Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Private respondent's complaint is an action to compel the petitioner to 3.Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
remove the illegal and unauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 of Posted by Pius Morados on November 28, 2011
the condominium which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and falls (Civil Procedures – Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation)
2. ATTORNEY'S FEES IS ONLY INCIDENTAL TO THE PRINCIPAL Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of
CAUSE OF ACTION -- removal of the illegal & unauthorized installation of heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition,
the glasses made by the petitioner. the question for resolution is whether or affecting the land executed by and among the respondents whereby
not the petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of
of Restriction of the corporation, and if so, to remove the illegal and petitioners who are entitled thereto as legal heirs also.
unauthorized installation of glasses at Unit AB-122 of the Condominium. Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated “DECLARATION OF NULLITY
Clearly, the issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation. AND PARTITION” against defendants with the RTC claiming that the
document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the
In the instant case, the claim of attorney's fees by the private respondent in only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been
the amount of P10,000.00 is only incidental to its principal cause of action made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be
which is for the removal of the illegal and unauthorized installation of the declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all
glasses made by the petitioner and therefore, said amount is not the heirs.
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of
3. THE COMPLAINT IS NOT MANDATORY INJUNCTION, IT IS MERELY A the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas
PROVISIONAL REMEDY. Note should be taken, however, that the trial PambansaBlg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive
court had erroneously considered the complaint as one for mandatory jurisdiction of the MTC.
injunction, misled perhaps by the caption of the complaint. Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC
A writ for mandatory injunction is a provisional remedy. It is provisional has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of
because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129,
of the main action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is as amended.
dependent upon the result of the main action.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
DISPOSITIVE:
Petition for certiorari & prohibition dismissed. Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said
NOTE: court.
“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
courts [now municipal trial courts] or in the courts of first instance [now capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the Issue # 1:
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to Whether MTC had jurisdiction over first exprop case:
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
Held: No.Exprop suit does not involve sum of money. It is incapable of
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the RTC (Section 19 of BP
(now Regional Trial Courts). 129 as amended by RA 7691).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and - The primary consideration of exprop proceedings is whether the gov't
void the document in question. While the complaint also prays for the has complied with the requisites for the taking or property.
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the - An exprop suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the
declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that value of the land.
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the Issue # 2:
claims asserted therein. Whether the dismissal of the first complaint in the MTC amounts to res
judicata?
4.Bardillon v. Brgy. Masili
Held: NO
Nature: - Requisites for res judicata
Petition for review under Rule 45 1. Former judgment must be final.
2. Court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject
Facts: matter and the parties.
- Brgy Masili in Calamba Laguna wanted a lot on which a multi-purpose hall 3. Judgment is on the merits.
will be constructed, so it offered to buy Bardillon's 144 sq. m. lot for Php 4. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in both actions.
200,000. - Since MTC had no jurisdiction, there is no res judicata.
- No agreement was reached.
- Feb. 23, 1998: The first complaint for eminent domain was filed before the Issue # 3:
Calamba MTC by Brgy. Masili against Bardillon. Whether CA erred when it ignored the RTC's issuance of a writ of
- MTC dismissed for Bardillon and counsel's failure to appear at pre-trial. possession despite the pending MR of the ruling dismissing the complaint.
MTC denied Masili's Motion for Reconsideration (MR).
- Oct 18, 1999: The second complaint for eminent domain was filed with the Held: NO
Calamba RTC by Masili. - Requisites of immediate entry:
- Bardillon opposed the complaint thru Motion to Dismiss, alleging res 1. filing of a complaint for exprop sufficient in form and substance
judicata. 2. deposit of amount equivalent to 15% of the property's fair market value
- RTC denied motion to dismiss, saying that MTC had no jurisdiction over based on its current tax declaration.
the first complaint. - Masili complied with both requisites.
- July 10, 2000: Municipal Ordinance authorizing Masili to initiate exprop - The issue of necessity of the exprop is a matter that should be addressed
proceedings was approved and submitted. by the RTC. If petitioner objects to the necessity, her objection should be
- Aug 16, 2000: RTC issued writ of possession. included in her Answer to the complaint.
- Bardillon appealed to the CA. CA affirned RTC.
- No res judicata. MTC had no jurisdiction over the first complaint. Issue # 4: Whether or not Masili is guilty of forum shopping?
Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has
Held: NO jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.
