G.R. No.

L-33541 January 20, 1972

ABDULGAFAR PUNGUTAN, petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
OF SULU. respondents.

Jose W. Diokno and Manuel M. Gonzales for petitioner.

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for respondent Benjamin Abubakar.

Teaño, Garcia and Apostol for respondent COMELEC, etc.

FERNANDO, J.:p

The resolution of respondent Comelec1 now assailed in this petition for review, was undoubtedly motivated by the objective of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections in the discharge of its constitutional function to enforce and administer electoral
laws.2 It excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone district of the province of Sulu the returns from 107
precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured
and therefore no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar Pungutan, who otherwise would have been entitled to
the last remaining seat for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, there being no question as to the election of the other two
delegates,3 would lose out to respondent Benjamin Abubakar. Petitioner would thus dispute the power of respondent
Commission to exclude such returns as a result of oral testimony as well as the examination of the fingerprints and signatures of
those who allegedly voted as the basis for the holding that no election in fact did take place. This contention is, however,
unavailing, in the light of our holding last month in Usman v. Comelec.4 The other principal question raised is whether the
recognition of such prerogative on the part of respondent Commission would contravene the constitutional provision that it
cannot pass on the right to vote. The appropriate answer as will be made clear is likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence,
respondent Commission must be sustained.

The case had its origin from a petition filed on December 16, 1970, by respondent Abubakar and the other
candidates,5 superseding an earlier one dated December 7, 1970 alleging that in the towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, no
elections were in effect held in view of massive violence, terrorism and fraud.6 The respondents named therein, including now
petitioner Pungutan, answered on December 18, 1970 to the effect that the elections were duly held in the above-mentioned
municipalities and denied the allegation as to the existence of massive fraud, terrorism and serious irregularities. The case was
duly heard, with oral testimony from five chairmen of certain precincts in Tapul, five teachers from Parang, five teachers from
Luuk and three teachers from Siasi, followed by an examination of the precinct book of voters from said towns and the
fingerprints and signatures of those who voted, as shown at the back of CE Form No. 1 and CE Form No. 39 for the 1970
elections for the Constitutional Convention.

After reciting the relevant facts, respondent Commission came to this conclusion: "In the light of the foregoing findings of the
Commission with respect to the manner in which the elections were conducted in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk, the
Commission is of the opinion that the elections in said municipalities were just as bad if not worse than the elections in
Karomatan, Lanao del Norte. Actually no elections were held in said municipalities as the voting was done by persons other
than the registered voters while armed men went from precinct to precinct, prepared the ballots and dictated how the election
returns were to be prepared. The same reasons which compelled the Commission to reject the returns from Karomatan and to
consider said returns as no returns at all or spurious or manufactured returns not one notch above returns prepared at gunpoint
(again paraphrasing in the reverse the second Pacis case) compel us with much greater justification to find that the returns from
Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk are spurious returns or manufactured returns and no returns at all and that the elections in said
municipalities are sham."7 The above findings of fact found support in the light of the competent and credible evidence
sustaining that the most flagrant irregularities did attend the so-called elections in Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk.

As to Siasi: "In Siasi where there were 21,688 registered voters it was made to appear that 20,970 had voted. However, the
result of the examination of the thumbmarks and signatures of those who voted compared with the fingerprints of the registered
voters appearing in their registration record, CE Form 1 showed that only 460 of the registered voters had been definitely
established to have actually voted, 131 identified through the thumbmarks and 329 by their signatures. The 11,154 of those who
voted were found to be substitute voters: 7,557 were discovered to be voters voting in substitution of the registered voters
through their thumbmarks and 3,597 through their signatures. No opinion was made with respect to the rest of the votes cast
because not all of the 13,282 voters whose thumbprints could not be analyzed were referred to the NBI for signature
examination. Only 4,631 of these blurred thumbprints from 28 precincts were referred to the NBI for signature examination.
Examination of these 4,631 signatures revealed that 3,597 were by persons other than the registered voters, only 329 were by the
register voters and no opinion could be rendered with respect to 705 for lack of sufficient basis of comparison. In 26 precincts of
Siasi there was 100% voting but not necessarily by the registered voters. The overall average for the whole town is 96.6%
voting. There were 80 persons who were able to vote without any CE Form 1 or without voting in the name of the voters
registered in the precinct."8

With respect to Tapul: "In Tapul where there were 12,223 registered voters it appeared that 11,575 votes were cast. 197 persons
were able to vote without CE Form No. 1 without using the names of registered voters in the precinct. When the thumbprints
corresponding to the 11,575 votes cast were examined by the Fingerprint Identification Division of the Commission, only 3
were found to be identical with the thumbprints of the registered voters in their registration record: one each in Precincts 8, 29
and 20-A. 5,300 thumbmarks were found to be not identical with the corresponding thumbmarks of the registered voters in their
registration records, CE Form 1. 6,199 thumbmarks, however, could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or
faint. Of these 6,199 blurred thumbprints from 56 precincts, 4,187 from 31 precincts were referred to the NBI handwriting
experts for signature examination. The result of said examination by the NBI of these 4,187 signatures showed that only 13 were
found to be identical with the signatures of the registered voters in their registration record, CE Form 1, while 2,897 were those
of persons other than the registered voters. No opinion could be rendered on 1,277 signatures for lack of sufficient basis of
comparison."9 Further: "It appeared, therefore, that in the whole town of Tapul out of the 11,575 votes cast only 13 were
definitely established as cast by the registered voters. 8,197 were definitely established as cast by substitute voters. No opinion
could be rendered with respect to 1,277 for lack of sufficient basis, 2,012 were not examined anymore since these were in
precincts where the number of substitute voting had been found to constitute a very high percentage. It has been also established
that on Election Day about one hundred men armed with long arms were seen going around from precinct to precinct in Tapul
driving away the voters and instructing the teachers-inspectors on how to prepare the election returns. Some of the ballot boxes
were seen to have been brought to the Municipal Treasurer's office early in the afternoon of Election Day hours before the
closing of voting. Nineteen (19) precincts of Tapul reported 100% voting while the over-all percentage of voting in the whole
municipality was 94.5%." 10

Then came the recital as to Parang: "In Parang, where there were 11,761 registered voters in 67 precincts, it was made to appear
that 11,083 votes were cast. 66 voters who were not registered in the precinct were able to vote illegally without even using the
names of the registered voters therein. An examination of the thumbprints of those who voted appearing in CE Form 39 or at the
back of CE Form 1 compared with the corresponding thumbprints of the registered voters appearing in their registration record
in CE Form 1 showed that only 39 thumbprints of the registered voters in his CE Form 1, while 4,698 were different from those
of the registered voters. 6,539 thumbmarks could not be analyzed because they were blurred, smudged or faint. However, only
2,647 of these 6,539 smudged thumbprints were referred to the NBI for signature examination since the rest of said blurred
thumbmarks were in precincts where a high percentage of non-identical thumbmarks was already discovered. 1,573 signatures
were found to be by persons other than the registered voters and only 83 were found to be identical with those of the registered
voters. No opinion could be rendered with respect to 991 signatures for lack of sufficient basis. In 20 precincts it was made to
appear that all the registered voters had voted. The overall percentage for the whole town of Parang was 94%. The evidence also
showed that in a number of precincts in Parang armed men had entered the polling places and prepared the ballots. The
registered voters were not able to vote." 11 Lastly, as to Luuk: "In Luuk where there were 13,124 registered voters, 12,263 votes
were cast. 281 persons who were not registered voters in this precinct were able to vote illegally without even using the names
of the registered voters. The thumbprints of those who voted appearing in their voting record either in CE Form 1 or in CE Form
39 compared with the thumbprints of the registered voters appearing in the voter's registration record in CE Form 1 showed that
only 22 of the thumbmarks of those who voted were identical with the thumbmarks of the registered voters, while 6,021 were
found to be different from those of the registered voters. 6,134 thumbmarks could not, however, be analyzed because they were
found to be blurred, smudged or faint. However, the signatures of those who voted in 13 precincts were examined by the NBI
and it was found that the said signatures were written by just a few persons as explained with greater particularity in the earlier
pages of this resolution." 12
In the light of the above and finding no need to determine how the election was in fact conducted as to Pata, Patikul, Indanan,
Panamao, South Ubian, Balimbing, Bongao and Tandubas, it was the holding of the Commission in the resolution of May 14,
1971: "1. To rule by unanimous vote that the returns from the 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of
Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk are spurious and/or manufactured returns or no returns at all and as such should be excluded
from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone congressional district of the province of Sulu; 2. To hold also by
unanimous vote that further hearings on the petition of [Benjamin Abubakar, et al] for the rejection or exclusion from the
canvass of the returns from Indanan, Panamao, Pata, Tandubas South Ubian, Patikul, Bongao and Balimbing would no longer be
necessary, it appearing that the results of the election would no longer be affected by the returns from said municipalities after
the rejection of the returns from the four towns of Siasi, Tapul, Parang and Luuk and, therefore, for the purpose of the
completion of the canvass, to direct the Board of Canvassers to include the returns from said municipalities in the canvass; 3. By
majority vote of the members of the Commission to direct the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu to reconvene in Jolo and
complete the canvass excluding from said canvass the returns from the towns of Siasi, Parang, Tapul, and Luuk and to proclaim
the 3rd winning candidate at 5:00 P.M. on May 28, 1971, unless restrained by the Supreme Court." 13 On May 22, 1971, this
petition for the review of the above resolution of May 14, 1971 of respondent Commission was filed. Three days later, a
resolution was adopted by this Court requiring respondents to file an answer not later than June 4, 1971. Both respondent
Commission on Elections and respondent Abubakar duly filed their answers on said date. Respondent Commission took pains to
explain with even more detail why such a resolution had to be issued considering the "massive voting anomalies ranging from
substitute voting to grabbing of ballots to preparation of election returns and other election documents at gunpoint" thus
justifying its conclusion that the elections in the four towns amounted to a sham. The case was heard on June 8, 1971 with
petitioner Pungutan represented by Attorney Jose W. Diokno. Respondent Abubakar, represented by Attorney Jovito R.
Salonga, sought permission to submit a memorandum, which was received by this Court on June 28, 1971. Petitioner was given
the opportunity to reply thereto, and he did so in his memorandum filed with this Court on October 18, 1971. The case was
deemed submitted on December 3, 1971. It is the decision of this Court, as noted at the outset, after a careful study of the
pleadings and in the light of our decision last month in Usman v. Commission on Elections 14 that the challenged resolution of
respondent Commission of May 14, 1971 is in accordance with law. The petition must therefore fail.

1. There is no merit to the contention that respondent Commission is devoid of power to disregard and annul the alleged returns
from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or
manufactured. So we have held on facts analogous in character in the above Usman decision rendered last month. Nor is it to be
wondered at. Any other view would indict itself for lack of fealty to reason and to the realities of the situation. It goes without
saying that what is contemplated in the law is that the electors in the exercise of their free will can go to the polls and exercise
their right of suffrage, with the boards of inspectors crediting each candidate with the votes duly obtained after an honest count.
It is on that basis that election returns are to be made. Where no such election was in fact held as was found by respondent
Commission with respect to the four towns, it is not only justified but it is its clear duty to stigmatize the alleged returns as
clearly spurious and manufactured and therefore bereft of any value. The words of Justice Castro, in the Usman decision,
referring to the election returns from Karomatan, considered as likewise not entitled to credit because of their lack of integrity
and authenticity, are opposite: "These circumstances definitely point, not merely to a few isolated instances of irregularities
affecting the integrity and authenticity of the election returns, but to an organized, well-directed large-scale operation to make a
mockery of the elections in Karomatan. We find and so hold that the election returns from the 42 precincts in question were
prepared under circumstances conclusively showing that they are false, and are so devoid of value as to be completely unworthy
of inclusion in the canvass. We have no alternative but to affirm the Comelec's finding that they are spurious and
manufactured." 15 Nor is it to be lost sight of that the power to reject returns of such a character has been exercised most
judiciously. Even a cursory perusal of the mode and manner of inquiry conducted by respondent Commission resulting in the
challenged resolution should suffice to remove any doubt as to the absence of any impropriety or improvidence in the exercise
of such a prerogative. Clearly, there was care and circumspection to assure that the constitutional objective of insuring that an
election be "free, orderly and honest" be realized. If, under the circumstances disclosed, a different conclusion were arrived at,
then certainly there is a frustration of such an ideal. Moreover, this Court has not displayed any reluctance in yielding the
imprimatur of its approval to the action taken by respondent Commission in the discharge of its constitutional function of the
enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The long line of decisions especially so since Cauton v. Commission
on Elections, 16 is not susceptible of any other interpretation. Only thus may there be an assurance that the canvassing and
proclamation reflect with fidelity and accuracy the true results of an election, in fact actually held. We do so again. As a matter
of fact, such a sympathetic approach to the results arrived at in the discharge of its functions started with the leading case
of Sumulong v. Commission on Elections. 17 As was so well put by Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos: "The Commission
on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the
discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created -- free, orderly
and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross
abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere." 18 The same approach is reflected in the opinion of the Chief Justice
in Lucman v. Dimaporo when as he pointed out if "pursuant to our Administrative Law, the findings of fact of administrative
organs created by ordinary legislation will not be disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or
no substantial evidence in support of such findings ... there is no reason to believe that the framers of our Constitution intended
to place the Commission on Elections — created and explicitly made 'independent' by the Constitution itself — on a lower level
than said statutory administrative organs; ... ." 19

2. The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the utmost significance. It is a right without which the principle
of sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. 20 In the traditional terminology, it is a political right enabling every
citizen to participate in the process of government to assure that it derives its power from the consent of the governed. What was
so eloquently expressed by Justice Laurel comes to mind: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and
safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great
reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type
of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of
the established authority."21

How such a right is to be exercised is regulated by the Election Code. 22 Its enforcement under the Constitution is, as noted,
vested in respondent Commission. Such a power, however, is purely executive or administrative. So it was characterized by the
Chief Justice in Abcede v. Imperial: 23 "Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although independent of the
President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.' ...."

