You are on page 1of 67

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA,

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19,
1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid
Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution dismissed
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment.

The Solicitor General expressed that the death of accused-Bayotas did not extinguish his civil liability
as a result of his commission of the offense charged. Relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego it
insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower
court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant opposed that view arguing that the death of the accused while
judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties,

Issue:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

Held:

Yes, the civil liability is extinguished. It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to
Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same
can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto.

The ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course
taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned.

It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money
claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed

2. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

Facts:

On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and to pay damages.

The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, its employer bus line shall be
liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final
and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large and as a result Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused,
hired and provided by petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court.

Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, petitioner filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial
court because as it alleged it has an interest in the outcome of the case against it employee.

Issue:

Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may
appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused and subsidiary liable on its civil
liability?

Held:

The petition has no merit. Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail or
flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.

In this case, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender, thus, he is deemed to have
abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and executory.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance
and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability

However, only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction
meted out to the employee.

Thus, the decision convicting an employee in a criminal case because of absconding is binding and
conclusive upon its employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to
its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

Therefore, Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines Inc is liable for the civil aspect of the case.
3. AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome from
Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over in
Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man
allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon
advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the plane’s
tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for damages
for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that
when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached
by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages
in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first
class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly
in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made by
the purser because the said note was never presented in court.

Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages in
favour of Carascoso?

Held:
Yes, there is. First, that there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering,
amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, that said contract was breached when
petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith
when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations. It is true that there is no specific
mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be
drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein

4. ANDAMO, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT


G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Facts:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated
in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners'
land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborer’s during rainy and stormy seasons,
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of herein
respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised
Penal Code.

February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil
case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same
court.

The trial court issued order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved

Issue:

Whether or not the dismissal of the said civil case is proper?

Held:

It is not. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict
are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant,
or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

The fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and
will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation.

Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act
or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between
the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

5. JEROME CASTRO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, July 23, 2008

Facts:

On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tans son, Justin Albert for
violating the terms of his disciplinary probation and impose condition such as excluding his son
from participating in the graduation ceremonies.

Tan filed a complaint in the Dep-Ed for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private
Schools against RIS and upon investigation Dep-Ed found that RIS code violation point system
violated due process and the Dep-Ed nullified it. Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert
without any condition. Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and participate in the
commencement ceremonies.
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In their
conversation, Tan intimated filing a suit against the officers of RIS including petitioner who was
the assistant headmaster.

Ching informed petitioner and told him that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching:

“Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that’s dangerous.”

Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said talking to him was dangerous.

Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City against petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner could be liable for damages for the said defamation?

Held:

Yes, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code[:

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As
such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.

6. MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111127 July 26, 1996

Facts:

Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners Mazda minibus. Private respondent Word for the
World Christian Fellowship Inc. arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of
its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La union and back, paid the amount of P3,000.00.
Petitioner Porfirion Cabil drove the minibus. However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair,
Cabil take the detour, it was 11:30 pm, the road was slippery because it was raining, causing the
bus running at speed 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the
traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then
turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of impacts. Several
passengers were injured. The driver claimed that that he did not see the curve until it was too
late, because it was dark and no sign on the road.

Seriously injured, Amyline Antonio brought this case in the RTC of Makati. No convincing
evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to long distance trip. The
RTC renders judgment against defendants Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y
Jamil are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. Court of appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline and sustained the trial court’s finding that the
petitioner Cabli failed to exercise due care and precaution in the operation of his vehicle. The
Court of Appeals held that the Fabre were themselves presumptively negligent. Petitioners raise
the following issues;

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners were negligent and were liable for the injuries suffered by private
respondents?

Held:

The court finds that the Fabre failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record of by factual
findings of the two courts as final and conclusive. As to the driver, Porfirion Cabil given the conditions
of the road and considering that the trip was Cabil’s first one outside of Manila, he should have been
driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is a testimony that, that portion of the road should only
be running 20 kilometers per hour, so at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was running very
high. Cabil was found by the Court grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered
by the private respondents Amyline Antonio.

No distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, the law avoided distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis. As common carriers the Fabre should exercise “extraordinary diligence for
the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. Supporting the finding of the trial court
and of the appellate court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi-delict, fully
justify findings them guilty of breach of contract of carriage the Civil Code.

7. VICENTE CALALAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO
SALVA, respondents. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at
the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas
and due to overloading she was given by the conductor an "extension seat.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.
Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger and suddenly an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena
and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was
injured. She sustained a fracture and was hospitalized for a month.

Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by
the former in failing to exercise the diligence required as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand,
filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be liable for the damages caused by him in failing to exercise the
diligence required of him as a common carrier and not the owner if the truck who caused such
accident?

Held:

Yes, Calalas should be held liable.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner
of truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore,
the principle of res judicata does not apply.

Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case
No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused
to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual,
has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual,
is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.

There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract

8. PORFIRIO P. CINCO, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City,
Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO,

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

Facts:

Petitioner herein filed a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery
of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by
Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.

Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same
accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil
action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules
of Court.

The City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil case pending the resolution of the
criminal case. CFI of Cebu also upheld the decision of the lower Court and dismissed the Petition for
certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in
suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an
independent civil action is proper.

Issue:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency
of the criminal action.

Held:

Yes, there can be.

Liability in this case being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the
civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which
refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited.

Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal
offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict.

9. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS
A. LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA,

G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995

Facts:

Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner
Far East Bank and Trust. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private
respondent Clarita S. Luna.

In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was informed. In order to replace the lost card,
Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. The bank's internal security procedures and policy placed the
lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.

On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend and to pay for the lunch, Luis
presented his FAREASTCARD. Subsequently the card was not honored and he was forced to pay in
cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages.
Adrian V. Festejo, vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies to Luis and also sent a
letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that private respondents
were "very valued clients" of FEBTC.

RTC of Pasig rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral
damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.

Issue:

Whether or not FEBTC should be liable for damages? What damages should be liable?

Held:

FEBTC is not liable for moral damages but liable to exemplary and nominal damages.

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. 2 The Civil Code provides:

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Nothing in the findings of the trial
court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of
FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give
personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. The Court finds
that the award of moral damages made by the court a quo, affirmed by the appellate court, to be
inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.

Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for
the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In contracts and
quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found to have acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Given the above premises and the
factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous to sustain the exemplary
damages granted by the courts below.

Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221
of the Civil Code providing thusly:

Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

10. AMADO PICART, vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.

G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918


Facts:

Amado Picart seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages
alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant.

Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union
when the defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his horn to give warning.
Plaintiff moved the horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no
sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he had
gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that it turned his body
across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse
died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car was guilty of negligence such as gives rise
to a civil obligation to repair the damage done?

Held:

As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider
would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived
that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature
of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and
from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by
going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment
is rendered that the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with
costs of other instances.

11. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CARIDAD O.


BERNARDO as Guardian Ad Litem for Minors JOJO, JEFFREY and JO-AN, all surnamed
BERNARDO, and GUILLERMO CANAVE, JR.
G.R. No. 127326 December 23, 1999

Facts:

Jose Bernardo managed a stall at the Baguio City meat market. On 14 January 1985 at around 7:50
in the morning, Jose together with other meat vendors went out of their stalls to meet a jeepney loaded
with slaughtered pigs in order to select the meat they would sell for the day. Jose was the very first to
reach the parked jeepney. Grasping the handlebars of the vehicle Jose suddenly stiffened and
trembled as though suffering from an epileptic seizure. In no time the other vendors rushed to Jose
and they discovered that the antenna of the jeepney bearing the pigs had gotten entangled with an
open electric wire. Jose was rushed to hospital but suddenly died thereafter.

Caridad O. Bernardo, widow of Jose and their minor children filed a complaint against BENECO before
the RTC of Baguio City for a sum of money and damages arising from the electrocution of Jose
Bernardo. BENECO filed a third-party complaint against Guillermo Canave, Jr., the jeepney owner.

RTC ruled in favor of the Bernardos and ordered BENECO to pay them damages. BENECO questions
the award of damages and alleges that the death of Jose Bernardo were directly attributable to the
fault and negligence of jeepney owner Guillermo Canave, Jr.

Issue:

Whether or not BENECO was solely liable for negligence in the electrocution and death of
Bernardo?

Held:

Yes, BENECO was liable for the death of Bernardo.

BENECO questions the grant of moral damages and attorney's fees on the same ground of non-
culpability. It is settled that moral damages are not intended to enrich the complainant but to serve to
obviate his/her spiritual suffering by reason of the culpable action of the defendant. In the instant case,
we are of the opinion that moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 are more in accord with the
injury suffered by private respondent and her children.

Also BENECO contends that exemplary damages should not be awarded as the amount claimed was
not specified in the body nor in the prayer of the complaint. BENECO's contention deserves no merit.
The amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint because the same cannot
be predetermined. In fact, the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved because its
determination is contingent upon or incidental to the amount of compensatory damages that may be
awarded to the claimant.

Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages are
awarded when the act or omission which caused injury is attended by gross negligence. In the instant
case, there is a clear showing of BENECO's gross negligence when it failed to detect, much less to
repair, for an inexcusably long period of (7) years the uninsulated connection which caused the death
of Jose Bernardo. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in awarding exemplary damages
to private respondent Bernardo in the amount of P20,000.00.
12. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN

G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989

Facts:

Defendant spouses filed an action for damages in the former CFI of Negros Occidental against
petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company for the injuries they sustained in the evening
of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.

PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent
spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible,
if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor which undertook the
construction of the manhole and the conduit system.3 Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint
against Barte. In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident
involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not PLDT was negligent and should be liable for damages?

Held:

In the instant case the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner
PLDT.

As per findings of the Supreme Court it clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio
Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of
the occurrence of the accident, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. By exercising
reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the
part of petitioner.

