morality.
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, [18] as the effect
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately
reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals.[19]
 Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of
moral turpitude.[20]
In Co v. Bernardino[21] and Lao v. Medel,[22] we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years
suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. [23]
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found guilty by final judgment
of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [24] It involves an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.[25]
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we
are constrained to impose a more severe penalty.
In fact, we have long held [26] that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,[27] [t]he review of respondent's conviction no
longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent
has proved himself unfit to protect the administration of justice. [28]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y.
Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as
alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became
part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine
Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. [2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment [3] stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual
practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that
one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by
the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the
IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of
Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help
in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what
petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP
could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors
is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of
Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of
Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or
inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from
constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the
IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without
income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive
status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive
lawyers-members reside.
 Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized
by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. [5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and
financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar [8] - which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which
they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar, [9] thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to 
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an 
integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such 
exaction.

The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The 
public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of 
the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice
of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by
the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of
members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do 
not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to 
perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and 
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty 
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory 
power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, [11] one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the
amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No.
75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration
and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause
or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24,
1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar
of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that
he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up
to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license
granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case
No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and
the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such
an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege,
a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege
must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of
the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of
the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of
the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations
of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons
and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery,
but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726).
It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration
vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession,
which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations
as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he
did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in
his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar
when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power
the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose
the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it
is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding
was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in
this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is
itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X,
Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly
vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.

THIRD DIVISION

Spouses EDUARDO and A.C. No. 5039

TERESITA GARCIA,
Complainants, Present:

Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ

Promulgated:
Atty. ROLANDO S. BALA,
Respondent. November 25, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

T he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability.

The Case and the Facts

On April 8, 1999, Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before this Court a Letter-Complaint [1] against
Atty. Rolando S. Bala. According to complainants, he failed to render a legal service contracted -- the preparation of
a petition for review that he was to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in connection with DARAB Case No. 5532.
Moreover, he supposedly refused to return the P9,200 legal fees they had paid him for the purpose. Finally, he
allegedly hurled invectives at them when they asked him for a copy of the petition that he claimed to have filed.

This Court required respondent to comment on the Complaint. [2] He failed to comply; thus, he was presumed
to have waived his right to be heard.[3] In its Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. [4]

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

 In her September 23, 2004 Report, [5] Investigating IBP Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa found respondent
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Despite due notice, he neither submitted a position paper nor appeared at any of the hearings [6] called by the
Commission. Thus, the case was decided on the basis of complainants evidence.

According to the findings of Commissioner Herbosa, complainants engaged the services of respondent
(sometime in May 1998)[7] to appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations
Adjudication Board (DARAB).[8] Instead, he erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal[9] with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB
should be filed with the CA through a verified petition for review. [10] Because of respondents error, the prescribed
period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients.

Commissioner Herbosa gave no credence, however, to the allegation of complainants that respondent had
deceived them by resorting to a wrong remedy. While opining that he might not have been in bad faith in filing a
notice of appeal instead of a petition for review, the commissioner in her Report nonetheless held that his failure to
use the proper legal remedy constituted lack of professional competency that warranted an appropriate sanction. [11]

The Report also concluded that respondent should be sanctioned for his unjustified refusal and failure to
return the money paid by his clients. [12] Their payment totaled P9,200, broken down as follows: P5,000 to write the
appeal; P700 to mail it; and an additional P3,500 for writing the pleading on short notice. He, however, failed to
return the money despite his promise -- and his obligation under the circumstances -- to do so. [13]

Finally, Commissioner Herbosa held that respondent should be sanctioned further for uttering unsavory
words against complainants during one instance when they had called on him to ask for a copy of the supposed
appeal. Hence, she recommended that, aside from a fine of P5,000 and the return to complainants of the amount
of P9,200, suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months should be imposed upon him.

Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 12, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-74, [14] which adopted
with modification the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner. It recommended that
respondent should be reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for six months; and that he should
return, within thirty days from his receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with legal interest from the filing
of the present Complaint with this Court.[15]

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possessed
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. [16]Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [17] They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms
of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [18]
Negligence for
Wrong Remedy

The Code of Professional Responsibility [19] mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and
diligence.[20] Rule 18.02 states that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Specifically, Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. [21] A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense authorized by law, and is expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. [22]

Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with wholehearted fidelity, care and
devotion. Despite
adequate time, he did not familiarize himself with the correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he
repeatedly assured them that the supposed petition had already been filed. [23]

Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume that there was no valid reason
for his failure to file a petition for review, and that he was therefore negligent.

