THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANICETO MARTIN, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-3002; May 23, 1951
JUGO, J.:
FACTS:
The defendant, 28 years old, is a farmer from Laoag, Ilocos Norte. Martin got Laura Liz, whom she courted,
pregnant before marriage. On the 8th month of pregnancy, Laura decided to live with Martin's family and demanded
marriage, which was solemnized on June 7, 1948. Between four and five o' clock in the morning of August 1, 1948, the
corpse of Laura was found inside the family toilet, which was at a certain distance from their home, with a maguey rope,
six meters long and one centimeter in diameter, around her neck, leaving a circular mark around it with the exception of
the nape which was unmarked undoubtedly due to her long and thick hair covering it. In the Municipal building, Martin
confessed to the murder of Laura. The defendant testified that while he was moving his bowels in the toilet with his
back towards the door, he felt that a rope was being put around his neck from behind. Upon seeing that it was his wife,
Martin asked why she did that to which Laura answered it was because he do not love her. Martin then snatched the
rope from her and placed it around her neck and tightened his grip with his two hands. Luara died in that moment. De.
Roman de la Cuesta, resident physician of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Hospital preformed an autopsy on Laura's body
and testified that the cause of her death was heart failure due to fright or shock.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is responsible for the death of Laura Liz.

RULING:
Yes. The appellant contends that the death was due to a heart failure, not the strangling. But it should be noted,
however, that the heart failure was due to fright or shock caused by the strangling, and consequently, the defendant is
responsible for the death, notwithstanding the fact that the victim was already sick. In the case of People vs Reyes, the
court held that a person is responsible for tge consequences of his criminal act even if the deceased is shown to be
suffering a diseased heart. Appellant's act was the proximate cause of the death. 2 mitigating circumstances are
considered in favor of the defendant: (1) unlawful aggression from the deceased without sufficient provocation from the
defendant, which in this case is equivalent to incomplete self-defense on the part of the defendant, as there is no
reasonable necessity of the means employed; and (2) lack of instruction without any aggravating circumstance to offset
them the penalty next lower in degree should be imposed, which is reclusion temporal.


THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO RIVERA, ANTONIO RIVERA, and CANUTO BATOON,
Defendants-Appellants.
G.R. No. 8924; November 13, 1913.
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
On the morning of December 27, 1912, a dispute arose between the wife of the deceased and the wife of the
defendant Domingo Rivera over some question as to the loan of a pair of scissors and the failure to return them. Heated
and insulting language passed between the women from the windows of their houses, which were located close
together. The deceased was drawn into the wordy dispute, and as a result of an offensive remark made by him to Rivera
and his wife, Rivera went down from his house and went in front of the house of the deceased with 2 rocks in his hands,
and challenged the deceased as to who was the better man. Upon seeing tge deceases rushing out of his house with a
large bolo, Rivera, who was a much smaller man, took to flight. The deceased pursued him and inflicted wounds on
Rivera's back and side. Antonio Rivera, the father of Domingo, rushed to his assistance and disarmed the deceased
together with Batoon. The deceased, being outnumbered, was wounded and died 4 days thereafter. Domingo claimed
he acted in self-defense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Domingo Rivera is entitled to the benefit of a mitigating circumstance.
1