- Test for determining forum shopping: whether the elements of The complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of
litispendentia are present in two or more cases, such that a final judgment in money with damages, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus,
one case will amount to res judicata in another. one within the RTC's jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that it
- The earlier case in the MTC had already been dismissed when the second is actually for breach of contract. A case for breach of contract is a
complaint was filed in the RTC. cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of contracts.
- Even if the MTC case was still pending, it will make no difference, because An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific
the MTC had no jurisdiction in the first place. performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under
Dispo: the jurisdiction of the RTC. The averments in the complaint show that
Petition denied. CA affirmed. Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the
downpayments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver
5.VILLENA vs. PAYOYO (April 27, 2007) the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts.
While the respondent prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main
FACTS:Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena, entered action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the contracts.
into a contract for the delivery and installation of kitchen cabinets in Petition DENIED.
Payoyo's residence. The cabinets were to be delivered within 90 days from
downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. A downpayment was paid. 6.Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr.,et al
Another contract was entered into for the delivery of home appliances and
Villena also paid the downpayment. Villenafaled to install the kitchen 7.De Ungria et al. vs. Court of Appeals
cabinets and deliver the appliances. G.R. No. 165777 | July 25, 2011
Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and
damages against Villena. Petitioner posits that the RTC has no jurisdiction FACTS:
over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum of money in the This is a petition for review on certiorari for ownership, possession and
amount of P184,821.50 which is below the jurisdictional amount set for damages, and alternativecauses of action either to declare two documents
RTCs. as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario'sconjugal share with
damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case Ungria et al.Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of the late Fernando
Castor, while the rest of the respondentsare their legitimate children. The
RULING: YES, RTC has jurisdiction. In determining the jurisdiction of an documents they (respondents) sought to annul are (1) the Deed of
action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon allegedly
principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily executed by Fernando in favorof Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment executed by Eugenio infavor of
pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the petitioner.Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss raising,
amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than among others that the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. Pending resolution of the motion,
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are respondents filed a Motion to Allow them to continue prosecuting this case
actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence as indigent litigants. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
cognizable by the RTCs. clarification on whether plaintiffs should beallowed to continue prosecuting
the case as indigent litigants. Said motion was denied. The same wasfiled to complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continuesuntil the case
the RTC and to the CA; both were denied. Hence, this petition for review on is terminated
certiorari wherepetitioner raises the following assignment of error: that the
Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent RTC committed grave 8.HILARIO vs. SALVADOR
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss despite G.R. No. 160384 .April 29, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. , J .
respondent’s non-payment of the correct docket fees.
FACTS: Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of land located
ISSUE: in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a complaint with the RTC of Romblon
Was jurisdiction vested to the RTC in this civil case despite the failure of the against herein, respondent, alleging that as co-owners, they are entitled to
plaintiff to file thenecessary docket fees? possession of the lot, and that respondent constructed his house thereon
without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite
RULING: demands to do so. They prayed for the private respondent to vacate the
YES. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in property and restore possession thereof to them. The complaint, however,
court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite failed to allege the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners
docket and filing fees. It is not simply the filing of thecomplaint or were able to present during the trial the most recent tax declaration, which
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, shows that the assessed value of the property was Php 5,950.00.
that vests atrial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
action.Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 7. jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the value of the land. The motion
Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive was denied.
counter-claim or moneyclaim against an estate not based on judgment, or Respondent then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the
for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party,etc. complaint, or a complaint, contending that petitioners had no cause of action against him
complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents,
total-sumclaimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
litigation, is:x x x x(b) For filing:1. Actions where the value of the subject The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the
matter cannot be estimated ........ P400.00 decision, holding that the action was one for the recovery of ownership and
possession of real property, and that “absent any allegation in the complaint
2. xxxIn a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, of the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction
the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be over the action” (citing Sec. 33 of R.A. No. 7691). The CA then ordered
the basis in computing the fees. therefiling of the case in the proper court.
Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not ISSUES: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action
susceptible of pecuniaryestimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, the docket fees should not be based on theassessed value of the HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action
subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be is an accionreivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
based onSection 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive
Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 jurisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is without merit.
was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of
the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not
assessed fees, the RTC hasproperly acquired jurisdiction over the the market value thereof. […] In the case at bar, the complaint does not
contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of of possession of the realty. […]”
the complaint. The court cannot take judicial The Supreme Court finally held that all proceedings before the RTC,
notice of the assessed or market value of land. The Court noted that during including the RTC decision, are null and void, since the RTC had no
the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence at ax de c l a r a t ion, jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.
showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was Php5,950.00.
