1

The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code
ARIEL M. LOS BAOS, on behalf of P/Supt. Victor Arevalo, SPO2 Marcial Olympia, SPO1 Rocky
(Code) after the Marinduque Philippine National Police (PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his
Mercene and PO1 Raul Adlawan, and in his personal capacity, firearm at a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint team was composed of Police Senior
Inspector Victor V. Arevalo, SPO2 Marshal Olympia, SPO1 Rocky Mercene, and PO1 Raul
Petitioner,
Adlawan. The team stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number WHT-371 on the national
- versus - highway, coming from the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion) opened
the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him. Pedro could not show any COMELEC authority
to carry a firearm when the checkpoint team asked for one, but he opened the case when asked to do so.
JOEL R. PEDRO, Respondent. G.R. No. 173588 The checkpoint team saw the following when the case was opened: 1) one Revolver 357 Magnum Ruger
April 22, 2009 GP100, serial number 173-56836, loaded with six ammunitions; 2) one ammunition box containing 100
bullets; 3) two pieces speed loader with six ammunitions each; and 4) one set ear protector. Pedro was
DECISION
with three other men. The checkpoint team brought all of them to the Boac police station for
BRION, J.
investigation.
The Boac election officer filed a criminal complaint against Pedro for violating the election gun
We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the September 19, 2005 decision[2] and
ban, i.e., for carrying a firearm outside of his residence or place of business without any authority from
the July 6, 2006 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80223. The petition seeks
the Comelec. After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against
to revive the case against respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro) for election gun ban violation after the CA
Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of the Codes Article XXII, Section
declared the case permanently dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
261 (q),[5] in relation to Section 264.[6]
THE ANTECEDENTS

Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the RTC granted. [7] The preliminary
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without the required written
investigation, however, did not materialize. Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash,
authorization from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national and
arguing that the Information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
local elections. The Information reads:
justification[8] and/or that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. [9] Pedro attached to his motion
a Comelec Certification dated September 24, 2001 that he was exempted from the gun ban. The
That on or about the 13th day of May 2001 at about 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon, in [S]itio Bantauyan, [B]arangay Bantad, Municipality of Boac, Province provincial prosecutor opposed the motion.
of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry The RTC quashed the Information and ordered the police and the prosecutors to return the
a Revolver Cal. 357, Magnum Ruger 100 loaded with six (6) ammunitions, with Serial
No. 173-56836 outside his residence during the election period, without authorization seized articles to Pedro.[10]
in writing from the Commission on Election[s].
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos (Los Baos), representing the checkpoint team,
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
moved to reopen the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was
deprived of due process when the judge quashed the information without a hearing. Attached to Los
 2
Baos motion were two Comelec certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was not exempted from the firearm
ban; and (2) the signatures in the Comelec Certification of September 24, 2001 were forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos
motion. [11]
Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule
117,[12] arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public prosecutors lack
of express approval of the motion to reopen the case.
The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen
the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and explained
that this provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to
the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to object to the dismissal
of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed upon motion of the accused and
over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedros arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs mandated
reopening.[13] He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal contemplated under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations
where either the prosecution and the accused mutually consented to, or where the prosecution alone
moved for, the provisional dismissal of the case; in rejecting his argument that the prescriptive periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code[14] or Act No. 3326[15] find no application to his case as the
filing of the Information against him stopped the running of the prescriptive periods so that the
prescription mandated by these laws became irrelevant; and, in setting the case for arraignment and pre-
trial conference, despite being barred under Section 8 of Rule 117.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The CA initially denied Pedros petition. For accuracy, we quote the
material portions of its ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
The trial court erred in ruling that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to
provisional dismissals on motion of the accused. The Rule merely provides that a case
shall not be provisionally dismissed, except with the express consent of the accused
and with notice to the offended party. Nothing in the said rule proscribes its application
to dismissal on motion of the accused.
Nevertheless, we find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of certiorari
and prohibition, as there is no showing that the error was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The grave abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.
Before the petitioner may invoke the time-bar in Section 8, he must establish
the following:
1. the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the
case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served, with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.
Although the second paragraph of Section 8 states that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof, without the case having
been revived, such provision should be construed to mean that the dismissal shall
become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor, as the public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeliness
requirement unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
In the instant, case, the records are bereft of proof as to when the public
prosecutor was served the order of dismissal dated 22 November 2001. Absent such
proof, we cannot declare that the State is barred from reviving the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
 3
In his motion for reconsideration, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of the Marinduque
provincial prosecutors receipt of the quashal order to be 2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001, and argued that
based on this date, the provisional dismissal of the case became permanent on December 10, 2002. Based
on this information, the CA reversed itself, ruling as follows:
On 9 September 2005, we ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to a
dismissal on motion of the accused. However, we did not issue the writs of certiorari
and prohibition, because it was shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the reopening of the case. Moreover, we stated that we cannot
rule on the issue of whether or not the State is barred from reopening the case because
it was not shown when the public prosecutor was served the order of dismissal.
xxx
The arguments raised in the respondents motion for modification were duly
passed upon in arriving at the decision dated 9 September 2005, and no new matters
were raised which would warrant a reconsideration thereof.
On the other hand, the petitioner was able to prove that the motion to reopen
the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the time the public
prosecutor was served the notice of dismissal. Therefore, the state is barred from
reopening the case.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Joel Pedros motion for partial reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED, and respondent Ariel Los Banos motion for modification of
judgment is, accordingly, DENIED.
To summarize this ruling, the appellate court, while initially saying that there was an error of law but no
grave abuse of discretion that would call for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on motion for
reconsideration; it then ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply
Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this provision.
THE PETITION
Los Baos prays in his petition that the case be remanded to the RTC for arraignment and trial,
or that a new charge sheet be filed against Pedro, or that the old information be re-filed with the RTC. He
contends that under Section 6 of Rule 117, an order sustaining a motion to quash does not bar another
prosecution for the same offense, unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section
3(g)[16] and (i)[17] of Rule 117. Los Baos argues that the dismissal under Section 8 of Rule 117 covers
only situations where both the prosecution and the accused either mutually consented or agreed to, or
where the prosecution alone moved for the provisional dismissal of the case; it can also apply to instances
of failure on the part of the prosecution or the offended party to object, after having been forewarned or
cautioned that its case will be dismissed. It does not apply where the information was quashed. He adds
that although the trial court granted the motion to quash, it did not categorically dismiss the case, either
provisionally or permanently, as the judge simply ordered the return of the confiscated arms and
ammunition to Pedro. The order was open-ended, and did not have the effect of provisionally dismissing
the case under Section 8 of Rule 117.
Los Baos also contends that the CA gravely erred when: (1) it ruled in effect that the Order
dated November 22, 2001 granting the motion to quash is considered a provisional dismissal, which
became permanent one year from the prosecutors receipt of the order; the order to quash the Information
was based on Section 3 of Rule 117, not on Section 8 of this Rule; (2) it granted Pedros motion for
reconsideration and denied Los Baos motion for modification of judgment, when Section 6 of Rule 117
clearly provides that an order granting a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense.
He notes that the grounds Pedro relied upon in his motion to quash are not subsections (g) or
(i) of Rule 117, but its subsections (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and (h) that it
contains averments which if true would constitute a legal justification. Pedros cited grounds are not the
exceptions that would bar another prosecution for the same offense.[18] The dismissal of a criminal case
upon the express application of the accused (under subsections [a] and [h]) is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense, because his application is a waiver of his constitutional prerogative
against double jeopardy.
In response to all these, respondent Pedro insists and fully relies on the application of Section
8 of Rule 117 to support his position that the RTC should not have granted Los Banos motion to reopen
the case.
THE ISSUES
 4
The issue is ultimately reduced to whether Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as the
CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling effectively lays the matter to rest.If it does not, then the
revised RTC decision reopening the case should prevail.
OUR RULING
We find the petition meritorious and hold that the case should be remanded to the trial
court for arraignment and trial.
Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal
a. Motion to Quash
A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity
of the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information. [19] The motion, as a rule, hypothetically
admits the truth of the facts spelled out in the complaint or information. The rules governing a motion to
quash are found under Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 3 of this Rule enumerates the
grounds for the quashal of a complaint or information, as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
b. Provisional Dismissal
On the other hand, Section 8, Rule 117 that is at the center of the dispute states that:
SEC.8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one
(1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect
to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional
dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived.
A case is provisionally dismissed if the following requirements concur:
1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, moves
for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for its provisional dismissal;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
and
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case.[20]
In People v. Lacson,[21] we ruled that there are sine quanon requirements in the application of
the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-
bar under the foregoing provision is a special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to
prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the
lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
c. Their Comparison
An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a
provisional dismissal are far different from one another as concepts, in their features, and legal
consequences. While the provision on provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117 (entitled Motion
to Quash), it does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section
8, Rule 117 applies.
 5
A first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that it does not exactly state what a provisional
dismissal is. The modifier provisional directly suggests that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially
refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without prejudice to the re-
filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the
case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are those barred by the principle
of
double jeopardy,[22] by the previous extinction of criminal liability,[23] by the rule on speedy trial,[24] and
the dismissals after plea without the express consent of the accused. [25] Section 8, by its own terms,
cannot cover these dismissals because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional dismissal.
This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under Section 3. The
delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a class in
itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of Court. A necessary
consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy
is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a ground does not appear under
Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal may then
apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious
motion to quash. This feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an information can be
treated as a provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117 unmistakably provide for the
consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of an amendment of the complaint or
information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the
effect of sustaining the motion to quash - the complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the
instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-
filing that Section 5 allows it cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal
liability or double jeopardy. Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided
under Section 3(i) and the exception stated in Section 6.
Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when a provisional dismissal can be
made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the offended party is given notice. The consent of
the accused to a dismissal relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7 provide, i.e., the conditions
for dismissals that lead to double jeopardy.This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section
8 i.e., one with the express consent of the accused is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided
under Section 7, but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section
8.
This feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion
to quash the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for the
dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation
with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable
implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under
Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been provided under Sections 4
and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure
of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution
shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal
to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in a world of its own separate from motion to quash,
and merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section
3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its time-
bar does not apply.
Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a motion to quash
and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of the
complaint or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may
be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject to the
conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117.[26]
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117;
these requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal
information for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be
grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information.
 6
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may
be a provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway provided
that the required consents are present.[27]
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at
which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays quashed
until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of impermanence,
and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is important is the
question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of action or of the
offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar, and prescription
is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules
refer to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates to an
intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the remedy is a
motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for seeking the dismissal of
the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall
under provisional dismissal.
Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does not apply to the reopening of the case that the
RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the reversal of the CAs order is legally proper.
Pedros Motion to Quash
The merits of the grant of the motion to quash that the RTC initially ordered is not a matter that
has been ruled upon in the subsequent proceedings in the courts below, including the CA. We feel
obliged to refer back to this ruling, however, to determine the exact terms of the remand of the case to
the RTC that we shall order.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash are that the Information contains averments
which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense [Section 3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the
records that the Information duly charged a specific offense and provides the details on how the offense
was committed.[28] Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground has no merit. On the other hand, we do not see
on the face or from the averments of the Information any legal excuse or justification. The cited basis,
in fact, for Pedros motion to quash was a Comelec Certification (dated September 24, 2001, issued by
Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law Department, Committee on Firearms and Security Personnel
of the Comelec, granting him an exemption from the ban and a permit to carry firearms during the
election period)[29] that Pedro attached to his motion to quash. This COMELEC Certification is a
matter aliunde that is not an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support, a motion to quash
grounded on legal excuse or justification found on the face of the Information. Significantly, no hearing
was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the genuineness of the COMELEC certification.[30]
Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling that a quashal of the Information was in
order. Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated the true nature, function, and utility of a motion to
quash. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be
arraigned and stand trial.
One final observation: the Information was not rendered defective by the fact that Pedro was charged of
violating Section 261(q) of the Code, instead of Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which amended Section
261(q); these two sections aim to penalize among others, the carrying of firearms (or other deadly
weapons) in public places during the election period without the authority of the Comelec. The
established rule is that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime
committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information[31] Further, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,[32] we specifically recognized that the amendment
under Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 does not affect the prosecution of the accused who was charged under
Section 261(q) of the Code.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and accordingly declare the assailed
September 19, 2005 decision and the July 6, 2006 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
80223 respectively MODIFIED and REVERSED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Boac, Marinduque for the arraignment and trial of respondent Joel R. Pedro, after reflecting in the
 7
Information the amendment introduced on Section 261(q) of the Code by Section 32 of Republic Act
No. 7166.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000]
FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN
and FIDEL BESARINO, petitioners, vs. ELIZABETH BALISING, ROGER ALGER,
MERLINDA CAPARIC, EUSTAQUIO R. TEJONES, ANDREA SAYAM, JENNY ISLA,
WILMA ROGATERO, PABLITO ALEGRIA, ROLANDO CANON, EDITHA ESTORES,
EDMUNDO DOROYA, TERESITA GUION, DANNY ANDARAYAN, LOURDES CADAY,
ROGELIO MANO, EVANGELINE CABILTES AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR OF RIZAL,
Antipolo, Rizal, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 dated August 26, 1997.[1]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel
Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa [2] filed by the private respondents. The
cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. Ncm
After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,[3] they filed a Motion to Dismiss
the aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure
of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dalig,
Antipolo, Rizal.[4] Petitioners averred that since they lived in the same barangay as private respondents,
and the amount involved in each of the cases did not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), the said
cases were required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code of
1991[5] and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[6] to be referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned for conciliation proceedings
before being filed in court.[7]
The municipal trial court issued an Order, dated July 17, 1995 [8] denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the
case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for
dismissing the cases.[9]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, claiming that nowhere in the
Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss.[10]
On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases
against petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.[11] Scncm
More than two months later, on February 26, 1996, private respondents through counsel, filed a Motion
to Revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners, stating that the requirement of referral
to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with.[12] Attached to the motion was a
Certification dated February 13, 1996 from the Lupong Tagapamayapaof Barangay Dalig, Antipolo,
Rizal[13] stating that the parties appeared before said body regarding the charges of estafa filed by private
respondents against petitioners but they failed to reach an amicable settlement with respect thereto.
Petitioners filed a Comment and Opposition to Motion to Revive claiming that the Order of the municipal
trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and executory; hence,
private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive.[14]
On March 18, 1996, the municipal trial court issued an Order [15] granting private respondents Motion to
Revive. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] of the aforementioned Order which was denied
by the municipal trial court.[17]
Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a petition for certiorari,
injunction and prohibition assailing the Order dated March 18, 1996 of the municipal trial court. They
claimed that the said Order dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the criminal cases against them had
long become final and executory considering that the prosecution did not file any motion for
reconsideration of said Order.[18] In response thereto, private respondents filed their
Comment,[19] arguing that the motion to revive the said cases was in accordance with law, particularly
Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[20]
After the parties submitted additional pleadings to support their respective contentions, [21] the Regional
Trial Court rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition,
stating as follows:
Evaluating the allegations contained in the petition and respondents comment thereto,
the Court regrets that it cannot agree with the petitioner(sic). As shown by the records
the 16 criminal cases were dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the
petitioners for failure of the private respondent to comply with the mandatory
requirement of PD 1508. Since the dismissal of said cases was without prejudice, the
Court honestly believes that the questioned order has not attained finality at all.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Sdaamiso
 8
SO ORDERED.[22]
The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration [23] of the
aforementioned Decision for lack of merit.[24]
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following questions of law:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain
finality if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be
revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that
was dismissed without prejudice still has jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive
after the order of dismissal has become final and executory. [25]
Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not
appealed within the reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the case is filed within the
reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration of the
courts order, the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only be revived by the filing of a
new complaint or information.[26] Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case
attains finality, the court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the
authority to act on any motion of the parties with respect to said case. [27]
On the other hand, private respondents submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure such as the criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule regarding finality of
decisions and orders under the Revised Rules of Court. They insist that cases dismissed without prejudice
for non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat
ng Tagapagkasundo of the barangay concerned may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to
revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case. [28]
Petitioners contentions are meritorious. Sdaad
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its
entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court.[29] As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order"
is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.[30]
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order [31] if no
motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals,[32] we stated thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said
dismissal order was any less final. Such order of dismissal is complete in all details,
and though without prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not
merely an interlocutory order but a final disposition of the complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the courts decision or
order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same. [33]
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power
or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. [34] A final judgment or order
cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an
erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same. [35]
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside
the courts power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to
file a new complaint.
This was explained in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,[36] where we ruled
thus: Scsdaad
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider
or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Courts
docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no
longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action,
but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment
of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law.
xxx
[S]ince theoretically every final disposition of an action does not attain finality until
after fifteen (15) days therefrom, and consequently within that time the action still
remains within the control of the Court, the plaintiff may move and set aside his notice
of dismissal and revive his action before that period lapses. But after dismissal has
become final after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period, the only way
by which the action may be resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of a
subsequent action through the filing of another complaint and the payment of fees
prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of finality of the dismissal
through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses jurisdiction and
control over it and can no longer make a disposition in respect thereof
inconsistent with such dismissal.[37] (Emphasis supplied.)
 9
Contrary to private respondents claim, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but to criminal
cases as well. In Jaca vs. Blanco,[38] the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal case as a
dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or
to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense." [39]Supremax
Thus, the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition
and ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without
prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated
by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
Equally erroneous is private respondents contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under
the Revised Rules of Court[40] do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to conciliation at the
barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code.
The said provision states:
Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508[41] where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision
shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. [42]
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents view. Section 18 merely
states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without
prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute
subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local
Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion
even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court
applies suppletorily to cases covered by the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. The regular procedure prescribed in the
Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory
capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith.[43]
A careful examination of Section 18 in relation to Section 22 of the 1991 Revised Rule of Summary
Procedure and Rule 40, Section 2 in relation to Rule 13, Sections 9 and 10,[44] and Rule 36, Section
2[45] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, leads to no other conclusion than that the rules
regarding finality of judgments also apply to cases covered by the rules on summary procedure. Nothing
in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a
judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the
prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality.[46] Hence, the principle expressed in the
maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence [47] applies
in interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion
that said doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some
definite date set by law.[48] Misjuris
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure
especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases
expeditiously.[49] To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival of dismissed cases by mere
motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would prevent the courts from settling
justiciable controversies with finality,[50] thereby undermining the stability of our judicial system.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal trial
court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government
Code of 1991[51] may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the
law[52] is not jurisdictional in nature[53] and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in
a motion to dismiss.[54] The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of
prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior
to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said
ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on
the ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said
ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked at present considering
that the same had long become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled[55] by
the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court. [56] Scjuris
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II dated August 26, 1997 and its Order dated January 29, 1998 in SCA Case No.
96-4092 are hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 94-0829, 94-0830, 94-0831, 94-0832, 94-
0833, 94-0836, 94-0838, 94-0839, 94-0841, 94-0843, 94-0847, 94-0848, 94-0850, 94-0854 and 94-0058
of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo are ordered DISMISSED, without prejudice, pursuant to Sec.
18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
SO ORDERED. KAPUNAN
10
 11

