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APPENDIX A - ASSUMPTIONS
REGISTER

SKANGASS AS

REPORT NO./DNV REG NO.: 2013-4091 / 17TLT29-4


REV 1, 11.06.2013
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Table of Contents

Assumption no. Subject


Description and Background Data
1-A Manning Level
2-A Meteorological Data
3-A Meteorological Parameters
4-A Ignition sources – Equipment
5-A Ignition sources – Traffic
6-A Ignition Sources – People
7-A Ignition sources – Hot work
8-A Bunkering installation – Base case design and inventory
9-A Escape and Evacuation of Passengers and Personnel
LNG accidents
Representative Scenario Assumptions
1-C Release Location / Height
2-C Release Sizes
Frequency Analysis Assumptions
3-C Leak frequencies
Event Tree Modelling Assumptions
4-C Detection and Isolation Times
5-C Isolation Failure
6-C Immediate Ignition Probability
7-C Event Tree Framework
8-C Event Tree Probabilities
Consequence Modelling Assumptions
9-C Dispersion Parameters
10-C Consequence Modelling Parameters
Storage & loading – Specific
1-D Bunkering Frequency
Impact Criteria
1-H End Point (Impact) and Vulnerability (Fatality) Criteria

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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 1-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Manning level and distribution
Specifications:
Manning levels are defined for the following time periods:
 ‘Day’: Morning shift (08:00 to 16:00) and Afternoon shift (16:00 to 00:00).
 ‘Night’: 00:00 to 08:00.
The risk analysis is based on the onsite population and off-site population :
- 1st party: Personnel in the plant; Fjordline and Skangass personnel involved in the bunkering
operation; Skangass personnel.
- 2nd party: Risavika harbour personnel, Fjordline personnel not involved in the bunkering
operation, Ferry terminal workers.
- 3rd party: Population (workers and public) working/evolving in the Container ara,
Ernegiveien + Risavika, Rest Companies areas. Fjordline’s Passengers, public evolving around
the plant, Tananger residents.
The LNG bunkering operation of Fjordline which are not to be present 24 hours a day, all days
throughout the year, are taken into account. The bunkering operations are planned to last 1.5 hours
every day. 1 hour for LNG cool down and transfer and ½ an hour for connection and disconnection of
loading arm to ship manifold. Hence, possible leakage, from downstream ESD valve, may occur only
during 1 hour per day.
In order to obtain a good representation of the risk picture towards the ferry passengers and to take a
conservative approach, it has been decided that the same population is present for 30 % of the totality
of the LNG bunkering operations.
A total number of 4 workers (1st party) will be present at the bunkering terminal. 1 to 2 Fjordline
personnel at the ship manifold and 1 to 2 Skangass personnel at the jetty. This figure is used to
calculate the average individual risk for 1st party population.
The distribution of on-site (inside the ISPS area of Risavika jetty 38) and off-site people is summarised
in Table 1 and Table 2. Indoor and outdoor factors used in the analysis for the different parties are
presented in Table 3 and Table 4.

Implication of assumption:
Societal risks are directly influenced by the numbers of personnel exposed to hazardous events and
hence the results are sensitive to the manning assumptions.
Key influence on societal risk / FAR.

Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis 17.02.2012, Draft Version
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:

Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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Attachment to Assumption 1-A

Table 1 Base case manning within each area for 1st party
Area/Category During Bunkering, i.e. afternoon
Fjordline personnel involved in bunkering activity 2
Skangass Bunkering personnel 2

Table 2 Base case manning and population


‘Day’
24 hrs
Area/Category ‘Night’
‘Morning’ ‘Afternoon’ average

Peninsula 16*1 16*1 0 2


1
Hiking Track 8* 8*1 0 1
2
Skangass LNG plant* 9 4 4 6
Ferry Terminal – Office Workers 100 10*3 10*3 40
Ferry Terminal – Industry Workers 10 10 14 11
Ferry Terminal – Passengers incl. ferry crew 0 1500 0 500
Energiveien+Risavika – Office Workers 400 40*3 5 148
Energiveien+Risavika – Industry Workers 559 56*3 0 205
Container Area – Office Workers 10 10 1 7
Container Area – Industry Workers 50 50 0 33
Rest Companies – Office Workers 1 139 114*3 10 421
Rest Companies – Industry Workers 715 72*3 0 262
Living Quarters 60 60 60 60
4
Tananger* 5 964 5964 5 964 5 964
1
* In a non-working day
*2 24 hours average will be used when no bunkering is on-going. ‘Afternoon’ will be used when bunkering is
on-going.
*3 Assuming that 10% are working overtime.
*4 Population updated at the 1st of January 2011, source: Statistisk sentralbyrå.