RULING:
Yes. The court held that in view of the provocation given by him to the deceased, he cannot be said to have
established his claim of absolute exemption from criminal liability on the ground that the killing was done in lawful
self-defense. The evidence of record shows no room for doubt that Domingo Rivera provoked tge quarrel which resulted
to the death of his adversary. He should thus be given the benefit of mitigating circumstance, with penalty lower by one
or two degress than that prescribed by law.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NILO DE JESUS and WILFREDO YALONG, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-58506; November 19, 1982
DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Quezon City convicted Nilo De Jesus and Wilfredo Yalong of murder qualified
by treachery and conspired in killing Feliciano de los Santos. Only one eye-witness, Fernando de los Santos, son of the
victim has testified for the prosecution. According to him, he was awakened by a shout of a small boy informing him that
his father was engaged in a quarrel. He stated in his testimony that he saw Yalong aiming a gun at his father and when
he shouted at him to run the latter had already fired before he could do so. Afterwards de Jesus grabbed the gun and
also shot his father causing the latter to fall as he was about to run away. Thereafter, both appellants ran away; while
Fernando immediately went home to look for his brother, Pat. Narciso de los Santos. When the two brothers returned to
the crime scene, Fernando could no longer feel the pulse of his father. Forthwith, Narciso left to hunt for the killers;
while Fernando reported the incident to the police authorities, to whom he gave the names of the suspects and a verbal
account of the incident. Meanwhile, a cousin of the two brothers, Baltazar de los Santos, brought the victim to the
hospital, but the latter was pronounced dead upon arrival.
Although the assailants have been Identified, prosecution of the case could not proceed because the suspects
went into hiding to escape arrest. In the case of appellant de Jesus, he stayed for one week in the house of a friend in
the Tatalon Estate, then proceeded to the province of Isabela. He was arrested by the P.C. only on October 14, 1978
while in Pangasinan buying smoked fish. For his part, appellant Yalong proceeded to hide at his uncle's house in
Lardizabal St., Sampaloc, Manila for about three weeks. From there, he proceeded to Quezon Province, then to Iloilo and
Zamboanga before returning to Lardizabal Street, where he was arrested on February 22, 1979.
Petitioners interposed self-defense. Yalong admitted to shot Feliciano twice after the victim almost stab him with
a knife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of self-defense be consider or conviction of conspiracy be sustained?

RULING:
(1) Yes, Yalong is entitled to the benefit of the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
inasmuch as there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased without any provocation coming from Yalong,
but it was not proven that the means employed by the latter was reasonably necessary. The penalty one degree lower
than that of reclusion temporal prescribed for the crime of homicide must be imposed, which is prision mayor. On those
grounds, there should be imposed upon Yalong the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
(2) No. Fernando's testimony that it was De Jesus who shot the victim was found to be fabricated. Based on the
record, Yalong admitted the shooting, corroborated by De Jesus and another witness, Mrs. Anita Bernales' testimony. It
was likewise found that Fernando was the one who had a previous quarrel with the deceased, thus the former was with
motive to harm the latter. And if conspiracy existed, accused-appellants would not have to do it at the place where they
can be seen conspicuously. The qualifying circumstance of treachery by the lower court cannot be sustained as Yalong's
decision to shoot the deceased appeared to be sudden, brought about by the latter's unlawful aggression to stab the
former by a dagger.
De Jesus ACQUITTED; Yalong's conviction was MODIFIED to homicide
2


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUIS B. TORING DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B. BERDIN, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-56358; October 26, 1990
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
A benefit dance was held in one sitio in Lapu lapu City In the evening of May 25, 1980, for the last canvassing of
votes for the candidates for princesses, attended by the entire family of one of the candidates. Also present were
members of the kwaknit gang, headed by Toring, noted for their bird-like way of dancing and their propensity for
drunkenness and provoking trouble.

Samuel, the father of the declared winner, while answering the call of nature, was approached by Toring and two others
and was stabbed from behind by Toring using a knife handed to him by a companion. Samuel died of stab wound he
sustained on the right side of his abdomen.

An information for muder was filed against Toring. The lower court rendered a decision discrediting Toring's claim that
the killing of Samuel was justified because it was done in defense of a stranger. While Toring testified that Samuel was
aiming his shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon (Amion), prosecution witness Joel Escobia claimed that he was at the
receiving end of Samuel's thrusts with the butt of his shotgun. To the court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense
because in appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with definiteness the
identity of the stranger defended by the accused.

