RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN POLITICAL LAW

(Political Law and Election Laws )

July 2017 Edition

By:

ATTY. LAURO D. GACAYAN

Professor of Law, College of Law
UNIVERSITY OF THE CORDILLERAS
Baguio City

BAR REVIEWER IN CONSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL LAW

CPRS PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Cebu City, Cagayan de Oro City, Zamboanga City, Tacloban
City, Iloilo City, Iligan City and Davao City)

VILLASIS LAW CENTER

Quezon City, Makati City, Manila and Cebu City

POWERHAUS PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Manila, Dipolog City, Naga City, Santiago City, San Fernando
City, [LU] and Tagbilaran City)

EXCELLENT PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City, Cebu City and Tacloban City)

HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE PRE-BAR REVIEW CENTER

(General Santos City)

COSMOPOLITAN BAR REVIEW CENTER

(Baguio City)

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN BAR REVIEW CENTER

Dagupan City
 2

RECENT CASES IN POLITICAL LAW

IS THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW

AND SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE
WHOLE OF MINDANAO BY PRESIDENT
RODRIGO DUTERTE LAST MAY 23, 2017
CONSTITUTIONAL.

REP. EDCEL LAGMAN, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY MEDIALDIA, ET AL., G. R. No. 231658,
July 4, 2017

THE FACTS:

On May 23, 2017, while President Rodrigo R. Duterte was on a state visit to
Russia, he issued Proclamation No. 216 Declaring Martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

The basis of the said proclamation is the sudden attack made by the Maute
Terrorist Group of Marawi City, specifically the Marawi City Jail as well as
government and privately owned facilities. They ambushed and killed policemen and
attacked the Marawi Police Station, and committed other atrocities. They also raised
the ISIS Flag in Marawi City.

ISSUES:

1. Is there factual basis to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus?
2. May the Supreme Court act on the petitions to declare Proclamation No.
216 unconstitutional even if Congress has not convened to revoke or
concur with the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus?
3. Is terrorism considered rebellion and a valid ground for the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
4. Is Proclamation No. 216 void for being vague as to “other rebel groups”?

HELD:

1. There is factual basis on the part of the President to declare martial law
and suspend the privilege f the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao. This is so because all the elements of rebellion are present
and that public safety requires said proclamation. In determining factual
basis, it is enough that the President has probable cause. Judicial power
on the part of the Supreme Court does not extend to the calibration of the
President’s decision which among his calibrated powers under Section 18,
Art. VII of the Constitution he will avail of in a given situation. These
powers are:

a. calling out the armed forces;

b. suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or
c. declare martial law.

Under a valid martial law, the President may order:

d. arrest and seizures without warrant;

e. ban public assemblies;
f. take over news media and agencies and press censorship; and
issue presidential decrees.

However, the acts of the President does not give him unbridled discretion to
infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is so because martial law
does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant the
 3

operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. The guarantees under the Bill of
Rights remain in place.

2. While in the case of David vs. Arroyo, the Supreme Court held that it shall
wait until Congress has acted on the martial law declaration, whether
revoking it or approving it, before it could exercise its power of judicial
review, it abandoned said doctrine. It held that the SC can simultaneously
exercise its powers of review with, and independently from, the power to
revoke by Congress. As such, any inaction or default by Congress does
not deprive the Supreme Court of its power to review the martial law
declaration of the President.

3. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion is only one of

the various means by which terrorism is committed. As such, the
declaration of martial law based on terroristic acts of the Maute group is
valid.

4. The Proclamation No. 216 is not unconstitutional under the void for
vagueness doctrine. Void for vagueness is present when “men of common
intelligence must necessary guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application”. In such instance, the statute is unconstitutional in two
respects:

a. it violates the due process clause for failure to accord persons,

especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and
b. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government
muscle.

The void for vagueness doctrine applies only in free speech cases. As
such, the doctrine does not apply to Proclamation No. 216 because
what it seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

90-DAY PERIOD FOR THE TRIAL COURTS

TO DECIDE CASES SUBMITTED FOR
DECISION AS WELL AS OTHER INCIDENTS.
PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO DO SO.