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Table 3 Indoor/outdoor fraction – 1st party


Indoor Outdoor
Area/Category fraction fraction
Administration Building 1 0
Operator/Maintenance 0.8 0.2
Truck Loading (1 person per truck per 1.2h) 0 1
Ship Loading (Jetty- only during connection and disconnection) 0 1
Ship Deck (during loading only) 0 1
Ship Bridge (during loading only) 0.75 0.25

Table 4 Indoor/outdoor fraction - 2nd and 3rd party


Location/Category Indoor fraction Outdoor fraction
Peninsula 0 1
Hiking Track 0 1
Ferry Terminal – Office Workers 1 0
Ferry Terminal – Industry Workers 0 1
Ferry Terminal – Passengers 0.75 0.25
Ship passengers 0.75 0.25
Energiveien+Risavika – Office Workers 1 0
Energiveien+Risavika – Industry Workers 0 1
Container Area – Office Workers 1 0
Container Area – Industry Workers 0 1
Rest Companies – Office Workers 1 0
Rest Companies – Industry Workers 0 1
Living Quarters 0.75 0.25
Tananger Population 0.75 0.25

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Skangass LNG
anlegg

Figure 1 Risavika harbour and population location

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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 2-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Meteorological Data
Specifications:
Data on the wind direction, wind speed and atmospheric stability are combined to form a set of
representative weather categories in the surroundings of Sola, which are taken from the QRA for Lyse
LNG Base Load Plant (ref A). Table 5 shows the wind data and Figure 2 shows the wind rose for Sola.

Implication of assumption:
The weather conditions have a key influence on flammable cloud dispersion and fore heat loads, hence
the consequences associated with any release. The influence of any specific weather category and
direction will vary for each and every release, where on balance the resulting influence of any changes
in the meteorological assumptions will have a negligible influence on the risk results.
Relevant to specific consequences – risk is not sensitive to individual meteorological assumptions.

Reference:
QRA for Lyse LNG Base Load Plant – Train 1 (R100-LE-S-RS0003)
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:

Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

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Attachment to Assumption 2-A

Table 5: Rationalised representative weather categories for Sola


% Occurrence of Weather Classes (Pasquill Stability, Wind Speed)
Wind Direction (o) D1.5 (day) / F1.5 (Night) D6 D12
Total
1.5m/s 6 m/s 12 m/s
292.5 – 337.5 1.99 14.71 2.79 19.49
337.5 – 22.5 0.961 7.09 1.346 9.397
22.5 – 67.5 1.012 7.47 1.417 9.899
67.5 – 112.5 1.633 12.04 2.293 15.966
112.5 – 157.5 1.335 9.89 1.878 13.103
157.5 – 202.5 0.501 3.69 0.702 4.893
202.5 – 247.5 0.807 5.96 1.13 7.897
247.5 – 292.5 1.977 14.57 2.76 19.307
All 10.216 75.42 14.316 100

Figure 2 Wind rose data for Sola, Rogaland

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Assumption No.: 3-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Meteorological Parameters
Specifications:
In addition to the weather categories, certain meteorological constants are defined as inputs to the
consequence modelling. These values are summarised below:

Parameter Value Notes and References


Atmospheric temperature 10ºC Range is 5º to 45ºC.
Atmospheric pressure 101 325 Average sea level pressure.
N/m2
Relative humidity 68% Range is 50% to 85%.
Surface temperature 10ºC Taken to be the same as atmospheric
temperature.
Surface roughness parameter 0.3 for land Land value appropriate for terrain with varying
0.05 for geometry, water value for coastal waters.
water
Solar flux 100 W/m2 The maximum solar flux (i.e. midday
midsummer) is about 1320 W/m2. However, the
solar flux varies diurnally, annually and with
cloud amount. Hence the annual mean value will
be less than half the maximum. 100 W/m2 is a
representative value.
Wind speed reference height 10 m Standard for meteorological measurements.

Implication of assumption:
The dispersion and consequences associated with LNG and other dense gas releases are relatively
sensitive to assumptions affecting the heat transfer to the cloud. Hence, the above values are relatively
conservative representative conditions, but will not necessarily correspond to the worst-case dispersion
conditions that may occur.
Representative conditions used – relevant to consequences, with relatively minor influence on
subsequent risks.
Reference:
QRA for Lyse LNG Base Load Plant – Train 1 (R100-LE-S-RS0003)
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:

Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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Assumption No.: 4-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Ignition Sources – Equipment
Specifications:
The basis for defining ignition source probabilities for equipment items within the plant is taken as the
JIP Ignition Modelling study /1/.
The values given in the JIP Ignition Modelling study are summarised below, together with
modification factors proposed within the study and the value adopted for this analysis. It is considered
that with respect to ignition sources associated with electrical and rotating equipment, the Skangass
LNG Plant and the LNG bunkering facility is consistent with a modern, best-practice offshore facility.
Hence the recommended modification factors are adopted for all except the ‘Other’ category, which is
considered to be less practical to control for land based facilities.

