Padilla v CA (Torts) offense such as threat or malicious mischief

PADILLA v CA G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO Roy Padilla et al for petition for review on certiorari - grounds
GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, 1. where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that arising from
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the
criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising
FACTS: from the criminal charge could be imposed upon him
1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused 2. liability of the defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not
prevented Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action for the
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently recovery of the said amount
forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and
destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting
them from the criminal charge.
Contentions: RULING:
Vergara Family No, the Court of Appeals is correct.
1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the 1. A separate civil action is not required. To require a separate civil action simply
incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets
Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort,
that it was committed with evident premeditation. and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition
Roy Padilla, et al that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. The exceptions are
2. the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted institute it separately.
municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall liability arising from the act as a crime.
owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premise The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and based on reasonable doubt.
Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, omission of the defendant. That the same punishable act or omission can create
and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
costs of this proceedings. employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types
9,000. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended
coercion when they properly constituted some petitioners were acquitted because party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted."
What Article 29 merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded
by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.
The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement
that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering
damages. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial,
appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
EMMA P. NUGUID vs. CLARITA S. NICDAO
G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006
FACTS: Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of
Violation of BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that
respondent and her husband approached petitioner and asked her if they could
borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by them and
because of the close relationship of respondent to petitioner, the latter lent the
former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00
to the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00, respondent gave petitioner open dated checks
with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year,
petitioner can deposit the checks.
Subsequently, petitioner demanded payment of the sums above-mentioned, but
respondent refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thereafter, petitioner
deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank totaling P1,150,000.00. The
checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
A verbal and written demand was made upon respondent to pay the amount
represented by the bounced checks, but to no avail. Hence, a complaint for
violation of BP 22 was filed against the respondent. The trial court convicted the
defendant. The CA reversed the decision, thus acquitting Nicdao. Petitioner now
contends that the civil liability of the defendant was not extinguished by the
acquittal.
ISSUE: Whether respondent remains civilly liable to petitioner despite her
acquittal.
HELD: No. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an
offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as
an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the
crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil
liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to
be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the
fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil
Code. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly
free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond
reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere
preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a
person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If
the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held
civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It
may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only
civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based
upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As
found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and
extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt
that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already
been completely relieved of civil liability.
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER
VS.
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO(Presiding Judge, RTC Quezon City) DIONISO M
SIBAYAN and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (rep. VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS)
G.R. no. 151452 July 29, 2005
Facts:
Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
homicide and multiple physical injuries due to the vehicle collision between Viron
Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a Lite Van Ace. However the municipal circuit
trial court was no pronouncement of civil liability. The petitioners filed a complaint
for damages to the respondents pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil
action citing Sibayan’s judgment conviction. And it was moved to dismiss by the
Viron Transit. The petitioners opposed and contends that the motion to dismiss
that be ten (10) years from the judgment of criminal action is the prescription and
therefore it is within the period since it was just barely two (2) years had elapse.
The complaint was dismissed by the trial court due to the ground that the cause of
action had prescribed; based on quasi-delict that it prescribes four (4) years from
the accrual of the cause of action. Again the petitioners filed a reconsideration that
the complaint is not based on quasi- delict but on the final judgment of conviction
in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years upon the finality of the
judgment. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was denied by the trial
court based on quasi-delict in Article 1146 of the Civil Code that the complaint was
filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular activities therefore it prescribes
already.
On the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed to the Court of Appeals it was
dismissed the same error in the choice or mode of appeal. It also denies the
petitioners’ motion for and the petitioners failed to allege that the petition was
brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of
appeal. Petitioners insist that it should be enforced in the complaint that arose in
ex delicto and not based on quasi-delict. Since the action is based on the criminal
liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the
judgment of conviction. Private respondents insisted, pointing out the averments in
the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict in Article 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from
the time the accident took place. Viron transit also alleges that its subsidiary
liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the
criminal case, in sitting Art. 103 of Revised Penal Code the civil aspect of the case
were instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case
was made. Respondents likewise allege that the petitioners should have appealed
the adverse order of the trial court. Petitioners filed a reply and the private
respondents also filled a rejoinder both in reiteration of their arguments. Hence
this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the dismissal of the action was based on culpa aquiliana is a bar to
the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer?