IN THE MATTER OF THE JUDICIAL AUDIT IN

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 8, LA
TRINIDAD, BENGUET AND OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR VS. JUDGE MARYBELLE DEMOT-
MARINAS, AM 14-10-339 RTC AND AM NO. RTJ-16-
2446, MARCH 7, 2017

The Facts:

From March 30, 2014 up to April 12, 2014, the Office of the Court
Administrator conducted a judicial Audit involving cases pending before RTC 8, La
Trinidad, Benguet. The result shows that there are:

1. 105 Civil Cases which are undecided way beyond the period provided
under Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and

2. 45 Criminal Cases which are undecided way beyond the period provided
under Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

The cases submitted for decision were as early as 2003.

The Supreme Court required the respondent judge to comment in three (3)
Resolutions but no comment was received.
 4

Held:

Section 15, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution is very clear. Lower courts
MUST decide cases or resolve incidents within three months from date of
submission UNLESS REDUCED BY THE SUPREME COURT.

Likewise, Canon 3, Rule 3.5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to
promptly decide cases within the required period. The 90-day period is
MANDATORY for the lower courts.

Failure to decide within the said period constitutes gross inefficiency which
warrants administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. In the case at bar, the
respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of the duty and responsibility
that her position required.

Likewise, her failure to comment on three Resolutions of the Supreme Court

requiring her to explain constitutes grave misconduct.

The penalty should have been DISMISSAL BUT DEEMED RESIGNED ON

December 5, 2015 when she filed her certificate of candidacy for a public office.

NOTE:

While the period of 90 days for trial

courts and 12 months for the Court of Appeals
to decide cases is MANDATORY, the 24-month
period for the Supreme Court to decide cases
before is only DIRECTORY!

PENALTY FOR A JUDGE WHO FAILS TO

DECIDE CASES WITHIN THE 90-DAY
PERIOD PROVIDED BY THE CONSTITUTION
AS WELL AS BORROWING MONEY FROM
LAWYERS. REQUISITES FOR “JUDICIAL
CLEMENCY”. MAY A DISMISSED JUDGE BE
PARDONED BY THE PRESIDENT IN ORDER
TO RETURN TO HIS OR HER SALA?

CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN VS. JUDGE

VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, AM NO. 09-
2183, FEBRUARY 14, 2017

The Facts:

On July 7, 2009, Judge Pornillos was dismissed by the Supreme Court for her
repeated failure to decide cases submitted for Decision within the period prescribed
by Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution which constitutes Gross inefficiency and
for borrowing money from lawyers which constitute grave misconduct.

After almost eight (8) years from her dismissal, she filed at the President of
the Philippines a “Petition for Absolute Pardon from Dismissal from the Service
Sentence”. The President of the Philippines instead referred the said “Petition” to the
Office of the Court Administrator.

On October 3, 2016, she also wrote a letter to the Office of the Court
Administrator praying for “Judicial Clemency” from the Supreme Court.

Pornillos claimed that “she suffered almost eight years of UNFOUNDED

PUNISHMENT AS THE CHARGES AND FINDINGSAGAINST HER WERE BASED
ON GOSSIP.” She also claims that since the Supreme Court exonerated former
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the charges against her, the same privilege
should be extended to her in the spirit of Christmas.
 5

Held:

Judicial Clemency is an act of mercy. Thus, proof of reformation and showing

of potential and promise are indispensable. These are the requirements of to grant
“Judicial Clemency”. None was presented. Instead, the respondent claims that the
charges against her and the findings of the Supreme Court were based on mere
gossip.

Read:

Llamas vs. Orbos, October 15, 1991.

DUAL CITIZENS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE

ELECTED TO A PUBLIC OFFICE. FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE COMELEC DESERVE
RESPECT BY THE SUPREME COURT.

AGAPITO CARDINO VS. COMELEC and ROSALINA

JALOSJOS, G.R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017.

The Facts:

The petitioner and Rosalina Jalosjos were candidates for City Mayor of
Dapitan City for the May, 2013 elections.