Upon appeal, Toring contended that his assault on Samuel was justified because he acted in defense of his first cousin,
Joel Escobia is the first cousin of Toring their fathers being brothers, although no explanation appears on record why
they have different surnames. At any rate, this allegation on relationship was not rebutted by the prosecution. Escobia
attested that as he was about to dance with a girl, Samuel stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from
his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia. Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and told him to eat the bullet.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Toring is entitled to the benefit of a privileged mitigating circumstance because he acted in
defense of a relative.

RULING:
Yes. Toring should be credited with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of relative and
the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given to
Toring's claim of defense of a relative. Toring himself admitted in court that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber
revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel, Toring was impelled
by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather,
he was motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the
Toring brothers. Indeed, vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other.

3



THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-47722; July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.:
FACTS:
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped
convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Defendant corporal Alberto
Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the
office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper
clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise
called by the Provincial Inspector. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and
Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living.
When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare and asked her where Irene's room was.
Brigida indicated the place and also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then
went to the room of Irene, and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were,
simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw
her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him.
Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious
criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a mitigating circumstance is present in Oanis and Gallanta's act of killing Tecson.

RULING:
Yes. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be
taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and
(b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in
the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary
consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if
resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take
no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas
without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed.

4




US v. MANUEL RODRIGUEZ ET AL.
19 Phil. 150; GR No. 6344; March 21, 1911
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
Manuel Rodriguez, Cipriano Galvez, Raymundo Revilla, Doroteo Rojas, Feliciano Pantanilla, Roman
Villaister, Pedro Villanueva, Nicomedes Abella, Sabino Raymundo, Geronimo Guijon, Martin Sauler, Eusebio
Bustamante, Victoriano Oalipusan and Valentin Multialto members of the second company of the Constabulary
stationed at Davao, mutinied on the 6th day of June, 1909, attempting, during the course of such mutiny, to kill one
of their superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria; that immediately after such revolt the mutineers, having taken
arms and ammunition from the depositary, left the vicinity of Davao and marched toward the mountains of Lipada;
that on the 8th day of June, 1909, said mutineers returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking the town; that the
inhabitants thereof, having received previous notice of the proposed attack, prepared themselves to meet it; that J. L.
Burchfield, P. C. Libby, A. M. Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, having been detailed by those commanding
the defense of the town, on the afternoon of the day referred to, advanced to the cemetery within the limits of the
town, forming an outpost for the purpose of awaiting the coming of the mutineers; that about 4.15 o'clock they
sighted the mutineers; that immediately thereafter they heard a shot, followed by others, which came from near the
cemetery, where the mutineers had halted and dismounted; that after a few shots had been exchanged Roy Libby was
struck with a ball and killed; that the outpost retreated to the convent and took refuge therein ; that the mutineers
advanced against the town, attacking it at various points and especially the convent, where a portion of the residents of
the town had gathered, including the women and children:, for the purpose of defending themselves; that no
other person except Roy Libby was killed, although several others were more or less severely wounded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not aggravating circumstamces attended the commission of the crime.

RULING:
No. We do not believe that this circumstance was present. This circumstance is characterized by the
intellectual or mental rather than the physical means to which the criminal resorts to carry out his design. This
paragraph was intended to cover, for example, the case where a thief falsely represents that he is the lover of the
servant of a house in order to gain entrance and rob the owner (astucia); or where (fraude) A simulates the
handwriting of B, who is a friend of C, inviting the latter, without the knowledge of B, by means of a note written in
such simulated hand, to meet B at a designated place, in order to give A, who lies in wait at the place appointed,
an opportunity to kill C; or where (disfraz) one uses a disguise to prevent being recognized; and cases of that
class and nature.

We are unable to find from the facts proved any element which warrants the conclusions of the learned trial court as to
the presence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime of which the appellants were found guilty. They
boldly marched from the mountains of Lipada to Davao, partly, at least, in the daytime, with the purpose of
attacking the town, which purpose they communicated to at least three persons, one of whom was permitted to
precede them to the town. They advanced against the town at about 4.15 in the afternoon without any effort at
concealment. They were in no way disguised, but, on the contrary, each wore the greater portion of the Constabulary
uniform in which he was clad at the time of the mutiny. While it appears that some of them had cloths wrapped
about their heads, it does not appear that this was done as a disguise, but was following rather the custom of the
country in which they had been reared. We find in all the case nothing of craft, fraud or disguise.

