Chapter I

The Problem

1. Introduction

All persons are entitled to equality of protection before the law. This is guaranteed by the

Constitution which provides that no person shall be denied of the equal protection of the law. This

equality of protection before the law mandates that all persons similarly situated must be treated

alike both as to the responsibility imposed and to the rights conferred. This is a rule that embodies

the concept of fairness since it is reasonable that those persons not similarly situated must not be

treated alike, and that those who belong to the same situation must be similarly treated. In a family

for instance, an infant has different needs than that of a teenager child such that parents would

provide them different kinds of care and treatment in terms of foods, medical needs, and attention.

Similarly in a State, citizens who are well off may be treated differently in the imposition of higher

tax than that of the ordinary employees; or that persons committing heinous crimes are punished

severely compared to those who committed minor offenses who are given light penalties.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,

as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit

legislation which is limited either [by] the object to which it is directed or by [the] territory within

which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires

that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to

privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by

legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to

1
all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between

those who fall within such class and those who do not1.

It is well settled that the equal protection clause has been considered as a limitation of

lawmaking body in enacting laws. Consequently, there were laws which were considered

unconstitutional for being violative of the Equal Protection clause. In GSIS v Montesclaros, 434

SCRA 441 the Supreme Court declared as invalid Sec. 18 of PD 1146 which provides that a

surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension benefits if the surviving spouse contracted

marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. It

held that the classification does not rest on substantial distinction. If the purpose of the proviso is

to prevent deathbed marriages there is no reason why the proviso reckons the three year

prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for the pension and not from the date the

pensioner died. It lumps all marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified

for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience. In Ormoc Sugar Co. v.

Treasurer of Ormoc City the ordinance was invalidated by the Supreme Court because it taxes

only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company and none other such

that if a new sugar central is established in Ormoc it would not be subject to the ordinance. It is

thus clear from these and all other similar cases that with the Equal Protection Clause fairness is

guaranteed.

There are conspicuous provisions however in the Revised Penal Code that need to be

reassessed in the light of Equal Protection Clause. These provisions refer to the noticeable

disparity on the penalties imposed on public officers and private individuals in felony involving

restraint of liberty of persons which are arbitrary detention and illegal detention. In Articles 124 to

126 which are committed or violated by public officers the penalty imposed in detaining a person

if the detention exceeds 3 days is only prission correctional in its medium and maximum period

1
Conrado L. Tiu vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999

2
or equivalent to two years four months and one day up to 6 years. However, upon examination of

Article 267, the penalty imposed of detaining a person committed by a private individual for the

same period of detention is already reclusion perpetua equivalent to twenty years and one day to

forty years; and if the detention does not last for three days the private individual is still punished

by a severe penalty of reclusion temporal equivalent to twelve years and one day to twenty years.

The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by government

officers form part of our statute books even before the advent of American sovereignty in our

country. Those provisions were already in effect during the Spanish regime; they remained in

effect under American rule; continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the

Japanese regime they were not repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of

the free and sovereign Republic of the Philippines2. One may ask therefore if the penalties

imposed have been fair? Should there be any distinction in the penalty imposed between a public

officer and a private individual such that the latter is punished severely compared to the former

when in fact they commit the same crime that is unlawfully restraining the liberty of another? Or

is this really consistent with the principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause?

2
People of the Philippines vs. Astorga G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003

3
2. Statement of the Problem

Main Problem:

Are the penalties imposed on the crimes of Arbitrary detention and Illegal detention embodied

in the Revised Penal Code consistent with the Equal Protection Clause?

Sub-problems:

1. How does the Constitution define the Equal Protection Clause?

2. What are the crimes of Illegal detention and Arbitrary detention and their corresponding

penalties?

3. What are the fundamental principles concerning penalty in the Revised Penal Code?

4. Is there inconsistency in the penalties imposed on Arbitrary detention and Illegal detention to

Equal Protection Clause?

5. Is there a way of dealing with the inconsistency?

3. Definition of Terms

The following are the terms used in this research with their corresponding meanings:

Arbitrary Detention- As used in this research arbitrary detention is committed when a public

officer or employee without legal grounds detains a person. It excludes the other kinds of arbitrary

detention under the Revised Penal Code which are: 1. Delay in the delivery of detained persons

to the proper judicial authorities; and 2. Delaying release.

Court- refers to the Supreme Court

Equal Protection Clause- refers to the provision in the Constitution which provides that no

person shall be denied of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person

4
be denied of the equal protection of the law. It also refers to the fact that all persons or things

similarly situated must be treated similarly both as to rights conferred and responsibilities

imposed.

Illegal Detention- It is committed when any private individual kidnaps or detains another, or in

any other manner deprive him of his liberty.

Penalty- is the punishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits an unlawful,

deliberate or negligent act.

Persons- refers to natural persons unless the context otherwise provides

Public Officer- is an employee of the government who has the power to detain or order the

detention of a person

4. Significance of the Study

The significance of this research is its contribution to the field of study of Criminal Law.

Such contribution will be based on the researcher's reevaluation of the provisions regarding

Arbitrary detention and Illegal detention; their corresponding penalties; their conformity with the

Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution as well as fundamental principles concerning penalty.

This research is relevant as there is a need to reevaluate the provisions in the Revised Penal

Code particularly the great difference between the penalties imposed on Arbitrary Detention and

Illegal Detention especially at present that the Congress is in the process of revising the latter.

5. Scope and Limitations

5
 The study relies on the rulings laid down by the Supreme Court relevant to the resolution of

the main problem and sub problems of this research. It does not include as bases for its study the

discussions nor the intentions of the committee which was created by Administrative Order No.94

of the Department of Justice chaired by Anacleto Diaz which made the Revised Penal Code nor

the commission which was responsible for the creation of 1987 Constitution. This study also made

reference as bases for study opinions or commentaries and treaties made by highly respected

authors of books in Criminal Law as well as Constitutional Law.

The concept of arbitrary detention refers to Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code which

is committed when any public officer or employee without legal grounds detains a person. The

researcher finds it unnecessary to include Article 125 referring to the delay in the delivery of

detained persons to the proper judicial authorities and Article 126 delaying release in this research

since both of them involves the penalty, offender or offense essentially the same as that of Article

124.

Chapter II

6
 Review of Related Literature

1. Review of Related Studies

Books

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Principles and Cases Volume 1 2012 by Hector S.

De Leon and Hector M. De Leon, Jr.

On Equal Protection of Laws

Equal protection of the laws signifies that “ all persons subject of legislation must be

treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and

liabilities imposed.”

The equal protection guarantee is directed principally against undue favor and individual

or class privilege. It does not absolutely preclude classification by law. Where there are

reasonable grounds for so doing, persons or their properties may be classified or grouped into

classes to each of which a special legal rights or liabilities may be attached. No violation is

committed when one class is treated and regulated differently from another as long as the

classification is reasonable or based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be

accomplished, and those within the same class must be treated alike. The presumption is that

every classification made by law is reasonable.

The principle is well-recognized that the limited application of the statute, either in the

object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate, does not necessarily

violate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. It is sufficient for the purpose of complying

with the constitutional mandate, that the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary or

capricious, although the law may apply only on some and not all the subjects thereof.

For the classification to be considered reasonable:

1. It must be based on substantial or material distinctions which make real differences;

7
 2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there

are real or substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.

PRINCIPLES, COMMENTS AND CASES IN CONTITUTIONAL LAW II 2012 by Rolando A.

Suarez

On Equal Protection of Laws

The phrase “ nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws” is what is

known as the equal protection clause. It is a constitutional guarantee that all persons are equal

before the law. It is a constitutional guarantee that all persons are equal before the law which

means that what the Constitution guarantees is not absolute equality of all individuals but only

equality of opportunity, or protection given by law to persons or classes of persons who are

similarly situated and who therefore belong to a certain classification made by law.

It is this classification which determines whether the equal protection clause has been

violated or not. The rule then and up to now is that the classification made by law must be valid

and reasonable and not arbitrarily, to ensure that equal protection of the laws is not violated by

any law or legislative measure.

In case the classification is made the following requisites must concur: 1. It must rest on

substantial distinctions; 2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. It must not be limited

to existing conditions only; and 4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Constitutional guarantee of equal protection is not violated by any reasonable

classification which is based on substantial distinctions, not on distinctions which are drawn

merely out of convenience or caprice to favor a person or group of persons more than the others

8
who are similarly situated. It must be a valid distinction founded on good and justifiable reasons.

Otherwise it may be considered as arbitrary and unreasonable. The classification must not only

be based on substantial distinctions but should also be relevant to the purpose which the law

seeks to achieve. Such classification will continue to be valid and effective for as long as the

conditions sought to be addressed or corrected by the law continue to exist. Lastly, a law can

make a classification but once a classification is made, all those covered by the classification are

to be treated equally.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A BARRISTER’S COMPANION 2010 By Cecilio D. Duka

On Equal Protection of Laws

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair

discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied

in a separate clause in Article III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution to provide for a more specific guaranty

against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general

may be challenged on the basis of due process clause. But if a particular act assailed partakes of

an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection

clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or

things similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities

imposed. Similar subjects in other words should not be treated differently, so as to give favor to

some and unjustly discriminates against others.

The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under

similar circumstances and that all persons are treated in the same manner the conditions not

being different both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable

classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class

may be treated differently from another. Equal protection limits governmental discrimination. It

9
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.

The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class

privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed

or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality. The equal

protection clause does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real

and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of particular legislation. If

the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and

applies equally to all present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal

protection guarantee.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our constitution

and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice

and Human Rights exhorts Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that

protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political

inequalities. The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, in the exercise of

his rights and in the performance of his duties, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and

observe honesty and good faith.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135,

for example prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee

as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice

for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage

membership in any labor organization.

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal

truism of equal pay for equal work. Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill,

effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. Equal pay for

equal work is equal protection.

Election to public office is not a reasonable classification. The court cannot validate badges

10
of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government

authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are

disregarded. Therefore, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification

in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions

which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of

movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to

all those belonging to the same class.

NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE 2012 by Leonor D. Boado

On Penalty

Penalties are the punishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a

deliberate or negligent act or for omitting to act when there is a duty to do so. They are imposed

as a result of judicial proceedings.

Penalties are prescribed by statutes and are essentially and exclusively legislative. Judges

can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as

determined exclusively by the legislature.

Only those penalties prescribed by law prior to its commission may be imposed. Unless

there is a law defining an act or omission as a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor, that act

or omission cannot be penalized, no matter how reprehensible it may be. Nullum crimen, nulla

poena sine lege.

The primary function of punishment in criminal law is to protect society from potential and

actual wrongdoers. The retributive aspect of penal laws should be directed against them. Thus,

in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of the retribution of a

wronged society should be directed against the ‘actual and potential wrongdoer’s.

On Arbitary Detention

11
 Arbitrary detention can be committed by public officers whose official duties give them the

authority to effect arrest and detain persons such as barangay chairman and police officers. If

committed by other kinds of public officers, the crime is illegal detention. But a person is deemed

a public officer only when he is acting within the bounds of his official authority or function. If not,

he acts in his private capacity.

A detention without lawful cause by barangay officials constitutes arbitrary detention

because they are persons in authority or agents of persons in authority. They are vested with

authority to cause arrests in the maintenance of peace and order in the barangay.

On Illegal Detntion

The essence of kidnapping is restraint or deprivation of liberty, or that the victim was

transported away against his will with the primary or original intent to effect that restraint or

deprivation. The primary element of kidnapping is actual confinement, detention and restraint of

the victim. The intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latter’s liberty, in any manner must

be established by indubitable proof.

For kidnapping to exist, there must be proof that the intent of the malefactors was to

deprive the offended of her liberty and not where such restraint of freedom of action was merely

an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. The offender

in this crime must be a private individual.

POINTERS IN CRIMINAL LAW 2011 by Edilberto G. Sandoval

On Penalty

Penalty is the punishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits an

unlawful, deliberate or negligent act. Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony

shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission but the law cannot

impose cruel and unusual punishment as the Constitution prohibits it. In a judgment of conviction

12
for any crime, the court should specify the appropriate name for any penalty provided for in the

Revised Penal Code or special laws.

On Arbitrary Detention

Like in the case of illegal detention, the accused detains a person or restrains his liberty

without any legal ground. The offender however in arbitrary detention is a public officer whose

functions have something to do with the protection of life and property and maintenance of peace

and order.

The arrest or detention must be without legal grounds. The following are the legal grounds:

the commission of a crime; violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory

confinement of the patient in hospital; the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving his final judgment or is temporarily

confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being placed from one confinement to

another. When the peace officers acted in good faith even if the three grounds mentioned above

are not obtaining there is no arbitrary detention.

In Arbitrary Detention like in illegal detention there must be actual confinement or

restriction of the person of the offended party so that where the latter had freedom to leave the

premises or is not actually restricted to get out there is no crime of detention. The victim however

need not be place in inclosure.

On Illegal Detention

The essence of the offense is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the

intent of the accused to effect it. There must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the

malefactor is to deprive the offended party liberty. The restraint however need not be permanent.

In kidnapping, the culprit takes and carries away the victim depriving the latter of his liberty.

If the detention lasted more than three days or is committed simulating public authority or any

13
serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if

threats to kill him shall have been made or if the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,

female or public officer, it is serious. Otherwise, the crime is slight illegal detention.

In unlawful arrest public officer may be held liable. A private individual whose purpose is to

bring the person arrested to the proper Authorities is liable for unlawful arrest if the ground for the

arrest is illegal or not authorized by law. In the absence of such purpose his crime is Kidnapping

and Serious Illegal Detention or Slight Illegal Detention

2. Conceptual Framework

This research presupposes the Classical theory of criminal liability which posits that:

1. The basis of Criminal liability is human free will and the purpose of penalty is retribution;

2. That man is essentially a moral creature with an absolute freedom to choose between good

and evil thereby placing more stress upon the effect or result of the felonious act than upon the

criminal himself;

3. It has endeavored to establish a mechanical and direct proportion between crime and penalty;

and

4. There is a scant regard to the human element3.

Chapter III

3
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law Book 1 2012 Ed., p.23

14
 Methodology and Procedure

The research intends to use as sources The Philippine Constitution, Revised Penal Code,

Rules of Court, Judicial decisions and legal textbooks on the Constitution and Criminal Law. From

these sources a review shall be made on the fundamental principles involving the Equal

Protection Clause; Arbitrary Detention; Illegal detention; penalties and Criminal Law in general.

The data gathered will then be evaluated, analyzed and applied towards the resolution of the sub-

problems and the main problem.

Chapter IV

15
 The Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection clause is embodied in the 1987 Philippine Constitution Article III Section

1 which provides that: No person shall be denied of life, liberty or property without due process of

law, nor shall any person be denied of the equal protection of the law. The second part of the

sentence which states “nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws” is what

is known as the equal protection clause. In a long line of cases the Supreme Court held that the

equal protection clause does not require absolute equality but instead it recognizes the

indispensable part of legislation that is of making classifications as long as it is valid and

reasonable.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification

in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in

speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not

invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it

goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of

constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means

that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,

that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions

only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the

standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or

rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over

matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is

not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in

their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety.

