DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Fenequito v. Vergara

Doctrine: [p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. The term does not mean 'actual or positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry xx x whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act complained of constitutes the offense charged." ' Thus, in
determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the (accused] are required, not absolute certainty."

Facts:

On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila (representing Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito,
Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro H. Rodriquez. On April 23, 2004, Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case
Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC issued an order granting the said motion. Upon appeal by the public
prosecutor, however, the RTC set aside the MeTC’s order and directed the latter to trial. Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal
before the CA, which subsequent ruled that the RTC’s assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and was therefore not
appealable. Hence, the instant petition for review.

Issue:

WON there is no probable cause to warrant the relaxation of the rules on the erroneous manner of appeal.

RULING:

RTC’s decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be appealed.

One of the grounds for the CA’s outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.’s petition for review was because of the latter’s
failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition filed, as required under
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in
the Rules of Court. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities
the orderly disposition of appealed cases. Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and
directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the
RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be done on its
merits. It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report No. 048-03 that the
document examiner found that the signatures appearing in the questioned Deed of Sale as compared to the standard
signatures "reveal divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure [which is] an indication that they WERE
NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON." Thus the resolution of the Prosecutor as to the finding of probable
cause should be and is upheld.

Aguilar v. DOJ
Remedial Law: A public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause — that is, one made for the purpose of filing an
information in court — is essentially an executive function and,therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial
scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce
becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of Certiorari. It is fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of
discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise
definition, grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.” Corollary, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. To note,the
underlying principle behind the courts’ power to review a public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is to
ensure that the latter acts within the permissible bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse the same. This
manner of judicial review is a constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the very core of our
system of government.

In the present case, the existence of probable cause against Fortuno and Abordo is justified by the circumstances on
record which, if threaded together, would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that they were also
probably guilty of the crime charged.These circumstances are as follows: (a) Fortuno and Abordo were with Dangupon
during the time the latter killed Tetet in an undisclosed place along the Viga River(b) Tetet was apprehended, taken into
custody and boarded on a military jeep by the group of armed elements of which Fortuno and Abordo belonged to (c) as
earlier mentioned, Tetet was handcuffed when he was boarded on the military jeep and, in effect, restrained of 聽 his
movement when he supposedly stole the grenade from Abordo and (d) also, as previously mentioned, Tetet suffered
from lacerations and gunshot wounds and the same were fired in close distance.

Facts: Petitioner is the father of one Francisco M. Aguilar, alias Tetet (Tetet). On April 10, 2002, he filed a criminal
complaint4 for murder against the members of a joint team of police and military personnel who purportedly arrested
Tetet and later inflicted injuries upon him, resulting to his death. The persons charged to be responsible for Tetet’s killing
were members of the Sablayan Occidental Mindoro Police Force, identified as respondents SPO3 Gregardro A. Villar
(Villar), SPO1 Ramon M. Lara (Lara), SPO1 Alex L. Acaylar (Acaylar), PO1 Leo T. Dangupon (Dangupon), and PO1 Jovannie C.
Balicol (Balicol), and members of the Philippine Army, namely, respondents 1st Lt. Philip Fortuno5 (Fortuno) and Cpl.
Edilberto Abordo (Abordo).6cralaw virtualaw library

In the petitioner’s complaint, he averred that on February 1, 2002, between 9:00 and 10:00 in the morning, at Sitio
Talipapa, Brgy. Pag-asa, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro (Sitio Talipapa), Tetet was arrested by respondents for alleged acts
of extortion and on the suspicion that he was a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines/National People’s
Army Revolutionary Movement. Despite his peaceful surrender, he was maltreated by respondents. In particular, Tetet
was hit on different parts of the body with the butts of their rifles, and his hands were tied behind his back with a black
electric wire. He was then boarded on a military jeep and brought to the Viga River where he was gunned down by
respondents.7 Petitioner’s complaint was corroborated by witnesses Adelaida Samillano and Rolando Corcotchea who
stated, among others, that they saw Tetet raise his hands as a sign of surrender but was still mauled by armed
persons.8 A certain Dr. Neil Bryan V. Gamilla (Dr. Gamilla) of the San Sebastian District Hospital issued a medical
certificate dated February 1, 2002,9 indicating that Tetet was found to have sustained two lacerated wounds at the
frontal area, a linear abrasion in the anterior chest and five gunshot wounds in different parts of his body.

In a Resolution16 dated March 10, 2003, 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Levitico B. Salcedo of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro (Provincial Prosecutor) dismissed petitioner’s complaint against
all respondents for lack of probable cause. To note, Barte was dropped from the charge, having died in an ambush
pending the investigation of the case. In a Resolution22 dated November 27, 2008, the DOJ dismissed petitioner’s appeal
and thereby, affirmed the Provincial Prosecutor’s ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to show that respondents
conspired to kill/murder Tetet. In a Decision29 dated June 30, 2011, the CA dismissed petitioner’s certiorari petition,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ in sustaining the Provincial Prosecutor’s ruling.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming that no probable cause exists.