The private respondent was proclaimed the winning candidate for the above
position after obtaining 18,414 votes as against the petitioner’s 16, 346.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a Petition for Quo Warranto before the
COMELEC based on the alleged ineligibility of the private respondent because
though she was formerly a Filipino citizen, she was naturalize in the United States
thereby becoming a US citizen. While she obtained Filipino citizenship on August 2,
2009, when she took her oath before the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles,
California, thereby having dual citizenship, dual citizens are expressly disqualified to
run for a public office under Section 40 [d] of the Local Government Code.

Petitioner claims that there is no valid renunciation of her US citizenship as

required by Philippine Law before she is qualified to run for public office. Jalosjos
alleged Affidavit of Renunciation dated July 16, 2012 before Judge Veronica De
Guzman-Laput of MTC Manulca, Zamboanga Del Norte is a forgery because she
arrived in the Philippines from the United States only on July 17, 2012 as certified by
the Bureau of Immigration and deportation..

On the other hand, the private respondent claims that the date was a
typographical error. It should have been July 19, 2012 as testified to by no less than
the Judge who administered the oath.

Held:

Indeed, there was a typographical error in the date of the Affidavit of

Renunciation. THERE WAS NO LOGICAL REASON WHY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO ANTEDATE HER AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION SINCE THE
SAME IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE COMELECT ONLY IN OCTOBER, 2012
WHEN SHE WILL FILE HER CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. As such, the factual
findings of the COMELEC shall be given utmost respect especially so that her
obtaining the highest number of votes from the electorates is not being contested.

The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any
way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results.
 6

WHETHER OR NOT COMELEC COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CANCELLING PETITIONER’S CERTIFICATE
OF CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT BASED
ON “FALSE MATERIAL REPRESENTATION”
ON HER CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCE.

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- LLAMANZARES

vs. COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P.
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ AND
ESTRELLA, ELAMPARO, G.R. Nos. 221697 &
221698-700, March 8, 2016 and April 5, 2016

THE FACTS:

1. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a

newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo
Militar on 3 September 1968.

2. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. Three days after or on 6 September
1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City .

3. In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was
given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar."

4. When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of San Juan City.

5. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar"
to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."

6. Having reached the age of eighteen ( 18) years in 1986, petitioner

registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for
Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

7. 5 On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport
No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on
5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.

8. Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development

Studies at the University of the Philippines but she opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988.
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political
Studies.

9. On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares

(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario
de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.

10. On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14

She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.

11. On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
 7

12. Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's

name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39 Again, petitioner
registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August
2006. She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the
No. XX4731999.

13. On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as

Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB). Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and
Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig
City on 20 October 2010;

14. During the May, 2013 elections, she was elected as a Member of the
Philippine Senate, garnering the highest number of votes. However, in her
2012 COC for Senator, she indicated that she had resided in the country for
only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections;

15. In October, 2015 she filed her Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Philippines;

16. Thereafter, the private respondents filed petitions for disqualification and
cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy on the grounds that she is not a
natural born Filipino citizen and that she fell short of the 10-year residence
requirement mandated under Art. VII of the Constitution based from her
sworn COC in 2012 where she stated under oath that she had resided in the
country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
In short, based from said statement in her 2012 COC, she will only be a
resident of the Philippines for 9 years and 6 months during the May 9, 2016
Presidential elections;

17. The COMELEC granted said petitions and held that petitioner and cancelled
her certificate of candidacy "on the exclusive ground" that she made in
the certificate a “false material representation” when she claimed that
she is a natural born Filipino citizen and that she met the 10-year
residence requirement.

Hence, this Petition.

MAIN ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN CANCELLING THE CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY OF THE PETITIONER.

H E L D:

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities
are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128
provides that “ Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters
shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in
the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country
was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines
in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83 %. Other circumstantial
evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has
typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond
 8

shaped eyes and an oval face. There is a disputable presumption that things
have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino
features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population
of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's
parents are Filipinos.

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she
put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she
started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and
the 2015 COC as false. As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she
misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as
of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned
residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was
sold and her husband returned to the Philippines.

