PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD
UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of
the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
begot two children. The parties were divorced in
Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-
Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice
be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that Richard be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner
had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo)
denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties
and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
RULING:
Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to dismiss the Complaint…
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between
Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other
regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce,
had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared
in person before the Court during the trial of the case.
It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent
who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to
agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in
the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations.
Page 1 of 18
VB
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and
do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be
adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as
an American citizen. What he is contending in this
case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said
Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO
ORBECIDO III,
G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondent’s
petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady
Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis
City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In
1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their
son and after a few years she was naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from
his son – who was living with his wife in the States –
that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce
decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to
remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of
the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition
of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.
The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the
applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY
UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES.
RULING:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof,
failed to submit competent evidence showing his
allegations that his naturalized American wife had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried.
Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is
hereby SET ASIDE.
“Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
Page 2 of 18
VB
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
the Philippine laws.”
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to
case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.
S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply
to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into
consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The
Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be
construed and interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction
absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may
therefore be extended to case not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirits or intent.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, Petitioner, v. THE reiterates the arguments previously advanced by

MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING respondents.
CORPORATION, NOEL CABRERA, GERRY
ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. However, from the supplemental motion for
DIOLA, RAUL VALINO, THELMA SAN JUAN and reconsideration, it is apparent that Coyiuto, Jr. raises a
ROBERT COYIUTO, JR., Respondents. new matter which has not been raised in the
proceedings below. This notwithstanding, basic equity
FACTS: dictates that Coyiuto, Jr. should be given all the
opportunity to ventilate his arguments in the present
The present controversy arose when in the last quarter action, but more importantly, in order to write finis to
of 1993, several allegedly defamatory articles against the present controversy.
petitioner were published in The Manila Chronicle by
Chronicle Publishing Corporation. ISSUE:

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before Whether petitioners cause of action based on Abuse of
the RTC of Makati City under three separate causes of Rights warrants the award of damages.
action, namely: (1) for damages due to libelous
publication against Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, RULING:
Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza,
Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all
members of the editorial staff and writers of The Manila AWARD OF DAMAGES BASED ON ABUSE OF
Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishing; (2) for damages RIGHT,PROPER
due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for attorneys fees and granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
costs against all the respondents. source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms
On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
Decision in favor of petitioner. another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse before the Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
CA. The CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the government of human relations and for the
decision of the RTC. maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
Respondents then filed an MR. The CA rendered an damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
Amended Decision reversing the earlier Decision. proper. Here, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed
abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila
Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse Chronicle, which led to the publication of the libelous
before this Court. articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner
to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20.
On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a
Coyuito, Jr.'s supplemental MR is partially granted.
Decision partially granting the petition.

Respondents later filed a MR dated which the Court

denied.

Meanwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion

for Leave to File Supplemental MR with Attached
Supplemental Motion.

On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution grant

Coyiuto, Jr.s motion for leave to file supplemental
motion for reconsideration, and require petitioner to
comment on the motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
filed his Comment.

It is apparent that the MR of respondents generally

Page 3 of 18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 97336
February 19, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian
citizen, exchange student taking a medical course in
Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou
Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the
condition that they would get married, she reciprocated
his love. They then set the marriage after the end of
the school semester. He visited Marilou’s parents to
secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987, he
forced her to live with him, which she did. However,
his attitude toward her changed after a while; he would
maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from which
she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the
barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage
agreement, saying that he was already married to
someone living in Bacolod.
Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh
denied the accusations but asserted that he told her
not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing
his money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor of
Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is
an actionable wrong.
2. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code
applies to this case.
3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his
case.
RULING:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
in the statute books.
Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by
the (Civil Code).
Page 4 of 18
VB
It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not
sarcastic regard for the private respondent on account
of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. From the beginning,
obviously, he was not at all moved by good faith and
an honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and
promise to marry were empty words directly intended
to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor
woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing
but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina
who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino concept of morality and so
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have
for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person
to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and
in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of
our laws, customs and traditions.
She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could be
conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of
the parties, where his transgression has been brought
about by the imposition of undue influence of the party
on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured by fraud.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA” neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable
as its liability springs from that of its employees.
2005 Feb 28 G.R. No. 154259
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
FACTS: conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
In the evening of October 13, 1994, while drinking
committed for which the wrongdoer must be
coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, respondent was
responsible. Article 21 states that any person who
invited by a friend, Dr. Filart to join her in a party in
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
celebration of the birthday of the hotel’s manager.
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
During the party and when respondent was lined-up at
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
the buffet table, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the
Executive Secretary of the hotel, and asked to leave Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s
the party. Shocked and embarrassed, he tried to act cannot amount to abusive conduct.
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart, who was
herself a guest. Not long after, a Makati policeman The maxim “Volenti Non Fit Injuria” (self-inflicted injury)
approached him and escorted him out of her party. was upheld by the Court, that is, to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as injury, that consent
Ms. Lim admitted having asked respondent to leave to injury precludes the recovery of damages by one
the party but not under the ignominious circumstances who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
painted by Mr. Reyes, that she did the act politely and danger.
discreetly. Mindful of the wish of the celebrant to keep
the party intimate and exclusive, she spoke to the
respondent herself when she saw him by the buffet
table with no other guests in the immediate vicinity.
She asked him to leave the party after he finished
eating. After she had turned to leave, the latter
screamed and made a big scene.