This circumstance depends upon the relative strength of the one attacking and the one attacked. It can hardly be said
that advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense when twenty-three men, in
the daytime, openly and without stratagem of any kind, attack a town of the size of Davao. The results of the attack

5
clearly show that the strength of the attacking party was not sufficient to accomplish the purpose in view. They
demonstrate, under the circumstances, that no means were employed to weaken the defense, outside of such as are
inherent in the situation when one body of men attacks another with deadly weapons.

For the existence of this circumstance it is necessary that there exist a relation of trust or confidence between the
person committing the crime and the one against whom it is committed and that the former make use of such relation
to commit the crime. For example, where one commits a robbery in a house in which, as a friend of the owner, he is
at the time a guest. No relation of this nature existed between the appellants and the citizens of Davao or the
deceased. The evidence fails to disclose a single fact upon which the existence of this relation can be based.

In order that this aggravating circumstance exist it is necessary that the person committing the crime be a public
official and that he use the influence, prestige or ascendency which such office gives him as the means by which he
realizes his purpose: The essence of the matter is presented in, the inquiry, "Did the licensed abuse his office in
order to commit the crime?" We do not believe that the facts of this case warrant the finding of the trial court in this
particular, (Supreme court of Spain, decisions of 4th March, 1872; 18th December, 1871.)

The reason for the existence of this circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the
midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their
misfortune to despoil them.

As is readily seen from the facts, no such.condition as is described in this paragraph existed in Davao on the occasion
of the attack.
The second paragraph of this subdivision reads:
"The courts shall take this circumstance into consideration according to the nature and characteristics of the crime."
In this case, under all the circumstances, including those presented in the discussion relating to paragraph 9, the fact
that there were more than three armed persons in the attacking party is not sufficient to call for the application of the
provisions of this paragraph.

The supreme court of Spain has held "that the circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority, provided for
in paragraph 16 of the Penal Code, can exist only when such authority is engaged in the exercise of its functions and he
who is thus engaged in the exercise of said functions is not the person against whom the crime is committed in
which that circumstance appears;" the court further saying that such aggravating circumstance was not present in
the case before it "because D. Jose Torres, although he was municipal judge, was the object of the murder involved
in that case."

In the case at bar, if the crime was committed with contempt of and insult to the public authorities, those authorities
must have been the public authorities of Davao. But the persons exercising that authority were the very persons
against whom, among others, the crime charged in this action was being committed.

After diligent investigation and extended consideration; we have been unable to find that any aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of this crime.

There being present no aggravating circumstance and there existing no extenuating circumstances, the penalty
imposed must be in its medium degree.

6






People vs rodil
FACTS:
After Lt. Masana and the appellant went inside the restaurant to settle wether the rodil’s gun had a license, they both
had an altercation which lead rodil to suddenly pull a double edged dagger and stabbed LT. masana several time which
lead to his demise. Lt. Masana was wearing a civilian clothing at that time but the appellant identified him as a PC
officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and treachery was present

HELD:
No. evident premeditation and treachery were not present. Prior to the attack, the two had an altercation which made
the attack on the victim as a spur in the moment decision. The suddenness of the attack does not suffice treachery. It
fails to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim neither does it show that the accused employed
means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to himself.
*the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the rank and contempt of or insult to public authority was present as
appellant new the deceased as an officer. Officers belong to the public authority who are vested with jurisdiction.
Chief of police primo panaligan was in the same restaurant where the incident happened. Appellant knew him to be a
chief of police and deliberately disregarded the respect due


PEOPLE VS PAGAL

FACTS:
The accused Pedro pagal was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. Pagal together with Jose torazo, who
were both employees of the deceased, took away an amount of PHP. 1,281 from Gau guan and thereafter killed the
latter. The appellant pleaded guilty in the arraignment.