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to cancel her COC
on the exclusive ground of false representation. All put together, in the
matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as
President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in
Division and En Banc are diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to
fruits. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

NOTE:

In its Resolution on the Motions for Reconsideration of the Private

Respondents dated April 5, 2016, the Supreme Court held that their Decision did not
rule on whether or not the petitioner is “QUALIFIED” to be elected President of the
Philippines. Only the Supreme Court acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, in
an appropriate case after the elections, has the power to decide cases involving the
qualifications of all candidates for President and Vice President as provided in the
last paragraph, Section 4, Art. VII of the Constitution. What was in issue in this case
is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the COC
of petitioner based on false and material representation in her COC.

THE 59-YEAR OLD “AGUINALDO OR THE

CONDONATION OR FORGIVENESS
DOCTRINE” ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
INVOLVING ELECTIVE OFFICIALS WAS
ABANDONED BY THE SUPREME COURT.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY

AS THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
(SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY,
JR., G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

THE FACTS:

During the first term (June 30, 2010 up to June 30, 2013) of Makati Mayor
Jejomar Erwin Binay, Jr., he allegedly performed the following acts:

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase
III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction
Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding
contract on September 28, 2010, without the required publication and the
lack of architectural design, and approved the release of funds therefor in
the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15,
2010; (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011; (3) P92,775,202.
On February 25, 2011; (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011; (5)
 9

P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011; and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7,

2011;

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase
IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract on August 18, 2011, without the
required publication and the lack of architectural design, and approved the
release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1)
P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11; (2) P173,132,606.91 on October
28,2011; (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011; (4) P62,878,291.81
on February 10, 2012; and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;

(b)
(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for
Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract on September 13,
2012, without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,
and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of
P32,398,220.05 and P30,582,629.30 on December 20, 2012.

He was re-elected as Mayor of Makati City during the May, 2013 elections.

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and
other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati accusing
them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as
"The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of
the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati
Parking Building).
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of

Investigators to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report,
and file the necessary complaint, if warranted. Pursuant to the Ombudsman's
directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint)
against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous
activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati
Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City
Mayor of Makati.

On March 10, 2015, a preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et

al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during
the pendency of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the
preventive suspension of a public officer are present, finding that the evidence of
Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong. Their continued stay in their respective offices
give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses;
hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the
OMB Cases filed against them. Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A.
Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension
order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the
Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s
staff.

On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension
order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.
Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for
 10

any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking
Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected
Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and
that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic.

The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated April 6, 2015 granting

Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction which further enjoined the
implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that
Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification
of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine,
citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.

Hence, this petition by the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE TRO AND EVENTUALLY, THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENJOINING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
ORDER AGAINST BINAY, JR. BASED ON THE CONDONATION
DOCTRINE

H E L D:

The “Aguinaldo” or “Condonation” or “Forgiveness” doctrine, which condones

the administrative liability of an elected official for an act committed during his
previous term by reason of his re-election, is hereby set aside since it is in violation of
the accountability provision of the Constitution. Section 1, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution which provides:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public

officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the
Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept,
abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and
action bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically
intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the
ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including
Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support
these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the
Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office.
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very
powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a notch above other
grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and
statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of
public officers.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the
accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
 11

suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the

penalty. The CA Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was
based on the condonation doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos . The CA
held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can
hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in
2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from
anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to
2013. Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which were
apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , Binay, Jr. cannot be held
administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona,
Jr., and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica, wherein the condonation doctrine was applied by
the Court although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning
that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said
re-election.

Condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied

forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had
been no offense." The condonation doctrine - which connotes complete
extinguishment of liability is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential
creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board
ofNueva Ecija, (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-elected to the same position in
1955. As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Supreme
Court resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the matter are
conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional
provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of
whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct."
Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it
proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline

toward the rule denying the right to remove one
from office because of misconduct during a prior
term, to which we fully subscribe.

