LIM v. PEOPLE (2000)
DACUYCUY (1990)
Petitioner: Rosa Lim || RTC CEBU
Facts: 2 COUNTS of BP 22
ROSA LIM called Maria Antonia Seguan (the
complainant), and went to her store. She bought
various kinds of jewelry (Singaporean necklaces,
bracelets and rings) worth 300k PHP.
CHECK 1  She wrote out a check dated AUG 25,
1990, payable to “cash” for 300k and gave it to
SEGUAN
Bought jewelry the next day again.
CHECK 2  Dated AUG 26 1990, payable to
“cash” for 241,668 PHP, sent the check to SEGUAN
through a certain AURELIA NADERA*
DISHONOR  SEGUAN deposited the 2 checks
with her bank, returned w/ notice of dishonor.
LIM’s account in the bank from which the checks
were drawn was CLOSED.
DEMAND  SEGUAN demanded and LIM
promised to pay, but she never did.
CONVICTED, 1YEAR imprisonment each (2
YEARS total); FINED 200k per info (400k
total)  APPEAL TO CA  DISMISSED  SC
ARGUMENT: She never knew SEGUAN or had a
“transaction”; rather she issued the 2 checks to
AURELIA NADERA* not SEGUAN, for a “security
arrangement” or ”guarantee” that she would
return the jewelry received if she was unable to
sell them.
RULING: DISMISSED
Never denied issuing the checks  1st and 3rd
elements of BP 22 are present  to escape liability
she must have proven the 2nd element (knowledge
of insufficiency) to be nonexistent which she failed
 gravamen of BP 22 is issuing a worthless check
 no need to prove it was in payment of an
obligation or that there was damage
DOCTRINE/HIGHLIGHT: SC DELETED PRISON
SENTENCES ON GROUND THAT THE PETITIONERS
WERE IN GOOD FAITH WHEN THEY ISSUED SAID
CHECK; Also due to the underlying philosophy of
ISL to redeem valuable human material  prevent
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty or of
economic usefulness.
NIERRAS v.
Petitioner: Peter Nierras
Respondent: Judge Auxencio Dacuycuy (RTC
LEYTE) || City Fiscal Antonio Lopez (TACLOBAN)
Facts: 9 COUNTS OF BP 22 (in MTC) // 9
COUNTS OF ESTAFA (in Dacuycuy’s sala//RTC
LEYTE)
PETER NIERRAS is a customer of SHELL (Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corp). He purchased oil products
(no specification).
CHECK  Upon DELIVERY of the products, he
issued 9 CHECKS for their payment
DISHONOR  CHECKS presented to PNB at
Naval, Leyte  DISHONORED, due to account
closed.
DEMAND  SHELL demanded that he deposit
funds for the checks or pay for the products but he
failed and refused
FILED MOTION 2 QUASH in RTC LEYTE: On the
ground of double jeopardy, because the said
offenses of ESTAFA were already included in the
BP 22 cases  DENIED  SC
ARGUMENT: DOUBLE JEOPARDY because estafa
& BP 22 are the same; namely that in ART 315
(2d) it says:
“(1) the postdating or the time the check was
issued
(2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check
(3) damage to the payee thereof”
RULING: DISMISSED
ESTAFA & BP22 are DISTINCT AND SEPARATE
OFFENSES.
DECEIT & DAMAGE are essential to ESTAFA while
in BP 22 they are not.
** There is no double jeopardy because what DJ
prevents is the IDENTITY of ELEMENTS in 2
offenses. Thus you cannot be prosecuted for the
same OFFENSE but you may be prosecuted for the
same ACT.
WANG v. CA (2001)
Petitioner: Luis Wong || RTC CEBU
Facts: 3 COUNTS OF BP 22
WONG is an AGENT of Limtong Press, Inc. (LPI), a
manufacturer of calendars. Customarily, LPI prints
sample calendars which AGENTS present to
customers, and afterwards acquire purchase
orders and forward them to LPI. AGENTS were to
collect payment after. WONG had a history of
unremitted collections, which he duly
acknowledged. So his customers were required to
issue postdated checks before LPI would accept
their purchase orders.
CHECK  EARLY DEC 1985, WONG issued (6)
postdated checks totaling 18,025 PHP, dated DEC
30, 1985 and drawn payable the to the order of
LPI. These checks were initially to guarantee the
calendar orders of customers who failed to issue
postdated checks. LPI refused to accept the checks
as guarantees, and instead they agreed to apply
the checks to the payment of WONG’s unremitted
collections for 1984 (18,077PHP). LPI waived the
52PHP difference.