ISSUE:
whether or not the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation, and in disregard of the respect were
properly appreciated

Held:
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was properly appreciated. The same was purposely and deliberately sought
by the appellants to purposely sought and facilitate in the commission of the crime. Evident premeditation was not
present because evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of robbery. Evident premeditation will be appreciated if
it is proven that accused purposely plan to kill the victim. But in this case, the original plan was only to rob and that
homicide only happened as a necessary means to commit the crime. The aggravating circumstance of disregard on the
respect is not present. This aggravating circumstance is only applicable in crimes against persons or honor when in the
commission of the crime there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age or sex. Robbery with homicide is mainly a
crime against property.



People vs Luchico
Facts:
7
About five in the evening, the accused attempted sexual advances to Inocencia Salva, a girl of 13 years of age, who was
the servant of the accused, by kissing her but inocencia was able to run to the municipal building to file a complaint and
secured a pen-knife. Accused pursued her and after she was advice by the municipal president to go home, accused
intimidated inocencia that if he won’t come with him, he would kill her. Accused brought the offended party to a place
where houses are distant and had carnal knowledge with the latter.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and abuse of confidence was attendant

Held:
the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is not attendant in the case. In order to allege such AC, it is necessary that
the accused sought and took advantage of the nightime. In this case, crime of rape was the result of the succession of
acts which took place at 5 in the afternoon and ended 7 in the evening. It appears that nocturnity was not specially
sought by and taken advantage by the accused.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence was not attendant. For such to be appreciated, confidence must
facilitate in the commission of the offense. In this case, when the accused raped the offended party, she had already lost
confidence in him when the accused kissed and made proposal to her prior to the incident.


US vs Punsalan
FACTS:
Simon punsalan and Don Francisco Tizon where respectively plaintiff and defendant in a civil case. After the testimony
was taken, Don Fernandez was invited by the justice to accompany him into an adjoining and thereafter, accused arose
with a knife of his hand and stabbed Tizon 15 times. He was convicted of murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not treachery and where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties are present

HELD:
Treachery was attendant in the case, as the accused employed means and methods in the execution in order to specially
sought for its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
aggravating circumstance of where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties is not present. In order
to invoke this aggravating circumstance, accused must commit the crime while public authorities are in the discharge of
their duties. In this case, the public authority, the justice of peace, was not in the discharge of their duties.


People vs Fontillas
FACTS:
The minor daughter of the accused helped her father, the accused, to get inside their house because he was drunk. The
accused lied beside her and forced her to have carnal knowledge with AAA. AAA reporter the incident to her aunt and
uncle and reported it to the police station

ISSUE:
Whether or not alternative circumstance of intoxication can be appreciated

HELD:
In order to invoke the intoxication, the burden of proof lies in the accused. The accused failed to prove that he took such
quantity of alcoholic beverage that would blur his mental faculty. Subsequently, his drinking buddies failed to testify
such information. The alternative circumstance of intoxication cannot be appreciated in his favour.


8








People vs Mondigo
Facts:
Appellant, Damaso Delima, Damaso’s son delfin delima, Anthony Delima and other unidentified individuals were have a
drinking spree. Around 6 in the evening, appellant hacked Anthony on the head then proceeded to attacked Damaso.
Damaso later died from the injuries. Appellant was charged with murder and frustrated murder.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in appreciating the alternative circumstance of intoxication as mitigating circumstance

HELD: The RTC erred in appreciating intoxication as mitigating circumstance. For the alternative circumstance to be
appreciated, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, subsequent to plan to commit the felony and
the aaccused’s drunkness affected his mental faculties. The low alcohol content of beer, the low quantity of such liquor
and the absence of any independent proof negate the finding that the appellant was intoxicated enough. Intoxication
shall not be appreciated


People v. Abello
G.R. No. 151952, 25 March 2009
(RAPE)
Facts:

• AAA was sleeping in their house with her sisterinlaw and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello
mashed her breast.
• Abello again mashed the breast of AAA under the same situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two
occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside.
• Abello placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation.
The victim on the same date reported the incident to her sisterinlaw and mother.
• The RTC found Abello guilty under all three Information, one count of rape by sexual assault and two counts of
sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law. The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal and increased the
penalties imposed.
• Abello questions his conviction for sexual abuse since AAA does not fall under those protected by RA 7610 (Child
Abuse Law).