The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of
knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but
the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.

It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to
exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. Furthermore, respondent Also, Antonio
Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence
he imputes to petitioner PLDT.

13. PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, and
TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988


Facts:

Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that on May 15, 1979
while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of
their cargo truck; that defendant's driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a
result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized and spent TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) and will
incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries.

Defendant admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano.
Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-
law law of the driver of said truck; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver
of the parked truck in installing the early warning device, hence the driver of the parked car should be
liable for damages sustained by the truck of the herein defendant in the amount of more than
P20,000.00; that plaintiff being a mere bystander and hitchhiker must suffer all the damages he
incurred.

From the evidence presented during trial, it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by
the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano also supported by police report.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner Pedro Layugan is negligent under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur?

Held:

Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable.

The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the parked truck, a lighted
kerosene lamp were placed.

Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road
would be of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp
placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this warning which we rule as
sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent, still
bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck

It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
established by clear and convincing evidence.

The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.

14. DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN BATIQUIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS

G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996

Facts:
Dr. Batiquin was a Resident Physician at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, Dumaguete City and
also the Actg. Head of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said Hospital.

In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin with the assistance of other physician and student
nurses on the hospital she performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas and after 45
minutes Mrs. Villegas delivered her first child, Rachel Acogido. Soon after leaving the Hospital Mrs.
Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually lost
her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin who prescribed for her certain medicines. The abdominal
pains and fever kept on bothering Mrs. Villegas no end despite the medications administered by Dr.
Batiquin. As a result she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child's Hospital in Dumaguete City.

Dr. Salud suggested Mrs. Villegas to undergo an examination. The results of all those examinations
impelled Dr. Kho to suggest that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery. As a result of the surgery,
Dr. Kho found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries
which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the right side of
the uterus. This piece of rubber could be a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or could have come from
other sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently
of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery on September 21, 1988.

The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and although Dr. Ma. Salud Kho
testified that she sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination.

Issue:

Whether or not Dr. Batiquin is liable under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor?

Held:

First, considering that Dr. Kho is a credible witness, her positive testimony [that a piece of rubber was
indeed found in private respondent Villega's abdomen] prevails over the negative testimony in favor
of the petitioners.

As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore which stated "Where the thing which causes injury
is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen in those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.

In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. The petitioners, in this
regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.

15. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO
VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC.

G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999

Facts:
On 28 August 1988, around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda
motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad manager of
Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. In the process,
the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to
the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later
to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital.

Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital and Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible
Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever expenses may incur.

A Criminal Case was filed against Abad but was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute but
an action for damages was commenced by the parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez against
Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation.

The trial court ordered Jose Benjamin Abad and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation to pay jointly
and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez the amounts for burial expenses; moral damages; attorney's fees;
for loss of earning capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctor's Hospital for unpaid medical and hospital bills.

CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious
and not solidary" with the former.

Issue:

Whether or not ABAD being a manager of the petitioner was acting within the scope of his assigned
tasks and thus the petitioner CASTILEX is vicariously liable?

Held:

ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned task when the accident occurred and thus
Castilex Industrial Corp. is not vicariously liable.

ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to
whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office, which
was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente
Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner's place of business.

At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD
was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private
respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a woman in his car,
who then shouted: "Daddy, Daddy!". To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his
own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time of vehicular accident.
It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working
day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as
petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no
connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager.

Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences
of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.

16. Caedo, et al. vs. Yu Khe Thai, et al.


G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

FACTS:

The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E.
de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on
his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a
plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the
opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking
the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were
traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic —
the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to
56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going
in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing
another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held
at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight
meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two
lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial,
the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have
been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo,
instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered
to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward
rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other
lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own
lane; he slackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the
Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the
point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was
a risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was
moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late
to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had
to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the
clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated,
caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected
situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was
unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the
unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.

ISSUE:

(1) who was responsible for the accident?

(2) if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily
liable with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the
second, held his employer solidarily liable with him.

HELD:

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence
and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether
or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law is
Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is
disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise
of due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil
Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:

... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver are
continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and
to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and
permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he
has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom,
becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to
drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him,
although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally
and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a
sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act
or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although
present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of
time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver
since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity
for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of
the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is,
in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the
danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed.
The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open,
and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special
state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the
presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it
earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it
at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its
left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time
element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he
sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse.
It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent
the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive
for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the
rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a
car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so
on the part, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in
the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The
test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence
of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with
danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law
to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners
who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The
next question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages

17. BLT Bus co. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.

G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988

FACTS:

The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB,
for brevity) driven by Armando Pon and Bus No. 404 of Superlines Transportation Company
(Superlines, for brevity) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway traversing Barangay
Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon in the afternoon of August 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death
of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several injuries to Nena Rosales (wife
of Anecito) and Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLTB Bus No. 1046. The evidence shows that as
BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just
as Bus No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus, Armando Pon
(driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to
his proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each other.
Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the deceased Francisco Pamfilo,
Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri instituted separate cases in the Court of First Instance of
Marinduque against BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers praying for damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses
were filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.

Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and Dasco, denied liability by
claiming that they exercised due care and diligence and shifted the fault, against each other. They all
interposed counterclaims against the plaintiffs and crossclaims against each other.

After trial on the merits, the lower court exonerated defendants Superlines and its driver Dasco from
liability and attributed sole responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon, and ordered them
jointly and severally to pay damages to the plaintiffs. Defendants BLTB and Armando Pon appealed
from the decision of the lower court to respondent appellate court which affirmed with modification the
judgment of the lower court as earlier stated.

ISSUE:

Whether IAC erred in adjudging that the actions of private respondents based on culpa
contractual?

HELD:

The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries to two of the
passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the BLTB Bus, who recklessly
operated and drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed by Traffic Rules and
Regulations. Such negligence and recklessness is binding against petitioner BLTB, more so when We
consider the fact that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of
the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the
express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by its
passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil
Code).

Petitioners also contend that "a common carrier is not an absolute insurer against all risks of travel
and are not liable for acts or accidents which cannot be foreseen or inevitable and that responsibility
of a common carrier for the safety of its passenger prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New
Civil Code is not susceptible of a precise and definite formulation." (p. 13, Rollo) Petitioners' contention
holds no water because they had totally failed to point out any factual basis for their defense of force
majeure in the light of the undisputed fact that the cause of the collision was the sole
negligence and recklessness of petitioner Armando Pon. For the defense of force majeure or act of
God to prosper the accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively without human intervention.

18. Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907

FACTS:
M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One
day, they were working in the company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars
(karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the
front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the
sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move were also
weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage
in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached
the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and
the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and
he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).

Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their
workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars
have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should
be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was
negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable.

HELD:

Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another
employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in
continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand
though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the
cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of
the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme
Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.

In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:

Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between
two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of
an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).

Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without
the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or
culpa contractual).

19. Afiada vs. Hisole

G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1949

FACTS:

Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947,
without any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him thereby causing
his death. Afialda’s sister, Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code, “The
possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even
if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage
should arise fromforce majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed Afialda.

HELD:

No. The law uses the term “possessor and user of the animal”. Afialda was the caretaker of
the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is the
possessor and the user of the carabao and therefore he is the one who had custody and control of the
animal and was in a position to prevent the animal from causing damage. It would have been different
had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal
from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under
those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.

This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as the risk involve was one of occupational hazards.

20. Spouses Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District

G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958

FACTS:

On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers went to the swimming
pool operated by Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After paying the entrance fee, the three
proceeded to the small pool.

The swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator
and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear
visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations
governing the use of the pools. MWD employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a
course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule
prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look
after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided
with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of
emergency.

Later, Dominador told his brothers that he’ll just be going to the locker room to drink a bottle of Coke.
No one saw him returned. Later, the elder Ong noticed someone at the bottom of the big pool and
notified the lifeguard in attendant (Manuel Abaño), who immediately dove into the water. The body
was later identified as Dominador’s. He was attempted to be revived multiple times but of no avail.

The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was negligent in selecting its employees. During
trial, the elder brother of Ong and one other testified that Abaño was reading a magazine and was
chatting with a security guard when the incident happened and that he was called a third time before
he responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even assuming that there was no negligence on the part of
MWD, it is still liable under the doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” for having the last opportunity to save
the Dominador, its employees failed to do so.

ISSUE:

Whether MWD is liable for the death of Dominador Ong.

HELD:

No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting its employees as all of them were
duly certified. MWD was not negligent in managing the pools as there were proper safety measures
and precautions/regulations that were placed all over the pools. Hence, due diligence is appreciated
as a complete and proper defense in this case. Further, the testimony in court by the elder Ong and
the other witness was belied by the statements they have given to the investigators when they said
that the lifeguard immediately dove into the water when he was called about the boy at the bottom of
the pool.

The doctrine of “Last Clear Chance” is of no application here. It was not established as to how
Dominador was able to go to the big pool. He went to the locker and thereafter no one saw him returned
not until his body was retrieved from the bottom of the big pool. The last clear chance doctrine can
never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously (how can the lifeguard act
instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from going to the big pool if he did not see him go there),
and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should
have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot
be said to have contributed to the injury.