WARNING  Before the maturity of the checks,
petitioner told LPI not to deposit the checks and
promised to replace them within 30 DAYS, but he
did not.
DISHONOR  LPI deposited said checks with
RCBC, they were returned for “account closed.”
RCBC gave a return slip.
NOTICE  LPI through counsel notified WONG,
but he failed to make arrangements for payment
within 5 banking days.
He was only charged for 3 checks though, worth
5,500PHP, 3,375PHP and 6,410PHP respectively.
 LPI insists the checks were used for
WONG’s unremitted 1984 collections (an
obligation, essentially)
 WONG insists he intended the checks to
guarantee the 1985 purchases of his
customers. (not in an obligation daw)
CONVICTED, 4 months/count + respective
amounts of the checks (5.5k, 3.3k and 6.4k)
 APPEALED CONVICTION, affirmed in toto 
SC
RULING:
The checks may have initially been intended for
guarantee but were in fact used to pay his
obligation  No need to determine the reason for
which the checks were issued, mala prohibita
anyway  maker is NOT required to maintain
funds for 90 DAYS only, this is not what the law
intended  said 90 days is NOT an element of the
offense  checks are not stale (checks are
generally good for 180 days), they were deposited
only 157 days after issuance  he was duly
notified of dishonor  all elements present 
application of AM No 12-2000 (fine OR
imprisonment only)  NEW PENALTY: No
imprisonment but double fine [6,750 – 12,820 –
11,000 respectively]
PEOPLE v. GROSPE (1988)
Petitioner: PEOPLE & San Miguel Corp
Respondent: Judge Nathaniel Grospe (RTC
Pampanga) and Manuel Parulan (accused)
Facts: 1 COUNT of BP 22 // 1 COUNT OF ESTAFA
 WHICH JUDGE DISMISSED; lack of jurisdiction
PARULAN is an authorized wholesale dealer of SMC
in BULACAN.
CHECK  Issued 2 checks for beer purchases he
made on various occasions in SMC Guiguinto,
BULACAN, and handed to SMC Supervisor
CORNELIO, assuring him of the sufficiency of funds
DISHONOR  deposited in BPI SAN FERNANDO
PAMPANGA (because that’s where SMC maintained
its accounts)  sent to PLANTERS BANK, STA
MARIA BULACAN for clearance, was DISHONORED
JUDGE DISMISSED CASE FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION: Allegedly, the estafa or the
issuance were NOT committed in Pampanga, but
Bulacan  PEOPLE/SOLGEN APPEAL TO SC
RULING: RTC PAMPANGA HAD JURISDICTION.
Both crimes were transitory  CRIMPRO: Can file
in any court where essential elements occurred
ESTAFA – DECEIT was in PAMPANGA (because
under NIL issuance + delivery must be to a person
who took it as a holder; SMC Supervisor in
BULACAN did not do so but transferred it, the
FINANCE OFFICER in SMC Pampanga became
holder in due course) but DAMAGE IN BULACAN
(where it was dishonored)
BP 22 – ISSUANCE in Pampanga & DISHONOR in
BULACAN. Knowledge of insufficiency of funds is
also a continuing eventuality, whether accused is
in one territory or another.
* No DOUBLE JEOPARDY in this case since the info
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It was not
decided on its merits, and thus the dismissal will
not give rise to res judicata.
 JUDGE DIRECTED TO REASSUME
JURISDICTION & TRY CASE.
LLAMADO v CA (1997)
Petitioner: Ricardo Llamado
Facts: 1 COUNT OF BP 22
LLAMADO and co-accused JACINTO PASCUAL (at
large) were Treasurer and President of the PAN
ASIA FINANCE CORP.
LEON GAW (complainant) delivered 180k to
LLAMADO & PASCUAL. He was assured by AIDA
TAN, the secretary of PAN ASIA that the money
would be repaid on NOV 4, 1983 + 12% interest
+ share in corporate profits, if any.
CHECK  Upon delivery of said 180k, LLAMADO
put the 180k in a deposit box. LLAMADO &
PASCUAL signed a PH Trust Company Check
postdated NOV 4 1983 in the amount of 186,500
in front of GAW.