Base Ignition JIP Ignition Probability


Modification
Equipment Type Probability, per Modification Used, per second of
factor Used
second of exposure Factor exposure
Electrical 2.7E-08 per m2 0.49 0.5 1.4E-08 per m2
Other 2.1E-09 per m2 0.65 1 2.1E-09 per m2
Pump 2.1E-07 per item 0.61 0.6 1.3E-08 per item
Compressor 5.1E-06 per item 0.61 0.6 3.1E-06 per item
Generator / Turbine 6.2E-06 per item 0.61 0.6 3.7E-06 per item

Ignition Time of
Ignition Source
probability exposure (s)
Flare 54-FC-101 0.251) 10
Fired Heater for Hot Oil 52-FA-101 0.12) 60
2)
H2S Converter 0.1 60
Electrical Substation1) 0.13) 600
Ferry terminal and surroundings (e.g. lighting poles) 0.7 60
1) The flare is located 70m above the ground level, and only large leaks from segment 1 and 2 are
assessed to reach the flare. For other scenarios the ignition probability will be 0.
2) 60 seconds of exposure with an operating probability of 0.5
3) It is assumed that if the air intake of a substation or building is exposed to gas for 600 seconds,
which then enters the building, ignition will occur (i.e. ignition probability of 1). It is, however,
assumed that the gas detection and automatic closure of the HVAC intake dampers is effective in
isolating the sources within the building in 90% of such cases, i.e. the activation frequency for each
substation / building ignition source is taken as 0.1.
In case of gas detection, the bunkering activity will be automatically stopped
Implication of assumption:
Key influence in determining the likelihood of flash fire, pool fire and explosion hazards and the extent
of each (i.e. time of ignition relative to size of cloud). Note, however, that the overall effect is that
there are a significant number of very low ignition probabilities.
Overall effect is a key influence on the risks, but not sensitive to any particular ignition source.

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Reference:
/1/ JIP, 1998. Ignition Modelling, Time Dependent Ignition Probability Model, Joint Industry Project –
DNV, Scandpower, et al. DNV Report No. 96-3629, Revision 4, February 1998
/2/ QRA for Lyse LNG Base Load Plant – Train 1 (R100-LE-S-RS0003)
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:

Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 5-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Ignition sources – Traffic
Specifications:
 Bunkering will only take place when southbound ferry lay at port. Boarding will take place
either by passenger tube or cars/trucks by the ro-ro ramp. Consequently, vehicles do not board
through ISPS area, where bunkering station is to be located. Vehicles board from the parking
area south/southwest to the ISPS area, at a minimum distance of 40 m from the bunkering
station.

 Bunkering is planned to take place at the same time as cars are boarding. However, no
passengers are allowed in the tube during this operation.

 Unloading of vehicles only takes place when northbound ferry lay at port. Vehicles are then
routed through the ISPS area, i.e. directly past the bunkering station. However, bunkering is
not taking place when unloading vehicles.

 The jetty is assumed closed for traffic except for when boarding/unloading takes place.
There are 150 parked cars and trucks waiting to board, with the possibility to have their
engines running.

 150 cars and trucks are assumed to be boarding the ferry by the south gate, planned LNG
bunkering operations is allowed during this step.

Ignition Time of
Ignition Source Traffic density, per day
probability, per vehicle/vessel exposure (s)
Trucks/cars loading 0.4 60 150
Maintenance traffic 0.4 60 1
Parking area traffic 0.4 60 20
Ferry 0.5 60 1

Implication of assumption:
Probability of ignition in case of release.
Influences societal risk result.
Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis 17.02.2012, Draft Version
/2/ Unloading Loading routes Layout Draft
/3/ PGS 3, Guideline for quantitative risk assessment (“Purple book”), Ministry of VROM, 2005
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:

Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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Figure 3 Loading/unloading routes; tube and bunkering station (‘manifold’) location; parking areas

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Assumption No.: 6-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Ignition Sources – People
Specifications:
The default value assigned within PhastRisk for the ignition source associated with people
corresponds to 1.68E-4 per person per second of cloud exposure. This value has been derived to
account for the probability of ignition associated with people in general, and includes an allowance for
smoking and general human behaviour associated with residential areas.
The value assigned to personnel working offshore by the JIP Ignition Study (Reference /2/) is
significantly lower, being almost 4 orders of magnitude lower even for dense populations.
The value applicable to Skangass personnel at the bunkering station (i.e. a trained workforce, with no
smoking and with traffic and hot work ignition sources accounted for separately) would be much
closer to that recommended by the JIP study in practice; however the default PhastRisk value will be
conservatively applied in the analysis.