Held:
The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the subsidiary
liability of the employer. Because the Article 103 of the R.P.C. operates with
controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of
indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
The trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be
prosecuted on the merits, this does not offend the policy that the reservation or
institution of a separate civil waives the other civil actions but this is merely an
avoidance of multiple suits. The action for damages based on quasi- delict should
be considered waived no occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against
private respondets as available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.
CANCIO vs. ISIP
G.R. No. 133978
November 12, 2002
Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of
B.P. 22, also known as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the
B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it being deposited before 90 days from the date
written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22 were filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismissed due to the failure of the
prosecution to prosecute the crime.
Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga. After failing to present its second witness, the prosecution
dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil
action from the said criminal cases. The court granted the reservation. The criminal
case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil action. On
December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum of
money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases.
Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the
petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res Judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless
of the dismissal of the criminal case of estafa.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The
reservation for civil action was made by the prosecution on time. According to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that civil liability is
deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a reservation of the right
to file a separate civil action.
In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual.
The cause of action was the breach of the respondent’s breach of the contractual
obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was seeking to make good the value written on
the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not anchored the criminal aspect of
estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is distinct and
independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed
regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.
[G.R. No. 141485. June 30, 2005]
PABLITO MURAO and NELIO HUERTAZUELA, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioners pray for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 21134, dated 31 May 1999,[1] affirming with modification the Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, in Criminal Case No.
11943, dated 05 May 1997,[2] finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner Pablito Murao is the sole owner of Lorna Murao Industrial Commercial
Enterprises (LMICE), a company engaged in the business of selling and refilling fire
extinguishers, with branches in Palawan, Naga, Legaspi, Mindoro, Aurora, Quezon,
Isabela, and Laguna. Petitioner Nelio Huertazuela is the Branch Manager of LMICE
in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.[3]
On 01 September 1994, petitioner Murao and private complainant Chito Federico
entered into a Dealership Agreement for the marketing, distribution, and refilling of
fire extinguishers within Puerto Princesa City.[4] According to the Dealership
Agreement, private complainant Federico, as a dealer for LMICE, could obtain fire
extinguishers from LMICE at a 50% discount, provided that he sets up his own sales
force, acquires and issues his own sales invoice, and posts a bond with LMICE as
security for the credit line extended to him by LMICE. Failing to comply with the
conditions under the said Dealership Agreement, private complainant Federico,
nonetheless, was still allowed to act as a part-time sales agent for LMICE entitled to
a percentage commission from the sales of fire extinguishers.[5]
The amount of private complainant Federicos commission as sales agent for LMICE
was under contention. Private complainant Federico claimed that he was entitled
to a commission equivalent to 50% of the gross sales he had made on behalf of
LMICE,[6] while petitioners maintained that he should receive only 30% of the net
sales. Petitioners even contended that as company policy, part-time sales agents
were entitled to a commission of only 25% of the net sales, but since private
complainant Federico helped in establishing the LMICE branch office in Puerto
Princesa City, he was to receive the same commission as the full-time sales agents
of LMICE, which was 30% of the net sales.[7]
Private complainant Federicos first successful transaction as sales agent of LMICE
involved two fire extinguishers sold to Landbank of the Philippines (Landbank),
Puerto Princesa City Branch, for the price of P7,200.00. Landbank issued a check,
dated 08 November 1993, pay to the order of L.M. Industrial Comml. Enterprises
c/o Chito Federico, for the amount of P5,936.40,[8] after deducting from the original