Held: Yes. In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutor’s
resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In particular, case law states that
probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not
mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty.A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.

People v. Borje

Facts: Several officials of the DPWH were accused of malversation and taking advantage of their public position authority,
connection or influence as such public officer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally, amass, accumulate
and acquire, by himself, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY-TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED
TWENTY-ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE AND 38/100 PESOS (₱82,321,855.38), more or less, thereby
unjustly enriching himself at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino People and the Republic of the Philippines in
the aforestated amount, through a series and/or combination of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means,
consisting of misappropriations, conversions, misuses, diversions and/or malversation of public funds and/or raids on the
public treasury, by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to, or simultaneously with, the fraud, by
falsifying public, officials and/or commercial documents, such as Job Orders, Pre-Repair Inspection Reports, Post-Repair
Inspection Reports, Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment (RSE), Certificates of Emergency Purchases/Repair, Waste
Material Reports, Certificate of Acceptance, Certificates of Fair Wear and Tear, Price Verifications, Requests for
Obligation Allotment and Disbursement Vouchers, and such other falsified documents, untruthfully narrating therein
material facts on fictitious emergency repairs of various DPWH vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare parts, which are,
in truth, imaginary or spurious transactions, and by using such falsified documents of said imaginary or spurious
transactions for said accused to unlawfully cause the undue releases of public funds and obtain undue payments on
4,406 transactions, more or less, for said fictitious emergency repairs of DPWH vehicles and/or ghost purchases of spare
parts, thereby misappropriating, converting, misusing, diverting and/or malversing the proceeds thereof for MAXIMO
BORJE, JR. y AQUINO’s personal use and benefit.

Ombudsman found probable cause. Accused assails the authority of the ombudsman to determine probable cause.

Sandiganbayan issued a finding that the Ombudsman had no authority to take cognizance over the accused.
Issue: WON the Ombudsman has the authority to determine probable cause

Held: Yes. It is well to recall that there are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. On the
one hand, executive determination of probable cause ascertains whether a criminal case must be filed in court.11 It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and should be held
for trial.12 On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused. It is one made by a judge who must satisfy himself that based on the evidence presented,
there is necessity in placing the accused under custody so that the ends of justice will not be frustrated. Verily, as far as
crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman, which is
empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person
believed to have committed the crime as defined by law.

Hasegawa v. Giron

Facts:

Giron filed a Complaint- Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against Hasegawa. Senior State Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Giron filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ and her subsequent
motion for reconsideration were likewise denied. She filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA
reversed and set aside the resolution of the DOJ.

CONTENTION OF HASEGAWA: The prosecutor‟s findings on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review
by the courts.

CONTENTION OF GIRON: The CA did no err in finding that the prosecutor usurped the duties belonging to the court
when she “overstretched her duties and applied the standards, not of ordinary prudence and cautiousness, nor of mere
„reasonable belief‟ and probability, but of a full-blown trial on the merits, where rules on admissibility of testimonies and
other evidence strictly apply.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutor had overstretched her duties that would amount to grave abuse of discretion
warranting the review of the court

HELD: Yes. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the accused depends on the sound
discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations,
or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information
against an offender. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.
Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel
a public prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the evidence before him
insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor‟s findings on the existence of probable
cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of
discretion. We find such reason for judicial review here present. We sustain the appellate court‟s reversal of the ruling of
the Secretary of the DOJ. The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings
dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed. She delved into
evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a fullblown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly
evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters
that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the
presentation of prosecution‟s evidence in support of the charge. The validity a nd merits of a party‟s defense or
accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level. By taking into consideration the defenses raised by petitioner, the Investigating
Prosecutor already went into the strict merits of the case.

People v. Yec Yec

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Prosecutors; The public prosecutor, who is given a broad discretion
to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the crime as defined by law
and, thus, should be held for trial, has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court.

— To determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the crime as defined
by law, is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an Executive function. The public prosecutor, who is given
a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the
crime as defined by law and, thus, should be held for trial, has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor,
that is, whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that
the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The determination of probable cause tohold a
person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a
judicial function.

—The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of
probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a

judicial

function. The judiciald etermination of probable cause, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there
is a necessity to place the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a
criminal case should be filed in court, and the courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information
filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the public prosecutor.

—Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there
is no probable cause for doing so, the judge should not override the public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause
to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant
was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of
discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and the courts must respect the exercise of
such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.