Implication of assumption:
Key influence in determining the likelihood of flash fire, pool fire and explosion hazards and the extent
of each (i.e. time of ignition relative to size of cloud). Note, however, that the overall effect is that
there are a significant number of very low ignition probabilities.
Overall effect is a key influence on the risks, but not sensitive to any particular ignition source.

Reference:
/1/ PhastRisk version 6.7., 2011
/2/ JIP, 1998. Ignition Modelling, Time Dependent Ignition Probability Model, Joint Industry Project –
DNV, Scandpower, et al. DNV Report No. 96-3629, Revision 4, February 1998.
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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Assumption No.: 7-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Ignition sources – Hot work
Specifications:
The analysis is based on no hot work taking place within the bunkering area.

Implication of assumption:
Key influence in determining the likelihood of flash fire, pool fire and explosion hazards and the extent
of each (i.e. time of ignition relative to size of cloud). Note, however, that the overall effect is that
there are a significant number of very low ignition probabilities.
Overall effect is a key influence on the risks, but not sensitive to any particular ignition source.

Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis, 17.02.2012, Draft Version

Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.213


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 8-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Bunkering station – Base case design and inventory
Specifications:
The base case design is described by Skangass in Design Basis document /1/ and drawings /2/, /3/ and
/4/.
The ferry bunkering system relevant for the analysis corresponds to /2/ :
- 1 LNG booster pump
- 1 8” LNG pipeline
- 1 4” Vapour Return Line
- 1 flowmeter package
- 1 LNG loading arm
- Small bore fittings, manual and actuated valves.

The details of equipment are available in the appendix D of this study.

The LNG booster pump, the fiscal metering package and the first part of the pipeline is located inside
the plant area. The pipeline within the plant will be routed in the existing pipe rack /1/. Outside the
plant, the pipeline will be routed in an underground tunnel up to jetty 38 following the route indicated
in reference /3/. Part of this section will be alongside water pipes. The LNG pipeline will run
underground between the ferry terminal building and the jetty (together with power cables) before
going vertically up. The pipe will then go above ground the last 7 meters before the bunkering station.
The design of the piping has the following characteristics:
- Double-wall (pipe-in-pipe) stainless steel pipe
- Full containment
- Routed in an underground tunnel
- Carried on pipe supports
- Leak detection between the double walls

The loading arm is assumed to be equipped with a break-away coupling according to SiGGTO
standard.
The inventory of a given section is defined as the isolatable mass within that section under normal
operating conditions and in addition to that, the inventory released prior to the segment isolation.
The total inventory is according to Skangass 21,8 m3. /4/
Pressure used in the analysis (leak frequency and release rate), when bunkering is on-going, is 10 barg
downstream the booster pump /4/. This is according to Skangass based on pump vendor’s
specifications.
Pressure used between bunkering operations is the settle out pressure of 7 barg, ref. /1/. Note that all
the pipes and equipment downstream the ESD valve will be filled with LNG during the standby mode.

Implication of assumption:
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Key influence in determining the likelihood of flash fire, pool fire and explosion hazards and the extent
of each (i.e. time of ignition relative to size of cloud). Note, however, that the overall effect is that
there are a significant number of very low ignition probabilities.
Overall effect is a key influence on the risks, but not sensitive to any particular ignition source.

Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis, 17.02.2012, Draft Version
/2/ Cryonorm Project BV documents, P&IDs number 1301-1100-100, sheets TA01, TB01, TC01,
received 06.05.2013
/3/ Suggested pipeline_trase_24.2.2012.pdf
/4/ Eivind Anfindsen, Skangass, 06.05.2013
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 9-A Revision: 1
Category: Description and Background Data
Subject: Escape and Evacuation of Passengers and Personnel
Specifications:
It is assumed that the escape and evacuation of passengers and personnel are following the LNG plan
evacuation of Fjordline /1/

Implication of assumption:
The above assumptions each have a qualitative influence on risks to 1st, 2nd and 3rd parties.

Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis 17.02.2012, Draft Version
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 1-C Revision: 1
Category: Representative Scenario Assumptions
Subject: Release Location / Height
Specifications:
Release location for each section is derived from the plot plan/drawings of the respective area. The
location is generally selected as that of the vessel containing the main inventory of the section or,
where a number of vessels apply, as the centre of the section.
The representative release height for the plant is 1.5 meter.
The representative release height for the underground pipelines is 0 meter.
The representative release height for the bunkering station is 1 meter.