STATE PROSECUTOR AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON SSS CASES IN REGION V, ROMULO

SJ. TOLENTINO, AND REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SANTIAGO violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 28 (e) of Republic Act No. 8282 [1] for failing to remit the
M. TURINGAN, as alter ego of the G.R. No. 150606 premiums due for his employee to the Social Security System despite demand.
Secretary of Justice in Region V, in
their official capacities, and, for and Present:
in representation of the PEOPLE OF The Information contains a certification by State Prosecutor Tolentino, thus:
THE PHILIPPINES and MARITES PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,*
C. DE LA TORRE, in her official SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CERTIFICATION
capacity as counsel for the Complainant, CORONA,
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) AZCUNA, and I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN
Bicol Cluster, GARCIA, JJ. THIS CASE HAS BEEN CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED SPECIAL
Petitioners, PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND UNDER OATH AS
Promulgated: OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO
- versus - BELIEVE THAT THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN COMMITTED, THAT THE
June 7, 2007 ACCUSED IS PROBABLY GUILTY THEREOF AND THAT THE FILING OF
THE INFORMATION IS WITH THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL
HON. PABLO M. PAQUEO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 23, of the City of OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR.[2]
Naga, and Accused BENEDICT DY TECKLO,
Respondents.
The case was raffled to the RTC of Naga City, Branch 23, presided by respondent Judge Pablo
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x M. Paqueo, Jr. It was set for arraignment on August 7, 2001. On said date, counsel for private respondent
DECISION moved for the deferment of the arraignment and requested time to file a motion to quash the Information,
which request was granted by the court.
AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus alleging that respondent Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, On August 10, 2001, private respondent filed a Motion to Quash, thus:
Jr., Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 23, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
Accused, through counsel, most respectfully moves to quash the
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated August 24, 2001 and October 15, 2001. The
Information x x x upon the sole ground that State Prosecutor Romulo SJ Tolentino,
Order dated August 24, 2001 granted the Motion to Quash of private respondent Benedict Dy Tecklo, not being the City Prosecutor nor the Provincial Prosecutor, has no legal personality
nor is he legally clothed with the authority to commence prosecution by the filing of
thus dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. The Order the Information and thus prosecute the case.[3]
dated October 15, 2001 denied State Prosecutor Tolentinos Objection and Motion dated September 5,
2001.
On August 16, 2001, State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Opposition to Motion to Quash[4] on
the following grounds:
The facts are:

(1) He (State Prosecutor Tolentino) is authorized to investigate, file the

On June 22, 2001, petitioner State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino filed an Information necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases since he was designated as
Special Prosecutor for SSS cases by Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M.
charging private respondent Benedict Dy Tecklo, the owner/proprietor of Qualistronic Builders, of Turingan by virtue of Regional Order No. 97-024A dated July 14, 1997;
 12
(2) In a letter[5] dated October 24, 2000, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo
confirmed such authority and that Informations to be filed in court by
prosecutors-designate do not need the approval of the Regional State
Prosecutor or Provincial or City Prosecutor;
(3) Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Regional State Prosecutor,
as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice, is vested with authority to designate
Special Prosecutors; and
(4) The City Prosecutor has been inhibited by the private complainant from
investigating SSS Cases as it is the Panel of Prosecutors that is now acting as
City Prosecutor over all city cases involving violations of the Social Security
Act. As acting Prosecutor, the panel outranks the City Prosecutor.
On August 24, 2001, the RTC issued an Order quashing the Information and dismissing the
case, thus:
For resolution is a motion to quash filed by x x x counsel for the accused,
with an opposition to the same filed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino, the
prosecutor who filed the information.
The motion is based on the lack of legal personality of State Prosecutor
Tolentino, [not being] legally clothed with the authority to commence prosecution by
the filing of the information and, thus, prosecute the case.
dated August 24, 2001 be set aside and that the case entitled People v. Tecklo be scheduled for
One of the grounds provided by the rules to quash an Information is paragraph
arraignment without unnecessary delay.
(c), of Sec. 3 of Rule 117.
(c) that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do
so.
thus:
A glance on the face of the information would glaringly show that it was filed
by State Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino, without the approval of the City Prosecutor of
Naga City, the situs of the crime, a blatant violation of the third paragraph of Sec. 4 of
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
An information filed by a qualified and authorized officer is required for the
jurisdiction of the court over the case (Villa v. Ibaez, et al., 88 Phil. 402).
A justification put up by State Prosecutor Tolentino is a Regional Order No.
07-024-A subject of which is the Designation of Personnel issued by the Regional
State Prosecutor which in effect designated him as the special prosecutor to handle the
investigation of all SSS cases filed before the Offices of the City Prosecutor of the
Cities of Naga, Iriga and Legaspi and the Offices of the Provincial Prosecutor of the
different provinces in the Bicol Region, except the provinces of Catanduanes and
Masbate, and if evidence warrants to file the necessary information and prosecute the
same in the court of [appropriate] jurisdiction.
The designation of State Prosecutor Tolentino to investigate, file this
information if the evidence warrants, and to prosecute SSS cases in court does not
exempt him from complying with the provision of the third paragraph of [Sec. 4 of]
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the Provincial or City Prosecutor or Chief State
Prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. The designation given to Prosecutor
Tolentino came from the Regional Chief State Prosecutor [who] is not one of those
mentioned exclusively by the Rules to approve in writing the filing or the dismissal of
an information.
Also, as ruled by this court in a similar case which was dismissed, the second
attached document supporting the opposition to the motion, is but an opinion of
the Chief State prosecutor which has no force and effect to set aside the mandatory
requirement of the Rules in the filing of an information in court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is granted, The
information is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.[6]
Petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an Objection and Motion praying that the Order
In an Order dated October 15, 2001, respondent Judge denied Tolentinos Objection and Motion,
For consideration is an Objection and Motion filed by State Prosecutor
Romulo SJ. Tolentino, praying that the Order of this court dated August 24, 2001 be
set aside and the case be scheduled for arraignment.
Acting on said motion upon receipt thereof, the court gave the defense a
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order dated September 18, 2001 to file
its comment and/or opposition; however, the period lapsed with the court never
receiving any comment and/or opposition from the defense.
The records show that the issue raised in the pleadings from both parties is
whether Prosecutor Tolentino, in filing the information, can just ignore the provision
 13

of the third paragraph of Sec. 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on [C]riminal
[P]rocedure.
It is the stand of this court, when it ruled and so holds that Prosecutor
Tolentino may conduct exclusive investigation and prosecute all violations of the
provisions of the SSS Laws within the Bicol Region, but in the filing of the information
in court, he must comply with [x x x] the above-cited provision of the rules on criminal
procedure, that is, to have the provincial or city prosecutor at the situs of the offense
approve in writing said information. It was further ruled by this court that failure to
secure said written authority of the provincial or city prosecutor would touch on the
jurisdiction of this court.
With the foregoing, this court cannot find any legal basis to disturb its ruling
of August 24, 2001. The instant objection and motion is therefore denied.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Prosecutor. An administrative opinion interpreting existing rules issued by
agencies directly involved in the implementation of the rules should be
respected and upheld.
Respondent judge quashed the Information based on Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in relation to the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, thus:
Rule 112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. x x x
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.[9]

Petitioners, thereafter, filed this petition praying for the nullification of the Orders dated August
Rule 117. Sec. 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or
24, 2001 and October 15, 2001. information on any of the following grounds:

xxx
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
authorized to file the subject Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor?