Hence, legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the

16
equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or

harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear4. In short, the equal protection

clause requires that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated similarly both as to

rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

The requirements for a valid classification have been used by the Supreme Court in many

cases in sustaining the Constitutionality or rejecting the laws passed by the legislature. A close

examination of these cases would give a deeper and clear understanding of the equal protection

clause and the inevitable function of the legislature to make classifications in enacting laws.

In People vs.Vera G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 the Court declared Act No. 4221,

the Probation Law, unconstitutional and granted the People the writ of prohibition against the CFI

from entertaining the application for probation of the defendant.

In its decision the Court held that it is also contended that the Probation Act violates the

provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of

the laws

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand

departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof,

and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal

protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge

of the protection of equal laws. Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal

protection of the laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every

case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in

prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is

permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions

4
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary G.R. No.
148208 December 15, 2004

17
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited

to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted

delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.

Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral

argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation

officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would

be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise

coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one

province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same

benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial

boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their

respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that

probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of

appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the

purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will there

be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any

amount for the salary of the probation officer — which is the situation now — and, also, if we

accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be

considered as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation

for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that

while inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits

therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case,

it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and

inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual

denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a

18
law vulnerable on that score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion

that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on

that account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may

appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal

discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. If the law has the effect of denying the

equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only

may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but

one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year — and have

probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no

probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which

delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which

is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the

guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand".

Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United

States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme Court of the United

States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that

there was a denial of the equal protection of the laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis

(Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the

equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this

case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by

General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial

of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612,

amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that

"in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not

be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney,

after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper

19
form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the

investigation by the prosecuting attorney — although not in the form had in the provinces — was

considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of

the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.

Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to

a situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the Supreme Court of the state

from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the

constitution establishes a separate court of appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The

provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes

the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.

We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because

it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.

Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated,

the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.

In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and

the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a

statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the

constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio

vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in Williams vs.

Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A.

L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established

rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language: . . . where part of the a

statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if

separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion

must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative

would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the

20
other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors

of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must

remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent.

(Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be eliminated without

causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the

Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58

Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S.,

540, 565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State

vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in the invalid part of a statute can

have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the

legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs.

Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs. Rodriguez [1918],

38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed.,

1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R.C.L., 121.)

It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those

provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers

were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may

be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is,

in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of

the section what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit

to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system.

The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context,

is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the

different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not

lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various

boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the

21
provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to

show that if not one of the provinces — and this is the actual situation now — appropriate the

necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be

illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation

officer without the probation system.

In an old case of People vs. Cayat 28 Phil (1939), the classification made by the legislature

was upheld by the Supreme Court for being valid and reasonable. In that case the accused was

convicted of a violation of Act No. 1639. The act made it unlawful for any native of the Philippine

Island who was a member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, possess, or drink any spirits,

beer wine or other intoxicating liquors, other than the native wine or liquors.

The court held that it is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of

the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation

based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on

substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited

to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial,

not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or

parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture.

"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical

area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually

living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is unquestionably

reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian

tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position

of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the

classification thus established.

22
 That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy,

receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors

of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes

have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably

designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad

experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly

intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,

thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment.

It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated,

as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable

to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a

people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and

security.

Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal

thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason

of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other

duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors

found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the

due process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at

bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This

rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in

applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in

Rubivs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall

be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the

23
government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according

to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all

citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal

by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property

may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used

in violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property

constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said

that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It

has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of

overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and

good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add

to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the

police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of

an individual, the same must be upheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-

Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually,

to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate

purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less

capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy

towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those

privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the

law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate

measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress,

with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true

24
equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely

asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that

they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme."

As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best

institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of

community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and

gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant

a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the

prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our

government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to

enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted,

and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters

which this court has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated

non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending

principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the

discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot

be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some

members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the

paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).

In Re Cunanan March 18, 1954 the Court held that a good summary of a classification

constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows: The general rule is well

settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material

differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be

based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional

prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant

and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must

25
be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals

to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other

words, there must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the

members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in

relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for

the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not

general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is

made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any

subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to

1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954,

and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office

as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75

per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature

indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none

has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general

average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful

candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful

candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those

who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no

record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some

other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its

retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does

Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal

26
permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per

cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or

more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74

per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the

Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the

passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is

desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not

obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to

do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented

is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946

to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of

judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity

of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year

the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar.

This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and

correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply

taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years

according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal,

alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend

them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because

it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such

duty been confided.

In Ichong vs. Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 R.A. NO. 1180 An Act to

Regulate the Retail Business nationalized the retail trade business was assailed for being violative

of the equal protection clause.

27
 The Court stated that the equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and

individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is

not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by

territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it

merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and

conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is

not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it

applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a

distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,

Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in

pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare

involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is

it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection

with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the

aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with

private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and

equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the

guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the

indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There

can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither

be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons

of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified

into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or

standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public

28
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if

distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —Now, in this matter of equitable

balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first

place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the

prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge

of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise

of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public

interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have

nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They

have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable

abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate

policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

Economic problems sought to be remedied.With the above considerations in mind, we

will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were merely

a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope

of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from

engaging therein. The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade

or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to

residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —In a primitive economy where

families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course,

is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more

than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer

comes into existence. As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production

begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in

29
which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the

retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods

and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform

the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are

ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the

community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the

various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around

his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily

cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes

that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store,

to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.

The alien retailer's trait. —The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this

country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial

towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in

the cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings

of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their

agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the

alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the

patience and forbearance of a slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of

ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and

he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and

extremely useful.

Alleged alien control and dominance. —There is a general feeling on the part of the public,

which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer

30
holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life

reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired

not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such

as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and

articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas

and the Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily become full and

complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one

breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that

the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said,

is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make

control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious

consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the

legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black

and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination

and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings,

and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics

unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail

trade, as witness the following tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Year and
No.- Per cent Per cent
Retailers Pesos Pesos
Establishments Distribution Distribution
Nationality

1941:

31
 Filipino 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74

..........

Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21

...........

Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05

............

1947:

Filipino 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03

..........

Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96

...........

Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01

...........

1948: (Census)

Filipino 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51

..........

Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20

..........

Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29

..........

1949:

Filipino 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47

..........

32
 Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36

..........

Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17

..........

1951:

Filipino 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07

.........

Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06

..........

Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87

..........

AVERAGE

ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino 1,878 1,633

.............................................

Chinese 7,707 9,691

..............................................

33
 Others 24,415 8,281

...............................................

1947:

Filipino 1,878 2,516

.............................................

Chinese 7,707 14,934

...........................................

Others 24,749 13,919

..............................................

1948: (Census)

Filipino 1,878 4,111

.............................................

Chinese 7,707 24,398

.............................................

Others 24,916 23,686

..............................................

1949:

Filipino 1,878 4,069

.............................................

34
 Chinese 7,707 24,152

..............................................

Others 24,807 20,737

..............................................

1951:

Filipino 1,877 3,905

.............................................

Chinese 7,707 33,207

.............................................

Others 24,824 22,033

...............................................

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners,

Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of

Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on

Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien

participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the

edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their

assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many

Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more

capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report,

pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the

35
Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents,

the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of

capital, credit, price and supply.

Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —It is this

domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the

legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been

adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance

and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it

is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail

trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67

of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either

pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law,

commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution

were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests

that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the

country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members

of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the

nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says: But there has been a general feeling that alien

dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should

remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino

private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy.

Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under

such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and

assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation

in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the

Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against

36
the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in

the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino

businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien

control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution

No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and

a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of

Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance

and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien

stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by

official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.

Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —But the dangers arising from alien

participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing

feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity

of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such

complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the

amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods

or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national

economy and of the complete subservience of national economy and of the consuming public are

not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at

their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed

by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because

a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree

to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute.

Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article

37
suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation.

Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of

alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is

a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the

interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien

participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the

mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have

cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to

justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods

to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has

had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous

hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods

and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No.

1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that

they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the

law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who

would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise.

They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and

out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and

contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials

with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government.

As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and

by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling

about the existence of many of the above practices.

38
 The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come

in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of

population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other

calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods

among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the

distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They

owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or

emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of

his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.

Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —We are fully satisfied

upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of

racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and

determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the

economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its

disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and

indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its

existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

The Equal Protection Limitation a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The

next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As

pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the

alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or

his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain

and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is

naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays

and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino

customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them.

39
The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his

beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown

such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has

been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a

genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general

distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the

country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely

transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important

function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out

above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the

welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they

are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the

trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences

between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail

trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national

over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold

that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.

Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —The above

objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and

real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and

aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer,

that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification

is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be

said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare

40
that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act

transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications

among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative

power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional

limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we

have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911),

55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to

a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto: . . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police

laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is

done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A

classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because

it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3.

When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be

conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted

must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of

showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."

Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —The question as to whether

or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively

decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith

Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine

Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged

in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States,

thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal

protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate

41
purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from

foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all

presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of

domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not

violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of

Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice

Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows: "Licensing acts, in fact, in

legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses,

retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms

part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place

them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation

reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in

favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this

subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect

has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American

privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by

foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well

as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."

The rule in general is as follows: Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which

forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the

lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than

for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference

in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the

exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the

licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is,

42
or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the

following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are

supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the

court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio,

1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic

of liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose

to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with

"our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business

to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach,

274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an

ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms)

to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not

follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate

object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state

that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative

appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an

apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to

the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn

brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is

within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in

auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So

also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially

known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the

prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card

room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State

Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as

43
barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise

of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the

convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479

(1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person

ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over

immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters

and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added

that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However,

two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural

resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law

which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years

of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification

and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.

Authorities contra explained. —It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of

the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a

valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either

arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and

hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs.

Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine

law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish

or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were

driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese

would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of

their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's

belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand

it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo

44
vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent

in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said

that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which

attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere

racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to

engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no

reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have

said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers

with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy,

except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes

to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many

occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than

borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and

significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus: . . . . It may be judicially

known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our

laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes

of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and

reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and

whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under

entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal,

nor are they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of

the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously

it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason

for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates

to the subject of legislation. . . .

45
 In Philconsa vs. G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965 R.A. No. 3836 allowed

retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to senators and representatives.

The constitutionality of the law was assailed.

The Court held that another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the

features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal

protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)

In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members

of the House of Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective

officials such as the governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and the

elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.

The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully

explained by Us in the case of People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the

classification to be reasonable must be based upon substantial distinctions which make real

differences and must be germane to the purposes of the law.

As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p.

1937, the principle of the requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly

situated. Why limit the application of the benefits of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members of

Congress? We feel that the classification here is not reasonable.

Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits

after serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and

employees are given retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years. In fact, the original

bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.

In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement

benefit irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act

3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon

46
being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years'

salary.

Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been

retired and reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186,

as amended), this is not so under Republic Act 3836.

Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are

not members of the Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits

under the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of

their monthly salaries to the System.4

The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far

as Members of Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each

House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the

Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the benefits of retirement without

having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the Government.

In Felwa vs. Salas G.R. No. L-26511 October 29, 1966 R.A. No. 4695, divided mountain

province into the four provinces on Mountain Province, Benguet, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao. It

was challenged for being violative of the equal protection clause.

The Court stated that petitioners herein maintain that this Act is unconstitutional and hence

null and void, because: (1) it denies equal protection; (2) one of the provisions thereof is not

covered by its title; (3) it creates congressional districts without the reapportionment provided in

the Constitution; and (4) the congressional districts thus created do not consist of contiguous and

compact territory.

The alleged denial of equal protection is based upon the following premises, viz.: (a) That

the old Mountain Province became a first class province under the administration of its Governor,

petitioner Lamen, who, pursuant to Republic Act No. 4695, retains said position in the new

Mountain Province, which, however, in view of the divisions effected by said Act, is reduced to

47
the category of a sixth-class province. Upon the other hand, respondent Dennis Molintas, as Vice-

Governor of the old Mountain Province and, hence, subordinate of petitioner Lamen, as Governor

thereof, has become, in consequence of the contested legislation, the Governor of Benguet, a

second class province, and, hence, higher, in this respect, in rank to his former superior officer,

petitioner Lamen, who, because of the same statute, has been reduced to the category of

Governor of a sixth-class province.

(b) That, although by becoming Provincial Governor of the new province of Benguet,

respondent Molintas vacates his former position as Vice-Governor of the old Mountain Province,

petitioner Pio Felwa, the senior member of the provincial board of the old Mountain Province is

retained, by Republic Act No. 4695, in such position in the new Mountain Province, instead of

filling said vacant position of Vice-Governor of Mountain Province, pursuant to the order of

succession prescribed in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 2264, and Section 21, paragraph 6, of

Republic Act No. 180.

(c) That similarly, petitioners Gaspar Ponchinlan and Castro Lammawin, as elective

members of the Provincial Board of the old Mountain Province, are retained as members of the

provincial board of the new provinces of Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, respectively, instead of

becoming Vice-Governors thereof, pursuant to the rule of succession prescribed in said Republic

Acts Nos. 180 and 2264, which are applied to respondent Molintas, as Vice-Governor of the old

Mountain Province, who, pursuant to Republic Act No. 4695, becomes the Governor of the new

province of Benguet.

The foregoing arguments do not prove that equal protection has been denied to petitioners

herein. It is well settled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically

situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subjects of legislation, and that a

classification is reasonable where: (1) it is based upon substantial distinctions which make real

differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies, not

48
only to present conditions, but also, to future conditions which are substantially identical to those

of the present; and (4) the classification applies equally to all those who belong to the same class.

We believe that these requirements are sufficiently met in Republic Act No. 4695. It cannot

be denied that the offices of provincial governor and vice-governor on the one hand,2 are

substantially different from those of plain members of the provincial board,3 and those of

appointive officers of the provincial government,4 on the other. The former are essentially

executive in nature, whereas plain members of the said board perform functions partaking of a

legislative character, since the authority vested by law upon provincial boards involves primarily

a delegation of some legislative powers of Congress. Indeed, a good legislator is not necessarily

an effective executive, and vice-versa. And, this is specially true in provinces, like those created

by Republic Act No. 4695, for its inhabitants belong to the non-Christian and less enlightened

minorities of our population, and the administration of their public affairs requires a special kind

of tact understanding and vision, which are not needed in the Christianized regions of the

Philippines. It goes without saying that the equal protection clause does not require the identical

treatment of appointive and elective officers, insofar as the order of succession is concerned,

because they obviously belong to different classes, both constitutionally and administratively.

The reduction in class of Mountain Province is not material to the issue of equal

protection. It may not be amiss to add, also, that such reduction is not made by Republic Act No.