DISHONOR  ON NOV 4, complainant deposited
check in Equitable Banking Corp which was
DISHONORED, because payment stopped &
insufficient funds. GAW’s account was debited the
amount of the check by reason of its dishonor.
NOTICE 1  Returned to AIDA TAN to inform her,
and she received said check, assuring him it will
be changed with cash. GAW returned to her once
more but this time she said she had nothing to do
with the check & returned it to him.
NOTICE 2  Went to LLAMADO (NOV 11) to
inform him, LLAMDO offered in writing to pay 10%
of the said amount on NOV 14/15 and the balance
to be paid over a period of 90 days  GAW
AGREED. LLAMADO FAILED TO DO SO.
DEMAND  (year 1985) GAW demanded
payment but LLAMADO refused, offering to pay
only 30% of his money, which GAW REFUSED.
LLAMADO insisted that he did not know of the
transaction as he customarily signed them in
blanks for Pascual to be able to freely transact. He
did, however, agree to other parts of GAW’s
testimony (the NOTICES above)
CONVICTED, 1yr + 200k fine  APPEAL TO
CA, affirmed in toto  SC
ARGUMENTS:
1. Check was for contingent payment of an
investment which was unsuccessful and
thus not issued “to apply on account for
value”
2. He just signed but had no knowledge of
transaction (as in case of Dingle v. IAC)
3. Novation theory (as in the cases of Ong v.
CA & Guingona Jr. v. City Fiscal of Manila)
the said obligation to pay was novated by
entering into new agreement (NOTICE #2)
4. Cannot be personally liable as it was a PAN
ASIA check, and he signed it in official
capacity
RULING: DENIED
1. Untenable; the check was given for actual
valuable consideration. If the agreement
was intended to be fulfilled only upon the
success of the investment, said written
agreement and receipt would have been
sufficient – there was no need for a check.
2. Dingle v. IAC cannot apply – The following
circumstances are not present
a. Prosecution witness established
that he only dealt with accused’s
CO-SIGNATORY
b. In same witness’ testimony,
ACCUSED’s name was never
mentioned in connection of the
transaction and the issuance of the
check
c. It was the CO-SIGNATORY that
received notice of demand, not
ACCUSED.
In this case, LLAMADO actually took the
money & put it in deposit box. He also
entered into a new agreement with GAW,
directly dealing with him.
3. NOVATION THEORY – He was not paid, lol
4. OFFICIAL CAPACITY – the law provides that
should the check be issued by a
corporation, the person who did so on its
behalf is personally liable.
QUE v. PEOPLE (1987)
Petitioner: Victor Que || RTC QUEZON CITY
Facts: 2 COUNTS of BP22
QUE is the Manager of Powerhouse Supply Inc.
CHECK  He issued the said checks to Francis Hill
Supply (in Sta. Mesa Heights, QC sa may
Gilmore to), to guarantee payments for purchases
made by Powerhouse Supply.
DISHONOR  somewhere else, not mentioned in
case. Basta dishonored.
CONVICTED  appeal to CA, affirmed in toto
 appeal to SC, gave minute resolution  this
is now a MR for the CA & SC decision
ARGUMENTS:
1. SC’s denial of the petition by minute
resolution had no reason except for “lack of
merit.”
2. CA erred in not considering material facts,
such as that RTC QUEZON CITY had no
jurisdiction
3. CA failed to consider an element of BP 22,
which is the place of the issuance of the
check is clearly absent in the case
RULING: MR DENIED
1. CONSTI: Minute resolutions are not
“decisions” within the constitutional
requirement.
2. It does not matter whether the checks were
dishonored elsewhere, the place of
issuance is the determinative factor and it
is in QUEZON CITY. RTC had jurisdiction.
3. That he meant to guarantee payment does
not matter, because even if checks were
issued for a guarantee or deposit the intent
is not material as it is mala prohibita. * this
was not part of his petition but SC took
cognizance anyway
CABRERA v. PEOPLE (2003)
Petitioner: Evangeline Cabrera || RTC DAVAO
Facts: 3 COUNTS OF BP 22
LUIS GO (Complainant) is the sole proprietor of
DAVAO MINDANAO PIONEER HARDWARE & CO.
(DMPHCo.) He had a customer, BONI CO, and they
agreed that GO would sell lumber materials &
merchandise to CO on a 30-40DAY CREDIT BASIS.