21. Ferrer, et al. vs. Ericta

G.R. No. L-41767 August 23, 1978

FACTS:

In a complaint for damages against respondents, dated December 27, 1974 but actually filed on
January 6, 1975 (Civil Case No. Q-19647), and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge, it was
alleged that defendants Mr. and Mrs. Francis Pfleider, residents of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, were
the owners or operators of a Ford pick-up car; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December
31, 1970, in the streets of Bayawan, Negros Oriental, their son, defendant Dennis Pfleider, who was
then only sixteen (16) years of age, without proper official authority, drove the above-described vehicle,
without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, and without taking the necessary precaution to
prevent injury to persons or damage to property, and as a consequence the pickup car was overturned,
causing physical injuries to plaintiff Annette Ferrer, who was then a passenger therein, which injuries
paralyzed her and required medical treatment and confinement at different hospitals for more than two
(2) years; that as a result of the physical injuries sustained by Annette, she suffered unimaginable
physical pain, mental anguish, and her parents also suffered mental anguish, moral shock and spent
a considerable sum of money for her treatment. They prayed that defendants be ordered to reimburse
them for actual expenses as well as other damages.

In due time, defendants filed their answer, putting up the affirmative defense that defendant Dennis
Pfleider exercised due care and utmost diligence in driving the vehicle aforementioned and alleging
that Annette Ferrer and the other persons aboard said vehicle were not passengers in the strict sense
of the term, but were merely joy riders and that, consequently, defendants had no obligation
whatsoever to plaintiffs.

At the pre-trial on May 12, 1975, only plaintiffs-petitioners and their counsel were present.
Consequently, defendants-private respondents were declared in default and the plaintiff petitioners
were allowed to present their evidence ex parte. On May 21, 1975, petitioners moved that they be
granted an extension of ten (10) days from May 22, 1975 to present her evidence, which was granted
by the court a quo. The presentation of petitioners' evidence was later continued by the trial court to
June 16, 1975, when the deposition of Annette Ferrer was submitted by petitioners and admitted by
the trial court.

On June 26, 1975, private respondents filed a motion to "set aside the order of default and subsequent
pleadings" on the ground that "defendants' failure to appear for pre-trial was due to accident or
excusable neglect." This was opposed by petitioners on the ground that the said pleading was not
under oath, contrary to the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules, and that it was not
accompanied by an affidavit of merit showing that the defendants have a good defense. In view of
this, the motion of private respondents was denied by respondent Judge on July 21, 1975. On the
same date, respondent Judge rendered judgment against private respondents, finding that the minor
Dennis Pfleider, was allowed by his parents to operate a Ford pick-up car and because of his reckless
negligence caused the accident in question, resulting in injuries to Annette, and ordering the
defendants, as a result thereof, to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following amounts: (1)
P24,500.00 for actual expenses, hospitalization and medical expenses; (2) P24,000.00 for actual
expenses for the care, medicines of plaintiff Annette for helps from December 31, 1970 to December
31, 1974; (3) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (4) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; (5) P5,000.00
for attorney's fees; and (6) costs of suit.

On September 1, 1975, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the decision and
of the order denying the motion to set aside order of default, based on the following grounds: (1) the
complaint states no cause of action insofar as Mr. and Mrs. Pfleider are concerned because it does
not allege that at the time of the mishap, defendant Dennis Pfleider was living with them, the fact being
that at such time he was living apart from them, hence, there can be no application of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, upon which parents' liability is premised; and (2) that tile complaint shows on its face
"that it was filed only on January 6, 1975, or after the lapse of MORE THAN FOUR YEARS from the
date of the accident on December 31, 1970", likewise appearing from the complaint and, therefore,
the action has already prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

A Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 2 was subsequently filed by defendants-private


respondents on September 10, 1975, alleging that their defense of prescription has not been waived
and may be raised even at such stage of the proceedings because on the face of the complaint, as
well as from the plaintiff's evidence, their cause of action had already prescribed, citing as authority
the decision of this Court in Philippine National Bank v. Pacific Commission House, 3 as well as the
decisions quoted therein. The Opposition 4 to the above supplemental motion interposed by plaintiffs-
petitioners averred that: (a) the defense of prescription had been waived while the defense that the
complaint states no cause of action "is available only at any time not later than the trial and prior to
the decision"; (b) inasmuch as defendants have been declared in default for failure to appear at the
pretrial conference, they have lost their standing in court and cannot be allowed to adduce evidence
nor to take part in the trial, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court; and (c) the
motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration are pro forma because the defenses raised
therein have been previously raised and passed upon by respondent court in resolving defendants'
motion to set aside order of default. Being pro forma, said motion and supplemental motion do not
suspend the running of the thirty-day period to appeal, which was from August 5, 1975, when
defendants received a copy of the decision, to September 4, 1975, and hence the decision has already
become final and executory. Plaintiffs-petitioners accordingly prayed that a writ of execution be issued
to enforce the judgment in their favor.

ISSUE:

Whether the defense of prescription had been deemed waived by private respondents' failure
to allege the same in their answer.

HELD:

As early as Chua Lamko v. Dioso, et al., 5 this Court sustained the dismissal of a counterclaim
on the ground of prescription, although such defense was not raised in the answer of the plaintiff.
Thus, this Court held that where the answer does not take issue with the complaint as to dates involved
in the defendant's claim of prescription, his failure to specifically plead prescription in the answer does
not constitute a waiver of the defense of prescription. It was explained that the defense of prescription,
even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is not deemed waived unless such defense
raises issues of fact not appearing upon the preceding pleading.

In Philippine National Bank v. Perez, et al.,6 which was an action filed by the Philippine National Bank
on March 22, 1961 for revival of a judgment rendered on December 29, 1949 against Amando Perez,
Gregorio Pumuntoc and Virginia de Pumuntoc pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the rules of court the
defendants were declared in default for their failure to file their answer. There upon, the plaintiff
submitted its evidence, but when the case was submitted for decision, the court a quo dismissed the
complaint on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action had already prescribed under Articles 1144 and
1152 of the Civil Code. The plaintiff in said case, contending that since prescription is a defense that
can only be set up by defendants, the court could not motu proprio consider it as a basis for dismissal,
moved to reconsider the order, but its motion was denied. When the issue was raised to this Court,
We ruled:

It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked as such in the
answer of the defendant and that in this particular instance no such defense was invoked because the
defendants had been declared in default, but such rule does riot obtain when the evidence shows that
the cause of action upon which plaintiff's complaint is based is already barred by the statute of
limitations. (Emphasis supplied.)

Again, in Philippine National Bank v. Pacific Commission House, 7 where the action sought to revive
a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila on February 3, 1953 and it was patent
from the stamp appearing on the first page of the complaint that the complaint was actually filed on
May 31, 1963, this Court sustained the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription,
although such defense was not raised in the answer, overruling the appellants' invocation of Section
2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in tile answer are deemed waived." We held therein that "... the fact that the plaintiff's own
allegation in tile complaint or the evidence it presented shows clearly that the action had prescribed
removes this case from the rule regarding waiver of the defense by failure to plead the same."

In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved in connection with the question of prescription.
The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-19647 alleges that the accident which caused the injuries sustained
by plaintiff Annette Ferrer occured on December 31, 1970. It is undisputed that the action for damages
was only filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising from physical injuries because of a tort
must be filed within four years. 8 The four-year period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed
or the date of the accident

22. Kramer, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989

FACTS:

The record of the case discloses that in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing
boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from
Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a
collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-
Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its
fish catch.

After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of
Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose
of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.

On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V
Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a
subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein
the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine
officer.1

On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent
before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City.2 The suit was docketed as Civil Case No.
2907-P.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent
arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations.

HELD:

The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-
delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-
delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia,16 this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from
the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive
period must be counted from the day of the collision.

In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 17 this Court held as follows-

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b)
an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes
place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .

From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element
occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of
the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.

It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four
(4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need
not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision
was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. The
ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved party can
seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of
the other vessel.

Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision
occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed iii court only on May 30, 1 985, was
beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.

23. Gotesco vs. Chatto, et al

G.R. No. L-87584 June 16, 1992

FACTS:

The evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year
old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater,
owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then were
unable to find seats considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes
after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness
and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As
soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for one (1) day.

The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital
from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.

Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982
for further treatment . She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in
the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital
five (5) or, six (6) times.

Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due
to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in finding that the ceiling if the balcony collapse due to some structural
construction or architectural defect and not due to force majeure or act of God.

HELD:
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force
majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either
he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held,
incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's
examination. Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present
proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that
the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.
The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown
that any of the causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of
the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised
due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of
Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His
answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said. inspection
nor the nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly
approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do
not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling,
considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.

It is settled that:

The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine
being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. 14

This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:

Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused
the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant. 15

That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.

24. National Power Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al

GR Nos. 103442-45 (1993)

FACTS:

This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate complaints2 for damages filed
against the NPC and Benjamin Chavez before the trial court. The plaintiffs therein, now private
respondents, sought to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to
property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978. The
flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the
spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). In said complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
that: 1) defendant NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River
at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan; 2) defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time
of the incident in question; 3) despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the
impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level
at the dam; 4) when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the
typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways,
thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River; and 5) as a
consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and
their properties were washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours of 27 October
1978.3

In their Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that: 1) the NPC exercised due care,
diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC
exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were sent
to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of
a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary
precautions; 4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam
and avoid greater damage to people and property; 5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the
diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted and; 6) the damages
incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the
nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense, the defendants
averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function.4

ISSUE:

Whether the defendants were guilty of negligence?

HELD:

We reiterate here in Our pronouncement in the latter case that Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of
Appeals20 is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is
concerned. In the Nakpil case, We held:

To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation
due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must
be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral
manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria
v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279;
Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).

Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as
provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot
escape liability.

The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or
entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is
found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or
neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from
the rules applicable to the acts of God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).

Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing
a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage
was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from
any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned.
(Fish & Elective Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan, 49 O.G. 4379; Limpangco & Sons
v. Yangco Steamship Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657). 21
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability
for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of
negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a
human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in
question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the
whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts
of God.

25. Ramos vs. Pepsi

G.R. No. L-22533 February 9, 1967

FACTS:

The car driven by Augusto Ramos (son of co-plaintiff Placido Ramos) collided with the truck of PEPSI,
driven by the driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio. As a result, the Ramoses sued Bonifacio and
Pepsi.