Issue:

WON the alternative circumstance of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship should be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

Ruling:

NO, the relationship should not be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Though the three Informations
all alleged the stepfather- stepdaughter relationship between AAA and Abello, this modifying circumstance, was
not duly proven in the present case. The prosecution failed to present the marriage contract between Abello
and AAA’s mother. If the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was only via an admission by Abello
9
 of his marriage to AAA’s mother. This admission is inconclusive. The court is strict on considering relationship as
an aggravating circumstance because it increases the imposable penalty, and hence must be proven by
competent evidence.

US vs. Carlos H. Acebedo

GR No. 5799, Feb 23, 1911
(MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS)

Facts:

• L. W. Berry, auditor of the district testified that he was in palo leyte to investigate the alleged irregularities
commited by the municipal president of said pueblo in relation to certain fines and costs imposed by the
justice of the peace of that place.
• He had found out that certain sums due from the municipal president to the justice of the peace had not been
turned over to the latter.
• The accused answered that he had left the matter of the collection of the costs and fines and the turning over of
the same to his secretary, Crisanto P. Urbina.
• At first, the secretary said he had already turned over the sums for which he had given receipts, but later said
that he had forgotten to do so.
• Upon asking the accused why he had not ordered his secretary to turn over said sums, he replied that he
understood that the secretary had already done it.
• The list of the sums collected aggregated a total of P50.85.
• Upon asking the accused and his secretary as to what had been done with this amount, the accused answered
that his secretary ought to have it. The secretary thereupon opened his money box but could find therein only
P10.55.

Issue:

WON the appellant and his secretary conspired in embezzling public funds.

Ruling:

NO, there was no conspiracy between the appellant and his secretary. No guilty knowledge of the theft
committed by the secretary was shown on the part of the appellant in this case, nor does it appear that he in any
way participated in the fruits of the crime. If the secretary stole the money in question without the knowledge
or consent of the appellant and without negligence on his part, then certainly the latter can not be convicted of
embezzling the same money or any part thereof. The evidence completely fails in showing that any portion of
the money in this case came actually into the hands of the appellant. It fails utterly to establish that he had any
knowledge of the peculations of his secretary. It, therefore, fails to demonstrate that he, directly or indirectly,
embezzled the money in question or any portion thereof. Nor is it shown that the accused was guilty of
negligence or bad faith in leaving the collection and remitting of said sums to his secretary.

10












David, Jr. vs. People
G.R. No. 136037, August 13, 2008
(SELF-DEFENSE)
Facts:
• Domingo Datalio was walking alone in an alley from where he live, he met Severino David and Timoteo Gianan
both of whom were not his acquaintances.
• Severino stabbed him while Timoteo tried to hit him with an adobe stone, but Domingo kicked him. Wounded,
Domingo ran out of the alley and called for his sister to bring him to the hospital.
• Brought to the MCU hospital, Domingo was transferred to Chinese General Hospital where he was treated. Per
the Medico-Legal Certificate signed by the resident on duty, he suffered a stab wound at the lower abdomen
• Montallana was told the suspect was in a house inside the compound. On their way to that house, suspect
Timoteo Gianan was surrendered by a Bantay Bayan in a street corner near the place of the stabbing.
• At the house where suspect Severino was, the policemen were allowed to enter by the owner. Then, Severino
came out and surrendered a fan knife.
• The accused claims that the killing arose from an impulse of self- defense.

Issue:
WON the assertion of the accused that he acted from an impulse of self-defense is valid.