Notably, changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised
In their Memorandum,[8] petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Tolentino was duly authorized
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000. It is noted that the letter dated
to file the Information based on the following:
October 24, 2000 of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, upon which State Prosecutor Tolentino
1. Petitioner Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M. Turingan, per Regional Order relies to support his authority to file the subject Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor,
dated July 14, 1997, authorized State Prosecutor Tolentino to file the
necessary Information for violations of Republic Act No. 8282 in the Bicol was issued before the changes in the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 were introduced in the Revised
Region, except Masbate and Catanduanes, and to prosecute the same in courts Rules of Criminal Procedure.
of competent jurisdiction. This was in response to the request of the SSS,
Region V for the designation of a Special Prosecutor to handle the
prosecution of said criminal cases with the Office of the City Prosecutor and While the old 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, stated that [no] complaint or
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the cities of Naga, Legaspi and Iriga
and all provinces of the Bicol Region. information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal of chief state prosecutor, the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
2. Per ruling of the Chief State Prosecutor in his letter dated October 24, 2000, . . . the
information to be filed in court by prosecutors-designate do not need the Procedure states that [n]o complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
approval of the Regional State Prosecutor or the Provincial or City
 14
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Since the provision is couched in negative terms
importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than designated, it is mandatory. [10]
An examination of the functions[11] of the Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 1275[12] showed that they do not include that of approving the Information filed or dismissed
by the investigating prosecutor.
It is a rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to
approve the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor, the Information filed
by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the
Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners also contend that the accused must move to quash at any time before entering his
plea and the trial court is barred from granting further time to the accused to do so; and that there is no
evidence in support of the motion to quash.
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the Motion to Quash provides:
SECTION 1. Time to move to quash.At any time before entering his plea, the
accused may move to quash the complaint or information.
SEC. 2. Form and contents. The motion to quash shall be in writing, signed
by the accused or his counsel and shall distinctly specify its factual and legal
grounds. The court shall consider no grounds other than those stated in the motion,
except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The Court finds that there is substantial compliance by private respondent with the rule above
quoted, as it was satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum[13] that his counsel orally moved to quash
the Information before the arraignment on August 7, 2001. In an Order issued on the same date,
respondent Judge required private respondents counsel to file a motion to quash within five days from
the issuance of the Order. Accordingly, the motion was filed on August 10, 2001.
Moreover, there was no need to submit any evidence to support the ground for quashing the
Information, since it was apparent and within judicial notice that petitionerState Prosecutor Tolentino
was not the City Prosecutor or the Provincial Prosecutor.
As regards the allegation of willful miscitation of the ground for quashing the Information, the
Court finds that respondent Judge failed to cite in his Order the correct paragraph under Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court where the ground relied upon for quashing the Information is enumerated. What is
important, however, is that he correctly cited the ground for quashing the Information.
Certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to
weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. [14]
In this petition for certiorari, the Court finds that respondent judge did not gravely abuse his
discretion in dismissing the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino for
failure to comply with the third paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The Rules of Court governs the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines.
For the orderly administration of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all
litigants, but especially by the prosecution arm of the Government.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
 15