4695, but is a mere effect of the limited revenues of the territory comprised in the new Mountain

Province, as compared to that of Benguet;6 that the territory of each of the four (4) provinces

established by the Act in question merely follows the traditional political division of the region

commonly known as Mountain Province, based upon the tribes or ethnic groups inhabiting the

same; and that, being a resident of the Municipality of Sagada, which is part of the new Mountain

Province, petitioner Lamen cannot be made Provincial Governor of any of the other three (3)

provinces into which the old Mountain Province has been divided, without violating the very

policies of our laws on public corporations which petitioners cite in their favor. By the same token,

49
respondent Molintas, who resides in La Trinidad, which is the provincial capital of the new

province of Benguet, cannot, without impinging upon said policies, be made provincial governor

either of the new Mountain Province, or of Ifugao, or Kalinga-Apayao.

In Viray vs. Caloocan City G.R. No. L-23118 July 26, 1967 the issue was on Ordinance

94, series 1962 of Caloocan City imposing additional fees for each cadaver sought to be buried

in private cemeteries within Caloocan coming from other places.

The Court held that with regard to the defenses interposed on behalf of the respondent

City, premised upon the provisions of the Local Autonomy Act, suffice it to observe that, while

section 2 (on Taxation) of Republic Act 2264 confers on chartered cities and municipalities —

authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or

business, or exercising privileges in chartered cities or municipalities x x x by requiring them to

secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council, respondents have failed to

show that the persons merely burying a cadaver in a private cemetery constitutes either an

occupation or business or the exercise of privileges that would justify the imposition of taxes

thereon within the terms and intent of the enabling act, the terms employed by the statute in

themselves denoting habitually or a repetition of acts, and not a solitary act.

Respondent City also endeavors to justify the fees prescribed by the ordinance in question

as a proper exercise of the police power, claiming that it — involves the assignment of police

officers to insure that the funeral procession x x x is orderly so as not to cause great and serious

inconvenience to the public. During the procession traffic has to be re-routed at times; policemen

have to use the city's motorcycles or cars; the streets and other City property have to suffer certain

degree of depreciation." (Brief for Appellees, p. 24-25).

While undeniably the above-described activity of city officers is called for by every funeral

procession, yet we are left without explanation why the Ordinance should collect the prescribed

fees solely in the case of cadavers coming from places outside the territory of Caloocan City for

burial in private cemeteries within the City. Surely, whether the corpse comes from without or

50
within the City limits, and whether interment is to be made in private or public cemeteries, the City

police must regulate traffic, And must use their City cars or motorcycles to maintain order; and

the City streets must suffer some degree of erosion. Clearly, then, the ordinance in question does

unjustifiably discriminate against private cemeteries, in violation of the equal protection clause of

the Constitution, a defect adequate to invalidate the questioned portion of the measure.

In Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968

Ordinance No. 4, series 1964 of Ormoc City imposing “ on any and all productions of centrifugal

sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. a municipal tax of one percent per export sale to the

United States and other foreign countries” was challenged.

The Court held that the point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional

limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of

taxation, were infringed.

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal

protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection

clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable

classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based

on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of

the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions

which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those

who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet

them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company,

Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company,

Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be

reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance

should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central,

51
of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar

company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to

Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

The case of Gomez vs. Palomar G.R. No. L-23645 October 29, 1968 puts in issue the

constitutionality of Republic Act 1635, as amended by Republic Act 2631, which provides as

follows: To help raise funds for the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, the Director of Posts shall

order for the period from August nineteen to September thirty every year the printing and issue of

semi-postal stamps of different denominations with face value showing the regular postage

charge plus the additional amount of five centavos for the said purpose, and during the said

period, no mail matter shall be accepted in the mails unless it bears such semi-postal

stamps: Provided, That no such additional charge of five centavos shall be imposed on

newspapers. The additional proceeds realized from the sale of the semi-postal stamps shall

constitute a special fund and be deposited with the National Treasury to be expended by the

Philippine Tuberculosis Society in carrying out its noble work to prevent and eradicate

tuberculosis.

The Court in its decision stated that ther should be a consideration of the constitutional

objections raised against the statute and the implementing orders.

1. It is said that the statute is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More

specifically the claim is made that it constitutes mail users into a class for the purpose of the tax

while leaving untaxed the rest of the population and that even among postal patrons the statute

discriminatorily grants exemption to newspapers while Administrative Order 9 of the respondent

Postmaster General grants a similar exemption to offices performing governmental functions. .

The five centavo charge levied by Republic Act 1635, as amended, is in the nature of an

excise tax, laid upon the exercise of a privilege, namely, the privilege of using the mails. As such

the objections levelled against it must be viewed in the light of applicable principles of taxation.

52
 To begin with, it is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select the subjects

of taxation and to grant exemptions. This power has aptly been described as "of wide range and

flexibility." Indeed, it is said that in the field of taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature

possesses the greatest freedom in classification. The reason for this is that traditionally,

classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to

achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.

That legislative classifications must be reasonable is of course undenied. But what the

petitioner asserts is that statutory classification of mail users must bear some reasonable

relationship to the end sought to be attained, and that absent such relationship the selection of

mail users is constitutionally impermissible. This is altogether a different proposition. As explained

in Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co.: While the principle that there must be a reasonable

relationship between classification made by the legislation and its purpose is undoubtedly true in

some contexts, it has no application to a measure whose sole purpose is to raise revenue ... So

long as the classification imposed is based upon some standard capable of reasonable

comprehension, be that standard based upon ability to produce revenue or some other legitimate

distinction, equal protection of the law has been afforded. See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v.

Bowers, supra, 358 U.S. at 527, 79 S. Ct. at 441; Brown Forman Co. v. Commonwealth of

Kentucky, 2d U.S. 56, 573, 80 S. Ct. 578, 580 (1910).

We are not wont to invalidate legislation on equal protection grounds except by the

clearest demonstration that it sanctions invidious discrimination, which is all that the Constitution

forbids. The remedy for unwise legislation must be sought in the legislature. Now, the

classification of mail users is not without any reason. It is based on ability to pay, let alone the

enjoyment of a privilege, and on administrative convinience. In the allocation of the tax burden,

Congress must have concluded that the contribution to the anti-TB fund can be assured by those

whose who can afford the use of the mails.

53
 The classification is likewise based on considerations of administrative convenience. For

it is now a settled principle of law that "consideration of practical administrative convenience and

cost in the administration of tax laws afford adequate ground for imposing a tax on a well

recognized and defined class." In the case of the anti-TB stamps, undoubtedly, the single most

important and influential consideration that led the legislature to select mail users as subjects of

the tax is the relative ease and convenienceof collecting the tax through the post offices. The

small amount of five centavos does not justify the great expense and inconvenience of collecting

through the regular means of collection. On the other hand, by placing the duty of collection on

postal authorities the tax was made almost self-enforcing, with as little cost and as little

inconvenience as possible.

And then of course it is not accurate to say that the statute constituted mail users into a

class. Mail users were already a class by themselves even before the enactment of the statue

and all that the legislature did was merely to select their class. Legislation is essentially empiric

and Republic Act 1635, as amended, no more than reflects a distinction that exists in fact. As Mr.

Justice Frankfurter said, "to recognize differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard [them]

and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic."

Granted the power to select the subject of taxation, the State's power to grant exemption

must likewise be conceded as a necessary corollary. Tax exemptions are too common in the law;

they have never been thought of as raising issues under the equal protection clause.

It is thus erroneous for the trial court to hold that because certain mail users are exempted

from the levy the law and administrative officials have sanctioned an invidious discrimination

offensive to the Constitution. The application of the lower courts theory would require all mail

users to be taxed, a conclusion that is hardly tenable in the light of differences in status of mail

users. The Constitution does not require this kind of equality.

As the United States Supreme Court has said, the legislature may withhold the burden of

the tax in order to foster what it conceives to be a beneficent enterprise. This is the case of

54
newspapers which, under the amendment introduced by Republic Act 2631, are exempt from the

payment of the additional stamp.

As for the Government and its instrumentalities, their exemption rests on the State's

sovereign immunity from taxation. The State cannot be taxed without its consent and such

consent, being in derogation of its sovereignty, is to be strictly construed. Administrative Order 9

of the respondent Postmaster General, which lists the various offices and instrumentalities of the

Government exempt from the payment of the anti-TB stamp, is but a restatement of this well-

known principle of constitutional law.

The trial court likewise held the law invalid on the ground that it singles out tuberculosis to

the exclusion of other diseases which, it is said, are equally a menace to public health. But it is

never a requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at

all. As this Court has had occasion to say, "if the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt,

it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied."

In Tuazon and Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration G.R. No. L-21064 February

18, 1970 R.A. No. 2616 a legislative act directing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, Quezon

City, was challenged on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution

because it is solely directed against the petitioner.

The Court held that it is primarily the equal protection guaranty though that petitioner's

case is made to rest. The Constitution requires that no person be denied "the equal protection of

the laws." A juridical being is included within its terms.

The assumption underlying such a guaranty is that a legal norm, whether embodied in a

rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense against anarchy at one extreme and tyranny at

the other. Thereby, people living together in a community with its myriad and complex problems

can minimize the friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure, at the very least, a peaceful ordering

of existence. The ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed

outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs

55
of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea

of law.

The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the

ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of

the situation. The constitutional guaranty then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what

is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of

law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected

may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the

governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was

prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in

reason. .

It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar

circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being

different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue

preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given

to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon

in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,

whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

It is precisely because the challenged statute applies only to petitioner that he could assert

a denial of equal protection. As set forth in its brief: "Republic Act No. 2616 is directed solely

against appellee and for this reason violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Unlike

other laws which confer authority to expropriate landed estates in general, it singles out the

Tatalon Estate. It cannot be said, therefore, that it deals equally with other lands in Quezon City

or elsewhere." With due recognition then of the Power of Congress to designate the particular

property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of

expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party

56
adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will

not allow.

The judiciary can look into the facts then, no conclusiveness being attached to a

determination of such character when reliance is had either to the due process clause which is a

barrier against arbitrariness and oppressiveness and the equal protection guaranty which is an

obstacle to invidious discrimination.

We start of course with the presumption of validity, the doubts being resolved in favor of

the challenged enactment. As this is the first statute of its kind assailed, we should not stop our

inquiry there. The occasion that called for such legislation, if known, goes far in meeting any

serious constitutional objection raised. We turn to the Explanatory Note of the bill, which was

enacted into the challenged statute. It started with the declaration that it provides for the

"expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, and for the sale at cost of the lots therein to

their present bona fide occupants, authorizing therefor the appropriation of ten million pesos."

Then it continued: "The Tatalon Estate has an area of more than ninety six hectares and the lots

therein are at present occupied by no less than one thousand five hundred heads of families,

most of whom are veterans of World War II. It is the earnest desire of this group of patriotic and

loyal citizens to purchase the lots at a minimum cost." Why there was such a need for

expropriation was next taken up: "The population of Quezon City has considerably increased.

This increase in population is posing a serious housing problem to city residents. This bill will not

only solve the problem but will also implement the land-for-the-landless program of the present

Administration."

What other facts are there which would remove the alleged infirmity of the statute on equal

protection grounds? The brief for respondents invited our attention to the social problem which

this legislation was intended to remedy. Thus: "There is a vital point which should have great

weight in the decision of this case. The petitioner led the occupants of Tatalon Estate to believe

that they were dealing with the representatives of the real owners, the Veterans Subdivision, in

57
the purchase of their lots. The occupants believed in good faith that they were dealing with the

representatives of the owners of the lots. This belief was bolstered by the fact that the petitioners

herein even entered into a compromise agreement on March 16, 1953 with the Deudors, agreeing

to give the latter millions of pesos in settlement of their claim over the Tatalon Estate. The

occupants, therefore, purchased their respective portions from the Veterans Subdivision in good

faith. The petitioner allowed the Veterans Subdivision to construct roads in the Tatalon Estate; it

allowed said firm to establish an office in the Tatalon Estate and to advertise the sale of the lots

inside the Tatalon Estate. Petitioner admits having full knowledge of the activities of the Veterans

Subdivision and yet did not lift a finger to stop said acts. The occupants paid good money for their

lots and spent fortunes to build their homes. It was after the place has been improved with the

building of the roads and the erection of substantial residential homes that petitioner stepped into

the picture, claiming for the first time that it is the owner of the Tatalon Estate. Some of the

occupants had erected their houses as early as 1947 and 1948. ..."

The cutting edge of the above assertions could have been blunted by the brief for

petitioner. This is all it did say on the matter though: "Appellants alleged that appellee 'led the

occupants of Tatalon Estate to believe that they were dealing with the representatives of the real

owners, the Veterans Subdivision, in the purchase of their lots' ... . There is absolutely no evidence

on record to establish this ludicrous allegation." Only the alleged duplicity of petitioner was

denied, leaving unanswered the rather persuasive recital of conditions that could rightly motivate

Congress to act as it did. Clearly, there is no sufficient refutation of the seriousness of the problem

thus underscored by respondents, the solution of which is the aim of the statute now under attack.

This is not to deny that whenever Congress points to a particular piece of property to be

expropriated, it is faced with a more serious scrutiny as to its power to act in the premises. It would

require though a clear and palpable showing of its having singled out a party to bear the brunt of

governmental authority that may be legitimately exerted, induced, it would appear by a feeling of

disapproval or ill-will to make out a case of this guaranty having been disregarded. If such were

58
the case, then in the language of Justice Laurel, it "will be the time to make the [judicial] hammer

fall and heavily. But not until then." The most careful study of the matter before us however yields

the conclusion that petitioner was unable to sustain the burden of demonstrating a denial of equal

protection.

Moreover, there is nothing to prevent Congress in view of the public funds at its disposal

to follow a system of priorities. It could thus determine what lands would first be the subject of

expropriation. This it did under the challenged legislative act. As already noted, Congress was

moved to act in view of what it considered a serious social and economic problem. The solution

which for it was the most acceptable was the authorization of the expropriation of the Tatalon

Estate. So it provided under the statute in question. It was confronted with a situation that called

for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the

necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills

certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction

to the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding

eminent domain, that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of

"all or none". Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of equal protection clause is not

attended with success.

In Tan vs. LTA G.R. No. L-27971 October 16, 1970 R.A. No. 1162, in which the

government expropriated land for resale to tenant. Petitioner a Chinese citizen challenged the law

when she was disqualified by the Court when she sought to lease the land.

The Court held that appellant asks whether the provision as thus construed would not

constitute a deprivation of appellant's right to property without due process of law, or amount to a

denial to appellant, a resident of the Philippines, of the equal protection guarantee of the

Constitution.

It must be remembered in this connection that the fact alone that the law withdraws from

non-Filipinos the enjoyment of certain rights exclusively reserved to Philippine citizens does not

59
expose such law to charges of constitutional infirmity. For classification will constitute no violation

of the individual's right to equal protection as long as it is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.

The established and recognized principle is that classification is not unreasonable where it is

based on substantial distinctions that make real differences, is germane to the aim and purpose

of the law, is not limited to existing conditions, and it applies equally to all members of the same

class, under similar conditions. A legislation that affects a particular class would not infringe the

constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, provided said statute applies uniformly

and without discrimination to everyone of that class.

In this case, a classification based on citizenship is more than justified. The requirement

that lots in an expropriated estate shall be leased only to those who are qualified in law to buy the

same can hardly be considered unreasonable. Republic Act 1162 was not enacted to allow the

government to go into the real estate business, by leasing lots to those who desire and can afford

to rent. It is rather aimed at giving realization and meaning to the policy of the State to provide

land for the landless citizens and enabling them to acquire home-lots at minimum cost. Clearly,

the measure of reasonableness is reached.