The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved
that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA
and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs damages.

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, but
absolved PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that it sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of
its driver Bonifacio. In its decision, CA stated the basis for its decision:

“The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to
the effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production
department; that when he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background,
asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent
to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: first, theoretical examination
and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant
company was a member of the Safety Council. Our Supreme Court had put it down as a rule that ‘In
order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license;
he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experiences and record of service.’ Defendant Company has taken all these steps.”

ISSUE:

Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its employee.

HELD:

The appellants contended that Añasco, being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and an interested
witness. This is a question of fact, and the SC would not disturb the findings of CA.

It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to due diligence in the
supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 points out that the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. This
responsibility shall cease when the employers prove that they observed the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-COLA shall be relieved from liability (rebuttable
presumption of negligence).

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1 in that
at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being
driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a
rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the driver. There is no finding that the tractor-truck did
not have a rear-vision mirror.

Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor
Vehicle Law, alleging that the truck exceeded the dimensions allowed. It is not enough that the width
of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in addition, it must also appear that there was no
special permit granted under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual link is missing.
There was no proof much less any finding to that effect.

We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We cannot however,
abandon the Bahia ruling without going against the explicit mandate of the law. A motor vehicle owner
is not an absolute insurer against all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is
very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case merely clarified what that diligence
consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-employee.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that
of his employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and
supervise his erring employees. We do not — and have never — followed the respondent superior
rule.8 So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are not
authoritative here.

In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

26. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991

FACTS:

Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames" mini bus at Aringay, La Union bound for Bauang, of the same
province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle
and fell into a ditch. Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead

Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses.
She also gave transportation expense of P12 in going home from the hospital and they were made to
sign a Joint Affidavit stating that they are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against
the said driver and owner of the said Thames.
Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages
stating that the mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the
forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part. As a result, she had to
retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her
of opportunities for employment Delim averred that it was a fortuitous event

CFI dismissed because of the Joint Affidavit

ISSUE:

W/N Gatchalian is entitled to damages

HELD:

YES.

A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains
to him.

While reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had
also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in
its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner
understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit

To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable.

To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground
of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty was
entirely independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid.

The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus after the snapping sound

A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished,
actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner
Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon
her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio
ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery may
be expected to be correspondingly modest.

27. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993

FACTS:

At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam, causing
deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the
reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents
within the vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the
water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in
the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further
contended that there was no direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged
negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what
happened was a fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.

ISSUE:

Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria

HELD:

We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by the
opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although
there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no
question that petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the
facilities of Angat Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention
may be. The end does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise
than simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled
to counterclaim.

28. SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely:
ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO, ANITA GARCIA, NICOLAS LIAGOSO,
ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely:
EDUARDO, ROLANDO, DANIEL, AND JOCELYN, all surnamed BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA
FAJARDO in her behalf and as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: GILBERT, GLEN,
JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA LIAGOSO, in her behalf
and as guardian ad litem, of her minor grandchildren, namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE
and GERRY, all surnamed LIAGOSO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
AND CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993

FACTS:

November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request
with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao
wherein Bascon won.

November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William
Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.

The bodies were removed by a fireman. The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle,
Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there.

The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without
clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. Since the septic tank was
found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of
oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas.

ISSUE:

W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for
damages

HELD:

Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury

Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover

Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a
suitable equivalent for his own imprudence

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which
would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public

While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary
requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements

Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned
for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims
are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to
know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures
for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate and immediate cause of the death
of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages
from the public respondent.

29) PILIPINAS BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORENCIO REYES,
respondents.

G.R. No. 105410 July 25, 1994

FACTS:

Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation (20k~) and Vincent Tui
(11k~) as payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes. To cover the face value of
the checks, Reyes requested PCIB Money Shop’s manager to effect the withdrawal of 32k from his
savings account and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto Santos
was requested to make the deposit.

In depositing in the name of Reyes, Santos inquired from the teller Reyes’ current account number to
complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was “815” so that was the
number he placed on the slip. Noting that the account number coincided with the name “Florencio,”
Efren Alagasi [Pilipinas Bank Current Account Bookkeeper] thought it was for Florencio Amador, so
he posted the deposit in the account of Amador.

The check in favor of Winner was presented for payment. Since Reyes’ ledger indicated that his
account only had 4k~ balance, the check was dishonored. This check was redeposited 4 days later
but it was dishonored again. This also happened with the check issued in Tui’s favor. Tui returned the
check to Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value.

Furious over the incident, Reyes proceeded to Pilipinas Bank and urged an immediate verification of
his account. It was then that the bank noticed the error. The 32k posted in Amador’s account was
transferred to Reyes’ account upon being cleared by the former that he did not effect a deposit of 32k.
The bank then honored the check.

ISSUE:

W/n proximate cause of injury was alagasi’s negligence in erroneously posting reyes’ cash deposit in
the name of another depositor having the same first name

HELD:

Yes

For NCC 2179 to apply, it must be established that Reyes’ own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.

Proximate cause – any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and
from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that
the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence.

Alagasi failed to exercise degree of care required in the performance of his duties. He posted the cash
deposit in Amador’s account from the assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger
without going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip

He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption and proceeded with clear certainty,
considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create --> checks issued by Reyes
were dishonored because his ledger indicated an insufficient balance.

30. FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place
where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated
portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier
admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the
right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano
and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On
November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The
doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm.
He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial
court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit
of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation
canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death

HELD:

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus
because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than
14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six
days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is
that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him
was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable
doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound
by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure
to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action
if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

31 FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPELAS and PHILIPPINE
PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.

FACTS:

M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the
Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino,
who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for
the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge,
with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of
the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the
anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchors,
with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed
of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed
that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the
pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the
anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused
by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;

(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent
negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD:

(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He
becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and
reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where
pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to
act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel,
but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation
even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide
for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports,
with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these
laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to
enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming
such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of
care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to
navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted
than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have
and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care.
In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required
of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were
promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible
for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A
perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his
duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining
watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the
negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot
is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefore in rem. Where, however, by the provisions
of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in
compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is
compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or
crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the
pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their
liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused
by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule,
the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and
proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or
navigation.

32. ESTANISLAWA CANLAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CHAN LIN PO, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.

FACTS:

June 11 1951: Juanito Chan, son of Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala, drove and operated a motor
vehicle (a truck) along Rizal Ave Ext, Manila in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing to
hit Nicolas Paras, 65 yo, and ran over his head, crushing it, resulting to his instantaneous death; facs
revealed that the truck was registered in the name of Lim Koo.

At the initial stage of the criminal trial, Petitioner, Estanislawa Canlas (widow of Nicolas, representing
also 5 minor children), made a reservation to file a separate civil action.

Trial Court rendered Juanito is guilty, serve sentence of 1yr-8mos, plus 5K indeminity.

In the civil action, same facts were alleged. Defendants disclaimed liability by establishing that Juanito
is married and is no longer a minor living in the company of his parents, and that he is also not an
employee of Lim Koo. Thus, Neither Juanito’s parents can be made liable under vicarious liability
(2180 of the NCC) nor the owner of vehicle be the subsidiary liable under 103 of the RPC.

Civil action was dismissed, since petitioner already tried to execute the indemnity adjudged in the
criminal action and Juanito already served subsidiary imprisonment by virtue of his inability to pay
indemnity. Petitioner insists on the liability of parents and truck owner. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether Respondents can be made liable over the civil liability of Juanito?

HELD:

NO.

Art. 2180 par 5 of the NCC (primary liab-vicarious liability) only applies if the offender is a MINOR
LIVING in the COMPANY of his PARENTS. In this case, Juanito was already married and lives
independently from his parents

Art 103 of the RPC (subsidiary liability) only attaches if EER between the owner and offender is
established and that the act happened while he was discharging his duties (as employee). In this case,
no evidence was presented to establish such relationship.

The civil complaint was confused with the nature of liability to charge (103 or 2180). Court however
clarified that the lower court erred when they adjudged that the civil action is barred by res judicata.
The civil action from criminal action and independent civil action are of different nature and purpose.
The 2 cases affect different parties. In the independent civil action, subsidiary and vicarious liability
were being established. Nevertheless, since 2180 of

NCC and 103 of RPC was inapplicable, the action was still dismissed.
33. CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.

FACTS:

Wendell Libi (Wendell) , son of petitioners, and Julie Ann Gotiong (Julie Ann), the daughter of private
respondent spouses, were sweethearts until Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his
sadistic and irresponsible character.

Wendell tried hard to reconcile with Julie Ann but when the latter refused, Wendell started making
threats. On that fateful day of January 14, 1978, Julie Ann and Wendell died from a single gunshot
wound each coming from the same Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner
Cresencio Libi (Cresencio).

There being no eyewitnesses to the crime, petitioners and private respondents herein advanced
conflicting versions of the case. Private respondents claimed that with the use of the same gun,
Wendell took his own life after killing Julie Ann. On the other hand, the petitioners argued that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased by reason of his work as a narcotic
informant, must have caused the death of Wendell and Julie Ann.

As a result of the death of Julie Ann, private respondents filed an action to recover damages arising
from the vicarious liability of the parents of Wendell (petitioners herein) under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code. After trial, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, the counterclaim
filed by the petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.

On appeal lodged by private respondents, the respondent court set aside the dismissal of the case
and held petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Hence this case. Herein petitioners seek for
the reversal of judgment of requiring them to pay P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

ISSUE:

Are petitioners liable for vicarious liability under Art 2180 of the NCC?

HELD:

The Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and who lives in their
company.