sales price the 15% discount granted by private complainant Federico to Landbank
and the 3% withholding tax. Private complainant Federico encashed the check at
Landbank and remitted only P2,436.40 to LMICE, while he kept P3,500.00 for
himself as his commission from the sale.[9]
Petitioners alleged that it was contrary to the standard operating procedure of
LMICE that private complainant Federico was named payee of the Landbank check
on behalf of LMICE, and that private complainant Federico was not authorized to
encash the said check. Despite the supposed irregularities committed by private
complainant Federico in the collection of the payment from Landbank and in the
premature withholding of his commission from the said payment, petitioners
forgave private complainant Federico because the latter promised to make-up for
his misdeeds in the next transaction.[10]
Private complainant Federico, on behalf of LMICE, subsequently facilitated a
transaction with the City Government of Puerto Princesa for the refill of 202 fire
extinguishers. Because of the considerable cost, the City Government of Puerto
Princesa requested that the transaction be split into two purchase orders, and the
City Government of Puerto Princesa shall pay for each of the purchase orders
separately.[11] Pursuant to the two purchase orders, LMICE refilled and delivered all
202 fire extinguishers to the City Government of Puerto Princesa: 154 units on 06
January 1994, 43 more units on 12 January 1994, and the last five units on 13
January 1994.[12]
The subject of this Petition is limited to the first purchase order, Purchase Order
No. GSO-856, dated 03 January 1994, for the refill of 99 fire extinguishers, with a
total cost of P309,000.00.[13] On 16 June 1994, the City Government of Puerto
Princesa issued Check No. 611437 to LMICE to pay for Purchase Order No. GSO-
856, in the amount of P300,572.73, net of the 3% withholding tax.[14] Within the
same day, petitioner Huertazuela claimed Check No. 611437 from the City
Government of Puerto Princesa and deposited it under the current account of
LMICE with PCIBank.[15]
On 17 June 1994, private complainant Federico went to see petitioner Huertazuela
at the LMICE branch office in Puerto Princesa City to demand for the amount
of P154,500.00 as his commission from the payment of Purchase Order No. GSO-
856 by the City Government of Puerto Princesa. Petitioner Huertazuela, however,
refused to pay private complainant Federico his commission since the two of them
could not agree on the proper amount thereof.[16]
Also on 17 June 1994, private complainant Federico went to the police station to
file an Affidavit-Complaint for estafa against petitioners.[17] Petitioners submitted
their Joint Counter-Affidavit on 12 July 1994.[18] The City Prosecution Office of
Puerto Princesa City issued a Resolution, dated 15 August 1994, finding that
a prima facie case for estafa existed against the petitioners and recommending the
filing of an information for estafa against both of them.[19]
The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11943 and raffled to the RTC of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, Branch 52, reads as follows
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PABLITO MURAO and NELIO C. HUERTAZUELA of the
crime of ESTAFA, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of June, 1994, at Puerto Princesa City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, after having received
the amount of P309,000.00 as payment of the 99 tanks of refilled fire extinguisher
(sic) from the City Government of Puerto Princesa, through deceit, fraud and
misrepresentation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
one Chito Federico in the following manner, to wit: said accused, well knowing that
Chito Federico agent of LM Industrial Commercial Enterprises is entitled to 50%
commission of the gross sales as per their Dealership Contract or the amount
of P154,500.00 as his commission for his sale of 99 refilled fire extinguishers
worth P309,000.00, and accused once in possession of said amount of P309,000.00
misappropriate, misapply and convert the amount of P154,500.00 for their own
personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands made upon them by
complainant to deliver the amount of P154,500.00, accused failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said Chito Federico in
the amount of P154,500.00, Philippine Currency.[20]
After holding trial, the RTC rendered its Judgment on 05 May 1997 finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of estafa
defined and penalized in Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Estafa, under
the said provision, is committed by
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow . . .
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
(a)
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods,
or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; . . .
In the same Judgment, the RTC expounded on its finding of guilt, thus
For the afore-quoted provision of the Revised Penal Code to be committed, the
following requisites must concur:
1. That money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
4. That there is demand made by the offended party to the offender. (Reyes,
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, p. 716; Manuel Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996)
All the foregoing elements are present in this case. The aborted testimony of Mrs.