In Victoriano v. Elizalde G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974 R.A. No. 875, as

amended by R.A. No. 3350, allows the employer to make an agreement with a labor organization

to require as a condition of employment membership therein,but this does not cover members of

religious sects which prohibits affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.

The Court held that appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a

discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue

advantages over other workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which

forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws.

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application

of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the

constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected

60
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on

persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It

guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are

different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does

not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is

limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.

Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of

things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law

is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so

that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of

constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means

that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;

that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions

only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the

standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or

rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over

matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is

not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in

their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical

nicety. Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for

the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil

or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.

We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The

Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security

61
agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up

with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile

classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There

is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not

believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons.

Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places, and in all

times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many views that

comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners

in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the

country is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these

differences are important and should not be ignored.

Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is based on real and important

differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they

carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain rules. of human conduct

and the justification of certain acts. Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events in

their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive character, its tone, its happiness or

unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved

in a religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their experience is more important to

them than their religion, or their not having any religion. Because of differences in religious belief

and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself better than the rich, and the man who

even lacks the necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries.

Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable and

accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in

religious beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed and

war, generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other religious

62
beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial

distinctions.

The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of

the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions,

from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of

union shop security agreements.

Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing

at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period

of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is

applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor

union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor

unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues.

Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from

its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by

itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them

their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in

the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor

unions. The circumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently situated, are

not granted the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification

allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves inequality.

The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not

violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation

by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A

classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in practice it

results in some inequality. Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from

the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the

63
benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though incidental

advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public.

In Dumlao vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980 Batas Pambansa Blg. 52

disqualified from the same elective public office, any retired public official who had received

payment of his retirement benefits and was 65 years old. Petitioner questioned the

Constitutionality of said law.

The Court held that if, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach

that it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a

sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving

of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the

subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors

that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was

pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: "It suffices then that the

laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons

must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges

conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For

the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under

circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or

charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions

cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. It cannot be denied that others similarly fall

under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he

falls within the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials

be excluded in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the

legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did under the challenged legislative

provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local officials

having reached the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running

64
for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A portion of the opinion in

the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that

caned for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the

necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills

certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction

to the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding

eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of

all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of the equal protection clause is futile

and unavailing ."

In Ceniza vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-52304 January 28, 1980, B.P. Blg. 51, Sec. 3, was

assailed because it uses the annual income of a given city whose voters may not participate in

the election of provincial officials of the province where the city is geographically located.

The Court stated that the classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component

cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The

revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a

relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has

sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where

it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the

provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of

provincial officials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection

of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials.

The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for

provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter

of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage. In

the case of Teves v. Commission on Election the Court said.

65
 Petitioners' contention is that, as the Charter of Dumaguete City is silent as to the right of

its qualified voters to participate in the election of provincial officials of Negros Oriental and as

said voters are residents of the province, they are clearly entitled to vote for said provincial

officials.

The charters of other recently formed cities are articulate on the matter. Thus, in the case

of Bacolod, Cabanatuan Legaspi Naga, and Ormoc, their charters expressly prohibit the residents

therein from voting for provincial officials of the province to which said cities formerly belonged.

Upon the other hand, the charters of Cagayan de Oro, Butuan, Cavite, Iloilo, Calbayog Lipa San

Pablo, and Dagupan contain provisions extending their part in the election of the provincial official

cities were previously included.

The question that presents itself has reference to the effect of the omission in the charter

of Dumaguete City of an express provision on the right of its residents to vote for provincial officials

of Negros Oriental, in the light of the legislative practice that, when desired, the right is either

recognized or withdrawn expressly. We are inclined to overrule petitioners' position.

The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights

and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal

protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting

for provincial officials while granting it to another individual or groups of voters in the same city.

Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage since

the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial officials of the province

where the city is located. Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in local

elections which the questioned statues neither withdraw nor restrict.

The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for elective

provincial officials would impose a substantial requirement on the exercise of suffrage and would

violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to the provisions of Art. VI, Section 1 of the Constitution.

The prohibition contemplated in the Constitution, however, has reference to such requirements,

66
as the Virginia poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs. Virginia Board of Elections, or the New York

requirement that to be eligible to vote in a school district, one must be a parent of a child enrolled

in a local public school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, which

impose burdens on the right of suffrage without achieving permissible estate objectives. In this

particular case, no such burdens are imposed upon the voters of the cities of Cebu and Mandaue.

They are free to exercise their rights without any other requirement, save that of being registered

voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot is maintained.

In Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982, P.D. No.

1486 which created the special anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner assailed

its validity.

The Court held that petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal

protection in seeking to nullify Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from

J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The Ideal situation is for the law's benefits

to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could

chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial

uniformity which is of the very essence of the Idea of law." There is recognition, however, in the

opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the

reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional

guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist .To

assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may

cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances

invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far

from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility,

or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. " Classification is thus not ruled

out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and

uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the

67
same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities

imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal

protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical,

are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class

should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally

binding on the rest."

3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum

thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because

- appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise

was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence;

and - there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead

of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of

right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and

thereafter to the Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing, considering that the classification

satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring that

it "must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to

the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally

to each member of the class. To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes mention of the

creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response to a problem, the urgency

of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may

thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when

the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,

whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the

equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling

of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill

of Rights, included among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must

68
"give way to [a] specific provision, " in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the

operation of public services or utilities." The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It

is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.

In Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation G.R. No. L-59234 September 30,

1982 Board of Transportation issued a circular phasing out old and dilapidated taxis. Petitioner

questioned its validity.

The Court held that petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to

equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is

directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation

outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the

pertinent portion: For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein

shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be

carried out only after the project has been implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date

has been determined by the Board.

In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu

City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the

operation of taxicabs in other cities.

The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in

this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more

constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same

in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause

can hardly be successfully claimed.

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding

consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and

dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to

promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can

69
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property

rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public

welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain

groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded".

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services

is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the

same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly

situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is

reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must

apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is

the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance

would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The

challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any

constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right

must be clear, categorical and undeniable.

In Bautista vs. Juinio G.R. No. L-50908 January 31, 1984 Letter of Instruction No. 869,

restricted the use of certain motor vehicles during stated days and hours as fuel saving measures.

It was assailed as violative of the equal protection clause.

The Court explained that a governmental act may not be offensive to the due process

clause, but may run counter to such a guarantee. Such is the case when there is no rational basis

for the classification followed. That is the point raised by petitioners. For them, there is no rational

justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH),

for precisely those owned by them fall within such category. Tested by the applicable standard

that must be satisfied to avoid the charge of a denial of equal protection, the objection of

petitioners is shown to be lacking in merit. Such a classification on its face cannot be characterized

70
as an affront to reason. A legal norm according to J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure

Administration, "whether embodied in a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense against

anarchy at one extreme and tyranny at the other. Thereby, people living together in a community

with its myriad and complex problems can minimize the friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure,

at the very least, a peaceful ordering of existence. The Ideal situation is for the law's benefits to

be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance

and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity,

which is of the very essence of the Idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to

continue to be, cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it

does not take into account the realties of the situation. * * * To assure that the general welfare be

promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and

property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection

clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the

attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,

discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and

uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the

same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities

imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal

protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical

are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class

should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally

binding on the rest.

In Sison vs. Ancheta G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984 B.P. Blg. 135, the National Internal

Revenue Code of 1977, Section 21, provided for rates of tax on citizens or residents on various

taxable compensation income. The constitutionalty of this was challenged by the petitioner.

71
 The Court held that it is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a much wider

scope, The reason was so clearly set forth by retired Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas

which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called

upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public

welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined

boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its

sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times." Hence the need

for more revenues. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the

performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To praphrase a

recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability

is of the essence.

2. The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm, "is an attribute of

sovereignty. It is the strongest of all the powers of of government." It is, of course, to be admitted

that for all its plenitude 'the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions. The Constitution

sets forth such limits . Adversely affecting as it does properly rights, both the due process and

equal protection clauses inay properly be invoked, all petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate

cases a revenue measure. if it were otherwise, there would -be truth to the 1803 dictum of Chief

Justice Marshall that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." In a separate opinion

in Graves v. New York, Justice Frankfurter, after referring to it as an 1, unfortunate remark

characterized it as "a flourish of rhetoric [attributable to] the intellectual fashion of the times

following] a free use of absolutes." This is merely to emphasize that it is riot and there cannot be

such a constitutional mandate. Justice Frankfurter could rightfully conclude: "The web of unreality

spun from Marshall's famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke of Mr. Justice Holmess

pen: 'The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." So it is in the Philippines.

3. This Court then is left with no choice. The Constitution as the fundamental law overrides

any legislative or executive, act that runs counter to it. In any case therefore where it can be

72
demonstrated that the challenged statutory provision — as petitioner here alleges — fails to abide

by its command, then this Court must so declare and adjudge it null. The injury thus is centered

on the question of whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from

business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm.

4, The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere

allegation, as here. does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional

taint. Considering that petitioner here would condemn such a provision as void or its face, he has

not made out a case. This is merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that were the due

process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but

rather broad standards, there is a need for of such persuasive character as would lead to such a

conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.

5. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is

so arbitrary that it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be

shown to amount to the confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power. It then

becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary act amounted to the exercise of an

authority not conferred. That properly calls for the application of the Holmes dictum. It has also

been held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for

a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to

attack on due process grounds.

6. Now for equal protection. The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a

denial of this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the lice power

or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrated that the governmental act assailed, far from

being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at

the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate

equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be

treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred

73
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle

is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumtances which if

not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall

within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the

group equally binding on the rest." That same formulation applies as well to taxation measures.

The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating the Ideal

of the laws benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being governed by that serene

and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law. There is, however,

wisdom, as well as realism in these words of Justice Frankfurter: "The equality at which the 'equal

protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the

equal protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. They do not relate to abstract

units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, address to the

attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does not require

things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the

same." Hence the constant reiteration of the view that classification if rational in character is

allowable. As a matter of fact, in a leading case of Lutz V. Araneta, this Court, through Justice

J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold "at any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be

free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which

result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional

limitation.'"

7. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity. According to the

Constitution: "The rule of taxation shag be uniform and equitable." This requirement is met

according to Justice Laurel in Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco, decided in 1940, when the tax

"operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found. " He

likewise added: "The rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality,

because this is hardly attainable." The problem of classification did not present itself in that case.

74
It did not arise until nine years later, when the Supreme Court held: "Equality and uniformity in

taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the

same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for

purposes of taxation, ... . As clarified by Justice Tuason, where "the differentiation" complained

of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not discriminatory within the

meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform." There is quite a similarity then to the standard

of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all persons, firms and

corporations placed in similar situation."

8. Further on this point. Apparently, what misled petitioner is his failure to take into

consideration the distinction between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a

broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time

reducing the applicable tax rate. Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. To repeat,

it. is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real

differences. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the,

discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of

generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set

of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation

income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are

e not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation

more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and

businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income.

It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and

indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is

ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation

to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards

professional and business income.

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 9. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the petition is without merit, considering the

(1) lack of factual foundation to show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision; (2) the

force of controlling doctrines on due process, equal protection, and uniformity in taxation and (3)

the reasonableness of the distinction between compensation and taxable net income of

professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect classification,

In Sison vs. Ancheta G.R. No. L-65848 May 24, 1985, R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft

and Corrupt practices Act Section 13, imposed mandatory suspension from office of any public

officer, against whom a criminal prosecution under a valid information has been instituted.

The Court made it clear that if the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in

character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while

preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic

limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond

sixty days after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that the principle against

indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. So it was held in the leafing

case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To

adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative

charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where

the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due
20
hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law." Further:

"In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in

effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of

the Constitution." Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a

suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a

charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To

do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.

76
 In Association of Service Exporters, Inc vs. Drilon G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, the

petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged

principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas

placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of

the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE

TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD

WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for

"discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only

to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;

The Court held that petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested

measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to

"female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the

sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a

perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1)

such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the

law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of

the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —

rests on substantial distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen

our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions

marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment

suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by

testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As

precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of

exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.

77
 The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no

evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an

Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act

similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male

chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely

a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive

instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this

case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court

accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is

simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as

classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence.

Discrimination in this case is justified.

As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the

Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part,

the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is

implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom.

As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or

his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on

how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and

the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the

rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite

of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call

for a deployment ban.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the

measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the

protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the

78
terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their

own good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply

indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review

of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." ),

meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of

permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary

malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon

recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the

suspension in countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection

of Filipino workers.

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic

overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for

unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been

unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.

What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an

existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to

another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A,

but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the

Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A

and gives it to B." It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and

needless to state, an invalid act. (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such

distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups,

79
the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the

cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of

unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is

made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult

to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly

accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)

In Small Land Owners vs. Agrarian Reorm G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 R.A. No.

6657 the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 was assailed.

The Court stated that the argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal

protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6

of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also

the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection

also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular

interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites

of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other

in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must

conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must

be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites

have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated

alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown

that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not

only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of

implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two

80
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to

elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a

valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except

only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police

power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise,

the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the

interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary

for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the

Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be

examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the

individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid

objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the

Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that

not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few

notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say

that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one

even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III

of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section

9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without

just compensation.

In Basco vs. PAGCOR G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991, petitioners filed the instant petition

seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) because it

81
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted

gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug

trafficking and other vices.

In its decision the Court said that there is no valid ground to sustain this contention. The

petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the

laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different

treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v.

Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things

to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572,

December 21, 1989).

The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes

of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847).

The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in

law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal

protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like

cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries

and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others

are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because

there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)

The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations

called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent

which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not

less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically

exact.

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 In Chua vs. Civil Service G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992, petitioner filed an application

for early retirement under R.A. No. 6683 which provided benefits for early retirements. The

application was denied, instead she was offered separation benefits of one-half month basic pay

for every year of service starting 1980.

The Court held that applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would

violate the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits

of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those

covered by said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the

applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that: No

statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always

an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment,

to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the

future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory

construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states

that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute

is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its

object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,

including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred

from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is

deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes

the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.

During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in

response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university

employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3)

years, he explained: This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and

83
voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the appointment one

received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is covered.

It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal

to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep.

Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on

coverage of early retirement, would provide: Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of

the national government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the

personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to

all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age, who

have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years government service as of the date of

separation. The term "contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and

consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with

definite expected output.

Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those of the PC-

INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.

The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the

bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of

their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such

objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel

from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus officio. Casual,

temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they only have to

establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's

argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and

transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here, violation of the

equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because casuals are not even in the

plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the

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Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement

benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in such a case,

be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal

of excess personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.

Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of

continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as

they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC

regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14,

Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, requires, as a condition to qualify

for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government service which

need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual,

emergency, seasonal, contractualor co-terminous including military and police service, as

evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. A similar regulation should be

promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the

test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to

promote the physical and mental well-being of public servants" After all, co-terminous personnel,

are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments,

with the general disadvantage of transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC

of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,

unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a

reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed

after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the

application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her

application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the

85
minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive

governmental projects.

In Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993,

R.A. No. 7354 withdrew the franking privilege from the judiciary but it retains the same for the

President, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and members of the House of

Representatives, the COMELEC; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and

Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and

officers.

The Court stated that the equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due

process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has

nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to

provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the

government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.

But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper

weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or

things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities

imposed, Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue

favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all

persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as

where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit

the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among

equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping

of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in

these same particulars.

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 What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking

privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former

Presidents of the Philippines purely as acourtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because

of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the

grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was

carefully deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is

reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause,

resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is

unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary

as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same observations are

made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the

franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some

private individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the

perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial

revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication

between the government and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the

government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question

that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial

Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify

the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking

privilege while extending it to others less deserving.

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 In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service

Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to

P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose

functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of

Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe

Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total

amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable

volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking

privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows

of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like

saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not

an operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the

remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including

those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it

from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which

may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not

solved by violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been

withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong.

If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the

franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need

on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the

franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to

understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we

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may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we

are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the

privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former

Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled

corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public

service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from

performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended

to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. Among the services

it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that

need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion

pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from

the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the

retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice,

the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The

volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the

dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and

litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national

budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for

1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the

increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they

send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

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 We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents

a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find

its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection

of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law

is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the

Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a

matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its

title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul

Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person

shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455 August 25, 1994, the value-

added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on

the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value

in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the

sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing

VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

The court held that the PPI's claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law

abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a

democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the State. It has

been held: The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws.

He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel.

He may be punished for contempt of court. . . . Like others, he must pay equitable and

nondiscriminatory taxes on his business. . . . The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

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 What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media

transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No.

7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass

media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We

have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of the

press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required

to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less

targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption previously

granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other

transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to

expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge

of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But

that is not the case.

The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support

of its claim that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases

cited, the discriminatory purpose was clear either from the background of the law or from its

operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., the law imposed a license tax

equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers which

had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the

volume of advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law

applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed four papers with

circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which

were in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the

thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature

of Louisiana respondent by taxing what Long described as the "lying newspapers" by imposing

on them "a tax on lying." The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation.

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As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was "a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of

a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the

constitutional guaranties." The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is

the power to destroy.

In the other case invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out

because everything was exempt from the "use tax" on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota

imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a

complementary tax on the privilege of "using, storing or consuming in that state tangible personal

property" by eliminating the residents' incentive to get goods from outside states where the sales

tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to

1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the "use tax"

on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The law was held to have singled out the press

because (1) there was no reason for imposing the "use tax" since the press was exempt from the

sales tax and (2) the "use tax" was laid on an "intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate

retail sale." Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to

do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory because the

legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink used,

further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that "only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all

and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax." The discriminatory purpose was thus very

clear.

More recently, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, it was held that a law which

taxed general interest magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and

sports journals was discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole,

it targeted a small group within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of contents

(i.e., between general interest and special interests such as religion or sports) the law became

"entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."

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 These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press

creates risks of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to

a wide range of goods and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media

whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates is

without merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been

unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press along but to all

sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are

treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication, which

are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the

classification.

In Himagan vs. People G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994,the RTC issued an order

suspending petitioner until his case for murder and attempted murder is terminated on the basis

of R.A. No.6975, or the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. The Civil

Service Decree, Section 42, merely limits the suspension for 90 days.

The Court stated that the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under

Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal

protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to

eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real

differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely

requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as

to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not

absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the

classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the

law; applies to all members of the same

class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned

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as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and

reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here

is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

In Tatad vs Department of Energy G.R. No. 124360 November 5, 1997, R.A. No. 8180

deregulated the downstream oil industry. Petitioner particularly sought the annulment of section

5 (b), which imposed different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum

products for being violative of the equal protection clause.

The Court in its decision said that R.A. No. 8180. Section 5(b) provides: b) Any law to the contrary

notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and

collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum

products at the rate of seven percent (7%), except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be

the same as that for imported crude oil: Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff

rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further,

That this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress.

The petition is anchored on three arguments:

First, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined

petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends that the 3%-7% tariff

differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective

investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to

source refined petroleum products from abroad.

Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil

industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the law. Petitioner

avers that the tariff differential between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum

products bars the entry of other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the

94
interest of oil companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law

"to foster a truly competitive market."

Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 violates

Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which

shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b)

of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream

oil industry.

In G.R. No. 127867, petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Joker P. Arroyo, Enrique Garcia,

Wigberto Tanada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) and

Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section

15 provides: Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation. — Pursuant to Section 5(e) of Republic

Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of

the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time

the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are

declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the

implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed

terminated and the following laws are deemed repealed:E.O. No. 372 states in full, viz.:

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7638, otherwise known as the "Department of Energy Act of 1992,"

provides that, at the end of four years from its effectivity last December 1992, "the Department (of

Energy) shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and time table of

deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy sector;"

WHEREAS, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8180, otherwise known as the "Downstream Oil

Industry Deregulation Act of 1996," provides that "the DOE shall, upon approval of the President,

implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March, 1997. As far as

practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum

95
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to

the US dollar is stable;"

WHEREAS, pursuant to the recommendation of the Department of Energy, there is an imperative

need to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry because of the following

recent developments: (i) depletion of the buffer fund on or about 7 February 1997 pursuant to the

Energy Regulatory Board's Order dated 16 January 1997; (ii) the prices of crude oil had been

stable at $21-$23 per barrel since October 1996 while prices of petroleum products in the world

market had been stable since mid-December of last year. Moreover, crude oil prices are beginning

to soften for the last few days while prices of some petroleum products had already declined; and

(iii) the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar has been stable for the past twelve

(12) months, averaging at around P26.20 to one US dollar;

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 377 dated 31 October 1996 provides for an institutional

framework for the administration of the deregulated industry by defining the functions and

responsibilities of various government agencies;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8180, the deregulation of the industry will foster a truly

competitive market which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair prices and

adequate, continuous supply of environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by the

powers vested in me by law, do hereby declare the full deregulation of the downstream oil

industry.

In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the following

submissions:

First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to

the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or

determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full

deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when

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it is practicable for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation of

the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable to declare full

deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when the prices

of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the

peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of the

downstream oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was enacted due to the alleged

depletion of the OPSF fund — a condition not found in R.A. No. 8180.

Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de facto cartel

among the three existing oil companies — Petron, Caltex and Shell — in violation of the

constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair

competition.

Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180

and E.O. No. 392. In addition, respondents contend that the issues raised by the petitions are not

justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the law. Respondents further aver that petitioners have

no locus standi as they did not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the

implementation of R.A. No. 8180.

The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7, 1997, the

Court ordered the private respondents oil companies "to maintain the status quo and to cease

and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and other petroleum fuel products for a period

of thirty (30) days . . . subject to further orders as conditions may warrant."

We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural and

substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392.

The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy, and (2)

whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and

executive order. The substantive issues are: (1) whether or not section 5 (b) violates the one title

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— one subject requirement of the Constitution; (2) whether or not the same section violates the

equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether or not section 15 violates the constitutional

prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether or not E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and

unreasonable; and (5) whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against

monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche of

arguments of the petitioners assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180. They aver that deregulation of

the downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by Congress and it cannot be reviewed,

much less be reversed by this Court. In constitutional parlance, respondents contend that the

petitions failed to raise a justiciable controversy.

Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the duty of

the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality

of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to

determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the

fundamental law. Where a statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of

the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. We held in the recent case

of Tanada v. Angara: In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it

contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an

action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes

not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed

is judicial rather than political. The duty to adjudicate remains to assure that the supremacy of the

Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional

provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by

constitutional mandate to decide.

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 Even a side glance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised constitutional

issues which deserve the resolution of this Court in view of their seriousness and their value as

precedents. Our statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that petitioners are

assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law

lacks wisdom. The principle of separation of power mandates that challenges on the

constitutionality of a law should be resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of

a law should be debated in the halls of Congress. Every now and then, a law may be denounced

in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally infirmed. Such denunciation will not deny

this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the said law while prudentially refusing

to pass on its wisdom.

The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on

barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal

stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental

significance to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas,

Inc. v. Tan, we stressed: Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing

or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public

of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine

whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the

Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court

has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.

There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far

reaching importance of the validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry.

Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for they pose

issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.

We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where petitioner is

Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential violates the

99
provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be

expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a

liberal construction of the one title — one subject rule. We have consistently ruled that the title

need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a

single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how

diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,

and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of

carrying out the general subject. We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is

germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.

The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and

make them rely less on imported petroleum. We shall, however, return to the validity of this

provision when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.

We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners assail section

15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil

industry. We restate its pertinent portion for emphasis, viz.: Sec. 15. Implementation of Full

Deregulation — Pursuant to section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval

of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than

March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of

crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate

of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .

Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil prices in the

world market" and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar" are ambivalent, unclear

and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they do not provide the "determinate or determinable

standards" which can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil

industry. In addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full deregulation

is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor.

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 The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled by this

Court. As early as 1916 inCompania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. The Board of Public

Utility Commissioners, this Court thru, Mr. Justice Moreland, held that "the true distinction is

between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to

what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under

and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be

made." Over the years, as the legal engineering of men's relationship became more difficult,

Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the execution of laws to the executive

and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been developed to determine whether the

delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law

itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines,

Inc. VS. POEA, thus: There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid

delegation of legislative power,viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under

the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative

such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the

sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the

boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are

intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed

to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional

landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an inevitability in light

of the increasing complexity of the task of government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible

to sustain the constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative powers.

Citing Hirabayashi v. United States as authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz states "that even if

the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend over backward to locate the

same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity."

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 Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section

15 on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can hurdle

both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress

expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,

regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is

mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the

law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the

President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15

lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President — he is to time it as far as

practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market

are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar isstable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should

have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards.

The stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words

are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable"

as meaning possible to practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction,

and "stable" as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in

the exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has

sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.

It ought to follow that the argument that E.O. No. 392 is null and void as it was based on

indeterminate standards set by R.A. 8180 must likewise fail. If that were all to the attack against

the validity of E.O. No. 392, the issue need not further detain our discourse. But petitioners further

posit the thesis that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of

the OPSF fund as a factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in February 1997. A

perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be

considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when

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the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time

when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not

mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before

ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our

legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund

must not be in deficit. 27 We therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully

the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the

OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the

Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market

and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to

hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180.

The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in

R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law

is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of

delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action

cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of

depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market

and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is

impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the

OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have

been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty,

we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No.

8180.

We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180 violate

section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are: (1) Section 5 (b) which

states — "Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff

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duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and

imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and LPG,

the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil. Provided, that beginning on

January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the

same. Provided, further, that this provision may be amended only by an Act of Congress."(2)

Section 6 which states — "To ensure the security and continuity of petroleum crude and products

supply, the DOE shall require the refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory

equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales volume or forty (40) days of

supply, whichever is lower," and (3) Section 9 (b) which states — "To ensure fair competition and

prevent cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the following acts shall be

prohibited: (b) Predatory pricing which means selling or offering to sell any product at a price

unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of

competitors.

On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the

aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall regulate or prohibit

monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair

competition shall be allowed."

A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or

companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade,

manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity.

It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a

product or service. On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or

understanding between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding

company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition,

monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its, production, distribution

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and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. Combination

in restraint of trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end.

Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code breathe life to

this constitutional policy. Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes monopolization and

creation of combinations in restraint of trade, while Article 28 of the New Civil Code makes any

person who shall engage in unfair competition liable for damages.

Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and objectives of

R.A. No. 8180. They explain that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants

to invest in refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous

domestic supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also submit that the

prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants. Respondents

manifested to the Court that new players have entered the Philippines after deregulation and have

now captured 3% — 5% of the oil market.

The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light of the

letter and spirit of our Constitution, especially section 19, Article XII. Beyond doubt, the

Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system but it is a system impressed with its own

distinctness. Thus, while the Constitution embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did

not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public

interest. 33 Thus too, our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and

unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the let-

the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competitions are

absolutely proscribed and the proscription is directed both against the State as well as the private

sector. This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our

national economy as defined by section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable

distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and

services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as

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the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls for the State

to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.

Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It espouses

competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of

trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason for regulation of

unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of

our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the observation of

Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon

the belief that through competition producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest

price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers

to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their desires with society's opportunity

costs." 35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "the operation of the 'market'

system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how resources shall be allocated in

the production process, and to whom the various products will be distributed. The market system

relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on competition,

among producers to determine who will manufacture it."

Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section 19,

Article XII of the Constitution is competition for it alone can release the creative forces of the

market. But the competition that can unleash these creative forces is competition that is fighting

yet is fair. Ideally, this kind of competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but

several players. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of

players (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail.

Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our careful scrutiny and laws which barricade the

entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion.

Prescinding from these baseline propositions, we shall proceed to examine whether the

provisions of R.A. No. 8180 on tariff differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices imposed

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substantial barriers to the entry and exit of new players in our downstream oil industry. If they do,

they have to be struck down for they will necessarily inhibit the formation of a truly competitive

market. Contrariwise, if they are insignificant impediments, they need not be stricken down.

In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and

controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only

major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the

dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The

tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the

tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a

high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of

Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos.

Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of

increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument

that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in

refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot

be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the

league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex

against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory

requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors

again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The

construction cost of storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players.

Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and

enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as ". . . selling or

offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract

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customers to the detriment of competitors." Respondents contend that this provision works

against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot

be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on

the entry of new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part

of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of

new playersText-writer Hovenkamp, gives the authoritative answer and we quote: The rationale

for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the

future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new

entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be

profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscsussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant

barriers which discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers

established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON,

SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and

succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners' charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-

competitive is not without reason.

Respondents belittle these barriers with the allegation that new players have entered the

market since deregulation. A scrutiny of the list of the alleged new players will, however, reveal

that not one belongs to the class and category of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX. Indeed, there

is no showing that any of these new players intends to install any refinery and effectively compete

with these dominant oil companies. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that the new players could

have been more in number and more impressive in might if the illegal entry barriers in R.A. No.

8180 were not erected.

We come to the final point. We now resolve the total effect of the untimely deregulation,

the imposition of 4% tariff differential on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products, the

requirement of inventory and the prohibition on predatory pricing on the constitutionality of R.A.

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No. 8180. The question is whether these offending provisions can be individually struck down

without invalidating the entire R.A. No. 8180. The ruling case law is well stated by

author Agpalo, viz.: The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the

Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand

and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption that

the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute. To justify this

result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume

that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not

constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid

statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . .

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually

dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for

each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one

part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected

with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not

have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other

provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.

R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any reason,

any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts not affected

thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This separability clause notwithstanding, we hold

that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to

be struck down. The provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among

the principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil

industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff

differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power

and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to

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vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be

overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did

not have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing

aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain

unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect

to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market

where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.