Petitioners Libi failed to prove that they had exercised due diligence of a good father of a family over
their son Wendell as shown by the fact that it was only when Wendell died that petitioners came to
know that their son Wendell was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) agent and that the gun
of petitioner Cresencio Bili was missing from their safety deposit box. Petitioners are indeed liable
under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the parents to know the activity of their children
and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent in supervising the activities of Wendell and in
keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie and Wendell could have been prevented.

Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the parents to
know the activity of their children and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent in supervising the
activities of Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie and Wendell could have
been prevented. The liability of the parents for damages caused by their children imposed under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligation arising from both quasi delict and criminal offenses.
34. CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING,
JR., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School,
Kanlaon, Quezon City. A ‘pitogo’ (an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank) belonged to
Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi.
Renato was not aware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was
Benedicto’s, so when Augusto attempted to get the ‘pitogo’ from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to
do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the ‘pitogo’. Augusto resented
his remark and pushed Manuel, Jr., which started the fight. After successive blows to Manuel, Jr.,
Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a piece of razor.

Manuel, Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado, Augusto’s father.

ISSUE:

W/N the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the father since the
incident occurred in the school during recess time, through no fault of the father.

HELD:

NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY.

Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code: “Lastly, teachers or
heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”

That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence on the pupil supersede those of the parents.

In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass
from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.

Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school
hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over.

35. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO
LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND
PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION
and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Ferdinand Castillo, a 13-year-old freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School
(SFHS) wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. However, his parents, Dr.
Romulo Castillo and Lilia Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow him.
He was only allowed to bring food (adobo) to the teachers for the picnic. However, the teachers
persuaded him to go with them to the beach.

During the picnic, a teacher was apparently drowning. Some students, including Ferdinand, came to
her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He was brought to Mt. Cannel
General Hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

Ferdinand’s parents filed a case for damages against SFHS and the teachers.

The CA declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to
guard against the foreseen harm. Also, SFHS and principal Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and
solidarily liable with the teachers for the death of Ferdinand, under Art 2180.

ISSUE:

WON the school SFHS, principal and teachers were liable for the death of Ferdinand?

HELD:

NO. Petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence.

It is the rule in Art 2180 that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives
rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of SFHS and its principal; and while this presumption
is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or
manager (SFHS and principal) exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case,
the defendants-teachers).

“The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.”

“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.”

SC found that CA committed an error in applying Art 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering SFHS liable
for the death of respondent's son.

SC found that the teachers are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the negligence of
those under them. Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.

At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed
their son to join the excursion. The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even
without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same.

In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened outside the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers
and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school
head or its principal, because this picnic is not a school-sanctioned activity or an extra-curricular
activity. Mere knowledge by the principal of the planning of the picnic by the students and teachers
does not in any way show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same.
It was shown that Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, did her best and exercised diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the
picnic.

a. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez (who conducted first aid on Ferdinand) and
Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid
application and swimming.

b. Even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that the teachers brought life savers in
case of emergency.

c. The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible
to save the child.

Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, the teachers are not guilty of any fault or negligence,
hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.

36 ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, respondents.

FACTS:

Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o’clock
in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric
post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged.
Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It
thereupon sued him for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was liable to it
as the employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his
employee. Meralco did not present any evidence to prove that Nestor Martin was the employee of
Ernesto Martin and Ernesto Martin did not rebut such allegation.

ISSUES:

Who bears the burden of proving employer-employee relationship between the owner of the car and
the driver at the time of the accident?

Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts

HELD:

HE WHO ALLEGES MUST PROVE HIS ALLEGATION! MERALCO had the burden of proof, or the
duty to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim as required by Rule 131,
Sec 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts
provided the following are shown: (1) employment relationship and (2) employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.

No evidence whatsoever was adduced by MERALCO to show the employment relationship. Trial
court merely presumed its existence. It even shifted the burden to Ernesto by saying that “he did not
present any proof to substantiate his allegation.”
Although the law recognizes presumption juris (law) or presumption hominis (fact), both are not
applicable in the case at bar. There is no law directing the deduction made by the courts below from
the particular facts presented to them by the parties. Neither is there a sufficient base from the facts
proved, or not denied for the inference that the petitioner is the employer of Nestor.

The case of Amor v. Soberano was missaplied because the vehicle involved in that case was a 6x6
truck, which reasonably raised the factual presumption that it was engaged in business and that its
driver was employed by the owner of the vehicle.

37. METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO


TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENTSERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES and LILY
ROSALES, respondents.

FACTS:

MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area and Musa was its
driver . The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school student at the
University of the Philippines Integrated School.

At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven
by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye witness
said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound for the south, hit her.
She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over
by the left rear tires thereof. Her body was dragged several meters away from the point of impact. Liza
Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center, but efforts to revive her proved futile.

Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. However, for the civil
liability, Souses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC
Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
They subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the
MMTC, as a defendant therein.

To free themselves from liability, petitioners attempted to prove that it exercise diligentissimi patris
familias in the selcetion and supervision of employees through oral evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MMTC is solidarily liable with Musa.

HELD:

Yes!

Petitioner’s attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other
evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.
Although, MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on
vehicle maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests
to determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, there is no record that Musa attended
such training programs and passed the said examinations before he was employed. No proof was
presented that Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily inspections,
allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever presented.

The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof
tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and
the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.

As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in view of
Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This does not
make the employee’s liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages is satisfied by
the common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed
the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Hence, the spouses
Rosales have the option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa.

Rationale for Imposing Vicarious liability

What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure
to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a
required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an
enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of
employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should
bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates
or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large. Added
to this is the makeweight argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest
incentive to be careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every
precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.

38. Vestil v. IAC

G.R. No. 74431 Date: November 06, 1989

FACTS:

Theness (3 years old) was bitten by the Vestil’s dog at the house of Vicente Miranda, Purita Vestil’s
late father while playing with Purita’s daughter. She was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead and was administered with an anti-rabies vaccine. She was later re-admitted due to vomiting
of saliva. She died due to broncho-pneumonia. Her parents, the Uys, sued the Vestils for damages,
holding them liable as possessors of the dog, Andoy.

Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint.

Court of Appeal: Theness had died due to the dog bites. Under Article 2183 of the Civil Code., the
Vestils are liable for damages as possessor of the property and the dog.
Defense: The dog was tame and had merely been provoked, although no one had seen it bite
Theness. Additionally, she had died of broncho-pneumonia, which had no correlation to dog bites.

Anyway, she (Purita) could not be held liable because the dog does not belong to her but to Vicente
Miranda, her father. She is not the sole owner of the unpartitioned property, there are other heirs.
There are also other occupants of the house that maintain themselves out of a common fund, they do
not pay rent because of their relation to her father but do occupy the property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Vestils liable for damages.

HELD:

YES. The cause of Theness’ death was the dog bites. She developed hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, and had died due to broncho-pneumonia, a complication of rabies.

The Vestils are the possessors of the property and Purita is the only heir residing in Cebu City. They
use it as a second home and visited weekly - renting it out to the boarders, paying for utilities and
hiring the maid who cleaned and cooked for the house occupants. An occupant of the household
(Marcial Lao) testified that they maintain the house for business purposes and that he is one of the
boarder of said property.

Liability is due to the possession of the dog, regardless of the ownership of the dog or property. Under
Article 2183, regardless if the animal was tame or vicious or if it had been lost and removed from the
control of the Vestils, liability still attach because one who possesses an animal for utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which the animal may had caused.

Article 2183: The possessor of an animal… is responsible for the damage it may cause… The
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault
of the person who suffered damage.

The Vestils are liable for damages for Theness’ death as possessor of Andoy, the dog. Theness is
just 3 years old and could not be faulted for any of actions of alleged provocations. Notably, the Vestils
had offered to assist in the hospitalization expense, even if they declared the Uys to merely be their
casual acquaintances only.

39. CAEDO vs YU KHE THAI and BERNARDO

G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

FACTS:
Caedo and family were traveling Highway 54 on the way to the airport. Private respondents were
traveling on the opposite direction. Bernardo was the personal river of Yu. Both vehicles were running
at moderate speeds when a carritela was traveling the same direction as Bernardo’s. The latter
overtook the caritella and took the lane Caedos were traveling and caused multiple injuries and
damage to the Caedos. Bernardo was held liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the owner of the vehicle who was riding with the driver at the time of the accident be
held solidarily liable.

HELD:

The court ruled that if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who
was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the existence of due
diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the
master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it
in order to prevent injury or damage.

40. Malayan Insurance Co, Inc. V CA (1986)

FACTS:

Aurelio Lacson ,owner of a Toyota NP Land Cruiser, Model 1972, bearing Plate No. NY-362 and with
engine Number F-374325 insured with Malayan Insurance Co

Dec. 1, 1975: Aurelio brought it to the shop of Carlos Jamelo for repair

Dec. 2, 1975: Rogelio Mahinay, together with Johnny Mahinay, Rogelio Macapagong and Rogelio
Francisco took and drove the Toyota Land Cruiser and it met an accident with Bo

Carlos reported the incident to the police and instituted a criminal case for Qualified Theft against his
employees

Rogelio Mahinay pleaded guilty and was convicted of theft

Aurelio was not allowed to claim on the ground that the claim is not covered by the policy inasmuch
as the driver of the insured vehicle at the time of the accident was not a duly licensed driver

Trial Court: favored Aurelio

CA: Affirmed

ISSUE:

/N the taking of the vehicle by another person without permission or authority from the owner or person-
in-charge thereof is sufficient to place it within the ambit of the word theft in the policy

HELD:
YES.The damages therefore were sustained in the course of the unlawful taking

Bacolod IFCs interest in the insured vehicle was in the amount of P2,000.00 only compared to plaintiff's
P26,000.00 it is well to presume that Bacolod IFC did not deem it wise to be impleaded as party-
plaintiff in this case. This inaction on the part of BIFC will only show that it was not really interested to
intervene.

41. City of Manila vs Teotico

FACTS:

At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta
and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a loading and unloading zone, waiting for a jeepney when one
came along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney and took a few steps, he
fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole. The fall caused Teotico’s head to hit the rim and break
his eyeglasses and the broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Respondent was then brought
to PGH to be treated of his injuries. Respondent suffered contusions in various parts of his body and
allergic eruptions caused by the anti-tetanus injections administered to him required further medical
treatment and payment of these charges. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for damages against the
City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial
court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the City of Manila was sentenced to pay the damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for damages.

HELD:

YES.

Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason” —
specifically — “of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision.” In other words, Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective
streets,” in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road,
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that “the streets aforementioned were
and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and
manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned” who “have been ever
vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them
by law.” Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either “control or supervision” over said street or road.

42. Nakpil & Sons et. al. vs. Court of Appeals

October 3, 1986 160 SCRA 334

FACTS:

In the RTC of Manila, PBA filed a complaint for damages and thus was appealed to the CA where
judgment was modified as what the RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff. PBA constructed a building
whereby the construction was undertaken by United Construction Inc, (UCI). Approved by the
president of PBA, the plans and specification were prepared by Nakpil & Sons. August 2, 1968,
earthquake hit Manila and thus damaging properties where the building of PBA was one of which.
November 29 of that same year, plaintiff PBA filed suit for recovery of damages against the UCI. The
UCI in turned filed suit against Nakpil & Sons, by which in March 3, 1969 filed their written stipulation.
In the RTC, technical issues were submitted to Commissioner Hizon and as for other issues the Court
resolved. Commissioner sustained that the building was caused directly by the earthquake and
maintained that the specification were not followed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an Act of God-fortuitous event, exempts liability from parties who are otherwise liable
because of their negligence?

HELD:

Although the general rule for fortuitous events stated in Article 1174 of the Civil Code exempts liability
when there is an Act of God, thus if in the concurrence of such event there be fraud, negligence, delay
in the performance of the obligation, the obligor cannot escape liability therefore there can be an action
for recovery of damages. The negligence of the defendant was shown when and proved that there
was an alteration of the plans and specification that had been so stipulated among them. Therefore,
therefore there should be no question that NAKPIL and UNITED are liable for damages because of
the collapse of the building.

43. Alfredo Velayo vs Shell Company

FACTS:

Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its
C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined
as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt
so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint
representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each
creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will
file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was
represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee
convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was
pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is
assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not
the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-
54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the
subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.

Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell
Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines.
In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these
other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for
insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s
appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him
to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order
for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that
judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54
plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing
in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

HELD:

Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:

“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not
constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217)
may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent
act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

43. Wassmer vs. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get
married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-
to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not
appear and was not heard from again.

Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default.
Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000
as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.

Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby
rendered judgment hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

HELD:

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a
wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good
customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.

When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary
damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless
and oppressive manner.

44. St. Louis Realty Corp. vs CA

FACTS:

Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical
Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis
Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was
republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and
not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published.
After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week
after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto
Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand
actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr.
Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint
for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.

ISSUE:
Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

HELD:

St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore,
it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as
attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement
for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of
the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong
to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.

45. Torio vs. Fontanilla

G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978

FACTS:

On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: one for
management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta
Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment
and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was
being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon
of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The
defendants were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its
Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it
performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. The
defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in
carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and
as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore,
they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the
municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to construct the stage and dismissed
the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily liable for damages.

ISSUE:

1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate


function of the municipality?

2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?

3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable for
the death of Fontanilla?

HELD:

1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise
of a private or proprietary function of the municipality.
Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives
authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe
one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town
is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the
public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed
was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless
it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like
which are for public service. No governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration
of a town fiesta.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise
the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their
acts are political and governmental Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they
are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the municipalities exercise a
private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public
agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the
municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.

2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death
of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's
officers, employees, or agents.

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for
the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the
post and braces used were of bamboo material. The collapse of the stage was also attributable to the
great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the
necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. But they failed take the
necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or
spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage.

Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who
constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as
chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela"
stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent
superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting
within his assigned tasks.

3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function.
The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary
private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary
principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or
persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort
or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a
showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records do not show that
municipal councilors directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that
they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability. (Torio
vs. Fontanilla, GR No. L-29993, October 23, 1978)

46. Lim vs Ponce De Leon

G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975

FACTS:

On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor
launch. A year later Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan, filed with the CFI of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon,
upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial
Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balacbac to impound
and take custody of the motor launch. On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request
to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a
third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.
Consequently, on July 6, 1962 upon the order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee
Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balacbac, Palawan, seized the motor launch from
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it. Plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the
CFI of Palawan on November 19, 1962 a complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal
Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962, Maddela entered the premises of
Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his
consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly
suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

HELD:

Defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiff-appellants. To be liable under Article 32 of the New
Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. A person
whose constitutional rights have been impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public
officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In
the instant case, Delfin Lim’s claims were amply supported by evidence that he should be awarded
damages. However, with respect to plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to recover any damage which
he alleged he had suffered from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had already
transferred 52 the ownership and possession of the motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized
and therefore, he has no legal standing to question the validity of the seizure.

47. GEO. W. DAYWALT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES


AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-13505 February 4, 1919

FACTS:

In 1902, Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to plaintiff a tract of
land. It was agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as the title to the land should be perfected
and a Torrens certificate should be produced therefore in the name of Endencia. True enough the
decree had been obtained but the Torrens certificate was not issued until later. All the same, the
parties entered into another contract with a view to carrying the original agreement (i.e. 1902 contract)
into effect. Still, a third agreement was entered into between the parties in 1909; this time Endencia
promised that upon receiving the Torrens title, she will immediately deliver the same to Daywalt. In
time, the Torrens certificate was issued. Haplessly for the plaintiff, Endencia now became reluctant to
turn over the same for the reason that it was not her intention to sell so large an amount of land as
what was found by the official survey. Eventually, the controversy—one different from this case—had
reached the Supreme Court which Court found for Daywalt; the Court ordered Endencia to convey the
whole tract to Daywalt. La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation, who owned
an estate on the same island immediately adjacent to the land which Endencia had sold to Daywalt—
for many years the Recoletos Fathers had maintained large herds of cattle on the estate. Father Sanz,
the person in charge with the farm’s management, had long been well acquainted with Teodorica
Endencia and exerted over her an influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well as
to the personal friendship which existed between them. Teodorica appears to be a woman of little
personal force, easily subject to influence, and upon all the important matters of business was
accustomed to seek, and was given, the advice of father Sanz and other members of his order. He
was fully aware of the existence of the contract of 1902 as well as of the later important developments
connected with the history of that contract and the contract substituted successively for it. When the
Torrens certificate was finally issued in 1909, Endencia delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant
corporation where it remained in the custody and under the control of P. Juan Labarga. What is more,
Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with Endencia whereby large numbers of cattle belonging
to the defendant corporation were to be pastured upon said land during a period extending from June
1, 1909, to May 1, 1914. Plaintiff Daywalt sued defendant La Corporacion, in part, for damages for
wrongful interference in the performance of the contract.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of defendant La Corporacion in advising Endencia to abstain from carrying on with
the contract constituted a tort.

HELD:
NO. Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission, characterized
by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage so done. Ignoring so
much of this article as relates to liability for negligence, we take the rule to be that a person is liable
for damage done to another by any culpable act; and by "culpable act" we mean any act which is
blameworthy when judged by accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad
enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society. The fact that the officials of defendant La Corporacion may have advised Endencia not to
carry the contract into effect would not constitute actionable interference with such contract. It may be
added that when one considers the hardship that the ultimate performance of that contract entailed on
the vendor, and the doubt in which the issue was involved — to the extent that the decision of the
Court of the First Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court itself was divided
— the attitude of the defendant corporation, is not difficult to understand. To our mind a fair conclusion
on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good faith that
the contract could not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into
effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was, therefore, prompted by no mean or
improper motive. It is not, in our opinion, to be denied that Teodorica would have surrendered the
documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence and promptings of members
of the defendants corporation. But we do not credit the idea that they were in any degree influenced
to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their
cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff.

48. Custodio et al vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996

FACTS:

Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and
spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to Mabasa’s house passes through
the properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.

Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around their property. This
effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios and the Santoses
to compel them to grant his right of way with damages. Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because
of the blockade done by the families in front. The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the
Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and for Mabasa
to pay just compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding damages in favor of
Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary damages: P10k).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.

HELD:

No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.

In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left because
of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was well within his right.
He built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement agreement, either by contract
or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build the fence. It was only
after the judgment in the trial court that the easement was created which was even conditioned on the
payment of Mabasa of the just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa
when he built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In
this case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.

49. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA
EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998

FACTS:

This is a civil case for damages arising from a sea collision incident when plaintiff's tanker hit
respondent's fishing boat, causing the boat to sink.

The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of documentary exhibits presented,
mainly the price quotations. These price quotations were issued personally to Del Rosario who
requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels.
However, these are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation nor containing
data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation.

ISSUE:

Are price quotations considered commercial list, thus can be admissible in evidence?

HELD:

NO. Price quotations are not within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard
handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work
of the occupation.These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.

The price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have
been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on
the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet
because he was not the one who issued the price quotations.

A document is a commercial list if:

(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;

(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said
compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and

(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
50. SIMONA MANZANARES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL MORETA, Defendant-Appellant.

G.R. No. 12306. October 22, 1918.

FACTS:

Salvador Bona, 8 to 9 years of age, was run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
defendant on the morning of March 5, 1916. A case for recovery of damages was filed and judgment
was rendered on August 3, 1916, whereby the said defendant was sentenced to pay the sum of P1,000
as indemnity child, and to pay the costs. From this judgment, an appeal was taken by the defendant
after his motion for a new trial had been overruled, and the case is now before this court by bill of
exceptions.