The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax Criticism of the ponencia: The discussion about the distinction between an
declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed accionreivindicatoria and an accionpubliciana is inappropriate. The issue to
their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the be resolved by the court is: which court has jurisdiction, the MTC or the
property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC RTC? It is immaterial whether the case is one for accionreivindicatoria or
had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, since the case involved accionpubliciana; only one court will have exclusive jurisdiction. I submit that
title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than what should have been discussed in the obiter is that if the claim of co-
Php20,000.00. As the Court of Appeals had held: ownership by the defendant is true, may a plaintiff co-owner then file an
“The determining jurisdictional element for the accionreinvindicatoria [sic] is, action in ejectment against another co-owner?
as RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question.
For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed Dr. Tolentino is of the opinion that a co-owner may bring such an action
value exceeds Php20,000.00, and the MTC, if the value is Php20,000.00 or against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession of and asset
below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the ownership in himself alone. The effect of the action will be to obtain
municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax recognition of the co-ownership.
declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured
and presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark The defendant co-owner, however, cannot be excluded from possession
made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention because as co-owner, he also has the right to possess.
that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the
fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration 9. San Pedro vs. Asdala
that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in
Exhibit B, this is Php5,950.00. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive 10. Maslag vs. Monzon et al
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has
jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court 11.Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg
a quo. 24” Leasing Corp.
If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction in a case of quasi- In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving
delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the claim for the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative
actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further
delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners’ invocation of Samson is the owner of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufacturing
this Court’s jurisdiction in the first instance. Corporation.
(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from It is located at Robinson’s Galleria, EDSA cor. Ortigas Avenue, QC.
the denial of the RTC of the petitioners’ motion to dismiss. There is no
final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.) Sometime in November 1999, Samson unlawfully distributed/sold Caterpillar
products(footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories) which are closely
13. Samson vs. Daway identical/colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and
G.R. No. 160054-55 | July 21, 2004 | Ynares-Santiago, J. likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause
confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the
Petitioner: damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user
Manolo P. Samson and owner of the following internationally: “CATERPILLAR”,
Respondents: “CAT”,“CATERPILLAR & DESIGN”, “CAT AND DESIGN”, “WALKING
Hon. Reynaldo Daway (RTC Quezon City), People of the Philippines, and MACHINES” and “TRACK TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.”
Caterpillar, Inc.
Summary: Samson filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings
Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with a because of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in
criminal complaint for unfair competition with the Quezon City RTC because another case (Civ Case No. Q-00-41446) involving unfair competition
he sells imitations of Caterpillar products, to the damage and prejudice of pending in the same RTC branch, as well as a petition for review with the
respondent Caterpillar Inc. He filed a motion to suspend arraignment Sec. of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution.
because of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in
another civil case. This was denied by the trial court. Next, he also filed a RTC denied this.
motion to quash information alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over
him. The Supreme Court ruled against him. In criminal/civil cases involving He then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the trial
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of court has no jurisdiction over the offense.
origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the RTC, as
provided under RA 166 or the Old Trademark Law. Note that at this time, He contended that since under Section 170 of the IPC, the penalty of
the IPC was already enacted. However, the IPC did not repeal the imprisonment forunfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is
provisions involving jurisdiction, hence, RA 166 as regards jurisdiction is still cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court,
good law. Further, there can be no prejudicial question involved in this case. per R.A. No. 7691.
It is important to note that under unfair competition,
fraud RTC also denied this.
is the common element. Also, an independent civil action may be filed
under Art. 33 of the Civil Code for fraud. Being an independent civil action, Hence, this petition.
there can be no prejudicial question.
Facts: Issues/Held:
Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with two (IMPT) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation
informations for unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code of intellectual property rights?
(IPC). The following are the pertinent portions of the informations:
RTC. Samson is wrong.
Was there a prejudicial question involved in this case as claimed by the O
accused? Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual
– property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly
NO. Judge correctly dismissed the motion to suspend arraignment. stated so under Section163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict
Whether the pendency of the petition for review with the SOJ on the finding between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail.
of probable cause for unfair competition shall suspend the proceedings In this case, the IPC and RA 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction
– over violationsof intellectual property rights to the RTC.
NO. It should prevail over RA No 7691 (as cited by Samson) which is a general
law.
Ratio Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is
Jurisdiction Issue properlylodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is
Under Section 170 of the IPC, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the imprisonment of lessthan 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging
criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
false designation of origin and false description or representation, is In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving
imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand violations of intellectual property rights under the IPC, the Court issued A.M.
Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002designating certain Regional Trial
Courts as Intellectual Property Courts.
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating
criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 jurisdiction to hearand decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and
shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction Exchange Commission cases inspecific Regional Trial Courts designated as
under existing laws. Special Commercial Courts.
Petitioner also cites the case of Mirpuri in arguing that RA 166 was already
The existing law referred to here is Sec. 27 of RA 166 (The OLD repealed totally by the IPC. However, such argument has no merit because
Trademark Law) there is no categorical ruling that violation of IP rights is lodged with the
It provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, MTC. Also, the mere passing remark in that case was merely
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or a backgrounderto the enactment of the IPC and cannot
representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial be construed as a pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual
Court) property rights.
Now, Samson is claiming that RA 166 is already repealed by the IPC.
However, this is not so, because: Prejudicial Question Issue
The repealing clause of the IPC reads that “all acts and parts of Acts Samson failed to substantiate his allegations of prejudicial question.
inconsistent herewith, more particularly RA 166 (and goes on to cite other
laws), are hereby repealed). In any case, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according tolaw, proceed independently of each other.
The use of the phrases “parts of Acts” and “inconsistent herewith” only
means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair
susceptible of harmonization with the IPC. competition under Section168 of the IPC is fraud
Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with
Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation,
fraud, and physicalinjuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the three sons in the
distinct from the criminal action,may be brought by the injured party. Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal
dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of
Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by private their children and deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that
respondent also relateto unfair competition, is an independent civil action petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and
under Article 33 of the Civil Code.As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
question that will justify the suspension of thecriminal cases at bar. On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that
Petition for Review Issue respondent was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was
habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of
According to the Rules, while the pendency of a petition for review is a the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her
ground for suspension ofthe arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002,
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60days reckoned from the filing it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then
of the petition with the reviewing office. that he went to Laguna where he worked as a tricycle driver. He also
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under
Hence, after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of
the accusedor to deny the motion to defer arraignment. 1997”) family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
In this case, Samson failed to substantiate his allegations/failed to discharge For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May
the burden of provingthat he was entitled to a suspension of his 18, 2002 but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner
arraignment. who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner’s alcoholism and
drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of
His pleadings and annexes do not show the date of filing of the petition of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the
review withthe SOJ. fact that their home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently
meddled in their personal problems.
14. In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its
Corpus authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213
of the Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of the two
15.MADRIÑAN vs. MADRIÑAN younger sons who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject
GR No. 159374 to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to eldest son who was then
July 12, 2007 eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the
proper family court in a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule
FACTS: 99 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
married on July 7, 1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a
daughter. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their ISSUE: Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas
conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Albay and corpus as jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the Family Courts under
subsequently to Laguna. R.A. 8369.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch HELD:
things up between her and petitioner but failed. She then brought the matter RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
to the LupongTagapamayapa in their Barangay, but this too proved futile. over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA
8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the Court of Leyte, a separate civil complaint against the petitioners for
SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in harmony with the damages arising from what they claimed to be their malicious prosecution.
provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129 The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the
(the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — that family courts have trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-
concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter. The
where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed by motion was granted .On July 6, 1989, however, the respondent judge, acting
Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004. on the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the complaint, saying it was
In this case, after petitioner moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002, “distinct from the labor case for damages now pending before the labor
he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial courts.” The petitioners then came to this Court for relief.
regions. By giving the family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation leaving individuals like the Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the claim for damages
respondent without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her children. arising from the malicious prosecution of the petitioner company.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose Held: It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and
writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack their employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so
of recourse could not have been the intention of RA 8369. only if there is a “reasonable causal connection” between the claim asserted
Moreover, under, RA 8369, the family courts are vested with original and employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of
exclusive jurisdiction in custody casesnot in habeas corpus cases. Writs of Article 217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the
habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by the family courts under regular courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.
said law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome, 3 two employees filed in the Court of First
with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Instance of Rizal a civil complaint for damages against their employer for
slanderous remarks made against them by the company president. On the
16. TUCP vs. Coscolluela order dismissing the case because it came under the jurisdiction of the labor
17. Primero vs. IAC arbiters, Justice Vicente Abad Santos said for the Court:
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair
18.PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTOR PHILS.vs. GALANG, September 24,1991 labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts
allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing
Facts: The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders
suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola under review are based on a wrong premise.