The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not escaped

Congress. A lot of our leading legislators have come out openly with bills seeking the repeal of

these odious and offensive provisions in R.A. No. 8180. In the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has

filed S.B. No. 2133 which is the result of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on

Energy. The hearings revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for the new

entrants in the downstream oil industry, and (2) there was no law punishing a person for selling

petroleum products at unreasonable prices. Senator Alberto G. Romulo also filed S.B. No. 2209

abolishing the tariff differential beginning January 1, 1998. He declared that the amendment ". .

. would mean that instead of just three (3) big oil companies there will be other major oil

companies to provide more competitive prices for the market and the consuming public." Senator

Heherson T . Alvarez, one of the principal proponents of R.A. No. 8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290

increasing the penalty for violation of its section 9. It is his opinion as expressed in the explanatory

note of the bill that the present oil companies are engaged in cartelization despite

R.A. No. 8180,viz,: Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February 1997,

there have been eight (8) fuel price adjustments made by the three oil majors, namely: Caltex

Philippines, Inc.; Petron Corporation; and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Very noticeable

in the price adjustments made, however, is the uniformity in the pump prices of practically all

petroleum products of the three oil companies. This, despite the fact, that their selling rates should

be determined by a combination of any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar

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exchange rate at the time payment is made for crude purchases, sources of crude, and inventory

levels of both crude and refined petroleum products. The abovestated factors should have

resulted in different, rather than identical prices.

The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are uniformly priced suggests

collusion, amounting to cartelization, among Caltex Philippines, Inc., Petron Corporation and

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to fix the prices of petroleum products in violation of

paragraph (a), Section 9 of R.A. No. 8180.

To deter this pernicious practice and to assure that present and prospective players in the

downstream oil industry conduct their business with conscience and propriety, cartel-like activities

ought to be severely penalized.

Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff rate on

imported crude oil and refined petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, he declared

in no uncertain terms that ". . . the present set-up has raised serious public concern over the way

the three oil companies have uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the country, an indication of a

possible existence of a cartel or a cartel-like situation within the downstream oil industry. This

situation is mostly attributed to the foregoing provision on tariff differential, which has effectively

discouraged the entry of new players in the downstream oil industry."

In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are equally

feverish. Representative Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura has filed H.B. No. 9826 removing the

tariff differential for imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products. In the explanatory

note of the bill, Rep. Buenaventura explained: As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates

between imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products, unwittingly provided a built-

in-advantage for the three existing oil refineries in the country and eliminating competition which

is a must in a free enterprise economy. Moreover, it created a disincentive for other players to

engage even initially in the importation and distribution of refined petroleum products and

ultimately in the putting up of refineries. This tariff differential virtually created a monopoly of the

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downstream oil industry by the existing three oil companies as shown by their uniform and

capricious pricing of their products since this law took effect, to the great disadvantage of the

consuming public.

Thus, instead of achieving the desired effects of deregulation, that of free enterprise and

a level playing field in the downstream oil industry, R.A. 8180 has created an environment

conducive to cartelization, unfavorable, increased, unrealistic prices of petroleum products in the

country by the three existing refineries.

Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion among

the present oil companies by strengthening the oversight function of the government, particularly

its ability to subject to a review any adjustment in the prices of gasoline and other petroleum

products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said: To avoid this, the proposed

bill seeks to strengthen the oversight function of government, particularly its ability to review the

prices set for gasoline and other petroleum products. It grants the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)

the authority to review prices of oil and other petroleum products, as may be petitioned by a

person, group or any entity, and to subsequently compel any entity in the industry to submit any

and all documents relevant to the imposition of new prices. In cases where the Board determines

that there exist collusion, economic conspiracy, unfair trade practice, profiteering and/or

overpricing, it may take any step necessary to protect the public, including the readjustment of

the prices of petroleum products. Further, the Board may also impose the fine and penalty of

imprisonment, as prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. 8180, on any person or entity from the oil industry

who is found guilty of such prohibited acts.

By doing all of the above, the measure will effectively provide Filipino consumers with a

venue where their grievances can be heard and immediately acted upon by government.Thus,

this bill stands to benefit the Filipino consumer by making the price-setting process more

transparent and making it easier to prosecute those who perpetrate such prohibited acts as

collusion, overpricing, economic conspiracy and unfair trade.

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 Representative Sergio A.F . Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in R.A.

No. 8180 where there is no agency in government that determines what is "reasonable" increase

in the prices of oil products.Representative Dente O. Tinga, one of the principal sponsors of R.A.

No. 8180, filed H.B. No. 10057 to strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in its

explanatory note: The definition of predatory pricing, however, needs to be tightened up

particularly with respect to the definitive benchmark price and the specific anti-competitive intent.

The definition in the bill at hand which was taken from the Areeda-Turner test in the United States

on predatory pricing resolves the questions. The definition reads, "Predatory pricing means selling

or offering to sell any oil product at a price below the average variable cost for the purpose of

destroying competition, eliminating a competitor or discouraging a competitor from entering the

market."

The appropriate actions which may be resorted to under the Rules of Court in conjunction

with the oil deregulation law are adequate. But to stress their availability and dynamism, it is a

good move to incorporate all the remedies in the law itself. Thus, the present bill formalizes the

concept of government intervention and private suits to address the problem of antitrust violations.

Specifically, the government may file an action to prevent or restrain any act of cartelization or

predatory pricing, and if it has suffered any loss or damage by reason of the antitrust violation it

may recover damages. Likewise, a private person or entity may sue to prevent or restrain any

such violation which will result in damage to his business or property, and if he has already

suffered damage he shall recover treble damages. A class suit may also be allowed.

To make the DOE Secretary more effective in the enforcement of the law, he shall be

given additional powers to gather information and to require reports.

Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more unforgiving view

of R.A. No. 8180. He wants it completely repealed. He explained: Contrary to the projections at

the time the bill on the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation was discussed and debated upon

in the plenary session prior to its approval into law, there aren't any new players or investors in

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the oil industry. Thus, resulting in practically a cartel or monopoly in the oil industry by the three

(3) big oil companies, Caltex, Shell and Petron. So much so, that with the deregulation now being

partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in increasing the prices of most of

their petroleum products with little or no interference at all from the government. In the month of

August, there was an increase of Fifty centavos (50¢) per liter by subsidizing the same with the

OPSF, this is only temporary as in March 1997, or a few months from now, there will be full

deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase in the prices of petroleum products will be fully

absorbed by the consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this would

make the lives of our people, especially the unemployed ones, doubly difficult and unbearable.

The much ballyhooed coming in of new players in the oil industry is quite remote

considering that these prospective investors cannot fight the existing and well established oil

companies in the country today, namely, Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new players will

come in, they will still have no chance to compete with the said three (3) existing big oil companies

considering that there is an imposition of oil tariff differential of 4% between importation of crude

oil by the said oil refineries paying only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7% tariff rate to

be paid by businessmen who have no oil refineries in the Philippines but will import finished

petroleum/oil products which is being taxed with 7% tariff rates.So, if only to help the many who

are poor from further suffering as a result of unmitigated increase in oil products due to

deregulation, it is a must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, or R.A. 8180

be repealed completely.

Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate and

comprehensive review of R.A. No. 8180 to prevent the downpour of its ill effects on the people.

Thus, S. Res. No. 574 was filed by Senator Gloria M. Macapagal entitled Resolution "Directing

the Committee on Energy to Inquire Into The Proper Implementation of the Deregulation of the

Downstream Oil Industry and Oil Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180 and

8184, In Order to Make The Necessary Corrections In the Apparent Misinterpretation Of The

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Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The Rising Tide Of Disenchantment Among The

Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real Intentions And Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator

Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No. 664 entitled resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy To

Conduct An Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The Government's Oil Deregulation Policy In

Light Of The Successive Increases In Transportation, Electricity And Power Rates, As well As Of

Food And Other Prime Commodities And Recommend Appropriate Amendments To Protect The

Consuming Public." Senator Ople observed:

WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has

imposed successive increases in oil prices which has triggered increases in electricity and power

rates, transportation fares, as well as in prices of food and other prime commodities to the

detriment of our people, particularly the poor;

WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil cartel-Shell, Caltex and

Petron-have not come in;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be made to consider

appropriate amendments to the existing law such as an extension of the transition phase before

full deregulation in order to give the competitive market enough time to develop;

WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some incentives in order to attract

the entry of new oil companies to effect a dynamic competitive market;

WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the institutional framework for full

deregulation of the oil industry as mandated under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President

Ramos last October 31, 1996 . . .

Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the

Committees on Energy and Public Services In Aid Of Legislation To Assess The Immediate

Medium And Long Term Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices And The Economy." Among the

reasons for the resolution is the finding that "the requirement of a 40-day stock inventory

115
effectively limits the entry of other oil firms in the market with the consequence that instead of

going down oil prices will rise."

Parallel resolutions have been filed in the House of Representatives. Representative

Dante O. Tinga filed H. Res. No. 1311 "Directing The Committee on Energy To Conduct An

Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, Into The Pricing Policies And Decisions Of The Oil Companies Since

The Implementation of Full Deregulation Under the Oil Deregulation Act (R.A. No. 8180) For the

Purpose of Determining In the Context Of The Oversight Functions Of Congress Whether The

Conduct Of The Oil Companies, Whether Singly Or Collectively, Constitutes Cartelization Which

Is A Prohibited Act Under R.A. No. 8180, And What Measures Should Be Taken To Help Ensure

The Successful Implementation Of The Law In Accordance With Its Letter And Spirit, Including

Recommending Criminal Prosecution Of the Officers Concerned Of the Oil Companies If

Warranted By The Evidence, And For Other Purposes." Representatives Marcial C. Punzalan,

Jr. Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon III filed H.R. No. 894 directing the House Committee

on Energy to inquire into the proper implementation of the deregulation of the downstream oil

industry. House Resolution No. 1013 was also filed by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman,

Enrique T . Garcia, Jr. and Joker P. Arroyo urging the President to immediately suspend the

implementation of E.O. No. 392.

In recent memory there is no law enacted by the legislature afflicted with so much

constitutional deformities as R.A. No. 8180. Yet, R.A. No. 8180 deals with oil, a commodity whose

supply and price affect the ebb and flow of the lifeblood of the nation. Its shortage of supply or a

slight, upward spiral in its price shakes our economic foundation. Studies show that the areas

most impacted by the movement of oil are food manufacture, land transport, trade, electricity and

water. At a time when our economy is in a dangerous downspin, the perpetuation of

R.A. No. 8180 threatens to multiply the number of our people with bent backs and begging

bowls. R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition provisions cannot be allowed by this Court to stand

even while Congress is working to remedy its defects

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 In Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998, R.A. No.

8177 changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection.

The Court held that even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section of the

implementing rules which provides: "SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE

DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the

three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person

over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the

penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised

Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as

for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists

that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an

express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A.

No. 7659.

Article 83 f the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 now reads

as follows: "ART. 83, Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.- The death sentence

shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor

upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last case, the death sentence shall be

commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty provided in Article 40.

x x x".

On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit. While Article 83

of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the

implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after

delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as

an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of

sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is

117
the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view,

tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an

impermissible contravention of the applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead

remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative

rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.An

administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. In case of discrepancy between a

provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory

provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a woman

within the three (3) years next following the date of sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the

Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid.

In Tiu vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999 R.A. No. 7227 created the

Subic Special Economic Zone and granted it special privileges. E.O. No. 97-A specified the area

within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative. . E.O. No. 97-A was challenged for

being violative of the bequal protection clause

The Court made it clear that on the other hand, the solicitor general defends, on behalf of

respondents, the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the

President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds that the issuance

fully complies with the requiretnents of a valid classification.

We rule in favor of the constitutionality and validity of the assailed EO. Said Order is not

violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real and

substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtain;ng inside and those outside the Subic

Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to

reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make

real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. 6 The

118
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those

belonging to the same class. Explaining the nature of the equal protection guarantee, the Court

in Ichong v. Hernandez said: The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and

individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is

not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either [by] the object to which it is directed or

by [the] territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among

residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and

conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is

not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it

applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable. grounds exist for making a

distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the

purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all

members of the same class.

We first determine the purpose of the law. From the very title itself, it is clear that RA 7227

aims primarily toaccelerate the conversion of military reservations into productive uses.

Obviously, the "lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement" are its object. Thus, the

law avows this policy: Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. — It is hereby declared the policy of the

Government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of

the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air

Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas

Relay Station), to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps, and to apply

said funds as provided herein for the development and conversion to productive civilian use of

the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the

United States of America, as amended.

119
 To undertake the above objectives, the same law created the Bases Conversion and

Development Authority, some of whose relevant defined purposes are: (b) To adopt, prepare and

implement a comprehensive and detailed development plan embodying a list of projects including

but not limited to those provided in the Legislative-Executive Bases Council (LEBC) framework

plan for the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their

extensions consistent with ecological and environmental standards, into other productive uses to

promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in

general; (c). To encourage the active participation of the private sector in transforming the Clark

and Subic military reservations and their extensions into other productive uses; Further, in

creating the SSEZ, the law declared it a policy to develop the zone into a "self-sustaining,

industrial, commercial, financial and investment center."

From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be deduced that the real concern of RA

7227 is to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial

areas. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic

incentives to attract and encourage investors, both local and foreign. Among such enticements

are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) tax-and-duty-free importation's, (3)

restructured income tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no foreign exchange

control, (5) liberalized regulations on banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status to

certain investors and of working visas to certain foreign executives and workers.

We believe it was reasonable for the President to have delimited the application of some

incentives to the confines of the former Subic military base. It is this specific area which the

government intends to transform and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned naval

facility into a self-sustaining industrial and commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local

investors to use as operational bases for their businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias

for the big investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can pour huge investments to spur

economic growth in the country and to generate employment opportunities for the Filipinos, the

120
ultimate goals of the government for such conversion. The classification is, therefore, germane to

the purposes of the law. And as the legal maxim goes, "The intent of a statute is the law."

Certainly, there are substantial differences between the big investors who are being lured to

establish and operate their industries in the so-called "secured area" and the present business

operators outside the area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso investments and

thousands of new, jobs. On the other hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the

economic impact will be national; in the second, only local. Even more important, at this time the

business activities outside the "secured area" are not likely to have any impact in achieving the

purpose of the law, which is to turn the former military base to productive use for the benefit of

the Philippine economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis to extend to them the benefits

and incentives accorded in RA 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, it will be

easier to manage and monitor the activities within the "secured area," which is already fenced off,

to prevent "fraudulent importation of merchandise" or smuggling.

It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of

laws. As long as there are actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation

of the constitutional clause. And of course, anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the

requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his or her

resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone.

In Lacson vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999, petitioner now

questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which

provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not

begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that: a) The questioned provisions of the

statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the

situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof

to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the

Constitution

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 The Court decided that petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249

violate their right to equal protection of the law because its enactment was particularly directed

only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve

merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of

an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive

department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus,

the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of

the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is

reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:(1) it must rest

on substantial distinction;(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;(3) must not be limited

to existing conditions only, and(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, all of which

are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of

constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those

pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and

whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction

under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the

law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence

against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their

respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of

Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be

reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending

cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus,

petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different

category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that

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it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in

Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument,

the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision

does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened

that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where

trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law

(R.A. 8249).