Implication of assumption:
Dispersion is based on those inputs, and location and height contributes significantly for the
consequence modelling.
Reference:

Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 2-C Revision: 1
Category: Representative Scenario Assumptions
Subject: Release Sizes
Specifications:
To define the hazardous release events applying to each Process Accident release scenario (QRA
section), representative hole sizes are modelled. The selection of the hole sizes is made based on the
need of defining different leak categories, and for each leak size a leak rate is associated. It depends on
how refined the assessment can be, meaning that as more leak categories chosen, a better distribution
of the frequency per leak size is obtained. Based on previous experience, Skangass proposes the
selection of three different leak categories ranging from the following sizes:
Range of Leak Sizes: Representative Hole Size / Equivalent Diameter:
Small 1 to 10 mm To be calculated by LEAK
Medium 10 to 50 mm To be calculated by LEAK
Large greater than 50 mm To be calculated by LEAK

Skangass assessed that the maximum volume LNG released due to leak from the loading arm was
estimated to be 3 m3 /1/.
Cryonorm assessed that the inventory in the system is 21.8 m3. /2/
Skangass assessed that the main LNG line up to the ESV valve at the ferry terminal jetty is 15 m3. /3/

Implication of assumption:
The release size taken as representative is a key factor in the release parameters and subsequent
consequences in each case. However, the use of representative releases is inherent in QRA and the
frequencies are assigned according to each of the defined leak size ranges, such that the overall risks
should not be sensitive to the specific values selected. Nevertheless, the representative nature of each
release size should be recognised.
Reference:
/1/ Assumption 4-C
/2/ Email received from Eivind Anfindsen 08.05.2013
/3/ Email from Eivind Anfindsen received 06.05.2013
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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MANAGING RISK

LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 3-C Revision: 1
Category: Frequency Analysis Assumptions
Subject: Leak frequencies
Specifications:
The generic failure data used as the basis of the frequency analysis of valves, flanges and pipes is the
UK HSE’s Hydrocarbon Release Database from 2010, or HCRD 2010 /1/, /2/. Although the leak
frequency data refer to offshore leaks, it is commonly applied for onshore installations. The leak
frequencies for LNG piping are considered as having a failure frequency of 10% of regular process
pipes.
Equipment count is based on P&ID (Cryonorm Project BV documents, P&IDs number 1301-1100-
100, sheets TA01, TB01, TC01), received 06.05.2013.
Equipment downstream ESV valve for ferry bunkering is assumed to only be in use during bunkering.
Loading arm leak frequency is calculated based on ACDS data covering both connection failures and
ranging failures (leading to disconnection) /2/. The ACDS data is considered to be the most
representative data for liquefied gas loading arms but can be considered a conservative estimate for
LNG.
The table below gives a breakdown of contributors to the loading arm failure frequency from ACDS
data, predicted by DNV /2/:
Cause / Type of failure Failure Frequency (per visit)
Connection Failures Failure of arm 5.7E-05
Failure of quick release connection 5.7E-06
Failure of ship's pipework 6.1E-06
Operator error 6.1E-06
Ranging Failures Mooring fault 6.7E-07
Passing ships 2.3E-07
All 7.6E-05

Leak frequency per visit in the ACDS data /2/ is for filling of LNG tankers, which typically lasts for
18-24 hours, whereas the ferry bunkering duration is significantly shorter, see Assumption no. 1-A and
1-D. The total generic frequency above is this thus reduced accordingly.
It should also be noted that the generic frequency data is not modified to account for dropped objects,
this should be considered. The generic data includes leaks from all causes, including dropped objects,
such that additional dropped object risks should only be included where identified as a particular
hazard or potential leak cause. (The passengers have access to the sun deck, however due to the design
of the ship it is assumed that it will not be possible to drop any objects from the deck and onto the
bunkering station).

Implication of assumption:
Key influence on the risks (i.e. risk is directly proportional to frequency).

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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Date :11.06.2013 Page 19 of 32
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Reference:
/1/ HSE, 2010. Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics, 2010 (until march 2010)
/2/ DNV Guideline 16, LNG QRA Guideline, 09.11.2011

Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 20 of 32
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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 4-C Revision: 1
Category: Event Tree Modelling Assumptions
Subject: Detection and Isolation Times
Specifications:
The times required to detect a release and then to initiate isolation are summarised in the tables below,
which give the representative times assumed for Process Barge and ‘Other’ process events,
respectively.