It becomes obvious then why the right to vote, a denial of which should find redress in the judiciary as the guardian of
constitutional rights, is excluded from the authority vested in respondent Commission. If the exclusion of the returns from the
four towns in Sulu involved a question as to such a right, then, clearly, what the Commission did was beyond its competence.
Such is not the case however. What is deemed outside such a sphere is the determination of whether or not a person can exercise
or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage. Thus, the question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters is
properly judicial. 24 As to whether or not an election has been held is a question of a different type. It is properly within the
administrative jurisdiction of respondent Commission. If, as is our decision, no such voting did take place, considering the
massive irregularities that attended it in the four towns, then the exclusion of the alleged returns is not tainted by infirmity. In
that sense, the second issue raised by petitioner that in so acting the respondent Commission exceeded its constitutional power
by encroaching on terrain properly judicial, the right to vote being involved, is likewise to be resolved against him. At any rate,
what was set forth by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Diaz v. Commission on
Elections 25 would likewise dispose of such a contention adverse to petitioner. Thus: "It is pleaded by respondents that the
rejection of the Sagada returns would result in the disfranchisement of a large number of legitimate voters. But such
disfranchisement would only be provisional, subject to the final determination of the validity of the votes at the protest that may
be filed with the Constitutional Convention." 26

3. As to the plea in the prayer of the petition that in the event that the challenged resolution of May 14, 1971 as to the power of
respondent Commission is sustained, a special election be called by it in all the 290 precincts in the four municipalities of Siasi,
Tapul, Parang and Luuk, it suffices to refer to our ruling in Usman v. Commission on Elections, where a similar point was raised
without success. So it should be in this case. We see no reason to order such a special election. 27

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated May 14, 1971 is affirmed.
The Commission on Elections is directed to order the board of canvassers to convene without delay and forthwith proceed with
and complete the canvass of the election returns from all the precincts of Sulu, excluding therefrom all the election returns from
107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk, and thereafter proclaim the
winning candidate for the third Constitutional Convention seat allotted to the said province. This decision is hereby declared
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

Concurs without committing himself as to whether or not the same considerations herein invoked would apply to elections other
than those of the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

Concurs without committing himself as to whether or not the same considerations herein invoked would apply to elections other
than those of the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
G.R. No. 128054 October 16, 1997

KILOSBAYAN, INC., FERNANDO A. SANTIAGO, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, EMILIO C. CAPULONG JR.,

RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, FRANKLIN DRILON, CESAR SARINO, LEONORA V.
DE JESUS, TIBURCIO RELUCIO, RONALDO V. PUNO, BENITO R. CATINDIG, MANUEL CALUPITAN III,
VICENTE CARLOS, FRANCISCO CANCIO, JIMMY DURANTE, MELVYN MENDOZA, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, otherwise known as the
"General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1992" allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other
priority projects and activities. In order to be valid, the use and release of said amount would have to proceed upon strict
compliance with the following mandatory requirements: (1) approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) release of the
amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; and (3) list of projects and activities.

In a letter, dated March 17, 1992, respondent Cesar Sarino, the then Secretary of Interior and Local Government, requested for
authority to negotiate, enter into a sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) in
order to utilize them to implement the projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180.

Thereafter, in an undated letter1, respondent Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the above-mentioned request
of secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG).

Pursuant to the above-described authority granted him as the then Regional Director of the DILG-NCR, respondent Tiburcio
Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement2 with an accredited NGO known as the "Philippine
Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc." (PYHSDFI).

The PYHSDFI was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on October 25, 1985 as a non-stock, non-
profit foundation with principal address at AFMC Building, Amorsolo Street, Makati City.3 Its incorporators were private
respondents Benito Catindig, President; Manuel Calupitan, Vice-President; Francisco Cancio, Treasurer; Melvin Mendoza,
Secretary, and Ronaldo Puno, Chairman.4

The PYHSDFI was organized to promote among the youth, consciousness and greater involvement and participation in sports
and cultural development activities through training camps and demonstration seminars conducted by qualified experts in the
field.5

Not long after its incorporation, that is, in 1987, the PHYSDFI suspended its operations because of lack of fund donations and
the migration to the United States of many of its members.6 The foundation became active again in October, 1991.7

In order to be eligible for financial assistance, the PYHSDFI, on December 12, 1991, applied with the DILG for accreditation as
NGO in accordance with the guidelines prescribed in Memorandum Circular No. 90-07, dated January 31, 1990.8

On March 23, 1992, the PYHSDFI approved Board Resolution No. 7, series of 1992, requesting for allocation from the
government's CDF in order to implement its various sports, health, and cultural activities in specific areas in Metro
Manila.9 Hence, the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 24, 1992 was entered into by PYHSDFI President Catindig and
DILG-NCR Regional Director Relucio. In compliance with accreditation requirements of the DILG, the PYHSDFI, on April 27,
1992, filed with the SEC a new set of by-laws.10

Under the said Memorandum of Agreement, it was the express responsibility of the DILG to effect the release and transfer to
PYHSDFI of the amount of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000.000.00)11 from the aggregate allocation of the CDF for the
complete implementation of the foundation's sports, health and cultural work program.
Respondent Salvador Enriquez, as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), signed on April 22, 1992
and released on April 30, 1992, Advice of Allotment (AA) No. BC-8494-92-215 dated April 22, 1992, allocating the amount of
Seventy Million Pesos from the CDF under object 200-10 to cover financial assistance for sports, health and cultural programs
and other related activities in the various barangays in the National Capital
Region.12

The release of the Seventy Million Pesos was made in several checks13:

Date PNB Check No. Amount

May 5, 1992 138051 P23,000,000.00

May 5, 1992 138052 P23,000,000.00

May 6, 1992 138060 P24,000.000.00

During the hearing of the Senate Committee on Finance on November 22, 1993, DILG Budget Officer Rafael Barata confirmed
the above allotment as part of the amount of Three Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P330,000,00000) that was released by the
DBM from the 1992 CDF. The exact amount released to DILG-NCR was P70,099,393.00 while the amounts released to the
other regions are as follows:

Region I — P 14,942,834.00

Region II — 108,000.00

Region III — 19,115,000.00

Region IV — 74,131,150.00

Region V — 25,047,991.00

Region VI — 5,545,000.00

Region VII — 20,159,500.00

Region VIII — 23,006,600.00

Region IX — 19,900,900.00

Region X — 25,356,012.00

Region XII — 9,549,000.00

CAR — 10,300,000.00

The total amount disbursed under the CDF was P330,470,688.00.

On December 14, 1993, public respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter
informing the former of "two . . . serious violations of election laws"14, thus:

1. The documented admission of Secretary of Budget Salvador Enriquez, in the October 5, 1993 hearing of the Commission on
Appointments, that the amount of P70 million was released by his department, shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in
favor of a private entity, the so-called "Philippine Youth, Health and Sports Development Foundation," headed by Mr. Ronaldo
Puno, who had been repeatedly identified by columnist Teodoro Benigno as a key member of the Sulu Hotel Operation (SHO),
which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said elections. . . .

2. The illegal diversion of P330 million by Malacanang from the Countryside Development Fund to the Department of Interior
and Local Government which disbursed this huge amount shortly before the May 11, 1992 elections, as revealed by DILG
Budget Officer Barata, in a hearing of the Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Sen. Vicente Sotto III, held last November 22,
1993.15

and "request[ing] that . . . these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially, without fear or
favor, so that public confidence in the integrity and purity of the electoral process may be immediately restored for the sake of
our newly-regained democracy"16

On December 14, 1993, then Comelec Chairman Christian Monsod called a meeting of the Comelec En Banc which resolved to
refer petitioner Kilosbayan's letter-complaint to the Law Department for comment and/or recommendation.17 Said letter-
complaint was docketed as E.O. Case No. 93-193.

The evidence proffered by Kilosbayan in support of its letter-complaint consisted of the published writings of Teodoro
Benigno18 in his column in the Philippine Star newspaper imputing to the so-called Sulo Hotel Operation (SHO) headed by
PYHSDFI's chairman, Ronaldo Puno, the commission of illegal election activities during the May 11, 1992 elections, including
the obtention of government funds for electioneering purposes; the transcripts of record of the testimony of Secretary Enriquez
before the Commission on Appointments during a hearing on October 5, 1993 and of the testimony of DILG Budget Officer
Rafael Barata before the Senate Finance Committee during a hearing on November 22, 1993; and an Affidavit executed by
Norberto Gonzales, a congressional candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections, who alleged therein that at the Makati
Headquarters of the Lakas-NUCD, in February, 1992, he overheard respondents Franklin Drilon and Leonora de Jesus
discussing party plans to use the funds of various government offices to finance the party's election campaign and that ten (10)
days or so before May 11, 1992, he obtained his election propaganda materials, following instructions from the party's National
Headquarters, from the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City.

In a Memorandum dated March 28, 1994, Comelec Commissioner Regalado Maambong informed Chairman Christian Monsod
that petitioner Kilosbayan "[has already] presented their affidavits and supporting documents and [that] it is now time for the
respondents to be subpoenaed and for them to present their counter-affidavits and supporting documents, if any, relative to the
complaint of the Kilosbayan for illegal disbursement of public funds in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections 19.

On March 29, 1994, the Comelec En Banc, during its regular meeting, directed Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director of Law
Department, to issue the proper subpoenas and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the hearing of the Kilosbayan letter-
complaint; to proceed in accordance with the Comelec Rules and Procedure relative to the investigation of cases involving
election offenses; and to submit a complete report within ten (10) days from the termination of the investigation.20

Director Balbuena issued a subpoena dated April 17, 199421 addressed to respondents Salvador Enriquez, Ronaldo Puno,
Francisco Cancio, Vicente Carlos, Jimmy Durante, Melvin Mendoza and "Other John Does" requiring them to appear at the
Office of the Director on April 28, 1994 and to submit their respective counter-affidavits and other supporting documents, if
any, in connection with petitioner Kilosbayan's letter-complaint against them.

On May 10, 1994, respondents Melvin Mendoza and Salvador Enriquez filed their respective counter-affidavits22specifically
denying all the accusatory allegations in petitioner Kilosbayan's letter-complaint.

On May 25, 1994, respondent Vicente Carlos submitted his counter-affidavit23

For his part, respondent Francisco Cancio filed a Manifestation24 dated May 24, 1994 that he cannot submit his counter-affidavit
due to lack of material time.

Thereafter, petitioner Kilosbayan manifested that it will file a consolidated reply to the Counter-Affidavits of respondents
Mendoza, Enriquez and Carlos. In order to give petitioner Kilosbayan sufficient time to prepare its consolidated reply, the
hearing was set on June 6, 1994.

When June 6, 1994 came, however, petitioner Kilosbayan filed, not a consolidated reply, but a pleading denominated as
"Interrogatories"25 dated May 20, 1994 Said pleading contained a list of questions sought to be propounded to respondents
Enriquez, Carlos and Mendoza in an attempt to elicit from them confirmation regarding the questioned CDF allotment,
specifically the cash allocation received by PYHSDFI, and the consumption thereof by PYHSDFI chairman Ronaldo Puno's
SHO for its reported illegal election campaign activities during the May 11, 1992 elections.
Amidst opposition forged by respondents Enriquez and Mendoza, the Comelec Law Department, through Director Balbuena,
scheduled the clarificatory questioning on July 9, 1994.26

Through a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1994, respondent Enriquez persisted to question the legality of the
scheduled clarificatory questioning on the ground that the same is in violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Said motion, however, was denied by the Comelec Law Department through Director Balbuena.

Thus, respondents Enriquez and Mendoza filed separate Petitions for Certiorari27 before the Comelec En Bancassailing the
afore-mentioned orders of Director Balbuena.

The Comelec En Banc treated said petitions as motions for reconsideration or petitions for review, of the orders of Director
Balbuena giving due course to petitioner Kilosbayan's Interrogatories and scheduling the same for hearing. Ultimately, it ruled
in favor of respondents Enriquez and Mendoza and held that the questions sought by petitioner Kilosbayan to be propounded by
Director Balbuena to said respondents, are being raised in a preliminary investigation during which any person being accused of
an offense, has the right to remain silent, among others.28

On February 9, 1995, the Comelec En Banc, during its regular meeting, promulgated Minute Resolution No. 95-0713 approving,
with modification, the recommendations of the Law Department, as follows:

1. To dismiss the complaint against Secretary Salvador Enriquez, Jr. for insufficiency of evidence to establish a probable cause;

2. To hold in abeyance the case against Ronald Puno, Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza, Francisco Cancio and Jimmy Durante,
and to direct the Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct further rigid and extensive investigation on the alleged irregularities
or anomalies stated in its report dated November 15, 1993 and to submit its report on such investigation including pertinent
papers thereof, which shall be included in the re-evaluation of the existing documents pertaining to the PYHSDFI before the
case of the above respondents be re-submitted to this Commission for resolution;

3. To order the Law Department to summon Atty. Tiburcio A. Relucio, former Regional NCR-DILG Director to shed light on
the Kilosbayan complaint or the P70 million which were allotted by his office to the PYHSDFI shortly before the May 11, 1992
synchronized national and local elections;

4. To direct the Law Department to send a letter to former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino to explain allotments and sub-
allotments per evaluation report of the Law Department . . . ; [and]

5. To direct the Kilosbayan to identify, under oath, the John Does in their complaint.29

Dismissing the case against respondent Enriquez, whose evidence of strict compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7180
prior to the release of the Seventy Million Pesos to PYHSDFI, was significantly left unrebutted by petitioner Kilosbayan, the
Comelec En Banc reserved the disposition of the case against Ronaldo Puno and other PYHSDFI officers until after submission
by the COA of a more detailed report of the nature and extent of the anomalous practices of the PYHSDFI in the utilization of
the CDF money allocated thereto. Easily understandable is the need for further investigation by the COA, considering that
nothing on the Special Audit Report on PYHSDFI's CDF allocation imputed the use thereof for electioneering activities.

In response, however, to the letter of the Comelec Law Department dated August 20, 1995 requesting the COA to conduct a
more rigid and extensive investigation, COA Chairman Celso Gangan wrote Director Balbuena on September 12, 1995 that "the
facts stated in our report dated November 15, 1993 are already complete; that the report does not make mention of irregularities
or anomalies, rather deficiencies like lack of supporting documents to fully substantiate the disbursements . . . although the
distribution of funds by the Foundation is supported by a list . . .30

On the same day, August 20, 1995, a letter was also sent to respondent Cesar Sarino, former DILG Secretary, requesting him to
submit a verified explanation regarding the sub-allotments issued by his office on several dates in February and March, 1992, as
well as some various sub-allotments issued by respondent Leonora de Jesus, then Undersecretary of the DILG.

In the meantime, in a letter dated August 18, 1995, Director Balbuena asked petitioner Kilosbayan to "identify, under oath, the
John Does in their complaint". Responding through a letter31, petitioner Kilosbayan, through its Acting President, Cirilo Rigos,
gave the following names:
Cesar Sarino Victor Sumulong

Leonora de Jesus Dionisio de la Serna

Jose Almonte Gabriel Claudio

Franklin Drilon

The above-named respondents were duly subpoenaed. Thereafter, they filed their respective Comments and/or Answers.

On November 13, 1995, respondent Cesar Sarino submitted his Sworn Explanation/Comment remonstrating that the questioned
sub-allocations were approved after a strict compliance with the proscribed time frame under the law which was March 27, 1992
until May 2, 1992 and the prohibition against public work expenditures.

Respondent Gabriel Claudio filed his Comment/Answer on December 12, 1995 contending that he had not yet joined
government at any time before the May 11, 1992 elections.

Respondent Franklin Drilon filed his Comment on January 29, 1996 denouncing as hearsay the sole evidence against him
consisting of Teodoro Benigno's newspaper articles implicating him in the SHO.

Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong and Jose Almonte, who were additionally named as respondents by petitioner
Kilosbayan, denied any knowledge or participation in the election offenses subject of the letter-complaint and objected thereto
for failure to state, with particularity, the acts that they had supposedly committed in violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Likewise, they pointed out that Teodoro Benigno newspaper articles constituted hearsay evidence bereft of any probative value.

Insofar as respondent, then DILG-NCR Regional Director, Tiburcio Relucio was concerned, the Law Department was unable to
subpoena him because he was abroad.

