117 143 169

117

Philippine merchant marine school vs ca

Villar vs tip

Tablarin vs guittierez

Guingona vs carague

Philconsa vs emnriquez

Prc vsde guzman

143 people vs jalosjos

International school alliance of educatiors vs quisumbing

Gsis vs montercarlos

Re request of assistant court admin

Biraogo vs phil truth com

Jesus Garcia vs hon ray drilon

169

People vs peralta

Callanta vs Villanueva

Bagcal vs cillaraza

People vs dural

Cojuangco vs sandiganbayan

Francisco larranaga vs ca

De Garcia vs locsn
International school alliance of educatiors vs quisumbing

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel
selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being
exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that
have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a
salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and
the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires
should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached
the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:
NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane
conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the
office or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In
Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the
right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the
School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure;
local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same
working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-
hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These
benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former
from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
Gsis vs montercarlos

FACTS: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due process and equal
protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension. GSIS
denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.

HELD: There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an opportunity to be heard.
There is also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain number of years of togetherness
in marriage before the employee’s death is valid to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary
gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent
spouse married the pensioner more than 3 years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within 3 years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose intended.

Biraogo vs phil truth com

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission”
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing
is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right”
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds
reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

Jesus Garcia vs hon ray drilon

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO
should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted
the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise
the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all
that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause
by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that
the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a
subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

People vs Peralta, et al.

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

People vs Amadeo Peralta, et al.

G.R. No. L-19069

October 29, 1968

Facts:

On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known warring gangs
inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m.
However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big commotion in the plaza where the prisoners
were currently assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led away to the investigation
while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their respective quarters.

In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts confined in the said prisons by
virtue of final judgments.

They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident premeditation
and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined
in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised
weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which
directly caused their deaths.

Issues

(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?

(b) Whether or not an aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the
crime?
Held:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the law specifically
provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of
a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes a pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express
or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.

The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action
of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in
order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them
to executing the conspiracy.

Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special
instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.

Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission
of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can safely say that
there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all
the deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were
from either Visayas or Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been
planned. Second, the accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really
prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going
from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for
liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six
accused at the time of the commission of the offenses were serving sentences in the New Bilibid Prison
by virtue of convictions by final judgments that penalty for each offense must be imposed in its
maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the RPC. Hence, severe
penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of the perversity and incorrigibility of the
crime.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora,
Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three
separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three death penalties; all of them
shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.

CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA [77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]

Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City Judge of
Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus, petitioner Callanta
brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of
warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary
investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of
the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her
provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judge’s investigation, and agreed
with the complaints filed.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

Held: Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and
waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary
examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case at bar, it is futile for
the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the
bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary
investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan, “the City Court of Dagupan City may also
conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishment, and may
release, or commit and bind over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before
the proper court”. Petition for certiorari is denied. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set
aside.
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BAGCAL v. VILLARAZA J. Abad-Santos (1983)  This case stemmed from a petition for the issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Corpus by herein petitioner Jose BAGCAL in Oct 1982, who alleged that he was illegally
arrested and detained  The Court issued said Writ returnable to the Executive Judge of the CFI Cagayan
de Oro (Judge Rosete) for proper hearing on the petition for release  The FACTS are as follows: BAGCAL
was arrested on Feb 28, 1982, by the Philippine Constabulary. The arrest was without warrant. He has
been detained at Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, since his arrest to the present  On Aug 6, the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an “information” for murder against petitioner Bagcal with the MTC of
Cagayan de Oro presided by herein respondent Judge Rolando VILLARAZA  Said “information” was
accompanied by the several affidavits from different persons. However, said affidavits were not
subscribed before Judge VILLARAZA who did not ask the affiants to ratify their oaths nor did he ask them
searching questions  Also, the “information” submitted before the MTC has no certification by the City
Fiscal that he had conducted a preliminary investigation  Indeed, if preliminary investigation was duly
conducted, the information should have been filed in the CFI (not MTC) which had jurisdiction to try the
case on its merits  From the forgoing, it is quite obvious that the information was filed with Judge
VILLARAZA so that he would conduct the preliminary examination and thereafter issue a warrant of
arrest  Ultimately, Judge VILLARAZA issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioner BAGCAL  As a result
of the issuance of said warrant of arrest, taken together with BAGCAL’s actuations in response thereto,
Executive Judge Rosete (tasked to hear BAGCAL’s petition for release pursuant to the writ of habeas
corpus previously issued) was constrained to rule that BAGCAL should remain in custody pending
hearing and resolution for bail  BAGCAL now questions the legality of such warrant under the attendant
circumstances, raising the same as the sole issue of this petition – WON issuance of warrant of arrest
cured the illegality of his previous warrantless arrest meriting his immediate release from detention
HELD/RATIO: NO! At the outset, it must be stressed that herein respondent Judge VILLARAZA should not
have issued the subject warrant of arrest to begin with. Judge Rosete and BAGCAL are in agreement, and
now, the Court as well, on this point. As provided in the records, it was never refuted that Judge
VILLARAZA did not “personally” examine the witnesses of the prosecution before issuing the questioned
warrant of arrest. This is a glaring mark of the irregularity in Judge VILLARAZA’s actuations. But does this
mean that, under the attendant circumstances, BAGCAL should be released?  NO. The above discussion
notwithstanding, the denial of BAGCAL’s petition for release is hereby UPHELD. As provided in Judge
Rosete’s decision in the petition for release (pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued), although the
warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was cured when petitioner
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a memorandum in
support thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his application was denied6 DISPOSITIVE:
 Judge Rosete’s decision is affirmed with modification that the hearing for bail be heard by him, the
Executive Judge of CDO RTC and not by Judge VILLARAZA of the CDO MTC. If evidence of guilt is strong,
the petition for bail should be denied, otherwise, the same must be granted.