SO ORDERED.
 16
[G.R. Nos. 107964-66. February 1, 1999]
THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES represented by the PANEL OF PROSECUTORS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding
Judge, Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and IMELDA R.
MARCOS, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960, as amended,[1] in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 [2] were filed against private
respondent Imelda R. Marcos before Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig (herein
Branch 158-Pasig). Said Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-
92 were amended prior to arraignment.[3]
After arraignment, where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the People thru herein petitioner,
Panel of Prosecutors from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Solicitor General filed separate
motions for consolidation of the three (3) Informations pending before Branch 158-Pasig with the 21
other cases pending before RTC Branch 26-Manila (herein Branch 26-Manila).[4] The Solicitor General
alleged in its motion that the indictable acts under the three informations form part of and is related to
the transaction complained of in criminal cases 91-101732, 91-101734 and 91-101735 pending before
Branch 26-Manila[5] and that these two groups of cases (the Pasig and Manila cases) relate to a series of
transactions devised by then President Ferdinand Marcos and private respondent to hide their ill-gotten
wealth.[6] The RTC of Pasig granted the motion for consolidation provided there is no objection from the
presiding judge of Branch 26-Manila.[7] Before the Manila RTC, the three (3) informations were re-
raffled and re-assigned instead to Branch 52-Manila presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan
wherein the three informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92) were re-
numbered as Criminal Case Nos. 92-107942; 92-107943 and 92-107944.
Then, without private respondent yet taking any action or filing any motion to quash the
informations, respondent judge issued an order dated July 20, 1992 requiring petitioners to show cause
why criminal case number 92-107942 should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates private
respondents right against ex post facto law.[8] In that order, respondent judge said that a check with
official publications reveals that CB Circular 960 is dated 21 October 1983 (x x x) and that said
regulatory issuance was imperfectly published* in the January 30, 1984 issue of the Official
Gazette.[9] Respondent judge concluded that since the date of violation alleged in the information was
prior to the date and complete publication of the Circular charged to have been violated, the information
in this case appears peremptorily dismissible, for to apply the Circular to acts performed prior to its date
and publication would make it an ex post facto law, which is a violation of the Constitution.[10]
On the same day, respondent judge issued another order requiring the prosecution to show cause
why the two other criminal informations (92-107943 and 92-107944) should not be dismissed on the
ground that private respondents right to double jeopardy was violated. [11] It is respondent judges posture
that based on the Solicitor-Generals allegations in its Motion for Consolidation filed in Branch 58-Pasig
that the three cases form part of a series of transactions which are subject of the cases pending before
Branch 26-Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent judge further stated that
to separately prosecute private respondent for a series of transaction would endow it with the functional
ability of a worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction.[12] Thus, accused would be unduly vexed with
multiple jeopardy. In the two orders, respondent judge likewise said that the dismissal of the three
seemingly unmeritorious and duplicitous cases would help unclogged his docket in favor of more serious
suits.[13] The prosecution complied with the twin show cause orders accompanied by a motion to inhibit
respondent judge.
On August 6, 1992, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for consolidation
(embodied in the prosecutions compliance with the show cause orders) of the three informations with
those pending before Branch 26-Manila on the ground that consolidation of cases under Rule 31 of civil
procedure has no counterpart in criminal procedure, and blamed the panel of prosecutors as apparently
not conversant with the procedure in the assignment of cases. As additional justification, respondent
judge stated that since he is more studious and discreet, if not more systematic and methodical, than the
prosecution in the handling of cases, it would be unfair to just pull out the case when he had already
studied it.[14]
The next day, August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued an 8-page order dismissing criminal case
no. 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law.[15] In a separate 17-
page order dated August 10, 1992, respondent judge also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases
(92-107943 & 92-107944) ruling that the prosecution of private respondent was part of a sustained
political vendetta by some people in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of
private respondents right against double jeopardy. [16] From his disquisition regarding continuing,
continuous and continued offenses and his discussion of mala prohibita, respondent judge further
ratiocinated his dismissal order in that the pendency of the other cases before Branch 26-Manila had
placed private respondent in double jeopardy because of the three cases before his sala.
The prosecution filed two separate motions for reconsideration which respondent judge denied in
a single order dated September 7, 1992 containing 19 pages wherein he made a preliminary observation
that:
(T)he very civil manner in which the motions were framed, which is consistent with the high ideals and
standards of pleadings envisioned in the rules, and for which the panel should be commended. This only
shows that the Members of the panel had not yielded to the derisive, panicky and intimidating reaction
manifested by their Department Head when, after learning the promulgation of the orders dismissing
some of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos cases, Secretary Drilon went to the media and repeatedly aired
diatribes and even veiled threats against the trial judges concerned.
By the constitutional mandate that A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence (Sec 7[3], Art. VIII, judges are precluded from being dragged into
running debates with parties-litigants or their counsel and representatives in media, yet by reason of the
same provision judges are mandated to decide cases in accordance with their own independent
appreciation of the facts and interpretation of the law. Any judge who yields to extraneous influences,
such as denigrating criticisms or threats, and allows his independence to be undermined thereby, leading
to violation of his oath of office, has no right to continue in his office any minute longer.
 17
The published reaction of the Hon. Secretary is to be deplored, but it is hoped that he had merely lapsed
into impudence instead of having intended to set a pattern of mocking and denigrating the courts. He
must have forgotten that as Secretary of Justice, his actuations reflect the rule of law orientation of the
administration of the President whom he represents as the latters alter ego.[17] (emphasis supplied).
The dispositive portion of the order denying the motions for reconsideration provides:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds no valid reason to reconsider the
dismissals heretofore decreed, and the motions for reconsideration are consequently denied for manifest
lack of merit.[18]
Obviously dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case via petition for certiorari, where the primary
issue raised is whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a
criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on
the alleged violation of the latters right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy.
Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
complaint or information. (emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above rule that the accused may file a motion to quash an information at any
time before entering a plea or before arraignment. Thereafter, no motion to quash can be entertained by
the court except under the circumstances mentioned in Section 8 of Rule 117 which adopts the omnibus
motion rule. In the case at at bench, private respondent pleaded to the charges without filing any motion
to quash. As such, she is deemed to have waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal ground
which she may have properly and timely invoke to challenge the complaint or information pursuant to
Section 8 of Rule 117 which provides:
Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore. The failure of the accused to assert any
ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not
file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in his motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds
of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and
(h) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There
is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if
no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the
accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will based his objection
to the information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging
the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing
before an independent and impartial tribunal. Such independence and impartiality cannot be expected
from a magistrate, such as herein respondent judge, who in his show cause orders, orders dismissing the
charges and order denying the motions for reconsideration stated and even expounded in a lengthy
disquisition with citation of authorities, the grounds and justifications to support his action. Certainly, in
compliance with the orders, the prosecution has no choice but to present arguments contradicting that of
respondent judge. Obviously, however, it cannot be expected from respondent judge to overturn the
reasons he relied upon in his different orders without contradicting himself. To allow a judge to initiate
such motion even under the guise of a show cause order would result in a situation where a magistrate
who is supposed to be neutral, in effect, acts as counsel for the accused and judge as well. A combination
of these two personalities in one person is violative of due process which is a fundamental right not only
of the accused but also of the prosecution.
That the initial act to quash an information lodged with the accused is further supported by Sections
2, 3 and 8 of Rule 117 which states that:
Section 2. The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by the accused or his counsel. It shall specify
distinctly the factual and legal grounds therefor and the Court shall consider no grounds other than those
stated therein, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses;
f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the
offense charged.
Section 8. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads
(Emphasis supplied).
Section 2 requires that the motion must be signed by accused or his counsel; Section 3 states that
the accused may file a motion, and; Section 8 refers to the consequence if the accused do not file such
motion. Neither the court nor the judge was mentioned. Section 2 further, ordains that the court is
proscribed from considering any ground other than those stated in the motion which should be
 18

specify(ied) distinctly therein. Thus, the filing of a motion to quash is a right that belongs to the accused Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent
who may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume. court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent
It is therefore clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to of the accused.[23]
quash an information or complaint are (1) those grounds stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the offense charged, whether or not mentioned in the motion. Other than that, Other than the Solicitor-Generals allegation of pending suits in Branch 26-Manila, respondent
grounds which have not been sharply pleaded in the motion cannot be taken cognizance of by the court, judge has no other basis on whether private respondent had already been arraigned, much less entered a
even if at the time of filing thereof, it may be properly invoked by the defendant. Such proscription on plea in those cases pending before the said Branch. Even assuming that there was already arraignment
considerations of other grounds than those specially pleaded in the motion to quash is premised on the and plea with respect to those cases in Branch 26-Manila which respondent judge used as basis to quash
rationale that the right to these defenses are waivable on the part of the accused, and that by claiming to the three informations pending in his sala, still the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Precisely, those
wave said right, he is deemed to have desired these matters to be litigated upon in a full-blown Branch 26-Manila cases are still pending and there was as yet no judgment on the merits at the time
trial. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes respondent judge quashed the three informations in his sala. Private respondent was not convicted,
into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgment on the cause. acquitted nor the cases against her in Branch 26-Manila dismissed or otherwise terminated which
definitely shows the absence of the fifth requisite for the first jeopardy to attached. Accordingly, it was
With these, the rule clearly implies the requirement of filing a motion by the accused even if the wrong to say that the further prosecution of private respondent under the three informations pending
ground asserted is premised on lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Besides, lack of jurisdiction Branch 56-Manila would violate the formers right against double jeopardy.
should be evident from the face of the information or complaint to warrant a dismissal thereof. Happily,
no jurisdictional challenge is involved in this case. WHEREFORE, Premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the two orders dated January
20, 1990, as well as the orders dated August 7, 1992, August 10, 1992 and September 7, 1992 all issued
Assuming arguendo that a judge has the power to motu proprio dismiss a criminal charge, yet by respondent judge are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the
contrary to the findings of respondent judge, the grounds of ex post facto law and double jeopardy herein trial court for further proceedings.
invoked by him are not applicable.
SO ORDERED.
On ex post facto law, suffice it to say that every law carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court.[19] To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post
facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-
General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality
of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action.
With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper
and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three
requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in
the first[20] or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.[21] In this case, it is manifestly
clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated. Section 7, Rule 117
provides:

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessary included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

x x x x x x x x x.[22]
 19
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of the present appeal by certiorari is the decision dated November 27, 1992 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 12037, (a) affirming in toto the trial courts decision finding petitioner guilty
of estafa, and (b) denying her Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 25, 1993. The
Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40, rendered a joint decision finding petitioner
guilty of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. C-2313,
and likewise found petitioner liable for the amount of P150,000.00 in Civil Case No. R-3733. Only the
criminal case is before us for review. h Y
The uncontroverted facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,
Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a
physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During
this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated
bills totalling P150,000.00. The One Hundred Peso bills actually counted was P3,850,000.00 as against
the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet, or a total shortage of
P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a re-verification of the records
and documents of the transactions in the bank was conducted. There was still a shortage of P150,000.00.
The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the
Manager. The second was by the banks internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then, the
banks Department of Internal Affairs conducted an independent investigation. Thereafter, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All of these investigations concluded that there
was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was the banks Cash Custodian,
Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused. Jksm
On November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of P150,000.00, the accuseds service
with the bank was terminated.
To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed a Civil Case
for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment docketed as Civil Case
No. R-3733 against petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce. Esm
Prior to the filing of the Answer, the following Information for Estafa was filed against petitioner:
"That on or about the 16th day of August 1985, and for a period prior and subsequent
thereto, the above-named accused, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, and
with intent to defraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, in her
capacity as Cash Custodian of the Metrobank, Calapan Branch, take from the Banks
Vault the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
which is under her direct custody and/or accountability, misappropriate and convert to
her own personal use and benefit, without the knowledge and consent of the offended
party, despite repeated demands for her to account and/or return the said amount, she
refused and failed, and still fails and refuses to the damage and prejudice of the
Metrobank, Calapan Branch, in the aforementioned amount of ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS.
Contrary to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, November 27, 1985." [1]
Both civil and criminal cases were raffled to the same branch of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40. Esmsc
Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question, viz., that the resolution of the civil case was determinative of her guilt or innocence
in the criminal case.[2] The trial court, over the vehement opposition of the private and public prosecutors,
granted the motion and suspended the trial of the criminal case.[3] On petition for certiorari to the Court
of Appeals, the appellate court ruled that there was no prejudicial question.[4]
Petitioner was arraigned and assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty.[5] While the trial
of the criminal case was suspended, the trial of the civil case continued. At the time of arraignment, the
civil case was already submitted for decision. Hence, during the pre-trial conference of the criminal case,
the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case as their respective evidence in the
criminal case.[6] The trial court ordered the parties to submit their written agreement pursuant to Section
4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court.[7]Thereafter, petitioner, duly assisted by her counsel, with
the conforme of the public prosecutor, entered into the following pre-trial agreement:[8]
"COMES NOW, the accused, assisted by counsel, and unto this Honorable Court most
respectfully submits this Pre-Trial agreement:
1. That the evidence already adduced by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-3733 will be
adopted by the prosecution as its evidence in Criminal Case No. C-2313;
2. That the evidence to be adduced by the defendant in Civil Case No. R-3733 will
also be adopted as evidence for the defense in Criminal Case No. C-2313.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is prayed that the foregoing pre-trial
agreement be admitted in compliance with the Order of this Court dated April 19,
1988.
 20

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period but considering that the
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided for shall be imposed in its
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, August 20, 1990. maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total amount
not to exceed twenty years. Esmmis
CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE (sgd.)
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be one degree
Accused lower as minimum of arresto mayor with a penalty range of One Month and One Day
to Six Months, as minimum to prision mayor in its maximum period, as maximum, or
a penalty of Six years to Twelve Years. Considering the mitigating circumstance of
Assisted By: voluntary surrender, the court hereby imposes upon the accused to suffer
imprisonment from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor in its maximum period, as
RODRIGO C. DIMAYACYAC (sgd.) minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, in its minimum period, as
maximum. The civil liability shall not be imposed in this case due to a separate civil
Defense Counsel action. Esmso

San Vicente, Calapan - In Civil Case No. R-3733 -

Oriental Mindoro WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Metrobank,
ordering defendants Cristeta Chua-Burce and Antonio Burce, spouses, to pay
IBP O.R. No. 292575 Metrobank the amount of P150,000.00 representing the amount misappropriated with
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from August 15, 1985 until fully paid and
to pay the costs of suit.
May 11, 1990
SO ORDERED."
Quezon City
Petitioner seasonably appealed her conviction in the criminal case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
With Conformity:
filed a separate appeal in the civil case.

EMMANUEL S. PANALIGAN (sgd.)