Chapter 5

Arbitrary Detention and Illegal Detention

Arbitrary Detention

The Constitution gives paramount protection to the right to liberty of every human person.

It prohibits the deprivation of life liberty or even property without the due process of law. This right

to liberty of every individual is violated by a public officer in the crime of arbitrary detention or by

a private individual in the crime of illegal detention.

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 The crime of arbitrary detention is defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised

Penal Code. It provides Arbitrary detention. - Any public officer or employee who, without legal

grounds, detains a person, shall suffer;

1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum

period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the detention has

continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;

3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen days but not

more than six months; and

4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.

The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory

confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of any

person.

The penalty imposed in Arbitrary detention is dependent upon the duration of the

deprivation of the victim of his liberty. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to

prision correccional in its minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three days, range

from four months and one day to 6 months (arresto mayor in its maximum period) up to six months

and one day to two years and four months (prision correccional in its minimum period). The

penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the detention has continued

more than three but not more than fifteen days is equivalent to two years, four months and one

day to four years and two months (prision correccional in its medium) up to four years, two months

and one day to six year (prision correccional in its maximum period). The penalty of prision mayor,

if the detention has continued for more than fifteen days but not more than six months, ranges

from six years and one day to twelve years. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have

exceeded six months is equivalent to twelve years and one day to twenty years.

Supreme Court held that Arbitrary detention has the following elements: 1) That the

124
offender is a public officer or employee; 2.That he detains a person; and 2) The detention is

without legal grounds5.

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure or in any

manner depriving h of his liberty6. A person is detained when he is placed in confinement or there

is a restraint in his person. In Arbitrary detention, like in Illegal detention there must be actual

confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party so that where the latter had freedom

to leave the premises or is not actually restricted to get out there is no crime of detention. However,

there can still be arbitrary detention even if there is absence of actual physical restraint. The

Supreme Court held in People vs. Cortez 107 Phil. 360 [1960] that: in establishing the intent to

deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an

enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in

said case was found outside talking to the owner of the house where she had been taken. She

explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make

good their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as

the kidnappers knew where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in

looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to

render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or

similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence. This same ruling is reiterated

in People of the Philippines vs. Benito Astorga G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004 when the Court

held that: the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the

complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was quickly followed by the

call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who

proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. Given

5
People of the Philippines vs. Astorga G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003
6
People v. Flores, G.R. No. 116488, May 31, 2001

125
such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it was not "safe" to

refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident

effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in

the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-

Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is

thus clear.Thus, the victim need not be placed in an inclosure. In the crime of illegal or arbitrary

detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended

party. The deprivation of liberty must be proved, just as the intent of the accused to deprive the

victim of his liberty must also be established by indubitable proof7.

In People vs. Devera 8399-R, June 20, 1952, the Court clarified that it is not just the

moment a person is locked up that the crime of arbitrary detention is committed or that the crime

ceases when person is already freed. The Court held that arbitrary detention begins not merely

from the moment a person is locked up in a prison cell but from the moment such person is

deprived of his liberty without legal grounds. And it ends only when such person is absolutely

freed from any restraint in his person.

The last paragraph of Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the legal grounds

for detaining a person which provides that the commission of a crime, violent insanity or any other

ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the patient in hospital shall be considered as

legal grounds for detaining persons. Under the 1997 Rules of Court a person may also be lawfully

deprived of his liberty by a public officer or even by a private individual without warrant of arrest

when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or

attempting to commit an offense; when an offense has just been committed and he has a

probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge and circumstances that the person to be

arrested has committed it; and when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

7
People of the Philippines vs. Aaron G.R. No. 116488 Flores May 31, 2001

126
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving his final judgment or is temporarily

confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being placed from one confinement to

another.

In crimes of arbitrary detention (article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, which is equivalent

to article 200 of the old Penal Code), the legality of the detention made by a person in authority

or an agent thereof, as stated by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of January 27, 1855,

does not depend upon the judicial and much less judicial fact of a crime which, at the time of its

commission, is not and cannot definitively be determined for lack of the necessary data and of

jurisdiction, but upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be

inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at that moment leaves the decision for the

urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.The obligation of an agent of authority to

make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the

fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it

is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient

grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same

grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein8. Thus, in one

case, two BIR secret service agents, strangers in the municipality who were spying the

neighborhood of the market place and acting generally in a manner calculated to arouse the

suspicion of anyone not advised as to their duty were arrested by the policemen on of the town.

The Supreme Court ruled that the policemen acted in good faith and cannot be held liable for

arbitrary detention9.

The public officer liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain or

order the detention of persons accused of a crime but when he detains a person he has no legal

8
Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 5, 1892 as cited in People of the Philippines vs. Vicente P.
Ancheta G.R. No. L-46250 July 26, 1939
9
U.S. vs. Batalliones,et al., Phil. 775

127
grounds therefor10. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges

or mayors. A barangay captain and a municipal councilor are public officers. If the detention is

perpetrated by other public officers, the crime committed may be illegal detention, because they

are acting in their private capacity. The eminent jurist, Justice Florenz B. Regalado elucidates on

this point It should be understood that the public officer who unlawfully detains another and is

punishable by Art. 124 is one who has the duty to apprehend a person with a correlative power to

detain him. If he is only an employee with clerical or postal functions, although the Code considers

him as a public officer, his detention of the victim is illegal detention under this article since he is

acting in a private, and not an official, capacity11. If the offender is a private individual the act of

detaining another is illegal detention under Article 267 or Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

But private individuals who conspired with public officers in detaining certain policemen are guilty

of arbitrary detention.

The crime of arbitrary detention can also be committed through imprudence. In one case,

the chief of police rearrested a woman who had been released by means of a verbal order of the

justice of the peace. The accused acted without malice but he should have verified the order of

release before proceeding to make the rearrest. The crime committed by the chief of police is

arbitrary detention through simple imprudence provided for and punished under Article 365

paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with Article 124 paragraph 1 of the same

Code12.

Illegal Detention

10
Ramon S. Milo vs. Angelito C. Salanga G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987
11
People of the Philippines vs. Froilan L.Trestiza G.R. No. 193833 November 16, 2011
12
People vs. Misa, C.A., 36 O.G. 3496

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 Illegal Detention under the Revised Penal Code is classified into three: 1.Kidnapping and

Serious Illegal Detention in Article 267; 2. Slight Illegal Detention in Article 268; 3. Unlawful Arrest

found in Article 26913. (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law 2012 Ed., p. 576)

The Revised Penal Code, provides that:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or

detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained,

or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the

purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances

above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped or is

subjected to torture or other dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. ( As

amended by R.A. No. 7659)

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal

detention is equivalent to twenty years and one day to forty years ( reclusion perpetua) up to the

capital punishment of death. At present however only reclusion perpetua can be imposed since

R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines.

The elements of the crime of serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised

Penal Code are:

13
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law 2012 Ed., p. 576

129
1. That the offender is a private individual;

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;

3. That the act of detention is illegal, not being ordered by any competent authority nor allowed

by law;

4. That any of the following circumstances is present: a. That the detention lasts for more than

five (5) days; or b. That it is committed by simulating public authority; or c. That any serious

physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or threats to kill him shall have been

mode; or d. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer14.

In illegal detention physical restraint is no longer essential. The prevailing jurisprudence

on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s liberty need not involve

any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can

produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the

victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the

accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will15.

Thus, In the case of People v. Acosta107 Phil. 360 [1960].,which involved the illegal

detention of a child, the Supreme Court found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping

despite the lack of evidence to show that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim.

However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to leave until his

godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that

he could not leave because of his fear to violate such instruction. And in another case of People

v. Cortez, 381 Phil. 345 [2000] once again held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim

of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her

freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found

outside talking to the owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did

14
People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 65152, 30 August 1984, 131 SCRA 501
15
Benito Astorga, vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003

130
not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to

kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew

where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin

was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render people immobile

and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are

equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.

The intention to deprive the victim of his liberty is essential in the crime of illegal detention.

Thus, in People vs. Felipe Sacayanan (L-15024-25, Dec. 31, 1960; 110 Phil. 588), a group of five

armed men forcibly took from their hour the victims Juan Galaraga and Victor Alamar to a place

about 40 meters away from the house where they were shot. Juan Galaraga died. Victor Alamar

was seriously wounded. The trial court convicted the accused of the complex crime of kidnapping

with murder. The Supreme Court held that this was error. "Nothing was said or done by the

accused on his confederates to show that they intended to deprive their victims of their liberty for

sometime and for some purpose. There was no appreciable interval between their being taken

and their being shot from which kidnapping may be inferred." And in People vs. Nestorio

Remalante (L-3512, Sept. 26, 1952; 92 Phil. 48), the accused with about 10 armed men met

Mercedes Tobias, accompanied by Eusebio Gerilla and Lucia Pilo, on the way to her home in the

barrio of Guiarona, municipality of Dagami, Province of Leyte. The accused took hold of Mercedes

Tobias and dragged her, while at the same time striking her with the butt of his rifle at different

parts of her body. Eusebio Gerilla and Lucia Pilo saw Mercedes being dragged towards the sitio

of Sawahan. Hardly had they walked one kilometer when they heard gun reports. The following

day, Mercedes was found dead in Sawahan with two gunshot wounds. Nestorio Remalante was

charged and found guilty by the trail court of the crime of kidnapping with murder. As to the charge

of kidnapping, the Supreme Court held: "There is no sufficient evidence of intention of kidnap

because from the moment Mercedes Tobias was held and dragged to the time when the gun

reports were heard nothing was done or said by the appellant or his confederates to show or

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indicates that the captors intended to deprive her of her liberty for sometimes and for some

purposes and thereafter set her free or kill her. The interval was so short as to negative the idea

implied in kidnapping. Her short detention and ill-treatment are included or form part of the

perpetration of the crime."

Another kind of illegal detention is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised

Penal Code. The Code provides:

Art. 268. Slight illegal detention. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any

private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding article without the

attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated therein.

The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration of

the crime.

If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three

days from the commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended,

and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in

its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 700 pesos.

The liability of an accomplice performing a specific act in slight illegal detention is the same

as that of the principal.Thus, the same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the

place for the perpetration of the crime is given under paragraph 2 of Article 268. His participation

is raised to that of a real co-principal. But if the cooperation of the accomplice is by an act or acts

other than furnishing the place for the perpetration of the crime, the penalty should be one degree

lower than that provided for slight illegal detention.

The same article provides for a privileged mitigating circumstance. It states that if the

offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three days from the

commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended, and before the

institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its minimum

and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 700 pesos. In effect it is a privileged mitigating

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circumstance because the penalty is lower than one degree. It must be shown however, that the

offender was in the position to prolong the detention for more than three days and yet he released

the person detained within that time. No mitigation of penalty is allowed when the proceedings

have already been instituted, for the simple reason that in this case the accused acted in fear

rather than repentance. When the victim however is a woman there is no privilege mitigating

circumstance, because the applicable provision is Article 267 on kidnapping and serious illegal

detention.

Illegal detention is distinct from arbitrary detention in the sense that it is committed by a

private person who deprives another of liberty; while arbitrary detention is committed by a public

officer who detains a person without legal ground. Furthermore, Illegal detention is a crime against

personal liberty and security; Arbitrary detention is a crime against the fundamental law of the

State16.

In Arbitrary Detention, like in illegal detention, there must be actual confinement or

restriction of the person of the offended party so that where the latter had freedom to leave the

premises or is not actually restricted to get out, there is no crime of detention. The victim however,

need not be placed in an inclosure17. The last kind of illegal detention is unlawful arrest under

Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not

exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, in any case other than those

authorized by law, or without reasonable ground therefor, shall arrest or detain another for the

purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities.

The elements of this crime are: 1. That the offender arrests or detains another person; 2.

For the purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities; and 3. That the arrest is not authorized

by law, or without reasonable ground18.This article speaks of any person so that even if the

16
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law 2012 Ed., p. 587- 588
17
People vs. Crisostomo, et al.,46 Phil.775
18
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law 2012 Ed., p. 589

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offender is a public officer, as long as Article 124 on Arbitrary Detention does not apply, said

public officer is liable under this article. A private individual whose purpose is to bring the person

arrested to the proper authorities is liable for unlawful arrest if the ground for the arrest is illegal

or not authorized by law. In the absence of such purpose his crime is Kidnapping and Serious

Illegal Detention or Slight Illegal Detention as the case may be19.

Chapter VI

Fundamental Principles on Penalty

Penalty is the punishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits an

unlawful, deliberate or negligent act20. It is the suffering that is inflicted by the State for the

transgression of a law. In its general sense it signifies pain; specially considered in the juridical

sphere it means suffering undergone because of the action of human society by one who commits

a crime.21In a case the Supreme Court held that the primary function of punishment in criminal

19
Sandoval, Pointers in Criminal Law 2010 Ed., p. 177
20
People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 431
21
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law 2012 Ed., p. 601

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law is to protect society from potential and actual wrongdoers. The retributive aspect of penal laws

should be directed against them. Thus, in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused,

the objective of the retribution of a wronged society should be directed against the ‘actual and

potential wrongdoer’s. This is the utilitarian theory22.

The classical school on which the Revised Penal Code is mainly based enumerated

juridical conditions of penalty which are: 1. Must be productive of human suffering without however

affecting the integrity of the human personality; 2. Must be commensurate with the offense-

different crimes must be punished with different penalties 3. Must be personal- no one should be

punished for the crime of another; 4. Must be legal it is the consequence of judgment according

to law; 5. Must be certain- no one may escape its effects; 6. Must be equal for all; and 7. Must be

correctional23.

In the imposition of penalty emphasis should be made in the voluntariness of the act or

omission. For there can be no penalty unless the act or omission be voluntary. The reasons why

an act or omission must be voluntary are: 1. The Revised Penal Code continues to be based on

the Classical Theory according to which the basis for criminal liability is human free will; 2. Acts

or ommissions punished by law is always deemed voluntary since man is a rational being. One

must prove that his case falls under Article 12 to show that his act or omission is not voluntary;

3. In felonies by dolo, the act is performed with deliberate intent which must necessarily be

voluntary; and in felonies by culpa the imprudence consists in voluntarily but without malice doing

or failing to do an act from which material injury results. Therefore, in felonies committed by means

of dolo as well as those committed by means of culpa, the act performed or the omission incurred

by the offender is voluntary, but the intent or malice in intentional felonies is replaced by

22
Magno vs. CA GR No. 96132, June 26, 1992
23
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law 2012 Ed., p. 601-602

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imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill in culpable felonies.

In felonies committed by dolo the following requisites must concur: 1. He must have feedom

while doing an act or omitting to do an act; 2. He must have intelligence while doing the act or

omitting to do an act; 3. He must have intent while doing the act or omitting to do an act. On the

other hand in felonies committed by culpa or fault the following requisites must concur: 1. He must

have freedom while doing or omitting to do an act; 2. He must have intelligence while doing the

act or omitting to the act; 3. He is imprudent or negligent or lacks foresight or skill while doing the

act or omitting to do an act24.

Freedom is an essential element of voluntariness because person who acts without it is

reduced to a mere tool. Consequently, a person who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear

of an equal or greater injury; or one who acts under the compulsion of irresistible force are exempt

from criminal liability. Hence, no penalty may be imposed to such an individual by the State.