Norma Dacuan, Cashier III of the Treasurers Office of the City of Puerto Princesa
established the fact that indeed, on June 16, 1994, co-accused Nelio Huertazuela
took delivery of Check No. 611437 with face value of P300,572.73, representing
payment for the refill of 99 cylinders of fire extinguishers. Although the relationship
between complaining witness Chito Federico and LMIC is not fiduciary in nature,
still the clause any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return personal property is broad enough to include a civil obligation (Manahan vs.
C.A., Et. Al., Mar. 20, 1996).
The second element cannot be gainsaid. Both Pablito Murao and Nelio Huertazuela
categorically admitted that they did not give to Chito Federico his commission.
Instead, they deposited the full amount of the consideration, with the PCIBank in
the Current Account of LMIC.
The refusal by the accused to give Chito Federico what ever percentage his
commission necessarily caused him prejudice which constitute the third element of
estafa. Demand for payment, although not an essential element of estafa was
nonetheless made by the complainant but was rebuffed by the accused. The
fraudulent intent by the accused is indubitably indicated by their refusal to pay
Chito Federico any percentage of the gross sales as commission. If it were true that
what the dealer/sales Agent is entitled to by way of commission is only 30% of the
gross sales, then by all means the accused should have paid Chito Federico 30%. If
he refused, they could have it deposited in his name. In that way they may not be
said to have misappropriated for themselves what pertained to their Agent by way
of commission.
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused PABLITO MURAO and NELIO HUERTAZUELA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals, of the crime of estafa defined and penalized in Article 315
par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, and applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, both accused are hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from a minimum of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its medium period, to a
maximum of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal in its maximum period; to
pay Chito Federico, jointly and severally:
a. Sales Commission equivalent to
50% of P309,000.00 or ------------------- P154,500.00
with legal interest thereon from
June 17, 1994 until fully paid;
b. Attorneys fees ---------------------------- P 30,0000.00.[21]
Resolving the appeal filed by the petitioners before it, the Court of Appeals, in its
Decision, dated 31 May 1999, affirmed the aforementioned RTC Judgment, finding
petitioners guilty of estafa, but modifying the sentence imposed on the petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that appellants PABLITO MURAO and NELIO HUERTAZUELA are hereby each
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The
award for attorneys fee of P30,000.00 is deleted because the prosecution of
criminal action is the task of the State prosecutors. All other aspects of the
appealed decision are maintained.[22]
When the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 19 January 2000, [23] denied
their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present Petition for
Review[24] before this Court, raising the following errors allegedly committed by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision, dated 31 May 1999
I clients, even though private complainant Federico personally helped in hauling and
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315 1(B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE UNDER THE FOREGOING SET OF FACTS, WHEN IT IS
CLEAR FROM THE SAID UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT THE LIABILITY IS CIVIL IN NATURE.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT UPHOLD (sic)
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO A FIFTY (50%) PERCENT
COMMISSION WITHOUT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH CLAIM.
This Court finds the instant Petition impressed with merit. Absent herein are two
essential elements of the crime of estafa by misappropriation or conversion under
Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) That money, goods or
other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return, the same; and (2) That there be a misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender.
The findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that petitioners committed estafa
rest on the erroneous belief that private complainant Federico, due to his right to
commission, already owned 50% of the amount paid by the City Government of
Puerto Princesa to LMICE by virtue of Check No. 611437, so that the collection and
deposit of the said check by petitioners under the account of LMICE constituted
misappropriation or conversion of private complainant Federicos commission.