F&G Detection
The fire and gas detection depends on the location and magnitude of the event, the number, location of
detectors and their PFD (probability of failure on demand). However, the basic design of the LNG
bunkering terminal is considered to have enough gas detectors.
The F&G system is automatic activated upon gas detection.
 Automatic shutdown of the ESV valve at the bottom of the loading arm:
 Manual activation of the emergency shutdown and isolation push-buttons by the operator in the
CCR. The F&G detection system is the basis of ESD duration time.

ESD system – release duration


The initial release rate [in kg/s] is calculated within the PHAST RISK discharge model and set
constant during the representative release duration. In reality, the internal pressure is reduced and this
reduces the release rate (please refer to assumption 11-C), meaning that the release rate should drop in
time. Larger release rates have shorter duration than smaller scenarios for the same segment, as the
inventory after the ESD closure is the same.
At the jetty, DNV recommends to use ESD total time of 90 seconds when the operation is
continuously supervised by operators (60 seconds for detection and initiation, 30seconds for isolation).
The main study will be based on this time at the jetty. For the other areas, the detection and response
time are in compliance with the table provided by Skangass below.
The line will constantly have a flow of 330 m3/h during bunkering operation and no flow during no
bunkering operation. The line will then be liquid filled with stagnant LNG.

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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Date :11.06.2013 Page 21 of 32
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Representative detection and response times


Based on the experience of Skangass and the use of fast responsive gas detectors, ensuring automatic
closure of ESV upon detection, the following response times have been estimated:

Cumulative Time to Initiation


Response Time (min)
(min)
Leak Size Detection Isolation Isolation
Small (<10 mm) 2 2 4
Medium (10-50 mm) 0.2 0.3 0.5
Large (>50 mm) 0.2 0.3 0.5

The ESV valve is based on Skangass input, able to be closed in 6 seconds. /1/
Note: Skangass will use assumptions for response times as requirements for selection of
designer/vendors. DNV recommends that equipment is qualified for compliance with these
requirements.

Implication of assumption:
The detection and isolation assumptions are key influences on the release duration and impact on the
selection of representative release rates. On balance, any specific inventory assumption will have a
limited influence on the overall risks, although the inventory is a key parameter with respect to the
detailed modelling of each scenario.
Reference:
/1/ Eivind Anfindsen email received on the 06.05.2013
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 22 of 32
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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 5-C Revision: 1
Category: Event Tree Modelling Assumptions
Subject: Isolation Failure
Specifications:
To account for the possibility of failure to isolate occurring either due to failure of the relevant ESDs
(PESD) or due to human error (Phuman), the probability of isolation failure is determined as:
Pisolation failure = 1 – (1-Phuman)*(1-PESD)
Where:
PESD = 1 – (1-PFDESD)N
And:
PFDESD is the probability of failure on demand of the ESD(s)., and is the sum of technical
failure rate of logic (0.15%) , valve (2% to 5%) and actuator (0.5%), ref. A and B.
N is the number of ESDs required for isolation, and On average 2 valves are assumed to be
required to isolate a section, hence N = 2.
Phuman = Probability of human failure, and is set to 10%

The general rule-set adopted is that two ESD valves are required for isolation of a section. For liquid
and gas sections, a probability of failure on demand of 2% is assumed.
As a result, the probability of isolation failure applied within the study is calculated as follows:
 Gas QRA Sections: Pisolation failure = 0.15
 Liquid QRA Sections: Pisolation failure = 0.15

Reference:
A: TD0096, Akseptkriterier og beskrivelser av svikt for utvalgte sikkerhetskomponenter (DRAFT)
B: Anbefalte sviktrater – risikoanalyser, Skangass AS 29.03.05.

Implication of assumption:
The probability of isolation failure has a key influence on the frequency of release events that have
sufficient duration to lead to escalation.

Reference:

Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 23 of 32
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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 6-C Revision: 1
Category: Event Tree Modelling Assumptions
Subject: Immediate Ignition Probability
Specifications:
The probability of immediate ignition is derived as a function of the release rate and release phase
using the framework set out below. This immediate ignition probability model is the same as derived
for the corresponding Kårstø QRA study conducted by DNV /1/.
It should be noted that the basis of the derived ignition probabilities is the energy associated with each
release. As such it is important to note that the “liquid” category, in this context, corresponds to the
phase of the material at standard pressure and temperature. Hence, in this study, only the condensate
release scenarios are treated as liquid in terms of ignition probability (i.e. all other liquid releases are
actually gas under cryogenic, or pressurised, conditions).