In a decision dated November 27, 1992,[12] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.[13] Hence, the recourse to this Court. Msesm
Prosecuting Fiscal
Petitioner raises the following issues:[14]
Pursuant to the pre-trial agreement, the public prosecutor filed a Motion to Adopt Evidence. [9] Both the
pre-trial agreement and said Motion were granted by the trial court. [10]
1. IS THE RESULT OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE?
On March 18, 1991, the trial court rendered a consolidated decision [11] finding petitioner (a) guilty of
estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code in the criminal case, and (b) liable for the
2. CAN THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ADMIT
amount of P150,000.00 in the civil case. The dispositive portion of decision provides -
IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS ALREADY DENIED ADMISSION
IN THE ORDER OF THE FORMER JUDGE OF THE SAME COURT?
- In Criminal Case No. C-2313 -
3. DOES PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF MISAPPROPRIATION OR
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Cristeta Chua-Burce guilty beyond CONVERSION EXISTS (sic) AGAINST THE PETITIONER WHEN THERE
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa, punishable under Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b) of WERE OTHER PERSONS WHO HAD DIRECT AND GREATER ACCESS IN THE
the Revised Penal Code, which imposes a penalty of prision correccional in its CASH-IN-VAULT?
 21
4. IS RULE 111 SECTION 2 (a) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE APPLICABLE IN (sic)THE CASE AT BAR?
5. WAS THERE A VALID PROCEEDING WHEN THE FISCAL WAS NOT
ACTUALLY PRESENT AND DID NOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE THE
PROSECUTION OF THE CASE? Exsm
In gist, (1) petitioner contends that the trial court erred in taking into account the results of the polygraph
examination as circumstantial evidence of guilt considering the inherent unreliability of such tests, and
the fact that the previous trial judge who handled the case already ruled such evidence as inadmissible;
(2) petitioner insists that there can be no presumption of misappropriation when there were other persons
who had access to the cash in vault; and (3) petitioner questions the validity of the trial of criminal case
considering that the pre-trial agreement dispensed with the intervention of the public prosecutor in a full-
blown trial of the criminal case. Kyle
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the State, contends that the guilt of petitioner has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the following facts which were duly established during trial - first, petitioner
was the cash custodian who was directly responsible and accountable for the cash-in-vault. Second, the
other persons who had access to the vault facilities never used the duplicate keys to open the safety
deposit boxes and the cash safe from where the P100.00 bill denominations were located. In fact, the
duplicate keys were offered in evidence still in their sealed envelopes. Third, alterations and
superimposition on the cash-in-vault summary sheet were made by petitioner to cover the cash shortage.
Lastly, there was a valid joint trial of the civil and criminal cases.
The crucial issues, in our mind, are (1) whether there was a valid trial of the criminal case, and (2)
whether the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code were
duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. Kycalr
First, petitioner assails the validity of the proceedings in the trial court on the ground that the public
prosecutor did not intervene and present any evidence during the trial of the criminal case. The records
clearly show that the pre-trial agreement was prepared by petitioner with the conforme of the public
prosecutor. Thereafter, petitioner filed a consolidated memorandum for both civil and criminal cases.
Section 5 of Rule 110[15] requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecutions by private persons."[16] The records show that the public prosecutor actively participated in
the prosecution of the criminal case from its inception. It was during pre-trial conference when the parties
agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed under
Section 2 (e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court[17] which provides that during pre-trial conference, the
parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in
compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118,[18] reduced to writing such agreement. Petitioner, her counsel,
and the public prosecutor signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement, and she
cannot now belatedly disavow its contents.[19]
On the second issue. Petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.[20] In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a)
by abuse of confidence or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[21]Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa
with abuse of confidence, since the breach of confidence takes the place of the fraud or deceit, which is
a usual element in the other estafas.[22]
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code are:[23]
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or
under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so
received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When the
money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party (1)
in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received.[24] Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the
owner.[25] In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-in-
vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere
bank employees. Calrky
In People v. Locson,[26] the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by him for the
bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the
possession of the bank. We explained in Locson that -
"The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and
the possession of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant,
with grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it to his own use
without the consent of the bank, there was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated
in the definition of the crime of theft." [27]
In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals,[28] a travelling sales agent misappropriated or
failed to return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or authorized to
sell. He was, however, found liable for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, and
not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained the distinction between possession of a bank teller
and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability -
 22

"The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support
of its theory that appellant only had the material possession of the merchandise he was
selling for his principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In said case, the receiving
teller of a bank who misappropriated money received by him for the bank, was held
guilty of qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller is the possession
of the bank. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving
teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives
the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In
the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself;
the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent
right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other
hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right
to retain money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages
suffered without his fault (Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730, old)." Mesm

Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence,
the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. [29]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa
under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is ordered RELEASED from custody
unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. No costs. Slx

SO ORDERED.
 23
G.R. No. 152644 February 10, 2006
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March
2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners John Eric
Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief
Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of
Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base
of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had
placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel’s
end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court
of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B), 4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"),5 Section 86 of Presidential Decree
No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), 7 Section 1088 of Republic Act
No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), 9 and Article 36510 of the Revised Penal
Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. 11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were
"duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners
John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of
the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse
or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC 12 initially deferred ruling on petitioners’
motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled
petitioners’ arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners’ motion, the MTC issued a
Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint
Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine tailings" which were
precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian
drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be
undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single fact
of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of
evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements constituting
violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the
terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other
words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking into
consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3)
aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be
maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the
Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid
violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act
(RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code; and
Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the
Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and
heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to
[sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the negligent act of
polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to
the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. 13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners’ arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In
the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge
for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended
 24
to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After making
of record petitioners’ manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of
"not guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque,
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942.
Petitioners’ petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal
with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondent’s appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public
respondent’s motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent’s appeal consolidated with petitioners’
petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent’s appeal but denied
petitioners’ petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations
for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the
Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no absorption
by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct
from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same with each other. Concededly,
the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers
was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is
also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that –
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if
one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from
one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not although they stemmed from a single act.15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted with
grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and
the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations
contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.16Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained
of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts complained
of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. 17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94’s ruling. The appellate
court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned Informations
for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides
the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners’ claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the doctrine
laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People’s argument with respect to the variances in the
mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the
context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the
Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are
national in character.
xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent’s understanding that the laws by which the petitioners
have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different.
Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, although
they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to any
suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Court’s quashal of the Informations against the petitioners
for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court’s denial of
the petitioner’s motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 18
 25
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution of 14
March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN
MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
(R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER
CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067),
THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
(R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED
FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING
THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE
TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND
MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN
PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT "AN ACCUSED SHOULD
NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH
THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH
CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF
TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION,
NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST
PETITIONERS[.]19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity
of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as
Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one
offense.21
Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single
information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to
avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.23 Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the
petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only — Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Damage to Property — because (1) all the charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on
a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and
(2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of
"lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among
them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend
against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of
the accused for more than one offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that
no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."25 In People v.
Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
 26
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. 28 However, for the
limited purpose of controverting petitioners’ claim that they should be charged with one offense only,
we quote with approval Branch 94’s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article
365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one
essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine
tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the
authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump said
mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-
Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can
be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if]
it has complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did
take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual
pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be
exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation
and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and
silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that
the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the
run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be
prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of
the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of
the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous laws.
Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the
Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast
with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident,
is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes this
Court’s ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Court’s statement in Relova that the
law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one Manuel
Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted
of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated
Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by
those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance
and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act
under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of
electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first
or a frustration thereofand that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from the express
terms of the constitutional provision involved – which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner’s position is that it must be
examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather
under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general
rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution
is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of
Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against
double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x 30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing
supplied)
 27

Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act
not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of
Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes
and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence
of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova,
for offenses arising from the same incident.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.