Dr. Filart testified that she did not want the celebrant to
think that she invited Mr. Reyes to the party.

Respondent filed an action for actual, moral and/or

exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The lower
court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court,
consequently imposing upon Hotel Nikko moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its
decision. Thus, this instant petition for review.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Ms. Ruby Lim is liable under Articles 19

and 21 of the Civil Code in asking Mr. Reyes to leave
the party as he was not invited by the celebrant thereof
and whether or not Hotel Nikko, as the employer of
Ms. Lim, be solidarily liable with her.

RULING:

The Court found more credible the lower court’s

findings of facts. There was no proof of motive on the
part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and to expose
him to ridicule and shame. Mr. Reyes’ version of the
story was unsupported, failing to present any witness
to back his story. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right
to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable for damages under

Page 5 of 18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FOUND GUILTY OF RAPE and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua as well as to indemnify the offended party
P30,000.00 for moral damages, the accused GUILLERMO
1
CASIPIT y RADAM appeals to us insisting on his innocence.
The victim, Myra Reynaldo, was then 14 years old and a
sixth grader, while appellant was 22. They were neighbors in
Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
On 19 September 1986, before going to Manila for a medical
checkup, the father of Myra entrusted her to the parents of
Guillermo. On the same day, Guillermo invited Myra to go to
the town proper of Alaminos to buy rice and bananas. When
they reached the poblacion, he told her that they should buy
in Dagupan instead because the prices were cheaper. She
agreed. Upon arriving in the poblacion, Guillermo invited
Myra to watch a Movie. They watched the movie until six
o'clock in the evening, after which, they took a ride for
Alaminos arriving there at eight o'clock. They took their
dinner in Alaminos before proceeding home to Barangay
Victoria. On their way home it rained hard that they had to
take shelter in a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang.
Inside the hut, Myra sat on the floor while Guillermo laid
down. After a few minutes, he told her to lie down with him
and rest. Then he went near her. He removed her panties,
poked a knife at her neck and warned her not to shout. She
resisted appellant, kicked him twice, but was helpless to
subdue him as he tied her hands behind her nape. Moreover,
he opened her legs, went on top of her, and the inevitable
had to come. He mounted an assault on her chastity until he
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She could
not stop him as he was big and strong. After the sexual
encounter, she felt pain and could not
sleep. 2
After waking up the following morning, they proceeded
home. On their way, he told her to proceed ahead. When she
reached home, she was observed to be walking abnormally
(bull-legged) by Rogelio Casipit, her cousin-in-law. When her
aunt, Nenita Rabadon, learned about it, she called for her
and asked her what happened. She then narrated everything
to her. Her aunt took her to the house of their barangay
captain, Bruno Carambas, and reported the incident to him.
The barangay official then called for Guillermo but he denied
having raped Myra.
While inside the house of the barangay captain, the victim
was examined by her sister-in-law Susan Cabigas and Elsa
Carambas, wife of the barangay captain, who both found the
victim's private part reddish and her panties stained with
blood. 3
The following afternoon, Myra, accompanied by an uncle,
went to the police station of Alaminos to report the rape and
then to the Western Pangasinan General Hospital where she
was examined by Dr. Fideliz Ochave. The medical findings of
Dr. Ochave showed no external sign of physical injuries but
noted the presence of first degree fresh healing laceration at
the perineum and of
the hymen at six o'clock position. The laboratory result was
Page 6 of 18
VB
negative for spermatozoa. On 26 September 1986, Myra
4
gave her statement to the police and later filed a criminal
complaint against Guillermo. 5
The version of Guillermo, on the other hand, is that long
before the incident, he and Myra were sweethearts. On 19
September 1986, they agreed to watch the movie "Cabarlo"
so they went to Dagupan City. They entered the moviehouse
at noon and left at six o'clock in the evening. While watching
the show, he placed his arm on the shoulder of Myra and she
did not object. He kissed her several times; she kissed him
as many times. They talked about their love for each other.
After the movie, they went home. However, when they
reached Alaminos, it rained hard so they sought shelter in a
hut. They removed their wet clothes. He embraced her and
she liked it. Then he lowered her panties and she did not
resist. He laid her down on the floor and she consented. He
joined her on the floor. He placed himself on top of her and
sexual intercourse followed as a matter of course. They
stayed inside the hut the whole night. They went home
together the following morning. After the love tryst, he went
to look for a job in San Juan, Metro Manila. He was arrested
in July 1987. He contended that the victim was probably
induced by her aunt Nenita Rabadon to file the case. 6
After the trial, the court a quo sustained the prosecution and
found appellant guilty of raping Myra by means of force and
intimidation.
Appellant now assails the trial court for giving credence to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while
disregarding his and worse, for finding him guilty instead. He
maintains that the victim's story contained many flaws: firstly,
even as she had testified that she struggled with him and
kicked him twice, the doctor who examined her found no
external physical injuries on her body; secondly, the fact that
the victim agreed to have a movie date with him shows that
she liked him and was attracted to him; and, thirdly, the
victim did not leave the hut but slept with him until morning,
which is an unnatural behavior of one who had been raped.
We cannot sustain the accused; hence, we affirm his
conviction. We cannot argue against the trial court for giving
full faith and credit to the testimony of Myra that appellant
poked a knife at her neck and sexually abused her despite
her resistance as he was stronger and bigger than she who
was only 14 years old. Considering the physical condition of
the victim and the place where the crime was perpetrated,
which was in an isolated hut in an open field, it was not
difficult for the accused to subdue the victim and coerce her
into submission.
These factual findings of the trial court appear to be borne by
the records, and we cannot have any justification to hold
otherwise. When the question of credence arises between
the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense
on the commission of rape, the answer of the trial court is
generally viewed as correct, hence entitled to the highest
respect, because it is more competent to so conclude having
closely observed the witnesses when they testified, their
deportment, and the peculiar manner in which they gave
their testimonies and other evidence in court. 7
The argument that the absence of external injuries on the
body of the victim belies her claim that she struggled with
appellant to prevent him from raping her is devoid of merit.
The absence of external signs or physical injuries does not
negate the commission of rape. Proof of injuries is not
necessary because this is not an essential element of the
crime. This does not mean however that no force or
8
intimidation was used on the victim to consummate the act.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