bottles. On July 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for
against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte
complaint for falsification of private documents. After a preliminary by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that there is
investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte, the a “reasonable causal connection” between the complaint and the relations of
complaint was dismissed. the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did not arise from
Allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private respondents were such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an
dismissed by the petitioner company on November 23, 1987. As a result, employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any
they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that the
Branch of the NLRC in Tacloban City and decisions mandateed petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint which
reinstatement with damages. In addition, they instituted in the Regional Trial the Municipal Trial Court said was intended “to harass the poor employees”
and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial Prosecutor “for
lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability that all the thewrit of execution since it has the inherent power to controlits own
respondents processes in order to enforce its judgments andorders.True, an action
herein have committed the crime imputed against them.” This is a matter for damages lies within the jurisdiction of aregional trial court. However,
which the labor arbiter has no competence to resolve as the applicable law the RTC has no jurisdiction toissue a TRO in labor cases. The SC finds
is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal Code. respondent Judgeguilty of gross ignorance of the law.
WHEREFORE, the order dated July 6, 1989, is AFFIRMED and the petition
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. 22. Tolosavs NLRC (2008)
On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the CA’s decision, Locsin filed the
Chairman of the Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the present petition.
Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda was the election of a new
set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman nor ISSUE:WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction?
reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.
HELD: We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal The CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists
with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and between Locsin and Nissan. Locsin was undeniably Chairman and
attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who President, and was elected to these positions by the Nissan board pursuant
was then President of NCLPI. to its By-laws. As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. The
CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on
On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson Presidential Decree 902-A, which defines corporate officers as “those
filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have officers of a corporation who are given that character either by the
jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsin’s removal as Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.” Likewise, Section 25 of
EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute. the Corporation Code provides that corporate officers are the president,
secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the
On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to by-laws. Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin already acted
dismiss, maintaining his position that he is an employee of NCLPI. as a corporate officer because the position of Executive Vice-
President/Treasurer is provided for in Nissan’s By-Laws. Article IV, Section
On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying the 4 of these By-Laws specifically provides for this position.
Motion to Dismiss, holding that her office acquired “jurisdiction to arbitrate
and/or decide the instant complaint finding extant in the case an employer- An “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is
employee relationship.” elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an “employee”
usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the
NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. NCLPI raised the issue on also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
whether the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion by denying
the Motion to Dismiss and holding that her office had jurisdiction over the In this case, Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with the
dispute. Amended By-Laws of the corporation. Locsin, therefore, at the time of his
severance from NCLPI, was the latter’s corporate officer.
On August 28, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a corporate
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)
or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his bondingcompany and defendant-appellant.
relationship with Nissan. The RTC should exercise jurisdiction based on the G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
following:
FACTS:
Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of PD 902-A provided that intra- Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses
corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC. However, after Sibonghanoy to recover from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal
RA8799 took effect, Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of the said law transferred interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the
said jurisdiction to the RTC.
defendants’ properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the
court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had
Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, we would be forced to
become final and executor, the court issued a writ of execution against
remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if we were to
the defendants. The writ being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the
dismiss the petition outright due to the wrongful use of Rule 65. We cannot
close our eyes, however, to the factual and legal reality, established by
issuance of the writ of execution against
evidence already on record, that Locsin is a corporate officer whose the Surety’s bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on
termination of relationship is outside a labor arbiter’s jurisdiction to rule the ground that the
upon. same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied by the
RTC. The Surety appealed in the CA, which was denied. This time, the
Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the surety just asked for an extension in order for them to file the motion for
case, and primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it
hear and rule on a case and is the threshold element that must exist before filed a motion to dismiss saying that by virtue of R.A. 296 which is the
any quasi-judicial officer can act. In the context of the present case, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948, section 88 of which placed
Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
brought, and should not be allowed to continue to act on the case after the action where the value of the subject matter does not exceed P2,000.00.
absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on the records and the The Court of First Instance therefore has no jurisdiction over the case.
law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial The question of jurisdiction was filed by the Surety only 15 years from
delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of the time the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance.
injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the
merits of termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of ISSUE: WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE
an intra-corporate dispute on this point before the appropriate RTC.
LACK OF JURISDICTIONHELD:
No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
The petition is dismissed and the CA decision is affirmed.