Leak Size Size Interval, Release Rate (kg/s) Immediate Ignition


Category Gas Liquid Probability
Small <1 < 1.2 0.01%
Medium 1 – 10 1.2 - 25 0.1%
Large > 10 > 25 1%

Implication of assumption:
The immediate ignition probability has a direct influence on the risks associated with jet and pool fire
risks to personnel (and to assets), which contribute around a quarter of the overall risks.
Reference:
/1/ “Kårstø Plant”. DNV Report No. 98-3090, Rev. 01.
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:

Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 24 of 32
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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 7-C Revision: 1
Category: Event Tree Modelling Assumptions
Subject: Event Tree Framework
Specifications:
Figure 4 shows the framework for the modelling of a release within the PHAST RISK risk model, as
summarised below:
 Immediate ignition has a defined probability for each release, detailed in Assumption 6-C.
 Given that immediate ignition occurs, the majority of release scenarios will be modelled as a jet
fire, for gas releases. Where rainout occurs (i.e. where some liquid is present in the release) a
similar event tree applies where the equivalent outcome will be a pool fire (liquid only), or both
pool and jet fires (where liquid rains out from the initial discharge).
 However, the event tree structure enables a proportion of short duration releases (defined as less
than 20 seconds, in this study) to be modelled separately. The event tree enables the user to define
the proportion of these short duration events that are fireballs, flash fires or explosions (conditional
probabilities A, B and C in Figure 4, which are defined in Assumption 8-C). As above, where
liquid is present, the event tree enables pool fires to be either neglected, modelled as the only
outcome, or modelled in addition to the gas impacts (where the latter option is applied within this
study).
 Delayed ignition is calculated within the risk model for each release, as described in the Appendix
A assumptions.
 Where delayed ignition occurs, the outcome is split into flash fire and explosion scenarios
(conditional probabilities D and E in Figure 4, which are defined in Assumption 8-C). This applies
equally to vapour clouds arising from gas releases or clouds flashed from liquid releases, where
delayed ignition of liquid releases will have an additional (“late”) pool fire outcome.
Implication of assumption:
The event tree framework is a key aspect of the QRA model, although the main influence on the risk
results is the probabilities applied within the framework, as described elsewhere within this appendix.
Reference:

Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 25 of 32
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Attachment to Assumption 7-C

Residua
Source Immediate Evaluate Short release Consequence
l Pool
Ignition ? short release ? ? (model used) ?
Fire?

Y Y Y y p=F
Firebal
Defined User Determined p=A n
l
for each defined by PHAST
release (p=1) RISK y p=F
Releas according to Flash
p=B n
e release Fire
properties y p=F
Explosi
p=C n
on

N N
Jet
Fire

Delayed Consequence
Ignition ? (model used) ?

N Y y p=G
p= Flash
Determined by PHAST RISK N
D Fire
according to dispersion,
duration, ignition sources y p=G
Explosi
p=E N
on

N
No
ignitio
n
Figure 4 Example risk model event tree structure

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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Assumption No.: 8-C Revision: 1
Category: Event Tree Modelling Assumptions
Subject: Event Tree Probabilities
Specifications:
The development of a release is largely defined by the stage at which ignition occurs, where the
immediate and delayed ignition parameters are described elsewhere within this appendix.
Immediate ignited releases with pool formation are likely to develop pool fires. Thus in case of a
release with liquid drop which ignites immediately, the pool fire is considered as one of the
consequences.
 Process areas: % fireball, % flash fires, % explosion, % pool fires (i.e. A=, B=, C=, F= 1)
Delayed ignition events are split between flash fire and explosion outcomes (probabilities D and E,
respectively, in Figure 4) which may result or not in pool fires as follows:
 Process areas: % flash fire, % explosion, % pool fires (i.e. D=, E=, G= 0.15)
Those probabilities will come from the explosion assessment.
Implication of assumption:
Short duration events (in the context of PHAST RISK, i.e. less than 20 s) are very limited, and the
difference in risks to personnel associated with flash fire and explosion events are not major. Hence,
the above values do not have a major influence on the overall risks, although the influence will
accumulate for all release scenarios for which each parameter set is applied.

Reference:

Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 27 of 32
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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 9-C Revision: 1
Category: Consequence Modelling Assumptions
Subject: Dispersion Parameters
Specifications:
The key inputs into the dispersion modelling are the release / discharge parameters. Additional
assumptions that influence the dispersion are:
 Weather. The wind speed, direction and stability have a key influence on the downwind dispersion
distance of vapour clouds (and to a lesser extent the radiation contours associated with fires).
These parameters are defined within Assumption 2-A.
 Ambient conditions. The air and surface temperature, together with other local parameters such as
atmospheric pressure and relative humidity, will also have an influence on dispersion. These
parameters are defined within Assumption 3-C.
 Congestion / impingement. The dispersion parameters are derived for an idealised release, with no
consideration of potential obstructions. It is likely that a release will impinge on equipment;
therefore the release is treated as impinged releases.
Implication of assumption:
The above assumptions each have key influences on the consequence results.