However, his right to a commission does not make private complainant Federico a
joint owner of the money paid to LMICE by the City Government of Puerto
Princesa, but merely establishes the relation of agent and principal.[25] It is
unequivocal that an agency existed between LMICE and private complainant
Federico. Article 1868 of the Civil Code defines agency as a special contract
whereby a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
Although private complainant Federico never had the opportunity to operate as a
dealer for LMICE under the terms of the Dealership Agreement, he was allowed to
act as a sales agent for LMICE. He can negotiate for and on behalf of LMICE for the
refill and delivery of fire extinguishers, which he, in fact, did on two occasions with
Landbank and with the City Government of Puerto Princesa. Unlike the Dealership
Agreement, however, the agreement that private complainant Federico may act as
sales agent of LMICE was based on an oral agreement.[26]
As a sales agent, private complainant Federico entered into negotiations with
prospective clients for and on behalf of his principal, LMICE. When negotiations for
the sale or refill of fire extinguishers were successful, private complainant Federico
prepared the necessary documentation. Purchase orders, invoices, and receipts
were all in the name of LMICE. It was LMICE who had the primary duty of picking up
the empty fire extinguishers, filling them up, and delivering the refilled tanks to the
carrying the fire extinguishers during pick-up from and delivery to clients.
All profits made and any advantage gained by an agent in the execution of his
agency should belong to the principal.[27] In the instant case, whether the
transactions negotiated by the sales agent were for the sale of brand new fire
extinguishers or for the refill of empty tanks, evidently, the business belonged to
LMICE. Consequently, payments made by clients for the fire extinguishers
pertained to LMICE. When petitioner Huertazuela, as the Branch Manager of LMICE
in Puerto Princesa City, with the permission of petitioner Murao, the sole
proprietor of LMICE, personally picked up Check No. 611437 from the City
Government of Puerto Princesa, and deposited the same under the Current
Account of LMICE with PCIBank, he was merely collecting what rightfully belonged
to LMICE. Indeed, Check No. 611437 named LMICE as the lone payee. Private
complainant Federico may claim commission, allegedly equivalent to 50% of the
payment received by LMICE from the City Government of Puerto Princesa, based
on his right to just compensation under his agency contract with LMICE, [28] but not
as the automatic owner of the 50% portion of the said payment.
Since LMICE is the lawful owner of the entire proceeds of the check payment from
the City Government of Puerto Princesa, then the petitioners who collected the
payment on behalf of LMICE did not receive the same or any part thereof in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same to private complainant
Federico, thus, the RTC correctly found that no fiduciary relationship existed
between petitioners and private complainant Federico. A fiduciary relationship
between the complainant and the accused is an essential element of estafa by
misappropriation or conversion, without which the accused could not have
committed estafa.[29]
The RTC used the case of Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[30] to support its position
that even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, the petitioners still had the civil
obligation to return and deliver to private complainant Federico his commission.
The RTC failed to discern the substantial differences in the factual background of
the Manahan case from the present Petition. The Manahan case involved the lease
of a dump truck. Although a contract of lease may not be fiduciary in character, the
lessee clearly had the civil obligation to return the truck to the lessor at the end of
the lease period; and failure of the lessee to return the truck as provided for in the
contract may constitute estafa. The phrase or any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same refers to contracts of bailment,
such as, contract of lease of personal property, contract of deposit,
and commodatum, wherein juridical possession of the thing was transferred to the
lessee, depositary or borrower, and wherein the latter is obligated to return the
same thing.[31]
In contrast, the current Petition concerns an agency contract whereby the principal
already received payment from the client but refused to give the sales agent, who
negotiated the sale, his commission. As has been established by this Court in the
foregoing paragraphs, LMICE had a right to the full amount paid by the City
Government of Puerto Princesa. Since LMICE, through petitioners, directly collected
the payment, then it was already in possession of the amount, and no transfer of
juridical possession thereof was involved herein. Given that private complainant
Federico could not claim ownership over the said payment or any portion thereof,
LMICE had nothing at all to deliver and return to him. The obligation of LMICE to
pay private complainant Federico his commission does not arise from any duty to
deliver or return the money to its supposed owner, but rather from the duty of a
principal to give just compensation to its agent for the services rendered by the
latter.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 31 May 1999, defined the
words convert and misappropriate in the following manner
The High Court in Saddul v. Court of Appeals [192 SCRA 277] enunciated that the
words convert and misappropriate in the crime of estafa punished under Art. 315,
par. 1(b) connote an act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were
ones own, or if devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate to ones use includes, not only conversion to ones personal
advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right.[32]
Based on the very same definition, this Court finds that petitioners did not convert
nor misappropriate the proceeds from Check No. 611437 because the same
belonged to LMICE, and was not anothers property. Petitioners collected the said
check from the City Government of Puerto Princesa and deposited the same under
the Current Account of LMICE with PCIBank. Since the money was already with its
owner, LMICE, it could not be said that the same had been converted or
misappropriated for one could not very well fraudulently appropriate to himself
money that is his own.[33]
Although petitioners refusal to pay private complainant Federico his commission
caused prejudice or damage to the latter, said act does not constitute a crime,
particularly estafa by conversion or misappropriation punishable under Article
315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Without the essential elements for the
commission thereof, petitioners cannot be deemed to have committed the crime.