Based on the 1987 Constitution the doctrine of condonation is actually

bereft of legal bases.To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust
and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a
prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office,
or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully
absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be
condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos.

It must be pointed out, however, that the Supreme Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, Petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS

SANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting
Governor of Cagayan, G.R. No. 94115 August 21,
1992

THE FACTS:
 12

Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having
been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to
serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oath sometimes around March
1988.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent Secretary
of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to
petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or remove
from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt
thereof.

On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and

culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba
and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao
and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed during the
coup attempt. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to the complaint.

On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter

from petitioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent Secretary's
December 4, 1989 letter requiring him to explain why should not be suspended or
removed from office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the
planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that
he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. virtual law library

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as his answer to the

complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. On the basis thereof, respondent
Secretary suspended petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending
the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him.

During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner, complainants

presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner
neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the complainant's witnesses,
choosing instead to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the
case, which motion was denied.

Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding

petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as
Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then
the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.

Petitioner elevated the Decision of the DILG to the Supreme Court and while
the same was pending, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. Three separate petitions for his
disqualification were then filed against him, all based on the ground that he had been
removed from office by virtue of the March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent
Secretary. The commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution
dated May 9, 1992.

Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court G.R. Nos. 105128-30, entitled Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v.
Commission on Elections, et al., seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission
ordering his disqualification. The Supreme Court, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992,
issued a temporary restraining order against the Commission to cease and desist
from enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the disqualification
case, thereby allowing the canvassing of the votes and returns in Cagayan to
proceed. However, the Commission was ordered not to proclaim a winner until
Supreme Court has decided the case.

On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case

granting petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission on the
ground that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and is
still pending review with the Supreme Court As petitioner won by a landslide margin
in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.
 13

ISSUE:

May Gov. Aguinaldo be subjected to administrative sanctions as a result of his

acts in his previous terms after he was overwhelmingly re-elected by the people of
Cagayan?

HELD:

Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered

the administration case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after
the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province which was: .

AGUINALDO: 170,382 votes;

Patricio T. Antonio - 54,412 votes;

Paquito F. Castillo - 2,198; and

Florencio L. Vargas - 48,129.

Considering the fact narrated, the expiration of petitioner's term of office

during which the acts charged were allegedly committed, and his subsequent re-
election, the administrative case against the petitioner must be dismissed for the
reason that the issue has become academic. In Pascual v. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31, 1959, this Court has ruled:

The weight of authority, however, seems to

incline to the ruled denying the right to remove from
office because of misconduct during a prior term to
which we fully subscribe.

Offenses committed, or acts done, during a

previous term are generally held not to furnish cause
for removal and this is especially true were the
Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for
removal shall not extend beyond the removal from
office, and disqualification from holding office for a term
for which the officer was elected or appointed.

The underlying theory is that each term is

separate from other terms, and that the re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty.
Gen. v. Kasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50 L.R.A.
[NS] 553). As held in Comant v. Bregan [ 1887] 6
N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50 [NE]
553.

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of
their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character,
and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people. (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., 17 SCRA
58, 59-60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163)

ROMEO R. SALALIMA, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T.

GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive
 14

Secretary, VICTOR R. SUMULONG, RENATO C.

CORONA and ANGEL V. SALDIVAR, in their
capacity as Members of the Ad Hoc Committee,
G.R. Nos. 117589-92. May 22, 1996

THE FACTS:

Sometime in 1993, several administrative complaints were filed against the

petitioners, who were elective officials of the Province of Albay, with the Office of the
President . One is for entering into a negotiated contract and for entering a retainer
contract for legal services AS COLLABORATING COUNSEL ONLY between the
Province of Albay, on the one hand, and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and the Cortes &
Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the disbursement of public fund in payment
thereof P7,380,410.31. The contract includes a contingent fee of 18% where the
amount involved is the P2l4 million claim of the Province against NPC and therefore
amounts to P38.5 million. This is so despite the fact that the Provincial Legal Counsel
of the Province had already filed the Comment for the province in a case pending
before the Supreme Court. Only the Memorandum before the Supreme Court was
filed by Atty. Cornago and no pleadings were filed by the Cortes and Reyna Law
Firm. Yet, they were already paid P7,380,410.31---with over P30M still to be collected
if the Province wins the case against the NAPOCOR in the Supreme Court.