Conduct Unbecoming

Having become aware of the wrong remedy he had erroneously taken, respondent purposely evaded
complainants, refused to update them on the appeal, and misled them as to his whereabouts. [24] Moreover, on June
17, 1998, he uttered invectives at them when they visited him for an update on the case. [25]

Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of
the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Accordingly,
complainants had the right to be updated on the developments and status of the case for which they had engaged
the services of respondent.[26] But he apparently denied them that right.
 Furthermore, for using unsavory words against complainants, he should also be sanctioned. Lawyers may be
disciplined -- whether in their professional or in their private capacity -- for any conduct that is wanting in morality,
honesty, probity and good demeanor.[27] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times.

In addition, the Court notes the nonparticipation of respondent even in the present proceedings. He ignored
the directive for him to file his comment, [28] just as he had disregarded the IBP hearing commissioners orders [29] for
the conduct of hearings, submission of documentary evidence and position paper. Never did he acknowledge or offer
any excuse for his noncompliance.
Clearly, his conduct manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. Despite the fact that his profession and
honor are at stake, he did not even bother to speak a word in his defense. Apparently, he has no wish to preserve
the dignity and honor expected of lawyers and the legal profession. His demeanor is clearly demeaning.

The Need to Reimburse

the Money Paid

Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the money paid by complainants. First, his legal
services were virtually nullified by his recourse to the wrong remedy. Complainants would not have lost their right
to appeal had he acted competently.

Second, the legal fees were not commensurate to the services rendered. Complainants engaged his legal
services to appeal the DARAB Decision, but all he did was to file a Notice of Appeal. [30]
Additionally, he had already promised them a refund of the money paid, yet he failed to do so.

The Court may ascertain how much attorneys fees are reasonable under the circumstances. [31] In the present
case, the request of complainants for a full refund of the attorneys fees they had paid effectively challenged the
contract; it was as though the parties had no express stipulation as to those fees. [32] Quantum meruit therefore
applies.

Quantum meruit -- meaning as much as he deserves -- is used as basis for determining a lawyers professional fees
in the absence of a contract.[33] Lawyers must be able to show that they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their
efforts in pursuing their clients case, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees. [34]Based on the
circumstances of the present case, the legal services actually rendered by respondent were too insignificant for
remuneration because of the uselessness of the remedy he took.

This Court has imposed the penalty of suspension for six months for a lawyers negligence in failing to perfect
an appeal.[35] Considering the similarity of the circumstances with those prevailing in this case, we find the
imposition of the same penalty reasonable.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer; he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Furthermore, he is ORDERED to pay Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia the amount of P9,200 -- with legal
interest from April 8, 1999 -- within 30 days from his receipt of this Decision. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offenses will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney. Further, let other copies be
served on the IBP and on the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts
in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY.
GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for
disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to
the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of
70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.
Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the
grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of
the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the
examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper
request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got
unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not
afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in
five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by
the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the
1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances
under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March
5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations,
the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should
not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the
Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.).
At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer
filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked
examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V,
rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164.
Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned
by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This
notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and
Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law
of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of
Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of
August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required under
the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-
respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully
employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as
their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to
the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the
Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination
notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner
in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary
high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for
re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do
so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I
found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same standard used in
the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to
10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional
statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded
at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner
until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of
the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty.
Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the examination
booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting
the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no
alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the
real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and
permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from
all members of the Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I
might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the
original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed
in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
 On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972,
he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears
that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority
as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present
bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a
particularly low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded
it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result
that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to
correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been
decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached
thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the
two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof,
and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered 661, I did know
the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now
knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up to the
present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked the
Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular
and so appeared to be in the regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an
examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as
possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of
the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction,
not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of
the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661
was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass
the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with
him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

 2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna
Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the
correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal
Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his
paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%then he would make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and
without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and
others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and
possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in
other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general
average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to
the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however
informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that
the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every
item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items,
made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the
following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in
Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted
for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by
Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had
every right to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that
the request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated
each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the
Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that
it was only in that particular subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that
he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It
should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a
previous rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