GO required CO to issue postdated checks for
payment.
CHECK  CO had no checking account of his own,
but instead offered in payment, 3 checks drawn
and issued by CABRERA, with whom CO had a
business arrangement with.
COMPLAINANT SIDE:
GO made his background checks on CABRERA and
believing CO to be a good businessman, GO
agreed. CO agreed that on the due date of the
checks, he would pay the amount of the checks,
either in cash or by negotiating them or depositing
them in DMPHCO’s account.
DISHONOR  CO failed to pay and GO deposited
the checks in FEBTC on AUG 3, 1992. As of JUL
1999, CABRERA only had 700 PHP  On AUG 3,
the account only had 100PHP  BANK CLOSED
ACCOUNT after applying 100PHP to bank charges
 Checks DISHONORED for account closed.
GO STILL CONTINUED TO TRANSACT WITH CO,
THOUGH (dafuq).
CHECK (not the one in this case. Checks ni
CABRERA yung isyu dito.)  But this time CO was
drawing/issuing postdated checks from HIS
personal account. GO accepted said checks hoping
he would be paid. DISHONOR  all checks were
dishonored.
NOTICE  GO notified CABRERA that her checks
were dishonored. She went to see GO and
confirmed her business arrangement with CO. She
asked GO to give CO more time to redeem the
postdated checks with cash, which he failed.
PETITIONER’S SIDE:
 CO testified that he was buying and selling
merch from DMPH Co. Aside from their initial
agreement, GO apparently also agreed that CO
would pay for his purchases after the merchandise
was sold and CO would pay with the amount
collected from his customers. As it turns out, CO
has already paid 120,000PHP to GO, who did not
issue a receipt. GO did not return the 3 checks.
 CABRERA admitted she drew them, but insisted
that she did not receive any consideration  she
wrote them in blank, because she and CO agreed
that the checks would not be enchased or
deposited, as they were meant only to guarantee
payment  she was in GOOD FAITH when she
issued said checks  and while she SPOKE to GO,
she never received a notice of dishonor, or a
demand letter from GO or DMPH Co. She only
knew the checks were dishonored when she
received a subpoena pertaining to the same.
CONVICTED, FINED with amount of checks
(in favor of gov’t, for some reason) and
directed to pay civil indemnity for amount of
checks to GO  APPEALED TO CA, CA affirmed
RTC, MR DENIED  SC
RULING: ACQUITTED
There is no issue that the 1st and 3rd elements are
present in said case. It is the 2nd that is at issue,
because it only gives rise to a prima facie
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds. HOWEVER, the prosecution must still
PROVE IT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Since
knowledge is difficult to prove, the law has SEC 2
to EVIDENCE said knowledge, which is the notice
of dishonor of said check  Prosecution must
PROVE that there was a notice of dishonor and that
within 5 banking days accused failed to pay, or at
least failed to make arrangements to pay the
amount of the checks.  Drawer can STILL rebut
this prima facie presumption of knowledge  It is
NOT ENOUGH to prove that a notice of dishonor
was SENT to drawer, it must have been RECEIVED
 LUIS GO’s testimony that he sent her demand
letters is insufficient  Since prosecution failed to
prove receipt, the prima facie presumption of
knowledge CANNOT ARISE.  Petitioner however,
is still obliged to pay because a check is an
evidence of a debt against drawer, and since it
passed on to a third person, it will be valid in his
hands like any other check.  CABRERA TO PAY
209,175.45 PHP with 12% legal interest
SVENDSEN v. PEOPLE (2008)
Petitioner: James Svendsen || MeTC MANILA
Facts: 1 COUNT OF BP22
In OCT 1997 -- CRISTINA REYES extended a loan
to SVENDSEN for 200k at a 10%/month interest.
SVENDSEN was able to partially pay his obligation,
he failed to settle the balance which reached 380k
with interest. REYES filed a collection suit which
was SETTLED and petitioner paid her 200k.
CHECK  SVENDSEN issued her an International
Exchange check postdated FEB 2, 1999 for 160k,
co0signed by WILHELM BOLTON (at large)
DISHONOR  When presented for payment on
FEB 9, 1999  DISHONORED for insufficiency of
funds (DAIF)
NOTICE  REYES, through counsel, notified
petitioner by registered mail and demanded he
make it within 5 days from receipt. No such
settlement was made. Case filed against
SVENDSEN and BOLTON. BOLTON remained at
large.