The force or intimidation required in rape is relative. It is

viewed in the light of the victim's perception and not by any
hard and fast rule. It need not be overpowering or irresistible
but necessary only to achieve its purpose. Aside from
applying force, the appellant used intimidation by threatening
the victim with a knife.

The fact that Myra went with appellant to a movie is no

indication that she already agreed to have sex with him. Her
actuation is understandable as she is a close relative of
appellant, according to his grandfather. Hence, it is not
9

improbable that the victim placed her trust on appellant by

letting him accompany her to the movie. It should be
emphasized that she was then only fourteen years old, an
innocent barrio lass. Records are bereft of evidence that she
was a woman of ill-repute, or of a flirtatious nature to incite or
provoke appellant to have sex with her.

The principal defense of appellant that he and Myra were

sweethearts cannot be given weight. For, if that was true,
she would not have immediately disclosed to her family and
to the authorities the sexual assault done to her. After all,
10

nobody else but the two of them knew what happened

between them in the loneliness of an isolated hut in an open
field. The fact that Myra lost no time in immediately reporting
the violation of her honor and submitting herself to medical
examination bolsters her credibility and reflects the
truthfulness and spontaneity of her account of the incident. If
she had voluntarily consented to the sexual act with
appellant, her most natural reaction would have been to
conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her
honor and reputation as well as to her family. Her
unwavering and firm denunciation of appellant negates
consent. 11

Worth noting is the marked receptively of our courts to lend

credence to the testimonies of victims who are of tender
years regarding their versions of what transpired since the
State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to minimize the
risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not
yet able to fully protect themselves. 12

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-

appellant GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM guilty of rape and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the indemnity in favor of MYRA REYNALDO
is increased to P50,000.00.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Page 7 of 18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA133 SCRA 179 WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is
affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
FACTS:

Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member

of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical
Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis
Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr.
Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with

the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished
on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house
featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio
with whom the company asked permission and the
intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil
noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis
demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt.
No rectification or apology was published despite that
it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in
charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr.
Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and
exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis
published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but
nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr
Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29.
During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was
published.