 That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar
candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of
Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the
Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No.
1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never
met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of
ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the examinations, we are
usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-
correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but
on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because
the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought
to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right,
the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed
only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which
was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in
order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back to
the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a
point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that
comes into my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I
saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO)
attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court
building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a
portion of the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain
such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded
to "954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the
ticket number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat
instinctively to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code
numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as
Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said number.
(1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of
the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227"
at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On
November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a
result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13,
1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of
a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On
February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on
February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born
on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the
time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity
prompting me to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the
basis of the aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that
they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners
for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the
matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases which I brought to
the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% (47%)
in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and
marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951
with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below
60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office
the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified
and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as
Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook
mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was
reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners concerned;
 5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in
his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-
evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10%
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn
statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of
the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post
provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official
release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the
bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent
is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no
knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the
resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to
contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently
purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-
evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him
and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-
evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be
done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the
members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their
work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the
stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there
made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the
examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp.
3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number
95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not
know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision,
examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said
notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that
the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by
respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise
made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that
in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and
solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his
(Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five
subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo
Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected,
respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other
subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be
increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible
— the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one
subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent
Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%,
or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the
charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp.
43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing
marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one
examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political
Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal
Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if
his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the
words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the
mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number
is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and
71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this
particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average
but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation
requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in
three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for
the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular
and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16,
rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a
candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order
members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper.
The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613
with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase
the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs.
A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and
passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent
Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had
to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last
bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of
February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent
Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns
that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to
examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL
FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to
the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty
percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the
Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects
and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted
paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162;
Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his
honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him
as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the
examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not
only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive
cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered
the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the
records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners
implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the
five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang
failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In
fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing
mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of
Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI
 1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great
damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook
was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela
Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades
of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the
corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all
subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis
of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the
answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is
not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the
examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such
initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases.
This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for
re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the
cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the
Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in
Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over
ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-
evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
respectively — as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by
respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on
August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO
50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO
EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT
FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law
respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation
with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.).
Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the
said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee
was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the
dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in
his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such
sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially
brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's
examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however,
that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of
said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-
Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner
Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not
interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook
in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of
passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to
the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of
an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated
it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is
not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate
or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said
examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————
 Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification
grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the
consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent
Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered
by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-
evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of
74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in
Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is
believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a
necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition
for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing
grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as
Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each.
Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the
Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the
Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already
clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and
confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass
the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with
respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's
answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that
led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character requirement of
candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of
Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2,
Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's
personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require
the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal
cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar
for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated,
implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character.
And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964,
when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court
or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the
applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required
under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of,
indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm.
Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of
slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make
mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his
pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court
that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741).
Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been
apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State
ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to
him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of
the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him, one of
which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with
such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165
NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the
Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to
clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should
not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the
Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations
and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary
to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its
confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52
Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the
Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of
Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re:
Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of
the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro
and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro
were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon
the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did
the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE
so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar
examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before
acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination
Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent
Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent
Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades
of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my
subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a
passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this
particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination
notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this
being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so
I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to
go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be
more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and
what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also
allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2,
Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —
 3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do
so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of
them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every
answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that
said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade
of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's
memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that
their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the
imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration
of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in
the performance of their duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian
"in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom
said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo,
Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed
away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out
during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also
against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal",
does not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that
examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971
Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner
Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the
said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of
the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar
examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the
1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in
February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area
of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First
mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972:
Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which
according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo
claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol.
VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected
and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In
his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that
of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because
the transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from
1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time
he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or
time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised
to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the
records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in
Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the
amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973
the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter
cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as
the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the
GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13,
1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his
liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such
car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972
(as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the
said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the
above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his
passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the
1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on
vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot
(Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
 (a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property
or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or
taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from
his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to
1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955
to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising
Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of
filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational
benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955,
respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of
Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational
benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the
G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol.
V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never
bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is
beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits
given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his
duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not
know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49,
rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his
guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the
country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its
meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined
there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment.
He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was
attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945
date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS
NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT
RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN
FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that
he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to
be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because
contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the
credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful
completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had
left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his
army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious.
Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate
(1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was
erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing
that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he
would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm
under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.)
as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his
lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989

JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,

vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of
respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his
(complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his
conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then
has been living with respondent at that address.

Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of
complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of
seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against
her), much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as to what
to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that
the latter sustained from the former." (Rollo, p. 8).

Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations,
to wit:

(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken;

(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981,
and visited her at the hospital everyday;

(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had refused to
do so;

(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living although
she had no means of livelihood; and

(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.

Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant, and stating that he (respondent) had
merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.

By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings
complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.

The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms:

1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May 12, 1982, p. 9).

2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. Domingo, Quezon City
(tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983).

3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house at No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas,
Quezon City, to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila
(tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).

4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household appliances which she could not
afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985, Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').

5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU Hospital, respondent paid for her
expenses and took care of her (tsn, pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident between
respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept. 20, 1983, Exhibits 'C' and
'C-l').

6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and complainant
at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29, 1983; Exh. 'B',
'B-l' and 'K').

7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought to the
attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G').

8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the CLAO
and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).

Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner:

a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with
complainant; that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment, physical injuries and
public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant;

b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at No. 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon was a friend and
former client whom respondent visited now and then;

c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital, as assistance in her medical
expenses; that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the hospital which led
to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital;

d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto. Domingo
Church in 1980;

e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street, Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila from her earnings;
 f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon
City; that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant;

g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he
had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was between Priscilla's
brother, Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went there only to intervene upon request
of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-37).

The Solicitor General then submitted the following

FINDINGS

1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.

2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and they (complainant and Priscilla)
considered respondent also their 'ninong'.

3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their residences being one house away from each
other.

4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice, because of her differences with
complainant.

5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No. 45 Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and
former client of respondent.

6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon.

7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened.

8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas,
Quezon City; but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's house.

9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in CLAO, where
respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the
same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:

1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy
that he was having an affair with his wife.

2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend and
former client of respondent.

3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his differences with
complainant.

4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant and
Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1'] and ['I'])

5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the FEU
Hospital, in spite again of his differences with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).

Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or
behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior
was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty.
Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been
cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.

At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of conduct
appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be
of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an
officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.

Florentino G. Temporal for complainant.

Trabajo Lim Law Office for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking the latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice
and grave misconduct.

The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a
promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the
United States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of assignment states that the same shall be
irrevocable until the loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand,
collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above documents were apparently prepared and
notarized by respondent Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.

On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned special power of attorney, complainant
informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a
complaint for injunction with damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys.
Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on

23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later filed an
urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant in contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her
address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated 21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the
preliminary injunction to prevent all post offices in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.

On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw the pension checks. This motion does not
bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of record but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney
Alexander H. Lim.

On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again without the participation of the former's counsel.
In the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was
likewise stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be paid in monthly installments over a period of 54
months at an interest of 40% per annum discounted every six (6) months. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court
on 15 August 1985.

On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment, based on the following allegations:

7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and signature of any of her two
(2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them or at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas
to be furnished copies of the same;

8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the
pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she
consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents
foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any event
respondent already took care of everything;

9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form
of mendacity practiced on her by respondent;

10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat;
...1

Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,

Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively
participate in the case and it was upon the request of complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent)
made the compromise agreement.

Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since
she could not pay his attorney's fees.

Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers. Complainant stated that respondent never furnished
her lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap,
respondent's client.

Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4 October 1984. There is no provision in the
promissory note signed by her with respect to any interest to be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on the
promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by him to collect the loan.

In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985, complainant's debt to Yap was increased to
P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10) months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent
(75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00 debt would be payable in fifty-four (54)
monthly installments at an interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of mathematical prowess is required to see that
the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.

With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise agreement, it is of record that complainant was
represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her
lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in this decision.

There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any
showing that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel, respondent saw an opportunity to take advantage of
the situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently
disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.

Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

9. Negotiations with opposite party.

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid
everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake
to advise him as to the law.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

Rule 8.02 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts.

The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon
him of the proper sanction from this Court. Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not
only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.