CRIMES AGAINST SECURITY Art.
275-289 Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day,
ABANDONING A MINOR
People v. Bandian
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs
of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the
trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission
to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her newborn babe,
and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and
in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the
appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas
from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there
that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later,
he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood
both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being
able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very
weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed
her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house,
what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy.
Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin
Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later
requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come
upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he
saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the
appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and
latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked
whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the
appellant answered in the affirmative.
Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan,
Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still
bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the
bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in
question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own
bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she
had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of
another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give
force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him
that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on
the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr.
Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was
contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant,
as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore
held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however,
does not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may
be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the
Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the
minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child
in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in
the body of the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites animals,
the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed
wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious
and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed
through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said
circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must
be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's
death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully,
consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose
it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to
her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her
married life with Kirol — she considers him her husband as he considers her
his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the
appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such
belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her
womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for
the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed
of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin
Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and
carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left the
place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the
extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to
lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's
affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant
denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the time
she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her
extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the
hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances
that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore
inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties
usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol —
a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and
could supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience
itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware
of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due
to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or
insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12,
Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given
it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing
its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into
the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the
fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she
caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she
was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be
blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any
person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12,
subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and
granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket
and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented
by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the
alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it
appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime
of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is
actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she be
released immediately. So ordered.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is
exempt from criminal liability but because she has committed no criminal act or
omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina
Bandian had spent a year of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was
begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover knew that she was pregnant and
both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love should be
born. Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy. On
January 31, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house and
entered a thicket about four or five brazas away, where the residents of said place
responded to the call of nature. After some minutes the accused emerged from the
thicket staggering and apparently unable to support herself. Her neighbor Valentin
Aguilar, who saw her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to help her,
supported her and aided her in going up to her house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what
happened to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy. Thinking that he alone
was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby,
and requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano
had scarcely gone about five brazas, when he saw the body of a newborn child near the
path adjoining the thicket where the accused had been a few moments before. Upon
being informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to bring the child
into the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the child shown to her was
hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After an autopsy had been made of the
body, it was found that the child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among
young primiparæ who, by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and
of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not aware that they are giving birth when they
are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine
Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926, page 530;
Vibert, Manual de Medicina Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no
doubt that the accused, in her feverish, weak and dizzy condition when she went into
the thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no experience in childbirth, was not
aware that upon defecating she was also expelling the child she was carrying in her
womb. Believing that she did nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature which
brought her there, she returned home staggering for lack of strength to support herself
and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she was leaving a newborn child behind
her, and she only knew that she had given birth when she was shown the already dead
child with wounds on the body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law
are felonies, which may be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent, and fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been
exposed to the rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she
deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor,
because according to the above-cited legal provision there is deceit when the act
punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and from
dizziness, the appellant under the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth
and, consequently, she could not have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose
existence she was ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the animals.
Neither can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as already stated, not
knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly lawful
physiological act, being natural — she might expel the child she carried in her womb,
she cannot be considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who fails to
use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of his willful act.
Having had no knowledge of the fact of her delivery, the accused could not think that by
leaving the child in the thicket, it would die as a consequence of the rough weather or
of the cruelty of animals. Neither can she be considered negligent because negligence
is the omission to do what the law or morals obliges one to do, which implies knowledge
of the thing which is the subject matter of the compliance with the obligation. Inasmuch
as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot contemplate complying
with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her child. Neither can it be held that
the appellant lacked foresight because, having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery,
she could not foresee that by abandoning her child in a thicket it would die. Neither can
it be held that her act was the result of lack of skill because she did not know that to
defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her delivery, and as defecation is a
natural physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it,"
because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological necessity
accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the exposure
of the child at the mercy of the elements and of the animals which cased its death. As
the child was born alive, if the accused had been aware of her delivery and she had
deliberately abandoned the child, her accidental delivery would not exempt her from
criminal liability because then the death of said child no longer would have been
accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting circumstance of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law,
when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this exempting
circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied with but is
prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive which has
lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law commands. In the
present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant, with respect to the child,
is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had she been aware of her delivery and
of the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her dizziness resulting from the
fever which consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and her
illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would constitute
the lawful or insuperable impediment required by law. Having been ignorant of her
delivery and of the existence of the child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the
law to impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from
its exposure to the rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed
to the accused, because she had neither deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or
omission punishable by law with regard to the child.
TRESPASSING
People v. De Peralta
VILLAMOR, J.:
About the month of October, 1919, and for sometime previously Cecilio Toledo
held the position of president of the "Philippine Marine Union," and in such
capacity, he had the privilege of occupying, as his dwelling, a room of house
No. 507 of Jaboneros Street of this city, which was rented to said association.
About the middle of said month of October, Toledo was discharged from the
position of president and was succeeded by Olimpio de Peralta. The latter, for
the purpose of looking for a desk glass which he believed was the property of
the union, entered the room in question in the morning of the 16th of the same
month. This gave rise to the information for trespass to dwelling against
Peralta, in which it is alleged that he entered the room of Toledo against the
will of the occupant. Trial was had and the accused was sentenced to suffer
two months and one day of arresto mayor, to pay a fine 400 pesetas, and
costs. From this judgment the present appeal was taken.
Two witnesses for the prosecution, Lucia Matias and Daniel Alvarado, testify
as to how the accused entered the room on the day in question. The former
stated that she was inside the room, the door of which was closed, when the
accused pushed the door; and that she, upon seeing him already inside, asked
him: "Why did you enter without permission?" to which the accused answered:
"I need something in this room," and Lucia Matias told him not to take away
the glass because Toledo was absent. The second witness, Daniel Alvarado,
states that he was inside the room cleaning a phonograph when the accused
struck the door and he heard a strong blow which he believes was a kick
against the door given by the accused.
On the other hand, two witnesses for the defense, Bernardo Bildad and
Bonifacio Viloria testify similarly that the accused on the day in question,
between half past ten and eleven in the morning, entered the room of Toledo
looking for the desk glass in question, accompanied by Lucia Matias whom he
found outside.
After a careful study of the testimony given in the case, we are of the opinion
that the accused, after calling at or near the door, pushed it and without the
permission of the occupants entered the room with the object of taking away
the desk glass. There is no evidence that Toledo had expressed his will in the
sense of prohibiting the accused Peralta from entering his room, and the mere
fact that the latter entered it, without the permission of the occupant, does not
constitute the offense of trespass to dwelling provided for and penalized in
article 491 of the Penal Code. In order that this crime may exist it is necessary
that the entrance should be against the express or presumed prohibition of
the occupant, and the lack of permission should not be confused with
prohibition. In the decisions of the courts of Spain, as well as in those of this
jurisdiction, it has been held uniformly that this crime is committed when a
person enters another's dwelling against the will of the occupant, but not when
the entrance is effected without his knowledge or opposition.
As Groizard says in his commentaries on article 504 of the Penal Code of
Spain, corresponding to article 491 of that of the Philippines: "It is not
necessary, in the ordinary life of men, in order to call at the door of a house or
enter it, to obtain previous permission from the owner who lives in it. With the
utmost good faith may a person, to whom entrance has not been denied
beforehand, suppose that the owner of the room has no objection to receiving
him in it." And in the present case it is to be supposed that the members of the
"Philippine Marine Union," among them the accused, had something
familiarity which warrants entrance into the room occupied by the president of
the association, particularly when we consider the hour at which the act in
question happened (between half past ten and eleven in the morning), the fact
that the door of the room was not barricaded or locked with a key, and the
circumstance that the room in question was part of the house rented to said
association.
For the reason above stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the
accused Olimpio de Peralta is acquitted, with costs of both instances de oficio.
So ordered.
People v. Uy Almeda
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TRESPASS TO DWELLING; CASE AT BAR. — The
house in which the offended party lived was built on a lot inclosed by a stone
fence having an iron grill gate and on which the appellant had a warehouse.
Although the latter had free entry into and passage on the common lot, his
unauthorized intrusion into the house of the offended party made him a
trespasser.
2. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL INTENT. — What is intended to be protected and
preserved by the law is the privacy of one’s dwelling, and, except in those
cases enumerated in the third paragraph of article 280 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal intent inheres in the unwelcome visit of a trespasser.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
convicting the appellant, Anacleto Uy Almeda, of the offense of qualified
trespass to dwelling and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of from four months and one day of arresto mayor to two
years, four months and one day of prision correccional, with the accessories
of the law and one-third of the costs.
The facts established during the trial are substantially as follows: On the
morning of November 13, 1940, the appellant, in company with other persons,
arrived at the house of Honorata Limpo in the municipality of Biñan, Province
of Laguna. The latter was thereupon informed by appellant’s companion,
Potenciano Villano, that they were going to demolish and repair her house, to
which Honorata Limpo objected, specially in view of the absence of her
husband at the time. Unheeding this opposition, and upon express orders of
the appellant, his companions Potenciano Villano and Antonio Dysionglo
proceeded to gain entry into the house by means of two ladders which they
placed against the front wall and to remove some boards and iron sheets that
served to cover the front side. Appellant’s designs were put to a stop, however,
only by the arrival of Honorata’s son named Francisco, who called a policeman
to the scene.
It appears that the house in question was built on a lot inclosed by a stone
fence having an iron grill gate. On the same lot the appellant had a warehouse;
and as he had freely used said gate in going to his property, it is now
contended that his entry into the yard of Honorata Limpo, which was a part of
her "dwelling," could not have been unauthorized or against her will, so as to
warrant his conviction under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant’s argument would require some inquiry if the lot on which Honorata’s
house was erected were exclusively hers and the appellant had not admittedly
used its gate in common with Honorata, and if said argument would not further
lead to a plainly unacceptable, nay undesirable, result that simply because he
had free entry into and passage on the common lot, he could have the same
right as regards Honorata’s house.
Another defense pressed in this appeal is that the opposition registered by
Honorata Limpo was directed against the demolition or repair of her house
and not against the original entry of the appellant and his companions into the
yard or premises of her dwelling, and that although the removal of some
boards and iron sheets, done by the appellant through his companions after
their lawful entry, may constitute an independent offense, the said subsequent
act cannot be the trespass defined and penalized by article 280 of the Revised
Penal Code. This contention is of course partly disposed of in the preceding
paragraph. It is only necessary to add that Honorata could not have consented
to appellant’s intrusion into the house, which made him a trespasser, for the
very purpose already objected to by her. Moreover, the method employed by
appellant’s men in affecting entry suggests prior refusal on the part of
Honorata to admit them through its stairs. Neither is there any point in
appellant’s pretense that, one week before the occasion in question he had
notified Honorata about the intended repairs, because said notice did and
could not mean her subsequent conformity.
The appellant next tries to exculpate himself by maintaining that there is
absolutely no proof as to his criminal intent in entering the yard or even the
house of Honorata. Indeed, it is insisted that he merely wanted to repair said
house over which he was claiming ownership. Appellant thus pretended to
have brought the house for P70 from the estranged wife of Honorata’s son
against whose father he subsequently filed a suit to recover the premises. This
case was however, decided against him. We are of the opinion that the alleged
ownership is immaterial, for even supposing that the house belonged to the
appellant, that fact alone did not authorize to him to do anything with or enter
the house against the will of its actual occupant. he could have invoked the
aid of the court for the exercise or protection of his alleged proprietary rights.
What is intended to be protected and preserved by the law is the privacy of
one’s dwelling, and, except in those cases enumerated in the third paragraph
of article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent inheres in the
unwelcome visit of a trespasser.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Gabriel and Natividad v. People and Court of Appeals
REYES, A., J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, convicting the
appellants Pedro Gabriel and Avelino Natividad of simple trespass to dwelling
on facts found by the said court to be as follows:
. . . Sherman Jones and his wife, Josefina Jones, were occupying
the house No. 9-B, M.H. del Pilar St., Malabon, Rizal, having as
neighbor their comadre Mariquita Beltran. The electric meter of the
premises was installed on a wall in a balcony, and visible from the
porch of the house (Exhibit 1). At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening
of April 19, 1949, accused Pedro Gabriel, Avelino Natividad and
Miguel Evangelista arrived at the house, presented themselves as
Meralco light inspectors to Mrs. Jones who was them on the stairs of
the house with Mariquita and inquired from the ladies for Sherman
Jones. Mrs. Jones told them to wait on the porch; she entered the
living room, closed the door behind her and went to the family
bedroom where Sherman was then in the act of changing his clothes.
While Mrs. Jones was inside the bedroom and informing her husband
of the presence of Meralco inspectors, accused Gabriel inspected
the electric meter and then shouted to his co-accused Natividad:
"Naty, atras ang contador." Natividad rushed into the living room and
then entered the bedroom where Sherman and his wife were talking.
Natividad pushed the door of the bedroom with such force that the
said door brushed aside Mrs. Jones who was then leaving behind it.
Accused Gabriel followed Natividad to the bedroom and, with the
help of the flashlights, both searched for a gadget which they
suspected Sherman used in order to steal electric fluid.
Notwithstanding Sherman's protest of their institution, the two
accused continued their search. Finding that Sherman meant
business, the intruders left the bedroom hastily, boarded their jeep
and went away with the other accused Evangelista to Sangandaan
Street where they met policeman Pablo Malosido of Caloocan. The
trio requested the policeman accompany them to tension to do him
any arm. The policeman accompanied them, but upon noticing the
presence of several Americans in the house, they left. They noticed
latter that a truck commonly known as 6 X 6 started from Sherman's
house and followed them. They were able to hide and later went to
 the municipal building of Caloocan, at which Sherman and his
companions subsequently arrived to complain. Sherman's complaint,
however, was referred to the police authorities of Malabon who had
jurisdiction over the case.
In asking for the reversal of the judgment below counsel for appellants argue
that inasmuch as the original entry was with the permission of the occupant of
the house and therefore lawful, nothing that happened afterwards could
"convert the original lawful entry into a unlawful one." The argument assumes
that appellants entered a dwelling with the consent of the householder. But
the assumption is gratuitous and unwarranted, the Court of Appeals having
found "that the entry was against the will of the spouses." That will was, we
think, clearly manifested by the lady of the house when she told appellants to
wait on the porch and closed the door behind her as she entered the drawing
room. She did not, it is true, in so many words tell the appellants not to enter.
But when she made them wait outside and shut the door to the interior of the
house, her action spoke louder than words. The porch is an open part of the
house, and being allowed to wait there under the circumstances mentioned
can in no sense be taken as entry to a dwelling with the consent of the dweller.
Counsel cite the case of U.S. vs. Dionisio and Del Rosario, 12 Phil., 283; U.S.
vs. Flemister, 1 Phil., 354; and People vs. De Peralta, 42 Phil., 69. But those
cases were decided upon facts different from those of the present case.
In the case first cited, U.S vs. Dionisio and Del Rosario, the defendants found
the principal door of a house half-open. Entering without opposition from the
occupant of lower part of the house, who was, present, they proceed to the
upper story, also without opposition, and there conversed with one of the
inmates, who invited them to sit down and allowed them to stay for about two
hours. Then trouble arose when defendants, posing as detectives, started
doing something illegal. In declaring defendants not guilty of the crime of
trespass to dwelling, this court were held that the fact and circumstances from
which, in a given case, the opposition of the occupant may be inferred, must
have been in existence prior to or at the time of the entry, and in no event can
facts arising after an entry has been secured with the expenses of tacit
consent of the occupant change the character of the entry from one with the
assent of the occupant to one contrary thereto. That the case is to be
distinguished from the one before us in that there the defendants entered a
half-opened door and went inside the house without opposition, express or
implied, from any of the occupants. Here, on the other hand, the lady of the
house clearly — be it only impliedly — manifested her opposition to appellants'
entry by telling them to wait on the porch and closing the door behind her as
she left them there.
In the second case, U.S. vs. Flemister, the defendant, an American, went to a
bail uninvited, danced with somebody and then left. Returning a short time
thereafter, he was met near the door by the host, who took him by the hand
and asked him if he had come to dance and even invited him to be seated,
but tried to prevent him from entering the sala where there was a guest,
another American, with whom he had a quarrel pending. The defendant,
however, rudely brushed the host aside, proceeded to the sala and quarreled
with the other American. "It seems clear to us," said this Court in declaring the
defendant not guilty of trespass to dwelling, "that the purpose of the owner of
the house was to prohibit the defendant not from entering his house but from
entering the sala in order to avoid a quarrel between the two Americans. His
taking the defendant by the hand, asking him if he came to dance, and
requesting him to be seated, are inconsistent with the idea that he was
attempting to keep the defendant from entering the house." Again, unlike the
appellants in the present case, the defendant in the case cited was not
prohibited from entering the house; on the contrary, it would appear that he
was not welcomed into it.
In the third case, People vs. De Peralta, the accused, the new president of the
Philippine Marine Union, called at the door of a room which his predecessor
in office was allowed to occupy as his dwelling in a house rented by the union,
pushed the said door and without the permission of the occupant entered the
room to take away a desk glass which he believed was union property. These
was no evidence that the occupant "has expressed his will in the sense of
prohibiting (the accused) from entering his room," and it was to be supposed,
this Court said, "that the members of the Philippine Marine Union, among them
the accused, had some familiarity which warrants entrance into the room
occupied by the president of the association, particularly when we consider
the hour at which the act in question happened (between half pat ten and
eleven in the morning), the fact that the door of the room was not barricaded
or locked with a key, and the circumstance that the room in question was part
of the house rented to said association." Upon those facts, this Court acquitted
the accused of the charge of trespass to dwelling, following the uniform
doctrine here and in Spain that "this crime is committed when a person enters
another's dwelling against the will of the occupant, but not when the entrance
is effected without his knowledge or opposition." It is to be noted that the entry
in that case was effected without express or implied opposition from the
occupant of the room and under circumstances warranting an entrance
without previous leave. In the present case, the entry was, as already noted,
against the will of the lady of the house, who, by her action if not by direct
words, made it plain to the appellants that they were not to enter her dwelling.
Lastly, counsel contend that appellants are exempt from criminal liability under
the third paragraph of article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, because "they
rendered a service to justice" when, as Meralco line inspectors, they "followed
Mrs. Sherman Jones to the bedroom" and there found her husband "hiding a
transformer in an "aparador" ". Here again, counsel assume something which
was not believed by the Court of Appeals, that is, that appellants saw Jones
in the act of hiding a transformer used by him "in stealing electricity," this claim
being characterized by the court as nothing but a "vain effort on the part of the
appellants to fit the facts of the case to the provisions of the Revised Penal
code to the effect that a person who enters a dwelling for the purpose of
rendering service to justice, is not guilty of trespass." In other words, the Court
of Appeals believed that appellants merely suspected that there was a
transformer in the house. That alone did not give them the right to enter the
house against the will of its owner, unarmed as they were with a search
warrant.
It appearing that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with law and
the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, the same is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellants.
Marzalado Jr. v. People
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated November 9,
2001 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated November 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 79, in Criminal Case No. Q-98-74695. The RTC upheld
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35, convicting
herein petitioner Salvador Marzalado, Jr., for violation of Article 280 3 of the
Revised Penal Code on Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor and
to pay a fine of P500 and to pay the costs. 4 This petition likewise assails the
Resolution5 dated April 23, 2002, of the Court of Appeals, denying the
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by Luz
Marzalado, the mother of herein petitioner, Salvador Marzalado, Jr. Sometime
in February 1993, Luz Marzalado filed an ejectment case against Albano.
Judgment was rendered against Albano, who was ordered to vacate the
leased premises and to pay the unpaid rentals. Albano appealed to the RTC.
In September 1993, during the pendency of the appeal, the electricity supply
of the unit was cut off due to non-payment of bills. As a result, Albano
transferred her children to her father's house, four houses away, leaving a
maid to sleep in the unit.
Albano claims that on November 2, 1993, at around 1:00 p.m., she went to
her unit. She noticed that the lead pipe she used to hang clothes to dry was
missing. When she returned at about 8:00 a.m. the following day, November
3, 1993, she discovered the padlock of the main door changed, preventing her
from entering the premises. She went to see petitioner but he was not around.
On November 4, 1993, Albano again returned to her unit. She peeked through
the window jalousies and saw that the place was already empty. She
immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials, who in turn, advised
her to go to the police. Thereafter, she filed a complaint for grave coercion,
qualified trespass to dwelling and theft against petitioner.
On November 14, 1993, Albano tried to see the accused, but again failed. This
time she noticed that the roofing of her unit had been removed and the main
door locked from the inside. She was informed that on November 1, 1993,
Marzalado, Jr., and his female companion took her lead pipe and on
November 2, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., took her personal belongings and brought
them inside his house.
Accordingly, Albano filed a suit for trespass to dwelling with the MeTC of
Quezon City against Marzalado, Jr., thus:
The undersigned accuses SALVADOR MAR[Z]ALADO, JR., of the crime of
Trespass to Dwelling, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1993, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused without any justifiable cause,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
dwelling place of CRISTINA N. ALBANO located at No. 241 Road 1,
Pag-Asa, this City, against the latter's will and without her consent or
any members of the household, to the damage and prejudice of the
said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, March 16, 1994.6
On May 12, 1994, the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charge. A summary hearing followed, with Albano and her witness, Narciso
Raniedo, testifying for the prosecution.
Raniedo, the owner of the house fronting Albano's unit, testified that at around
5:00 p.m., on November 1, 1993, he was about to enter his house, when he
glanced at the unit leased by Albano. He saw Marzalado, Jr., take a lead pipe
and hand it to a woman waiting at the terrace of Marzalado, Jr.'s house.
Raniedo further said that on November 2, 1993, sometime between 4:30 p.m.
and 5:00 p.m. he was relaxing in front of his house, when he heard noises
coming from Albano's apartment. There he saw Marzalado, Jr., forcibly open
the door of the unit, bring out the belongings of Albano, and take these to his
own house.
For his defense, Marzalado, Jr., testified that after the MeTC ruled against
Albano in the MeTC ejectment case filed by his mother and because of the
disconnection of the electricity, Albano already vacated the leased unit and
moved to her father's place. According to petitioner, on November 3, 1993, he
was on his way home when he saw water in a continuous stream flowing out
of Albano's unit. He then searched for Albano but to no avail. He reported the
matter to the barangay officers and asked for two barangay tanods to
accompany him to the vacated unit. They went inside the unit where they
found an open faucet, with water flooding the floor. He accused Albano of
deliberately leaving the faucet open. He claimed Albano filed the criminal case
of trespass to dwelling to harass him and to retaliate against him and his
family.
On October 28, 1997, the MeTC handed down the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Salvador Mar[z]alado, Jr.
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trespass To
Dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code and he is
hereby sentenced the penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of Arresto Mayor and to pay a fine of P 500.00 and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court observed that the defense would have been "a good defense"
had the alleged entry been made on November 2, 1993, the date stated in the
Information, instead of November 3, 1993, the date the accused said he
entered the premises because Albano deliberately left the faucet open.
Marzalado, Jr., appealed to the RTC, which ruled the matter in this wise:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision
dated October 28, 1997, the same is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.8
Undaunted, Marzalado, Jr., elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22645. The Court of Appeals found no error in the challenged
RTC decision and held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower court's decision is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, petitioner comes to this Court assigning as errors of the court a quo
the following:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BOTH OF QUEZON CITY
BECAUSE THE INCIDENT HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1993,
AND NOT NOVEMBER 2, 1993, AND THE PETITIONER'S ENTRY
IN THE PREMISES IS FULLY JUSTIFIED BECAUSE HE WAS
ASSISTED BY THEIR BARANGAY SECRETARY AND TWO
BARANGAY TANOD[S] AND THE ENTRY IS FOR A VALID
PURPOSE. HENCE, THERE IS NO TRESPASS TO DWELLING.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING
THE INFORMATION THAT THE ALLEGED TRESPASS TO
DWELLING HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 2, 1993. THUS, WITH
DUE RESPECT TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
THERE WAS A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND IT SHOULD
NOT HAVE ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT.10
The foregoing may be reduced to one issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in
sustaining the conviction of Marzalado, Jr., for qualified trespass to dwelling?
The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in sustaining the lower court, since in the proceedings below, there was a
grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in finding that he
committed trespass to dwelling despite the glaring proof that his entry was
justifiable under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code 11 - to
prevent an imminent danger to property. He stresses that while he did enter
the unit, he did so with the aid of barangay officers and for the sole purpose
of turning off the faucet that was causing the flooding of the unit. He adds that
the Information filed against him should be considered fatally defective for
having stated that his entry was on November 2, 1993, when in fact it was on
November 3, 1993.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that petitioner's entry
cannot be justified since the flooding of the floor was not a danger to life nor
property. Rather, the OSG claims that the flooding of the unit could have been
averted had the petitioner resorted to merely turning off the inlet valve of the
water source. The OSG also stresses petitioner's failure to refute the charge
that he entered the complainant's unit on November 2, 1993. Moreover, the
OSG asserts that the exact time of the commission of the crime in the
Information need not be so accurate to preclude other dates near the actual
date. It is sufficient that the Information states a time as near to the actual
date, more so, where the time is not an essential element of the offense, as in
this case.
Anent the Information, the contention of petitioner that the Information is
defective is untenable. Admittedly, there is a discrepancy on the precise date
of the alleged trespass - the Information charges petitioner Marzalado, Jr.,
with trespass to dwelling allegedly committed on November 2, 1993, while
petitioner's defense relate to an entry made the following day. The
discrepancy however, does not make the information defective. Facts and
circumstances necessary for inclusion in the information are determined by
reference to the definition and elements of the specific crime.12 In trespass to
dwelling, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) that he
enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against the latter's will.
The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an essential element
of the offense of trespass. It is sufficient that the Complaint or Information
states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to
the date of its actual commission.13 Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court
provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise time the offense was committed except when time is a material
ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed
at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as
the information or complaint will permit. A variance between the time set out
in the indictment and that established by the evidence during trial does not
constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely on
that score.14 Thus, the error invoked by the petitioner in the date of the alleged
trespass in the Information is of no grave import, for it is far from being the
decisive issue in this case.
However, still incumbent upon the prosecution is to establish the criminal
intent and the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Criminal cases
rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not the
weakness of the evidence of the defense or the lack of it. 15 In the prosecution
for trespass, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the trespass. The gravamen of the crime is violation of
possession16 or the fact of having caused injury to the right of the
possession.17
To prove trespass, the prosecution presented as witness Narciso Raniedo
who testified that he saw petitioner enter the unit at around 4:30 p.m. to 5:00
p.m. on November 2 and take out Albano's belongings. No other eyewitness
corroborated Raniedo's testimony. However, by her own account, Albano
declared that she discovered the trespass in the evening of November 3,18 the
same day the barangay certified Marzalado, Jr.'s entry. This obviously does
not discount the fact that although the exact date of entry varied as between
petitioner and respondent, they both were referring to the same entry.
What remains now is the issue of whether the entry of petitioner Marzalado,
Jr., was legally justified. We rule that it is, based on the circumstances of this
case.
As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya, the unit rented
by Albano was "forcibly opened by the owner because of the strong water
pressure coming out of the faucet…"19 As Albano herself admitted, she and
her children already left the unit when the electricity supply was cut off in the
month of September. Hence, nobody was left to attend to the unit, except
during some nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado,
Jr., acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to
his mother's property caused by the open faucet. No criminal intent could be
clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken. There was
an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit.
There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalado, Jr.'s judgment call to enter
the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested
by the OSG.
Thus, we find the evidence on record insufficient to hold petitioner guilty of the
offense charged. Palpable doubt exists in our mind as to the guilt of petitioner.
In our view, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court and of the Metropolitan Trial Court when it found
petitioner guilty of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling. In a situation of ambiguity,
where the act of the accused permits of two possible signification, one
culpable and another innocent, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
the accused. The evidence in this case simply fails to convince us of his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 9,
2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645, and its Resolution
dated April 23, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner SALVADOR MARZALADO, JR., is hereby
ACQUITTED of the charge against him for lack of evidence to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
THREATS
Caluag v. People
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated December 9, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 and its Resolution2 dated February 15,
2006, denying reconsideration. The appellate court had affirmed the Decision3
dated August 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City,
Branch 198, in Criminal Case No. 04-0183-84, which affirmed the Joint
Decision4 dated January 28, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Las Piñas City, Branch 79, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47358 and 47381 finding
petitioner Ronnie Caluag and Jesus Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries
and Ronnie Caluag guilty of grave threats.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate Informations 5 docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 47381 and 47358, respectively, were filed against Caluag and
Sentillas. The Information in Criminal Case No. 47381 charged Caluag and
Sentillas with slight physical injuries committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of March, 2000, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together, and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person
of NESTOR PURCEL DENIDO, by then and there mauling him, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries which required medical attendance for less
than nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor
for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358 charged Caluag with grave
threats committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2000, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, moved by personal resentment which he entertained against
one JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously threaten said JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO with the infliction on her
person of a harm amounting to a crime, by then and there poking his gun at
her forehead and uttering the following words in tagalog, to wit:
"Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?"
thereby causing said complainant to be threatened.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, joint
trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the spouses Nestor
and Julia Denido, as witnesses. Their version of the facts are as follows:
In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o’clock 8 in the afternoon, Nestor
learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At
that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son of
Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people including his own son
Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and replied, "Bakit kasama ka ba
roon?," and immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he
was overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box
her husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they did not listen to her. To
avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around
6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay
authorities.9
Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on
their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag, who blocked her
way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it
at her forehead, and said "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"10 Despite this
fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she
reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.11
For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and Sentillas; and the
barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr. as witnesses. According to them, in
the afternoon of March 19, 2000 at around 6 o’clock in the evening, Caluag
was on his way home with his three-year old son when Nestor, drunk and
unruly, blocked his way and asked him, "Pare, galit ka ba sa akin?" He
answered in the negative but Nestor persisted in his questioning and would
not allow him to pass through. Annoyed, he told Nestor, "Hindi nga! Ang kulit
kulit mo!" Nestor then boxed him on his face which caused him to fall down.
Caluag first assured himself of the safety of his son and then punched Nestor
back. As people around pacified them, he was led to the store owned by the
son of Sentillas. Nestor pursued him and punched him again. As he retaliated,
some bystanders separated them. Nestor then shouted, "Putang ina mo, Pare!
Gago ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong niloko!" Thereafter, an unidentified
man from the crowd armed with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas
timely interceded and pacified the man. Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag
also denied poking a gun at Julia.12
In a Joint Decision dated January 28, 2004, the MeTC found Caluag and
Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave threats.
The MeTC relied on Nestor’s testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny that
he was drunk at the time of the incident while Caluag admitted that he got
annoyed by Nestor’s attitude. The MeTC concluded that Caluag and Sentillas
lost control of their tempers due to Nestor’s unruly behavior. On the other
hand, the MeTC noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking
incident to the barangay. While she had intended to report the mauling of her
husband, as he instructed her, what she reported instead was what happened
to her. With such straightforward and seemingly natural course of events, the
MeTC was convinced that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia.
The decretal portion of the joint decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds and
declares accused RONNIE CALUAG AND JESUS S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries under
Criminal Case No. 47381, and sentences them to pay [a] fine of ₱200.00 each.
The two (2) accused are also censured to be more complaisant and well-bred
in dealing with people.
The Court also finds accused RONNIE CALUAG guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Grave Threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, under Criminal Case No. 47358, and sentences him to suffer two
(2) months imprisonment [and to] pay [a] fine of ₱200.00.
Criminal Case No. 47382, as earlier explained, is ordered dismissed being
merely a duplication of Criminal Case No. 47358.
SO ORDERED.13
Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the joint
decision of the MeTC.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC on
December 9, 2005. The appellate court noted that the MeTC gave credence
to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia because they were in accord with the
natural course of things. Likewise, petitioner’s negative assertions cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia. The appellate court
disregarded the purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nestor and
Julia since these refer to collateral matters and not to the essential details of
the incident.1avvphi1
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground that the Court of
Appeals:
I.
… MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT
DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED
WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION;
II.
… ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE [MeTC] WHICH MADE
INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS IN ITS JOINT DECISION THAT ARE
MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH ARE
GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR
CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;
III.
… ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE
OFFENSES CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.14
Simply, the issue is: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner’s
conviction of slight physical injuries and of grave threats?
Petitioner contends that he was able to present Barrameda, an independent
and impartial witness, who supported his version of events and debunked
those of Nestor and Julia. Contrary to the findings of the lower courts that
petitioner offered mere denials, Barrameda’s testimony is actually a positive
statement that should have been given full credit. Petitioner also argues that
although the lower courts acknowledged that Nestor was drunk and
troublesome at the time of the incident, they chose to believe his testimony
rather than petitioner’s. Petitioner adds that there is no basis for the lower
courts to conclude that he lost his temper because of Nestor’s unruly behavior.
Petitioner maintains that just because Julia immediately reported the gun-
poking incident to the barangay, this did not necessarily mean that it actually
happened. Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at
Julia, the crime committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.15
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that
the MeTC did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of Nestor and Julia.
The MeTC found that the positive assertions of Nestor and Julia, their
straightforward manner of testifying, and the seemingly natural course of
events, constituted the more plausible and credible version. The MeTC also
noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the
barangay authorities immediately after it happened. The OSG also agrees
with the MeTC that petitioner lost his temper, given the unruly behavior of
Nestor.
We find the petition with insufficient merit and accordingly sustain petitioner’s
conviction.
At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner raises questions of fact.
Certainly, such matters mainly require a calibration of the evidence or a
determination of the credibility of the witnesses presented by the parties and
the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation. 16
The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are
reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
under which this petition is filed. It is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to
review, examine and evaluate or weigh once again the probative value of the
evidence presented.17
Moreover, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to
weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals for
these are deemed final and conclusive and may no longer be reviewed on
appeal.18
A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the
evidence on record. Nevertheless, we find that there is no ground to apply the
exception in the instant case because the findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals are in full accord with those of the MeTC and the RTC. This
Court will not assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to the appeal particularly
where, as in this case, the findings of the MeTC, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals completely coincide.19
Even if the Court relaxes the abovecited general rule and resolves the petition
on the merits, we still find no reversible error in the appellate court’s ruling.
As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the testimonies
of Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the natural course of things.
There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their temper
as Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed by Nestor’s unruly behavior.
Likewise, the gun-poking incident also happened since Julia did not waste
time in reporting it to the barangay authorities. Instead of reporting the mauling
of her husband, she reported what happened to her in her hurry, excitement
and confusion. Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor and Julia that
petitioner committed the acts complained of undermined his negative
assertions. The fact that Barrameda testified in petitioner’s behalf cannot be
given more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor
and Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to concoct stories to pin down
petitioner on any criminal act, hence their testimonies deserve full faith and
credit.
The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner guilty
of grave threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced him to suffer two months of imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱200.
We find no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the MeTC and
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats
(Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285).
These provisions state:
Art. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any
wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime
he threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding
money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said
offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have attained
his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the
threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.
Art. 283. Light threats. — Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a
crime, made in the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding
article, shall be punished by arresto mayor.
Art. 285. Other light threats. — The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum
period or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the
next preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw
such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another
with some harm not constituting a crime, and who by subsequent
acts show that he did not persist in the idea involved in his threat,
provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it within
the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.
3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not
constituting a felony.
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may
not be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does
not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a condition. In other light
threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no
condition.
The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her
house to go to the barangay hall to report the mauling of her husband which
she witnessed earlier at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. On her way
there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at
the same time saying "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?"20 Considering what
transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband, petitioner’s act of
pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict
serious physical injury on her person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken
in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go
against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by petitioner’s
accompanying act.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under
Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone
amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically
states, "shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a
quarrel", since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not
constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not
constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on one
hand, and light and other light threats on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The Decision
dated December 9, 2005 and the Resolution dated February 15, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
COERCION
Consulta v. People
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court of Appeals having, by Decision of April 23, 2007,1 affirmed the
December 9, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
139 convicting Pedro C. Consulta (appellant) of Robbery with Intimidation of
Persons, appellant filed the present petition.
The accusatory portion of the Information against appellant reads:
That on or about the 7th day of June, 1999, in the City of Makati, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent of gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
complainant’s NELIA R. SILVESTRE gold necklace worth P3,500.00,
belonging to said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the owner
thereof in the aforementioned amount of P3,500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:
At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private complainant
Nelia R. Silvestre (Nelia), together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and Veronica
Amar (Veronica), boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon
reaching Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin Consulta (Edwin)
blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and left.
Appellant and Edwin at once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying "Putang ina
mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin."
Appellant added "Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala,
sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita."
Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant
which, according to an "alajera" in the province, was of 18k gold, and which
was worth ₱3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying "Putang ina kang
matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses
lang kayo. Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo kami
maipapakulong kahit kailan!"
Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall
where they were advised to undergo medical examination. They, however,
repaired to the Police Station, Precinct 8 in Comembo, Makati City and
reported the incident. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were
advised to return in a few days when any injuries they suffered were expected
to manifest.
Nine days after the incident or on June 16, 1999, Nelia submitted a medico-
legal report and gave her statement before a police investigator.
Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his
family in light of the following antecedent facts:
He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros.
Nelia is his godmother. The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s parents
with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental payments should be
remitted. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was
partial towards her, her parents disliked his family. Nelia’s father even filed a
case for maltreatment against him which was dismissed and, on learning of
the maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to move out of their
house and filed a case against him for grave threats and another for light
threats which were dismissed or in which he was acquitted.
Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to avoid
Nelia, she would track his whereabouts and cause scandal.
Appellant’s witness Darius Pacaña testified that on the date of the alleged
robbery, Nelia, together with her two companions, approached him while he
was at Ambel Street in the company of Michael Fontanilla and Jimmy
Sembrano, and asked him (Pacaña) if he knew a bald man who is big/stout
with a big tummy and with a sister named Maria. As he replied in the
affirmative, Nelia at once asked him to accompany them to appellant’s house,
to which he acceded. As soon as the group reached appellant’s house,
appellant, on his (Pacaña’s) call, emerged and on seeing the group, told them
to go away so as not to cause trouble. Retorting, Nelia uttered "Mga hayop
kayo, hindi ko kayo titigilan."
Another defense witness, Thelma Vuesa, corroborated Pacaña’s account.
The trial court, holding that intent to gain on appellant’s part "is presumed from
the unlawful taking" of the necklace, and brushing aside appellant’s denial and
claim of harassment, convicted appellant of Robbery, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused PEDRO C.
CONSULTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the felony of
Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph No. 5, in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from one (1) year,
seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to eight
(8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the said crime.
The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the complainant Nelia
Silvestre the amount of P3,500.00 representing the value of her necklace
taken by him and to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
The appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction with modification on the
penalty.
In his present appeal, appellant raises the following issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant was validly arraigned;
(2) Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been
represented by a fake lawyer during arraignment, pre-trial and
presentation of principal witnesses for the prosecution;
(3) Whether or not appellant has committed the crime of which he
was charged; and
(4) Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. (Underscoring supplied)
The first two issues, which appellant raised before the appellate court only
when he filed his Motion for Reconsideration of said court’s decision, were
resolved in the negative in this wise:
On the matter of accused-appellant’s claim of having been denied due
process, an examination of the records shows that while accused-appellant
was represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes, who "seems not a lawyer," during
the early stages of trial, the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity
of the former as early as July 28, 2000 and subsequently, approved by the
RTC in its Order dated August 4, 2000. Thereafter, accused-appellant was
represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the Public Defender’s
(Attorney’s) Office of Makati City. Since the accused-appellant was already
represented by a member of the Philippine Bar who principally handled his
defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot now be heard to complain
about having been denied of due process.3 (Underscoring supplied)
That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does
not dent the proven fact that appellant prevented Nelia and company from
proceeding to their destination. Further, appellant was afforded competent
representation by the Public Attorneys’ Office during the presentation by the
prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his
evidence. People v. Elesterio4 enlightens:
"As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-
lawyer, it is observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his
representation does not change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably
carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any rate, he has
since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the
petition for habeas corpus and the appellant’s brief." (Underscoring supplied)
On the third and fourth issues. Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code under
which appellant was charged provides:
Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. – Any person who, with intent to gain, shall
take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against
or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilt of
robbery. (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)
Article 294, paragraph 5, under which appellant was penalized provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties.
– Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation
of any person shall suffer:
xxxx
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its medium period in other cases. x x x (Citations omitted; italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
The elements of robbery are thus: 1) there is a taking of personal property; 2)
the personal property belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi;
and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with
force upon things.
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established
through the overt acts of the offender. It may be presumed from the furtive
taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances
reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.5
The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding
the incidental encounter of the parties, the taking of Nelia’s necklace does not
indicate presence of intent to gain on appellant’s part. That intent to gain on
appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light given his undenied claim
that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested by, among
other things, the filing of complaints6 against him by Nelia and her family which
were subsequently dismissed or ended in his acquittal. 7
Absent intent to gain on the part of appellant, robbery does not lie against him.
He is not necessarily scot-free, however.
From the pre-existing sour relations between Nelia and her family on one
hand, and appellant and family on the other, and under the circumstances
related above attendant to the incidental encounter of the parties, appellant’s
taking of Nelia’s necklace could not have been animated with animus lucrandi.
Appellant is, however, just the same, criminally liable.
For "[w]hen there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved." 8
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.9 (Italics in the original,
underscoring supplied)
Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. Thus Article
286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 286. Grave coercions. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine
not exceeding six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel him to
do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage
or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to
prevent him from exercising such right or from doing such act, the penalty next
higher in degree shall be imposed." (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied)
The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the
commission of the act. The motives of the accused are the prime criterion:
"The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery
and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was
the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force
or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without
authority of law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to compel
another to do something against his will and to seize property? Then,
conviction for coercion under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of
the accused are the prime criterion. And there was no common robber in the
present case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate,
taking the law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought
was due him. Animus furandi was lacking."10 (Italics in the original; citations
omitted; underscoring supplied)
The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats, intimidation and
violence consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the
tricycle driver, and kicking of the tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding
to her destination.
Appellant is thus guilty of grave coercion which carries the penalty of prision
correccional and a fine not exceeding ₱6,000. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium term.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum that may be imposed
is anywhere from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, and from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the challenged Court of Appeals
Decision and another is rendered finding appellant, Pedro C. Consulta,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Coercion and sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum, to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium
as maximum.
Appellant is further ordered to return the necklace, failing which he is ordered
to pay its value, Three Thousand Five Hundred (₱3,500) Pesos.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Santos
VITUG, J.:
It is not unknown that a debtor occasionally would suffer from the malady of
selective amnesia. The case is a tale of one unfortunate creditor who might
have sought to rouse her absent-minded debtor from the haze of
forgetfulness.
On 10 December 1996, at six o'clock in the morning, Leonida de la Peña was
at home in Barangay Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan, with her eight-year
old niece, Christine Lovely Mae Delanos, when a passenger jeepney arrived.
Five decently dressed men stepped down from the vehicle and entered the
house. The first, who was attired in a business suit, introduced himself as
Rocky Alberto and his companions as agents of the Criminal Investigation
Service ("CIS").1 Alberto asked Leonida about her unpaid obligation to
Josephine Santos. Leonida answered that she had already paid the debt
before the barangay captain of Umingan. Moments later, another vehicle, a
brown colored car, stopped in front of the house. Henry Salimbay (the
barangay captain of Umingan), Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar and two
unidentified males and one unidentified female, alighted. Leonida rushed to
confront Salimbay, telling him that Josephine had sent the CIS agents to
demand payment of her debt and that it was Josephine who should instead
be accosted. Sensing an escalating tension between the two women, the
barangay captain decided to leave, telling the parties that it was best for both
of them to just amicably settle their differences.
It would seem that the association between Leonida de la Peña and Josephine
Santos was one of friendship turned awry. On 22 March 1992, Josephine
appeared to have given a one-year loan to Leonida but the latter was unable
to timely pay the debt. For the next four years, Josephine would be
unsuccessful in securing payment from her delinquent debtor. Josephine and
Manny Baltazar, both residents of Baguio City, would travel all the way to
Resurreccion, Pangasinan, to seek payment from Leonida but, in all these
instances, Leonida would refuse to see Josephine and ignore the summons
issued by the barangay captain. This unease between the two women was
further heightened when Leonida subsequently filed a case for estafa against
Josephine.
The eventful 10th of December 1996 was the scheduled conference between
debtor and creditor before Henry Salimbay, the barangay captain, and the
already irate Josephine, anticipating another rebuff from Leonida, decided to
personally go to her house with Salimbay in tow. Leonida stubbornly
maintained her having already settled the account. At this obstinate
insistence, an enraged Josephine Santos shouted invectives at Leonida and
began hurling things inside the house, scattering the palay and hitting, in the
process, Felizarda Saturnino, an aunt of Leonida with a woodcarving.
Josephine and Baltazar held Leonida, handcuffed her and, with the help of
their companions, dragged her towards the parked passenger jeepney and
forced her to board it. She described the passenger jeepney as having a
locked door at its passenger rear-end portion and two doors on either side at
the driver’s seat, with side glass windows which were about ½ foot high and 1
foot wide, too small for a person her size to pass through. Leonida was flanked
by Rocky Alberto and one unidentified male in the passenger seat of the
vehicle. On the front seat of the passenger jeepney were three other men.
Josephine, along with Baltazar and three other companions, rode in the car.
The two vehicles traveled, the brown car leading the way and the passenger
jeepney closely following behind. The convoy first made a stopover at the
house of barangay captain Salimbay where Leonida heard Josephine and
Baltazar call out, "Captain, we already got Nida." The group proceeded
towards the direction of Carmen, Pangasinan, passing through San Leon, and
finally progressing towards Kennon Road. Somewhere in the long stretch of
the Kennon Road, the group stopped at the Twin Peaks, a hub of commercial
establishments where Baguio-bound passengers would casually stop for
refreshments. Leonida, from her seat at the passenger side of the jeepney,
heard Josephine and Baltazar telling the men from the jeepney to step down
from the vehicle and to partake of some refreshments. Josephine and one
unidentified companion came up to her and tried to force her to sign a
document forfeiting her property in favor of Josephine in satisfaction of the
unpaid loan. Leonida balked at the suggestion. Failing to convince Leonida to
sign the document, the group decided to continue with their journey.
In Baguio City, the group proceeded to a building along the Naguillan Road
which Leonida recognized to be Precinct I of the Baguio City police. She saw
Josephine and Baltazar enter the police precinct. Later emerging from the
police station, the duo told their companions to alight from the jeepney.
Baltazar then took over the wheel of the passenger jeepney while Josephine
seated herself beside Leonida in the passenger seat of the vehicle. The latter
had no idea where they were heading. It was only much later, upon seeing
several tombs within the vicinity, when she realized that they had taken her to
the local cemetery. Leonida overheard Josephine and her companions, while
they were alighting from the vehicle, say that they were "going to kill her at
8:00 (that) evening." Rocky Alberto then showed up, and he was ordered to
watch Leonida while Josephine and Baltazar said they would go elsewhere to
take something to eat.
Left alone with Alberto, Leonida begged for mercy. Alberto proved to be a
good Samaritan and helpfully handed over to her a steel pipe from a narrow
opening in the rear door of the jeepney. Armed with the steel pipe, Leonida hit
the glass front window of the passenger vehicle and made her exit. She and
Alberto then flagged down a taxicab, which took them to the Dagupan bus
station where, after relating her harrowing experience to the bus personnel,
she and Alberto were able to hitch a ride on a Manila-bound passenger bus.
Alighting at the Carmen junction, they took a tricycle for the remaining leg of
their journey home.
The next day, accompanied by Rocky Alberto, Leonida filed a complaint
before the Umingan Police Station. Alberto, upon giving his official statement
before the Umingan authorities, was unable to produce any document to prove
his being a CIS agent.
Felizarda Saturnino, an aunt of Leonida, sought to corroborate the statement
of her niece. According to Felizarda, the common-law husband of Leonida, a
certain "Itong," arrived shortly after the group had left. Upon learning what had
happened to Leonida, Itong made inquiries. Barangay captain Salimbay
informed him that a warrant of arrest had been issued against Leonida. Later,
when she and Itong went to the Umingan police station, to report the
abduction, they were instructed to first ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
was indeed issued against Leonida.
A subsequent examination by Dr. Maria L. Chan showed that Leonida had
sustained multiple abrasions and hematoma in both upper extremities
secondary to mauling.
On 19 March 1997, an accusatory information for the crime of Kidnapping was
filed against Josephine Santos, Manny Baltazar and three other unidentified
persons -
"That on or about the 10th day of December, 1996, in the morning, at Bgy.
Resurreccion, municipality of Umingan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
including three (3) Does whose identities have not yet been established, being
a private individual and without any legal justification and simulating public
authority, and by means of force, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
handcuff both hands of one LEONIDA DE LA PEÑA, then load her to a
passenger jeepney and brought her to a public cemetery at Naguillan Road,
Baguio City, thereby depriving her of her liberty by detaining inside a
passenger jeepney and threatening her with death but was able to escape, to
the damage and prejudice of said LEONIDA DELA PEÑA.
"Contrary to Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code."2
The accused pled "not guilty" to the offense charged.
Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar have vehemently denied the
accusation. The defense version is narrated by the Public Attorney's Office in
its brief for accused-appellant Josephine Santos.
"Manny Baltazar, testified that in the early morning of December 10, 1996 he
together with his co-accused Josie Santos, Ester Dino, Leo Badecao and
Sheriff William Baden, left Baguio City on board a Toyota Crown car on their
way to Caranglaan, Nueva Ecija to pick-up fifty (50) cavans of rice and visit
his 31/2 hectare land. Since they were passing by Umingan, Pangasinan,
accused Josie Santos suggested that they dropped by Resurreccion,
Umingan, Pangasinan to collect unpaid debts of Leonida dela Peña. Before
proceeding to the house of Leonida, they sought the help of Resurreccion
Barangay Captain Henry Salimbay. Captain Salimbay accompanied them to
the house of Leonida. They reached Leonida's house at around 6:00 o'clock
in the morning.
"He parked the car near the yard of Kagawad Dumaguing as the vehicle could
not get through the alley leading to the house of Leonida because a passenger
jeepney blocked the way, while Josie and Captain Salimbay proceeded to the
house of Leonida. After five (5) minutes Captain Salimbay left the place.
Thereafter, he heard Leonida and Josie quarreling inside the house. He
immediately proceeded to Leonida's house, pulled Josie and brought her to
the parked car. Then, he returned to Leonida's house and plead to the latter
to settle their differences between themselves to avoid trouble but she
(Leonida) denied that she was indebted. Then, the four (4) men inside the
house handcuffed Nida and left.
"He informed Josie that Leonida could not pay. Thus, they left the place and
dropped by at Captain Salimbay's place and informed the latter's wife that they
were leaving.
"On their way to Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan, they took the national
highway in Balungao where they saw Leonida's father-in-law, Leoncio dela
Peña. They offered a ride to Leoncio and dropped him at Balungao district jail.
Since it was already late, they cancelled their plan to go to Nueva Ecija and
drank tuba at a nearby store. Thereafter, they proceeded to Baguio City.
"Along the highway at Binalonan, Pangasinan, somebody flagged them down.
He pulled over beside the passenger jeepney which was previously parked in
front of Leonida's house. A man from the jeepney approached them and
invited Josie for a conversation in the jeepney. After 20 minutes, Josie
returned and told them to go back to Resurreccion because Leonida would
give them the palay. They returned to Resurreccion. Unfortunately, they were
not able to get the palay because Leonida's husband was not around, so they
left the place and proceeded to Baguio City via the Kennon Road.
"While they were approaching Twin Peaks at Kennon Road, the man who
flagged them down in Binalonan signaled again. He parked the car near the
passenger jeepney. Josie, Leonida and the alleged CIS agent took their
snacks in the canteen while he remained in the car. After 30 minutes, Josie
returned and instructed him to proceed to a police station near the city hall for
she was going to file a complaint for estafa against Leonida. However, a
policeman instructed them to proceed to Precinct No. 1 at Naguillan Road. He
accompanied Josie to the precinct but the policemen also told them that since
the transaction was consummated in Resurreccion, the case should be filed
in Pangasinan. Incidentally, when accused-appellants were inside the
precinct, Leonida was inside the parked passenger jeepney. When they were
about to go home, Rocky Alberto approached Josie. After few minutes of
conversation, they agreed to go home, leaving behind Leonida and the alleged
CIS agent.
"Furthermore, he denied all the allegations made by Leonida and branded
them as pure lies. (TSN pp. 4-12; June 9, 1998; TSN pp. 2-15; July 14, 1998).
"Josephine `Josie' Santos, testified that in the early morning of December
10, 1996, she together with her driver, accused Manny Baltazar, Ester Dino,
Leo Badecao and William Baden were on their way to Caranglaan, Nueva
Ecija. Upon her insistence, they dropped by at Resurreccion, Umingan,
Pangasinan to collect the debt of Leonida `Nida' dela Peña amounting to
P87,000.00. Before they proceeded to Leonida's house they sought the
assistance of Barangay captain Henry Salimbay who previously summoned
Leonida before his office to settle her indebtedness.
"Josie Santos and Captain Salimbay entered the house of Leonida while her
companions were left in the parked car. When they entered the house, she
noticed the presence of five (5) alleged CIS members, one of whom was
Rocky Alberto talking to Leonida. She informed Leonida that she was
collecting her indebtedness to which the latter replied, `I already paid my
indebtedness on you. Vulva of your mother. I will have a warrant against you'.
She also replied, `You did not pay even a cent'. Thereafter, an altercation
ensued between them. The barangay captain left them arguing. While they
were altercating, Manny Baltazar arrived and pulled her to the parked car.
When they were leaving, Leonida and the five (5) men also left on board the
passenger jeepney.
"On their way to Nueva Ecija, they dropped by at Captain Salimbay's house
informing the latter's wife that they were not able to collect Leonida's debt. The
passenger jeepney overtook them infront of Salimbay's house. While they
were cruising towards the national highway, they chanced upon Leonida's
father-in-law, Leoncio. They offered him a ride and dropped him at the
highway going to Balungao. Along the highway, they passed upon a tuba
vendor and they drank. After drinking, they decided to cancel their trip to
Nueva Ecija and returned to Baguio City.
"In the highway between Urdaneta and Binalonan, one of the CIS companions
(Rocky Alberto) of Leonida flagged them down. She alighted and talked to
Rocky Alberto who informed her that Leonida was willing to deliver fifty (50)
cavans of palay in payment of her obligation. They returned to Resurreccion
but Leonida's husband refused to give the palay. Unable to get the palay, they
proceeded to Baguio City via Kennon Road. At Twin Peaks along Kennon
Road, Rocky Alberto flagged them down again. Rocky asked why they did not
have the palay to which she replied that Leonida's husband refused to give.
Rocky suggested that they proceed to his house in Baguio City to settle the
problem, but she insisted that they should instead proceed to the police. Rocky
agreed. While she and Rocky were talking, Leonida was eating inside the
canteen at Twin Peaks.
"From Twin Peaks, they proceeded to the Central Police Station of Baguio
City to file an estafa case against Leonida but they were referred to a sub-
station in Naguillan Road. They were not able to settle their differences nor
filed a complaint for estafa because Nida and the five (5) alleged CIS men
hurriedly left the police sub-station.
"She denied all the criminal imputations made by Leonida against her. The
private complainant visited her in jail and made a proposal for her to pay the
former P500,000.00 as a settlement. (TSN pp. 3-12; December 7, 1998; pp.
3-13; February 22, 1999; p. 11 April 12, 1999)."3
The defense failed to convince the court a quo; on 09 July 1999, the court
convicted the accused on the ground that the deprivation of private
complainant Leonida de la Peña of her liberty, regardless of its purpose and
although lasting for less than twenty-four hours, was sufficient to support the
charge of kidnapping. Finding then Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping, the trial court
imposed the extreme penalty of death –
"WHEREFORE, as mandated by law, and having found the accused
Josephine Santos @ `Josie' of Irisan, Baguio City and the accused Manny
Baltazar @ `Candro' of 197 Marcos Highway, Baguio City GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping Leonida de la Peña, a female, on
December 10, 1996, attended with a host of aggravating circumstances with
none to mitigate as above noted, the Court hereby sentences them to each
suffer the penalty of DEATH, aside from the accessory penalties imposed
under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Additionally, the subject accused are hereby ordered to indemnify Leonida
de la Peña, her heirs, assigns or successors-in-interest for moral damages in
the sum of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs."4
Hence, the automatic appeal, and central to it is the staunch denial made by
appellants of any responsibility for the alleged kidnapping incident.
While appellants admitted having gone to the house of Leonida on 10
December 1996, they, however, strongly denied having abducted her. It was
true, according to them, that they did chance upon the CIS agents two times
on their way to Baguio - the first at a point between Urdaneta and Binalonan
and the second time at the Twin Peaks by the Kennon Road – but that these
encounters were "purely accidental."
The trial court had well-founded reasons to conclude that the so-called
"encounters" between the CIS agents and Josephine Santos and company
were indeed far from being "purely accidental." The time of arrival of the two
groups at the residence of Leonida de la Peña on the early morning of 10
December 1996 was only a matter of minutes of each other. The CIS agents
evidently knew and, in fact, inquired about Leonida's existing account with
Josephine Santos. At least twice later on the same day, the CIS agents and
the group of Josephine Santos met at stopovers on the way to Baguio City.
Appellant Josephine Santos even said that, at a point between Urdaneta City
and Binalonan, they were flagged down by the CIS agents in order to tell her
that Leonida de la Peña had finally consented to allow Josephine to get the
palay in payment of Leonida's debt.
But that is just about all. Nothing else can be gathered to support the charge
of kidnapping.
That there was an existing debt, and that the same remained unpaid as of 10
December 1996, would seem certain. Leonida de la Peña herself
acknowledged that no less than Henry Salimbay, the barangay captain,
accompanied appellants to her residence for the purpose of collecting
payment. The complainant claimed that appellants had dragged and forced
her to board the passenger jeepney but, strangely enough, the incident had
failed to attract the attention of neighbors, among whom was a kagawad, who
could have somehow lent a helping hand to the hapless hostage. The group
was then said to have made a stopover at the house of barangay captain
Salimbay and later at the police station at the Baguio City Hall and
subsequently at a police station along Naguillan. It was rather unusual for "Q. What did you do when they told [you] that it was station 1 of Baguio police
would-be kidnappers to request the intervention of the local barangay captain, which has jurisdiction over the case of Josie?
and then, with their hostage in tow, to brazenly stop at a police station not just
once but twice; the first at the police station at the Baguio City Hall and the "A. We went to station 1, sir.
second at a police station by the Naguillan Road. The complainant was neither
bound nor gagged and the jeepney where she allegedly was being held
hostage had been parked just meters away from the police station. "COURT:

The testimony given by Baltazar and Santos would seem to be more plausible "Q. Is this station 1 located beside the cemetery?
than what Leonida asseverated. Josephine Santos and her group, with the
assistance of CIS agents, brought complainant to Baguio City in order to "A. It is far, sir.
surrender her to the custody of Baguio City authorities where Josephine
Santos thought she could rightly seek redress. She was advised, however, "Q. How far, if you know?
that it was in the province of Pangasinan, not Baguio City, where a case could
be lodged. According to Manny Baltazar -
"A. About 200 meters, sir.
"Q. Where in Baguio did you proceed?
"x x x x x x x x x
"A. At the police department of the city hall.
"Q. What happened then at police station no. 1?
"Q. Do you know the reason why you went to the police station of Baguio?
"A. I parked my car in front of the station 1 and I accompanied Josie to the
station, sir.
"A. Josie said that it is better to file an estafa case against Nida.

"Q. What happened when you were inside the station with Josie?
"Q. Did she actually go to the police station against Nida?

"A. When we went inside station 1 a companion of Nida who has an amputated
"A. I accompanied Nida at precinct 7, sir. hand told us that this is the place where you can file your complaint and I will
leave you.
"Q. Is that the police station near the city hall?
"ATTY. GUILLERMO:
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Up to now, do you know the name of this man with an amputated arm who
"Q. What happened? told you that [he] will leave you?

"A. When she went to precinct 7 the officer said that the case is in the "A. What I know, sir, is Rocky.
jurisdiction of station 1.
"Q. Do you know this Rocky Alberto?
"Q. Where is this station 1?
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. Naguillan Road, sir.
"Q. Is he one of the men who rode in that jeepney with Nida according to "x x x xxx xxx
you?
"ATTY. GUILLERMO
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What happened next after that?
"Q. How about Nida de la Peña, did you see her while you were in the police
station? "A. We went to the Baguio police station to wait for them.

"A. She was inside the jeep, sir. "Q. Were you able to reach Baguio City?

"x x x x x x x x x "A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What happened when Rocky Alberto left you at precinct no. 1 of the "Q. You said you were supposed to go to the police station were you able to
Baguio police with Josie Santos? reach the police station?

"A. I talked to the police that Josie will be going to file a case. "A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And what happened after that? "Q. Where in Baguio is that police station?

"A. When Josie was about to file a case, they were talking to each other and "A. We first went to the main police headquarters but the main office advised
they found out that the money which was given to Nida was received at us to report to sub-station I which had jurisdiction.
Resurreccion and therefore the station has no jurisdiction.
"Q. Where was this police station?
"Q. What happened after that?
"A. Naguillan Road, sir.
"A. When the station did not accept the complaint, I advised her that we must
have to go home."5
"COURT
Similarly, Josephine Santos declared thusly:
"Q. Is that near the cemetery?
"A. After that he told me that we will just proceed to my house in Baguio and
we would talk the matter over. "A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What did you do when you were told that you were going to Baguio? "ATTY. GUILLERMO

"A. I questioned him why in my house why not at the police station so that "Q. When you were told to go to the police sub-station, did you go?
things would be legal because my claim consist of her account and I do not
know about your claim, anyway she was with you. "A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Who were your companions?
"A. Manny, sir."6
Rocky Alberto, in his own sworn statement before the Umingan authorities a
day after the incident, corroborated the version of appellants -
"Q. Ano pa ang sumunod na pangyayari, noong hindi pumayag na pumirma
si De la Peña?
"A. Kami po ay nagtuloy sa Baguio City at tumuloy kami sa Precinct I ng PNP
sa Naguillan Road, at noong huminto ang sasakyan nina Josie ay bumaba
siya (Josie) at si Manny Baltazar at umalis na ang sasakyan nina Josie at
pumasok sina Manny at Josie sa loob ng prisinto kung kaya sumunod ako sa
loob at doon ay nalaman ko na gustong mag-file ng estafa case laban kay
Leonida de la Peña at doon ko pa lang nalaman na walang kasong nakafile at
wala ring warrant of arrest laban kay Leonida de la Peña. At dahil ayaw naman
pumayag ang mga pulis doon na gawin ang gusto nina Josie Santos ay
lumabas na kaming tatlo nina Josie, at doon ay kinausap ko sina Josie Santos
na ako ay pupunta sa aming opisina at pagkatapos ay babalik ako at iuuwi ko
si De la Peña dahil wala naman pala siyang kaso, kung kaya umalis na ako at
iniwan ko si Leonida de la Peña sa aming sasakyan." 7
On the witness stand, complainant herself identified Rocky Alberto as being
one of the cohorts in her abduction; yet, she categorically denied that Alberto
had kidnapped her. She testified:
"Q. Did you also tell the barangay captain that Rocky Alberto was one of the
CIS people who helped kidnap you?
"A. I just told him that he is the one who accompanied me home, sir.
"Q. You did not answer my question. My question was did you tell the
barangay captain that Rocky Alberto your companion was one of those who
kidnapped you earlier on December 10, 1996, please answer the question.
"A. I did not tell that anymore, sir.
"x x x xxx xxx
"COURT
"Q. You did not tell the barangay captain that Rocky Alberto was one of those
who kidnapped you because as a matter of fact Rocky Alberto did not kidnap
you?
"A. I was not able to tell that, sir.
"Q. Answer the question. You did not tell the barangay captain that your
companion Rocky Alberto was one of those who earlier kidnapped you
because in point of fact you were never kidnapped by Rocky Alberto - that is
the question, do you understand?
"A. That is true, sir.
"Q. So it is clear that Rocky Alberto never kidnapped you?
"A. No, sir."8
The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave
coercion.9 Grave coercion is committed when a person prevents another
from doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong, and without any
authority of law, by means of violence, threats or intimidation. Its
elements are - First, that the offender has prevented another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something
against his will, be it right or wrong; second, that the prevention or compulsion
is effected by violence, either by material force or such display of force as
would produce intimidation and control over the will of the offended party; and,
third, that the offender who has restrained the will and liberty of another did so
without any right or authority of law. Where there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved and the
offense charged necessarily includes the lesser offense established in
evidence, the accused can be convicted of the offense proved.10 Grave
coercion carries the penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding
P6,000.00. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium term. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law the minimum that can be imposed is anywhere from one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction under review is
MODIFIED.1âwphi1 Appellants Josephine Santos and Manny Baltazar are
ACQUITTED of the crime of Kidnapping; instead, said appellants are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional medium,
as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
The facts as stated by the respondent Court of Appeals are undisputed, thus:
(PEOPLE v. ASTORGA CASE @ ILLEGAL DETENTION PART)
LEE v. Court of Appeals
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated June 29, 1989 which reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 129 at Caloocan
City, Metro Manila, and reinstated as well as affirmed in toto the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2, same city. The RTC decision
found the petitioner guilty of the crime of light coercion, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is
hereby modified. The accused Francis Lee is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of light coercion, as penalized
under paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code and he
is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of TWENTY (20) DAYS of
ARRESTO MENOR and to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs. (p. 40,
Rollo)
On the other hand, the MTC decision convicted the petitioner of the offense of
grave coercion, the pertinent portion of the same is hereby quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
Francis Lee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave
Coercion, as charged, defined and penalized under Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of THREE (3) MONTHS, of arresto mayor, medium,
and to pay a fine of P250.00, with cost.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify the offended party,
Pelagia Paulino de Chin, by way of civil liability the sum of P5,000.00
as moral damages and the sum of P2,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
... (p. 33, Rollo)
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 20, 1984, the
complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23 years old, was
fetched from her house at 112 BLISS Site, 8th Avenue, Caloocan
City by Atanacio Lumba, a bank employee, upon the instruction of
the petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee of Pacific Banking
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as bank). Upon arriving at the
office of Pacific Banking Corporation located at Caloocan City,
petitioner Francis Lee did not attend to her immediately. After an hour
later, the petitioner confronted the complainant about a forged
Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the latter
allegedly deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said
confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting at her with
piercing looks and threatened to file charges against her unless and
until she returned all the money equivalent of the subject cashier
check. Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared
withdrawal slip, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer,
where she was made to admit that she had swindled the bank and
had return the money equivalent of the spurious check. During her
stay at the said bank, the complainant, who was five (5) months in
the family way, was watched by the bank's employees and security
guards. It was about six o'clock in the afternoon of the same day
when the complainant was able to leave the bank premises.
Upon the other hand, the petitioner, 37 years old, presented his
version, basically a denial of the charges, to wit: he was the Branch
Bank Manager of Pacific Banking Corporation. After having been
informed that Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794
was dishonored for being spurious, he examined the relevant bank
records and discovered that complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de
Chin was instrumental in inducing their bank to accept the subject
dollar check and was also the one who withdrew the proceeds
thereof, by utilizing a withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Honorio
Carpio. Petitioner, thru Atanacio Lumba, invited the complainant to
his office. Responding to his invitation, the complainant arrived at the
 bank before noon of June 20, 1984, but was not attended to
immediately as the petitioner had to attend to other bank clients. The
complainant was merely informed about the subject fake dollar check
that was deposited with said bank upon her assurance that it was
genuine. The complainant was not compelled into signing the
withdrawal slip, but she acted freely and voluntarily in executing her
affidavit and in returning the money equivalent of the subject check.
There was nothing unusual during her lengthy stay in the bank. (pp.
44-45, Rollo)
The sole issue posed in this petition is whether or not the acts of petitioner in
simply "shouting at the complainant with piercing looks" and "threats to file
charges against her" are sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion
(p. 6, Rollo).
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him
to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another
to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so doing, the
penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.
Considering that the present case does not involve violence but intimidation,
the provisions of Article 1335 of the New Civil Code on intimidation are
relevant. It states:
Art. 1335. ...
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled
by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of
his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and
condition of the person shall be borne in mind.
A threat to enforce once's claim through competent authority, if the
claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent.
As a general rule, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals command
utmost respect. However, such findings are disregarded if there appears in
the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted that, if
considered, would affect the result of the case (see San Sebastian College v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 84401, May 15, 1991).
While the appellate court emphasized the pregnancy and feminine gender of
the complainant, it overlooked other significant personal circumstances which
are material in determining the presence of coercion in this case.
The records show that complainant is a highly educated person who is familiar
with banking procedures. She is a graduate of Business Administration major
in Banking and Finance from NCBA. She also finished one semester of MA in
graduate school. In 1983, complainant worked with the Insular Bank of Asia
and America as a bank teller (TSN, November 20, 1984, pp. 5-7; Records, pp.
96-98).
Likewise, it appears that complainant actively participated in the deposit and
withdrawal of the proceeds of the controversial check. We find that she told
Honorio Carpio (Carpio, for short), a relative and payee of the check; to open
a savings account with the Pacific Banking Corporation (Bank, for short) and
accompanied him; that subsequently, she presented a Midland National Bank
Cashier's check payable to Carpio in the sum of $5,200.00 to Mr. Lamberto
R. Cruz (Cruz, for short), PRO Manager, Foreign Department; that she
claimed that she was requested by her uncle to deposit the check for
collection; that she was a bank depositor and she "knew somebody
downstairs"; that she assured Cruz that the check would be honored between
banks (TSN, April 15, 1985, pp. 89-92; Records, 180-183); that on June 11,
1984, the bank, after the usual clearing period, sent out a notice to Carpio that
the proceeds of the check were already credited to his account but the same
was returned to the bank because the address was false or not true; that the
total amount of the check in pesos was P92,557.44; that the total deposit of
Carpio was P92,607.44, his initial deposit of P50.00 being added to the
amount of the check; that on the same day, complainant personally inquired
from the bank whether the proceeds of the check have already been credited
to Carpio's account (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 163, records, p. 163); that upon
an affirmative answer, the bank records show that on that day, the
complainant withdrew the sum of P12,607.00 thru a withdrawal slip
purportedly signed by Carpio; that in the interim, Carpio allegedly left abroad
(Annex C, p. 17, Records); that on June 13, 1984, she withdrew the sum of
P80,000.44 from Carpio's account by means of a withdrawal slip allegedly
signed by Carpio and then, she closed his account; that out of the said
amount, she redeposited the sum of P50,000.00 to her own savings account
and received in cash the remaining balance of P30,000.44; and on June 15
and 18, 1984, complainant withdrew the amounts of P2,000.00 and
P18,000.00, respectively from her savings account (Exh. "3", Records, p. 15,
in relation to TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 194-195, Records, pp. 286-287).
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner's demand that the private
respondent return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a threat to file
criminal charges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to
sue. In the case of Berg v. National City Bank of New York (102 Phil. 309,
316), We ruled that:
... It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by individuals
to demand payment of their accounts with the threat that upon failure
to do so an action would be instituted in court. Such a threat is proper
within the realm of the law as a means to enforce collection. Such a
threat cannot constitute duress even if the claim proves to be
unfounded so long as the creditor believes that it was his right to do
so.
The Solicitor General argues that the complainant was intimidated and
compelled into disclosing her time deposit, signing the typewritten withdrawal
slip and the affidavit by the petitioner's threat to detain her at the bank.
At this point, there is a need to make a distinction between a case where a
person gives his consent reluctantly and against his good sense and judgment
and where he gives no consent at all, as where he acts against his will under
a pressure he cannot resist. Thus, in Vales v. Villa (35 Phil. 769, 789), We
ruled:
... It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye
of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he
acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as
voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense
and judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. Between the
two acts there is no difference in law. But when his sense, judgment,
and his will rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested, but
is nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an extent
that he becomes a mere automaton and acts mechanically only, a
new element enters, namely, a disappearance of the personality of
the actor. He ceases to exist as an independent entity with faculties
and judgment, and in his place is substituted another — the one
exercising the force or making use of the intimidation. While his hand
signs, the will which moves it is another's. While a contract is made,
it has, in reality and in law, only one party to it; and, there being only
one party, the one using the force or the intimidation, it is
unenforceable for lack of a second party.
From these considerations it is clear that every case of alleged
intimidation must be examined to determine within which class it falls.
If it is within the first class it is not duress in law, if it falls in the second,
it is.
The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, despite her
protestations, indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to do all the
aforesaid acts.
Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and encashment of the check,
the complainant admitted to being nervous upon being informed that the check
was spurious (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 15; Record, p. 106)
We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the bank was not due to the
petitioner's threat. It was rather due to her desire to prove her innocence. Her
testimony on this point is a revelation:
Atty. Dizon: (counsel for petitioner)
You are always talking of signing the withdrawal slip by force, is it not
that earlier you admitted that no actual force was employed upon you
in connection with the signing of this document and the force that you
are claiming was the alleged shouting against you coupled with the
statement that you could not leave?
A Yes, sir.
Q When Mr. Lee was requiring you to sign the withdrawal slip did it
not occur to you to leave the bank?
Atty. Pangilinan:
The question has already been answered she said she cannot leave
because she is being threatened.
Atty. Dizon:
That was during the time when she first met Mr. Lee.
Court:
Witness may answer.
A When I was about to sign the withdrawal slip I inquired from him If
I signed it I can leave already but he insisted that I should not leave,
Sir.
Q When he told you that did it not occur to you to stand up and go
out of the bank?
A No, Sir.
Q Why?
A He was insisting that I return the amount I have withdrawn
especially on June 18 when I withdrew P18,000.00, Sir.
COURT:
The question is why did you not leave and disregarded him?
A Because I cannot just leave him that way, Your Honor.
Atty. Dizon:
Why? What was the reason that you cannot leave him?
A Because he is insisting that the responsibility of one person be my
responsibility and at that time I was feeling nervous and he did not
tell me to stand up and leave, Sir. (ibid, pp. 18-20, Records, pp. 109-
111)
In her insistence to clear up her name, it is not farfetched for Us to think that
the complainant voluntarily but grudgingly returned the money to show good
faith. Thus, it was she who informed the petitioner about the existence of the
RCBC Time Deposit Certificate (Exh. "A", pp. 4-5, Records). The allegation
that she did so because of petitioner's threats came from the complainant
herself. She has not been able to present any other witness to buttress her
claim.
Further, We find that contrary to complainant's allegations in her affidavit (ibid,
p. 5) it was not the petitioner who suggested the encashment of the RCBC
Time Deposit Certificate but her sister; and that again, it was not the petitioner
who agreed to the sister's suggestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign
Department of the bank (TSN, January 8, 1985, pp. 40-41, Records, pp. 131-
132).
Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of movement was
restrained, she, however, was able to move about freely unguarded from the
office of the petitioner situated at the ground floor to the office of Cruz at the
mezzanine floor where her sister found her (ibid, pp. 39- 40, Records, pp. 130-
131). Undoubtedly, during that time, there were many bank clients who
transacted business with the bank (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 21; Records,
p. 112). The bank security guards then were at their posts. Complainant
herself admitted that they manifested no overt acts to prevent her from leaving
despite the alleged loud threats of the petitioner (ibid, pp. 20- 21, Records, pp.
111-112) which could be heard considering that the door to petitioner's office
was kept open (TSN, October 8, 1985, p. 184, Records, p. 276). Given such
atmosphere, the complainant still did not leave the bank.
The respondent court cited the prepared typewritten withdrawal slip and the
non-presentation of the complainant's passbook as indicators of her
involuntary acts.
We disagree. The petitioner testified that the general rule was that the bank
requires the presentation of the passbook whenever withdrawals are made.
However, there was an exception to this rule, i.e. when the depositor is a
regular customer in depositing or withdrawing money in the bank (TSN,
October 8, 1985, pp. 189-190, Records, pp. 281-282). The prosecution failed
to submit evidence to rebut his contentions. Besides, the trial court's
conclusion that the withdrawal slip was typewritten was without basis
considering that the complainant merely averred that the withdrawal slip was
already prepared when she signed it (Exh. "A", Records, p. 4).
We also take exception to the following ruling of the appellate court:
 It must be noted that the position of a bank manager is one of
prestige and dignity and when the said bank was cheated or swindled
it certainly reflects on the capability and efficiency of the manager
and one can just imagine the kind of mental attitude and feeling of
anger the latter would have towards the alleged swindler. Shouting,
raising of voice and dagger looks are common characteristics of an
angry man and that was what accused Lee exhibited to a fragile
weaker sex and pregnant offended party. It would be natural to get
angry with someone who had victimized you. Naturalness, however
is not always righteous. It is like taking the law into your hands and
that was what the accused Lee did. (CA Decision, pp. 11-12, Rollo,
pp. 52-53)
This pronouncement creates an impression that the petitioner had made a
personal case out of the situation. However, the evidence does not support
this view. We find that at the time the check was deposited and encashed, the
petitioner was then on leave (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 156; Records, p. 248).
Under this circumstance, it is not fair to consider the bank's mistake in
accepting and paying the check as the petitioner's mistake which could militate
against his efficiency. The petitioner attributed the mistake in the payment of
the forged check to the usual risks in banking business. He stated:
Atty. Pangilinan, Private prosecutor (authorized by the Fiscal to
prosecute the case in the latter's stead)
Q So you no longer consider him (Carpio) as entitled in (sic) the
proceeds of the chek (sic) and therefore at that point of (sic) time you
will now concede that the payment made by you to him was a big
mistake?
A When we were asking for the respondent and we were locating
Honorio Carpio and we cannot locate him, I consider that a mistake,
Sir.
Q It was a big mistake as a matter of fact?
A When it comes to the falling of the business considering the big
amount I would say big mistake but only a mistake, it was a usual
risk in banking business, Sir.
Q But of course Mr. Lee, being a mistake that mistake will harm and
tense your personality as a Bank Manager?
A It is up to our Manager to decide but when it comes to other
transactions I am handling Three Million plus and considering that
check I don't think with all modesty it will affect me, Sir.
Q But you are called upon to try to recover any money which was in
your judgment was unlawfully taken from you by anybody
A When it comes to procedure I don't think it was unlawfully taken,
as a matter of fact it was our bank who credited this account, Sir.
Q So it is your bounded (sic) duty to recover money which was paid
to someonelse (sic) which payment is not due to him, am I correct?
A It is the duty of our lawyer to recover it, Sir.
Q Is it not a fact that your lawyer is only your agent?
Atty. Dizon:
I think we are going too far, it has nothing to do with the particular
incident subject matter of the criminal offense.
Court:
I see the point of the defense but the witness is very intelligent, I can
see the point of counsel, because in order not to effect his integrity
he resorted to this, for example in case of a bank employee who stole
P500.00 and the other one is P200.00, it could have the same
mistake which is supposed to be admonished by removal. You
answer.
A Yes that is the same case whether it is small or big but when it
comes to the Manager the Head Office is very understanding when
it comes to bogus checks and of course my work is a supervisory.
Sir. (ibid, pp. 170-171; Records, pp. 263-264)
The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that the
complainant refused to sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged threats
of the petitioner (TSN, January 8, 1985, p. 48; Records, p. 139). American
authorities have declared that "(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled
criminal conduct against the will of the actor must be immediate and
continuous and threaten grave danger to his person during all of the time the
act is being committed. That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened 'in
praesenti.' It must be a force threatening great bodily harm that remains
constant in controlling the will of the unwilling participant while the act is being
performed and from which he cannot then withdraw in safety." (State v. Hood,
165 NE 2d, 28, 31-32, Emphasis ours).
The complainant proferred excuses for her action. For one, she claimed that
her sister's presence helped her recover her composure (TSN, November 20,
1984, p. 29, Records, p. 120).
We are not persuaded. If indeed she had recovered her composure because
of her sister's presence, she could have just left the premises in a huff without
encashing the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate or if they (complainant and
sister) were already at the RCBC, they could have desisted from encashing
the check and then could have left for home notwithstanding the alleged
presence of Mr. Lumba who was no longer in his own bank but among the
RCBC clients or she could have refused to sign the affidavit which was handed
to her first before the promissory note. Yet, she did neither of these logical
possibilities.
Secondly, she averred that she refused to sign the promissory note because
she was able to read its contents unlike the affidavit and she realized that she
would have a great responsibility to return the amount taken by Carpio (ibid,
pp. 27-28, Records, pp. 118-119).
Such an excuse is flimsy and weak. It is strange that complainant's sister, who
was with her, failed to corroborate her statement that she was denied the
opportunity to read the affidavit. Her bare assertion simply confirms the
voluntariness of her actions. All her disputed acts were geared towards
proving her good faith. Complainant was willing to return the sum of
P48,000.00 she took since it was only up to this amount where her
involvement lies. However, as soon as she realized that she would have the
enormous task of reimbursing the bank the balance of the proceeds of the
forged check allegedly taken by Carpio, she refused to cooperate any further.
Notwithstanding the alleged threats of petitioner, she did not budge. Thus, We
find it as a logical consequence that she merely asked for the receipt of the
P18,000.00 she deposited rather than the cancellation of her earlier
withdrawal. On this point, complainant claimed that after her refusal to sign
the document, she no longer insisted on the return of the money because she
felt that it was the only way she could leave the bank premises (TSN,
November 20, 1984, p. 31, Records, p. 120). This pretense, however, was
belied by her subsequent actuations. We find that she and her sister left the
bank unescorted to eat their snack; that they were required by the petitioner
to come back; and that they decided not to eat but instead went home (TSN,
November 20, 1984, pp. 31-32, Records, pp. 122-123 and January 8, 1965,
pp. 49-50, Records, pp. 140-141). With such behavior, We are at a loss to
understand how coercion could attach in this case. Obviously, the complainant
has not been cowed into submission.
Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not exist in this case.
Consequently, the petitioner should be acquitted.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a
new one hereby entered ACQUITTING the accused of the crime of grave
coercion.
SO ORDERED.
Timoner v. People
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petition for review of the affirmance in toto by the Court of Appeals, now the
Intermediate Appellate Court, of the judgment of conviction handed down by
the then Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case No.
4281, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Timoner, finding petitioner
guilty of the crime of grave coercion, as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE this Court finds the accused JOSE 'PEPITO'
TIMONER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Grave Coercion as penalized under Art. 286 in the Revised
Penal Code, and hereby sentences the said accused
pursuant to the provision of Rule 64, Par. 3, to suffer SIX
MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO MAYOR IN
ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD, to pay a fine of P300.00 and to
pay the offended party in the amount of P5,000.00 as
damages, without subsidiary liability in case of insolvency.
The other accused SAMUEL MORENA and ERNESTO
QUIBRAL are hereby ordered ACQUITTED.
The salient facts are not disputed. At about 10:00 in the evening of December
13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by
two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six
laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main
thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers
proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls which
protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures
thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining
witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos. These
establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health
Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation
requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial
abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2257,
alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per
se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were
charged with the offense of grave coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet.
As already noted, the said court exonerated the two policemen, but convicted
petitioner of the crime charged as principal by inducement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop
was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful
authority.
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question
did constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public
nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal A private nuisance is one that is not included in the
foregoing definition.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main
thoroughfare and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health
Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision
in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus:
Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there
is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor
of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business
in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only
constitute a menace to the health of the general public
passing through the street and also of the unsanitary
condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and
ugly structures in the said place. Moreover, even if it is
claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or
toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living
quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an
act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons and the general public which posed a danger to the
people in general passing and using that place, for in
addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion
of its rights — the fact that it is in a public place and
annoying to all who come within its sphere [Baltazar vs.
Carolina Midland, Ry, Co., 54 S.C. 242, 32 SB 258, cited in
11 Tolentino's Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 375;
Kapisanan Lingkod ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Lacson, CA-G.R. No.
27260R, March 25, 1964; 61 O.G. 2487].
xxx xxx xxx
 ... IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
declares that the structures subject of this complaint as well
as those occupied by the impleaded defendants are
nuisances per se and therefore orders the defendants to
demolish the stall and vacate the premises immediately ...
But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been
faulted for having fenced off said barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the
Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without judicial
proceedings.
ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
[l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local
ordinance; or
[2] A civil action; or
[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the
aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted
in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal
liability.
Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law,
shall by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not
prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right
or wrong." 1 The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the
prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or
such display of it as would produce intimidation and control the will of the
offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and liberty of
another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not
made under authority of law or in the exercise of a lawful right. 2
The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held
guilty of grave coercion.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534-
CR, is hereby set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged. Costs
de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
UNJUST VEXATION
Ong Chiu Kwan v. Court of Appeals
PARDO, J.:
What is before the Court for consideration is the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the conviction of accused Ong Chiu Kwan, for unjust
vexation.1
On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod
filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an information charging
petitioner with unjust vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and
telephone lines of "Crazy Feet," a business establishment owned and
operated by Mildred Ong.2
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered
Wilfredo Infante to "relocate" the telephone, electric and water lines of "Crazy
Feet," because said lines posed as a disturbance.3 However, Ong Chiu Kwan
failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the
electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business establishment. 4
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court found Ong
Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation,5 and sentenced him to "imprisonment for
twenty days."6 The court also ordered him to pay moral damages, finding that
the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone
lines of "Crazy Feet" caused the interruption of its business operations during
peak hours, to the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong. The trial court also
awarded exemplary damages to complainant "as a deterrent to the accused
not to follow similar act in the future and to pay attorney’s fees."7 The trial court
disposed of the case as follows:
"IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of unjust vexation provided under Article 287 par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer a penalty of imprisonment
of twenty (20) days and to pay private complainant the following:
P10,000.00 - moral damages
P 5,000.00 - exemplary damages
P 5,000.00 - attorney’s fees and to pay the cost of this suit."
"SO ORDERED.
"Bacolod City, Philippines, September 1, 1992.
"(SGD.)RAFAEL O. PENUELA
Judge"8
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter court in a
decision dated December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted the decision of the
lower court in toto, without stating the reasons for doing so.9
On April 22, 1993, by petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals.10 On August 16, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision dismissing the appeal,11 agreeing with the lower court’s finding that
petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unjust vexation.
Hence, this petition for review.12
The Court notes that in the decision of the Regional Trial Court which the Court
of Appeals affirmed peremptorily without noticing its nullity, the Regional Trial
Court merely quoted the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in full and added
two paragraphs, thus:
"This Court, in accordance with the rules, required the parties to submit their
corresponding memorandum or brief. The prosecution filed its memorandum,
and also with the defense.
"After a careful perusal of the record of the case and evaluating the evidence
thereto and exhibits thereof, this Court finds no ground to modify, reverse or
alter the above-stated decision and hereby affirms the decision of the lower
court in toto."13
The Constitution requires that "[N]o decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based."14 The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides
that "[T]he judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and
distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the
law upon which the judgment is based."15
Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it
cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the
lower court. The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusions of law
of its own.16
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity. Very recently,
speaking of a similarly worded decision of a regional trial court, we said:
"[I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form.
It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation
of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself." 17
Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must rethink their
place in the judiciary or seriously take refresher courses on decision writing.
We warn them of stiff sanctions for such lackadaisical performance.
Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for compliance
with the constitutional requirement of contents of a decision. However,
considering that this case has been pending for sometime, the ends of justice
will be fully served if we review the evidence and decide the case.
Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and
telephone lines of complainant’s business establishment because these lines
crossed his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had
the necessary permit or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the
interruption of electric, water and telephone services during peak hours of the
operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly
annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan
is liable for unjust vexation.
Regarding damages, we find the award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees to be without basis. Moral damages may be recovered if they
were the proximate result of defendant’s wrongful act or omission.18 An award
of exemplary damages is justified if the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.19 There is no evidence to support such award.
Hence, we delete the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the lower courts are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, accused Ong Chiu Kwan is hereby sentenced to pay a
fine of P200.00, and the costs. The award of moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees is hereby deleted. SO ORDERED.
Maderazo v. People
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing
the September 3, 2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners
of unjust vexation in Criminal Case No. 24309.
On October 22, 1997, an Information2 was filed before the Sandiganbayan
(First Division), charging the following with grave coercion: Municipal Mayor
Melchor G. Maderazo; his nephew, Victor Maderazo, Jr., who is a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan; and Seniforo Perido, Caibiran Police Station Chief,
together with Rodolfo Rico, Orlando Mocorro, Rodolfo Azur, Reynaldo
Oledan, Jordan Gervacio and Jose Cesora. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of January 1997, at about 2:20 o’clock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Palanay, Municipality of Caibiran, Biliran, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, all
public officers, having been duly elected, appointed and qualified to such
public positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping with (sic) each other, by means of violence and intimidation, without
any authority of law, with deliberate intent did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly eject one Medaria Verutiao from the market
stall she was occupying and leasing from the Municipality of Caibiran, thereby
compelling her to give up her possession and occupation to said market stall
against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said Medaria Verutiao and
detriment of public service.
Contrary to law.3
On arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.4 The
Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order5 signed by all the parties, where it
was stipulated, among others, that all of the accused were government
officials; Verutiao was physically in possession of one of the stalls in the public
market of the Municipality of Caibiran previous to and as of January 27, 1997;
on January 21, 1997, the premises had been padlocked previously by Mayor
Melchor Maderazo, so that her goods were inside the stall, and she was
unable to transact any business; on January 27, 1997, the locks were opened
by the government upon the authority of the mayor, the goods in the premises
were inventoried and taken to the police station where they have remained up
to the present.6
The Case for the Prosecution7
The prosecution presented Verutiao as sole witness. She testified that she
had been the lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market. She paid a monthly
rental of P200.00.8 She was allowed to finish the construction of the market
stall with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer. 9
She averred that Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984,10 provides that,
to facilitate the development of the public market, in the absence of adequate
government finance, construction by private parties of buildings and other
structures for commercial purposes may be allowed and the expenses thereof
shall be reimbursed to the builder by applying 50% to the monthly rentals when
occupied for business.11
She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the market stall, as stated in the
itemized statement of expenses12 she submitted to then Municipal Treasurer
Jose Lee on February 14, 1992. She was not, however, reimbursed by the
Municipality of her expenses. After the construction, she then opened the stall
for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but did not pay the
rentals in 1993.
On January 13, 1994, Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year
lease contract,13 renewable every year with a monthly rental of P400.00. It is
also provided that, any violation of the conditions therein agreed shall be
sufficient cause for its cancellation, notwithstanding the fact that the contract
has not yet expired.
In 1995, the Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses
in the construction of the market stall.14 However, considering that she had
not been fully reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the stall, she
did not pay her rent.15 Almost weekly, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to
request for the reimbursement.16 She was told by then Treasurer Lee and his
successor, Lorenzo Dadizon, that the Municipality had no money and she had
to wait for another budget hearing.17 The treasurers did not collect her rents
for they knew that the Municipality still owed her money.18
On December 22, 1996 Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao
where she spent the Christmas holidays.19 She returned to Caibiran on
January 15, 1997. On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a
letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to vacate the stall
within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the
stall.20 As of January 1997, Verutiao had an unpaid rental of P2,532.00, after
deducting her expenses for the construction of the stall. The Mayor declared
in his letter that the lease contract had been cancelled.
On the same day, the spouses Verutiao, through counsel, sent a letter 21 to the
Mayor, stating, among others, that they can only be ejected from the market
stall if the Municipality reimbursed them for what they had advanced for the
construction of the stall and if the Municipality was no longer willing to lease
the subject premises. They admitted that Verutiao had not paid any rent since
1993 but maintained that, under Section 38 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1984,22 she did not have to pay rental until her expenses were reimbursed, as
the rentals due would be debited from 50% of the amount she advanced for
the construction of the market stall, and that she will vacate the stall only after
the municipality shall have reimbursed her expenses in the construction.
On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. 23
The
locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor on January 27, 1997. The
contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to
the police station for safekeeping.24 While these were being undertaken,
Verutiao was in her farm about 4 to 5 kilometers away from the market stall. 25
She considered the act of the Mayor as a political harassment, given that her
husband, was then a candidate for councilor under the ticket of the opposition;
and that she was a leader of the opposing party.26
The Case for the Accused27
Except for the accused Victor Maderazo, the other accused opted not to
testify. Victor Maderazo declared that as of January 27, 1997, he was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Caibiran. On said date, he was at the
stall of Verutiao at the public market in the company of Seniforo Perido, who
was the Chief of Police of Caibiran, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Rico, Revenue
Collector Orlando Mocorro, and Faulio Quizo, and other laborers. All of them
witnessed the inventory of the goods in the stall of Verutiao which Victor
Maderazo made upon the request of Mayor Melchor Maderazo. Earlier,
Verutiao was informed, by letter, of the inventory of the goods in the stall,
which, however, she failed to attend. One of the employees of the Municipality
brought the key to the stall and opened it. Victor Maderazo then conducted an
inventory of the goods, each was described, while someone was listing the
goods. The inventory was orderly.
The goods were then brought to the police station where the supplies were
kept.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On September 3, 2004, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment 28 convicting
the accused Melchor G. Maderazo, Seniforo Perido, and Victor Maderazo, Jr.
of the crime of unjust vexation, but acquitted the other accused. The court
ruled that Melchor Maderazo had no authority to padlock, open and inventory
the contents of the subject stall and take the same to the police station.
Although, he had the power to cancel the lease contract, as Mayor, he could
not eject the lessee by padlocking the market stall and order the hauling and
seizure of the goods contained therein. The remedies of the Municipality in
cases where there is delinquency in the payment of fees and rentals are
provided in the Local Government Code.
The court ruled that the accused cannot, however, be convicted of grave
coercion because they did not use violence, threats or intimidation. Verutiao
could not have possibly been intimidated or forced by the accused, as she
was not at the market stall when the same was padlocked, and its goods
inventoried and hauled. The court, however, held the said accused criminally
liable for unjust vexation even if the private complainant was not at the stall
because the overt acts of the accused caused her annoyance, irritation and
vexation. The court ruled that if the second element of grave coercion under
Article 286, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code is lacking, the crime committed
falls under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the same Code. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused MELCHOR G. MADERAZO,
accused SENIFORO PERIDO and VICTOR MADERAZO JR. are hereby
CONVICTED of the crime of Unjust Vexation, in Criminal Case No. 24309 and
hereby ordered to pay a fine of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00). Accused
RODOLFO RICO, accused ORLANDO MOCORRO, accused RODOLFO
AZUR, accused REYNALDO OLEDAN, accused JORDAN GERVACIO, and
accused JOSE CESORA are hereby ACQUITTED of the Crime of Grave
Coercion in Criminal Case No. 24309 for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, the cash bond they have posted for their provisional liberty are
hereby CANCELLED and the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Caibiran,
Biliran Cashier is hereby ordered to release the said Cash Bond to accused
Rico, accused Mocorro, accused Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan, and
accused Gervacio.
The Hold Departure Order issued against accused Rico, accused Mocorro,
accused Cesora, accused Azur, accused Oledan, and accused Gervacio are
set aside and any Hold Departure Order issued by the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation pursuant thereto is hereby recalled. However, the Hold
Departure Orders issued against accused Maderazo, accused Maderazo, Jr.,
and accused Perido stand.
SO ORDERED.29
The Petition Before the Court
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition30 and rely on the
following grounds:
I 2, Series of 1994. Consequently, petitioner Mayor Maderazo had every right
THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME OF UNJUST VEXATION.
II
THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
MAYOR MADERAZO HAS NO POWER TO PADLOCK A MARKET STALL
AND TO HAUL THE GOODS CONTAINED THEREIN.
III
THE SACROSANCT RULE IS THAT WHERE THE PROSECUTION FAILS
TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN OF PROVING BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME FOR
WHICH THE ACCUSED IS BEING HELD TO ACCOUNT -- AS IN THE CASE
AT BAR -- THE ACCUSED MUST PERFORCE BE ACQUITTED.31
The threshold issue is whether or not the People adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt of petitioners’ guilt for unjust vexation.
Petitioners maintain that they are not criminally liable for unjust vexation
because Verutiao was not prevented from doing something not prohibited by
law. She could not have been possibly intimidated or forced by petitioners,
and could not have been prevented from doing business. In fact, she was not
transacting business at the time. Verutiao was not at her stall when it was
opened and her goods inventoried; hence, she could not have been vexed.
Under the Information, they were charged with grave coercion for allegedly
evicting Verutiao from her stall on January 27, 1997, thereby compelling her
to give up her possession, and depriving her of said market stall. However,
they were convicted by the trial court of unjust vexation because they allegedly
padlocked the stall, hauled and/or seized the goods contained therein. It was
petitioner Mayor Maderazo who had padlocked the stall earlier on January 21,
1997. Petitioners Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. were not involved in the
padlocking of the stall. For his part, petitioner Melchor Maderazo was not at
the stall on January 27, 1997; he cannot, thus, be guilty of unjust vexation for
the overt acts of his co-petitioners on January 27, 1997.
Verutiao’s refusal to vacate the premises of the subject stall despite proper
demand and despite the fact that she was no longer operating the same,
rendered her a deforciant, and liable for violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
to consider the subject stall vacant; and proceed in accordance with Section
44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994, which provides:
Section 44 - Vacancy of Tienda or Stall before expiration of lease.
Should any reason (sic), a tienda, stall or stand holder or leases (sic)
discontinues or be required to discontinue his business before the expiration
of the lease, such tienda, stall or stand shall be considered vacant and its
occupancy thereafter shall be disposed of in the manner herein prescribed.
Petitioners posit that a Municipal Mayor has the duty to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality and the exercise of
its corporate powers and must ensure that all taxes and revenues of the
Municipality are collected. He is empowered to issue licenses and permits and
to suspend or revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which said
licenses or permits were issued; to adopt adequate measures to protect the
funds, credits, rights and other properties of the municipality; and to institute
or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for violation of
ordinances in the collection of taxes, fees or charges. Under Sec. 174 of the
Local Government Code, among the civil remedies for the collection of
delinquent local taxes, fees or charges, and other revenues is "by
administrative action through distraint of goods, chattels or effects, and other
personal property of whatever character, including stocks and other securities,
debts, credits, bank accounts, and interest in and rights to personal property,
and by levy upon real property and interest in or rights to real property."
Petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the right to padlock the stall of
Medaria Verutiao on January 21, 1997, after she refused to vacate the stall
despite his demand. Verutiao had no more lease contract and was no longer
operating the stall for the purpose it was intended, in violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984. Moreover, she was delinquent in the
payment of monthly rentals. Under the circumstances, and in view of her
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, petitioner Mayor
Melchor Maderazo was duty-bound to institute the necessary administrative
proceedings or to take immediate action to correct the violation, protect the
property of the Municipality, and ensure that the delinquent revenues from the
subject stall would be collected.
Petitioners aver that in closing down the stall, Verutiao was not ejected
therefrom but was merely stopped from improperly using it, in the exercise of
petitioner Mayor Maderazo’s power and duty to enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality and the exercise of
its corporate powers.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that, under the Local Government
Code, the local government concerned may avail of the following remedies,
either alternatively or simultaneously, for the collection of fees or charges: 1)
the administrative remedies of distraint of personal properties or levy upon
real properties; and 2) by judicial action. But from the evidence, petitioner
Melchor Maderazo cancelled the lease contract and ordered, which the other
petitioners obeyed, to padlock and to subsequently cart and haul the goods of
spouses Verutiao inside their market stall to the precinct, under the guise that
it was done in accordance with the law. He did not avail of the judicial action
which is specifically provided in the Local Government Code. He failed to avail
of the administrative remedies of distraint and levy and its procedure as
provided in Section 175 thereof.
Even if Verutiao was delinquent in the payment of their rentals, petitioner
Melchor Maderazo is mandated to consider and resolve the exemptions being
claimed by the former and which were properly communicated to him.
Petitioner Melchor Maderazo cannot take the law into his hands, and order
the seizure of the goods of the spouses Verutiao which was implemented by
the other petitioners, in clear violation of the law.
He maintains that nowhere in the Local Government Code is the Mayor of a
Municipality authorized to take the law into his own hands. Instead, the Local
Government Code provides specifically for the measures, procedures and
remedies to be undertaken in cases of delinquency in the payment of fees or
charges due to the local government concerned. Ordering to padlock, and to
subsequently cart and haul the goods inside the market stall being rented by
Verutiao to the police precinct without any court order or notice of distraint and
levy prejudiced the spouses. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo’s duties of protecting
the properties of the Municipality and enforcing the law do not include
depriving Verutiao of her means of livelihood. Perido and Maderazo, Jr.
cannot escape criminal liability by merely saying that they were following the
orders of Melchor Maderazo as only lawful orders deserved to be followed and
obeyed. The participation of petitioners Perido and Maderazo, Jr. went beyond
just being witnesses because they admitted that "they opened the stall and x
x x accounted for the goods and special effects contained inside." Petitioners
Perido and Maderazo, Jr. were invited to be at the vicinity as witnesses but
they acted beyond their participation as mere witnesses; they became
participants to an illegal and unauthorized act.
Petitioners Seniforo Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. occupy the positions of
Station Commander and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively.
They are public servants, and as such, owe the constituents of the Municipality
of Caibiran, including Verutiao, the performance of their official duties and
obligations to a higher degree of commitment and standards, and must
necessarily conform to the norms of conduct set forth by the law.
Verutiao was not at the subject stall and could not have possibly been
intimidated or forced by the accused. She could, likewise, not be prevented
from doing business because they were not transacting business at that time.
By the actuations of the petitioners, Verutiao was tormented and distressed.
Unjust vexation is a form of light coercion which is broad enough to include
any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or
material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, we agree with the contention of respondents that indeed,
the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove the guilt of
petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor
Maderazo, Jr. for unjust vexation.
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 287. Light coercions. – Any person, who by means of violence, shall seize
anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the
payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than
75 pesos.
Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor
or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.
The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human
conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm,
could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. 32 Compulsion or restraint
need not be alleged in the Information, for the crime of unjust vexation may
exist without compulsion or restraint. However, in unjust vexation, being a
felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good
defense to a charge for unjust vexation because good faith negates malice.
The paramount question to be considered is whether the offender’s act
caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of
the person to whom it is directed.33 The main purpose of the law penalizing
coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no
person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law,
not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the
administration of justice.34
In the present case, petitioner Melchor Maderazo opted not to testify in his
behalf. The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioners of unjust vexation on its
findings that petitioner Mayor Melchor Maderazo had the stall of Verutiao
padlocked and had it reopened, and had the contents of the stall inventoried
and taken to the police station. However, the padlocking of the stall of Verutiao
by petitioner Melchor Maderazo took place on January 21, 1997 and not on
January 27, 1997. Petitioners were charged with grave coercion, but were
convicted of unjust vexation for the eviction of Verutiao on January 27, 1997
and not on January 21, 1997 following the inventory of the contents of the stall
and the transportation thereof to the police station. The only events that took
place on January 27, 1997 were the unlocking of the padlock of the stall, the
inventory of its contents by petitioner Victor Maderazo on order of petitioner
Melchor Maderazo, and the transportation of the goods to the police station
where it was stored. Petitioners Victor Maderazo, Jr. and Seniforo Perido were
not present when the stall was padlocked on January 21, 1997.
We agree with respondent’s contention that based on the evidence on record,
the overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo,
Jr., on January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to
her. It was petitioner Melchor Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor
Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to conduct an inventory of the
contents thereof, and to effect the transportation of the goods to the police
station. Petitioner Victor Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member,
obeyed the order of the Mayor.
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents
thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of
unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not
necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed
by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed,
annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the
petitioners. Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from
her stall and prevented her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the
business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from January
21, 1997.
Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor
Maderazo, Jr., had no right, without judicial intervention, to oust Verutiao from
the stall, and had her merchandise transported to the police station, thereby
preventing her from doing business therein and selling her merchandize.
Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no right to take the law into his own hands
and deprive Verutiao of her possession of the stall and her means of
livelihood.
Admittedly, the lease contract of Verutiao and the Municipality expired on
January 13, 1997 without having been renewed, and petitioner Mayor ordered
Verutiao to vacate the stall, also for her failure to pay the rent amounting to
P2,532.00. Under Section 44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1999, the stall is
considered vacant and shall be disposed of. However, petitioner had to file an
action for unlawful detainer against Verutiao to recover possession of her stall
and cause her eviction from said premises. 35 Verutiao insisted on her right to
remain as lessee of her stall and to do business thereat. Such action is
designed to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder and prevent
those believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property resort to
force to gain possession rather than to secure appropriate action in the court
to assert their claims.36 It was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to institute an
action for the eviction of Verutiao. He cannot be permitted to invade the
property and oust the lessee who is entitled to the actual possession and to
place the burden upon the latter of instituting an action to try the property
right.37
An action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings
established for the purpose of providing expeditious means of protecting
actual possession, which is presumed to be lawful until the contrary is proven.
As this Court emphasized in Dizon v. Concina:38
Succinctly did this Court explain in one case the nature of the forcible entry
action: "In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the
purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession;
and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status
quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that
the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession
pending this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to
engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the
subject of dispute.39
Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the Municipality and to implement all approved
programs, projects, services and activities of the Municipality 40 and to ensure
that all taxes and other revenues of the Municipality are collected. 41 He is
obliged to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial
proceedings for the recovery of funds and property. 42 However, in the
performance of his duties, petitioner Mayor should act within the confines of
the law and not resort to the commission of a felony. A public officer is
proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and
ordinances. He must exercise his power and perform his duties in accordance
with law, with strict observance of the rights of the people, and never
whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically.
Even as we find petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo,
Jr. guilty of unjust vexation, we find petitioner Seniforo Perido deserving of an
acquittal. The Prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with the other
petitioners. He was at the situs of the stall merely to witness the inventory and
ensure peace and order. He agreed to have the contents of the stall of
Verutiao stored in the police station presumably to protect the property from
the elements and asportation by thieves until after Verutiao shall have claimed
the same or the disposition thereof determined by the authorities concerned.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
petitioner Seniforo Perido is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The bail bond
posted by him for his provisional liberty is cancelled. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Baleros Jr. v. People
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails
and seeks the reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271 as reiterated in its March 31, 1999
resolution2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642 finding petitioner
Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO) guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991 charging
petitioner with attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991
in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a
piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of rape by
lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but
was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being
committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by counsel,
pleaded "Not Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses. Among
them were private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her
classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and
Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision
of the CA, established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter "Building",
…) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU, occupying Room
307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was a medical student of the
University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at around
10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid, Marvilou, slept on
a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the smell of
chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not
move. Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She
wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet
with chemicals were very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU
continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got
free. With this …the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab
hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door and roused
Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok
sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however,
know. The only thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel of
her attacker’s clothes and weight. His upper garment was of cotton material
while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He …
was wearing a t-shirt and shorts … Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard
Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying, MALOU then
proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-turvy. Her nightdress was
stained with blue … (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from the window
with grills which she had originally left opened, another window inside her
bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from her room going through
the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one
without iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993,
p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her classmate
…, was friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO confided his feelings
for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she
rejected him. …. (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO arrived at
the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13, 1991, wearing a
white t-shirt with “‘…a marking on the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter
(sic) ΣΦ’ and below the quoted letters the word ‘1946’ ‘UST Medicine and
Surgery’” (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the brand name
“Adidas” (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to
Room 306. This Unit was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when
CHITO was asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the
room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and when
CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented] …. S/G
Ferolin made the following entry in the security guard’s logbook …:
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have (sic) a
Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I let him inter
(sic) for the reason that he will be our tenant this coming summer break as he
said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991 was
corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening of December
12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO’s knocking on the door woke him up, …. He
was able to fix the time of CHITO’s arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at
the alarm clock beside the bed when he was awakened by the knock at the
door ….
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt
(Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. …. It was at around 3 o’clock in the
morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up again later to the sound of
knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard Baptista (Bernard), ….
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room and thereat was
shown by Bernard the open window through which the intruder supposedly
passed.
 xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph was
finally able to talk to CHITO …. He mentioned to the latter that something had
happened and that they were not being allowed to get out of the building.
Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his gray
bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet another
classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock that same morning …. They
likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp Crame where the
two (2) were questioned ….
An occupant of Room 310 … Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in Court that
in the afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30 class, he and his
roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta (Gary) were called to the
Building and were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging
to them in their Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the
authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to
search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray
"Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they
did not know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he
saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid,
p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside the
classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents, among
others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black
Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear,
and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants (Exhibit
"D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITO’s because CHITO
had lent the very same one to him …. The t-shirt with CHITO’s fraternity
symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the handkerchief he saw
CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December 13,
1991, was what consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadan’s testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to about 11/4
feet and appeared to be full but was closed with a zipper when Renato saw it
then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went
back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 o’clock that afternoon along with some CIS
agents, they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom where Renato
had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past 9 o’clock in Camp
Crame, however, did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted in response to the written
request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M. Managuelod dated December 13,
1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory
examination on the specimen collated and submitted…. Her Chemistry Report
No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked ‘UNIMART’ with the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh ‘C’ – One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked ‘JONAS’ with the following:
Exh. ‘D’ – One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. ‘E’ – One (1) white T-shirt marked ‘TMZI’.
Exh. ‘F’ – One (1) black short (sic) marked ‘ADIDAS’.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or metallic
poison on the above stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens gave the
following results:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile poison.
Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile poison." 6 (Words in bracket
added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself.
He denied committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous
advances on Malou. Unfolding a different version of the incident, the defense
sought to establish the following, as culled from the same decision of the
appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of … (UST). With Robert
Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the Tau Sigma Phi
Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was known to him being also a medical student at
the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building …, CHITO, wearing the
prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes, arrived at their
Fraternity house located at … Dos Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7
o’clock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He was included in the
entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas
gathering at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No.
3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool …. Soon
after, … the four (4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity, CHITO included,
were being dunked one by one into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was thus wearing his t-shirt and
long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, …, offered each … dry clothes
to change into and CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the Fraternity’s symbol
and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white t-shirt
with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe, socks and
shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party with Robert Chan
and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of December 13, 1991 and proceeded
to the Building which they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had
left his gray traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks,
and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous
day ….
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and …, S/G Ferolin, looking at his
watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked at his own watch and
saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO
entry …. xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in, already
about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind the
opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to open the door
until Rommel Montes, … approached him and even commented: "Okey ang
suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to
open the door of Unit 306 … but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then
decided to just call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph, …, at
last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan" Joseph
immediately turned his back on CHITO and went inside the bedroom. CHITO
, …changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He still had on the same short
pants given by Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p.
20).
At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up …. He was
already in his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph came to the
room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter why this was so and, without
elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had happened and to just go
to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody, whom
MALOU was not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU and tried to rape
her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of the
Building …. When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for Renato Baleros,
CHITO presented himself. Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of
MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room 306….
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph was
told to dress up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph, were brought to
Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame …, Col. Managuelod asked Joseph inside
his room and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one interviewed CHITO to
ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who later
instructed them to undergo physical examination at the Camp Crame Hospital
….. At the hospital, … CHITO and Joseph were physically examined by a
certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip ….
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black striped short
pants lent to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original Records, p. 345),
inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7 o’clock in the morning of December
13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and
Joseph were brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS
agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his presence but the
contents of the bag were already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who,
however, made no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO denied
putting in his gray bag which he had left at Room 306 in the early evening of
December 12, 1991 before going to the fraternity house. He likewise
disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in his gray bag when he
returned to the apartment at past 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of
December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at
about 6 o’clock in the morning to go to school and brought his gray bag to
Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December 13, 1991, he was not
aware that his gray bag ever contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid).
He only found out for the first time that the black Adidas short pants was
alluded to be among the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when
he was in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner’s fraternity
brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both testified being with
CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in Dr. Duran’s place at Greenhills,
riding on the same car going to and coming from the party and dropping the
petitioner off the Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were one in
saying that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short
pants and leather shoes at the time they parted after the party. 7 Rommel
Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO
between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying to open
the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white barong tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the pair of
short pants with stripes after the dunking party held in her father’s house. 8
Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita Vargas, a forensic
chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in open court showed that
chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing
nor staining the cloth on which it is applied.9
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision10 convicting
petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the foregoing, the
Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias "Chito", guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape as principal and as charged
in the information and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment
ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as
Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and for the
accused to pay the offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of
P50,000.00 by way of Moral and exemplary damages, plus reasonable
Attorney’s fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision dated
January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the findings
of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in
its equally assailed resolution of March 31, 1999. 12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred -
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have
committed the attempted rape imputed to him, absent sufficient,
competent and convincing evidence to prove the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis merely of
circumstantial evidence since the prosecution failed to satisfy all the
requisites for conviction based thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to convict the
petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting in his
case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant despite the fact
that the award was improper and unjustified absent any evidence to
prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional presumption
of innocence and that moral certainty has not been met, hence, he
should be acquitted on the ground that the offense charged against
him has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on whether
or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of
applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioner’s acquittal,
but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence pointing to him as the
intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed
in the early morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to
that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There
are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission
of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the very
act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the
latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. 13 In the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing
circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed
in secret and under condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct
evidence is insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons
who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not
well-nigh impossible, to prove.14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions when
circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient – Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if –
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that petitioner was the intruder in question.
We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the circumstantial evidence that
led to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had
access to the room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had
a window which allowed ingress and egress to Room 306 where MALOU
stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard
Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and
fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the
morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle,
MALOU had made out the feel of her intruder’s apparel to be something made
of cotton material on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITO’s bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where
witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most
incriminating evidence: the handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some
kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-
shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time, Christian Alcala,
identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory
examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU
during the incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOU’s night dress
both contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree burn
exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the
chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced by the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on Malou’s face
the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her body tightly under the
weight of his own, had commenced the performance of an act indicative of an
intent or attempt to rape the victim. It is argued that petitioner’s actuation thus
described is an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can not be any
other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou
after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General,
echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioner’s intention was otherwise, he
would not have lain on top of the victim.15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man
who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the
following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation
to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru
Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt
which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a
particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and
natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the
offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to
commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the
standpoint of the Penal Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or
carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to
the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a
chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of
rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor
by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too
strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the
mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will
logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt
to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed
and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch
her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not
have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even
anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had
been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to
come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his intended victim
is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already
mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before
even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard first, or as
in this case, her unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice
disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere
speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish
the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner of the
crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to
produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must
have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the
victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her,
mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her
sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute
attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to
force his penis into the complainant’s sexual organ. xxx.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant’s feet when his Tito Onio
arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching to the
extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere holding of the feet is
attempted rape.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent,
under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed
against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face
of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou
testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and
having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily,
while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine
attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation
punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an
accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation,24 it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the
inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the
information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make
his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no
need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust
vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of
restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include
any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or
material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. 25 The
paramount question is whether the offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her
classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she
filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if
not distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of
the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from ₱5.00 to
₱200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the
charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light
coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay
a fine of ₱200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.