METC CONVICTED  APPEAL, RTC AFFIRMED
 APPEAL, CA AFFIRMED  SC
ARGUMENTS:
1. The obligation to pay interest is VOID, not
being in writing and the 10% interest being
unconscionable
2. That CA erred in holding him civilly liable
for 160k despite the invalidity of the
interest stipulation
3. Due process was violated when he was
convicted, but there was no proof of
dishonor was received by him
RULING: ACQUITTED
No issue that the 1st and 3rd requisites are proven,
SVENDSEN did not deny that he had issued the
check and that it was dishonored.  Prosecution
failed to prove notice of dishonor  The registry
receipt is insufficient as it only proves that the
notice of dishonor & demand letter were SENT, but
does not prove that both were received. 
RETURN RECEIPTS do not prove receipt, they have
to be authorized to be proof of receipt 
SVENDSEN IS STILL CIVILLY LIABLE THOUGH 
Petitioner to pay 160k, and the 10%/month
interest is unconscionable and voided by SC,
replaced with 12% per annum
MAGNO v. CA (1992)
Petitioner: Oriel Magno || RTC QUEZON CITY
Facts: 4 COUNTS OF BP 22
MAGNO was in the process of putting up a car
repair shop in APRIL 1983, but did not have
enough equipment to actually be in business. He
lacked funds to purchase the necessary equipment
as well. Thus, MAGNO, representing ULTRA
SOURCES INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
approached CORAZON TENG (complainant) VP of
MANCOR INDUSTRIES, for the equipment of which
MANCOR was a distributor. TENG referred MAGNO
to LS FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT CORP, advising
its VP JOEY GOMEZ that MANCOR was willing and
able to supply the pieces of equipment needed
(NOT EQUIPMENTS, PUTA), if LS FINANCE could
accommodate MAGNO and provide him with credit
facilities.
The arrangement pushed through, but had a
condition that MAGNO had to put up a warranty
deposit equivalent to 30% of the total value of the
equipment to be purchased  29,790PHP (yung
30%)
Since MAGNO could not come up with the amount,
he requested GOMEZ to find a third party who
would lend him the same amount of the warranty
deposit. UNKNOWN TO PETITIONER, TENG
ADVANCED THE DEPOSIT, ON THE CONDITION
THAT IT WOULD BE PAID AS A SHORT TERM LOAN
AT A 3% INTEREST.
MAGNO and LS FINANCE entered into a leasing
agreement, where LS would lease the equipment
and petitioner would pay rent with option to buy
the same. The documents were completed and the
equipment delivered to MAGNO.
CHECK 1  Upon delivery, MAGNO issued a
postdated check and gave it to GOMEZ, who,
unknown to petitioner, gave the same to TENG.
When the check matured, MAGNO requested
GOMEZ not to deposit the check as he was no
longer banking with PACIFIC BANK.
CHECK  To replace the first check, MAGNO
issued 6 postdated checks. The first 2 checks were
cleared, while the 4 remaining were held
momentarily by TENG upon request of MAGNO as
they were not covered with sufficient funds.
**.. He’s still blissfully unaware at this point..**
MAGNO could not pay LS FINANCE the rentals, and
thus pulled out the equipment. It was only they he
became aware that TENG was the one who
advanced the warranty deposit. MAGNO and his
wife promised to pay TENG but were unable to,
DISHONOR  The checks were deposited
eventually but were dishonored and returned,
“account closed.”
CONVICTED  APPEAL TO CA, DENIED 
Appealing RTC DECISION TO SC
RULING: ACQUITTED
1. The “cash out” made by TENG was not used
by petitioner, who was just paying rentals
for the equipment, not BUYING them. In
that case the warranty deposit would have
formed a part of the purchase price. But
since it never ended up as a sale and
remained a lease, the warranty deposit
should NOT BE CHARGED against
petitioner. To charge him for refund of a
“warranty deposit” which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it
having remained with LS FINANCE, is to
make MAGNO pay an unjust dept
2. That MAGNO was unaware that the checks
he issued were turned over to TENG, whose
operation was kept from MAGNO evokes
suspicion that the transaction is irregular
and immoral. She specifically requested
GOMEZ not to say she was the SOURCE of
the “warrant deposit”.