While petitioners may have no criminal liability, petitioners themselves admit their
civil liability to the private complainant Federico for the latters commission from
the sale, whether it be 30% of the net sales or 50% of the gross sales. However, this
Court is precluded from making a determination and an award of the civil liability
for the reason that the said civil liability of petitioners to pay private complainant
Federico his commission arises from a violation of the agency contract and not
from a criminal act.[34] It would be improper and unwarranted for this Court to
impose in a criminal action the civil liability arising from a civil contract, which
should have been the subject of a separate and independent civil action.[35]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21134, dated 31 May 1999, affirming with modification the Judgment of the RTC of
Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 11943, dated 05 May 1997,
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa by conversion or
misappropriation under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, and awarding
the amount of P154,500.00 as sales commission to private complainant Federico, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new Judgment is hereby entered ACQUITTING
petitioners based on the foregoing findings of this Court that their actions did not
constitute the crime of estafa by conversion or misappropriation under Article
315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The cash bonds posted by the petitioners for
their provisional liberty are hereby ordered RELEASED and the amounts thereof
RETURNED to the petitioners, subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000]
CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, JOSEFINA V. AMAGAN and DINA V.
AMAGAN, petitioners, vs. TEODORICO T. MARAYAG, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere
filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the
property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be
suspended even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the
demolition of petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of the
municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the February 9, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP
No. 50472,[1] which disposed as follows:
"It is plain to see that this Court, under its Decision, merely nullified the Order of
the Respondent, dated November 26, 1996 granting Private Respondents Motion
for Execution Pending Appeal and denying Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
[of] its said Order. This Court did not enjoin the Respondent Court from resolving
Petitioners appeal from the Decision of the Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court, on its
merits.
"Petitioners complaint for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance in Civil Case No.
1632 filed [at] the Regional Trial Court does not abate the proceeding in Civil Case
No. 1671 (TG) before the Respondent Court (Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of
Appeals, 229 SCRA 627; Felicidad Javier, et al., versus Hon. Regino T. Veridiano, II,
et al., 237 SCRA 565.
"In sum, then, the [im]pugned Orders of the Respondent Court are in accord with
case law and issued in the exercise of its sound discretion.
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is
hereby dismissed. No cost.
"SO ORDERED."[2]
Also challenged by petitioners is the April 22, 1999 CA Resolution[3] denying their
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"x x x. On June 3, 1996, the private respondent filed a complaint against the
petitioners for 'unlawful detainer' with the Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court in Silang,
Cavite. On September 27, 1996, the trial court promulgated a Decision in favor of
the private respondent and against the petitioners, the decretal portion of which
reads as follows:
'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds for the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter as follows:
1.......To vacate the property of plaintiff located at San Vicente, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 420 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 13023
and remove their house constructed thereon;
2.......To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P10,000.00 starting from
June 1, 1996 until the subject premises are fully vacated, as reasonable
compensation for their continued unlawful use and occupation of the same and
another amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees and other litigation
expenses; and
3.......To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.'