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court. The rule is that jurisdiction over the
26.Mangaliang vs. Catubig-Pastoral-SAME Pg. 8
subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusive by law as by law
and as the lack of it affect the very authority of the court to take
27. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL.,
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and
present cases, a party may be barred by laches from involving this plea
LUCIABAGUIO,
for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done
defendants,
in the case. A party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny HELD: No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the
it to escape a herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No.
penalty. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil
case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown,
among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been
28. CALIMLIMvsHON. RAMIREZG.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982 rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is
FACTS: lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy.
to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res
9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the judicata does not exist in the case.
name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was
not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a
the Court directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of
Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition to declare the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance,
TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
petition was granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of
Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the corporation, TCT No. issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of ownership or title to real property.
land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as
a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the 29. SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA
court dismissed the petition. vs.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation CA, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, and LUCKY HOMES, INC.
of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then
resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the G.R. No. 144025; December 27, 2002; CORONA, J.:
conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property,
covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have FACTS:
bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private Sometime in 1970, Sps. Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from private
respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of
property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated 240 square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19
on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco under a TCT and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as
Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by security for their housing loan.
prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the
respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior
judgment. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19
but on Lot No. 18, as Lucky Homes Inc mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as
Issue: W/N dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent informed petitioners
prior judgment of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen
their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their
house.
However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from ISSUE:
SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners’ WON the Sps Gonzaga are estopped from questioning the
certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of jurisdiction of the RTC to try the case
SSS.
HELD:
Sps. Gonzaga then offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in
Lucky Homes that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of numerous cases, is still controlling. In explaining the concept of jurisdiction
sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house by estoppel, the Court quoted its decision in said case, to wit:
was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This prompted "It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of contract secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36. to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x xxx [T]he
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the
action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that when Lot No. barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is
19 was foreclosed and sold at public auction, the reformation, or the valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19, was no longer feasible considering that Sps. practice can not be tolerated–– obviously for reasons of public policy."
Gonzaga were no longer the owners of Lot 19. Thus, Lucky Homes would Furthermore, the Court said that it was petitioners themselves who invoked
be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore. Furthermore, the RTC the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of
ruled: contract against private respondents. It must be noted that in the
"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their
defendant. It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue
Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly of the court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two
indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ
contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of
parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, jurisdiction ─ and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to
hence the same need no longer be reformed.” them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to question the court’s
A writ of execution was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to recall said jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
writ on the ground that the RTC lack jurisdiction as pursuant to PD 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), it was vested in DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consequently, Sps. Gonzaga
filed a new complaint with the HLURB, and also a petition for annulment of Petition for review is denied.
judgment with the CA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
30. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corp. V. Eddy Ng Kok Wei
G.R. No. 139791, 12 December 2003, Third Division, (Sandoval-
The CA dismissed the petition, relying on the doctrine of estoppel laid down Gutierrez, J.)
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
Yet while it may be true that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear vs.
the case, the petitioner company’s active participation in the proceedings ALS MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondent.
estopped it from assailing such lack of it. The Court has held that it is an PANGANIBAN, J.
undesirable practice for a party participating in proceedings and submitting DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Regulatory
its case for decision and then accepting judgment if acceptable, only to Board (HLURB) over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD 1344 is
attacking it later for lack of jurisdiction if adverse. exclusive. It has sole jurisdiction in:
a. A complaint of specific performance for the delivery of a certificate
FACTS: Eddy Kok Wei purchased from Manila Bankers Life Insurance Co. of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot;
a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces. Kok Wei and Manila Bankers b. For claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or
Life president Antonio Puyat executed a contract to sell where it was not; and
stipulated that the condo unit shall be substantially completed and c. For determining whether there is a perfected sale of contract.
delivered to Kok Wei within 15 months from February 8, 1989 or May 8, Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
1990. The turnover date was moved to May 31, 1990 due to uncontrollable seeking to set aside the decision of the CA.
forces (typhoons, coup d’etat attempts, steel and cement shortage).
The trial court found Manila Bankers Life liable for damages due to delay in Facts:
the performance of its obligation. On appeal, the CA affirmed the award of 1. "On July 29, 1985, [petitioner] BPI Investment Corporation filed a
damages, prompting Manila Bankers Life to elevate the case to the SC. complaint for a Sum of Money against ALS Management and
Petitioner company argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the Development Corporation, alleging inter alia that on July 22, 1983,
case as it is properly cognizable by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory [petitioner] and [respondent] executed at Makati, Metro Manila a
Board (HLURB). Deed of Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of the Twin
Towers Condominium located at Ayala Avenue, corner Apartment
ISSUE: Ridge Street, Makati, Metro Manila designated as Unit E-4A
Whether or not the trial court have jurisdiction to decide Kok Wei’s comprising of 271 squares [sic] meters more or less, together with
complaint? parking stalls identified as G022 and G-63.