ISSUE:

Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr.

Aramil.

RULING:

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences

in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it
never made any written apology and explanation of the
mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual

damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as
attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the
Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the
reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable
quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements pictured a
beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to
Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps”.

Page 8 of 18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals 160 SCRA

449 (1988)

FACTS:

A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as

Magna Cum Laude, because the president, herein
petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College
neglected his duty to inform the student on the result of
a case against the student which has, as its
punishment, the removal of awards or citations of the
student.

Said case was the extension of loans to students,

which the president contends to be against the school
rules and regulations, and which the student innocently
performed in her capacity as the treasurer of the
Student Leadership Club and in accordance to the
Constitution and By-Laws of the club, on the belief that
said constitution was presented and approved by the
president.

The student appealed to the Director of the Bureau of

Public Schools after being denied for reconsideration
by the president, where upon investigation, it was
found out that the student acted in good faith and that
her awards be reinstituted.

The president, upon receiving said decision, delayed

action and even e-mailed the director to reverse his
decision. The student therefore graduated as a plain
student and without honors and her award as Magna
Cum Laude was only entered on the scholastic records
weeks after the receipt by the president of the decision
and after the graduation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages

under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

RULING:

Yes.

The president’s failure to graduate a student with

honors and blatant disregard of the student’s rights on
the account of him being embarrassed shows neglect
of duty without just cause, rendering him liable for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code.
Undoubtedly, the student and the student’s parents
went through a painful ordeal brought about by such
neglect. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under
Article 27 are but proper.

Page 9 of 18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
RIVERA V CA
FACTS:
In deciding this appeal, the Court relies on the rule that
a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case
must establish his cause of action by a preponderance
of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in
equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the
preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the
burden of proof fails and the petition/complaint must
thus be denied.
On July 19, 1990, petitioner filed complaints for
ejectment against private respondents Amy Robles
Peregrino Mirambel, and Merlina Mirambel, docketed
as Civil Case Nos. 5740, 5741 and 5742, respectively,
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Branch 81.
On August 8, 1990, movant Jose Bayani A. Salcedo
filed an urgent motion for intervention on the ground
that he has a legal interest in the subject for he applied
for title of the public land under MSA No. (11-6) 131
(now MII [131-1] 33-D), which was denied on January
2, 1991.
On August 8, 1990, private respondents filed their
answers, respectively.
After submission of their position papers, the
(Metropolitan Trial Court) rendered joint judgment in
favor of the petitioner and against the private
respondents on March 18, 1993, the dispositive portion
of which herein-below quoted:
In fine, by evidence plaintiff has preponderably
established his cause of action.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff
respondent filed an appeal before the (Regional Trial
Court) which rendered the assailed judgment on
September 21, 1993 reversing and setting aside the
decision of the (Metropolitan Trial Court)
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of
petitioner, as plaintiff before the trial court, to prove a
cause of action.
ISSUE:
whether private respondents houses lie inside
petitioners land, and whether petitioner was able to
prove that fact.[11] Put differently, the issue for
resolution is whether or not petitioner proved his cause
of action.
Page 10 of 18
VB
RULING:
Basic is the rule in civil cases that the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence.[12] By preponderance of
evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.[13] In the present ejectment case,
petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden of proving that
the houses of private respondents were located within
his titled land. To justify a judgment in his favor,
petitioner must therefore establish a preponderance of
evidence on this essential fact.
Petitioner points out that the field survey, verification
and measurement of his land by his privately hired
geodetic engineer, Ildefonso Padigos, found that
private respondents houses are situated inside the
same.[14] Insisting on the findings of this private survey,
petitioner assails the Respondent Court of Appeals for
considering the same undeserving of credence and
belief and insufficient to prove his case.[15]
This Court is not persuaded. The extant records of this
case support the finding of the Court of Appeals that
the aggregate of evidence submitted by both parties
was insufficient to determine with certainty whether the
private respondents houses were inside the petitioners
titled property. As noted by Respondent Court, private
respondents claim that their houses were built on
public land, which Attorney Salcedo applied for, is not
convincing because petitioner has a transfer certificate
of title over the same parcel of land. Likewise
unconvincing is the private survey commissioned by
the petitioner himself to prove that the houses of
private respondents encroached on his property. The
reliability of the survey would have been indubitable
had it been properly authenticated by the Bureau of
Lands or by officials thereof.[16]
Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise
or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates[,] the party having the burden of proof
fails upon that issue.[17]Therefore, as neither party was
able to make out a case, neither side could establish
its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it
had. They are thus no better off than before they
proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof,
the courts can only leave them as they are. In such
cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the
complaints/petitions.[18]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
Urbano v. IAC
FACTS:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was
on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where
he stored palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to
see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino
Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted
that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel
ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with
his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the
bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an
amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical
expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano
was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be
caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing
wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano
was charged with homicide and was found guilty both
by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on
the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that
he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was
denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was
the proximate cause of the latter’s death
RULING:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the
symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14
Page 11 of 18
VB
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days.
Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus
2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be
the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since
we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that
the accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and
remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but
for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in
the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001

FACTS:

In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National

Highway of Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, George
Manantan was driving a Toyota car going home. At that
time, he was with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin
and Ruben Nicolas. Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from
the opposite direction hit the driver side of the car,
driven by Manantan. Consequently, Manantan,
Ambrocio and Tabangin were injured while Nicolas
died. Trial followed.

The lower court acquitted the accused of the crime of

reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The
respondents filed their notice of appeal on the
civil aspect of the lower court’s judgment. Even if the
accused was acquitted from his criminal liability, the
Appellate Court held him civilly liable and ordered him
to indemnify the aggrieved party for the death of
Nicolas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished

his civil liability.

RULING:

The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the

guilt of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code
provides that a civil liability is not extinguished in
criminal cases. Therefore, the accused cannot be
exempted from paying civil damages which may only
be proven by preponderance of evidence.

Manantan claimed that he was placed on double

jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to this
contention. The following elements must be present for
double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy
must have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must
be for the same offense as the first.

In the case at bar, the initially put into jeopardy but he

it was terminated by his discharge. When the case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals, the issue was about
the civil aspect of the criminal case. Thus, there could
be no double jeopardy.

Page 12 of 18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
FACTS:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons
to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon
City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element
in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him before
the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the
case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case before it.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court
of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that
even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed.
ISSUE:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
RULING:
NO.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
Page 13 of 18
VB
In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was
filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not
met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the
filing of the criminal action.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is
a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes
any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.”
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
case for parricide. Further, the relationship between
the offender and the victim is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In
this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married.
The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at
the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short,
even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals that “the judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses
is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the
effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was
no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second,
the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in that
case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal
laws are concerned.”
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

Tenebro v. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004

FACTS:

Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private

complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married
to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On
January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified
from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married
to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas
countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be
proven as a fact there being no record of such. He
further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas,
has been declared void ab initio due to psychological
incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

RULING:

Individual who contracts a second or subsequent

marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the
declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity.

Page 14 of 18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
GRACE POE vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant
in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar
in 1968. Parental care and custody over her was
passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar
and his wife. Emiliano reported and registered Grace
Poe as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces
adopted Grace Poe.
· 1991 – Poe went to the US to be a permanent
resident therein
· 2001 – She became a naturalized US citizen
· First quarter of 2005 – she came back to the
Philippines to permanently reside herein
· February 14, 2006- she went back to the US to
dispose family belongings
· July 18, 2006 – she re-acquired Filipino
citizenship
According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before
the May 13, 2013 election, she has been a resident of
the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months (reckoned
from year 2006 when she re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225).
Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016
elections (hence, computing from May, 2013, she has
been a resident in the Philippines for 9 years and 6
months only)
However, in her COC, Poe declared that she is a
natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to
the day before election would be 10 years and 11
months counted from May 24, 2005(when she
returned from the US to the Philippines for good).
ISSUE AND RULING:
Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the
National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
1) Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen? Yes,
based on:
a) Circumstantial evidence
b) Legislation
c) Generally accepted principles of international
law
Page 15 of 18
VB
Circumstantial evidence
There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
xxx. [T]here is a high probability that her parents are
Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official Statistics
from the Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to
1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the
country were more than 10 Million. On this basis, there
is a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines
would be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate more
than ample probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of
Poe’s parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in
Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.
There are disputable presumptions that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature.
On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe’s parents
are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd.
Legislation
Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.
Ø The amendment to the Constitution proposed by
constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural
born citizens was not carried out, not because there
was any objection to the notion that persons of
unknown parentage are not citizens, but only because
their number was not enough to merit specific mention.
There was no intent or language that would permit
discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws.
Ø Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do
not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the
first place to be adopted.
Ø Recent legislation all expressly refer to “Filipino
children” and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.
Generally accepted principles of international law
The common thread of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the International Convent on Civil and
Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is
stateless. The principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a
foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the
country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
(foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found)
bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to
these conventions.
Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in
Asia, North and South America and Europe have
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that
foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is
a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born and a
national of the country in which it is found.
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship
is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for
good.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013
COC was only a mistake in good faith. As explained by
Grace Poe, she misunderstood the date required in the
2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day
she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she
reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was
the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard,
she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence
could be counted from 25 May 2005. Such a mistake
could be given in evidence against her but it was by no
means conclusive considering the overwhelming
evidence submitted by Poe.

2) After renouncing her American citizenship and

after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, has Poe re-acquired her
status as a natural-born Filipino citizen? Yes, Poe’s
repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural
born citizenship.

A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine

nationality will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v.
HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).

3) Has Poe satisfied the 10 year residency

requirement? Yes, she will have been a resident for
10 years and 11 months on the day of the election.

[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to

other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently
abandon her US residence and reside in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she

and her family abandoned their US domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence
include former US passport showing her arrival on May
24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time
she travelled abroad, email correspondences with
freight company to arrange for the shipment of
household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school
records of her children showing enrolment in the
Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June
2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her

Page 16 of 18
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and
MONTEJO]
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) in the First district of Leyte in order
that she will be able to run for Congress of that district
in the 1995 elections. Her COC stated that she was a
resident of Leyte for seven months. Private
Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition
to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos on the
ground that she did not meet the one year residency
requirement as provided for in the Constitution. In
response, Marcos amended her COC changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood". Marcos
claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence." She further claimed that
she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the
ground that her original entry of "seven months" was
the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake".
The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC
and to disqualify Marcos. It held that the animus
revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan,
Manila, because that where she chose to live after she
went back to the Philippines after her well-publicized
exile in the US. It explained that while Petitioner grew
up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she
moved to Manila where she became a registered voter,
became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a
representative of Manila and eventually became
Governor of Manila. This, according to the COMELEC
debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st
District "since childhood".
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for
election purposes.
2. Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she
married and lived with her husband in Ilocos Norte and
in San Juan.
RULING:
1. YES.
The Supreme Court declared in this case that for
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous
with domicile. The decision of the COMELEC
however, shows that they confused the concept of
"Domicile" with "actual residence".
Page 17 of 18
VB
Domicile versus Residence
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the
exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their
place of habitual residence." In a past case, the Court
took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent." Thus, domicile is
composed of the two elements of:
1. The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed
place; and
2. Animus manendi - the intention of returning
permanently
Residence on the other hand merely refers to the
factual relationship of an individual to a certain place.
It is mere physical presence. Residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident
has taken up his abode ends. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
Domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time.
A person can have different residences in various
places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note
however, that a person may abandon a domicile in
favor of another.
Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban
Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. The
fact that she has a residence in Manila does not mean
that she has lost her domicile in that province. The
absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Applying this doctrine to
the case of petitioner, the fact that she has registered
to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do
not unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile in Tacloban. Even while residing in various
places, petitioner kept close ties to her domicile of
origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-
publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base
where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment,
always with either her influence or consent. These
well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGEST VB

the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos
power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored
in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the
COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country
always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte.
2. NO
The domicile of origin
Note further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was
born, her domicile followed that of her parents. Hence,
her domicile of origin was Tacloban. Once acquired,
domicile is retained until a new one is gained. The
domicile of origin is not easily lost. To effect a change
of domicile, one must demonstrate:
This rule has changed with the advent of the Family
code with the introduction of the common law concept
of "matrimonial domicile". This underscores the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and
the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new
provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and
spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women's rights in the intervening years by making the
choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses.
Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her
acts unequivocally show an intent to reestablish a
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as
early as in 1992, already obtained her residence
certificate in Tacloban.

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former

place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on

these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue.

Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the

family. But the court may exempt the wife from living
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to

the concepts of domicile or residence does not
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon
marriage. This article clearly refers to actual residence
and not domicile and merely establishes the default
rule in fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live
together" in article immediately preceding Art. 110.

When Petitioner was married to then Congressman

Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of
Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's
actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos had
several places of residence at the time: San Juan and
Ilocos Norte. Assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any
of these places as the conjugal residence, what
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence.
She did not lose her domicile of origin.

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