"The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cavite from said Decision,
which appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 1671. On November 26, 1996, the
private respondent filed a 'Motion for Execution Pending Appeal' with the
Respondent Court which, on November 26, 1996, issued an Order granting said
motion, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
'As prayed for by the plaintiff(s), through (their) counsel, and finding the grounds
alleged in their 'Motion for Immediate Exec(u)tion' to be impressed with merit, the
same is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, let a writ of execution pending appeal be issued in this case.'
"The Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration' [of] said Order, was denied by the
Respondent Court per its Order dated February 21, 1997.
"In the interim, the petitioners filed, on December 10, 19[96], a complaint against
private respondent in the Regional Trial Court for 'Quieting of Title, Reconveyance
and Damages,' entitled 'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al. versus Teodorico Marayag,
Civil Case No. 1682 (TG).'
"The petitioners filed, a 'Petition for Certiorari,' in the Court of Appeals, under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, dated April 28, 1997, against the respondents for the
nullification of the aforesaid Orders of the Respondent Court, dated November 26,
1996 and February 21, 1997, in Civil Case No. 1671, granting private
respondent's 'Motion for Reconsideration' respectively, which Petition was
entitled 'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al., versus Regional Trial Court, et al., CA-G.R.
[SP No. 43611].' This Court issued a Resolution granting petitioners' plea for a
temporary restraining order which expired on June 25, 1997.
"On July 7, 1997, the private respondent filed, with the Respondent Court, in Civil
Case No. 1671 (TG), an 'Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion to Direct Sheriff To Make a
Report And/Or Implement Writ of Execution and Declare the Case Submitted for
Decision'with the parties submitting to the Respondent Court their
respective 'Memorandum on Appeal.' The next day, July 18, 1997, this Court
promulgated, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], a Decision in favor of the petitioners and
against the respondents therein the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
'WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order
dated February 21, 1997, allowing execution pending appeal is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.'
On July 11, 1997, the Respondent Court issued an Order granting private
respondent's Omnibus Motion,' supra. The private respondent likewise filed
a Petition for Review' with the Supreme Court, from the Decision of this Court in
CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611] and its Resolution denying private respondent's 'Motion for
Reconsideration' but the Supreme Court, per its Resolution dated November 12,
1997, issued a Resolution denying private respondents['] 'Petition for Review.' The
Resolution of the Supreme Court became final and executory.
"On December 12, 1997, the private respondent filed with the Respondent Court,
in Civil Case No. TG-1671, a 'Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion' praying that the
Respondent Court resolve the case and promulgate its Decision on the merits.
However, the petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondent's motion,
contending that the proceedings before the Respondent Court, in Civil Case No.
1671 (TG), be suspended pending decision, on the merits, of the Regional Trial
Court, in Civil Case No. 1682 (Quieting of Title, Reconveyance with Damages). On
April 3, 1998, the Respondent Court issued its Order granting private respondent's
motion, declaring that the Court, under its Decision, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611],
merely nullified its Order granting execution pending appeal but did not enjoin the
Respondent Court from hearing and resolving Civil Case No. 16[7]1 on the merits.
The petitioners filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration' of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court but the latter issued an Order dated December 14, 1998 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, in this language:
'Anent the Motion for Reconsideration, movants anchored their arguments that
this Court should restrain itself from further proceeding with the appealed case
because of the decision, resolution of the Court of Appeals, and resolution of the
Supreme Court. It is worthy to note that [what] was brought up with the higher
Courts was the Order of the Court allowing the execution pending appeal, the said
Order was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals[;] however, there was no
permanent injunction that has been issued for this Court to stop from further
proceeding with the case. The said motion is, therefore, DENIED for lack of merit.'"
The facts of this case may be simply summarized as follows. The MCTC rendered a
Decision granting the ejectment suit filed by respondent against herein petitioners.