After giving the petitioners the chance to submit their evidence, Administrative
Order No. 153 was signed on 7 October 1994 by the President and by public
respondent Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., approving the findings of
fact and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and holding the petitioners
administratively liable for wanton disregard of law amounting to grave abuse of
authority and ordered them suspended from office.

ISSUE:

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Gov. Salalima be suspended for
acts or omissions allegedly committed by him during his previous term particularly
entering into the retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law
Firm and in making payments pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case
filed by NPC with the Supreme Court against the Province.

HELD:

The Supreme Court has ruled as early as in the case of i Municipality of

Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok, 93 Phil. 173 (1953), that local government units cannot be
represented by private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully
represent them.

In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, they exceeded

their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the Local Government Code
and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court.

Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. First, the

disbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7,380,410.31 were disallowed by the
Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made without the prior written
conformity of the Solicitor General and the written concurrence of the Commission on
Audit (COA) as required by COA Circular No. 86-25 5 dated 2 April 1986.

Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is the

fact that it was only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating counsel of record of
the Province in the Supreme Court case (G.R. No. 87479) without any appearance
from the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm.

Furthermore, the memorandum with the Supreme Court filed for the Province
was signed by Atty. Cornago and not by the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm.
Consequently, the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm was not counsel of record of the
Province in G.R. No. 87479. And yet, six of the ten checks paid by the Province and
 15

amounting to more than P3.6 million were issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law
Firm through Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes. In other words, respondents disbursed
money to the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel
for the Province in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87479.

Finally, the attorneys fees agreed upon by Salalima and confirmed by the
other petitioners are not only unreasonable but also unconscionable. The contingent
fee of 18% of the P2l4 million claim of the Province against NPC amounts to P38.5
million.

The Province has a legal officer, Atty. Ricafort, who had already filed a
comment on NPCs petition against the Province. The comment filed by Atty. Ricafort
already covers the basic issues raised in the petition. When Atty. Cornago filed an
appearance and subsequently a memorandum for the Province, the petition was
already been given due course by the Supreme Court and the only pleading to be
filed by the parties before the Court would issue its decision was a memorandum.
Surely, one memorandum could not be worth P38.5 million.

Unfortunately, we agree with the petitioners that Governor Salalima could no

longer be held administratively liable for the execution in November 1989 of the
retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This
is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual vs.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija and Aguinaldo vs. Santos. In Pascual, this Court
ruled:

We now come to one main issue of the

controversy - the legality of disciplining an elective
municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him
during his immediately preceding term of office.

Offenses committed, or acts done, during

previous term are generally held not to furnish cause
for removal and this is especially true where the
constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for
removal shall not extend beyond the removal from
office, and disqualification from holding office for the
term for which the officer was elected or appointed.

The underlying theory is that each term is

separate from other terms, and that the re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officers
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him therefore.

The Court should never remove a public officer

for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right
to elect their officers. When the people have elected a
man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregard or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of
such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will
of the people.

We may add that sound public policy dictates it. To rule otherwise would
open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests between the re-
elected official and his political enemies, who may not stop to hound the former
during his new term with administrative cases for acts, alleged to have been
committed during his previous term. His second term may thus be devoted to
defending himself in the said cases to the detriment of public service. This doctrine of
forgiveness or condonation cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the re-
elected official may have committed during his previous term.
 16

Ref:

1. Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,

L-11959, October 31, 1959
2. Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., 17 SCRA 58, 59-
60 [1966])

3. Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974])

4. MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA, petitioner, vs.

HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, G.R.
No. 139043. September 10, 1999 .

5. LIBRADO M. CABRERA, FE M. CABRERA

and LUTHER LEONOR vs. HON. SIMEON V.
MARCELO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN,
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. Nos.
157419-20. December 13, 2004

6. ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR vs.

OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. G.R. No. 180917,
April 23, 2010

7. RENATO U. REYES vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 120905. March 7, 1996]

8. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. MARIAN

D. TORRES, G.R. No. 168309, September 25,
2008,

Even if the House of Representatives is

considered the “sole judge” of all contests
involving Members of the House of
Representative by the Constitution, the
Supreme Court does not lose its power to
review the Decision of HRET in case of
grave abuse of discretion committed by the
latter.

MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, G.R. No. 219603, January
26, 2016

The Facts

1. On 16 September 2008, the Supreme Court promulgated its Decision in G.R.

Nos. 161032 and 161176, entitled "Tulfo v. People of the Philippines," convicting
private respondent Pichay by final judgment of four counts of libel. In lieu of
imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of Six Thousand
Pesos (P6,000.00) for each count of libel and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
as moral damages. The Decision became final and executory on 1 June 2009.
On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
damages and Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as fine for each count of libel.

2. On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Member of the Flouse of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections.

3. On 18 February 2013, petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-Delgado) filed a

petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
against Pichay before the Commission on Elections (Comelec), on the ground
that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Ty-Delgado
 17

argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period
barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse.

4. In his Answer dated 4 March 2013, Pichay, through his counsel, alleged that the
petition for disqualification was actually a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code, and it was filed out of time. He admitted his conviction
by final judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed that libel does not
necessarily involve moral turpitude. He argued that he did not personally perform
the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was only because of his presumed
responsibility as president of the publishing company.

5. During the elections in May, 2013, Pichay obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for the position of Representative, First Legislative District,
Surigao del Sur.

6. On 14 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a motion to suspend the proclamation of

Pichay before the Comelec.

7. On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur

proclaimed Pichay as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives
for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur;

8. On 31 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET
reiterating that Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of
Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by final judgment of four counts
of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two years have passed
since he served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the penalty imposed
on him.

9. In his Answer, Pichay claimed that his conviction for the crime of libel did not
make him ineligible because ineligibility only pertained to lack of the qualifications
under the Constitution.

10. In its Resolution dated 4 June 2013, the Comelec First Division dismissed the
petition for disqualification filed against Pichay because of lack of jurisdiction as a
result of the latter being a Member of the House of Representatives already.

11. In a Decision dated 18 March 2015, the HRET held that there is nothing in Tulfo
v. People of the Philippines which found that Pichay directly participated in any
way in writing the libelous articles, aside from being the president of the
publishing company. Thus, the HRET concluded that the circumstances
surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel showed that the crime did not involve
moral turpitude and therefore, his election as Congressman is valid.

Hence, this petition.

THE ISSUES:
[I]

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO
DECLARE RESPONDENT PICHAY INELIGIBLE OR
DISQUALIFIED FROM HOLDING THE POSITION OF
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES
BY REASON OF HIS CONVICTION OF LIBEL, A
CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.

[II]

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
 18

JURISDICTION BY FAILING TO DECLARE THAT

PETITIONER DELGADO WAS THE SOLE
LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE FOR MEMBER, HOUSE
OF REPRESENTANTIVES OF THE FIRST
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR,
THUS SHE MUST BE DECLARED THE RIGHTFUL
WINNER IN THE 2013 ELECTIONS AND MUST BE
MADE TO ASSUME THE SAID POSITION.

H E L D:

A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground

for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications.— Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which
he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed

removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from
his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,

modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. 7 Although not
every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general
rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do
not.

In Zari v. Flores, it was held that libel is one of the crimes involving moral
turpitude. In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel.
In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the
four defamatory articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless disregard of whether
they were false or not. The fact that another libelous article was published after the
filing of the complaint can be considered as further evidence of malice. Thus, Pichay
clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
He committed an "act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
he owes his fellow men, or society in general," and an act which is "contrary to
justice, honesty, or good morals."

Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude. Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence. In this case, since
Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year
period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is disqualified to become a
Member of the House of Representatives until then. Considering his ineligibility due
to his disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June 2009, Pichay
made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of
candidacy on 9 October 2012 for the 2013 elections.