No rebuttal evidence was tendered by petitioner Kilosbayan to dispute the counter-allegations of herein respondents. Notably,
too, petitioner Kilosbayan did not offer any additional evidence, in place of Teddy Benigno's published newspaper articles
implicating PYHSDFI's Ronaldo Puno and the SHO's electioneering activities during the 1992 elections, in order to show even
some semblance of a connection between the PYHSDFI's CDF allotment and the SHO's electioneering activities.

On April 3, 1996, the Comelec Law Department issued the following findings and recommendations:

SYNOPSIS OF CASE

[1] TITLE:

KILOSBAYAN VS. SECRETARY SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., ET AL.

[2] DOCKET NUMBER

E.O. Case No. 93-193

[3] LAW ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED:

Section 261 (o), (v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code. (Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, . . . , for an election
campaign; Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of public works; and
Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and
similar devices).

[4] FINDINGS:

The Law Department finds that there is insufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents Ronaldo Puno,
Secretary Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza, Francisco Cancio, Jimmy Durante, Hon. Cesar N. Sarino, Leonora V. de Jesus, Jose
Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong, Franklin Drilon and Gabriel (Gabby) Claudio have committed the acts being
complained of and are probably guilty thereof and should be held for further proceedings (trial) considering that the allegations
in the complaint are plain conjectures, speculations and based on hearsay evidence. The other set of evidence which was
obtained through coercive processes of the Commission did not show that the acts are reflected therein come within the
proscription of Section 261 (o), (v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code.

[5] RECOMMENDATION:

To dismiss the complaint of Kilosbayan against all the respondents.

xxx xxx xxx 32

The details of the investigation and a complete discussion of the evidence submitted by the contending parties are laid out in the
16-page
Study33 attached to the aforecited Synopsis of the Case. Essentially, the Law Department evaluated the evidence in this wise:

The provisions of the Omnibus Election Code that may have been possibly violated by the respondents in the KILOSBAYAN
complaint, are as follows:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts — the following shall be guilty of an election offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the government for an election
campaign. — Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever, directly or indirectly, (1)) public funds or money deposited
with, or held in trust by; public financing institutions or by government offices, banks, or agencies; . . . . for any election
campaign or for any partisan political activity.

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. — Any public official or employee including
barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days
before a regular election and thirty days before special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:

(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the Following:

xxx xxx xxx

(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants
and similar devices. — during the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election,
any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding
paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other
things of value chargeable against public funds.

The Commission on Audit, thru its Chairman, pointed out in its letter dated September 12, 1995, that the facts stated in their
report dated November 15, 1993 are already complete and that the report does not make mention of irregularities or anomalies,
rather deficiencies like lack of supporting documents to fully substantiate the disbursements, such that although the distribution
of funds by the Foundation is supported by a list, this does not show the acknowledgment by the supposed recipients.

Although the report of the COA dated November 15, 1993 mentioned that upon the start of the audit, it was disclosed that
PYHSDFI did not keep book of accounts, wherein to record its transactions, which constitute[s] a basic requirement in the
accounting for funds and "all it had to evidence its disbursements are vouchers, many of which are not supported by receipts or
other documents", it does not show that the public funds released to it by the DILG was used for any election campaign or for
any partisan political activity. The report says:

2) The inadequate financial reports, book of accounts and other supporting documents rendered verification of total
disbursements of P70M difficult.

This consist or the following:

a) Meals/snacks P14,465,000
b) Prof. fees/allowances
travel expenses P17,881,500
c) Rental site/facilities P3,441,480
d) Purchases of supplies
and materials P34,221,020
——————
P70,000,000

This particular part of the report of the COA also clearly showed that the public funds in the hands of the PYHSDFI were not
used for any and all kinds of public works.

Further it says:

3.A In most of the transactions undertaken, cash payments [were] used in paying their obligations, since it would have been
significantly expensive in overhead cost to maintain a pool of administrative staff and besides no allocation of such expenses
[was] programmed. Moreover, most [the] expenses were in the category of payrolls which [had] to be paid in cash. [L]ikewise
suppliers asked for cash-on-delivery (COD) basis since the prices given were the lowest obtainable commercial rates.

This showed that not all obligations of the PYHSDFI were paid in cash, in other words, the other obligations were paid in other
forms which may be checks or any other device undertaking future delivery of money. However, no single piece of evidence
was presented by Kilosbayan to prove its complaint to determine whether they (checks) have been issued within the prohibited
period.

In the light of the foregoing, the Law Department reiterates its former findings in its Study for Agenda dated February 8, 1995
that "in the case of respondents Ronald Puno, Secretary Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza, Francisco Cancio and Jimmy
Durante, based on the existing documents appearing on the records, no probable cause exists against them for violation of the
election law". It is well-settled that the complainant must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the respondent[s].

In the case of Hon. Cesar N. Sarino, he alleged that his approvals of the sub-allocations reflect a strict compliance with the law
and do not violate Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code as their approval [was] not within the proscribed time frame as
designated by the Commission on Elections, and Advice of Sub-allotment No. DILG-92-2-128 covers a type of expenditure
which is not a public works expenditure, hence, not violative of said provision of law.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [A]n incisive, careful, meticulous and rigid review and re-evaluation of the above-listed sub-allotments revealed, that the
nine (9) sub-allotments approved by former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino which appeared to be for construction of public works
are actually nine (9) pages of five (5) sub-allotments . . . and the one (1) sub-allotment issued by Undersecretary Leonora V. de
Jesus which appeared to be for construction of public works is actually:

(b) Sub-allotment No. Date of Approval Pane No.

1] 92-1-90 March 19, 1992 1

To be liable for violation of Section 261 (v), supra, four (4) essential elements must concur and they are:

1) A public official or employee releases, disburses, or expends any public funds;

2) The release, disbursement or expenditure of such public funds must be within forty-five days before regular election (March
27, 1992 until May 11, 1992, Section 1, Comelec Resolution No. 2332, Jan. 02, 1992);

3) The release, disbursement or expenditure of said public funds is for any and all kinds of public works; and

4) The release, disbursement or expenditure of the public funds should not clover any of the exceptions of Section 261 (v).
Except for Sub-allotment No. 92-1-94 and Sub-allotment No. 92-2-128 approved on March 27, 1992 and April 22, 1992,
respectively, by former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino, not one of the sub-allotments listed above does fall within the proscribed
period. Sub-allotment No. 92-1-98 was approved to cover the improvement/rehabilitation of Cabucgayan Waterworks System of
Cabucgayan, Leyte. This falls within the exception (maintenance of existing and/or completed public works projects) of the
proscription being merely a rehabilitation of an existing public works project. Sub-allotment No. 92-2-128 was not for any and
all kinds of public works. It was approved to cover the purchase of reference and instructional materials for distribution to all
local executives of the 2nd District of Surigao del Norte in support of the Educational Upliftment Program of the DILG, hence,
it could not also fall within the proscription. The sub-allotment approved by Undersecretary Leonora V. de Jesus, which
appeared to be for the construction of public works, having been approved on March 19, 1992 does not fall within the
proscriptive period, hence, it could not also fall within the proscription.

xxx xxx xxx

Prescinding from the foregoing documents appearing on [the] records, there exists no sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that former DILG Secretary Cesar Sarino and Undersecretary Leonora V. de Jesus have violated Section 261 (v)
of the Omnibus Election Code.

The Law Department must stress here that the allegations appearing in the columns of Teodoro Benigno in the Philippine Star
on several dates imputing dirty "election tricks and practices" (as worded by Kilosbayan) against respondents Jose Almonte,
Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong, Franklin Drilon and Gabriel (Gabby) Claudio cannot be admitted as gospel truth
because they are purely speculative and conjectural. Suffice it to say, that, they are mere hearsay evidence. Well-settled is the
rule that Newspaper clippings are hearsay and of no evidentiary value. (People vs. Jovito Aguel, et al., 97 SCRA 795].

Moreover, former Executive Secretary, now, Senator, Franklin Drilon's undated letter, where he approved the request for
authority dated March 17, 1992 of then former DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino to negotiate, enter into and sign Memoranda of
Agreements with and to utilize the accredited Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in accordance with the directive of
then former President Corazon Aquino dated March 13, 1992, regarding the implementation of projects under the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) provided under R.A. 7180, does not refer to any release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds
for construction of public works.

Consequently, there also exists no sufficient evidence to engender a well-grounded belief that respondents Jose Almonte,
Dionisio de La Serna, Victor Sumulong, Franklin Drilon and Gabriel (Gabby) Claudio have violated Section 261 (o) and (v) of
the Omnibus Election Code.

It would not be amissed to state here in passing that well-enshrined is the rule that the complainant must submit evidence to
prove his case. IN THE INSTANT CASE, COMPLAINANT KILOSBAYAN DID NOT SUBMIT EVIDENCE TO PROVE ITS
CASE. IT POSTULATES THE THEORY THAT SINCE IT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE COMMISSION TO
ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS, IT IS
INCUMBENT TO USE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO SECURE THE NEEDED EVIDENCE. THIS POSITION OF THE
KILOSBAYAN IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS AS IT IS NOT ONLY ITS LEGAL OBLIGATION BUT ALSO ITS MORAL DUTY
TO SUBMIT ITS EVIDENCE TO PROVE ITS COMPLAINT. . . .34

Adopting the foregoing findings and conclusions of the Law Department, the Comelec En Banc promulgated Minute Resolution
No. 96-1037 dismissing the charges against the following: respondents Ronaldo Puno, Vicente Carlos, Melvin Mendoza,
Francisco Cancio and Jimmy Durante for violation of Section 261 (o), (v) and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code; respondents
Cesar Sarino and Leonora de Jesus for violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code; and respondent Franklin
Drilon and others also charged in petitioner's complaint, namely, Jose Almonte, Dionisio de la Serna, Victor Sumulong and
Gabriel Claudio, for violation of Section 261 (o) and (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, all on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to establish probable cause.

Petitioner Kilosbayan, however, brushed off responsibility for adducing evidence of herein respondents' culpability, and
adamantly demanded that the Comelec perform its constitutional duty of prosecution election offenses upon any, even meager,
information of alleged commission of election offenses.
Its complaint having been dismissed in the aforementioned Resolutions dated February 9, 1995 and April 11, 1996, respectively,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 16, 1997 and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7,
1996 seeking the nullification of the said Resolution and praying for the filing of the corresponding criminal complaints and/or
informations against herein respondents.

Reiterating the dismissal of E.O. Case No. 93-193, however, the Comelec denied the motions in the Resolution dated October
30, 1996.35

The Comelec Resolution dated January 20, 1997 contained the detailed basis for the final dismissal of E.O. Case No. 93-193.
Discussing point by point the arguments raised by petitioner in its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc unanimously held, thus:

Movant complains:

The Law Department makes it appear that the KILOSBAYAN has greater responsibility in the enforcement of election laws
than the COMELEC to make it its moral and legal duty to spend its time and private funds to gather evidence from public
offices to convince the COMELEC that there is sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

It may do well to remember that the Constitution charged the COMELEC with the responsibility to . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(6) . . . where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices. (emphasis theirs)

The Commission has no quarrel with Complainant that indeed the Constitution tasked this Body with the prosecution of election
offenses. But the constitutional provision made it clear that the prosecution should be made only where it is appropriate. It is
appropriate when it is established in a preliminary investigation that probable cause exist to justify the filing of the necessary
information against the accused.

Lest the Complainant forgets, it initiated the complaint. Thus, on it rests the burden of supporting its charges with affidavits
and/any evidence, for it is upon the evidence thus adduced, that the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. This is so provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure . . . .

Nonetheless, even with Complainant's failure to submit evidence substantial enough to justify findings of probable cause, the
Commission, through its Law Department undertook an investigation of the case. The Law Department summoned the parties,
took testimonies of witnesses, secured documents, and conducted hearings. The result of the preliminary investigation was
certainly on the basis of the evidences adduced by complainant and the facts gathered by the Department on its own initiative.

xxx xxx xxx

No other evidence except Mr. Benigno's articles were submitted [by petitioner] to prove the existence of the so-called Sulo
Hotel Operations. "Newspaper clippings are hearsay and of no evidentiary value." (People v. Aquel, et al.. 97 SCRA 795). . . .

[Further] . . . [petitioner] wants the Commission to derive from [the Commission on Audit] report the conclusion that because
there were discrepancies, to wit: 1. No books of accounts [were] maintained by the NGO [i.e., PHYSDFI]; and 2. Cash
payments were made regardless of amount, then the allocation to PHYSDFI were made for electioneering purposes. Indeed,
there could have been, as alleged by Complainant, irregularities in the allocation, but it must be shown by the quantum of
evidence required to establish probable cause that such irregularities constituted election offense. This, Complainant's evidences
failed to show.

xxx xxx xxx

It was established that the PHYSDFI received from DILG-NCR an allocation of P70 Complainant "the nature" of the
allocation and the amount of the expenditures' made by PHYSDFI "within a short period of time, i.e., immediately before the
elections and in the light of the fact that it stopped all its operations shortly after the elections' established beyond reasonable
doubt that the foundation was engaged in partisan political activity. Complainant further averred that the "flight of the heads of
the foundation (Puno and Catindig) and Regional Director Tiburcio A. Relucio who went into hiding after the series of exposes
by columnist Teodoro Benigno . . . constitutes an implied admission of guilt. . . .

It is the Law Department's findings and so is Ours, that the nature and amount of expenditure within a short period of time are
not sufficient to meet the quantum proof required to establish that said contributions were made for partisan political activity. It
must be emphasized that the burden is on Kilosbayan to prove its allegations. He who alleges must prove his allegation.
Unfortunately for Complainant, it was not able to produce evidence showing that the contribution was used for partisan political
activity.

xxx xxx xxx

Complainant posits the view that respondents are liable . . . because the sports and medical kits were unlawful election
propaganda, having been purchased and distributed a few days before election and then stopped after the election. At most, this
is speculative and presumptive. In the absence of proof amply showing that the purchase and distribution of gadgets and kits
were made to advertise or to further the chances of victory of a candidate or candidates, the Commission cannot justify the
conclusion that probable cause exists to charge respondents . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

While it was established by documents thus presented . . . that there was a release of public funds by DILG/DILG-NCR, within
the prohibited period, the same could not be considered as a violation . . . because one, the expenditure was not for public works;
and two, the Department of Interior and Local Government can not be considered as an office of other ministries (departments)
performing functions similar to the Ministry of Social Services and Development or the Ministry of Human Settlements.