Intelligence is also an essential element of voluntariness. Without this power necessary to

determine the morality of human acts no crime can exist. It is then clear that a child fifteen years

and below; the imbecile or the insane are exempted from criminal liability because of the absence

of intelligence in determining the morality of their conduct.

Intent on the other hand being a purely mental process is presumed. The presumption arises

from the commission of unlawful act.

The imposition then of penalty to a person committing an intentional felony is justified only if

24
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law 2012 Ed., p. 40

136
he acted with intent freely and intelligently. In felonies by culpa the intent is replaced by

imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

The classical thought upon which the Revised Penal Code is mainly based postulates as one

of the juridical conditions of penalty the rule on commensurability. This means that the penalty

must be commensurate or proportionate with the offense. As a result of this principle, different

crimes are punished with different penalties under the Revised Penal Code

The principle of commensurability has been recognized by the Supreme Court. Thus in one

case the Supreme Court provides that there must be a reasonable proportionality between the

offense and the gravity of the penalty25. In another case it is reiterated that justice demands that

crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed26.

If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction is not followed.

arbitrariness intrudes27. This is the principle of proportionality between the offense committed and

the penalty imposed.

Interestingly, the concept of commensurability can also be seen in the Constitution itself. Thus

in section 19 article 3 it provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel degrading or

inhuman punishment inflicted. A fine is considered excessive when it is clearly shown that the

nature of the violation compared with the fine is disproportionate or if it exceeds the utmost limit

of the punishment which the vindication of the law demands. And to violate Constitutional

guarantee against cruel or inhuman punishment penalty must be flagrant and plainly oppressive,

disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the senses of the community.

In the Revised Penal Code the concept of commensurability of penalties is conspicuous. This

25
People vs. Temporada G.R. No. 173473 December 17, 2008
26
Malabanan vs. Ramento G.R. No. 62270 May 21, 1984
27
Bascon vs. CA G.R. No.144899, February 5, 2004; GST Fishing Enterprises vs. CA G.R. No 146174 July 12, 2006

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can be seen from the classifications of penalties from light to grave depending on the felony

committed; the circumstances which affect criminal liability such as mitigating, aggravating,

exempting, justifying or alternative circumstance; emphasis on persons who are criminally liable

such as principal accomplice or accessories; stages of execution from attempted to frustrated or

consummated; the classification of felonies into intentional or culpable; or the fact that certain

individuals or persons are punished more severely than others due to shown perversity such as

recidivists, quasi- recidivist or habitual delinquent among others. These instances are all present

in order to provide and to determine the imposition of proper penalty which is basically based on

the concept of commensurability.

Chapter 7

The Equal Protection Clause and the Penalties of

Arbitrary Detention and Illegal Detention

It has been said since time immemorial that justice is giving what is due to a person. The

basic and common criterion of what is due to a person is simply reward him if he does right and

punish if he does something wrong. History reveals that mankind are continuously striving to

provide for the criteria in order that every person will be given of what he deserves. This is

manifested in our laws, and is true particularly in the field of criminal law as persons who disturbs

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the tranquility of the State is given what is due them that is punishment. This punishment is

provided in order to maintain order of the State and for the common good.

In the imposition of penalty our laws particularly the Revised Penal Code provides for a

reasonable rules in providing punishment for crimes committed. However, one noticeable fact is

that the penalties imposed on Arbitrary detention and Illegal detention, though both involve the

act of depriving another with his liberty are different one having severe penalty than the other. In

Arbitrary detention covering Articles 124 to 126 which are committed or violated by public officers

the penalty imposed in detaining a person if the detention exceeds 3 days is prisson correctional

in its medium and maximum period or equivalent only to two years four months and one day up

to 6 years. An examination of Illegal detention under Article 267 would reveal that the penalty

imposed of detaining a person committed by a private individual is severe as it is punished by

reclusion perpetua equivalent to twenty years and one day to forty years; and if the detention

does not last for three days the private individual is punished by a penalty of reclusion temporal

equivalent to twelve years and one day to twenty years. One would naturally ask if its reasonable

to provide for a different penalties with great disparity to offenses which are of the same nature

but are simply committed by different individuals? In other words would this not violate the Equal

Protection Clause of the Constitution?

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class

privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to

prohibit legislation which is limited either [by] the object to which it is directed or by [the] territory

within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely

requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as

to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by

legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to

all persons within such class, and reasonable. grounds exist for making a distinction between

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those who fall within such class and those who do not. Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on

substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing

conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class28. (G.R. No. 127410

January 20, 1999 CONRADO L. TIU, JUAN T. MONTELIBANO JR. and ISAGANI M.

JUNGCO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,)

The criteria for valid classification have been used by the Court in all cases that involve

the invocation of the equal protection clause against the laws enacted by the Congress. To resolve

then the issue of whether or not the penalties imposed in arbitrary detention and illegal detention

adhere to the equal protection clause an application of the criteria for valid classification is

necessary.

It is undisputed that both crimes are punished in the different provisions of the Revised

Penal Code and that both have different penalties imposed, illegal detention being punished

severely than that of arbitrary detention. To determine whether there is a valid classification or

whether there is adherence to the equal protection clause the four criteria for valid classification

must be satisfied. To reiterate classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions,

(2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)

apply equally to all members of the same class.

The first criterion for valid classification is that the classification must rest on substantial

distinctions. Is there substantial distinctions between the crimes of arbitrary detention and illegal

detention? To answer this it is necessary to know the nature of the crime, the person of the

offender and his voluntariness as well as the purpose why the penalty is being imposed.

A closer examination of the crimes of arbitrary detention and illegal detention would reveal

that both are of the same nature. They are of the same nature as crimes without first considering

the offenders since they both involve the unlawful deprivation of another’s liberty. In Article 124

28
Jungco vs. CA G.R. No. 127410 January 20, 1999

140
of the Revised Penal Code the crime of arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer or

employee who without legal grounds detains a person. On the other hand in Articles 267 and 268

of the same code provide that illegal detention is committed by any private individual who shall

kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty. The two crimes are

essentially the same as they are committed when a person has been unlawfully deprived of his

liberty. In other words as crimes in themselves without regard to the person of offenders they are

essentially the same and no substantial distincton can be found.

Now, a consideration of the offenders should be made. The Revised Penal Code classifies

the crime of unlawfully detaining or depriving the liberty of another person into two according to

the person of the offender. If a private individual committed the act of unlawful deprivation or

detention, the crime is called illegal detention; while if the same act is committed by a public officer

or employee who are vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused,

the crime is arbitrary detention. Arbitrary detention as we have seen are penalized differently. In

arbitrary detention for instance if the public officer unlawfully detains another for four days the

penalty imposed is prission correccional in its medium and maximum periods ranging from six

months and one day up to four years and two months; on the other hand the same act which

involves a private individual in illegal detention would be penalized severely for reclusion perpetua

to death or equivalent to twenty years and one day to forty years up to capital punishment of

death, although at present it is prohibited to impose death penalty. The difference between the

two penalties would be fifteen years and ten months for the same felonious act. Is it reasonable

then to make a distinction between private individuals and public officers, such that the former is

punished severely compared to that of the latter?

In the imposition of penalty voluntariness of the offender is always considered. The reason

for this is that voluntariness of the offender is the basis for the appreciation of whether to impose

a higher or lower penalty or whether to impose a penalty at all. Hence, an imbecile or insane; or

someone who acted under the compulsion of irresistible force or impulse of uncontrollable fear

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who kills another is free from liability because of lack of freedom or intelligence which are

elements of voluntariness. In felonies committed by dolo as for instance that of arbitrary detention

or illegal detention the following requisites must concur: 1. He must have feedom while doing an

act or omitting to do an act; 2. He must have intelligence while doing the act or omitting to do an

act; 3. He must have intent while doing the act or omitting to do an act. In the case of private

individuals and public officers both have the same voluntariness. Being a public officer or a private

individual is not a cause for diminishing or increasing the voluntariness of a person. In other words

being a public officer or private individual does not in anyway affect the voluntariness of a person

that would justify the imposition of higher penalty in one and a lighter penalty on the other. Hence,

in terms of voluntariness of private individuals and public officers there is no substantial distinction

that could be the basis for the imposition of different penalties in essentially the same crime of

unlawfully depriving the liberty of another.

Another point of consideration in the imposition of penalty to an offender is his level of

perversity. In the Revised Penal Code, persons who are of greater perversity are punished

severely compared to those who are less perverse. Habitual delinquents, recidivists or quasi

recidivists for example are given additional or higher penalty than that of first time offender due to

their greater perversity as shown by their repetitious tendency to commit certain felonies. On the

other hand those offenders who voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority or his agents; or

those who voluntarily confessed their guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the

evidence for the prosecution are given mitigated penalties because of their lesser perversity as

shown by their acts of surrendering or of confessing guilt. In the case of public officer and private

individual their status as such does not in any way affect their level of perversity. A person in

unlawfully depriving another of his liberty is not more perverse just because he is a private

individual or that he is a public officer. Since, level of perversity is not affected by being a public

officer or by being a private individual it follows that there should be no distinction in the imposition

of penalty in crimes of arbitrary detention and that of illegal detention.

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 However, there seems to be apparent distinction between a public officer in the crime of

arbitrary detention and a private individual in the crime of illegal detention, which could be the

basis for the imposition of different penalty. Unlike in illegal detention the public officers in the

crime of arbitrary detention are agents of the State, and their acts are punishable because they

violate the constitutional right to liberty without due process as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of

the Philippine Constitution. The right to liberty as protected by the Constitution is just a mere

limitation to the essential, consistent and illimitable police power of the State; and public officers

being agents of the State could justify the imposition of lesser penalty compared to that of private

individuals in the crime of illegal detention. However this should not be the case. It is well settled

that illegal acts of public officers are not acts of State, and the officers who act illegally are not

acting as such, but stand in the same footing as any other trespasser29. This holds true in the

crime of depriving a person of his liberty. Whether the offender is an agent of the State or an

ordinary private individual, since both commit the same crime they should stand in the same

footing and should be punished with the same penalty. Clearly being an agent of the State is not

a reasonable ground for a substantial distinction that would justify the imposition of lesser penalty.

One may still argue that being a public officer who is vested with authority to detain or

order the detention of persons accused of a crime is a reasonable basis for imposing a lesser

penalty compared to that of private individuals. To classify penalties based on this would result in

a misplaced distinction since if a private individual is punished severely for an act of unlawfully

depriving another, with more reason that a person who has the apparent authority to detain be

punished severely otherwise there would always be a danger of abuse or of taking advantage of

public position and power. We find truth in the truism that greater power comes greater

responsibility. Public officers are expected to be knowledgeable and more cautious in the

enforcement of the law and their violation thereof requires a stiffer penalty than that of the ordinary

29
People vs. Romualdez G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004

143
private individual. To impose severe penalty on private individuals in the crime of illegal detention

and light penalty to public officers is misplaced it is the same as putting the cart in front of the

horse.

The first criterion of valid classification which is that classification must be based on

substantial distinction is not satisfied. Considering the nature of the crimes of illegal detention and

arbitrary detention are the same as they are both act of unlawfully depriving another; or that

voluntariness or perversity of the offender is not affected by being a private individual or public

officer; and that being public officer alone is not sufficient reason for a substantial distinction, there

can be no valid justification in the classification of private individuals being punished severely in

the commission of illegal detention compared to the lesser penalty imposed to a public officer in

the crime of arbitrary detention.

The second criterion of a valid classification is that the classification must be germane

to the purpose of the law. In Magno vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992 The Court

held that, the primary function of punishment in criminal law is to protect society from potential

and actual wrongdoers. The retributive aspect of penal laws should be directed against them.

Thus, in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of the retribution of a

wronged society should be directed against the ‘actual and potential wrongdoer’s. In the case of

arbitrary detention and illegal detention the offenders although one is a public officer with authority

to detain or order the detention of another and the other is a private individual, both in in their act

of depriving another of liberty are considered actual wrong doers which have to be punished

equally for their wrong acts. In other words if the purpose of penalty is to protect society from

actual wrongdoers such punishment must be applied to public officers and private individuals in

the crimes of arbitrary detention and illegal detention with equal force as they are both actual

criminals for the same crime of deprivation of liberty of another individual. A person is not a

wrongdoer of a higher degree just because he is a private individual or a public officer. Hence,

the classification or distinction made between public officer and the private individual in imposing

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severe penalty to the latter for the same act of deprivation fails to serve the purpose of criminal

law for the imposition of punishment. The classification is not needed in order to protect society

form actual or potential wrongdoers.

The third requisite for a valid classification which is classification must not be limited to

existing conditions only, and the fourth requisite which states that classification must apply equally

to all members of the same class are both satisfied. The classification made under the Revised

Penal Code for the imposition of penalty to public officers and private individuals in the crimes of

arbitrary detention and illegal detention covers existing as well as future conditions and the

penalty is apllied equally to the same class of public officers or same class of private individuals.

However, notwithstanding the compliance of the third and fourth requisites, since the first and

second requisite for a valid classification were not complied with, the classification then made in

the Revised Penal Code for the imposition of penalty in crimes of arbitrary detention and illegal

detention is invalid and does not pass the test of the equal protection clause.

Chapter VIII

Conclusions of the Study

It has been said that the equal protection clause is violated in two ways. The first way of

violation is when the legislature made a classification in enacting laws where in fact there should

be no classification and the other is when the legislature does not make a classification in

instances where classification should be made. In the crimes of arbitrary detention and illegal

detention under the Revised Penal Code the legislature made a classification in the imposition of

penalty to public officers and private individuals. However, the classification should not be made

for the following reasons: First, both crimes essentially involve the same act of depriving another

of his liberty; second, being a public officer or a private individual does not make a person more

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 criminal that would warrant an imposition of higher penalty; third, the purpose of criminal law in

the imposition of punishment to protect society from potential or actual wrongdoers will not be

served by the classification; fourth, the classification is against the principle of proportionality in

the imposition of penalty as one is punished severely compared to the other for the same act; and

finally to have the classification would ultimately violate the equal protection clause of the

Constitution.

It is therefore humbly recommended by the researcher that the provisions of the Revised

Penal Code concerning the imposition of penalties in the crimes of arbitrary detention and illegal

detention be reviewed and that the harsh penalty imposed in illegal detention be lessened to a

penalty lower or at least equal to that of the public officer in arbitrary detention especially at

present that the legislature is in the process of revising the Revised Penal Code. A consideration

of this would surely ensure that persons of the same class are treated the same both as to the

rights conferred and the penalty imposed.

Bibliography

1. Primary Sources:

The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 1987

The Revised Penal Code

The 1997 Rules of Court

Supreme Court Decisions

2. Secondary Sources:

Books

Duka Cecilio D. Constitutional Law: A Barrister’s Companion. Rex Bookstore, 2010.

146
Reyes, Luis B. The Revised Penal Code Criminal Law. Philippines: Rex Bookstore, 2012.

Sandoval Edilberto G. Pointers in Criminal Law. Philippine: Rex Bookstore, 2011.

Suarez Rolando A. Principles, Comments and Cases in Constitutional Law Volume II: Rex

Bookstore, 2010.

Websites

www.lawphil.net/

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/

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