Ruling:

NO, The accused who maintains that the killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has the onus probandi of
proving the elements thereof.[12] The essential requisites being: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there
must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced
to inflict the injury or wound upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.


People vs. Montescarlos
G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009
(ACCOMPLICE)

Facts:
• ABC is a minor and the daughter of appellant, Montescarlos. Who were both renting a room in a house owned
by Tampus.
• Montescarlos and Tampus were both drinking beer and forced her to drink with them.
• When she became intoxicated she was now very sleepy then she overheard Tampus requesting her mother,
Montesclaros that he be allowed to have sexual intercourse with her.
• Montesclaros agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he was finished.
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 • She fell asleep and when she woke up she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to
her knees and she felt pain all over her body and noticed that blood from her genitals.
• Montesclaros arrived home from work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant ignored her.
• A similar incident ensued and the same thing happened as Monteclaros ignored her again when she her told
about the incident.

Issue:

WON Ida Montesclaros is guilty as an accomplice in the rape of ABC.

Ruling:

YES, Montesclaros is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC. All the requisites under Article 18
of the RPC concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of
ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the ra pe of ABC. Ida had
knowledge of and assented to Tampus' intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. It is settled
jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the
commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The
evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus.
First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already
had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without
Ida's consent.


People vs. Bi-ay
G.R. No. 192187, December 13, 2010
(PRINCIPAL)
Facts:

• Rodrigo Claro together with his son Baby Boy, were in the house of his father, Francisco Claro.
• The accused Eliseo Bi-ay, Jr. (Eliseo) and his co-accused, Jorge Bi-ay and Elex Lingasa went to the house of
Francisco and asked for a coffee.
• Jorge asked the victim to serve the coffee to his companions, Alex and Eliseo, the latter hacked him and
Alex stabbed the victim at the back inflicting multiple fatal hack wounds upon the body of the victim
which caused his death.
• Baby Boy witnessed what happened and asked for his grandfathers help.
Issue:
WON Eliseo Bi-ay is a principal by direct participation.

Ruling:
YES. The court held the Eliseo Bi-ay is a principal by direct participation. He delivered the first blow on the victim.
He initiated the deadly assault by hacking the victim on the nape. Considering the circumstances, the court
cannot hold the accused as a mere accomplice because his active and direct involvement in the killing was
obvious.


People vs. Alpapara
G.R. No. 180421, Ocober 30, 2009
(CONSPIRACY)
Facts:
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 • Domingo Alpapara, Pedro Alpapara and Aldan Paya were alleged to have thrown stones at the roof of Gomez
Relorcasa while the latter was having a chat with a friend.
• The three named-accused challenged Gomez to come out of his house while armed with revolvers stormed into
the victim’s house and subdued him by holding and pinning him down.
• As the victim was being held, he was then shot at close range twice, first at the back then at the right temple.
Alden Paya then fired upwards warning those present not to testify on what transpired. The three accused then
went out and took off in a passenger jeepney driven by Mario Bicuna.

Issue:
Whether or not there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime.

Ruling:

YES. Based on the actions of the accused, it can be seen that they were united in purpose and made sure that it was
consummated. Direct proof is not essential in proving that there was conspiracy. Conspiracy maybe inferred from the
acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which undoubt- edly point to a joint purpose,
concert of action, and the same interest. Case and point, the accused are equally liable fro the crime.

US vs. Macasaet
GR No. 4432, Oct 15, 1908

Facts:
In the September 1907, the accused Agrapino Macasaet had been selling native wine at retail without necessary license.
The said act was a violation of the Sec 66, in relation to sec 68, subsection 5 of the Internal Revenue Law. The accused,
as he appealed following the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which was payment of the fine
amounting to 300Php and imprisonment for five months, felt that the said penalty of imprisonment was illegal. The said
judgement of the Court of First instance of Batangas was based on the punishment prescribe on the provision of Act No.
1732, sec 1 of Internal revenue law that stipulates that “ a fine is imposed as a whole or any part of the punishment for
any criminal offense made punishable by any act or acts of the Philippine commission, the court shall also sentence the
guilty person to suffer subsidiary the imprisonment until the fine is satisfied” which took effect on November of the
same year as the trial.