Kilosbayan's complaints were heard. They were investigated. Complainant was given opportunity to argue its case and prove its
charges. It presented arguments but not evidences. Its thesis is more on speculations, conjectures and suspicions. It expects the
Commission to find as circumstantial evidence the chain of circumstances which [it] presented, forgetting that:

The rule on circumstantial evidence necessarily requires that each circumstance must be positively established with the requisite
quantum of evidence, in the same manner that the catena that binds them together and conduces to a conclusion of guilt must
survive the test of reason and satisfy the required evidentiary weight. (People vs. Adofina, 239 SCRA 67)

Unfortunately, Complainant failed to substantiate with sufficient evidence the circumstances on which it based the liability of
respondents for offenses charged by way of its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. . . .36

Its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration having been finally denied by the Comelec En
Banc, petitioner Kilosbayan has come before us ascribing grave abuse of discretion to public respondent Comelec for: (1)
refusing and/or neglecting to gather more evidence of respondents' culpability, pursuant to its constitutional duty to prosecute
election offenses, through oral arguments upon petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration as well as from respondents Rolando Puno and Tiburcio Relucio who, petitioner claims, have not gone abroad
but are actually in the country; and (2) for issuing a blanket exoneration of all respondent despite the prima facie evidence
already in the hands of the Comelec.

The Comelec did not commit any act constituting grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner Kilosbayan's letter-
complaint against herein respondents, the former having failed to prove its case against the latter. As such, this petition must be
dismissed.

Section 2 (7) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Comelec shall exercise the power to "investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of elections laws, including act or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices". Discerning the rationale for this grant of prosecutorial powers to the Comelec, we already had
occasion to rule, thus:

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election
and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident
constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the
sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote.37

This constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec finds statutory expression under Section 265 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Sec. 265. Prosecution. — The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission
fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the
fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the Comelec is the "public prosecutor with the exclusive
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus
Election] Code before the competent court."38 This constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and
prosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the
course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued.39

For the effective investigation and prosecution of cases of election offenses and in the exercise by the Comelec of its quasi-
legislative power under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the Comelec Rules of Procedure were promulgated,
providing, among others, the guidelines pertinent to election offenses. They are as follows:

Rule 34 — Prosecution of Election Offenses

Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. — The Commission shall have the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except
as may otherwise be provided by law.

Sec. 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government. — The Chief State Prosecutor, all
Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as deputies of the
Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may
be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the commission or its duly authorized representatives and to
prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission whenever in its judgment such
revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes
that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the Commission.

Sec. 3. Initiation of Complaint. — Initiation of complaint for election offenses may be done motu proprio by the Commission,
or upon written complaint by any citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered political party, coalition of political parties or
organizations under the party-list system or any accredited citizen arms of the Commission.

Sec. 4. Form of Complaint and Where to File. — (a) When not initiated motu propio by the Commission, the complaint must be
verified and supported by affidavits and/or any other evidence. Motu propio complaints may be signed by the Chairman of the
Commission, or the Director of the Law Department upon direction of the chairman, and need not be verified.

(b) The complaint shall be filed with the Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Referral for Preliminary Investigation. — If the complaint is initiated motu proprio by the Commission, or is filed with
the Commission by any aggrieved party, it shall be referred to the Law Department for investigation. Upon direction of the
Chairman of the Commission, the preliminary investigation may be delegated to any lawyer of said Department, or to any of the
Regional Election Directors or Provincial Election Supervisors, or any lawyer of the Commission.
Sec. 6. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. — (a) If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting evidence, the
investigating officer finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint and shall
follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8 (c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching
thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents giving said respondent ten (10) days from receipt
within which to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant.

(b) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall be furnished by him to the
complainant.

(c) If the respondent cannot he subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten-dry period, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(d) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarification
questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter
may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.

(e) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10)
days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Sec. 7. Presumption of Existence of Probable Cause. — A complaint initiated motu proprio by the Commission is presumed to
be based on sufficient probable cause and the investigating officer must forthwith issue the subpoena mentioned in the
immediately preceding section.

Sec. 8. Duty of Investigating Officer. — The preliminary investigation must be terminated within twenty (20) days after receipt
of the counter-affidavits and other evidence of the respondents, and resolution thereof shall be made within five (5) days
hereafter.

(a) If the investigating officer finds no cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall recommend dismissal of the complaint.

(b) If the investigating officer finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution, and the corresponding
information wherein he shall certify under oath that he has examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

(c) In either case, the investigating officer shall, within five (5) days from the rendition of his recommendation, forward the
records of the case to

1) The Director of the Law Department of the Commission in cases investigated by any of the Commission lawyers or field
personnel and

2) The Stale Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal, as the case may be, pursuant to the continuing authority provided for in
Section 2 of this Rule.

Sec. 9. Duty of the Law Department, State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal Upon Receipt of Records. — (a) Within ten
(10) days from receipt of the records stated in paragraph (c) of the immediately preceding section, the State Prosecutor,
Provincial or City Fiscal shall take appropriate action thereon, immediately informing the parties of said action.

(b) In cases investigated by the lawyers or the field personnel of the Commission, the Director of the Law Department shall
review and evaluate the recommendation of said legal officer, prepare a report and make a recommendation to the Commission
affirming, modifying or reversing the same which shall be included in the agenda of the succeeding meeting en banc of the
Commission. If the Commission approves the filing of an information in court against the respondent/s, the Director of the Law
Department shall prepare and sign the information for immediate filing with the appropriate court.
(c) In all other cases, if the recommendation to dismiss or the resolution to file the case in court is approved by State Prosecutor,
Provincial or City Fiscal, they shall likewise approve the Information prepared and immediately cause its filing with the proper
court.

(d) If the recommendation to dismiss is reversed on the ground that a probable cause exists, the State Prosecutor, or the
Provincial or City Fiscal, may, by himself prepare and file the corresponding information against the respondent or direct any of
his assistants to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.

xxx xxx xxx [Emphasis ours].

The Comelec, whenever any election offense charge is filed before it, must have first, before dismissing the same or filing the
corresponding information, conducted the preliminary investigation proper of the case. At this initial stage of criminal
prosecution, is the determination of probable cause, i.e., whether or not there is reason to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrasment of trial40 or as the
Comelec Rules of Procedure phrase it, whether or not "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed"41.

The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill of Rights which enshrines
every citizen's right to due process, the presumption that he is presumed innocent, and the inadmissibility against him of any
damaging evidence obtained in violation of his right against self-incrimination. As Justice Reynato S. Puno has pointed out,
probable cause is neither an "opaque concept in our jurisdiction"42 or a "high level legal abstraction to be the subject of warring
thoughts"43 It constitutes those "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed"44 by the person sought to be judicially indicted. In determining probable cause, however, the
public prosecutor must have been apprised by the complainant of his evidence in support of his accusatory allegations. In other
words, determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of
documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint.

It follows, therefore, that in the instant case, petitioner Kilosbayan must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and
in support of the allegations in its letter-complaint, of such quality as to engender belief in an ordinarily prudent and cautious
man that the offense charged therein has been committed by herein respondents. Indeed probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt45, but it certainly demands more than "bare suspicion"46 and can never be "left
to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic"47. The efforts of petitioner Kilosbayan, thus, in order to successfully
lead to the judicial indictment of respondents, should have gone beyond a largely declamatory condemnation of respondents and
diligently focused on its two-fold obligation of not only substantiating its charges against respondents but also proffering before
the Comelec substantial evidence of respondents' utilization, through conspiratorial, cooperative and/or interrelated acts, of
Seventy Million Pesos from the CDF for electioneering activities in violation of the pertinent provisions on election offenses as
enumerated in the Omnibus Election Code.

In the dispensation of this obligation, however, petitioner Kilosbayan utterly failed. The encompassing narration of the pertinent
facts and circumstances of this case in the early part of this ponencia indubitably shows the complacency, at the least, and the
gross and deliberate negligence, at the most, of petitioner Kilosbayan in presenting sufficient evidence in support of its letter-
complaint.

To salvage its position, however, petitioner Kilosbayan denies the existence, under the 1987 Constitution, of any obligation on
its part to present any evidence of its accusations against respondents in its letter-complaint. Petitioner Kilosbayan asserts that it
is the obligation of the Comelec to search for the evidence needed to judicially indict respondents because it is the agency
empowered to investigate and prosecute cases involving election offenses; that E.O. Case No. 93-193 should, at any rate, be
deemed one filed by the Comelec motu proprio, thus needing no evidence since probable cause is such a case is presumed,
petitioner Kilosbayan having only "requested" for an investigation and the Comelec having proceeded to in fact hold the
investigation, as "requested" by petitioner Kilosbayan; and that the Comelec should already be grateful to petitioner Kilosbayan
for the latter's private efforts at exposing respondents' illegal election activities.

Kilosbayan's position is not tenable.

Indeed, Kilosbayan truly deserves commendation for its continued vigilance against any and all forms of government corruption
that cost this country not only the funds gravely needed to afford each Filipino a decent and honorable life, but also the moral
resolve to unite with each other and resist and eradicate the growing culture of greed, abuse of power and blatant disregard for
basic human dignity and social responsibility. But it must guard against arrogance in trumpeting its causes, if not recklessness in
its advocacy.

The claim of petitioner Kilosbayan that it is merely the "informant" and not the private complainant with the burden to prove
probable cause, borders on the ridiculous. Kilosbayan filed before the Comelec a letter-complaint dated December 14, 1993 in
support of which documentary evidences like copies of Teodoro Benigno's newspaper articles on the SHO's use of PYHSDFI-
obtained CDF, of respondent Enriquez's testimony before the Commission on Appointments, of DILG Budget Officer Barata's
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, and of Norberto Gonzales' affidavit, were likewise submitted by petitioner. The
letter-complaint not being verified, it is not disputed that petitioner Kilosbayan subsequently caused its verification; when later
asked to give the names of the other John Does in its letter-complaint, petitioner Kilosbayan obliged with a list, under oath, of
additional respondents. Petitioner Kilosbayan initiated the complaint against herein respondents, hence the docketing thereof as
E.O. Case No. 93-193; it filed numerous pleadings before the Comelec as a private complainant in E.O. Case No. 93-193; it
proceeded in the case in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure pertinent to the prosecution of cases of election
offenses. After all, the Kilosbayan should have presented evidence and not proceeded and relied on mere conjecture and hearsay
evidence.

The contention of petitioner Kilosbayan — that it is the Comelec that is duty-bound to search for evidence to prove its letter-
complaint — is downright erroneous. The task of the Comelec as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense
complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an
election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election
offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complainant. If the complainant
fails to proffer the necessary evidence to show probable cause, notwithstanding the lack of denial or any evidence in
controversion, of the accusation, the complaint must be dismissed, since any person accused of a crime is presumed innocent
and does not at all have to make a response or reaction to the charges against him.

The Comelec, in acting upon an election offense complaint in the course of preliminary investigation, initially facilitates the
confrontation process between the complainant and the respondents by requiring the submission of and interfacing, their
respective evidences. Ultimately, the Comelec passes upon the contending parties' respective submission and proofs and weighs
the fact and circumstances established therefrom. Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner Kilosbayan, the preliminary
investigation is not an occasion for the Comelec to, as a duty, spoonfeed the complainant with evidence needed to prove its case.

Finally, we cannot avoid to point out that no novel legal theory can distract even an ordinary layman from the plain dearth of
evidence of respondents' culpability on the record.

There is no proof of the electioneering activities alleged by petitioner Kilosbayan to have been perpetrated by PYHSDFI during
the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner claims that PYHSDFI distributed medical kits and sports equipment to several youth
groups in certain Metro Manila barangays for purposes of influencing their vote during the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner,
however, vaguely states the places where, the dates when, the particular candidate for whose cause, and the general description
of the people for whose consumption, the distribution of election propaganda materials was undertaken. In fact, there is no proof
that the medical kits and sports equipment were election propaganda materials. This is not surprising for there is the barest
evidence that this distribution had any taken place at all.

There is no proof that PYHSDFI used its cash allocations as an accredited non-governmental organization in order to undertake
electioneering activities. Petitioner likewise did not present proof that said distribution of medical kits and sports equipment was
for purposes of influencing the votes of certain groups of people during the May 11, 1992 elections. Brushing aside these fatal
evidentiary lapses, petitioner insists that PYHSDFI is guilty of using public funds for electioneering purposes simply because it
received its CDF allocation within a time frame suspiciously so near the May 11, 1992 elections. This CDF allocation, however,
has been convincingly shown to be a legal disbursement of public funds. Significantly, PYHSDFI neither presented rebuttal
evidence or even attempted to argue against the presumption of regular performance of official duty on the part of respondents
like Franklin Drilon, Cesar Sarino, and Salvador Enriquez who were then acting in their official capacity as heads of their
respective departments.
It may even be conceded that petitioner tells a credible story, it being too much of a coincidence for there to be, on the one hand,
rumors of electioneering activities on the part of PYHSDFI and on the other, genuine cash allotments showing disbursement of
public funds to the latter so coincidentally close to the May, 1992 elections. However, no matter how believable a story may be,
no matter how possible it could really have been that PYHSDFI was a financial conduit for criminal elements working for the
interests of a particular candidate in the 1992 elections, criminal charges cannot ever be sanctioned by possibilities or coffee
shop rumors.

In other words, said cash allocations appear to be evidence of perhaps, a thousand hypothetical, though, possible scenarios. But,
they are evidence of only one fact: that a certain amount of public money was made available to PYHSDFI as it is rightfully
entitled thereto as an accredited non-governmental organization at around the same time that the synchronized elections of 1992
were to be held. But this one fact is certainly no justification to indict herein respondent for the election offenses imputed to
them.

Lastly, there is no proof that respondents conspired to have PYSDFI accredited as a non-government organization in order to
avail itself of public funds to spend for electioneering purposes. In order for there to be reasonable ground to believed that a
conspiracy exists among (1) the government officials who set up the mechanism for accrediting NGOs to implement the projects
under the CDF and to qualify the latter to receive CDF allocations; (2) the incorporators and officers of the PYHSDFI; and (3)
the SHO implicated by Teodoro Benigno in his newspaper articles in alleged electioneering activities during the May 11, 1992
elections, there must be a semblance of evidence linking them to each other. There is none, however, except for the hearsay
evidence consisting of the aforementioned newspaper articles. Suffice it to say that although only a low quantum and quality of
evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause48, the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never
given any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction.

Incidentally, we note that although made party respondents in this case, Benito Catindig and Manuel Calupitan III were not
officially made respondents in E.O. Case No. 93-193 and accordingly not served with subpoena at any time during the pendency
of said before the Comelec. There is no ground, therefore, to implead Benito Catindig and Manuel Calupitan III in the instant
case.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, without any pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.]

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY

MONTEJO, Respondents.

Estelito P. Mendoza for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public Respondent.

Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; CONSTRUED. — Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that" [f]or the exercise of civil rights and
the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong v. Republic this
court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s "permanent home," "a place to which, whenever absent for business
or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on
the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

2. ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE, CONSTRUED. — Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.

3. ID.; ID.; DIFFERENTIATED FROM RESIDENCE. — The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is
to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE USED SYNONYMOUSLY WITH DOMICILE. — For political purposes
the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in
our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE FROM PERMANENT RESIDENCE WITHOUT INTENTION TO ABANDON IT DOES NOT
RESULT IN LOSS OR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. — So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these
and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile."cralaw virtua1aw library

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT OF RESIDENCE, NOT STATEMENT IN CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, DECISIVE FACTOR IN
DETERMINING RESIDENCY QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENT. — It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous
for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to
her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in
the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC’s Second Division’s questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First
District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at
said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately
by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election. Having been forced by private respondent to
register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner’s claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted
down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring
actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE FROM LEGAL RESIDENCE OR DOMICILE OF A TEMPORARY OR SEMI-PERMANENT
NATURE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LOSS OF RESIDENCE. — We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual
does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus,
the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she
filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.

9. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; A MINOR FOLLOWS THE DOMICILE OF HIS PARENTS; CASE AT BENCH. — A minor
follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of
the fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was
not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent’s averments.

10. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO EFFECT CHANGE OF DOMICILE. — Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the
purpose.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH. — In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE, NOT A CAUSE FOR LOSS OF DOMICILE. — In this connection, it cannot be correctly
argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the, late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos in 1954. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence."
The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred
from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts
are well delineated. A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect
the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage. Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889: La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o’ a pais
extranjero. Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el
marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be
understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring
from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more
consistent with the concept of actual residence. Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under
the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is
Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together. The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband
and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in
order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence."
Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.

13. ID.; ID.; TERM RESIDENCE REFERS TO "ACTUAL RESIDENCE." — The term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned — affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean
"actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessatium.

14. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTE REQUIRING RENDITION OF JUDGMENT WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME,
MERELY DIRECTORY. — It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory
that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.

15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; JURISDICTION TO DECIDE PENDING DISQUALIFICATION CASE NOT
LOST BY HOLDING OF ELECTIONS. — With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of
B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

16. ID.; LEGISLATURE; HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET); SOLE JUDGE OF ALL
CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTIONS, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS;
CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN PROCLAIMED. — As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

PUNO, J., concurring opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN AND DOMICILE OF CHOICE; ESTABLISHED BY CANDIDATE’S
CONTINUED STAY IN HER PARENT’S RESIDENCE. — There is no question that petitioner’s original domicile is in
Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the
place. Petitioner went to school, and thereafter worked there. Justice Puno considers Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her
domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a
minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.

2. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; ACQUIRED BY MARRIAGE AND DELIBERATE CHOICE OF A
DIFFERENT DOMICILE BY THE HUSBAND. — There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change
it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner’s marriage to former
President Marcos ipso facts resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. Justice Puno respectfully submits that her marriage by
itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to
fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in
which case, the wife’s domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife’s prior domicile even
if it is different. It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband
that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband
in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her
coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband.
These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law
and public policy.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH. — In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right
to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point
of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner’s Batac domicile has
been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San
Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when
they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served
as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency
of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the
family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common
law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter
where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE THAT AFTER THE HUSBAND’S DEATH, WIFE RETAINS LAST DOMICILE OF HER
HUSBAND, SHOULD NOW BE ABANDONED. — The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on
September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner’s Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our
jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. He echoes the theory that after the husband’s death, the wife retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband’s
domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The presumption that
the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its
extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. The rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice
Davide in CJS and AM JUR 2d are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917 and 1938, or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women’s liberation movement resulted in far-
ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. However, it has been declared that under modern
statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a
wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law. In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law,
Second (Conflict of laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone." . . is
no longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her
unmarried sister." In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and
perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her
dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69
of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in
any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WIFE REACQUIRED DOMICILE OF ORIGIN UPON DEATH OF HUSBAND. — Prescinding from these
premises, Justice Puno respectfully submits that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon
the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner’s Batac dictated domicile did not
continue after her husband’s death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person
can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it
was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
Likewise, Justice Puno cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile
before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of
her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The
law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden
on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband’s domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based
burden.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DELIBERATE CHOICE BY WIFE MANIFEST IN CASE AT BAR. — But even assuming arguendo that
there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample
evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred among others that: "I was not
permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after
repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there." It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner
reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother
in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both
Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile
in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence." . . for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.

7. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; AMENDMENT TO CORRECT A BONA FIDE

MISTAKE, ALLOWED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. — The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide
mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. (Alialy v. COMELEC, 2 SCRA 957, 960
[1961]; Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607 [1960]; Gabaldon v. COMELEC , 99 Phil. 898 [1956])

8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM FROM HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION OF BONA FIDE

CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE; RIGHT VIOLATED BY LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL OBSTACLES AGAINST
CANDIDATE TO PREVENT HER FROM RUNNING. — Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." A detached reading of the
records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to
prevent her from running as the people’s representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner’s Answer to the petition to
disqualify her, she averred that when respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in
Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended
registration by writing a letter stating that she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent
(petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner
(Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as
petitioner’s (Montejo’s) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it
a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with
respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank
harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any
hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment
and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one
Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the
Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.

9. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT; RATIONALE; CANDIDATE’S LIFE
TIME CONTACTS WITH FIRST DISTRICT OF LEYTE SATISFIES INTENT. — In Gallego v. Vera, we explained that the
reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . .." Petitioner’s lifetime contacts
with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she
is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

10. ID.; ID.; ELECTION CASES; DOMINANT CONSIDERATION IN RESOLUTION THEREOF IS THE NEED TO
EFFECTUATE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE. — In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to
effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-
One (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes.
Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics.
We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a
rule that will give life to the people’s political judgment.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DEFINED. — Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person’s habitation is fixed,
without any present intention, of removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has
voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it
his permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for
like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin
v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)

2. ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATIONS. — Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to
every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on
whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or
reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and
chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S.
6). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own
intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the
relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).

3. ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF DOMICILE; REQUISITES. — In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and
acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in
the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus
non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415).

4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE. — In election law, when our
Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ABANDONED OR LOST BY REGISTRATION OF VOTER IN A PLACE OTHER THAN HIS PLACE
OF ORIGIN. — In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than
his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300).
Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner’s intent of abandoning
her domicile of origin.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARITAL DOMICILE; LOST UPON DEATH OF HUSBAND; WIFE REVERTED TO HER ORIGINAL
DOMICILE; CASE AT BAR. — Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner’s domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with
another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the
domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital
duties and obligations to one another. The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral
duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the
marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter’s termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, Petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair
situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful
purpose. It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband’s death
without even signifying her intention to that effect.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY CLAIMING THAT A PERSON HAS ABANDONED OR LOST HIS RESIDENCE OF ORIGIN
MUST SHOW AND PROVE SUCH LOSS OR ABANDONMENT. — It is for the private respondent to prove, not for
petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other
place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his
residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28
C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S.
16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner
has acquired, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE-YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT; REQUIREMENT MET IN CASE AT BENCH. — The records,
on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile
abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good
Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various
places in Manila. In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San Juan,
Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate and resided with her
brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move
and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It was in the same month of August when she applied for
the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the
one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro
Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992
presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She
later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First
Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought
to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.

PADILLA, J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING CANDIDATE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCE
QUALIFICATION. — The one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate’s intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations
satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be
familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said
district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility. Petitioner’s certificate of candidacy filed on
8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven
months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." It
follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified
from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet
the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May
1995)."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DISQUALIFICATION; CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST
NUMBER OF VOTES CAN NOT BE DECLARED WINNER OF ELECTIVE OFFICE WHERE CANDIDATE WHO
OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS DECLARED DISQUALIFIED OR NOT ELIGIBLE FOR OFFICE. —
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible,
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (Labo v. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1)

3. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646 (AN ACT INTRODUCING REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES); VOTES CAST FOR A CANDIDATE DECLARED DISQUALIFIED BY FINAL JUDGMENT SHALL
NOT BE COUNTED; CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES WHERE THE
WINNING CANDIDATE IS DECLARED DISQUALIFIED DEEMED THE WINNER. — Under Sec. 6 of RA 6646, (An Act
Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided
that: . . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE
COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition
for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest
number of votes. It stands to reason that Section 6 f RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of
votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the
legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the
doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially
when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the
qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.

REGALADO, J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; DOMICILE OF ORIGIN; CONSTRUED. — The domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or
what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new
domicile in a different place.

2. ID.; ID.; KINDS. — Domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by
operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis; the second is that which is
voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium proprio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from
marriage, is sometimes called domicilium necesarium.

3. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; ACQUIRED BY MARRIAGE. — When petitioner contracted marriage
in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but of our own enactment, she acquired
her husband’s domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.

4. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. — To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
5. ID.; ID.; ONCE LOST CAN BE RECOVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW; NO AUTOMATIC REVERSION OR
REACQUISITION OF DOMICILE. — Domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in
accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a
domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost
her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the
ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty
in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.

6. ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT OF DOMICILE DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESTORE DOMICILE OF
ORIGIN. — If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the
former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile
unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile,
which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do. One’s
subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is
no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd. Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion
would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation
of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority
inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on one’s freedom of choice.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless
we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed
through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal
abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the
termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she
lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously
in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.

8. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; AFTER THE HUSBAND’S DEATH, THE WIFE HAS THE RIGHT TO
ELECT HER OWN DOMICILE. — The American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband’s death the wife has
the right to elect her own domicile, she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual
change. In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife’s domicile or legal residence
follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.

9. ID.; FAMILY CODE; RIGHT AND POWER TO FIX FAMILY HOME CAN NOT AFFECT DOMICILE FIXED BY LAW.
— I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority’s theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family
Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is now
shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could
affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has
the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her
husband, and each of her children having gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that
joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of
concern in petitioner’s case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.

10. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT; NOT MET BY CANDIDATE’S
RESIDENCY FOR SEVEN (7) MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION; PREVIOUS RESIDENCY AT
DOMICILE OF ORIGIN NOT COUNTED WHERE THE SAME WAS LOST DUE TO MARRIAGE AND NOT
REACQUIRED AFTER HUSBAND’S DEATH. — In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since
1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political
constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in
rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in
the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; PROPER REMEDY FROM A DECISION, ORDER OR
RULING OF THE COMELEC. — Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings
of the COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Aratuc v. COMELEC , 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WRIT OF, CERTIORARI; MAY BE GRANTED ONLY IN ABSENCE OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — A writ of certiorari may be granted only if the
COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court).

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BENCH, NOT A CASE FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT. — Since the COMELEC has,
undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent’s petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying the petitioner. My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the
COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much
less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the
facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in
the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of
substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.

4. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DOMICILE; LOSS OR ABANDONMENT THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — I

respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary evidence,
overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte.
Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay,
unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the
position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOMICILE OF CHOICE LOST BY OPERATION OF LAW BY MARRIAGE. — It may indeed be conceded
that the petitioner’s domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law
sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by
operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as
results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing
law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was
Batac, Ilocos Norte. Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires
that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense
that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25
Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).

6. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; FAMILY DOMICILE; FIXING THEREOF, A JOINT DECISION OF SPOUSES. — It
must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole
prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The
said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the
wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its
corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).

7. ID.; DOMICILE, DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; DEATH OF HUSBAND REVIVES POWER OF WIFE TO
ACQUIRE HER OWN DOMICILE; NO AUTOMATIC RESTORATION OF WOMAN’S DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. — The
theory of automatic restoration of a woman’s domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion
adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner’s marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence.
The settled doctrine is that after the husband’s death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or on the death of the husband, the
power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the
husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her
power to acquire her own domicile.

8. ID.; ID.; LOSS OF DOMICILE; MARRIAGE, NOT A GROUND. — I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority
opinion on Faypon v. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from
original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one’s profession, or engage in business in other states does
not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one’s "occupation; profession; employment in private and
public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not
deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the
exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the
marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then
such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the same.

9. ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT THEREOF IN CASE AT BENCH. — This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-
serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never
intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a
claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the
vicissitudes of the petitioner’s life after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile
of origin and had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile,
[1934], 214, 326).

10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; SELF-SERVING STATEMENT, WITHOUT
PROBATIVE VALUE. — Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner’s claim that she "merely committed
an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the
certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury
signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.

11. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF; ONE WHO ASSERTS A FACT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING IT. — The majority
opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving
it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC , 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19
[1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof
on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that" [b]y operation of law
(domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That
conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband’s domicile
until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her
right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; RESIDENCE; DOMICILE BY OPERATION OF LAW; WIDOW NO LONGER BOUND
BY THE DOMICILE OF THE DEPARTED HUSBAND; WIDOW MAY CHOOSE DOMICILE; ONE YEAR RESIDENCE
REQUIREMENT, MET IN CASE AT BAR. — Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with
"domicile" for election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioner’s domicile was in the First District of Leyte and
if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her
parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she married
Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly released her from the
obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the
fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which
subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions. A widow, like
the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was
before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her
domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to
her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year
requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, GENERALLY MANDATORY IN CHARACTER. —

Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino v. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).

2. ID.; COMELEC.; WITH JURISDICTION OVER PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES. — The Commission on

Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of election . . . (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF ONE-YEAR RESIDENCY

REQUIREMENT OF THE COMELEC, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL. — The matter before us specifically calls for
the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such compliance),
to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the
COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of
"grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court. Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the
COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.

4. CIVIL LAW; DOMICILE; PLACE OF HABITUAL RESIDENCE. — For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of
civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see
Article 50, Civil Code).

5. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; DOMICILE SYNONYMOUS WITH RESIDENCE. — In election cases, the Court treats
domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: ‘(t)he term ‘residence’ as used in the election law is synonymous with
‘domicile,’ which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.’ ‘Domicile’ denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . (Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City [226
SCRA 408, 409])

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS FOR CHANGE OF DOMICILE. — Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; ITS JURISDICTION ENDS WHEN JURISDICTION OF ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL BEGINS. — The COMELEC’s jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since
become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives.

8. ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION OF CANDIDATE, NOT A MINISTERIAL FUNCTION. — The question can be asked on
whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on
the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which,
being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is
tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a
proclamation is properly done.

9. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTIONS; CANDIDATE WHO OBTAINED THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES
NOT NECESSARILY ENTITLED TO BE DECLARED WINNER OF ELECTIVE OFFICE WHERE CANDIDATE WHO
OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS LATER DECLARED DISQUALIFIED OR NOT ELIGIBLE. — I
should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much
the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument
that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should
not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238
[1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon v. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos v. COMELEC (137 SCRA
740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo v. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA
1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994])
rulings. Benito v. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa,
Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and
Bellosillo were on official leave).

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMELEC; WITHOUT POWER TO DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE FOR LACK OF

ELIGIBILITY. — In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that
the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an
election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such
proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body. To be sure,
there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a
candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a
person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or
cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain matters required
by law to be stated in the certificates.

2. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ABSENCE OF PROVISION FOR PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTEST BASED
ON INELIGIBILITY. — The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a
candidate’s qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are,
in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo warranto proceedings against
winning candidates.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS. — Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining
before election the qualifications of a candidate. First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is
no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate’s eligibility,
e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term
of the office. Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, §15) The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution
of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the case may be. By
providing in §253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official’s qualifications after the results of
elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the
Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of
candidates unless they have been elected.