While an appeal was pending before the RTC, respondent filed a Motion for
immediate execution of the MCTC judgment, which was granted. However, the
Court of Appeals[4] later reversed the RTC Order granting the execution pending
appeal, a reversal that was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, petitioners also filed before the RTC a new action for quieting of title
involving the same property.
Petitioners thence claimed that the proceedings in the ejectment appeal should be
suspended pending final judgment in the quieting of title case. The RTC ruled in the
negative.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In sustaining the RTC, the CA held in two short paragraphs that its earlier Decision
in CA-GR SP No. 43611 enjoined only the execution of the judgment pending
appeal. Without discussing petitioners' plea for an exception, it curtly applied the
jurisprudential principle that an action for quieting of title would not abate an
ejectment suit.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted for the consideration of the Court the
following issues:
"I.......Whether or not the 8 July 1997 Decision and 23 September 1997 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611 (Annex I), as affirmed in toto by the
Supreme Court, called off and restrained the proceedings in this case;
II. Whether or not the dispositive portion of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611
should be referred to its body and text.
III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals Decision having been based on Vda. de
Legaspi vs. Avendano x x x, is now final and executory as it was upheld by the
Supreme Court in toto.
IV. Whether or not Lao vs. Court of Appeals [x x x] is applicable to the present case,
and
V. Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to consider and pass judgment on the
exceptional nature of the present case."[6]
In the main, the issue is whether the peculiar circumstances of this case justify the
suspension of the ejectment proceedings on appeal before the RTC, pending the
resolution of the action for quieting of title.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Suspension of the Ejectment Suit
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to summarily
restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been
illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the
parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. It has
been held that these actions "are intended to avoid disruption of public order by
those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed
right of possession."[7] In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de
facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are
provisional in nature.
As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same
property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying
reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve
physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional
Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the
issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment
action and there resolved."[8]
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action.
One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao, wherein the Court declared:
"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of
forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue
in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion
and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses.
For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is
brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of
any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the
more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has
been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be
immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other
party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to
discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without
resorting to the courts."[9]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the mere existence of a judicial proceeding putting at issue
the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is not enough reason to justify an exception
to the general rule. In Salinas v. Navarro,[10] the Court explained that "the exception to the
rule in x x x Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of equity not found in the present
petition. The right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment case
as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule. In
the Vda. de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in the ejectment case would also have
meant demolition of the premises, a factor not present in this petition."
After a close reading of the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, however, we hold that
equitable considerations impel an exception to the general rule. In its earlier July 8, 1997
Decision in CA-GR No. 43611-SP which has long become final, the Court of Appeals, through
Justice Artemio G. Toquero, arrived upon the following factual findings which are binding on
herein parties:
"Admittedly, petitioners who appealed the judgment in the ejectment case did not file a
supersedeas bond. Neither have they been depositing the compensation for their use and
occupation of the property in question as determined by the trial court. Ordinarily, these
circumstances would justify an execution pending appeal. However, there are circumstances
attendant to this case which would render immediate execution injudicious and inequitable.
"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on
the theory that petitioners possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance.
However, in answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 (Annex D), petitioners
categorically denied having any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are
owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J. P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.
In other words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in
this case.
"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action
for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil
Case No. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership
is squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative
of who is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.
"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include
the removal of the petitioners house [from] the lot in question.
"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay enequitable, to allow demolition of petitioner's
house prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it
stands.[11]
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of
the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity
require the suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the
respondent's suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the
ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to
create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said
exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision[12] would cause the respondent to go
through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the
premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership
only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be
wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best
temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent's claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or
a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging
the proceedings for the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional
circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.
The Suspension of Proceedings Even During Appeal
One final point. In Vda. de Legaspi, the Court held that "if circumstances should so require,
the proceedings in the ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found."
This statement is unequivocally clear; it includes even the appellate stage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of Cavite is DIRECTED to suspend further action in Civil Case No. 1671
until Civil Case No. 1682 is concluded. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.