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APPENDIX A - ASSUMPTIONS
REGISTER
SKANGASS AS
MANAGING RISK
Table of Contents
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
Societal risks are directly influenced by the numbers of personnel exposed to hazardous events and
hence the results are sensitive to the manning assumptions.
Key influence on societal risk / FAR.
Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis 17.02.2012, Draft Version
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
MANAGING RISK
Table 1 Base case manning within each area for 1st party
Area/Category During Bunkering, i.e. afternoon
Fjordline personnel involved in bunkering activity 2
Skangass Bunkering personnel 2
MANAGING RISK
MANAGING RISK
Skangass LNG
anlegg
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
The weather conditions have a key influence on flammable cloud dispersion and fore heat loads, hence
the consequences associated with any release. The influence of any specific weather category and
direction will vary for each and every release, where on balance the resulting influence of any changes
in the meteorological assumptions will have a negligible influence on the risk results.
Relevant to specific consequences – risk is not sensitive to individual meteorological assumptions.
Reference:
QRA for Lyse LNG Base Load Plant – Train 1 (R100-LE-S-RS0003)
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
MANAGING RISK
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
The dispersion and consequences associated with LNG and other dense gas releases are relatively
sensitive to assumptions affecting the heat transfer to the cloud. Hence, the above values are relatively
conservative representative conditions, but will not necessarily correspond to the worst-case dispersion
conditions that may occur.
Representative conditions used – relevant to consequences, with relatively minor influence on
subsequent risks.
Reference:
QRA for Lyse LNG Base Load Plant – Train 1 (R100-LE-S-RS0003)
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
MANAGING RISK
Ignition Time of
Ignition Source
probability exposure (s)
Flare 54-FC-101 0.251) 10
Fired Heater for Hot Oil 52-FA-101 0.12) 60
2)
H2S Converter 0.1 60
Electrical Substation1) 0.13) 600
Ferry terminal and surroundings (e.g. lighting poles) 0.7 60
1) The flare is located 70m above the ground level, and only large leaks from segment 1 and 2 are
assessed to reach the flare. For other scenarios the ignition probability will be 0.
2) 60 seconds of exposure with an operating probability of 0.5
3) It is assumed that if the air intake of a substation or building is exposed to gas for 600 seconds,
which then enters the building, ignition will occur (i.e. ignition probability of 1). It is, however,
assumed that the gas detection and automatic closure of the HVAC intake dampers is effective in
isolating the sources within the building in 90% of such cases, i.e. the activation frequency for each
substation / building ignition source is taken as 0.1.
In case of gas detection, the bunkering activity will be automatically stopped
Implication of assumption:
Key influence in determining the likelihood of flash fire, pool fire and explosion hazards and the extent
of each (i.e. time of ignition relative to size of cloud). Note, however, that the overall effect is that
there are a significant number of very low ignition probabilities.
Overall effect is a key influence on the risks, but not sensitive to any particular ignition source.
MANAGING RISK
Reference:
/1/ JIP, 1998. Ignition Modelling, Time Dependent Ignition Probability Model, Joint Industry Project –
DNV, Scandpower, et al. DNV Report No. 96-3629, Revision 4, February 1998
/2/ QRA for Lyse LNG Base Load Plant – Train 1 (R100-LE-S-RS0003)
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
MANAGING RISK
Bunkering is planned to take place at the same time as cars are boarding. However, no
passengers are allowed in the tube during this operation.
Unloading of vehicles only takes place when northbound ferry lay at port. Vehicles are then
routed through the ISPS area, i.e. directly past the bunkering station. However, bunkering is
not taking place when unloading vehicles.
The jetty is assumed closed for traffic except for when boarding/unloading takes place.
There are 150 parked cars and trucks waiting to board, with the possibility to have their
engines running.
150 cars and trucks are assumed to be boarding the ferry by the south gate, planned LNG
bunkering operations is allowed during this step.
Ignition Time of
Ignition Source Traffic density, per day
probability, per vehicle/vessel exposure (s)
Trucks/cars loading 0.4 60 150
Maintenance traffic 0.4 60 1
Parking area traffic 0.4 60 20
Ferry 0.5 60 1
Implication of assumption:
Probability of ignition in case of release.
Influences societal risk result.
Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis 17.02.2012, Draft Version
/2/ Unloading Loading routes Layout Draft
/3/ PGS 3, Guideline for quantitative risk assessment (“Purple book”), Ministry of VROM, 2005
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
MANAGING RISK
Figure 3 Loading/unloading routes; tube and bunkering station (‘manifold’) location; parking areas
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
Key influence in determining the likelihood of flash fire, pool fire and explosion hazards and the extent
of each (i.e. time of ignition relative to size of cloud). Note, however, that the overall effect is that
there are a significant number of very low ignition probabilities.
Overall effect is a key influence on the risks, but not sensitive to any particular ignition source.
Reference:
/1/ PhastRisk version 6.7., 2011
/2/ JIP, 1998. Ignition Modelling, Time Dependent Ignition Probability Model, Joint Industry Project –
DNV, Scandpower, et al. DNV Report No. 96-3629, Revision 4, February 1998.
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
Key influence in determining the likelihood of flash fire, pool fire and explosion hazards and the extent
of each (i.e. time of ignition relative to size of cloud). Note, however, that the overall effect is that
there are a significant number of very low ignition probabilities.
Overall effect is a key influence on the risks, but not sensitive to any particular ignition source.
Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis, 17.02.2012, Draft Version
MANAGING RISK
The LNG booster pump, the fiscal metering package and the first part of the pipeline is located inside
the plant area. The pipeline within the plant will be routed in the existing pipe rack /1/. Outside the
plant, the pipeline will be routed in an underground tunnel up to jetty 38 following the route indicated
in reference /3/. Part of this section will be alongside water pipes. The LNG pipeline will run
underground between the ferry terminal building and the jetty (together with power cables) before
going vertically up. The pipe will then go above ground the last 7 meters before the bunkering station.
The design of the piping has the following characteristics:
- Double-wall (pipe-in-pipe) stainless steel pipe
- Full containment
- Routed in an underground tunnel
- Carried on pipe supports
- Leak detection between the double walls
The loading arm is assumed to be equipped with a break-away coupling according to SiGGTO
standard.
The inventory of a given section is defined as the isolatable mass within that section under normal
operating conditions and in addition to that, the inventory released prior to the segment isolation.
The total inventory is according to Skangass 21,8 m3. /4/
Pressure used in the analysis (leak frequency and release rate), when bunkering is on-going, is 10 barg
downstream the booster pump /4/. This is according to Skangass based on pump vendor’s
specifications.
Pressure used between bunkering operations is the settle out pressure of 7 barg, ref. /1/. Note that all
the pipes and equipment downstream the ESD valve will be filled with LNG during the standby mode.
Implication of assumption:
DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4
Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 14 of 32
DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix A - Assumptions Register
MANAGING RISK
Key influence in determining the likelihood of flash fire, pool fire and explosion hazards and the extent
of each (i.e. time of ignition relative to size of cloud). Note, however, that the overall effect is that
there are a significant number of very low ignition probabilities.
Overall effect is a key influence on the risks, but not sensitive to any particular ignition source.
Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis, 17.02.2012, Draft Version
/2/ Cryonorm Project BV documents, P&IDs number 1301-1100-100, sheets TA01, TB01, TC01,
received 06.05.2013
/3/ Suggested pipeline_trase_24.2.2012.pdf
/4/ Eivind Anfindsen, Skangass, 06.05.2013
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
The above assumptions each have a qualitative influence on risks to 1st, 2nd and 3rd parties.
Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis 17.02.2012, Draft Version
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
Dispersion is based on those inputs, and location and height contributes significantly for the
consequence modelling.
Reference:
MANAGING RISK
Skangass assessed that the maximum volume LNG released due to leak from the loading arm was
estimated to be 3 m3 /1/.
Cryonorm assessed that the inventory in the system is 21.8 m3. /2/
Skangass assessed that the main LNG line up to the ESV valve at the ferry terminal jetty is 15 m3. /3/
Implication of assumption:
The release size taken as representative is a key factor in the release parameters and subsequent
consequences in each case. However, the use of representative releases is inherent in QRA and the
frequencies are assigned according to each of the defined leak size ranges, such that the overall risks
should not be sensitive to the specific values selected. Nevertheless, the representative nature of each
release size should be recognised.
Reference:
/1/ Assumption 4-C
/2/ Email received from Eivind Anfindsen 08.05.2013
/3/ Email from Eivind Anfindsen received 06.05.2013
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:
MANAGING RISK
Leak frequency per visit in the ACDS data /2/ is for filling of LNG tankers, which typically lasts for
18-24 hours, whereas the ferry bunkering duration is significantly shorter, see Assumption no. 1-A and
1-D. The total generic frequency above is this thus reduced accordingly.