4. ID.; ID.; PETITION TO DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE FOR INELIGIBILITY FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL. — Montejo’s petition before the COMELEC was not a petition for cancellation of certificate of
candidacy under §78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under §78 have for their purpose to disqualify a
person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding
public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of Representatives is vested in the
Electoral Tribunal of that body.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; QUO WARRANTO; QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE PASSED UPON
ONLY AFTER PROCLAMATION OF CANDIDATE. — In the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the
cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in
their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship, age, or residence. But in the generality of cases in which this
Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests or quo
warranto proceedings filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.

6. POLITICAL, LAW; ELECTIONS; ABSENCE OF PROVISION FOR PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTESTS BASED ON

INELIGIBILITY; CANNOT BE SUPPLIED BY A MERE RULE OF THE COMELEC. — The lack of provision for declaring
the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, §6 of the
Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of
voters. (Art. IX-C, § 2(3))

7. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS DIFFERENTIATED FROM DECLARATION OF INELIGIBILITY. —

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to
the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for
"disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are
based on grounds specified in Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and
are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a
word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the
other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

8. ID.; ID.; POSSESSION OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE DOES NOT IMPLY THAT CANDIDATE IS NOT
DISQUALIFIED. — That an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified
from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the law does not imply that he does
not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in §4.

9. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS BASED ON INELIGIBILITY; ELECTION PROTEST OR ACTION FOR
QUO WARRANTO, PROPER REMEDY. — To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought
in an election protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to §253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his
proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e. g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts,
as provided in Art. IX-C, §2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must be filed
with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, §4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, §17) There is greater
reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of
candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same policy
prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.

10. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; COMELEC WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ASSUME
DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATE BASED ON INELIGIBILITY. — For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the
COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void;
and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may
only be inquired into by the HRET. Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders dated April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25,
1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First
District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the
disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should be considered void.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2
The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community." 3

Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District
of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE

ELECTION: ______ Years and seven Months

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended
that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution’s one year residency requirement for candidates to the House of representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He
prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to
"since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte
informed petitioner that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the
deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC’s Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with
the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate
of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since
childhood" in her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence." 11 Impugning respondent’s motive in filling the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

When respondent (petitioner herein,) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that
she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the
town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose
being to remove respondent as petitioner’s opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along
with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First
District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed
the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and
verdict of the lectorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent Petition’s for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking petitioner’s
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate Candidacy. 14 Dealing
with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline
for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner’s compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that
she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the
First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that
her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and
which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner’s theory of disqualification
by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner
wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never
disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent’s claim of ‘honest misinterpretation or honest mistake.’ Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy
only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of ‘residence of origin’ which she interprets
to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she
thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy toto believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election.’ thus, the explanation of respondent, fails to
be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent’s defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent’s contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2
SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the ‘inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and
orderly conduct of elections.’ The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number
of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification
as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely
affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating
candidate, to the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was
‘since childhood’ is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7
months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter’s
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6
months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent
List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondent’s consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will
only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent’s contention that it was
an error.

x x x

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

x x x

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year
residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term ‘residence’ has always been considered as synonymous with ‘domicile’ which imports not only the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return. (Perfecto Faypon v. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez v. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent’s case,
when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her
animus revertendy is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to
give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the
facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation
in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in. San Miguel, Manila where she was again a
registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later
on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City
of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-
registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent’s conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. she registered as a voter in
different places and on a several occasion declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case
of Romualdez v. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In
other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and
later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a
resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her
place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent’s
statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."cralaw
virtua1aw library

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year,
petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995; respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. In doing so she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six
months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her
failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a
convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only." 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation should the results of the canvass show
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day,
however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May, 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to
the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental
Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and
the public respondent’s Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two
general areas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. The Issue of Petitioner’s qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time
of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the
Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner’s
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner’s qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC’s Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled
concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were,
residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that" [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong v. Republic 20 this court, took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual’s "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is
to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu v. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction
quite clearly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; ‘domicile’ denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man
may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."cralaw virtua1aw library

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval v. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence . . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena v. Teves 26
reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon v. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So
settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the
mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or
change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt
the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee’s concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President., insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section
merely provides, among others, ‘and a resident thereof’, that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the
day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

x x x

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7 page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept
that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement
mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner’s Certificate
of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement-in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only
when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word "seven" in the space
provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances
and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC’s Second Division’s questioned resolution, albeit with a different
interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her
eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of
Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which was Tolosa,
Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal
the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in
the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE

ELECTION: _____ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner’s claimed
domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her
period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual
residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s registration as a voter in
Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should
not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner’s domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner’s domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division
of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24, 1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites
certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner’s domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades
except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, Petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she
was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she registered as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the
COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-
permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence
and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena v. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in
another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the
other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that
he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon v. Quirino, 34 we explained that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of
course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or
business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the
officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his
home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in
a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It
finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one’s birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was
ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on
residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner’s domicile, which we lift
verbatim from the COMELEC’s Second Division’s assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City).
She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Pauls College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin,
the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand
E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected
Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965,
when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacañang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November
1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of
Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the past four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally
followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence
in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband’s presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime’s
powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays
and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province
and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either
through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of
origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in
the COMELEC’S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the
fact of petitioner’s domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner’s domicile of origin because she did not live there
until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many
years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do
not agree.

First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows
that in spite of the fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law.
This domicile was not established only when she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to
Leyte contrary to private respondent’s averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only
with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former domicile with an intent to supplant the former
domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because
the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area
explains:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person
and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of
physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse
upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of
the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa
causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o’ a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband)
wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act
of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another
positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to
refer to domicile which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one
place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent
with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the
family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference
could for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to
live together, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help
and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the
situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one
of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to
conclude that Art. 110 refers to domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is
left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr.
Tolentino further explains:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Residence and Domicile. — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with
"domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and
intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one
another.

x x x

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or
more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad
principle. In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has
recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either
allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original
domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs Villareal 43 this Court held that" [a] married woman
may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband
has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile
in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by
taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with
her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts at this country to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of
the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine
that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof;
and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained
suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that
court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt
bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject
was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in
obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve
in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a
preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow
and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby,
36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was
decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148)

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de
Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage.
(113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned
by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and
it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged-by virtue of Article
110 of the Civil Code-to follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr.
Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which
of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family’s residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the
conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s rights in the intervening years by making the choice of
domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and
obligations of husband and wife-the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President
in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to
choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner’s acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin(assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice"
was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG’s permission to
"rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a
home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in
her brother’s house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She
could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals.
Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual
residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly
illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of
selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different
from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that
the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were
rendered. on April 24, 1995, fourteen(14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48
Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely
directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made
on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities,. this court in Marcelino v Cruz held that:
51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being
that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which
a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that ‘the statutory provisions which may be thus departed
from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of
doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act.’ Thus, in said
case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner’s contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period
stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies
would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed
period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P.
881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a
ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA by ourselves bending
established principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justify deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn
ourselves to repeat the mistake of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and
May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers
to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.

As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself; The
controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional
provision on point states that — "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and
except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one-year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)

It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile.
This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous case 1 where significantly the factual circumstances
clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is
manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a resident
thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.

The first instance is where a person’s residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he has been
domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.

A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the luxury of
district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum period for
eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.

In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his domicile of
origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his
residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different districts. Since
his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can
practically choose the district most advantageous for him.

All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that" for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be elected.

To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with
"domicile." In other words, the candidate’s intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of
time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the
environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be
the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.

In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec
2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —

"In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban
City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She
pursued her college studies in St. Paul’s College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work
with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of representatives. In 1954, she married ex-
President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together
in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacañang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

"During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and
Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and
filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn
Application for Cancellation of Voter’s Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in
Precinct No. 1 57-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

"On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of
Election Inspectors. CE Form No. I, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).

"On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in the
constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/Teacher/Social Worker

8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Toloso, Leyte

9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING

ELECTION: _________ Years Seven Months

10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-
constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best o my knowledge.

(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos

(Signature of Candidate)" 2

Petitioner’s aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her
disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the constituency
wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."cralaw virtua1aw library

It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified
from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet
the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May
1995)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Having arrived at petitioner’s disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue to
resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.

I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo v. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176
SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio v. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . .. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible,
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905,
22 February 1988) it is provided that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."cralaw
virtua1aw library
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above.
As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgment of disqualification
only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a
disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on
Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of
votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.

Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is
also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast
for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.

It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate
is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the
votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered,

As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and
consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility" most especially when its is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the
1st district of Leyte.
[G.R. No. 191771 : May 06, 2010]

LIBERAL PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL A. ROXAS II AND SECRETARY GENERAL
JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NACIONALISTA PARTY,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR AND NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION,
ALLEGEDLY REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN FAUSTINO S. DY, JR., RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This case poses to the Court, at this very late stage of our election period, issues involving the registration of political coalitions,
the grant of accreditation to the dominant parties under the first time ever automated election system in the country, and validity
of the COMELEC en banc's (en banc) authority to act on the registration of political coalitions.

The challenged ruling is a Per Curiam Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)[1] dated April 12, 2010 in SPP-
10-(DM) granting the application for registration of the Nacionalista Party-Nationalist People's Coalition (NP-NPC or coalition)
and deferring the question of the coalition's dominant minority status to a future resolution. The challenge comes from the
Liberal Party (LP)[2] through a petition for certiorari and prohibition[3] with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
or a status quo order. We issued a status quo order through our Resolution of April 20, 2010.

I. THE BACKGROUND FACTS

a. General Background

On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of
petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752,
providing, among others, for the rules for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the dominant majority
party, the dominant minority party, ten major national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Resolution No. 8752 also set the deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation on February 12, 2010 and required that
accreditation applicants be registered political parties, organizations or coalitions.

On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same
date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-
NPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010
elections."[4] It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an
accreditation case.

On February 23, 2010, the LP filed its Opposition[5] to the NP-NPC's petition on the following grounds:

1) The NP-NPC's petition should be denied since it was not a duly registered coalition of political parties at the time of filing of
their petition for accreditation as dominant minority party;

2) The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for registration as a coalition because the petition should
have been first brought before the proper Division;

3) The petition for registration as a coalition was filed with the Clerk of the Commission instead of the Law Department in
violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
4) The petition for registration as a coalition was filed beyond the August 17, 2009 deadline set by the COMELEC; and

5) The respective chapters, incumbents and candidates of the NP and the NPC separately cannot be taken into account for
purposes of accreditation as dominant minority party because the NP-NPC as a coalition is an entirely different entity.

The COMELEC issued an Order dated February 16, 2010 and a Notice of Hearing on February 17, 2010 setting for hearing the
petitions for accreditation for the purpose of determining the dominant majority party, dominant minority party, ten (10) major
national parties and two (2) major local parties in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections. Among the petitions set for
hearing were the LP's and the NP-NPC's petitions for accreditation as the dominant minority party.[6]

On March 9, 2010, the LP presented Rep. Lualhati Antonino (a member of the NPC's National Convention) as its
witness.[7] Rep. Antonino testified, among others, that the NPC National Convention did not authorize its National Central
Committee to enter into a coalition with the NP,[8] and that neither the National Convention nor the general membership was
ever consulted about the merger with the NP.[9]

On March 10, 2010, the NP-NPC presented former Gov. Faustino Dy, Jr. as its witness to refute Rep. Antonino's
testimony.[10] On March 15, 2010, the LP and the NP-NPC filed their respective Memoranda.[11]

b. The Assailed COMELEC Resolution

On April 12, 2010, the en banc granted the NP-NPC's petition for registration as a coalition through the Resolution assailed in
the present case. In the same Resolution, the en banc deferred the resolution of the NP-NPC's application for accreditation as
dominant minority party.

On the issue of jurisdiction, the en banc citing Baytan v. Comelec[12] held that the registration of coalitions involves the
exercise of its administrative powers and not its quasi-judicial powers; hence, the en banc can directly act on it. It further held
that there is no constitutional requirement that a petition for registration of a coalition should be decided first by a division.
In Baytan, the Court held that the Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in the "Commission on
Elections," while providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Thus, the en banc can act directly on
matters falling within its administrative powers.

The en banc ruled further that although the NP-NPC's failure to file the petition with the Law Department constituted a violation
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules), the en banc has the discretion to suspend the application of the rules
in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases;[13] in any case, the authority to approve or deny the Law Department's
recommendation on the registration of the coalition rests with the en banc.

On the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the en banc held that no rule exists setting a deadline for the registration of
coalitions. It opined that the registration of a coalition is simply a recognition by the COMELEC of a political reality. It held
that if the NP-NPC is genuine, then the approval of its registration by the COMELEC is a mere recognition of an "operative
fact."

On the merits, the en banc found that both the NP and the NPC have validly agreed to join forces for political or election
purposes. It held that the NP-NPC satisfactorily submitted all the documentary requirements to prove the merger's validity. It
opined, too, that if the Constitution and By-Laws of either the NP or the NPC was violated by the merger, the representatives or
members of either party possess the legal standing to question the coalition; the LP, a stranger to the internal dynamics of both
parties, does not have this required standing.

The en banc noted that no representative from either the NP or the NPC ever filed any formal opposition to the NP-NPC petition
for registration and accreditation. It thus concluded that hardly any controversy existed for it to resolve. At the same time, it
disregarded Rep. Antonino's testimony, since she lost her NPC membership when she admitted support for the candidacy of
Sen. Manuel A. Roxas II - the Liberal Party candidate for vice-president - a ground provided under the Constitution
and By-Laws of the NPC.[14]

c. The Sarmiento Dissent

Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented on various grounds.[15] First, he ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc had no
jurisdiction over NP-NPC's petition for registration as a coalition and accreditation as dominant minority party.

Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules governs the registration of coalitions. Rule 32 is found under Letter F of the Rules entitled
"Special Proceedings." According to Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules, the Commission sitting in two (2) Divisions, shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases falling under special proceedings, with the exception of the accreditation of citizens' arms
of the COMELEC. The dissent concluded that the present petition is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC sitting in Division
and not of the COMELEC sitting en banc, citing Villarosa v. COMELEC.[16]

Commissioner Sarmiento secondly took the position that the relaxation of the Rules is inappropriate in the present case.

In general, election laws may be divided into three parts for purposes of applying the rules of statutory construction. The first
part refers to the provisions for the conduct of elections that election officials are required to follow; these provisions are merely
directory. The second part covers those provisions that candidates for office are required to comply with and are necessarily
mandatory. The last part embraces those procedural rules designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the
elections; this requires liberal construction. The NP-NPC's petition falls under the second part, so the applicable requirements of
law are mandatory. The dissent argued that the relaxation of the rules is not applicable to the present case, because it does not
involve the determination of the will of the electorate; thus, the rules governing the registration of coalitions should be construed
strictly and not liberally.

Commissioner Sarmiento's third point is that no valid coalition was formed between the NP and the NPC.