Facts:
Pioneer Amaresa, Inc.is a domestic corporation engaged in the buying and selling of rubber. Calixto B. Sison was the
supervisor of Pioneer’s rubber processing plant, who was tasked, among other things, with the acquisition of rubber
coagulum and rubber cup lumps in Talakag,Bukidnon. On August 19, 2002, Sison bought for Pioneer a total of 2,433 kilos
of rubber cup lumps from its various suppliers in Talakag, Bukidnon. Out of the total 2,433 kilos of rubber cup lumps he
bought, some 1,500 kilos were purchased from Julieto Edon (Edon), caretaker of the plantation of AlbertPoño ( Poño).

Considering that Pioneer did not have anystorage facility in Talakag, Bukidnon, Sison placed the newly-purchased rubber
cup lumps inside the fenced premises which he rented out as his residence.

On August 30, 2002, however, at about 4:00 o’clock inthe afternoon, Sison was surprised when respondent Rodolfo
Yecyec (Yecyec), manager of FARBECO, arrived at his place on board a “weapons carrier truck.” Yecyec, together with
co-respondents herein and several John Does totaling thirty-five (35) men, demanded that Sison give them the
rubber lumps/coagulum he bought from Edon. When Sison asked if they had any written authority and/or Court order
authorizingthem to take the rubber cup lumps from his house, Yecyecanswered in the negative. For said reason, Sison
refused to accede to their demands. In response, Yecyec suddenly yelled at Sison “by hook or by crook kuhaon gyud
namo ang mgarubber. Sumbong Lex (referring to Sison) bisag asa, apil pa si Mr. Poño ipa sumbong.

Yec Yec was able to get the said rubber later. A criminal complaint for robbery with intimidation of persons was filed.

MCTC= Probable Cause

Provincial Prosecutor=Probable Cause but only theft

RTC= No Probable Cause

CA=Affirmed, no probable cause

Issue: WON the RTC and the CA erred in dismissing the information against the respondents for the crime of Theft
for want of probable cause

Held: Yes. It was clearly premature on the part of the RTC and the CA to make a determinative finding prior to the
parties’ presentation of their respective evidence that the respondents lacked the intent to gain and acted in good faith
considering that they merely sought to recover the rubber cup lumps that they believed to be theirs. It has long been
settled that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that
may be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

Lawfirm v. Fria

Facts: The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03-110 instituted before Branch 203.[7] On
July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff (July 29, 2005 judgment), prompting the defendant in the
same case to appeal. However, Branch 203 disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered that a writ of execution be
issued to enforce the foregoing judgment.[8] Due to the denial of the defendant's motion for reconsideration, the July 29,
2005 judgment became final and executory. [9]

In its Complaint-Affidavit[10] dated February 12, 2006, The Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had been
following up on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment. However, Atty. Fria
vehemently refused to perform her ministerial duty of issuing said writ.

In her Counter-Affidavit dated June 13, 2006, Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ of execution (draft writ) was not
addressed to her but to Branch Sheriff Jaime Felicen (Felicen), who was then on leave. Neither did she know who the
presiding judge would appoint as special sheriff on Felicen's behalf.Nevertheless, she maintained that she need not sign
the draft writ since on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge issued an Order stating that he himself shall sign and issue the
same. On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor issued a Memorandum recommending, inter alia, that Atty. Fria be indicted for
the crime of Open Disobedience.

MTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause.

TC affirmed the MTC's ruling, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the latter's part since its dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 46400 for lack of probable cause was "in full accord with the law, facts, and jurisprudence.

Issue: WON the RTC erred in sustaining the MTC's dismissal of the case for Open Disobedience against Atty. Fria, i.e.,
Criminal Case No. 46400, for lack of probable cause.

Held: No.Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately dismiss a
criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz:

Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.

A careful reading of the case will reveal that the integral elements of open disobedience is not present. To elucidate, the
second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority
made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due to Branch 203's lack of jurisdiction over the
said case.

Hilbero v. Morales

Facts:

On June 16, 2007, Demetrio and his wife, Estela S. Hilbero, had just attended the Saturday evening anticipated mass at
the Calamba Catholic Church. Both spouses proceeded to Demetrio's law office, and arriving at said office around 7:45
p.m., Estela alighted first from their car and immediately went inside the office, while Demetrio went to a nearby store to
buy cigarettes. When Demetrio was about to enter the gate of his office, two armed men on-board a motorcycle
suddenly appeared and shot Demetrio several times. The gunmen escaped towards the adjacent Mabini Street.
Estela thought that the gunshots were mere firecrackers, but when she checked, she found Demetrio sprawled on the
ground. She cried for help. Demetrio was rushed to the Calamba Medical Center where he was pronounced dead on
arrival. Initial medico-legal findings revealed that Demetrio sustained three gunshot wounds on the left side of his body.