Reference:

Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 28 of 32
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LNG Bunkering Terminal, Risavika Harbour Date: 20.05.2013


Assumption No.: 10-C Revision: 1
Category: Consequence Modelling Assumptions
Subject: Consequence Modelling Parameters
Specifications:
The key inputs into the consequence modelling are taken directly from the discharge and dispersion
modelling inputs and results. A wide range of additional parameters are applied within the models,
where in general the widely accepted PHAST Risk default values are applied. The key parameters that
are specific to the above consequence models are summarised below.
 Jet fire – maximum surface emissive power (SEP): 250 kW/m2
 Jet fire – rate modification factor (the mass of vapour that remains in cloud calculated by PHAST is
multiplied by this factor – determines the proportion of the liquid fraction that contributes to the jet
fire for 2-phase jets): 3
 Pool fire – minimum duration – 10 seconds
 Fireball / BLEVE – maximum SEP: 300 kW/m2
 Fireball / BLEVE – mass modification factor (the mass of vapour that remains in cloud calculated
by PHAST is multiplied by this factor – determines the proportion of the liquid fraction that
contributes to the fireball/BLEVE): 3
 Flash fire – The size is calculated based on mass between LFL and UFL (for ignition probabilities,
the 50% LFL is used)
 Explosion – minimum explosion energy: 5 x 106 kJ
 Explosion – explosion efficiency: 10%
Implication of assumption:
The above assumptions each have key influences on the consequence results.
Reference:

Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
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Assumption No.: 1-D Revision: 1
Category: Frequency Assumptions
Subject: Bunkering Frequency
Specifications:
Planned frequency of LNG bunkering is 1 per day.

Bunkering duration is 1 hour for LNG cool down and transfer and ½ an hour for connection and
disconnection of loading arm to ship manifold.

The ferry is scheduled to arrive at 8 in the afternoon. Fjordline /2/ has estimated the following ferry
arrival delays:

 Delay less than 3 hours: 4 %


 Delay more than 3 hours: 2 %

According to Fjordline /2/ 1 % of scheduled ferry travels are cancelled.

Implication of assumption:
The above assumptions each have key influences on the frequency estimates.

Reference:
/1/ LNG Bunkering of Fjordline ferries Project Design Basis 17.02.2012, Draft Version
/2/ Email from Larsen/Fjordline to Gautestad/Skangass, 24.02.2012, subject: “SV: Forsinkelser av
anløp pga vær etc.”
Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013
Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:
Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


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Assumption No.: 1-H Revision: 1
Category: Assumptions
Subject: End Point (Impact) and Vulnerability (Fatality) Criteria
Specifications:

(End Point) Vulnerability


Human Event Parameters
Impact Notes
Impact Location
Criteria Outdoor Indoor

Explosion Heavy blast


Default – building collapse is
(Heavy damage – Other areas 0.3 1
main impact potential
Blast) 350 mbarg

Explosion Light blast


Default – building damage is
(Light damage – Other areas 0.1 0.3
main impact potential
Blast) 100 mbarg

Fatality assumed if outdoors;


Flash fire 50% LFL All 1 0.1
shielded if indoors
Fireball / 250 kJ/m2 High fraction killed if outdoors;
All 0.7 0.1
BLEVE thermal dose shielded if indoors

Storage & LP – spray rather than jet fires;


12.5 kW/m2 0.5 0.1
Loading open area - good escape prospect
Jet fire radiation
level Process High fraction killed if outdoors,
0.7 0.1
Areas but some escape possible

Storage & Open area - good escape


12.5 kW/m2 0.5 0.1
Loading prospects for pool fires
Pool fire radiation
level Process Open area - good escape
0.5 0.1
Areas prospects for pool fires

Implication of assumption:
The risks are directly influenced by the impact and fatality assumptions, which quantify the severity of
the consequences. The above assumptions include some allowance for differing escape characteristics
in different areas of the facility, but remain consistent with established, conservative best-practice.

Reference:
- DNV expert judgement – using PHAST Risk defaults and DNV Technical data

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 31 of 32
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Prepared by: Sign: J-B, Berthomieu Date: 21.05.2013


Internal Verification: Sign: Date:
Comment from Skangass AS:

Approved by Skangass AS: Sign: Date:

DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-4


Revision No.: 1
Date :11.06.2013 Page 32 of 32
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