He pointed out that the Constitutions and By-Laws of both parties require that the parties' respective National Conventions give
their approval before their parties can enter into any coalition agreement with another political party. The dissent found that the
records are bereft of any proof that the National Conventions of both the NP and the NPC authorized their officers to form the
NP-NPC. The dissent held that the action of the Executive Committees of the NP and the NPC in issuing the Joint Resolution
(declaring the NP-NPC merger) was a clear violation of the parties' Constitutions and By-Laws and was thus ultra vires and
void.

The dissent also branded the NP-NPC as a sham whose sole purpose was to secure dominant minority party status. The
Commissioner noted that members of the NP and NPC are pitted against each other and are vying for the same election
positions - an absurd situation in a coalition, since no alliance for a common cause can exist if members of the component
parties are competing against each other for the same positions.

Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out as his last point that the NP-NPC cannot seek accreditation as the dominant minority
party without the requisite recognition by the COMELEC.

COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 requires that only political parties duly registered with the COMELEC may seek accreditation
as a dominant party. At the time the NP-NPC filed its petition for accreditation on February 12, 2010, it was still seeking
registration as a coalition of political parties. By filing the petition, both the NP and the NPC admitted that the COMELEC had
not extended any recognition to their coalition; without the requisite recognition and registration, the NP-NPC could not seek
accreditation as the dominant minority party for the May 10, 2010 elections.

The dissent also noted that the NP-NPC could no longer seek accreditation since the deadline for filing a petition for
accreditation had lapsed. Finally, while the NP and NPC are both duly accredited political parties, their recognition cannot
benefit the NP-NPC, since the latter seeks accreditation as an entity separate and distinct from both the NP and the NPC.
II. The Petition

The LP now assails the April 12, 2010 COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, as follows:

1) The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain petitions for registration of political coalitions;

2) The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the registration of the purported NP-NPC coalition despite the
lapse of the deadline for registration;

3) The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the registration of the purported NP-NPC coalition despite
patent and manifest violations of the NPC Constitution and By-Laws; and

4) The purported NP-NPC coalition is a bogus, sham and paper coalition that makes a mockery of the electoral process.[17]

In support of its petition, the petitioner attached the Sworn Affidavits of two prominent members of the NPC, namely: Atty.
Sixto S. Brillantes (the current NPC Legal Counsel) and Daniel Laogan (a member of the NPC's National Central Committee) to
show that the NP-NPC was entered into without consultations; much less, the approval of the NPC's National Convention which
was not even convened.[18]

a. Comments from the OSG and the COMELEC

On April 27, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a "Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment." The OSG
manifested that the duty to appear and defend on their behalf and on behalf of the COMELEC falls on the respondents, since
they are the real parties interested in upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution. The COMELEC, as a mere nominal party,
does not need to file a separate comment. We responded to the OSG's manifestation by requiring the COMELEC to file its own
comment, which it did on May 4, 2010.

On the merits, the OSG argues that the present petition is premature. It notes that the petition's real thrust is to foreclose the
possibility that respondent NP-NPC would be declared the dominant minority party in the coming May 10, 2010 elections. The
OSG emphasizes that the assailed COMELEC Resolution only affirmatively resolved the registration of the NP-NPC, not its
accreditation. Thus, the petition's core issue is not yet ripe for adjudication. As expressly indicated in the assailed Resolution,
the accreditation has yet to be the subject of a coming separate resolution.

The OSG also argues that no violation of due process attended the registration process, since the petitioner was given the
opportunity to be heard. The OSG notes that the petitioner filed its Opposition to the NP-NPC's application for registration and
accreditation before the COMELEC. In addition, hearings were scheduled and held where the COMELEC allowed the petitioner
to submit its evidence, both testimonial and documentary.

The COMELEC's comment is practically a reiteration of the rulings in the assailed Resolution, heretofore summarized. For this
reason, we shall no longer reflect on and repeat the COMELEC's positions in detail.

b. The NP-NPC Coalition's Comment

In their Comment, the respondents argue that the present petition should be dismissed outright since it is plagued
with procedural infirmities.

First, the respondents contend that the petitioner violated Section 5(2) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which requires that the
petition be accompanied by certified true copies of such material portions of the record the petition referred to. The respondents
point out that the petitioner failed to attach the required certified true copies of the documents to its petition.

Second, the respondents argue that the petitioner unjustifiably failed to implead the NP-NPC as a party to the present case. The
respondents contend that NP-NPC is a real party-in-interest, as well as an indispensable party without the participation of which
no final determination of the case can be secured.

Third, the respondents argue that the present petition raises mere errors of judgment that are not within the Court's authority to
act upon under its certiorari jurisdiction, since the present petition merely assails the en banc's appreciation of facts and
evidence.

On the merits, the respondents aver that the en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the registration of the
NP-NPC.

First, the respondents argue that that the en banc had jurisdiction to entertain their petition for registration of the NP-NPC. The
respondents emphasize that the NP-NPC's registration falls within the ambit of the COMELEC's administrative powers; hence,
the en banc properly assumed jurisdiction over their petition.

The respondents cite Baytan v. COMELEC[19] as authority for its position. The Court held in this cited case that the
COMELEC's administrative powers include the registration of political parties and coalitions under Section 2 (5) of Article IX
of the Constitution. The Court also ruled that since the Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in the
"Commission on Elections" while providing that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two Divisions, the en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.

Second, the respondents also contend that their petition for registration as a coalition is not time-barred. They argue that the
August 17, 2009 deadline applied only to "political parties"; and to "parties, organizations and coalitions under the party-list
system." The respondents emphasize that there is no deadline for petitions for the registration of coalition of parties, since
COMELEC Resolution No. 8646 has not specifically set a deadline. Thus, they conclude that the August 17, 2009
deadline applies only to the registration of new and unregistered political parties, and not to the registration of coalitions
between previously registered political parties such as the NP and the NPC.

Third, the respondents point out that the NP-NPC was validly formed, and that the requisite approvals were duly obtained. The
respondents contend that the en banc's factual findings on the formation of the coalition and the submission and approval of the
requisite documents are supported by substantial evidence, and thus are final and binding on this Court. The respondents
emphasize that the 1993 Revised Rules of the NP does not require the approval of the National Convention for purposes of
coalescing with another political party; neither do the Rules confer on the National Convention the power to approve a coalition
with another political party. Similarly, the respondents point out that the NPC's Constitution and By-Laws is silent on and does
not confer any power to approve a coalition with another political party. The respondents emphasize that they cannot violate a
non-existent requirement; Rep. Antonino in fact affirmed that there is no specific provision in the NPC's Constitution and By-
Laws relating to a coalition with another party.

The respondents argue that NPC Chairman Dy's testimony adequately showed that the NP-NPC was entered into after meetings
and consultations with party members and the NPC national organization; in fact, 70%-75% of those consulted supported the
coalition. The respondents also aver that it is a common party practice that the NPC National Convention decides through a
series of small meetings of leaders and members, whether to arrive at a consensus.

The respondents point out that, to date, no member of the NP or NPC has ever expressed his or her objection to the NP-NPC.
The respondents emphasize that the wisdom of entering into a coalition is strictly an internal matter; and no third party such as
the LP, not even the courts, can interfere. The respondents cite Sinaca v. Mula[20] as authority that political parties are generally
free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision.

Fourth, the respondents contend that Commissioner Sarmiento's thesis that the coalition is a sham since they are fielding
contending candidates is baseless. As explained in the hearings, the NP and NPC agreed on an arbitration procedure to settle
these conflicts, although no arbitration has taken place to date, since the registration of the NP-NPC has not attained finality.

Fifth, the respondents contend that the newspaper reports presented by the petitioner to show that there was no valid NP-NPC is
inadmissible and carries no probative value for being hearsay. The respondents further argue that the affidavits of Atty. Sixto
Brillantes and Daniel Laogan, attached to the present petition, are inadmissible as the Court cannot receive evidence or conduct
a trial de novo under its certiorari jurisdiction. In addition, the respondents argue that the affidavits are hearsay evidence, since
Atty. Brillantes and Daniel Laogan were never presented during the hearings before the en banc and were not subjected to cross-
examination. Finally, the respondents point out that the subject matter of Atty. Brillantes' affidavit is covered by the attorney-
client privilege; he was the NPC's general counsel who represented the NPC in all legal proceedings.

III. THE ISSUES

The parties' positions raise the following issues for resolution:

1. Preliminary Issues:

a. Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical infirmities?

b. Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC issue?

c. Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, time-barred?

i. Is the NP-NPC an "operative fact" that the COMELEC simply has to note and recognize without need
of registration?

2. Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the petition?

3. On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed the
registration of the NP-NPC?

a. Was due process observed in granting the registration?

b. Did the coalition take place as required by law:

i. in terms of compliance with internal rules of the NP and the NPC?

ii. in terms of the consent to or support for, and the lack of objection to, the coalition?

IV. THE COURT'S RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

a. Preliminary Considerations

1. The technical and procedural questions

We have indicated many times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical and procedural objections is the nature
of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues are solely confined to the parties' private interests and carry no
massive ripple effects directly affecting the public,[21] but have viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold
issues raised when grave public interests are involved.[22] Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical and
procedural where Court intervention has become imperative.[23] Thus, we have recognized exceptions to the threshold issues of
ripeness[24] and mootness[25] of the petitions before us, as well as questions on locus standi.[26] We have also brushed aside
procedural technicalities where the issues raised, because of the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or
weight as precedents deserve the Court's attention and active intervention.[27]

We see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of interests involved which are indisputably important to the
coming electoral exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and
the benefits these recognitions provide - particularly, the on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the
Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to official
election results; the per diems from the government that watchers of accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the
printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the dominant-party status brings - constitute distinct advantages to any party and
its candidates, if only in terms of the ready information enabling them to react faster to developing situations.[28] The value of
these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an automated system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this
late stage, are question marks to some. To the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are
evidence of equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small measure to transparency and
to the election's credibility.

Thus, our focus is on the core issues that confront us and the parties, by-passing the technical and procedural questions
raised that do not anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and concentrating as
well on the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties involved and the COMELEC can move on to their
assigned time-sensitive roles and tasks in the coming elections.

We note that while the respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the petition, their objection is a formal one as
they do not deny the existence and basic correctness of these attachments. We see no resulting harm or prejudice therefore if we
overrule the objection raised, given the weight of the counterbalancing factors we considered above.[29]

We do not likewise find the failure to formally implead the NP-NPC a sufficient reason to dismiss the petition outright.
Without any finally confirmed registration in the coalition's favor, NP-NPC does not legally exist as a coalition with a
personality separate and distinct from the component NP and NPC parties. We find it sufficient that the NP and the NPC
have separately been impleaded;as of the moment, they are the real parties-in-interest as they are the parties truly interested in
legally establishing the existence of their coalition. Again, we find no resulting harm or prejudice in the omission to implead
NP-NPC, as the component parties have voiced out the concerns the coalition would have raised had it been impleaded as a
separate and properly existing personality.

The respondents next argue that the petition's cited grounds are mere errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This objection can be read as a facial objection to the petition or
as a substantive one that goes into the merits of the petition. We will discuss under the present topic the facial objection, as it is
a threshold issue that determines whether we shall proceed to consider the case or simply dismiss the petition outright.

A facial objection is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous
applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. After due
consideration, we conclude that the petition passes the facial objection test.

In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[30] the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, gave a very succinct exposition of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in relation
to errors of law. The Court then said:

A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction.

xxxx
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the
court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.

As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure
Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:

"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through
the original civil action of certiorari."

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing
the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of
law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy. [Emphasis supplied.]

The most obvious ground cited in the petition that, if properly established, would constitute grave abuse of discretion is the
alleged unwarranted action of the en banc in acting on the registration of the NP-NPC when the COMELEC's own Rules of
Procedure provides that registration is under the jurisdiction of the Division at the first instance. This alleged error is more than
an error of law. If this cited ground is correct, then the en banc acted without legal authority and thereby committed a
jurisdictional transgression;[31] its action, being ultra vires, would be a nullity.

Another allegation of an ultra vires act is that the COMELEC, by appropriate resolution, ordered that August 17, 2009 be the
cut-off date for the registration of parties, and yet approved the registration of NP-NPC long after this cut-off date had passed
without any valid justification or reason for suspending the rule. For the en banc to so act was not a mere error of law. The grant
of registration was an act outside mandatory legal parameters and was therefore done when the COMELEC no longer had the
authority to act on it. In this sense, it is a proper allegation of grave abuse of discretion under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

In our view, these jurisdictional challenges to the en banc Resolution, if established, constitute ultra vires acts that would
render the Resolution void.

b. Prematurity

Is the present petition premature, since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC accreditation issue?

This is another threshold issue, raised this time by the OSG, and we rule that the OSG's objection has no merit.

The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as
the dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and in fact
decreed the NP-NPC's registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation aspect of the petition.

The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters that are substantively
distinct from each other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election
laws;[32] accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified
registered parties.[33]

Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules regulate the registration of political parties,
organizations or coalitions of political parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by COMELEC Resolution No.
8752, Section 1 of which states that the petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the Commission who shall
docket it as an SPP (DM) case, in the manner that the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC was docketed. While the
registration of political parties is a special proceeding clearly assigned to a Division for handling under the COMELEC
Rules,[34] no similar clear-cut rule is available for a petition for accreditation as a dominant party. We thus make no statement on
this point, as it is not a matter in issue.

Under the circumstances of the present case where the registration was handled at the en banc, action at the COMELEC ended
upon the en banc's issuance of the assailed Resolution; under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules, a motion for
reconsideration of an en banc ruling is a prohibited pleading, except in election offense cases. Any request for accreditation that
may be filed is conceptually a separate matter for the COMELEC to handle. Thus, after the en banc issued the assailed
Resolution resolving the NP-NPC's application for registration as a coalition, the COMELEC's part in the registration
process was brought to a close, rendering the Resolution ripe for review by this Court.

The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling the accreditation of the respondent NP-NPC; the petition
expressly and frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and restraining order to prevent the COMELEC from
accrediting a coalition that is not registered as a party. The combination of a petition for certiorari and for prohibition under
the circumstances of the present case is fully justified, as the registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked
with and in fact sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization
or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once
registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.

Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing of a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected as a logical remedial move; otherwise,
accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its
avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event - the accreditation - that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place.
From the point of view of the petition for certiorari questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the
nullification of a past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection based on prematurity
is shown to be completely groundless.

c. Timeliness

Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, time-barred?

This issue, raised by the petitioner, strikes at the heart of the petition that the assailed COMELEC Resolution passed upon, and
that the divided en banc decided in the NP-NPC's favor.

Our short answer to the question posed is: yes, the NP-NPC's petition for registration as a coalition is time-barred. Thus,
the en banc was wrong in ordering the out-of-time registration of the NP-NPC coalition.

Admittedly, Resolution No. 8646 simply states that August 17, 2009 is the "[L]ast day for filing petitions for registration of
political parties," without mentioning "organizations and coalitions" in the way that the three entities are separately mentioned
under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules. Resolution No. 8646,
however, is simply a listing of electoral activities and deadlines for the May 10, 2010 elections; it is not in any way a resolution
aimed at establishing distinctions among "political parties, organizations, and coalitions." In the absence of any note,
explanation or reason why the deadline only mentions political parties, the term "political parties" should be understood in its
generic sense that covers political organizations and political coalitions as well.
To rule otherwise is to introduce, through a COMELEC deadline-setting resolution, a meaning or intent into Section 2(5),
Article IX-C, which was not clearly intended by the Constitution or by the COMELEC Rules; Resolution No. 8646 would
effectively differentiate between political parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the other.

In fact, no substantial distinction exists among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify creating
distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Such distinctions in the deadlines for the registration of political organizations
and coalitions, if allowed, may even wreak havoc on the procedural orderliness of elections by allowing these registrations to
introduce late and confusing signals to the electorate, not to mention their possible adverse effects on election systems and
procedures. This, the en banc very well knows, and their lack of unanimity on the disputed point of timeliness shows how
unusual the majority's reading has been.

The en banc's failure to follow its own rules on deadlines may, at first blush, be a negligible error that does not affect its
jurisdiction (assuming for the sake of argument that the en banc has the authority to act at the first instance). An examination of
Resolution No. 8646, however, shows that the deadline for registration cannot but be a firm and mandatory deadline that the
COMELEC has set.

We note in this regard that the registration of parties is the first in a list of election-related activities that peaks in the voting on
May 10, 2010. This list takes into account the close step-by-step procedure the COMELEC has to undertake in implementing
the automated election system (AES). We note, too, that a closely related activity is the holding of political conventions to select
and nominate official party candidates for all election positions, scheduled on October 21, 2009,[35] and November 20, 2009 was
the deadline for the filing of the certificates of candidacy for all elective positions - an undertaking that required the candidates'
manifestation of their official party affiliation. There is also a host of election activities in which officially registered parties
have to participate, principally: the examination and testing of equipment or devices for the AES and the opening of source
codes for review;[36] the nomination of official watchers;[37] and the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots wherein
accredited political parties may assign watchers.[38] Of course, registered political parties have very significant participation on
election day, during the voting and thereafter; the COMELEC needs to receive advance information and make arrangements on
which ones are the registered political parties, organizations and coalitions.

All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but be mandatory; the whole electoral exercise may fail or at
least suffer disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason, the COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected
applications for registration for having been filed out of time. A case in point is the application of the political party Philippine
Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.,[39] where the COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been filed out of
time,[40] among other grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might not have been the only political party whose application
for registration was denied at the COMELEC level for late filing. We are sure that all these other organizations would now cry
foul - and rightly so - because of the denial of their applications on the ground of late filing, when the NP-NPC has been made
an exception without rhyme or reason.

Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change (as contrasted to an ad hoc change or a
suspension of the deadline in favor of a party in the course of application), the en bancacted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register
political parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Effectively, the mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter
that should have been satisfied and was not. Where conditions that authorize the exercise of a general power are wanting, fatal
excess of jurisdiction results.[41]

Separately from the above consideration, we view the en banc's position that the deadline for registration is only for "political
parties" and not for "organizations and coalitions" to be preposterous, given the importance of the participation of political
parties in the election process and the rigid schedules that have to be observed in order to implement automated elections as
efficiently and as harmoniously as possible. We note that the COMELEC has not even bothered to explain why it imposed a
deadline applicable only to political parties, but not to political organizations and coalitions. In our view, this kind of ruling
was patently unreasonable, made as it was without basis in law, in fact or in reason; and was a grave abuse of discretion
that fatally afflicted the assailed COMELEC Resolution.[42]
1. The "Operative Fact" Issue

Other than the matter of timeliness which is an open-and-shut consideration under the clear deadline imposed, the more
important issue is raised by the statement in the assailed Resolution that the coalition was an "operative fact" that the en
banc could note and thereafter recognize, thereby implying that coalitions of political parties may not need any separate
registration if the component parties are already registered.

Whether one party would coalesce or work together in partnership, or in close collaboration with another party for purposes of
an electoral exercise, is a matter that the law as a rule does not and cannot regulate. This is a part of the freedom of choice
derived from the freedom of individuals constituting the political parties to choose their elected leaders, [43] as well as from the
concepts of democracy and sovereignty enshrined in our Constitution.[44] This is a freedom, too, that cannot but be related to
individuals' associational rights under the Bill of Rights.[45] We mention this freedom, as it was apparently the basis for the
"operative fact" that the assailed COMELEC Resolution spoke of. In effect, the assailed Resolution implied that registered
political parties are well within their right to coalesce; and that this coalition, once proven, should already bind the COMELEC,
rendering registration a mere recognition of an operative fact, i.e., a mere ministerial formality.

We categorically reject this COMELEC position and its implication; the freedom to coalesce or to work together in an election
to secure the vote for chosen candidates is different from the formal recognition the Constitution requires for a political party,
organization or coalition to be entitled to full and meaningful participation in the elections and to the benefits that proceed from
formal recognition. Registration and the formal recognition that accompanies it are required, as the words of the Constitution
themselves show, because of the Constitution's concern about the character of the organizations officially participating in the
elections. Thus, the Constitution specifies religious and ideological limitations, and in clear terms bars alien participation and
influence in our elections. This constitutional concern, among others, serves as a reason why registration is not simply a
checklist exercise, but one that requires the exercise of profound discretion and quasi-judicial adjudication by the
COMELEC.[46] Registration must be undertaken, too, under the strict formalities of the law, including the time limits and
deadlines set by the proper authorities.

Explained in these terms, it is easy to discern why the "operative fact" that the assailed Resolution speaks of cannot simply be
equated with the formal requirement of registration, and why this process should be handled in all seriousness by the
COMELEC. To carry this statement further, the Constitution itself has spoken on the matter of registration and the applicable
processes and standards; there can be no dispute about the wisdom, propriety, reasonableness or advisability of the
constitutional provision and the standards and processes it imposed. Only the people as a sovereign can dwell on these matters
in their consideration of the Constitution in a properly called political exercise. In this sense, the question of whether a coalition
of registered parties still needs to be registered is a non-issue for being beyond the power of this Court to resolve; this Court can
only rule that the Constitution has set the norms and procedures for registration, and these have to be followed.

To sum up, political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be
recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a
different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If they
want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise
of their and their members' democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they
can choose to secure the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions,
including the right to be accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these constitutional
terms.

2. The Jurisdictional and Other Questions Raised

Aside from the threshold and timeliness questions we have extensively discussed, this case raises other important questions as
well that, without the time constraints the coming elections impose on us, would have been fertile areas for discussion in
exploring the limits and parameters of COMELEC authority on the registration of coalitions. These questions, however, are not
for us to answer now, given our time constraints and the decisive impact on the present case of our ruling on timeliness. Thus,
we reserve for another case and another time the answers to these no less important questions.
We solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the
registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party registration raises critical election
concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The
COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures the Constitution and
our laws impose.

In light of the time constraints facing the COMELEC and the parties as the election is no more than a week away, we find it
compelling to declare this Decision immediately executory.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and, accordingly, NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated April 12, 2010 in the application for registration of the Nacionalista Party-
Nationalist People's Coalition as a political coalition, docketed as SPP-10-(DM). The Commission on Elections is DECLARED
BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition in the May 10, 2010 elections for lack of the requisite
registration as a political coalition. This Decision is declared immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139853. September 5, 2000.]

FERDINAND THOMAS M. SOLLER, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

OF PINAMALAYAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO (Branch 42) and ANGEL M. SAULONG, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the resolution promulgated on August 31, 1999, in COMELEC special
relief case SPR No. 10-99. The resolution dismissed petitioner’s petition to set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, dated October 1, 1998 and February 1, 1999, which denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss the
election protest filed by private respondent against petitioner and the motion for reconsideration, respectively.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May
11, 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly
elected mayor.

On May 19, 1998, private respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a ‘petition for annulment of the
proclamation/exclusion of election return." 1 On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, an election protest against petitioner docketed as EC-31-98.

On June 15, 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Petitioner also moved to dismiss private respondent’s protest
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to state cause of action. 2

On July 3, 1998, COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by pr3ivate Respondent.

On October 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but said motion
was denied. Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent’s election protest.

On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner’s suit. The election tribunal held that private respondent paid
the required filing fee. It also declared that the defect in the verification is a mere technical defect which should not bar the
determination of the merits of the case. The election tribunal stated that there was no forum shopping to speak of.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en banc ruling is prohibited except in a case
involving an election offense. 3 Since the present controversy involves no election offense, reconsideration is not possible and
petitioner has no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Accordingly, petitioner
properly filed the instant petition for certiorari with this Court.

On September 21, 1999, we required the parties to maintain the status quo ante prevailing as of September 17, 1999, the date of
filing of this petition.
Before us, petitioner asserts that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[I]

. . . IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC’S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S ELECTION PROTEST

DESPITE HIS (sic) LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO PAY ALL THE REQUISITE FILING FEES.

[II]

. . . IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT’S RTC’S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S ELECTION PROTEST

DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS PETITION IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE AND ITS FAILURE TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

[III]

. . . IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC’S REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST BELOW ON THE
GROUNDS OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR
REQUIRING A TRUTHFUL CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE THEREOF. 4

In our view, notwithstanding petitioner’s formulation of issues, the principal question presented for our resolution is whether or
not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the
dismissal of private respondent’s election protest.

At the outset, even if not squarely raised as an issue, this Court needs to resolve the question concerning COMELEC’s
jurisdiction. Unless properly resolved, we cannot proceed further in this case.

Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to
expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en
banc." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Thus, in Sarmiento v. COMELEC 5 and in subsequent cases, 6 we ruled that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the
requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power
pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in
the first instance is null and void.

As can be gleaned from the proceedings aforestated, petitioner’s petition with the COMELEC was not referred to a division of
that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the Commission en banc. The petition for certiorari assails the trial
court’s order denying the motion to dismiss private respondent’s election protest. The questioned order of the trial court is
interlocutory because it does not end the trial court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights
and liabilities as regards each other. 7 In our view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of
election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the
COMELEC en banc. Note that the order denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of the election protest. If the principal
case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal by a division of the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions
for certiorari relating to incidents of election protest should not be referred first to a division of the COMELEC for resolution.
Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of petitioner’s petition in the first instance.
Since public respondent COMELEC had acted without jurisdiction in this case, the petition herein is without doubt meritorious
and has to be granted. But in order to write finis to the controversy at bar, we are constrained to also resolve the issues raised by
petitioner, seriatim.

Petitioner contends that private respondent’s protest should have been dismissed outright as the latter failed to pay the amount of
P300.00 filing fee required under the COMELEC rules. 8 Petitioner’s contention is supported by Section 9, Rule 35 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure 9 and corresponding receipts 10 itemized as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

P368.00 — Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;

P 32.00 — Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7022478;

P 46.00 — Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;

P 4.00 — Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 4167602;

P 10.00 — Legal Research Fund fee, O.R. 2595144, and;

P 5.00 — Victim Compensation Fund, O.R. 4167979

———

P465.00

Close scrutiny of the receipts will show that private respondent failed to pay the filing fee of P300.00 for his protest as
prescribed by the COMELEC rules. The amount of P368.00 for which OR 7023752 was issued for the Judiciary Development
Fund as shown by the entries in the cash book of the clerk of court. 11 Thus, only P32.00 with OR 7022478 credited to the
general fund could be considered as filing fee paid by private respondent for his protest. A court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. 12 Patently, the trial court did not acquire Jurisdiction over private
respondent’s election protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent’s protest
case.cralaw : red

We have in a string of cases 13 had the occasion to rule on this matter. In Loyola v. COMELEC, the clerk of court assessed
private respondent therein the incorrect filing fee of P32.00 at the time of filing of the election protest. Upon filing his counter-
protest, petitioner was assessed to pay the same amount. Subsequently, the trial court remedied the situation by directing the
parties to pay the balance of P268.00. On review, we held that the lapse was not at all attributable to private respondent and
there was substantial compliance with the filing fee requirement. The error lies in the Clerk’s misapplication and confusion
regarding application of Section 9 of Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and this Court’s resolution dated September
4, 1990 amending Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. An election protest falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, in which case the Rules of Court will apply, and that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is primarily
intended to govern election cases before that tribunal. But the Court declared that this decision must not provide relief to parties
in future cases involving inadequate payment of filing fees in election cases. Our decisions in Pahilan and Gatchalian bar any
claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases.

In Miranda v. Castillo, private respondents each paid per assessment the amount of P465.00 as filing fees. Of this amount,
P414.00 was allocated for the JDF, P10.00 for legal research fund, P5.00 for victim compensation fee, and only the amount of
P32.00 was regarded as filing fee. The Court considered the amount as partial payment of the P300.00 filing fee under the
COMELEC rules and required payment of the deficiency in the amount of P268.00. But then again, the Court reiterated the
caveat that in view of Pahilan, Gatchalian, and Loyola cases we would no longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full
amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 27, 1997.

Clearly then, errors in the payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable. And the dismissal of the present case
for that reason is, in our view, called for.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library

Besides, there is another reason to dismiss private respondent’s election protest. We note that the verification of aforesaid
protest is defective. In the verification, private respondent merely stated that he caused the preparation of his petition and he has
read and understood all the allegations therein. 14 Certainly, this is insufficient as private respondent failed to state that the
contents of his election protest are true and correct of his personal knowledge. 15 Since the petition lacks proper verification, it
should be treated as an unsigned pleading and must be dismissed. 16

Further, we find that private respondent did not comply with the required certification against forum shopping. Private
respondent successively filed a "petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return" and an election protest.
Yet, he did not disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election
returns.

It could be argued that private respondent’s petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns was a pre-
proclamation case. The issues raised in that petition pertain to the preparation and appreciation of election returns and the
proceedings of the municipal board of canvassers. But note that such petition was filed after the proclamation of petitioner as the
winning candidate, thus, the petition was no longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by
the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. It might even be claimed with some reason that private
respondent, by resorting to the wrong remedy, abandoned his pre-proclamation case earlier filed. 17

Nonetheless, private respondent’s belief that he no longer had a pending case before the COMELEC because he deemed it
abandoned upon filing of his protest is not a valid reason for non-disclosure of the pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note
that the COMELEC dismissed private respondent’s pre-proclamation case only on July 3, 1998. Before the dismissal, said case
was legally still pending resolution. Similarly, the fact that private respondent’s protest was not based on the same cause of
action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for not complying with the required disclosure in the certification
against forum shopping. The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Failure to comply with this
requirement cannot be excused by the fact that a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule applies to any complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing it has actually committed forum shopping.
Every party filing any initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not and will not commit forum shopping.
Otherwise we would have an absurd situation, as in this case, where the parties themselves would be the judge of whether their
actions constitute a violation of the rule, and compliance therewith would depend on their belief that they might or might not
have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would defeat the very purpose of the rule. 18

Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances in this case, we are persuaded that respondent Regional Trial Court erred
and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss private respondent’s election protest against petitioner. And to
reiterate, respondent COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of respondent trial court to dismiss private
respondent’s election protest.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public respondent COMELEC is hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 21, 1999, is made
permanent. The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, is hereby ordered to DISMISS election
protest EC No. 31-98. Costs against private Respondent.

SO ORDERED.