Three spent shells and one deformed slug of a .45 caliber pistol were recovered from the crime scene. A cartographic
sketch of one of Demetrio’s assailants was made based on the descriptions given by eyewitnesses to the shooting
incident. Demetrio's relatives also informed police investigators that Demetrio was heard having a heated argument on
the telephone with an unknown caller inside his office at around 12:30 p.m. on June 16, 2007. Demetrio seemed
bothered and anxious after said telephone conversation.

A revisit of the statement of the eyewitness reveals that respondent Morales and Sandy were not mere bystanders at the
scene of the crime but, rather, they were active participants whose actions were indicative of a meeting of the minds
towards a common criminal goal. They acted as lookouts to ensure the execution of the crime and the identification of
the victim. It is highly unusual for mere bystanders to wait for the victim at the scene of the crime before its occurrence,
stay there without budging from their positions while the crime is being executed and then finally leave the crime scene
only after the crime was consummated and upon a signal from the gunman for them to flee.

This theory of conspiracy by petitioner was further reinforced by the action of respondent Morales and Sandy in fleeing
from the crime scene together with Primo Lopez, the gunman, and Lorenzo Pamplona, riding in tandem in two
motorcycles, at the same time and in the same direction. From all indications, Primo, Lorenzo, Sandy, and respondent
Morales acted in a synchronized and coordinated manner in carrying out the criminal enterprise, thus evincing the
existence of conspiracy among them.

Issue: WON there is probable cause to hold Morales liable for the murder of Atty. Demetrio L. Hilbero

Held: Yes. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.

Apropos thereto, for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all
reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without
which there should be, at the most, no criminal offense.

Acting DOJ Secretary De Vanadera, in her Resolution dated September 30, 2009, found probable cause to charge
respondent for the murder of Demetrio based on eyewitness Reynaldo's credible narration of the circumstances
surrounding the shooting of Demetrio and his positive identification of the culprits. Aside from respondent's general and
sweeping allegations, there was no basis for concluding that Secretary De Vanadera issued her Resolution dated
September 30, 2009 capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or despotically, by reason of passion and hostility, as to
constitute abuse of discretion; and that such abuse of discretion was so patent and gross that it was tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

Delos Santos-Dio v. CA

Facts: Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized
representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized representative of Active
Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the majority shareholder of SBMEI. Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided
to invest in SBMEI’s Ocean Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure), a theme park to be constructed at the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone which, when operational, would showcase live performances of false-killer whales and sea lions. In this
relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value
of the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure, and also guaranteed substantial returns on investment.
Desmond even presented a Business Plan. While no Certificate of Stock was issued either to HS Equities or to Dio, HS
Equities was expressly granted minority protection rights in a subsequent Subscription and Shareholders Agreement
stating that there shall be “a nominee of the Subscriber to be elected as Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer, who may not
be removed by the Board of Directors without the affirmative vote of the Subscriber.” Dio was appointed as its Treasurer.
The parties later executed two (2) Investor’s Convertible Promissory Notes. Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested
in a separate business venture, called the Miracle Beach, which involved the development of a resort owned by Desmond
adjoining Ocean Adventure. They agreed that the said investment would be used to settle SBMEI’s loan obligation to First
Metro Investment Corporation and for the construction of 48 lodging units/cabanas. However, when the corresponding
subscription agreement was presented to Dio by SBMEI for approval, it contained a clause stating that the “funds in the
Subscription Bank Account” were also to be used for the funding of Ocean Adventure’s Negative Cash Flow This was in
conflict with the exclusive purpose and intent of Westdale’s investment in Miracle Beach and as such, Dio refused to sign
the subscription agreement.

Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond’s representations, SBMEI actually had no capacity to
deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses which prompted her to call for an audit
investigation. Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made certain
disbursements from Westdale’s special account, meant only for Miracle Beach expenditures (special account), and
diverted therein for the operating expenses of Ocean Adventure.21 When Desmond refused to execute an undertaking
to return the diverted funds, Dio, in her capacity as Treasurer of SBMEI, suspended the release of the remaining funds in
the aforesaid special account. Eventually, after Dio was ousted as Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, she filed 2 criminal
complaints, for Estafa (a) through false pretenses and (b) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence through
misappropriation or conversion both against Desmond before the Olongapo City Prosecutor’s Office. After the
preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against Desmond. The RTC ruled
in favour of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements
of estafa were not all present. The CA upheld the RTC’s authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the process of
determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish
probable cause.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject
information for lack of probable cause.

Ruling: Yes. Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court. The second is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the
judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot
be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating
the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss
the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit
additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause.

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC’s immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the
standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed.