Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 192828 November 28, 2011

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA
SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
December 14, 2009 Decision2 and July 8, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by

us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15,
2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6,
in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251.4

The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The Factual Antecedents

Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,5 the respondents filed a
Complaint6 against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc.
(formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of
Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his
successors-in-interest.

The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver,
Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer
for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction," was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(RTC).

In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:

First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching / Tiong Cheng /
Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime Cheng (Jaime) are
allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent Mercedes Igne (Mercedes).
Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. The
respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth
and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio
died of a stab wound. Police investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands
as the lone accused in a criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against
him have remained unserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the
authority of Article 9197 of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that Ramon can be
legally disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio.
1
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police investigations
tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former made an inventory of the
latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there were only six real estate properties left by Antonio.
The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally transferred to his name the titles to the said
properties. Further, there are two other parcels of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in
Hongkong, which were in Ramon's possession.

Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-talked by Ramon
into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of Time Deposit of
₱4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering two condominium units in
Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money but which were registered in
Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they
will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po
Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting undue influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute
an Agreement8 and a Waiver9 on August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the
Agreement and Waiver, specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the
amount of ₱22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the
execution of the said instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the
instruments are null and void.

Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the latter's
total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a forged document
of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in Binondo. Ramon's claim
that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in
Po Wing had also banished into thin air through Ramon's machinations.

Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate10 adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the
respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering eight
real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to the Po Wing shares, the
Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety Bond conditioned to answer for
whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection with the said stocks. Co-defendant
Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in Ramon's behalf.

Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia
Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate, was sold
by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price. By reason of Ramon's
lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate, the conveyances are null and void ab
initio.

Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no
intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.

The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:

1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON CHING and/or his
attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to
the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING;

xxx

4. x x x

a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING
disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;

b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels of land
from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;
2
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor of x x x
RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;

d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the names of
ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's name for having been
illegally procured through the falsification of their signatures in the document purporting the transfer
thereof;

e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing jurisprudence;

f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i) over two (2)
parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES, Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel
of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having illegally procured the ownership and titles
of the above properties;

x x x.11

The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12 alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res
judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in interest.

On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order13 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.

The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14 dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the
successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh
cause of action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the
amount of ₱4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they
be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them.
Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to
preserve it during the pendency of the case.

On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim.15

On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order16 admitting the respondents' Amended Complaint.
The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-in-
interest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed
willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on
May 3, 2006.

On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to the
respondents' Amended Complaint.

On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.17

On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss18 the respondents' Amended Complaint
on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint. The
petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the CPPA to the
respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance,
the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration of
nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC acting as an
ordinary court. Commented [IO1]: Issue

On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on
grounds:

In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the action delves mainly on
the question of ownership of the properties described in the Complaint which can be properly settled
3
in an ordinary civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the
nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching to defraud
the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have
translated this action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended
Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] Commented [IO2]:

of the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in itself poses an issue
of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as
emphasized by the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-
defendant.

As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of
the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there
can be disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be legally
disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court, the issue of disinheritance, which Commented [IO3]: issues

is one of the causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at
this stage, it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a will.20 (Emphasis Commented [IO4]:

supplied.)

The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended
Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects are within the
ambit of a special proceeding. Commented [IO5]:

On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision21 denying the petition
for certiorari on grounds:

Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of action of the
amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in the said complaint shows that the
action of the private respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding, it
appearing that their allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their rights
against the alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The
private respondents also instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them
from the consequence of the fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify
Ramon Ching from inheriting from Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing
or alienating the subject properties, including the ₱4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The
intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to
the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree
with the trial court that the probate court could not take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon
Ching, given the undisputed fact that there was no will to be contested in a probate court. Commented [IO6]: no will to be contested.

The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and complicates the issue of
jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings.
Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to
recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of
the court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest
the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners (defendants).22 Hence,
we focus our resolution on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and
not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the
petitioners.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject the action of the petitioners in a special proceeding since the nullification of the
subject documents could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to

4
evaluate the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined
during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251.23 (emphasis supplied)

The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a Resolution24 issued on
July 8, 2010.

The Issue

The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25 is anchored on the issue of:

Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the PETITIONERS on the
alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Amended Complaint, to
wit, (a) filiations with Antonio of Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of common-law wives, Lucina
and Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c) determination of the extent of Antonio's
estate; and (d) other matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an
ordinary civil action. Commented [IO7]: Petitioners arguments that case is for
special proceedings.

The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the heirs
of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d)
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.26 Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the
respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in
Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding
and not of an ordinary civil action.

The respondents opposed27 the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are engaged in forum
shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 17550728 and 183840,29 both involving the contending parties in the Commented [IO8]: Defense of forum shopping

instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further,
in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30 the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively participated in the trial of the case, are already
estopped from challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and Amended
Complaint.31

The Court's Ruling

We resolve to deny the instant petition.

The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing them to file their reply to
the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the prescribed period to comply
expired on March 15, 2011, the petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply
only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.

Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the
denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.

Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the petitioners engaged
in forum shopping and are already estopped from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having
validly submitted to it when the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant
Petition is still in order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among
others, the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now
under Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not
a special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court. Commented [IO9]: ruling

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters Commented [IO10]: Civil Action

relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the Commented [IO11]: Special Proceeding

5
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.32 A special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.33 It is distinguished from an Commented [IO12]: Special proceeding as a remedy

ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the Commented [IO13]: Special Proceeding as a remedy.
prevention or redress of a wrong.34 To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint Commented [IO14]: Civil Action purpose
should be filed. Commented [IO15]: Petition for special proceeding not a
complaint.

Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal
cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the
respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will
or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does not
partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its
limited jurisdiction. Commented [IO16]: Ruling

The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor of
the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments
subject of the complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as
Antonio's heirs.

It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful
owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and
Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of
a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency
of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on
Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the
declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the
respondents were parties to the execution of the Agreement35 and Waiver36 prayed to be nullified.
Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the
standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no
consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud
against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Antonio’s estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the
said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall
first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.

In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,37 the Court declared:

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.1âwphi1 Commented [IO17]: Ruling:

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No.
02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to
protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC
will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the
reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251
was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court. Commented [IO18]: Not proper subject of a special
proceedings.

The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from
6
Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the
RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of
respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated
therein are matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents' Commented [IO19]: Petition for review on Certiorari the lower
courts denying Motion to Dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;38 and (b) Manifestation39 through counsel that they will no
longer file a reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 12-57.

2Penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando
and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; id. at 59-70.

3 Id. at 72-73.

4 Id. at 69.

7
5 The copy of the Complaint filed with this Court was dated November 25, 2002 and stamped as
received by the RTC on December 3, 2002. However, the copy does not indicate if the Complaint was
filed personally or by registered mail.

6 Rollo, pp. 110-126.

7 Art. 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants,
legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator,
his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;

8 Rollo, p. 615.
22Fort Bonifacio Development Corp. v. Hon. Edwin D. Sorongon, G.R. No. 176709, May 8, 2009, 587
SCRA 613, 619-620, citing Caparros v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56803, February 28, 1989, 170
SCRA 758, 761.

26Citing Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2, 9th Revised Ed., p.
11.

27Please see Comment/Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari, rollo, pp. 499-535. Lucina died on
October 20, 2010, hence, substituted by Eduardo Santos Balajadia who claims to be her son.

28Id. at 536-570. G.R. No. 175507 originated from the RTC Order (Id. at 632) issued on November
22, 2002 dismissing Civil Case No. 02-103319 without prejudice. On the other hand, the petition now
under this Court's consideration originated from Civil Case No. 02-105251.

29 Id. at 571-612. Although G.R. No. 183840 involves the same parties, it originated from the RTC
Omnibus Order issued on July 30, 2004 denying the petitioners' first motion to dismiss. The RTC
Order issued on March 15, 2007 denying the petitioners' second motion to dismiss is the origin of the
instant petition now under this Court's consideration.

30 336 Phil 735, 740 (1997).

31Citing Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al., 131 Phil 556 (1968), Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC, 377
Phil 275 (1999), Antiporda v. Garchitorena, 378 Phil 1166, 1174 (1999).

32 Natcher v. Court of Appeals, et al., 418 Phil 669, 677 (2001).

33 Rules of Court, Rule 1, Section 3.

34 Reyes v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 86, 92.
35 Supra note 8.

36 Supra note 9.

37G.R. No. 180394, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 101, 116, citing Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao,
358 Phil. 83, 94-95 (1998).

38 Rollo, pp. 670-675.

39 Id. at 676-680.

8
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS,

AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY,
LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District Court,
Fourth Shari’a Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21, 2006.2

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer,
Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3 Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr.,
Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their children.4 On May 26,
1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a
District Court.6 The said complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and Liling M.
Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer,
Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montañer," and docketed
as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint, private respondents made the following
allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a
Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the
decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated
value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents
prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the
estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.9

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Shari’a
District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was
a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3)
private respondents’ complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.10

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The
district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to
the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.11

On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.12 On December 28,
2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for
reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.13 On January 17, 2006, the Shari’a District Court denied
petitioners’ opposition.14 Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of
hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of the
existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the said motion.15 The Shari’a District Court also
reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16
9
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of
dismissal dated November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to adduce
further evidence.18 In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court
ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference.19

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER

PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER
"THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A
NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND
DOCKETING FEES.

IV.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF
PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS
LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF
HEARING."

V.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR
TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAÑER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION
PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a District
Court must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a
Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.20 Commented [IO20]: To determine whether or not the
decedent is a Muslim In order to determine whether Shari’a court
has jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent on a
question of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is
the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears
emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim.
The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:

10
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:

xxxx

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors
regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and
character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to their
own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation.
Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive
averments of the pleadings."22

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a
"Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,23 such as the fact
of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also
contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents,
and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be
settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the
private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.24 These include the
following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the
appointment of an administrator of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that
Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject
matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer25 or a motion to Commented [IO21]: ruling

dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant27 or result in having
"a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed,
the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court
to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."29

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the Shari’a
District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the
allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and
receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination Commented [IO22]: the court has authority to determine
jurisdiction.
that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the
Commented [IO23]:
deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a
District Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous
understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to
the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs
or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the
proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of
Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the
fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which
would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate
11
of the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death
and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among
his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party
defendant in a civil action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of
the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special
proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding,
respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong"34necessarily has
definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.35 On the other hand, a special
proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,"36 has one
definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no
definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not
being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the
estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,37pay its liabilities,38 and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39

Docket Fees

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees,
is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding before the court a
quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion
that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners’ argument essentially
involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2)
whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the correct
amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the
responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.41 In such a case,
the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s reliance on the
clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees.42 As "every citizen has the right to assume
and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them
in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s
insufficient assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.44

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees.
Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether
private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the Shari’a
District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the
present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to
be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties
concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by
the court without proof of service thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its
provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically
of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned
final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein."48 In
these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in
technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits
rather than on technicalities.49

12
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to
determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent
alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure
conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling
the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because
the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on
notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected.50 The
purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,51 for the court to determine
whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within
which to file a reply or opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be
heard."53 In the case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, Commented [IO24]: Probate proceedings notice and hearing.

2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners
were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an
opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said
motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of
notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet determined
whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding Commented [IO25]: Court has the authority to determine
jurisdiction.
for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including
prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said
proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends
on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over
the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated August Commented [IO26]: Petition for Certiorari on the lower courts
denying the filed opposition to the Motion for reconsideration
22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners. granted by the Shari’a court to determine its jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

13
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

21 Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 152, 161 (2001).

22 Heirs of Celso Amarante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, May 21, 1990, 185 SCRA 585, 594.
23 Musa v. Moson, G.R. No. 95574, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 715, 719.
24 Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21, at 162.
25 Salas v. Castro, G.R. No. 100416, December 2, 1992, 216 SCRA 198, 204.
26 Hilado v. Chavez, G.R. No. 134742, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 623, 641.
27 Salas v. Castro, supra note 25.
28 Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21, at 163.

29 Salas v. Castro, supra note 25.

30 Mamadsual v. Moson, G.R. No. 92557, September 27, 1990, 190 SCRA 82, 87.

In the abovementioned case, the Court held that the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari’a Courts,
Ijra-at-al-Mahakim al Shari’a, proscribe "the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer which
would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay."

31 Musa v. Moson, supra note 23, at 721-722.

32 Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21, at 165.
33 Ventura v. Hon. Militante, 374 Phil. 562 (1999).
34 Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 3, par. (a).

35 Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 1.

36 Rules of Court, Rule 1, Sec. 3, par. (c).

37 Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 578, 593 (1995).
38 Id.
39 Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21, at 165.
40 Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274,
285.

41 Rivera v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 144934, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 626, 635.
42 Id.

14
43 Ayala Land, Inc. v. Spouses Carpo, 399 Phil. 327, 334 (2000), citing Segovia v. Barrios, 75 Phil.
764, 767 (1946).

44 Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Navarro, G.R. No. 152575, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 51,
61.

45 Rules of Court, Rule 15, Secs. 4-5.

46 Rules of Court, Rule 15, Sec. 6.

47 Rules of Court, Rule 2, Sec. 6.

48 Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269, 299 (1999).
49 Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99431, August 11, 1992, 212 SCRA 498,
504.

50 Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170, May 29, 2007, 523 SCRA 279, 291-292.
51 Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, at 299-300.
52 Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, supra note 50, at 292.
53 De Borja, et al. v. Tan, et al., 93 Phil. 167, 171 (1953).
54 Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184, 198.
55 Uriarte v. Court of First Instance Negros Occidental, et al., 144 Phil. 205, 215-216 (1970).

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to
any of the heirs? Commented [IO27]:

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set
aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor
of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059
and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
15
"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani,
Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of
TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children
received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children,
share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters
leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988.
Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where
the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the
second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No.
1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear
that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married
to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory
heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already
distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not
anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of
property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by
law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased." Commented [IO28]: Decision favorable to the petitioner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter
alia:

16
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the
court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule Commented [IO29]: CA went against her.

45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the
facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in
this wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to
definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special
proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted
and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense,
but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings
commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of
ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending
action, by petition or motion upon notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the Commented [IO30]: Probate court

exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged
to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
17
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor
of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover,
under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle
the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo
determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property
owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper
proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial
courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence,
it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as
the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general
jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle
that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate
that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir
may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can
be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes.19

18
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals
that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of
these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate
court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the
issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Commented [IO31]: Petition for review for certiorari to
reverse the decision of CA.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnote

1C.A. Decision in C.A. GR No.CV No. 51390, promulgated on 09 December 1997, penned by Justice
Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and concurred in by JJ. Ruben T. Reyes and Hilarion L. Aquino; Rollo, pp.
23-31.

2 TCT No.107442.

3 TCT No.107443.

4 Annex "C"; Records, p. 5.

5 Records, pp.1-7.

6 Exhibit E; Decision in Civil Case No. 94-71075; p. 205.

7 Records, pp. 20-23.

8 Rollo, p. 25.

9 Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880 [1920].

10Francisco, V.J., Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. V-A, 1970 ed., p. 596 citing 1 CJS
1094-1095.

11 Section 2, Rule 90.

12 Rollo, p.30; CA Decision, p.8.

13 81 SCRA 278 [1978].

14 269 SCRA 764 [1997].

15 Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 [1948].

16Coca vs. Borromeo, supra; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 [1942]; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-
1883, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892 [1965]; Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil 227 [1948]; 3
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 473.

17 269 SCRA 764, 769 [1997].

19
18 Pagkatipunan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 718 [1991].
19 Mateo vs. Laguna, 29 SCRA 864 [1969].

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 163108 February 23, 2005

GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by the petitioner
for the nullification of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals1 which dismissed his petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for his release from detention despite the pendency of People of Commented [IO32]: CA Resolution

the Philippines v. Glenn Caballes2for rape, and its resolution denying his motion for reconsideration
thereof. Commented [IO33]: CA Resolution 1. Dismissed his petition of
the issuance of a writ of habeas copus, 2. Denying his motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:

On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25756-MN
and raffled to Branch 169, presided by Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the petitioner was
charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained.

The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. The
prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice Vera Pio, the private complainant, and her
mother. The petitioner, through counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to
complete the same. In January 2003, the petitioner engaged the services of a new counsel, Atty.
Noel S. Sorreda, who entered his appearance as defense counsel.3

During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his cross-examination of Pio but still
failed to terminate the same. The trial was set on March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to terminate his
cross-examination of Pio. However, due to the illness of the private prosecutor, the trial on the said
date did not proceed. The trial was further reset to March 17, 2003 during which the petitioner
continued with his cross-examination of the private complainant. Thereafter, the continuation of trial
was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the petitioner concluded his cross-examination
of Pio. The prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the Medico-
Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-
legal examination of the private complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad. The
prosecution prayed for the cancellation of the trial scheduled on April 21, 2003 to give the
prosecution time to secure and cause the service of a subpoena duces tecum on him. The petitioner
conformed to the motion of the prosecution.

On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail.4

The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioner’s counsel filed a Manifestation5 that
his presence was required in an execution sale in Cavite. The said counsel manifested that he
reserved his right to cross-examine any witness the prosecution would present in case trial would

20
proceed on that date; on the other hand, in the event that the trial court would cancel the trial, he
would be available in May 2003 and during the first half of June 2003.

The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 a.m. of June 19, 2003 and gave the prosecution
ten (10) days to file its opposition6 to the petitioner’s petition for bail. It likewise ordered the issuance
of a subpoena to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez to require him to attend the trial on the said date.

On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion7 seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to
speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also filed a motion for the urgent resolution of his
petition for bail.8

On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another motion9 praying that the hearing scheduled on June 19,
2003 be moved to an earlier date, preferably on May 26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the
prosecution filed its comment/opposition10 to the petitioner’s petition for bail.

On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order11 declaring that the petition for bail was submitted for its
resolution and denying the petitioner’s motion for an earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003, the trial
court issued its Order12 denying the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against
the petitioner was strong.

During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court because, in the
meantime, he had been assigned to the Eastern Police District and failed to receive
the subpoena issued to him by the court. The prosecution prayed for continuance, but the petitioner
objected and invoked his right to speedy trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset
the trial to July 17, 2003.

On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez requiring him to appear for the trial set on July 17, 2003.13

On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s Order dated June 16,
2003 denying his petition for bail. His motion was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003. However,
the petitioner preempted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a Motion to
Dismiss14 the case on July 11, 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial had been violated. He
made the following allegations:

1. The hearings in the instant case have more often than not been scheduled more than one month
apart;

2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before undersigned counsel had filed a
Manifestation stating inter alia that his available dates for the next hearing may be "any Monday,
Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May 2003 and the first half of June 2003, except on May 14
and 21" – yet Atty. Manalaysay asked for the next hearing on June 19 which is already outside or
beyond the dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more than 1-1/2 months away, but
which the Honorable Court nonetheless granted;

3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any "good cause" as to how come he was not
able to present Dr. Marquez on April 30, 2003, and then again on June 19, 2003; and as aforesaid,
his absence on March 6, 2003 has not been supported by any medical certificate;

4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has now been more than
one year, or close to 400 days ago since trial started; neither has there been any authorization from
the Supreme Court that the trial period may exceed 180 days;

5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its orders granting continuance
that "the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the
accused in a speedy trial;"

21
6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false statement before the Honorable
Court in claiming they had asked Dr. Marquez to testify in the June 19, 2003 hearing, when in fact
they had not.15

Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received the subpoena issued by the trial court,
because of which the prosecution again failed to present him as a witness during the trial of July 17,
2003. The prosecution prayed for continuance, to which the petitioner vigorously objected. The court,
however, granted the motion and reset the trial to August 11, 2003.16

On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order17 inhibiting himself from hearing the case "to avoid
being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and objectivity and to live up to the ideal
impartial administration of justice." The case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge
Benjamin T. Antonio, who calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003. Nevertheless, on
August 11, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 of Judge Laurea’s Order dated
July 24, 2003, which the latter denied, on the finding that no cogent reason was presented to
reconsider the same.19

During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio granted the private prosecutor’s motion to
be given five (5) days within which to oppose the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Judge Antonio also
set the trial on September 18, 2003.20 On the latter date, the trial court issued an Omnibus
Order21 denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there was no
violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent delays could not be
attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. The trial court noted that the petitioner also sought
Postponements of the trials.

Anent the motion for reconsideration of the court’s Order dated June 16, 2003 which denied the
petition for bail, the trial court considered the same as having been abandoned by the petitioner
upon the filing of his motion to dismiss the case without waiting for the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration on his petition for bail.

The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a "Petition for Habeas
Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition."22 On October 2, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution requiring
the petitioner to inform the court of his choice of remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In
compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate court that he had chosen
his petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice "to the concomitant
application of certiorari if the court considered the same necessary or appropriate to give effect to
the writ of habeas corpus."

The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case;
(c) the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and (d)
Judge Antonio had prejudged the case against him.

On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition, viz:

WHEREFORE, for being the wrong or improper remedy, the PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.23

According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his preference that his petition be
treated as a petition for habeas corpus, the same was not the proper remedy to review and examine
the proceedings before the trial court and as a relief from the petitioner’s perceived oppressive
situation in the trial court. The CA further emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of
error; that it could not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or omission of the respondent
judge as a concomitant remedy; and that the remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in
nature, scope and purpose. The appellate court declared that the petitioner failed to present any
evidence to prove that there was any intentional or deliberate delay caused to prejudice him; nor was
22
there any malice in the failure of the prosecution to promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad
testificandum to its witnesses. The court also noted that the resetting of petitioner’s case may also be
attributed to the voluminous work of the RTC involved.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that (a) the
congestion of the trial court’s calendar is not a valid ground for continuance of the trial; (b) the trial
court failed to secure an extension of time of the trial period from the Supreme Court; (c) the trial
court should have given a precedence to the case, the charge therein being a heinous crime; (d) his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was proper because his continued detention had become illegal,
following the prosecutor and the trial court’s violation of his right to a speedy trial, and the trial
court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the case and his petition for bail which was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion; and (e) a writ of habeas corpus may be issued with the writ of certiorari for the
purpose of review. However, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
reiterating the grounds contained in his motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner
averred that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in rendering its resolution, as well as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration
thereof.

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s order denying his petition for bail,
motion to dismiss the case, and Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition. The OSG posits that the petitioner
was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case as well as under the
Speedy Trial Act.

The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of the CA is already final
and executory; (b) whether the proper remedy from the appellate court’s denial of a petitioner for a
writ if habeas corpus is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and (c) if in the
affirmative, whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ.

On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioner’s recourse to this Court via a petition for
certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the
judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the
judgment appealed from. While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of
the said Rules, which took effect on July 15, 2001, thus:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.—The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal
is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken
within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof;
instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is
plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist
with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal
are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two remedies are
mutually exclusive.24 An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy.
Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already
final and executory.
23
It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with
any other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the
remedy is by writ of error because the error committed by the court is an error of judgment and not
an error of jurisdiction.25

Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the
trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as
well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings,26 it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil Commented [IO34]: Special Proceeding

proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire
into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the
act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even
when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.27

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s
function.28 It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpusproceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void.29 The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.30 The
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot
be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving
the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed.31 It has
also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases,
the restraint is not illegal.32

Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the
sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of
his detention may be inquired into and his statements final.33 The writ of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the
unlawful authority.34 Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the
person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the
custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty.35 The writ may be denied if the
petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.36

A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a prerogative writ which does
not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ
of right on proper formalities being made by proof.37 Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal
act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.38 The primary, if not the only object of
the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a
person is held.39

Our review of the petitioner’s material averments in his petition before the CA reveals that it was a
"petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari" The petitioner
assailed therein the orders of the trial court denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on
the ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, and
questioned Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies
are governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the Commented [IO35]:

24
joinder of causes of action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus
proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil action. Commented [IO36]:

We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy
different from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial
court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack Commented [IO37]: Writ of habeas corpus is a collateral
attack.
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of
Commented [IO38]: Writ of certiorari is a direct attack.
certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a “Jurisdictional errors only) It reaches the record.
record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On
the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches Commented [IO39]: Writ of habeas corpus reaches the body
but not the record.
jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved into
court, and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may be
accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid Commented [IO40]: Writ of certiorari as an anciliary
proceeding.
of the primary action for the purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as
the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by any
body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such questions pertaining to the
detention made by the officer or body particularly complained of.40

The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated as a petition
for habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to
establish his right to the writ. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt
is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.41 There
is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of
the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner
until granted bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial.
The petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to
establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the
appellate court.1a\^/phi1.net

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a petition for habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial thereof:

… The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was
for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was Commented [IO41]: Before Trial – Remedy: Motion For Bail
During Trial – Remedy: Petition to be admitted to bail.
denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even
then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.43

The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his petition for bail was to file
a petition for certiorari in the CA if the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said order.44 If the petitioner had done so, his petition Commented [IO42]: Remedy

would have been granted because as gleaned from the assailed order of the trial court, it failed to
summarize the testimonies of the private complainant and that of her mother. Hence, such order is
invalid.45 The trial court would have had to issue another order containing the summary of the
testimonies of the private complainant and her mother, including its findings and conclusions.
However, the petitioner would still not be entitled to be released from detention in the meantime.

It bears stressing that under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 13746 of the Rules of Court, the
voluntary inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound discretion for just or valid reasons, the
primary consideration being that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.47 The
petitioner should have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA, instead of a
petition for habeas corpus.

25
In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the prosecution, the remedy
lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 8 of the said Rule provides:

SEC. 8. Sanctions.— In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney, or the
prosecutor:

(a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that a necessary witness would be
unavailable for trial;

(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he knows to be false and
which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof, the
court may punish such counsel, attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:

(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, a fine
not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00);

(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney, or prosecutor a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00); and

(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to practice before the court trying the
case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment provided for by this section shall be
without prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or other sanction authorized under these Rules.

If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction in
granting the prosecution’s motion for the resetting of the trial over the petitioner’s objections, the
more appropriate remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for
mandamus to compel the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule for trial Commented [IO43]: Appropriate remedy.

and termination of the case.

It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corpus assailing the trial court’s
order denying his motion to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the timeline provided for by
the said Rules. Reading and evaluating the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 18,
2000, it cannot be gainsaid that the court violated the right of the petitioner to speedy trial. Thus:

The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce the right of the accused
to speedy trial. In invoking such right, the accused contends that the failure of the prosecution to
present the medico-legal officer who examined the victim on two (2) occasions, and the non-
appearance of the private prosecutor on one occasion caused undue delay in the proceedings of this
case.

The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that since the prosecution has
not yet rested its case, the Court may not be able to appreciate the merits of the instant motion in
the light of the unfinished presentation of evidence for the prosecution and that the grounds relied by
the defense do not touch on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, but rather on the alleged delay and failure to present Dr. Jose
Arnel Marquez of the PNP Crime Laboratory.

After due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion untenable.l^vvphi1.net The alleged delay
and failure to present the medico-legal officer cannot be attributed to the fault of the prosecution
and/or the Court. The prosecution and the Court cannot encroach on the right of the medico-legal
officer to appear inasmuch as his schedule conflicted with the hearings set for his appearance.
Moreover, delays assailed by defense counsel that violated accused’ right to speedy trial are not all at

26
the instance of the prosecution. In fact, the defense, contributed to the delay since the former
defense counsel and even the present defense counsel sought postponements of the hearings.

Be that as it may, despite the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer, the Court (Branch 169)
proceeded in resolving the Petition for Bail of the accused (albeit unfavorable to the cause of the
accused) on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant, which is backed up by several
jurisprudence to this effect. The defense, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said denial after he
has filed a Motion to Dismiss. The filing of these pleadings adds to the delay until the Presiding Judge
who denied the Petition for Bail voluntarily inhibited himself from this case. Then when the Motion to
Dismiss was set for hearing, the Court, in an attempt to expedite the proceedings, suggested for the
parties to stipulate on the medical findings of the medico-legal officer so as to dispense with his
presentation. Defense counsel, however, would not want to enter into such a stipulation. Hence,
another delay.48

We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be filed if
one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the
1987 Constitution and of his right to due process.49 However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial
court his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he invoked was his
right to a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. He invoked his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, for the first time, only in the
Court of Appeals when he filed his petition for habeas corpus. Commented [IO44]:

Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v. Sandiganbayan,50 the Court had the occasion to
state –

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him Commented [IO45]: Speedy disposition of the case.

for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts
to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a
speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not
mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to
be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in
mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for Commented [IO46]: Factors to consider before invoking right
to speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial.
the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice
should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to
protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of
the accused to trial; and to limit the Possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,

27
hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to
public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to
carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts,
diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall deprive the
State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States,
for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things:
(a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For
instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should
be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to
gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand,
the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against
the State.

In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002. In the meantime, he was able to
present only two witnesses. The petitioner failed to terminate the cross-examination of the private
complainant by the year 2002. The Court cannot determine the reason for the delay because the
records of the RTC are not before it. Neither of the parties made any explanation for the delay; nor is
there any showing that the counsel of the petitioner complained about the delay. Aside from the
petitioner’s claim that the private prosecutor failed to give good cause for his failure to present Dr.
Jose Arnel Marquez during the trial dates April 30, 2003 and June 19, 2003, as well as to substantiate
his absence during the trial of March 6, 2003 with a medical certificate, the petitioner failed to
support his claim in his pleadings before the CA and in this Court. On the other hand, the counsel of
the petitioner was absent during the trial on April 30, 2003 because he had to attend an execution
sale in Cavite. The petitioner’s counsel gave priority to the execution sale and asked for a resetting
despite the fact that his client, the petitioner, was detained for a quasi-heinous crime. While it is true
that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003, or more than one month from April 30, 2003, the
petitioner’s counsel himself manifested that he was available for trial during the first half of June
2003. There was a difference of only four (4) days from the trial date set by the court and the
available dates suggested by the petitioner’s counsel. It bears stressing that trial dates cannot be set
solely at the convenience of the petitioner’s counsel. The trial dates available in the calendar of the
court and of the prosecutor must also be taken into account.1ªvvphi1.nét

Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit a medical certificate for his absence
during the trial of March 6, 2003. The petitioner could have asked the court to cite the private
prosecutor in contempt of court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to do so.
Moreover, the petitioner failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay of the trial, and that
the State deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. Commented [IO47]: Petition for Certiorari for the nullification
of the resolution of CA denying his petition for writ of habeas
corpus and motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

28
1Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Elvi
John S. Asuncion, concurring.

2 Criminal Case No. 25756-MN.

24 People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004.

25 Gaster v. State ex rel. Whitcher, 94 N.W. 787 (1903).

26 46 F. Supp. 663 (1942).

27 Click v. Click, 127 S.E. 194, citing Ex Parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556.

28 Burton v. Smithers, 31 F. 2d 966 (1929).

29 U.S. v. Pridgeon, 38 L. Ed. 627; Ex Parte Kearsey 38 L. Ed. 391.

30 Jones v. Perkins, 62 L. Ed. 1 (1918).

31 Johnson v. Zerbst, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938).

32 39 CJS, Habeas Corpus, §15, p. 448.

33 Sismon v. Georgia Iron and Coal Company, 43 SE, 78 (1903).

34 Brado v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 35 L. Ed. 443 (1973).

35 39 Am. Jur., Habeas Corpus, 86, p. 208.

36 Click v. Click, supra.

37 Bailey, Habeas Corpus, par. 2, p. 6.

38 Ex parte Billings, supra.

39 Caison v. Landon, 96 L. Ed. 547 (1952).

40 Gaster v. Whitcher, supra.

41Sec. 7, Rule 114 reads: Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.— No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

42 237 SCRA 685 (1994).

43 Id. at 713-714, citing Enrile v. Salazar, etc., et al., 186 SCRA 217 (1990).
44 People v. Gomez, 325 SCRA 61 (2000).
45 See Goodman v. De la Victoria, 325 SCRA 658 (2000).

46A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

47 People v. Kho, 357 SCRA 290 (2001).

48 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

29
49Bernarte v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 323 (1996); Olaguer v. Military Commission, 250 SCRA 144
(1987).

50 G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,

vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April
9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order
for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith,
petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate,
and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by
petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money
claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section
7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification
against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money
claim was not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money
claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to
pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to
contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?2

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring
a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment
of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court
30
provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory
manner.

The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this
Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings;
but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing
ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in
ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically Commented [IO48]: Applicability of rules in ordinary actions.

say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of
filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings,
thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's
contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping? Commented [IO49]: Main issue

The Court rules in the affirmative. Commented [IO50]: The RTC is in error. The petition should
not been dismissed.

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent
is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon Commented [IO51]: Contingent money claim is not an
iniatiatory pleading.
the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having
money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.5

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to
be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.
In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,6the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion
is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a
cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.7(Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's
estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action
31
for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial court has
jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a
lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of
separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees
within a reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action
for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against
the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de

Macatangay10 is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said
rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays
likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to
appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by
mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that
the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed,
unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to
and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The
exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11
itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and
filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit
of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion
and liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done
personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not
be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where
the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable
time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have
been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may", signifying
permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider
the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an
32
orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be
relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)1âwphi1

In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia’s
counsel’s is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done
personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been
allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for
respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court
should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is
indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court
of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done
personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under
Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial
justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the
benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was
further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we
held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain
and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order
to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a
written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
Commented [IO52]: Petition for review for Certiorari seeking
for the reversal of the Oder of RTC dismissing money claim on the
ground of no certificate of forum shopping.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
33
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Presiding Judge Valerio M. Salazar, rollo, pp. 35 and 40.

2 Rollo, pp. 12-13

3 Rules of Court, Rule 41, Sec. 2(c).

Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. –

xxxx

(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal
shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.

4 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 1780

5 Rules of Court, Rule 86, Sec. 5.

Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, bated; exceptions. – All claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice; otherwise, they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claims

34
had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
or contingent, may be approved at the present value.

6 G.R. No. 160479, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 753.

7 Id. at 762-763.

8 G.R. No. 120575, December 16, 1998, 300 SCRA 214.

9 Pascual v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8, at 228-229.

10 G.R. No. 164947, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 415.

11 Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay, supra note 10, at 423-425.

12 Medina v. Court of Appeals, No. L-34760, September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 206.
13 Medina v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 215.
14 G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 228.

15 Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez, id. at 240-241.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21725 November 29, 1968

AURELIO ARCILLAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
MODESTA ALFARO, GERONIMO ARCILLAS and VICENTE ARCILLAS, respondents.

Antonio J. Calvento for petitioner.

T. de los Santos for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on November 12 and 16, 1962, respectively,
are two separate petitions having direct and special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part of the estate of the late
Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate on March 8, 1958 in the City of Zamboanga.

In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased, sought the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the names of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the petition. It
was claimed that at various dates after the death of the deceased, several transactions affecting Lot
No. 276 transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of their respective shares and
participation in Lot No. 276 executed by four (4) other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir
Vicente Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas
argued that the proportion of each heir's participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a
new certificate of title. But before any other material pleading could be filed with respect to this
petition, five (5) other children of the deceased filed the November 16 petition aforementioned. This
later petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for the issuance of letters of

35
administration in favor of herein petitioner preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's
estate. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this later petition, insofar as pertinent to this case, read:

3. That the deceased left an estate consisting of real property in Zamboanga City with a probable
value of not less than SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency;

4. That as far as petitioners know, the deceased left no debts remaining unpaid;

In the meantime, on November 23, 1962 herein petitioner filed his opposition to the November 12
petition on the ground that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 — the subject matter thereof — was included in
the estate of the deceased for which a petition for administration had actually been filed and was
awaiting resolution, that petition (the one dated November 12) should be held in abeyance until after
Special Proceeding No. 632 was closed and terminated. Recognizing then the merit of petitioner's
ground, respondent Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963 temporarily holding in abeyance
resolution of the November 12 petition until the termination of the intestate proceedings.

Meanwhile, in his answer to the November 16 petition (Sp. Proc. No. 632) Geronimo Arcillas, this
time joined by Vicente Arcillas and the widow Modesta Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of
administration to herein petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left
by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was improper.
However petitioner, in his reply on January 18, 1963, insisted that there were still other properties of
the estate of the deceased besides Lot No. 276; he likewise took issue with respondents' view that
administration proceedings could be dispensed with asserting, firstly, that there was no unanimity
among the heirs for extrajudicial partition and, secondly, that some of the heirs had been unduly
deprived of their participation in the estate.

On March 8, 1963 respondent court denied the November 16 petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and at the same time gave due course to the November 12 petition. Reasoned the
court: "... to obviate the necessity of spending uselessly which would only deplete the funds of the
estate; to avoid unnecessary delay in the partition of the property involved herein, and following the
doctrines established by the Honorable Supreme Court in several cases of the same nature, which is
in consonance with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the court is of the
opinion that the herein petition (should) be denied and (holds that) the cadastral motion of the
oppositor Geronimo Arcillas covering the same property is the most expedient and proper action."

Unable to have this order reconsidered petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with
mandamus and preliminary injunction. On December 2, 1963, upon filing by petitioner of the required
bond, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with the
hearing of the "cadastral motion" dated November 12, 1962.

The issues to be determined are whether respondent Judge acted properly (1) in dismissing the
administration proceedings under the authority of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon
averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of
age and (2) in maintaining that the "cadastral motion" brought under the provision of section 112 of
the Land Registration Act was the more proper proceeding under the circumstances. Commented [IO53]: issues

Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the proposition
that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum requirements of the aforementioned section
obtain, i.e. the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that
there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an
administrator for the settlement of the estate for the reason that it is superfluous and unnecessary.
In other words, respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the heirs so
long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age.

36
We cannot entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention in the past, we had occasion
to explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92 Phil. 273:

... section I does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate Commented [IO54]: the law says heirs are allowed to divide
without securing letters of administration but does not preclude
has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of them from instituting the same.
partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit,
or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good
reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be
gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of
the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in
character. Note that the word may its used not only once but in the whole section which indicates an
intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.

Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less expensive
modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the
heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under section 1 of Rule 74
of the Rules of Court merely on the ground that the expenses usually common in administration
proceedings may deplete the funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses
incurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by
the heirs themselves so that they may not in the future be heard to complain of these matters.
Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to the alleged existence of other properties of
the deceased aside from the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in administration
proceedings rather than in any other action.

Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the "cadastral" motion, supposedly brought under
the authority of section 112 of Act 496, cannot be sustained. While this section authorizes, among
others, a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate
of title "upon the ground that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate have terminated and ceased," and apparently the November 12 petition
comes within its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or
there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case
becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the
incident properly belongs (see Puguid v. Reyes, L-21311, August 10, 1967 and the cases cited
therein). In the instant case the obvious lack of unanimity among the parties in interest, manifestly
demonstrated by petitioners' express objection to the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244, sufficiently
removes the November 12 petition from the scope of section 112 of Act 496. Besides, the
proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act are summary in nature and hence inadequate for
the litigation of issues which properly pertain to the case where the incident belongs.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the appealed orders and Commented [IO55]: Denying petition for the issuance of
letters of administration.
directing respondent Judge or whoever is presiding the court below to reinstate Special Proceedings
Commented [IO56]: Administration proceedings.
No. 632; the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued enjoining respondent Judge from
proceeding with the hearing of the "cadastral" motion dated November 12, 1962 is hereby made
permanent. Costs against respondents, except respondent Judge.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

37
G.R. No. L-23758 May 20, 1968

MAXIMINA OYOD DE GARCES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ESMERALDA BROCE, ET AL., defendants,
ESMERALDA BROCE, defendant-appellant.

Nick V. Garces for plaintiffs-appellants.

Parana and Diola for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal instituted by both parties in Civil Case No. 137 (6780) of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, from the decision rendered therein, dismissing the complaint in said case; declaring as
valid the sale to defendant Esmeralda Broce, by the heirs of Fortunata Oyod, of a portion of Lot No.
228 of the San Carlos Cadastre and referred to as Lot No. 228-D; and ordering therein defendant
Esmeralda Broce to pay to plaintiffs the sum of P780.00 with legal interest thereon, from the date of
the promulgation of the decision until its full payment.

The following facts are not in dispute:

In a complaint filed on September 19, 1962 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (which
was later amended), Maximina Oyod de Garces, Gregorio Oyod and Pio V. Garces sought the
termination of a lease and annulment of sale, in favor of defendants Tranquilino Broce and Esmeralda
Broce, and the return by the latter, of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 228-D of the subdivision
of Lot No. 228 of the Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Negros Occidental, with an area of 354,250
square meters more or less, that plaintiffs claimed to be their propertypro-indiviso.1ªvvphi1.nêt

At the pre-trial hearing of the case, the parties stipulated on the following:

1. That the original owners of Lot No. 228 were Severo Oyod and Bonifacia Mahinay and their
ownership is evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 23777 of the Registry of Deeds of Negros
Occidental.

2. That the said registered owners had four children namely — Fortunata, Eugenia, Gregorio and
Maxima Oyod.

3. That Eugenia died sometime in 1950 after the death of Severo Oyod; that Maxima Oyod is married
to Pio V. Garces; and that Fortunate Oyod, married Pedro Barbon and their children are Melecia,
Narciso, Leopoldo, Carlos, Margarita, Leonardo, Lilia and Ildefonso Barbon.

4. That in 1930 the heirs of Severo Oyod executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial partition which is
document 888, page 12, book 7, series of 1930 of Notary Public Victorino G. Apuhin (pp. 101 to 105
of record).

5. That on September 5, 1951 the heirs of Severo Oyod executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement
which is document 457, page 93, book 2, series of 1951 of Notary Public Filomeno T. Enriquez (pp.
77 to 78 of the record).

6. That Fortunata Oyod executed a lease agreement in favor of Tranquilino Broce on October 28,
1957 (Document 284, page 39, book 9, series of 1957 of Notary Public Apuhin, pp. 77 to 78 of the
Record).

7. That on September 25, 1962, the heirs of Fortunata Oyod Barbon executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement and Sale in favor of Esmeralda P. Broce which is document 188, page 92, book 1, series
of 1962 of Notary Public Roque Agravante (pp. 109 to 111 of the record).

8. That the questions before this Court are as follows:

38
(a) Which should prevail, the Extra-Judicial Settlement of 1930 or that of 1951?

(b) If the 1930 Extra-Judicial Settlement is upheld, then the buyer Esmeralda Broce bought on
September 25, 1962, Lot No. 228-D, is described in the 1930 document.

(c) If the 1951 Extra-Judicial Settlement is upheld, then Fortunata Oyod owned an undivided share in
Lot No. 288; and what Esmeralda Broce acquired in 1962 is not Lot No. 228-D specifically, but an
undivided share of ¼ in Lot 228.

After due hearing, the court rendered judgment on July 11, 1964, upholding the due execution and
validity of the 1930 extrajudicial partition by the heirs of Severo Oyod and Bonifacia Mahinay of Lot
No. 228, and of the sale in 1962 to Esmeralda Broce of Lot No. 228-D by the heirs of Fortunata Oyod.
And, finding that the heirs of the deceased Severo Oyod contracted an obligation with the Philippine
National Bank prior to the sale of Lot No. 228-D, to pay the outstanding taxes on the entire Lot 228,
the court ruled that lien was thus created and attached to the land. Esmeralda Broce was then
ordered to pay to plaintiffs the sum of P780.00 or 1/5 of the said obligation, as share of Lot 228-D.

Both parties appealed; plaintiffs excepting from the ruling that sustains the validity of the
extrajudicial partition of 1930 and the order to Esmeralda Broce to pay only the sum of P780.00
instead of P2,392.00; whereas, defendant Esmeralda Broce prays for her total exculpation from any
liability.

It is evident from the issues formulated and litigated in the court below, which are again being raised
in this appeal by the plaintiffs-appellants, that the controversy lies on the effect of the execution of
the extrajudicial partition in 1951, which was duly recorded in the Registry of Deeds, upon the 1930 Commented [IO57]: Registered.

agreement which, although embodied in a public instrument, was admittedly not registered.1 For, if Commented [IO58]: Not registered.
there was a valid partition of Lot No. 228 (one of the properties included in the 1930 agreement) and
ownership of the portions respectively assigned to the heirs thereunder had indeed passed to the
latter, then the sale of Lot No. 228-D to Esmeralda Broce in 1962 would also be valid. Upon the other
hand, if there was proper cancellation and substitution of that 1930 settlement, by the extrajudicial Commented [IO59]: Cancelled by 1951

partition of 1951, wherein the heirs agreed to form a co-ownership of the whole Lot 228, then what
could be acquired by defendant-appellee Esmeralda Broce would only be an undetermined ¼ share
of the same lot.

The issue — of the effect of an unregistered extrajudicial settlement2 among the heirs of the estate
of a deceased person — is not new. It was previously resolved by this Court in favor of the validity of
the partition in the case of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, in this wise:

Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition? In other words, is writing
the act that confers legal validity upon the agreement? There are no indications in the phraseology of
this rule which justify an affirmative answer to these questions. It must be noted that where the law
intends a writing or other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity of the transaction, it
says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as originally enacted in England
and as enacted in some of the states, uses the words "utterly void" with reference to certain
transactions. Under the terms of such statute transactions required to be in writing are absolutely
void and not merely voidable if not made in the manner indicated. Again article 633 of the Civil Code
says that donation may be valid only when made in a public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage
Law makes known its intention to have the execution of a public instrument and its registration in the
registry indispensable to the validity of the contract by using this phrase: "in order that voluntary
mortgages may be legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for
the same purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a public document: "in order
that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with respect to the formalities of last wills and
testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be valid to pass
upon any estate real or personal nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written etc." Other
examples might be mentioned.

Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public instrument
is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between
39
the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a
partition as between the parties dependent on the execution of a public instrument and its
registration.... (78 Phil. 204-205).

Touching on the purpose of the registration-requirement in the said provision, this Court ruled in the
same case:

The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion, for
its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must Commented [IO60]: Constructive notice and notice to others.

follow that the intrinsic validity of a partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not
come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of the creditors are not
affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into
an agreement for distrubution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
(Cas. cit., pp. 208-209).

There is nothing here on record to indicate that when the first partition agreement was entered into,
there existed any claim against the estate of the deceased or that prejudice was thereby caused to
any third party. Considering that a voluntary division of the estate of the deceased, by the heirs
among themselves, is conclusive3 and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the respective
portions assigned to them,4 the extrajudicial partition made by the heirs of Severo Oyod in 1930
could not have been cancelled or subtituted by the execution, by some of these heirs, of another
extrajudicial settlement of the same estate in 1951 even if the latter document be registered,
particularly since one of the co-signers of the 1930 agreement, Eugenia Oyod, had died on January 8, Commented [IO61]: 1930 cannot be cancelled by 1951

1950, (Exh. D) before the second extrajudicial settlement was made. The lower court, therefore,
committed no error in holding that the sale to defendant-appellee Esmeralda Broce of Lot 228-D in
1962 did not suffer from any infirmity.

A second reason is that it is not shown that appellee Broce had notice or knowledge of the second
partition of 1951. As the 1930 partition was operative to vest title in Fortunata Oyod to the lot
allotted to her, even if the agreement was unrecorded, Broce had reason to rely thereon.

However, there is no basis to the lower court's order to defendant-appellant, Esmeralda Broce, to
assume a proportionate share of the indebtedness contracted by the surviving heirs of the deceased
Severo Oyod with the Philippine National Bank. The fact alone that the property in dispute originally
formed part of the estate of said deceased person and that the obligation was contracted prior to its
purchase by herein
defendant-appellant, to pay the taxes due on the estate of the deceased, does not render the vendee
answerable therefor. As pronounced by this Court in the case of Habaña vs. Imbo, supra, if there is
really need to sell properties belonging to an heir to pay the debts of the estate, there should first be
exhaustion of other properties still owned by the said heir. In the present case, there is no proof that
the heirs of Fortunata Oyod received from the estate of Severo Oyod no property other than Lot 228-
D. Furthermore, it does not even appear that this obligation to the Philippine National Bank was duly
constituted as an encumbrance on the whole Lot 228. As mere vendee of Lot 228-D, defendant-
appellant cannot be required to share in the payment of an obligation contracted by the heirs of the
estate, of which she is not one.

WHEREFORE, as above modified, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against Commented [IO62]: Dismissing the complaint and declaring
validity of sale.
plaintiffs-appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

40
1By the 1951 agreement, the heirs (except Eugenia Oyod) agreed to hold the properties pro-indiviso,
while in the 1930 settlement, the heirs allocated to each a specific portion of the properties left by
their common ancestor.

2Under Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may divide the estate of a deceased
person among themselves as they see fit "by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds".

3Leaño vs. Leaño, 25 Phil. 180, 184.

4Habaña vs. Imbo, L-15598 & L-15726, March 3l, 1964; Art. 1068, Civil Code of 1889.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-47475 May 6, 1942

DONATO LAJOM, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSE P. VIOLA, RAFAEL VIOLA, and SILVIO VIOLA, defendants-appellees.

Simeon P. Mangaliman for appellant.

Adolfo A. Scheerer for appellees.

BOCOBO, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, sustaining the
defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint and dismissing the case. On March 17,
1939, the plaintiff-appellant, Donato Lajom, filed a complaint, which amended on May 16, 1939,
praying, among other things, that he be declared a natural child of the late Dr. Maximo Viola and
therefore a co-heir of the defendand-appellees, Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola, and Silvio Viola, legitimate
children of said Dr. Maximo Viola; and that after collation, payment of debts and accounting of fruits,
a new partition be ordered, adjudicating one-seventh of the estate to the plaintiff and two-sevenths
to each of the defendants. Among the allegations of the complaint are the following:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledged by his father, the
late Dr. Maximo Viola, begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom and born in 1882 when both,
Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and could have contracted marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

4. That from early childhood until before the year 1889, and even thereafter, the plaintiff had been
living with his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola, and had been enjoying the status of a son, not only
within the family circle but also publicly, on account of the acts of his said father;

xxx xxx xxx

6. That a testate proceeding was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, covering the
estate left by the said Dr. Maximo Viola, registered as civil case No. 4741 of said Court; and this

41
special proceedings was already closed on March 17, 1937, as can be seen in a copy of the order of
said Court, hereto attached, marked as Annex D, and is being made an integral part hereof;

7. That the plaintiff did not intervene during the pendency of the special proceeding above
mentioned, as he expected that his brothers, the herein defendants, would disclose and tell the truth
to the Court that they have a natural brother whom they knew to be living, and whose address was
well known to them; a brother who should also participate in the estate of their deceased father; and
besides, the herein defendants promised to the herein plaintiff that they would give him his lawful
share in the estate of their father;

8. That the herein defendants willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed the truth from the
Court that they have a natural brother who should also participate in the estate of their deceased
father, with the single and avowed intention to deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein
plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question;

9. That the herein defendants partitioned among themselves the estate in question, as can be seen in
their "Convenio de Patricion y Adjudicacion," dated October 25, 1935, a copy of which is hereto
attached, marked as Annex E, and is made an intergral part hereof, and since then up to the present
time, each of the herein defendants has been occupying, possessing and enjoying his corresponding
share, in accordance with the said "Convenio de Particion y Adjudicacion"; while the properties
alleged to be paraphernal properties of the late Juana Roura in said "Convenio de Particion y
Adjudicacion" are not paraphernal but conjugal properties of the late spouses, Dr. Maximo Viola and
Doña Juana Roura, acquired during their martial life;

xxx xxx xxx

18. That the plaintiff had demanded of the defendants that they give to him his lawful participation of
the estate in question, as well as of the products therefrom, in order not only to comply with their
promise but also in order to comply with the law; but the herein defendants have failed to give to the
herein plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in questions, nor of the products or fruits therefrom; and
the said defendants continue to fail to give to him his legal portion of the said estate and the fruits or
products therefrom, of which the plaintiff is entitled to one-seventh (1/7) while each of the three
defendants is entitled to two-sevenths (2/7) of the same.

By an order dated July 31, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sustained the defendants'
demurrer and dismissed the case. The Court held that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action because its allegation called for the exercise of the probate jurisdiction of Commented [IO63]: Case was dismissed on the ground that
the case should be in probate jurisdiction.
the court and consequently did not constitute a cause of action in an ordinary civil case like the
present. It was further held that the court had no jurisdiction because there was no allegation that
the late Dr. Maximo Viola was, at the time of his death, a resident of Nueva Ecija; on the contrary,
the complaint showed that the will of the deceased had already been probated in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan and that court having first taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate, the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija could no longer assume jurisdiction over the same case.

The two grounds for sustaining the demurrer to the complaint will now be discussed.

First, as to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The complaint alleges that
the plaintiff and one of the defendants, Jose P. Viola, are residents of Nueva Ecija; and from the
complaint it appears that 16 of the parcels of land belonging to the estate are situated in the
Province of Nueva Ecija, while 3 lots are in the Province of Isabela, 1 in the City of Baguio, 6 in
Manila, and the rest (46 parcels) are found in the Province of Bulacan. Paragraphs 7, 8, and 18 of the
complaint allege a violation of contract, a breach of trust, and therefore the case may be instituted in
the Province of Nueva Ecija. Paragraph 7 alleges "the herein defendants promised to the herein
plaintiff that they would give him his lawful share in the estate of their father." Paragraph 8 states
that "the herein defendants willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed from the Court the truth
that they have a natural brother who should participate in the estate of their deceased father, with
the single and avowed intention to deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his
lawful participation in the estate in question." And paragraph 18 asserts that "the plaintiff herein had
42
demanded of the defendants that they give to him his lawful participation of the estate question, as
of the products therefrom, in order not only to comply with their promise but also in order to comply
with the law; but the herein defendants have failed to give the herein plaintiff his lawful share of the
estate in question." These allegations clearly denounce a breach of trust which, if proved at the trial,
the courts could not for a moment countenance. Regardless of any legal title to the plaintiff's share,
declared by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in favor of the defendants in the testate
proceedings, high considerations of equity vehemently demand that the defendants shall not take
advantage of such legal title, obtained by them through a betrayal of confidence placed in them by
the plaintiff. So far as plaintiff's share in the inheritance is concerned, the defendants are trustees for
the plaintiff, who may bring an action in Nueva Ecija for breach of trust. (Sec. 337, Act No. 190, and
sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.) If this promise should be shown by proper evidence, its
enforcement would not necessitate the revision or reconsideration of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan approving the partition, because leaving that court order as it is the trust can
and should be carried out through conveyance to the plaintiff of his share, by the defendants out of
their respective participations in virtue of the partition.

The case of Severino vs. Severino (44 Phil. 343 [year 1923]) has declared certain principles that may
be applied in the case at bar. In that case, the defendant Guillermo Severino, who was agent of
Melecio Severino, had obtained a Torrens title in his own name to four parcels of land belonging to
the principal. More than one year having elapsed since the entry of the final decree adjudicating the
lands to the defendant, the question was whether the defendant could be compelled to convey the
lands to the estate of the deceased principal, Melecio Severino. This Court maintained the affirmative
holding in part:

In the case of Felix vs. Patrick (145 U. S. 317), the United States Supreme Court, after examining the
authorities, said:

"The substance of these authorities is that, wherever a person obtains the legal title to land by any
artifice or concealment, or by making use of facilities intended for the benefit of another a court of
equity will impress upon the land so held by him a trust in favor of the party who is justly entitled to
them and will order the trust executed by decreeing their conveyance to the party in whose favor the
trust was created." (Citing Bank of Metropolis vs. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. 19, 31; Moses vs. Murgatroyd,
1 Johns, Ch. 119; Cumberland vs. Codrington, 3 Johns, Ch. 229, 261; Neilson vs. Blight, 1 Johns.
Cas. 205; Weston vs. Barker, 12 Johns. 276.)

The same doctrine had also been adopted in the Philippines. In the case of Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan
Ling (19 Phil. 202), the facts are stated by the court as follows:

"From the facts proven at the trial it appears that a number of Chinese merchants raised a fund by
voluntary subscription with which they purchased a valuable tract of land and erected a large building
to be used as a sort of clubhouse for the mutual benefit of the subscribers to the fund. The
subscribers organized themselves into an irregular association, which had no regular articles of
association, and was not incorporated or registered in the commercial registry or elsewhere. The
association not having any existence as a legal entity, it was agreed to have the title to the property
placed in the name of one of the members, the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, who on his part accepted
the trust, and agreed to hold the property as the agent of the members of the association. After the
club building was completed with the funds of the members of the association, Cho Jan Ling collected
some P25,000 in rents for which he failed and refused to account, and upon proceedings being
instituted to compel him to do so, he set up title in himself to the club property as well as to the rents
accruing therefrom, falsely alleging that he had bought the real estate and constructed the building
with his own funds, and denying the claims of the members of the association that it was their fund
which had been used for that purposes."

The decree of the court provided, among other things, for the conveyance of the clubhouse and the
land on which it stood from the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, in whose name it was registered, to the
members of the association. In affirming the decree this court said:

43
"In the case at bar the legal title of the holder of the registered title is not questioned; it is admitted
that the members of the association voluntarily obtained the inscription in the name of Cho Jan Ling,
and that they had no right to have that inscription cancelled; they do not seek such cancellation, and
on the contrary they allege and prove that the duly registered legal title to the property is in Cho Jan
Ling, but they maitain, and we think that they rightly maintain, that he holds it under an obligation,
both express an implied, to deal with it exclusively for the benefit of the members of the association,
and subject to their will."

Torrens titles being based on judicial decrees there is, of course, a strong presumption in favor of
their regularity or validity, and in order to maintain an action such as the present the proof as to the
fiduciary relation of the parties and of the breach of trust must be clear and convincing. Such proof
is, as we have seen, not lacking in his case.

But once the relation and the breach of trust on the part of the fiduciary is thus established, there is
no reason, neither practical nor legal, why he should not be compelled to make such reparation as
may lie within his power for the injury caused by his wrong, and as long as the land stands registered
in the name of the party who is guilty of the breach of trust and no rights of innocent third parties
are adversely affected, there can be no reason why such reparation should not, in the proper case,
take the form of a conveyance or transfer of the title to the cestui que trust. No reasons of public
policy demand that a person guilty of fraud or breach of trust be permitted to use his certificate of
title as a shield against the consequences of his own wrong.

In the present case, the defendants partitioned the estate among themselves in the administration
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Even granting that the partition was
binding against the whole world (though it will be shown later that it was not), nevertheless it could
not have a more puissant finality than a decree of title under the Torrens system. Upon the authority
of the Severino vs. Severino, the legal title obtained by the defendants to the plaintiff's share in the
estate, in the partition approved by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, must yield to the superior
and inviolate rights equity of the plaintiff, who abstained from taking part in that partition because of
the promise made to him by the defendants that they would deliver to him lawful share as an
acknowledged natural child. Commented [IO64]: Ruling

A posssible objection to the promise of the defendants to give the plaintiff his share in the estate as
an acknowledged natural child is that such agreement may run counter to article 1814, Civil Code,
which reads: "No se puede transigir sobre el estado civil de las personas, ni sobre las cuestiones
matrimoniales, ni sobre alimentos futuros" (There can be no compromise over the civil status of
persons, or over matrimonial questions, or over future support). However, it does not appear from
the complaint that the defendants ever impugned or denied the plaintiff's status as an acknowledged
natural child; on the contrary, according to the complaint, the defendants admitted such status by
promising to give the plaintiff his lawful share in the estate of the father. There having been, in
accordance with the allegations in the complaint, no controversy over the condition of the plaintiff as
acknowledged natural child, the agreement between the plaintiff and defendants alleged in par. 7 of
the complaint, if shown at the trial, is not a compromise at all, and is not frowned upon by the
legislator in article 1814 of the Civil Code.

Furthermore, article 1965 of the Civil Code, which has been held by this court to be still in force, in
spite of secs. 43 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857 872-3)
provides as follows: "No prescribe, entre coheredores, condueños o propietarios de fincas colindantes
la accion para pedir la particion de la herencia, la division de la cosa cumon o el deslinde de las
propiedades contiguas." (Among coheirs, co-owners or proprietors of adjoining lands, the action to
ask for the partition of the inheritance, the division of the thing owned in common or the fixing of
boundaries of adjoining lands, does not prescribe.) The defendants having, according to the
complaint, promised to give the plaintiff his share in the inheritance, his right to demand partition of
the inheritance does not prescribe, in view of said article 1965.

In the case of Bargayo vs. Camumot, just cited, the defendant, Jorge Camumot, an uncle of the
plaintiffs, had been in possession for many years, of the whole estate in question, which had

44
belonged to the deceased grandfather of the plaintiffs and father of the defendant. This court held
that the defendant had not acquired the property by prescription under section 41 of the Code of
Civil Procedure because his possession had not been hostile and adverse, and that therefore, the
plaintiffs should be awarded one half of the estate This court said:

Taking the evidence together, it does not appear that the defendant's act upon the land had been of
real ouster, i e., that if among strangers said acts may be sufficient to characterize his possession as
adverse, such is not the case in the present suit wherein we are dealing with prescription among
coheirs. For it appears that when called upon by the plaintiffs to bring about the partition, the
defendant did not deny that the plaintiffs had any right to share in the inheritance. When Basilio
Bargayo was asked why they did not institute this action before, he replied that it was because they
considered the defendant as their father, since he was their uncle, and they expected him to give
them their respective shares of the inheritance, and that when they first asked him to make the
partition, he (defendant) asked them a postponement, saying that they should leave him the in the
possession of the land in order to compensate himself from what he has spent for their grandfather
when the latter was, and died, under his (defendant's) care. All of these show in some way that
defendant's possession was not adverse, i. e., hostile or repugnant to the plaintiff's right. The same
witness, who is once of the plaintiffs, only says that whenever they would ask him for the partition,
the defendant did not pay any attention to them, i. e., he limited himself in laying aside the fullfiment
of the partition, a conduct which can be explained in various ways. And it is probable that said
conduct was simply tolerated by the plaintiffs on account of his being their uncle, and they never
thought that by said conduct the defendant inheritance, not that the defendant would have so
intended. In any way dealing as we do here with the acquisition of a thing by prescription, the
evidence must be so clear and conclusive as to established said prescription without any shadow of
doubt. This does not happen in the instant case, for the defendant did not even try to proven that he
has expressly or impliedly refused plaintiff's right over an aliquot part of the inheritance.

But regardless of the defendants' under taking referred to, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
had jurisdiction over the case because the complaint contains allegations which, if shown at the trial,
would be sufficient to support and warrant an action for reivindiction of his right as a co-owner of the
sixteen parcels of land situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija. From the moment of the death of the
late Dr. Maximo Viola on September 3, 1933, succession was opened (art. 657, Civil Code.) The
possession of his whole estate was transmitted to all his heirs (including the plaintiff) without
interruption and from the moment of his death. (Article 440, Civil Code.) The plaintiff's dominion over
his share of the estate was therefore automically and by operation of law vested in him upon the
death of his natural father, subject of course to the lien of the creditors of the decedent. This being
true it is difficult to ignore the right of the plaintiff to recover his charge in the lands in Nueva Ecija,
(the debts of the estate having been adjusted before the partition approved by the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan) by an action of reivindication because of the defendant's refusal to deliver said
share to him.

In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil. 855, 869), this court held:

The law in force in the Philippine Islands regarding the distribution of estates of deceased persons is
to be found in section 753 et seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure. In general terms the law is that
after the payment of the debts and expenses of administration the court shall distribute the residue
of the estate among the persons who are entitled to receive it, whether by the terms of the will or by
operation of law. It will be noted that while the law (sec. 754) provides that the order of distribution
may be had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The
proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is every vague
and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice
by personal service or by publication, by which the court undertake to distribute the property of
deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.

Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that ten years actual adverse possession by
"occupancy grant, descent, or otherwise" shall vest title in the possessor. This would indicate that a

45
decree of distribution under which one may be placed in possession of land acquired by descent, is
not in itself conclusive, and that, as held in Layre vs. Pasco (5 Rob [La.], 9), the action of
revindication may be brought by the heir against the persons put in possession by decree of the
probate court at any time within a period allowed by the general statute of limitations.

In the case just cited, this court upheld two propositions: (1) that a judicial partition in probate
proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto; and (2) that in such cases, the
heir who has been deprived of his share in the estate may bring an action for reivindication with the
prescriptive period against the persons put in possession by the probate court.

Upon the first point, the following quotation from Corpus Juris (vol. 47, pp. 434 and 435) would seem
to be pertinent:

Sec. 417. Persons concluded — A judgment in partition is conclusive upon all persons having any
interest who were made parties to the proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

Persons not parties — The general rule is that persons not parties to the action or suit are not bound
by the decree or judgment for partition and their rights cannot be adjudicated; but such a decree is
not invalid as between the parties thereto, although it has been considered as erroneous. Among the
persons held not to have been concluded by the decree or judgment, by reason of not having been
made parties, are, besides owners of an undivided in the property, persons having a contigent
remainder therein, a widow with a dower right, creditors having a lien on the property, and a person
who had attached, on mesne process, the interest of one of the tenants in common.

In Rodriguez vs. De la Cruz (8 Phil., 665, 667), this court said:

With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
for the reason that the said Matea E. Rodriguez had not been made a party in the action for partition
between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de la Cruz, interest in said lands was in no way
prejudiced by the decision of the court in that cause.

But, it may be said, the plaintiff knew of the probate proceedings in the Province of Bulacan, and is
therefore bound thereby. However, it is alleged in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer, that
he did not appear in those proceedings because of the defendant's promise to give him his share.

On the second point, that is to say, that the aggrieved coheir may bring an action for reivindication
within the prescriptive period, this court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur properly applied section 41
of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding acquisitive prescription after ten years of adverse possession
by "occupancy, grant, descent or otherwise." In order words, that even after a decree of distribution,
an action for recovery may be brought by the excluded heir within ten years.

In Layre vs. Pasco (5 Rob. [La.] 9), cited by this court in Ramirez vs. Gmur, it was held:

II. This action may be considered as petitory one, brought against a third possessor. The plaintiff
must recover upon the strength of her title to the succession of her sister; and for that purpose, she
must show that she is the natural sister of the deceased, and that the deceased left no lawful heir
entitled to her inheritance. This has been done satisfactorily. The evidence establishes. that the
defendant was put in possession of the estate, as testamentary heir, by a decree of the Court of
Probates. It was, therefore, useless for the plaintiff to attempt to demand the possession of the
property of the succession, since it had been delivered to the defendant, and the estate had ceased
to be under the control and supervision of the Probate Court. Her application to the Court of Probates
Court would have had no object, as that court was no longer possessed of any power over the
succession, and, consequently, no order could have been rendered to take it out of the defendant's
hands. The action of reivindication was left to the plaintiff, and we are not prepared to say, that
previous to her instituting it, it was necessary that she should have been recognized as heir by the
Probate Court. This requisite is only to be complied with, as long as the succession is under the
46
supervision of the court by which the administrator, curator, or executor has been appointed, as it
seems to us, that after delivery to the heir who is apparently entitled thereto, it would be requiring a
vain thing. Lex neminen cogit ad vana.

xxx xxx xxx

With regard to the exception of jurisdiction: it was not insisted on by the defendant's counsel, and
was properly overruled by the Judge, a quo. The rule is well established, that "when an action of
reivindication is instituted by an heir at law, against the testamentary heir or universal legatee, who
has been put in possession of the estate, and who sets up the will as his title to the property, District
Courts are the proper tribunals in which such suits must be brought." (Roberts vs. Allier, 17 La. 15.)

It would not be amiss, at this juncture, to bring into view section 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(similar to sec. 12 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court) and article 405 of the Civil Code.

Section 196 of Act No. 190 provides:

Section 196. Paramount rights and amicable partition not affected. — Nothing herein contained shall
be construed so as to injure, prejudice, defeat, or destroy the estate, right or title of any person
claiming a tract of land, or any part thereof, by title under any other person, or by title paramount to
the title of the joint tenants, tenants in common, or co-parceners by whom partition may have been
made. (emphasis supplied.)

The plaintiff has a paramount title to his share in the estate.

Article 405 of the Civil Code reads:

La division de una cosa comun no prejudicara a tercero, el cual conservara los derechos de hipoteca,
servidumbre u otros derechos reales que la pertenecieran antes de hacer la particion. (Emphasis
supplied.) (The division of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice any third person, who shall
preserve the rights of mortgage, easement or other real rights which might belong to him before the
partition.)

It is to be observed that ownership is the real right par excellence. If, as alleged in the complaint, the
plaintiff is the owner of a share in the estate, then rights are shielded by article 405 of the Civil Code
against any adverse or inimical effect of the partition already mentioned.

These safeguards established both by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Code are sound in
principle and farsighted in the protection of property rights. They are morally and juridically right
because no partition, either by decree of court or by extrajudicial agreement, could add one iota or
particle to the interest which the partitioners had during the joint possession. Partition is of the
nature of a conveyance of ownership (Manresa's comment on article 400-406, Civil Code), and
certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true right. Section 196
of Act No. 190 and article 405 of the Civil Code are also an effective guarranty of ownership because
otherwise, it would be possible for usurpers to carry out their covetous designs either by deceiving
the court or through the egregious mockey of a contract solemnized by the signature and seal of a
notary public.

Moreover, a judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, as shown by articles
1073, 1074, 1080 and 1081 of the Civil Code.

1073. Las particiones pueden rescindirse por las mismas causas que las obligaciones.

1074. Pordan tambien ser rescindidas las particiones por causa de lesion en mas de la cuarta parte,
atendido el valor de las cosas cuando fueron adjudicadas.

47
1080. La particion hecha con pretericion de alguno de los herederos no se rescindira, a no ser que se
pruebe que hubo mala fe o dolo por parte de los otros interesados; pero estos tendran la obligacion
de pagar al preterido la parte que proporcionalmente le corresponda.

1081. La particion hecha con uno a quien se creyo heredero sin serio, sera nula.

The above legal provisions — section 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and articles 405, 1073,
1074, 1080 and 1081 of the Civil Code — are material in this aspect of the present case, not because
we believe the partition in the probate proceedings in Bulacan should be annulled or rescinded but
because said partition not being of such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a
coheir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such coheir may still, within the prescriptive period,
bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may
be situated. In this case, 16 of the lots belonging to the estate of the deceased Dr. Viola are located
in the Province of Nueva Ecija where the present action was brought.

Broad perspectives of which policy, which the lawmaker must have contemplated, would seem to
reveal the wisdom of allowing a coheir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition,
judicial or extrajudicial, has been had. Not infrequently, the heirs are living in different provinces, far
from one another and far from the residence of the decedent. Some of them may not hear of the
probate proceedings, or if they do, they may not have at the time either the means or the inclination
to participate therein. Sometimes, one of the heirs, by cajolery, bluster or truculence succeeds in
preventing a number of the coheirs from laying their just claims before the probate court. There are
also instances where an heir, cut of a sense of self-reliance, does not care to show keen and active
interest in the partition. In some cases, as it might have happened in the present one, a cohier, from
delicacy or fitting pride does not want, at the time of the settlement of the estate, to appear in court
as a natural child, and thus make himself the object of public pity or disdain and inconsiderately lift
the veil which time has benignantly placed over the father's past social deviation. Why should it be
presumed that the lawmaker did not respect this attitude of the child? It often occurs, likewise, that a
child, out of reverence for the memory of the deceased, is loath to show eagerness to secure his
share of the inheritance. Why should it be assumed that the legislator wanted to compel such a child
to haggle and argue over sordid and material things when the heart-wounds from the death of the
beloved father or mother still smart? To such a child, zealous alacrity to get one's share in the
inheritance so soon after the death of the father or mother is akin to the sacrilegious avarice of those
who, after the Crucifixion, parted and divided the garments. It is reasonable to suppose that the
lawmaker did not deem such child's feelings worthy of deferential regard?

The second main question is, Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?

Paragraph 2 of the complaint reads thus:

2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly acknowledge by his father, the
late Dr. Maximo Viola, begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom, and born in 1882 when both,
Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and could have contracted marriage;

Law 11 of Toro, promulgated in 1505, provides:

Ordenamos y mandamos que entonces se digan ser los hijos naturales, cuando al tiempo que
nacieren, o fueren concebidos, sus padres podian casar con sus madres justamente sin dispensacion.
(We order and command that children shall be said to be natural when at the time they are born, or
conceived, their fathers could marry their mothers justly without dispensation.)

The complaint does not allege that the parents were free to marry "each other" and "without
dispensation." One who is prone to search for the "nice sharp quillets of the law" would consider
these omissions in the complaint fatal because Law 11 of Toro requires that the children's "fathers
could marry their mothers justly without dispensation" ("sus padres podian casar con sus madres
justamente sin dispensacion"). In other words, a strict interpretation of the complaint would hold (1)
that the parents might be free to marry others but not each other; and (2) that by omitting the
words "without dispensation," the complaint contains no allegation that the parents were not so
48
related as to require dispensation to get married to each other. For example, under Law 11 of Toro, if
the parents are uncle and niece, the child is not natural because they need dispensation to marry
each other. Law 11 of Toro is on this point different from the Civil Code in that under the latter
(article 119) it is sufficient if the parents can marry each other "without dispensation," that is to say,
according to the Civil Code, even if the parents are, for instance, uncle and niece, the child is natural
if said parents have obtained dispensation to marry each other.

But pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties
(sec. 106, Code of Civil Procedure and sec. 17, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court). Upon this principle the
complaint is sufficient because the allegation that the parents "were free and could have contracted
marriage" signifies that neither was married and that there was no impediment on account of
relationship which would have required dispensation. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855,
861-862), this court held:

Relative to this presumption of the capacity of the parents to marry, the author Sanchez Roman
makes the following comment:

"Furthermore, viewing the conception of natural child in connection with two mutually interrelated
circumstances, to wit, the freedom of the parents to inter-marry, with or without dispensation, at the
time of the conception of the offspring stigmatized as natural, the first of those, or freedom to marry,
is a point upon which there is, according to the jurisprudence of our former law, whose spirit is
maintained in the Code, an affirmative presumption which places the burden of proving the contrary
upon those who are interested in impugning the natural filiation." (Vol. 5, Derecho Civil, pp. 1018,
1019.)

The Supreme Tribunal of Spain in its Sentence of October 11, 1882, declared that paternity having
been proved, it is presumed that the parents were not disqualified to marry each other.

This liberal interpretation of the complaint is the more compelling in this case because the status of
the plaintiff as a natural child is to be determined in harmony with Law 11 of Toro, which was the
least serve toward natural children in the history of Spanish legislation. The development of the law
on this subject has had three periods; first, the Roman law viewpoint which was the most strict;
second, the Laws of Toro which gave the largest measure of concessions to the natural child; and
third, the Civil Code, which places greater limitations on the concept of natural children. (See "Hijos
Naturales" by Victor Covian, Vol. XVII, Enciclopedia Juridica, p. 809; and "Comentario Historico,
Critico y Juridico a las Leyes de Toro," by Joaquin Francisco Pacheco, pp. 136-141.) The Laws of Toro
having been promulgated in 1505, their relatively liberal concept of natural children was the one
which prevailed in the Philippines during practically the entire period of the Spanish regime.

The complaint states that the plaintiff was born in 1882 when his parents were free to marry. This is
sufficient because Law 11 of Toro requires the freedom of the parents at the time either of the
conception or of the birth of the child, although according to the Civil Code this freedom to marry
must exist at the time of the Child's conception (article 119).

The complaint alleges that "the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and tacitly
acknowledged by his father." Under Law 11 of Toro, voluntary recognition of a natural child may be
tacit while under the Civil Code (article 131) it must be in a record of birth, in a will or in any other
public document.

Finally, it is proper and pertinent to invoke the case of Larena and Larena vs. Rubio (43 Phil. 1017).
Asuncion Larena, Maximiana Larena and Eustaquio Larena appeared in the proceedings for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Demetrio Larena, alleging that they were his natural
children and claimed the right to participate in the inheritance. The widow, Josefina Rubio viuda de
Larena, by whom the deceased had had four legitimate children, opposed the petition. The lower
court dismissed the petition, and Asuncion Larena appealed. The appellant was Demetrio Larena's
natural daughter, born in 1880 when he and the mother were free and could have been married to
each other. From early childhood she had been living with her father and enjoying the status of a
daughter, not only within a family but also publicly on account of the acts of her father. This court
49
reversed the order of the lower court and declared the appellant as the natural daughter of the
deceased with a right to a share in the estate, holding in part as follows;

The lower court based its decision upon the fact that since the appellant had attained the age of
majority in the year 1901, and her father having died in 1916, without any effort on her part previous
to that time looking to her acknowledgment as a natural child, she had lost such right in view of
article 137 of the Civil Code which requires that action for acknowledgment should be commenced
during the lifetime of the father. This is an error. The Civil Code is not applicable to this case. The
appellant was born and had enjoyed the status of a natural child by acts of acknowledgment of her
father even before the said Code was put in force here. Under the law at that time (Law 11 of Toro),
this tacit acknowledgment on the part of her father was itself sufficient to give the appellant the
status of a natural child, and such acknowledgment could be established by the ordinary means of
evidence without any limitations as to time. This civil status granted to the appellant by the former
law, derived from the fact of her birth and from the acts of implied acknowledgment of her father,
having taken place under the former legislation, gives appellant a vested interest inherent to her
status which cannot in any way be impaired by the provisions of the civil Code. The transitory
provisions of this Code declare that the changes introduced by it, when prejudicial to the rights
acquired under the former civil legislation, shall not have retroactive effect, and such former
legislation shall regulate all the rights arising under it although the Civil Code may provide differently
or may not recognize them. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 16, 1900; of April
11 and December 28, 1907; and decisions of this court in the cases of Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil. 195.
and of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 3 Phil. 697.)

Upon the authority of the decision just cited, the plaintiff in the present case is entitled to be
considered and declared a natural son of Dr. Maximo Viola, voluntarily acknowledged by him through
his own acts. There is, however, a statement in the decision in the Larena case which needs some
revision, and it is this: "Such acknowledgment could be established by the ordinary means of
evidence without any limitations as to time." These italicized words seemed to have been based on
the sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain of December 28, 1906 cited by Manresa in his
comment on the 1st rule of the transitory provisions. But later decisions of that Tribunal, such as that
of January 10, 1919, have held that the action by a natural child under Law 11 of Toro is limited by
the period for personal actions, which under article 1964 of the civil Code is fifteen years from the
death of the natural father. (See also Sentence of December 29, 1927.) It should also be noted that
personal actions under Law LXIII of Toro should be brought within twenty years; and that under
section 44 of the code of Civil Procedure all action not otherwise provided for should be brought
within ten years after the cause of action accrues. It will thus be seen that whether Law LXIII of
Toro, or the Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure is applied, there is a period for the bringing of
an action by a natural child whose status is governed by Law 11 of Toro. In view of the repealing
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in section 795 thereof, the period for bringing an action by a
natural child voluntarily recognized by the father under Law 11 of Toro, for declaration of the status
of a natural child, should be 10 years from the death of a natural father. In this case, less than six
years have elapsed from the death of Dr. Maximo Viola to the filing of the complaint. In any event
this matter of prescription of the action has not been set up as a defense.

Wherefore, the order of the lower court sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's amended complaint
and dismissing the case, should be and is hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs. Let
record of the case be returned to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. So ordered.

Yulo, C.J., Moran and Ozaeta, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur in the result for the reason that the demurrer admits the allegation in the complaint that the
plaintiffs is half brother to the defendants and that the latter promised to convey to him his legal
share in the estate left by their common father. A good cause of action in equity has thus been

50
shown. The Court of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija where the plaintiff resides has
jurisdiction to enforce the obligation assumed by the defendants.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012

NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA

D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D.
ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners Napoleon D.
Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D.
Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia), and Victoria D.
Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the April 27, 2010 Decision2 and October 18, 2010
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN which annulled the October
25, 2004 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del Norte and instead,
entered a new one dismissing petitioners’ complaint for annulment of sale, damages and attorney’s
feesagainst herein respondents heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).

The Facts

During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first
marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second
marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead
properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285 , (P-14608) P-51536and P-20551 (P-
8348)7 issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively.

On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity
and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and
Vismindaexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7,
1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying
themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of ₱
80,000.00.

On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the said
homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited
period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for
having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first
marriage.

51
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place
beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied
knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the
subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.

The RTC Ruling

On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others, the annulment of the
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale
occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria
were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares
of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. Commented [IO65]: RTC Ruling

Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed
possession of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are
imprescriptible.

The CA Ruling

On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and
dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge
of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it,
the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy’s
possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997,
ormore than two years fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died.
It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes from their co-heirs.

Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and binding
with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of
their respective shares as they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be
minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it upon
reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long
period of time.

The Issues

In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:

I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE
CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE;

II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE
WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS,
THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and

III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.

The Ruling of the Court

The petitionis meritorious.

It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion
from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are
entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which
read:

52
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.

xxx

ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.

As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique acquired
their respective inheritances,9 entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate, as
follows:

Enrique 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)

Eutropia 1/16
Victoria 1/16
Napoleon 1/16
Alicia 1/16
Visminda 1/16
Rosa 1/16
Douglas 1/16

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in
favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia
and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding uponthem and consequently, a total
nullity. Commented [IO66]: Ruling

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
(Underscoring added)

The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v.
Segura,10 thus:

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the
present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares
in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity
and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to
challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution…

However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject
propertiesmade by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the
respondents isvalid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied Commented [IO67]: Sale is valid as to the respective
proportionate share.
that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the
moment of her death11 and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in
the estate.12

53
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement
and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However,
on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their
mother, Anunciacion.

Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the settlement
and sale, provide:

ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.

ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of
guardians under the Rules of Court.

Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:

SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two
thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall
be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof.
For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according
to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the
substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother,
as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or
encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the
ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14

Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the
proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is
unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter or
unless he has by law a right to represent him.

A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.

ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

xxx

Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It
is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore
unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.16 Once ratified,

54
expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is
cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was constituted,17 as it has a retroactive effect.

Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with
absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11,
1997,they stated:

"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in and
conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji
Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was
voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as
far as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)

In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:

"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have any intention
to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and
acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement of the estate and the
subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the
conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is
not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the
homestead properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell
what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than
what the sellercan legally transfer."20 On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which
provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead
properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares.
They were deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas under an implied
constructive trust for the latter’s benefit, conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which
states:"if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their shares equivalent to
₱ 5,000.0021 each or a total of ₱ 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.

On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not
prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the
ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of

Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate.
Besides, an "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe"
in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the
cause of action accrues,22 which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed.23 In
55
this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence,
the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010 Commented [IO68]: Decision

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:

1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;

2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-
Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;

3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL
OWNERSof the 3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of
Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and

4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar,
Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily
the amount paid corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total
amount of ₱ 15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the time of payment
until finality of this decision and 12% per annum thereafter until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

56
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Erroneously referred to as Ulpha in the Regional Trial Court’s Decision and Jolpha in the Petition for
Review.

1 Rollo, pp. 14-36.

2Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., with Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and
Angelita A. Gacutan, concurring. Id. at 41-57.

3 Id. at 75-76.

4 Penned by Judge Jesus L. Grageda. Id. at 151-155.

5 Id. at 113-114.

6 Id. at 115-116.

7 Id. at 117-118.

8 Id. at 92-96.

9 CIVIL CODE, Art.777.

10 G.R. No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 367, 373.

11 Supra note 9.

12 Flora v. Prado, G.R. No. 156879, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 396, 404.

13Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 644
(1974).

14 Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III-A, p. 279 (2005),citing G.R. No. L-4155, December 17, 1952.

15 Ibañez v. Rodriguez, 47 Phil 554, 563 (1925).

16Coronel v. Constantino, G.R. No. 121069, February 7, 2003, 397 SCRA 128, 134, citingMaglucot-Aw
v. Maglucot, 329 SCRA 78, 94 (2000).

17 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1396.

18 Original records, pp. 82-83.

19 Id. at 84-85.

20 Supra note 10, at 374.

21 ₱ 80,000.00 (purchase price) ÷16 shares = ₱ 5,000.00.

22 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1144.

57
23 Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Aying, G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 496, 511.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by their

heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and
SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners
seeking to annul the Decision1 dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
Resolution2 dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration issued in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65630.3

Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely:
Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28,
1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by
Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of
Agatona Arrogante.

On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty.
Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special
Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was
represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels
appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case.
The trial court on even date issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the
undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor
of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a nominal bond of
₱1,000.00.6

Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate
hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together
with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Francisco’s counsel, manifested that the
parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the
Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect
the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. In
58
the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a
project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.

In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in
Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive
at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed
to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their respective
given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu, they
decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.

Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:

1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos,
one of the heirs, was administering the properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court)
as having been properly and duly accounted for.

2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of Gloria
Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly
accounted for.

3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco
Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.

4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of
₱40,000.00 subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the
properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four Thousand Pesos
(₱4,000.00) each.

5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective share of
₱4,000.00.9

The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all
those present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which everybody
present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the submission
of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make
some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on
July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information
that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be given the sum
of ₱5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her
in order to defray their father's hospitalization.

Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order10 dated December 16, 1976,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same
being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the
commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of
sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to
her of the sum of ₱36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the
claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder
shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. 11

The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of ₱5,570.00, as the same had been
allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.

In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new
administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it
59
appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the
early termination of the proceedings.

On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale13 over the six parcels of
land constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum of ₱36,000.00.

Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia
Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730,
000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were
canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132,
2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columba’s name; and that later on, Original Certificates of
Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these
parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie
M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which
transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the
existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
May 25, 1979.

Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.14

Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was
unsuccessful.15

On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation16 of the other heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,17 and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was
null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was
patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming
their share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as well as the
unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing
how to dispose of the estate of their parents and that they never received any payment from the
supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in close confederacy with
their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's recommendation, should the
same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a falsity, any order proceeding
therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor of respondents were
tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the assailed order did not appear to
have been furnished a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of
the consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the remainder of the
consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the administration expenses and estate taxes;
that the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was
the appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received their corresponding
share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with administrator
Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly
showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.

Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated
December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were represented by
counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this
was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory
period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land since May 25,
1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings;
that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano executed an

60
affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that
respondents were estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already
attained the status of finality.

On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order
issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the
Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent transfer of
these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be
continued.18

The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and
truthfulness of the Commissioner’s Report, which was used by the trial court as its basis for issuing
the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the
concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their
separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no
meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on
the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty, the
same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the contrary.

The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly,
to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in
the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the names of those who
were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who were
absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the
attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as regards the agreed
mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of physical evidence attached
to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled
conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal
existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground.

The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty.
Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be
taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyer’s authority to compromise cannot
be simply presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of
his client; that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the
principal is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being a void compromise
agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.

Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured
fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise agreement
which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.

The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of ₱36,000.00 to the
administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting
that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he received;
that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial court’s
order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of
Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum of ₱36,000.00; that said
sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and
the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided
equally among the heirs.

61
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor
was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated December 9,
1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated and
that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new
administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax Declarations
and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud. Consequently,
the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by
petitioners through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since
to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that it was also
evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were
denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners to
assert their claim.

Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where
the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief,
which they failed to take through their own fault.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old
Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of
regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official
act.

Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed
which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20

Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in
possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos21 and
respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares22 on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively.
In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the
case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate properties had been bought by
their late sister Columba, and they had already received their share of the purchase price. Another
heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an Affidavit23 dated December 13,
2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she had already received her
share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In addition, Numeriano had issued a
certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already
received ₱4,000.00 in payment of his share, which could be the reason why he refused to sign the
Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the
CA.

The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioner’s Report embodying the alleged
compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos. Commented [IO69]: Issue. Not an Error

We rule in the negative.

The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character25 and will not so easily and
readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 Commented [IO70]: remedy

impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:

Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments
or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner.

62
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.

Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or
order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,"
jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.26

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court. 29

While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it
should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold
Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for
lack of due process.

Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and
to prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent
upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his Commissioner’s
Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and
Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by
sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference scheduled
on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the
conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those
present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud
and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service, could not be located in
their respective given addresses.

However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae,
supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent to
the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably
present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an
affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor
was there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on
December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance31 regarding this case, it was only for the
reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she
had already received her corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the
affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a meeting. Respondent
Gloria also made an unnotarized statement32 that there was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of
Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.

Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving
at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything
to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied
the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their
consent and conformity thereto.

It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise
agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be
63
present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests.
Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying
their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a
conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in
the Report.

Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and
that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed.

While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection
with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may
be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as
absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the
heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents were
notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.

Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held
accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.

Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC),
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioner’s Report were
sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as enumerated
in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the accompanying registry receipts.34

In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and
bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to
participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we
held:

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement
and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what
happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the
present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having
discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed
notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not
whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement
afterwards.

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to
validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures
of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement
therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the
other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the
64
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We
find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's
Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.

We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate
proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for
petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case
amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January
30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire his own
lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who retains the
services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the estate
but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial court
issued the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the
parties’ lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the
Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers should be
considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of notices of
orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels,
any one of the respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for
reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but
they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such failure.

While the trial court's order approving the Commissioner’s Report was received by Attys. Yray and
Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other
heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Gloria’s
counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was Francisco’s
lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his Motion to
Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the other
heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice of the judgment approving the
compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax
declarations covering the parcels of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona
Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columba’s name, and Original
Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken
an appeal or other remedies.

Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation.38

In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:

A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at
bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it
cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is
deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In
Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:

x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.
It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to
enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded
on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It,
accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.

Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said

65
to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)

The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches.41 Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be
declared null and void and set aside.

We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after
the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.

Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.42

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is
the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would
result.44

In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the
petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process
is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to
declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.45

Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or
efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the
Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles
pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error
was thus committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated
November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI,
Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24-
BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

66
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Cancio C. Garcia (former member
of this Court) and Mariano C. del Castillo; rollo, pp. 32-39.

2 Id. at 41.

3Entitled, "Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Petitioners, v.
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, Sps. Gorgonio Benatiro and Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and
Sps. Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, Respondents."
4 CA rollo, p.32

5 Rollo, pp. 81-84.

6 Id. at 84.

7 Id. at 55.

8 Rollo, pp. 56-59.

9 Id. at 57.

10 Rollo, pp. 60-63.

11 Id. at 63.

12 Id. at 78.

13 Rollo, pp. 79-80.

67
14 CA rollo, p. 62.

15 Id. at 63.

16 CA rollo, pp. 24-26; Special Power of Attorney.

17 Refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney.

18 Rollo, p. 39.
19 G.R. No. 90974, August 27, 1990, 189 SCRA 107.

20 Rollo, pp. 10-11.

21 Id. at 124-125

22 Id. at 123.

23 Id. at 85.

24 Id. at 86.

25 Ramos v. Combong, Jr., G.R. No. 144273, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 499, 504.
26Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 168882, January 31,
2007, 513 SCRA 662, 668 citing Mercado v. Security Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 160445, February
16, 2006, 482 SCRA 501, 514; Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005,
470 SCRA 697, 707; Hi-Tone Marketing Corporation v. Baikal Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 149992,
August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 121, 131; Salonga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111478, March 13,
1997, 269 SCRA 534, 542; Pinlac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91486, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA
635, 650; Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133547, February 10, 2000, 325 SCRA 341,
358; Lapulapu Development & Housing Corporation v. Risos, G.R. No. 118633, September 6, 1996,
261 SCRA 517, 524; Regidor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78115, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 530,
534.

27 Rules of Court, Rule 47, Section 2.

28 Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164041, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 495, 508.
29 Tolentino v. Leviste, G.R. No. 156118, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 274.
30 CA rollo, p. 64.

31 Id. at 123.

32 CA rollo, p. 67.

33 Rollo, Annex "H", p. 64.

34 Id. at 75-76.

35 G.R. No. 156536, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 374.

36 Id. at 384-385.

37 Rollo, Annex "H", p. 64.

38 Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Alejo, 417 Phil. 303, 316, 318 (2001).
68
39 G.R. No. 111610, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 28. (2002).

40 Id.at 35-36.

41 Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian v. Philippine National Bank, supra note 26, at 670.
42 Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125837, October 6, 2004, 440 SCRA 121, 135.
43 Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Querimit, 424 Phil. 721, 732 (2002).
44 Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 607, 616 (1999).
45 See Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King, G.R. No. 78252, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA 60, 69
citing Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447, 45 (1950); Vda de Macoy v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 95871, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 244, 252.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN

GERONA,petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE
GUZMANrespondents.

Manuel J. Serapio for petitioners.

D. F. Castro and Associates for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan.

In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958, petitioners herein, namely,
Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the
legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9,
1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that
after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several
children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all
surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or
on May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only
surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were,
also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer
certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled
and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th
individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before
the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their (petitioners)
share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to
heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the latter prayed that
judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of
their participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to
69
petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register of deeds to cancel the
transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates of
title in the name of both the petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the former
and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of said properties
and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages
and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman,
was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of
the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.

After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was
a legitimate child, by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the
complaint belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife, Camila
Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the
complaint without costs. On appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the Court of Commented [IO71]: ruling of the lower court. Affirmed by CA.

Appeals, with costs against them.

Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of
limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed
did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is
claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the
present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-
heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in
question under an adverse title (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of
limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the
possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Castro
v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).

When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that
they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in
their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and,
consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for
the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. 1äwphï1.ñët

Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-12540, February 28, 1959;
Cuison v. Fernandez, L-11764, January 31, 1959; Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956;
and Sevilla v. De los Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this jurisdiction
that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting
from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations (Candelaria v. Romero, L-12149, September
30, 1960; Alzona v. Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon
the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years
from the discovery of the fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument
was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute
constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958; Avecilla v. Yatco,
L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v.
Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964).

As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:

70
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at least constructively,
of the alleged fraud committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extra-
judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of
deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4 November 1958, or more than
10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to have
discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years from the said date
within which to file this action. Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December
1949 or after the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the
remainder of the period of 4 years from December 1949 within which to commence her action.
Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9 January 1952 so that he was still a minor when
he gained knowledge (even if only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June
1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin Gerona became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also
still a minor at the time he gained knowledge (although constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco Gerona and Delfin Gerona had, therefore, two years after the
removal of their disability within which to commence their action (Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation
to Section 43, Act 190), that is, January 29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August 1954, with
respect to Delfin.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners Commented [IO72]: that petioners mothes was a legitimate
child and action of the petitioner already prescribed.
herein. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barredo, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Labrador and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19064 January 31, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PAZ E. SIGUION TORRES, deceased,

ALBERTO S. TORRES, petition-appellant,
vs.
CONCHITA TORRES and ANGEL S. TORRES, oppositors- appellees.

Tolentino and Garcia for oppositor-appellee Angel S. Torres.

Narciso Peña for oppositor-appellee Conchita Torres.

BARRERA, J.:

In a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay branch) on January 4, 1961, Alberto S.
Torres, claiming to be one of the four legitimate children of Paz E. Siguion Torres who died intestate
on December 18, 1959, prayed for the issuance in his favor of letters of administration in connection
with the properties left by the decedent, with an aggregate value of about P300,000.00. It was also
alleged therein that petitioner was unaware of any existing debt or obligation contracted by the
deceased or by her estate, from any of the heirs or from third persons.

This petition was opposed by Conchita Torres, one of the heirs, on the ground that the appointment
of an administrator is unnecessary in view of the fact that on January 27, 1960, the heirs of the
deceased (including petitioner) had already entered into an extrajudicial partition and settlement of
the estate, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. This was answered by petitioner
who, while admitting that such extrajudicial partition was signed by the heirs, contended that
attempts at the actual designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing the court's
intervention. It was also claimed that some properties of considerable value were not included in said
extrajudicial partition. In a supplemental answer to the opposition, subsequently filed, petitioner
likewise alleged that the estate has an existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons, a fact which
71
he claimed was not incorporated in the petition, through oversight. Petitioner, however, offered to
amend the petition before presentation of evidence, with leave of court. On July 21, 1961, the court,
finding that an extrajudicial settlement had already been entered into by the heirs, dismissed the
petition. Hence, the institution of the present appeal. Commented [IO73]: Finding of the court.

Petitioner-appellant does not controvert the execution of an extrajudicial deed of partition of the
estate, which, according to appellee, contains the following provisions:

1. That they (Alberto, Angel, Eduardo and Conchita, all surnamed Torres) are the only legitimate
children who survive the deceased Paz Siguion Vda. de Torres;

xxx xxx xxx

3. That the said decedent died without leaving any will and her only surviving heirs are the
aforementioned parties who are her legitimate children;

4. That the deceased left no debts;

xxx xxx xxx

6. That pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and in view of the difficulty of making a
physical division of the above properties, the parties have agreed to settle the aforementioned estate
by continuing the co-ownership on all the above properties in the following proportion:

Alberto Torres — ¼ undivided interest

Angel Torres — ¼ undivided interest
Eduardo Torres — ¼ undivided interest
Conchita Torres — ¼ undivided interest (Emphasis supplied.)

It appears from the pleadings filed therein that the petition to place the estate under administration
was predicated mainly on the alleged inability of the heirs to agree on a physical division of the
properties. The alleged existence of an indebtedness and non-inclusion in the list incorporated in the Commented [IO74]: Root cause

deed of extrajudicial partition, of certain properties that form part of the estate, seemed to be merely
an afterthought as the reference to them was made only in the answer to the opposition and motion
for dismissal of the petition, and is not made under oath. There is also no allegation as to the
particulars of the debt and the omitted properties sufficient to identify them. In the circumstances,
we agree with the lower court that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased is not here necessary.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SECTION 1. Extra-judicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no debts
and the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians,
the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affected affidavit filed in the
office of the Register of Deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor
files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the
decedent.1äwphï1.ñët

Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this case, there is
no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an administrator for the
settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected either extrajudicially or through an
ordinary action for partition. (Guico, et al. v. Bautista, et al., L-14921, December 31, 1960). If there
is an actual necessity for court intervention, as contended by appellant, in view of the heirs' failure to
reach an agreement as to how the estate would be divided physically, the latter, under the
aforequoted Rule, have still the remedy of an ordinary action for partition. Commented [IO75]: Proper remedy.

72
This is not to overlook the allegation that the estate has an outstanding obligation of P50,000.00. It
is to be noted, however, that appellant, as heretofore observed, did not specify from whom and in
what manner the said debt was contracted. Indeed, the bare allegation that, "the estate has an
existing debt of P50,000.00 from third persons" cannot be considered as concise statement to
constitute a cause of action. It must be for this reason that the lower court, notwithstanding the
existence of such averment in appellant's supplemental answer to the opposition, dismissed the
petition filed by said appellant.

Nor does the unverified statement that there are other properties not included in the deed of
extrajudicial partition in the possession of one of the heirs, justify the institution of an administration
proceeding because the same questions that may arise as to them, viz, the title there and their
partition, if proven to belong to the intestate, can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an
ordinary action of partition.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appeal from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs Commented [IO76]: Dismissing petition for issuance of
administration because of the existing extra judicial settlement.
against the appellant. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal. JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.

Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.

Moises B. Ramos for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion
of four parcels of land described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an
action instituted by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from
defendants one-half share of the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased
Teodoro Tolete.

According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January,
1945. He left for parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey
of San Manuel, Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and
nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings,
his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or
respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or
nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person
to inherit the above properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above
parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the
said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).

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In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro
Tolete (Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as
administratrix, brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the
Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said
properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of
sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950.

The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of
adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither
had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended
answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is Commented [IO77]: Amended answer of subsequent buyer.

barred by the statute of limitations; that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the
complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and inconvenience the defendants.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring
that the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit
"C", are all null and void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in Commented [IO78]: Declare null and void and usufruct right of
leon be terminated.
question, and finally declaring that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are
terminated. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of
the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but that the annulment of the
deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in
adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified the Commented [IO79]: Deed of sale annulment is pre-mature.

judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby
conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it ordered the Commented [IO80]: Null and void only as to the portion that
exceeds to the share of de leon.
defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Teodoro Tolete,
for disposition according to the law, one-half of the lands described in the complaint, but reserved to
Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said
properties may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring an action for the damages
that he may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.

Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the
following errors in their brief:

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover
her and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action
to recover was filed.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.

In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four
years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the
same was not brought within the period of two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.

Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two
74
sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the
such heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .

Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and
the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee,
he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition
for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.

It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case
in which there are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in
which there is only one heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as
follows:

SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever all the heirs of a
person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the
estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of
them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit,
without proceedings in court.

We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if
there are two or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This
requirement is made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the
clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the
persons to answer for rights violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also
significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons
who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that
those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound thereby. As to them
the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or share
in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the
period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or
interest. Evidently, they are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the
prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take part in the
settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of the settlement, there is no direct or
express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within
the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who did not take
part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be
violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra,
cited by the appellants in this case, we held:

It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had upon
the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision
is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to
all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly
it cannot be held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by
publication, by which the court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be
conclusive upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex

parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution
would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the
75
extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or
by implication. We have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all
between the circumstances on which the ruling therein had been predicated and those of the case at
bar.

Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of
the opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial
partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails
to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his
widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.

The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The
origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section
596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its
source which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is
only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against
third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a
different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a
statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.

But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The
action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her
affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself.
Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act
no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial
proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted soon
after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of
the statute of limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the action was
instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual
knowledge of the fraud.

The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for
value was rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said.

The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the
heirs of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the evidence of
record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de
Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who
are claiming the property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe
that Benny Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they Commented [IO81]: Failure to exercise due diligence

were nephews and nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The
fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan,
when the later saw Notary Public Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare
the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the
same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of
which she acknowledged before said notary public, coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient
showing that the consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our
belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may
claim the property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to him was a strategem concocted to
defeat the former's rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis
pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo when he acquired the
property might be true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis

76
pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he cannot claim that
he was a purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction
that a purchaser of registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry
and investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and
investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid
title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May Commented [IO82]: ruling

29, 1952.

Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against
the petitioners. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

77