It should also be noted that the generic frequency data is not modified to account for dropped objects,
this should be considered. The generic data includes leaks from all causes, including dropped objects,
such that additional dropped object risks should only be included where identified as a particular
hazard or potential leak cause. (The passengers have access to the sun deck, however due to the design
of the ship it is assumed that it will not be possible to drop any objects from the deck and onto the
bunkering station).
Implication of assumption:
Key influence on the risks (i.e. risk is directly proportional to frequency).
MANAGING RISK
Reference:
/1/ HSE, 2010. Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics, 2010 (until march 2010)
/2/ DNV Guideline 16, LNG QRA Guideline, 09.11.2011
MANAGING RISK
F&G Detection
The fire and gas detection depends on the location and magnitude of the event, the number, location of
detectors and their PFD (probability of failure on demand). However, the basic design of the LNG
bunkering terminal is considered to have enough gas detectors.
The F&G system is automatic activated upon gas detection.
Automatic shutdown of the ESV valve at the bottom of the loading arm:
Manual activation of the emergency shutdown and isolation push-buttons by the operator in the
CCR. The F&G detection system is the basis of ESD duration time.
MANAGING RISK
The ESV valve is based on Skangass input, able to be closed in 6 seconds. /1/
Note: Skangass will use assumptions for response times as requirements for selection of
designer/vendors. DNV recommends that equipment is qualified for compliance with these
requirements.
Implication of assumption:
The detection and isolation assumptions are key influences on the release duration and impact on the
selection of representative release rates. On balance, any specific inventory assumption will have a
limited influence on the overall risks, although the inventory is a key parameter with respect to the
detailed modelling of each scenario.
Reference:
/1/ Eivind Anfindsen email received on the 06.05.2013
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:
MANAGING RISK
The general rule-set adopted is that two ESD valves are required for isolation of a section. For liquid
and gas sections, a probability of failure on demand of 2% is assumed.
As a result, the probability of isolation failure applied within the study is calculated as follows:
Gas QRA Sections: Pisolation failure = 0.15
Liquid QRA Sections: Pisolation failure = 0.15
Reference:
A: TD0096, Akseptkriterier og beskrivelser av svikt for utvalgte sikkerhetskomponenter (DRAFT)
B: Anbefalte sviktrater – risikoanalyser, Skangass AS 29.03.05.
Implication of assumption:
The probability of isolation failure has a key influence on the frequency of release events that have
sufficient duration to lead to escalation.
Reference:
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
The immediate ignition probability has a direct influence on the risks associated with jet and pool fire
risks to personnel (and to assets), which contribute around a quarter of the overall risks.
Reference:
/1/ “Kårstø Plant”. DNV Report No. 98-3090, Rev. 01.
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
MANAGING RISK
MANAGING RISK
Residua
Source Immediate Evaluate Short release Consequence
l Pool
Ignition ? short release ? ? (model used) ?
Fire?
Y Y Y y p=F
Firebal
Defined User Determined p=A n
l
for each defined by PHAST
release (p=1) RISK y p=F
Releas according to Flash
p=B n
e release Fire
properties y p=F
Explosi
p=C n
on
N N
Jet
Fire
Delayed Consequence
Ignition ? (model used) ?
N Y y p=G
p= Flash
Determined by PHAST RISK N
D Fire
according to dispersion,
duration, ignition sources y p=G
Explosi
p=E N
on
N
No
ignitio
n
Figure 4 Example risk model event tree structure
MANAGING RISK
Reference:
MANAGING RISK
Reference:
MANAGING RISK
MANAGING RISK
Bunkering duration is 1 hour for LNG cool down and transfer and ½ an hour for connection and
disconnection of loading arm to ship manifold.
The ferry is scheduled to arrive at 8 in the afternoon. Fjordline /2/ has estimated the following ferry
arrival delays:
Implication of assumption:
The above assumptions each have key influences on the frequency estimates.
Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis 17.02.2012, Draft Version
/2/ Email from Larsen/Fjordline to Gautestad/Skangass, 24.02.2012, subject: “SV: Forsinkelser av
anløp pga vær etc.”
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:
MANAGING RISK
Implication of assumption:
The risks are directly influenced by the impact and fatality assumptions, which quantify the severity of
the consequences. The above assumptions include some allowance for differing escape characteristics
in different areas of the facility, but remain consistent with established, conservative best-practice.
Reference:
- DNV expert judgement – using PHAST Risk defaults and DNV Technical data
MANAGING RISK
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