2. The Condominium Certificate of Title No. 4800 of the Registry of
HELD: Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila was issued after the execution of
Complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium the said Deed of Sale.
unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the exclusive 3. [Petitioner] advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses in
jurisdiction of the HLURB. causing the issuance and registration of the Condominium
Yet while it may be true that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear Certificate of Title.
the case, the petitioner company’s active participation in the proceedings 4. Under the penultimate paragraph of the Deed of Sale, it is stipulated
estopped it from assailing such lack of it. The Court has held that it is an that the VENDEE [respondent] shall pay all the expenses for the
undesirable practice for a party participating in proceedings and submitting preparation and registration of this Deed of Sale and such other
its case for decision and then accepting judgment if acceptable, only to documents as may be necessary for the issuance of the
attacking it later for lack of jurisdiction if adverse. corresponding Condominium Certificate of Title.
5. After the [petitioner] complied with its obligations under the said
31. G.R. No. 151821 April 14, 2004 Deed of Sale, [respondent], notwithstanding demands made by
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, as Successor-in-Interest of BPI [petitioner], failed and refused to pay [petitioner] its legitimate
Investment Corporation, petitioner, advances for the expenses mentioned above without any valid,
legal or justifiable reason.
6. [Respondent] averred among others that it has just and valid b. The sum of P136,608.75, representing unearned
reasons for refusing to pay [petitioner’s] legal claims. income
a. In clear and direct contravention of Section 25 of c. The sum of P27,321.75 per month for a period of
Presidential Decree No. 957 which provides that ‘No fee twenty-one (21) months (from May 1985 to January
except those required for the registration of the deed of sale 1987), representing unearned income
in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance 8. Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s finding that "while
of such title’, the [petitioner] has jacked-up or increased the [petitioner] succeeded in proving its claim against the [respondent]
amount of its alleged advances for the issuance and for expenses incurred in the registration of [the latter’s] title to the
registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title in the condominium unit purchased, x xx for its part [respondent] in turn
name of the [respondent], by including therein charges succeeded in establishing an even bigger claim under its
which should not be collected from buyers of condominium counterclaim."11
units. 9. Hence, this Petition.12
b. "[Respondent] further averred that [petitioner] represented
to the [respondent] that the condominium unit will be Issues:
delivered completed and ready for occupancy not later than Whether or not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and
December 31, 1981. [Respondent] relied solely upon the not the RTC had jurisdiction over the respondent’s counterclaim--being one
descriptions and warranties contained in the for specific performance (correction of defects/deficiencies in the
aforementioned brochures and other sales propaganda condominium unit) and damages? YES!
materials when [respondent] agreed to buy Unit E-4A of the And, whether or not petitioner could still deny the trial court’s jurisdiction
Twin Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00 after prceeding with the trial? NO!
considering that the Twin Towers was then yet to be built. In
contravention of [petitioner’s] warranties and of good The Petition is partly meritorious.
engineering practices, the condominium unit purchased by
[respondent] suffered from the following defects and/or Held:
deficiencies: Contending that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
7. Trial court ruled: (HLURB) -- not the RTC -- that had jurisdiction over respondent’s
1. Ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sum of counterclaim, petitioner seeks to nullify the award of the trial court.
P26,300.45, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint up As mandated by PD No. 957, the jurisdiction of the HLURB is
to full payment thereof, representing the amount spent for the encompassing. Hence, we said in Estate Developers and Investors
registration of the title to the condominium unit in [respondent’s] Corporation v. Sarte:15
name; "x xx. While PD 957 was designed to meet the need basically to protect lot
2. Ordering [petitioner] to deliver, replace or correct at buyers from the fraudulent manipulations of unscrupulous subdivision
[petitioner’s] exclusive expense/cost or appoint a licensed owners, sellers and operators, the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ vested in the NHA
qualified contractor to do the same on its behalf, the following is broad and general -‘to regulate the real estate trade and business’ in
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit owned by the accordance with the provisions of said law."
[respondent. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following: Section 1 of PD No. 1344 is exclusive. Thus, we have ruled that the board
a. The sum of P40,000.00 representing reimbursement for has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of specific performance for the delivery of
expenses incurred for the materials/labor in installing a certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot; 16 for claims of refund
walls/floor titles in 2 bathrooms and bar counter cabinet.
regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not;17 and for determining METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA GOKONGWIE-
whether there is a perfected contract of sale.18 PE, Petitioners, v. Johnny Pastorin, Respondent.
Clearly then, respondent’s counterclaim -- being one for specific
performance (correction of defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit) FACTS:
and damages -- falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB as provided by Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by Metromedia Times
Section 1 of PD No. 1344. Corporation (Petitioner) on 10 December 1990 as a Field
In the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a Representative/Collector. His task entailed the periodic collection of
judgment unfavorable to it did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it may receivables from dealers of petitioner's newspapers.
no longer deny the trial court’s jurisdiction, for estoppel bars it from doing so. Respondent, because of tardiness was supposedly terminated by the
This Court cannot countenance the inconsistent postures petitioner has petitioner company, but because of the timely intervention of the union, the
adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular court to which it has dismissal was not effected.
voluntarily submitted.24 However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a
The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for magazine dealer and when he was not able to pay the loan, he stopped
decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it collecting the outstanding dues of the dealer/creditor. After requiring him
for lack of jurisdiction if it is not.25 to explain, respondent admitted his failure to pay the loan but gave no
We also find petitioner guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise the definitive explanation for the same.
question of jurisdiction earlier. From the time that respondent filed its Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed to
counterclaim on November 8, 1985, the former could have raised such do field work, and was transferred to a new position. Despite the completion
issue, but failed or neglected to do so. It was only upon filing its appellant’s of his suspension, respondent stopped reporting for work and sent a letter
brief26 with the CA on May 27, 1991, that petitioner raised the issue of communicating his refusal to accept the transfer. He then filed a complaint
jurisdiction for for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other money
Thus, we struck down the defense of lack of jurisdiction, since the appellant claims with the labor arbiter.
therein failed to raise the question at an earlier stage. It did so only after an
adverse decision had been rendered.
The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. Petitioner lodged an
WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed appeal with the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals MODIFIED, as follows: labor arbiter over respondent’s complaint. Significally, this issue was not
Hereby DELETED is the requirement on the part of petitioner to (1) deliver raised by petitioner in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
storage facilities on the ground floor; (2) pay P136,608.75 for unearned
income for the five-month period that the lease contract was allegedly The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA has no
suspended; (3) correct the alleged passageway in the balcony; (4) pay jurisdiction over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by
P40,000.00 as reimbursement for completion work done by respondent; (5) the voluntary arbitrator. However, the CA reinstated the ruling of the CA.
pay P27,321.75 per month for a period of twenty-one months for the alleged The CA held that the active participation of the party against whom the
unearned income during the period when the condominium unit remained action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the
vacant. Petitioner, however, is ORDERED to pay P51,000 as temperate court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an
damages for the termination of the lease contract because of the defects in invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the condominium unit. All other awards are AFFIRMED. the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s
jurisdiction.
33. [G.R. NO. 154295. July 29, 2005]
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Decision of the CA is set aside.
LA during appeal.
34. Lourdes Eristngcolvs CA, G.R. No.167702. March 20, 2009
HELD:
The SC held that petitioner is not estopped from questioning the FACTS: Petitioner, owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village, Makati City
jurisdiction of the LA during appeal. started constructing a house on her lot but for alleged violation of its
Construction Rules and Regulations, respondent UVAI, an association of
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject homeowners at Urdaneta Village, imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court working on her property. This prompted petitioner to file the subject
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This complaint before the RTC. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on ground
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that it is the Home
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over intra-
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to corporate disputes involving homeowners associations. Petitioner argues
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional that the subject matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular
circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from courts and need not be filed before a specialized body or commission.
the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been
ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that ISSUE: Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but Board (HLURB)*** which has jurisdiction?
rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time honored
principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. HELD: HLURB has jurisdiction. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that
in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments
the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, of the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint, designated as one for declaration of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by nullity, falls within the regular courts’ jurisdiction. However, we have, on
estoppel. However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not
heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court determinative of the nature of the action. A scrutiny of the allegations
had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals that the nature of the question
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s
court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the interpretation and application of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction
parties, has no bearing thereon. rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol,
admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the
Applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction, application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction
petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor Rules. ***(E.O. No. 535, which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the
arbiter before the NLRC on appeal. HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions
over homeowners’ associations originally vested with the SEC as well as
controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations.
Thereafter, with Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and
responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners’
associations, were transferred to the HLURB.)