Issue:
WON penalties of the violation of Sec 66 of the internal revenue law be applicable to the case of Agrapino Macasaet

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled, with the basis that penal statutes cannot be made retroactive and based on the facts that the
effectivity of the penal statute exemplified in the provision of art. No. 1732 was in November of 1970 and that the trial
of the accused started prior to the said effectivity, affirmed to the appeal of eradicating imprisonment of five months as
part of the penalty of his violation. The judgement, thus, be limited to the fine and costs.


People vs. Villaraza
G.R. No. L-46228. January 17, 1978

Facts:
On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa in the city court of Cagayan de Oro City
for having issued on October 16, 1974 two bouncing checks for the total sum of P4, 966. 63. City Judge Rolando R.
Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had waived the second stage of the preliminary
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investigation. He directed that the case be elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court.
Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order
of February 3, 1977 returned the case to the city court because in its opinion the case falls within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the two courts and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the case, should try it.
Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his order of April 21, 1977 directed the re-elevation
of the case. His view is that the case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because
estafa committed by the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took
effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. That order of respondent judge is
assailed in the petition for certiorari filed in this Court on May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de Oro
City.



Issue:
Whether or not the court of first instance issued a proper remedy in this case.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the case was properly filed with the city court which had original jurisdiction over it. The
penalty of prision mayor medium does not apply to estafa committed prior to the promulgation of Presidential Decree
no. 818.
The order of the Court of First Instance returning the case to the city court is affirmed and the two orders of the
respondent city judge, elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, are set aside. The City Court is directed to try the
case.


Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95523 March 26, 1998

Facts:
On October 28, 1988, petitioner Reynaldo Gonzales y Rivera was convicted for illegal possession of firearm and was
sentenced to a penalty ranging from 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 18 years, 8 months of Reclusion Temporal. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a decision dated July 12, 1990. On November 13,1990 petitioner filed
a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision. While the case was still pending,
Republic Act 8294 was enacted lowering the penalty for illegal possession of firearm. Petitioner was sentenced to four (4)
years and two (2) months, as minimum, to six(6) years, as maximum and was ordered released for already having served
the more than the maximum principal penalty for the offense.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be released for already having served more than the maximum penalty for the
offense.

Held:
It must be noted that in determining the preventive detention of the petitioner, we computed the total period from the
time the trial court convicted the petitioner which was on October 28, 1988 to the date of promulgation of our decision
on August 18, 1997.However, on September 10, 1997, Action Officer Homobono R. Lachica, Jr. informed this Court that
under the Bureau of Corrections' records, which were not attached to the records of this case, petitioner has only served
one (1) month and twelve (12) days of preventive suspension. He explained that upon the promulgation of petitioner's
conviction and the forfeiture of his bail bond, petitioner could no longer be located until his arrest on September 16,
1993. Moreover, it was only on July 4, 1997 that petitioner was committed to the Bureau of Corrections. Since it appears
that petitioner has not yet fully served the indeterminate penalty imposed above for his offense, as well as the
subsidiary penalty for the unpaid fine, the order for his immediate release dated August 27, 1997 is hereby RECALLED.

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 Go vs. Dimagiba
GR NO. 151876, 2005-06-21

Facts:
Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the
drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason "account closed. Dimagiba
was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final
Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The RTC
held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. It further noted that he was a first-time offender
and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability
had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties.


Issue:
a. Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
b. Whether or not retroactive application of law is favorable to the accused.

Held:
(a) No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration and in a
Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order
denying these motions. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already
become final and executory, an action deplorably amounting to forum shopping.

(b) No. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. SC-AC
No. 12-2000 cannot be given retroactive application for it is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. It is
merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of the case.

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