3. There is no doubt that the 4 checks were
intended to collateralize an
accommodation, not to cover receipt of an
actual “account or credit for value” and
therefore petitioner should not be punished
for mere issuance of the checks.
4. CA was a bit discriminative tbh. SC ruled
that CA even expected MAGNO to prove he
was not guilty  but SC says he could not
have produced documents showing that
the warranty deposit was already taken
back by TENG when she is an officer of
MANCOR, which has interest in the
transaction. And even if she did get back
the value, she would STILL pursue
collecting from MAGNO because the checks
were in her possession and they “bounced”.
5. MAGNO never hid the fact that he did not
have funds, and actually told GOMEZ of the
same. The element of knowing of the
insufficiency of funds is inversely applied in
this case. It would have been different if
this predicament was not communicated to
all parties MAGNO dealt with.
PEOPLE v. NITAFAN (1992)
Petitioner: PEOPLE/SOLGEN
Respondent: Judge Nitafan (RTC MANILA) & KT
LIM alias MARIANO LIM (accused)
Facts: 1 COUNT OF BP 22
KT LIM was charged of BP 22 in 1985 for issuing
to FATIMA SASAKI a Philtrust check dated FEB 9
1985, for 143k which was subsequently
dishonored and he failed to pay within 5 days after
notice.
JULY 1986  MOTION 2 QUASH: On the ground
that the facts charged did not constitute a felony
as BP 22 was unconstitutional and that the check
was a memorandum check in the nature of a
promissory note  Respondent Judge NITAFAN
granted the petition & ordered to quash it 
SOLGEN on petition for certiorari on behalf of
the Government
*IN DEC 1986, case of Lozano v. Martinez the
constitutionality of BP 22 was upheld. In the said
case 7 others were included (kasama din ata to
dun). Accordingly, the only issue is… W/N a
memorandum check issued postdated in partial
payment of a pre-existing obligation is within the
coverage of BP 22* LIM cites US v. Isham,
contending that a memorandum check, while not
different from an ordinary check, is given by
drawer to payee more in the nature of a
memorandum of indebtedness and is actually a
promissory note.
RULING: JUDGE DIRECTED TO HEAR CASE.
1. Even if it were intended NOT to be
presented, it is still the same as an ordinary
check; and if passed on to a 3rd person, it
would be valid in his hands like any other
check.
2. It is still drawn on a bank and is entirely
different from a promissory note, which is
but a mere promise to pay. If he wanted to
avoid BP 22, he could have issued a
promissory note instead.
3. A memorandum check falls under the NIL
definition of a check, “a bill of exchange
drawn on a bank payable on demand.”
4. It must therefore fall within the ambit of BP
22, which merely provides that “[…] any
person who makes or draws and issues ANY
CHECK knowing at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credt
with the drawee bank […]” BP 22 is meant
to cover ALL CHECKS DRAWN AGAINST
BANKS.
TAN v MENDEZ JR (2002)
Petitioner: Steve Tan & Marciano Tan
Respondent: Fabian Mendez
RTC IRIGA CITY
Facts: 1 COUNT OF BP 22
STEVE & MARCIANO TAN are owners of MASTER
TOURS AND TRAVEL CORP and operators of
PHILIPPINE LAWIN BUS CO. INC while FABIAN
MENDEZ is the owner of 3 gasoline stations in
IRIGA CITY, LIGAO CITY (Albay) and SIPOCOT,
CAMSUR.
Brothers TAN opened a credit line for their buses’
lubricants and fuel consumption with MENDEZ.
MENDEZ was also designated by Brothers TAN as
the booking and ticketing agent of PH LAWIN BUS
CO in IRIGA CITY.
Under this arrangement, drivers (employed by
TANs) purchased fuel and various oil products for
their buses on credit, through withdrawal slips
issued by TAN Brothers, with periodic payments to
MENDEZ through checks. MENDEZ remitted the
proceeds of the ticket sales to petitioners also
through the issuance of checks. Remittances from
Baao booking offices accompanied MENDEZ’s
remittances.
CHECK  FEBTC Check dated JUN 4 1991 for
58,237.75PHP as payment for gas and oil products
bought from MAY 2 -15 1991.
DISHONOR  Dishonored when presented for
DAIF.
NOTICE  MENDEZ sent a demand letter on JUN
21 demanding that they make good the check or
pay, to no avail. Case filed.