ISSUE:

Whether Defendant Moreta should be held liable for damages for the death of Salvador Bona.

HELD:

Yes.The defendant, as the one who had cause the accident, is bound to indemnify the mother of the
deceased child in the amount of P1,000, which was deemed by the trial judge to be the value of the
damages occasioned to the mother for the loss and death of a member of her family. If it were true
that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before
crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were
coming from the opposite direction along Solana street, it is to be believed that, when he against stated
to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he
should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real
Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by
the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred, if the auto
had been running at a slow speed, aside form the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act
of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left; If the accident had occurred
in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had
already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2
meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street form Real Street,
at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by
the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.

51. HUGO BORROMEO, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT
CO., Defendant-Appellant.

G.R. No. L-18345 December 5, 1922

FACTS:

On the evening of April 10, 1920, electric car No. 203 of the defendant company was running along
M. H. del Pilar Street of the city of Manila, and on arriving at the intersection of that street and Isaac
Peral it stopped to receive passenger. At that moment the plaintiff approached the car with his two
children, 12 and 16 years old, respectively, and putting his two children on board the car first, he
proceeded to follow, but in attempting to board he fell off and was dragged some distance by the car,
one of the rear wheels passing over his left foot. As a result of this accident, plaintiff's left foot was
amputated, making it necessary for him to use an artificial foot in order to be able to walk.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in not allowing the plaintiff recovery for the loss of his left foot, which has
incapacitated him from following his profession.

HELD:

It appears that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was chief engineer of the merchant steamer
San Nicolas with a monthly salary of P375, and that having lost his left foot, thereby necessitating the
use of an artificial foot in order to be able to walk, he can no longer be employed as a marine engineer
on any vessel, and, as a matter of fact, the Collector of Customs has refused to grant him a license to
follow his profession as marine engineer. It also appears that the plaintiff, who is 45 years old, has
been engaged in this profession for sixteen years (since 1904), and that he knows no other profession
whereby he can earn his living. It is evident that this damage must also be indemnified. The plaintiff's
incapacity to continue in the practice of his profession as marine engineer has put an end to one of
his activities and has certainly destroyed a source - the principal

source - of his professional earnings in the future. Taking into account the age of the plaintiff and the
salary he derived from this profession from the exercise of which he has been deprived, we fix this
future damage at P2,000.chanrobles

52. Agustin v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 107846. April 18, 1997

FACTS:

Leovillo C. Agustin executed a promissory note in favor of ERM Commercial for the amount
ofP43,480.80 (ERM). The note was payable in monthly installments and secured by a chattel
mortgage over an Isuzu diesel truck, both of which were subsequently assigned to private respondent
Filinvest Finance Corporation. When petitioner defaulted in paying the installments, private respondent
demanded from him the payment of the entire balance or, in lieuthereof, the possession of the
mortgaged vehicle. Neither payment nor surrender was made.

Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26
(RTC Branch 26) against petitioner praying for the issuance of a writ of replevin o Trial ensued and,
thereafter, a writ of replevin was issued by RTC Branch 26. By virtue thereof, private respondent
acquired possession of the vehicle. Upon repossession, the latter discovered that the vehicle was no
longer in running condition and that several parts were missing which private respondent replaced.
The vehicle was then foreclosed and sold at public auction. Petitioner contends that the award of
repossession expenses to private respondent as mortgagee is “contrary to the letter, intent and spirit
of Article 1484 of the Civil Code”. He asserts that private respondent’s repossession expenses have
been amply covered by the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, hence he could no longer be held
liable.
ISSUE:

Whether or not mortgagor is liable to pay expenses as a result of the enforcement of the foreclosure.

HELD:

Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the chattel subject of the mortgage upon his failure to
pay two or more installments, or if he conceals the chattel to place it beyond the reach of the
mortgagee, he may be held liable to pay expenses as a result of the enforcement of the foreclosure.
It logically follows as a matter of common sense, that the necessary expenses incurred in the
prosecution by the mortgagee of the action for replevin so that he can regain possession of the chattel,
should be borne by the mortgagor. Recoverable expenses would, in our view, include expenses
properly incurred in effecting seizure of the chattel and reasonable attorney’s fees in prosecuting the
action for replevin.

53. Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA

G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994

FACTS:

M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the
Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino,
who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for
the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge,
with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of
the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the
anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor,
with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed
of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed
that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the
pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the
anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused
by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;

(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent
negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and
navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He
becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and
reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where
pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to
act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel,
but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation
even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide
for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports,
with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these
laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to
enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming
such office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of
care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to
navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted
than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have
and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care.
In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence required
of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he should have made sure that his directions were
promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible
for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A
perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his
duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining
watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the
negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot
is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem. Where, however, by the provisions
of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in
compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is
compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or
crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the
pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of
responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their
liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages caused
by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule,
the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and
proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or
navigation.

54. Lopez V. Pan American

G.R. No. L-22415 March 30, 1966

FACTS:
August 1, 1960: Pan American Employees Association staged a strike so Pan Am forced them to take
a leave of absence without pay on February 22, 1961 to February 23, 1961 court a quo: affected them
financially and economically, it ordered Pan America to pay them their two days salaries.

CA: affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether the employees should be awarded back wages.

HELD:

NO. AFFIRMED in so far as it declares petitioner Pan American World Airways, Inc. not guilty of unfair
labor practice, but IS REVERSED in so far as it orders said petitioner to pay the members of the
respondent labor union, Pan American Employees Association, their wages or salaries for February
22 and 23, 1961 when they were made by the petitioner to go on furlough. The petitioner is absolved
from paying the said back wages. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

The dismiss employee is not entirely without remedy if his charge of unfair labor practice fails and his
complaint dismissed, because the breach by the employer of the obligation to him may be redressed
like an ordinary contract or obligation

in placing its employees on furlough for two days, petitioner acted in good faith. The record shows that
before laying them off it asked permission from the industrial court and only effected the furlough after
said court authorized it to do so.

the step taken by respondent was necessary to protect its interest whose business is mainly
dependent on the flight of its planes," giving as additional reason that "lack of work as a cause of lay-
off is justified. Inasmuch as petitioner acted in good faith, it should not be ordered to pay back wages
to its laid off employees. not paid their wages for only two days, We do not believe that the same would
place them in such a financial and economic distress as to warrant the award of their back wages

55. Japan Airlines vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118664

FACTS:

Private respondents boarded a JAL flight in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. It included an
overnight stopover at Narita, Japan at JAL’s expense. Due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, private
respondents’ trip to Manila was cancelled. JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers and paid
for the hotel expenses of their unexpected overnight stay. The flight of private respondents was again
cancelled due to NAIA’s indefinite closure. JAL informed the respondents that it would no longer defray
their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita. The respondents were forced to
pay for their accommodations and meal expenses for 5 days.

ISSUE:

Whether or not JAL has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses even if the delay was
caused by force majeure

Whether or not the award of damages was proper


HELD:

When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the general rule is that he
cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. When JAL was prevented from resuming its
flight to Manila due to the effects of the eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and
meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred cannot be charged to JAL. The predicament of the
private respondents was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL. JAL had the duty to arrange the
respondents’ flight back to Manila. However, it failed to look after the comfort and convenience of its
passengers when it made the passengers arrange their flight back to Manila on their own and after
waiting in the airport for a whole day.

Yes, the award of nominal damages is proper. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized
and not for indemnifying any loss suffered by him.

56. Cathay Pacific v. Vazquez

G.R. No. 150843; 14 March 2003

FACTS:

Sps. Dr. Daniel and Maria Luisa Vazquez, resposdents, together with their maid and two friends went
to Hongkong for pleasure and business. On their return flight, they booked Cathay Pacific Airways.
While boarding, they were advised that there was a seat change from Business Class to First Class.
Dr. Vazquez refused the upgrade for the reason that it would not look nice for them as hosts to travel
First Class and their guests, in the Business Class; and that they were going to discuss business
matter during the flight. Cathay informed the Vazquezes that the Business Class was fully booked,
and that since they are Marco Polo Club members, they had the priority to be upgraded to first class.
Dr. Vazquez eventually gave in, after being prohibited to take the flight if they would not avail
themselves of the privilege. Upon their return to Manila, the Vazquezes filed a complaint and
demanded to be indemnified for the humiliation and embarrassment caused by Cathay’s employees.

ISSUE:

Are the Vazquezes obliged to avail the privilege and take the First Class flight?

HELD:

No. A contract of carriage existed between Cathay and the Vazquezes. They voluntarily and freely
gave their consent to an agreement whose object was the transportation of the Vazquezes from Manila
to Hong Kong and back to Manila, with seats in the Business Class Section of the aircraft, and whose
cause or consideration was the fare paid by the Vazquezes to Cathay. The Vazquezes should have
been consulted first whether they wanted to avail themselves of the privilege or would consent to a
change of seat accommodation before their seat assignments were given to other passengers. It
should not have been imposed on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade,
Cathay breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes.

Art. 1244. The debtor of a thing cannot compel the creditor to receive a different one, although the
latter may be of the same value as, or more valuable than that which is due.
In obligations to do or not to do, an act or forbearance cannot be substituted by another act or
forbearance against the obligee’s will.

57. COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION and ENRIQUE SY, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR VENTANILLA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 85161 September 9, 1991

FACTS:

Oscar Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation (OVEC), as lessor, and the petitioner Enrique F. Sy, as
lessee, entered into a (6 years) lease agreement over the Avenue, Broadway and Capitol Theaters
and the land on which they are situated in Cabanatuan City, including their air-conditioning systems,
projectors and accessories needed for showing the films or motion pictures. After more than two (2)
years of operation, the lessor OVEC made demands for the repossession of the said leased properties
in view of the Sy's arrears in monthly rentals and non-payment of amusement taxes. By reason of Sy's
request for reconsideration of OVECs demand for repossession of the three (3) theaters, the former
was allowed to continue operating the leased premises upon his conformity to certain conditions
imposed by the latter in a supplemental agreement dated August 13, 1979. In pursuance of their latter
agreement, Sy's arrears in rental was reduced. However, the accrued amusement tax liability of the
three (3) theaters to the City Government of Cabanatuan City had accumulated to P84,000.00 despite
the fact that Sy had been deducting the amount of P4,000.00 from his monthly rental with the obligation
to remit the said deductions to the city government. Hence, letters of demand dated January 7, 1980
and February 3, 1980 were sent to Sy demanding payment of the arrears in rentals and amusement
tax delinquency. SY failed to pay the abovementioned amounts in full Consequently, OVEC padlocked
the gates of the three theaters under lease and took possession thereof in the morning of February
11, 1980. Sy, filed the present action for reformation of the lease agreement, damages and injunction
and by virtue of a restraining order dated February 12, 1980 followed by an order directing the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction issued in said case, Sy regained possession and operation of the
Avenue, Broadway and Capital theaters. The trial court arrived at the conclusions that Sy is not entitled
to the reformation of the lease agreement; that the repossession of the leased premises by OVEC
after the cancellation and termination of the lease was in accordance with the stipulation of the parties
in the said agreement and the law applicable thereto and that the consequent forfeiture of Sy's cash
deposit in favor of OVEC was clearly agreed upon by them in the lease agreement. The trial court
further concluded that Sy was not entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction issued in his favor after
the commencement of the action and that the injunction bond filed by Sy is liable for whatever damages
OVEC may have suffered by reason of the injunction. From this decision of the trial court, Sy and
(CBISCO) appealed the decision in toto while OVEC appealed insofar as the decision failed to hold
the injunction bond liable for damages awarded by the trial court. The respondent Court of Appeals
held that the cancellation or termination of the agreement prior to its expiration period is justified as it
was brought about by Sy's own default in his compliance with the terms of the agreement and not
"motivated by fraud or greed." It also affirmed the award to OVEC of the amount of P100,000.00
chargeable against the injunction bond posted by CBISCO which was soundly and amply justified by
the trial court. The respondent Court likewise found no merit in OVECS appeal and held that the trial
court did not err in not charging and holding the injunction bond posted by Sy liable for all the awards
as the undertaking of CBISCO under the bond referred only to damages, which OVEC may suffer as
a result of the injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding CBISCO’s bond liable

HELD:

No. A provision which calls for the forfeiture of the remaining deposit still in the possession of the
lessor, without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or
cancellation of the agreement by reason of the lessee's violation of any of the terms and conditions of
the agreement is a penal clause that may be validly entered into. A penal clause is an accessory
obligation, which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of insuring the performance
thereof by imposing on the debtor a special presentation (generally consisting in the payment of a sum
of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. As a general
rule, in obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the
payment of interests in case of non-compliance. In such case, proof of actual damages suffered by
the creditor is not necessary in order that the penalty may be demanded (Article 1228, New Civil
Code). However, there are exceptions to the rule that the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for
damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance with the principal obligation. They
are first, when there is a stipulation to the contrary; second, when the obligor is sued for refusal to pay
the agreed penalty; and third, when the obligor is guilty of fraud (Article 1226, par. 1, New Civil Code).
It is evident that in all said cases, the purpose of the penalty is to punish the obligor. Therefore, the
obligee can recover from the obligor not only the penalty but also the damages resulting from the non-
fulfillment or defective performance of the principal obligation. In the case at bar, inasmuch as the
forfeiture clause provides that the deposit shall be deemed forfeited, without prejudice to any other
obligation still owing by the lessee to the lessor, the penalty cannot substitute for the P100,000.00
supposed damage resulting from the issuance of the injunction against the P290,000.00 remaining
cash deposit. This supposed damage suffered by OVEC was the alleged P10,000.00 a month increase
in rental from P50,000.00 to P60,000,00), which OVEC failed to realize for ten months from February
to November, 1980 in the total sum of P100,000.00. This opportunity cost which was duly proven
before the trial court, was correctly made chargeable by the said court against the injunction bond
posted by CBISCO. There is likewise no merit to the claim of petitioners that respondent Court
committed serious error of law and grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent's
counterclaim for failure to pay the necessary docket fee, which is an issue raised for the first time in
this petition. Thus, We allowed the amendment of the complaint by specifying the amount of damages
within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice and the reassessment of the filing fees.

58. FORTUNATO DE LEON & JUANA F. GONZALES-DE LEON, petitioners-appellants, vs.


HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division composed of Justices Concepcion,
Serrano & San Diego) DR. CORNELIO S. TANTOCO and JUAN BRIONES represented by
Administratrix MAGDALENA BERNARDO, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-31931 August 31, 1988

FACTS:

The third-party defendants spouses Juan Briones and Magdalena Bernardo were the former
registered owners of the fishpond situated at San Roque, Paombong, Bulcacan, which was covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 (Exhibit 2). This fishpond was the subject of a deed of
mortgage executed by the spouses Briones on January 22, 1954, in favor of Hermogenes Tantoco
involving the consideration of P20,000.00 (Exh. 2), which amount was later assigned by the
mortgagee to his father herein defendant and thirdparty plaintiff Dr. Cornelio S. Tantoco (Exh. 10).
Apart from this first mortgage, the spouses Briones likewise executed a deed of second mortgage for
P68,824.00 with 10% interest per annum in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco dated May 26, 1959 (Exh.
1). Both mortgages were duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan and duly
annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 28296 (Exh. 2) of the Briones. While these
two mortgages were still subsisting the Briones spouses sold the fishpond, which is the subject
matter of said two mortgages, to plaintiff spouses Fortunato de Leon and Juana F. Gonzales de
Leon in the amount of P120,000.00 (Exh. 5). Of the amount of P120,000.00, the Briones spouses
actually received only the amount of P31,000.00 on June 2, 1959, as the amount of P89,000.00 was
withheld by the plaintiff de Leon who assumed to answer the mortgage indebtedness of the Briones
to the Tantocos (Exhs. 3, 3-a, 3-a-1 to 3-b). After the sale plaintiffs de Leon satisfied the mortgage
loan of P20,000.00 including 10% interest per annum to Hermogenes Tantoco who then accordingly
executed a deed of discharge of mortgage (Exhs. Z & Z-1), but the mortgage in favor of Cornelio S.
Tantoco in the amount of P68,824 was not satisfied. On February 5, 1962 plaintiffs made payment of
P29,382.50 to the defendant Cornelio Tantocos."

ISSUE:

Whether the award for exemplary damages is proper.

HELD:

The entitlement to moral damages having been established the award of exemplary damages is
proper (Bert Osmeña & Associates v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 395 [1983]; Tan Kapoe v. Masa,
134 SCRA 231 [1985]).

While the award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual
way of awarding said damages there is no question of respondent's entitlement to moral and
exemplary damage (Tan Kapoe v. Masa, supra). The amount should be reduced, however, for being
excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party (Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]). Moral damages though incapable of pecuniary
estimations, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty of the wrongdoer (San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA
85 [1982] cited in Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc. supra).

Time and again the Court has ruled that "moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action" (Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino,
Jr., 94 SCRA 966 [1979]); R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 736 [1984]; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra).

In the case of Miranda Ribaya v. Bautista (95 SCRA 672 [1980]), this Court considered 25% of the
principal amount as reasonable. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found on February 21, 1970
that the outstanding balance of the disputed loan was P64,921.69. Twenty five percent thereof is
P16,230.00 but considering the depreciation of the Philippine peso today, it is believed that the
award of moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is reasonable.

59. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO CRISTOBAL, accused-


appellant.
G.R. No. 116279 January 29, 1996

FACTS:

The pain rape causes becomes more excruciating when the victim carries the life of an unborn within
her womb. That tender and innocent life, born of love and its parents' participation in the mystery of
life, is thereby placed in undue danger. Such was the case of Cherry Tamayo, a married woman.
She was twenty-eight years old, with one child and another on the way, when tragedy struck. She
was sexually assaulted on 31 March 1986. Fortunately, the life in her womb survived.

She accused Rogelio Cristobal of rape in a sworn complaint2 filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Maddela, Quirino, on 8 April 1986.

Having found sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime charged has been
committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof, the court ruled that the accused should be
held for trial.3 Accordingly, it issued a warrant for his arrest4 and fixed his bail bond at P17,000.00. 5
The accused was arrested but was later released on bail.6 Thereafter, the court increased the
amount of bail to P30,000.00 and, consequently, ordered the rearrest of the accused.7
Unfortunately, by this time, he was nowhere to be found.

On 26 August 1986, the MTC ordered the case to be "sent to the files without prejudice to its
subsequent prosecution as soon as the defendant is apprehended." 8 Almost a year after, or
specifically on 24 August 1987, the said court ordered the records of the case to be forwarded to the
Provincial Fiscal for proper disposition. 9

On 15 September 1987, the Provincial Fiscal of Quirino filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabarroguis, Quirino, an information10 charging accused Rogelio Cristobal with the crime of rape

ISSUE:

Whether the award for exemplary damages is proper.

HELD:

The alibi of the accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it must establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission.37 The accused's testimony placing himself somewhere else was
corroborated by the testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But he failed to establish physical
impossibility because the alibi places him within only three kilometers from where the crime was
committed, a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.

For sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman, the accused has shown moral corruption,
perversity, and wickedness. He has grievously wronged the institution of marriage. The imposition
then of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from committing similar acts or for
correction for the public good38 is warranted. 39 We hereby fix it at P25,000.00.

Pursuant to the current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court should be
increased from P30,000.00 to P40,000.00.

You might also like