PROSECUTION: Witnesses (FABIAN & MULRY
MENDEZ) testified that the subject check and
other checks in the amount of 235,387.33PHP
were dishonored and that they sent a demand
letter to brothers TAN, who asked them to wait a
while. After the filing of this case, THE TANS tried
to settle the same, along with other cases pending
in other courts in IRIGA. They asked for time to
settle since they were waiting for a tax credit
certificate worth 517k to be issued by the Ministry
of Finance, which they would use to settle the
cases.
DEFENSE: MARCIANO TAN testified that he cannot
be liable as the amount subject of the check was
already offset (COMPENSATION) against the
collection of the ticket sales from the booking
office. He showed that the return to MENDEZ of
the various unencashed checks worth 66,839PHP,
representing remittance of the ticket sales in
IRIGA and BAAO that were earlier sent by
MENDEZ. After the alleged offset, there remains a
balance of 226,785PHP. A memorandum was
submitted in court to this effect. MARCIANO
admitted, however, to have drawn the subject
check to pay MENDEZ but it was not covered by
sufficient funds at the time of its issuance due to
uncollected receivables. Upon the court’s query,
MARCIANO also admitted that he did not talk to
MENDEZ and could not tell if MENDEZ agreed to
offset the checks with the remittances.
MENDEZ disputed the offsetting. He claimed that
the 4 unencashed checks could not have offset the
amount of the dishonored checks, since their total
obligation amounted to 906k PHP. AND even if
compensation did take place, it should be applied
to an earlier obligation of 235,387,33PHP. Lastly,
there was no application of payment in said
memorandum dated JUN 10, 1991.
CONVICTED  APPEAL, affirmed in toto  SC
RULING:
1. All elements are present! (a) He drew the
check to pay for the purchases (b) he knew
there were no sufficient funds to cover the
check because he had uncollected
receivables (c) the check was dishonored 
aba uwian na kung ganun
2. EVEN if there was a payment through
compensation or other means, there is
STILL a prosecution for BP 22. (dapat
dito palang tapos na pero HINDI EH)
3. Defense of compensation is unavailing
because there was no application of
payments – TAN did not specify in the
memorandum that the dishonored check is
being offset. Without such specification,
the payment should have been applied to
the more onerous obligation, the 235.387k
4. No compensation can take place as
MENDEZ is not a debtor of TANs insofar as
the two checks representing collections
from the BAAO ticket sales are concerned.
Those are not the ticket sales from
MENDEZ, who only acted as intermediary
in remitting the ticket sales. Moreover,
those remittances from the BAAO sale were
the ones allegedly used in offsetting the
dishonored check.
5. Petitioners never alleged compensation in
the PI, or in trial. They did not take back
the checks, if there had been actual
compensation, which is but ordinary action
in the course of business. Weird daw kayo
gago.
PENALTY: No more imprisonment but double
the value of the subject check. Merits deletion
due to the absence of bad faith of TANs.
LAO v. CA (1997)
Petitioner: Lina Lim Lao || RTC MANILA
Facts: 3 COUNTS OF BP22  1 acquit, 2
convicted
LIM was a junior officer of PREMIERE
INVESTMENT HOUSE in its BINONDO BRANCH.
She was authorized to sign checks for and in
behalf of the corp. She met FR PALIJO,
provincial treasurer of the Society of the Divine
Word through ROSEMARIE LACHENAL* a
trader for Premiere. PALIJO was authorized to
invest donations to the society and had been
investing the same with Premier, a total of
514,484PHP.
CHECK  PALIJO was issued Traders Royal
Bank checks (3) in payment of interest,
amounting to almost 330k.
They were all issued in his favor and signed by
LIM and TEODULO ASPREC (at large), the head
of operations. The transaction was further
evidenced by acknowledgement of postdated
checks dated JUL 8 1983 and the cash
disbursement voucher
DISHONOR  PALIJO presented the checks
and they were dishonored for the reason DAIF.
He immediately made demands on PREMIERE
to pay him. He first went to the BINONDO
Branch but was referred to the CUBAO main
branch, where he talked to the President,
CARINO. PALIJO was paid 5k for his efforts, but
no other payments followed. He wrote a formal
letter of demand to PREMIERE, which,
subsequently, was placed under receivership.
Case filed.
*in the case she was acquitted, the prosecution
failed to present evidence despite her being
arraigned.*
In her defense, LIM consistently stated the
following:
1. In the regular course of her duties as junior
officer, she was required to co-sign the
checks drawn against the account of the
corp together with the other co-signer,
 head of office, TEODULO ASPREC. Since
her duties required her to be mostly in the
field and out of the office, she customarily
signed the checks in blank. ASPREC was
the only one who filled them in, and he
ALONE decided to whom the checks would
ultimately be issued and delivered.
2. LIM had no knowledge of the actual funds
available in the corporate account, not
even as it was her duty to sign the checks.
Such responsibility, power and duty to
monitor and assess the balances against
the checks issued and the funding of the
checks belonged to the TREASURY
DEPARTMENT in the main office of CUBAO.
3. The checks were to guarantee payment of
PALIO’s investments. In his transactions,
he dealt with ROSEMARIE LACHENAL*, not
LAO. He had never met nor dealt with LIM
in any way before or during the issuance of
the delivery of the checks.
4. LIM was not involved in anyway with the
completion and subsequent delivery of the
check to PALIJO.
5. She had NO NOTICE OF DISHONOR. She
was not notified personally whatsoever.
RULING: ACQUITTED
1. Prima facie presumption was debunked. It
only evidences knowledge, but actual
knowledge must be proven. LIM was often
out, in charge of the marketing dept. of the
BINONDO branch, and she had no
knowledge of the transactions being
entered into when she signed checks, all in
blank. She had no identity of the payee, or
even the transaction that was the reason
for the checks, or even the amount. By
reason of organizational structure of the
organization, she was not even expected or
obliged to KNOW the insufficiency of funds.
2. DINGLE v. IAC applies: The following
circumstances are present
a. Prosecution witness established
that he only dealt with accused’s
CO-SIGNATORY
b. In same witness’ testimony,
ACCUSED’s name was never
mentioned in connection of the
transaction and the issuance of the
check
c. It was the CO-SIGNATORY that
received notice of demand, not
ACCUSED.
3. NO NOTICE OF DISHONOR, not from
PALIJO or from the DRAWEE bank. No
prima facie presumption of knowledge can
arise. Even if it was given to the main
branch, it was not transmitted to the
BINONDO branch. It was not even
personally handed to LIM. Responsibility
under BP 22 is personal, thus personal
knowledge of the notice of dishonor is
necessary.
PEOPLE v. BAUTISTA (2001)
Petitioner: Ruth Bautista || CAVITE CITY
Facts: 1 COUNT of BP 22
CHECK  Sometime in APR 1998, BAUTISTA
issued to private respondent SUSAN ALONA a
Metrobank Check dated MAY 8 1998 for
1,500,000PHP, drawn on Metrobank Cavite
branch. She was assured that the check would be
fully funded on maturity date.
DISHONOR  OCT 8, 1998, presented,
DISHONORED, DAIF.
ALONA filed a case with City Prosec of CAVITE. She
alleged there that she made repeated demands on
BAUTISTA to make arrangements for the payment
of the check within 5 working days from receipt of
dishonor, but BAUTISTA failed to do so.
BAUTISTA asserted that the presentment of the
check within 90 days was an essential element of
the offense of BP 22, and that since the check was
presented for payment 166 days after its due date,
it was no longer punishable under BP 22.
Prosec found probable cause, recommended
filing  approved  BAUTISTA filed petition
for review with Office of Regional State
Prosec Region IV  denied  MR with OSRP
IV  denied  petition for review in CA 
dismissed  SC
RULING: CA AFFIRMED.
1. BAUTISTA is being charged for the first
paragraph of SEC 1 BP 22, not paragraph
2. The 1st paragraph pertains to an instance
where drawer issues check when he knows
at the time that he has not enough
sufficient funds. The 2nd paragraph pertains
to an instance where drawer has sufficient
funds at the time of issuance, but fails to
keep sufficient funds/maintain credit within
90 days from the date appearing on the
check.  IN BOTH INSTANCES, THE
 OFFENSE IN CONSUMMATED FOR THE
DISHONOR OF THE CHECK.
2. The 90-day period is NOT an element of
violations of BP 22. SEC 2 of BP 22 clearly
states that a dishonored check presented
within the 90 period only creates a prima
facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds, said KNOWLEDGE
being the essential element of the crime.
Knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is
the ULTIMATE fact, or the element that
must be proven, while the dishonor of the
check presented within 90 days is merely
the EVIDENTIARY fact of such knowledge.