In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of

candidacy because he knew that he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that he was eligible for elective
public office constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or
eligibility for the office.

A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or
cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because
 19

his certificate of candidacy is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a
valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. In both Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections and Aratea v. Commission on Elections, the Court proclaimed the second
placer, the only qualified candidate who actually garnered the highest number of
votes, for the position of Mayor. The certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the
highest number of votes was void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all, and all
his votes were considered stray votes.

Accordingly, the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for
libel, a crime involving moral turpitude.

While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the

Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court
maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other
words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled precedents on the
matter before it, it commits grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado is DECLARED the winner for the

position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District
of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections. Considering that the term of the
present House of Representatives will end on 30 June 2016, the Decision is
immediately executory.

Which has jurisdiction to determine

the qualifications a candidate for
Members of the House of
Representatives? COMELEC or the
House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal?

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO v. HON. SPEAKER

FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY
GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP AND REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES, G.R. No. 211140, January 12,
2016

THE FACTS:

1. On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) of Reyes as candidate for the position of Representative of the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that
Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC, i.e., "(i) that
she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque; (ii) that she is a natural-bom
Filipino citizen; (iii) that she is not a permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a
foreign country; (iv) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964; (v) that her civil status is
single; and finally (vi) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected
to."5 The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-053 (DC), entitled ''Joseph Socorro
B. Tan v. Atty. Regina Ongsiako Reyes."

2. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition;
hence, Reyes's COC was accordingly cancelled. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion
for reconsideration thereto.

3. But while said motion was pending resolution, the synchronized local and
national elections were held on May 13, 2013 where Reyes was proclaimed the
winner.

4. The day after, or on May 14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
resolution of the COMELEC First Division, denying Reyes’ Motion for
Reconsideration;
 20

5. On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution,
the Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as
the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque.

6. On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes
in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET
Case No. 13-028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes."

7. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality in SPA

No. 13-053 (DC) which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

NOW, THEREFORE, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have
lapsed since the date of the promulgation with no Order issued by the Supreme
Court restraining its execution, the Resolution of the Commission en
banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 is hereby declared FINAL andEXECUTORY.

8. On June 7, 2013, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes.

9. On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before Supreme Court a Petition

for Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 207264, entitled "Regina Ongsiako Reyes v.
Commission on Elections and Joseph Socorro Tan," assailing (i) the May 14,
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which denied her motion for
reconsideration of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy (for material misrepresentations made
therein); and (ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality.

10. On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court promulgated a Resolution dismissing
Reyes's petition, which states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding

no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The
14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.

The Supreme Court held then that Reyes cannot assert that it is the FfRET
which has jurisdiction over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the
House of Representatives. This Court explained that to be considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (i) a valid proclamation, (ii) a proper oath, and (iii) assumption of office.

On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc). Thereafter, Velasco was proclaimed the duly elected
Representative for the Province of Marinduque

Despite said proclamation, however, on July 22, 2013, the 16 th Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint session. On the same day,
Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque,
along with the rest of the Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths
in open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

On October 22, 2013, Reyes's motion for reconsideration of the June 25,
2013 Decision was denied by this Supreme Court.

On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two
letters to Reyes essentially demanding that she vacate the office of Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor. Likewise, on
December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting,
among others, that he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque.

On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr.

reiterating the above-mentioned request but to no avail.
 21

On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap

reiterating his earlier requests (July 12 and 18, 2013) to delete the name of Reyes
from the Roll of Members and register his name in her place as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

However, Velasco relates that his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all
the letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they
refused to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate
the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, she
continues to discharge the duties of said position.

Hence, the Petition for Mandamus.

I S S U E S:

A. Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. can be COMPELLED,

DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to administer the oath
in favor of petitioner as duly elected Marinduque Representative and
allow him to assume said position and exercise the prerogatives of said
office.

B. Whether or not respondent SG Barua-Yap can be COMPELLED,

DIRECTED and ORDERED by a Writ of Mandamus to delete the name of
respondent Reyes from the Roll of Members of the House and include
the name of the Petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives.

C. Whether or not a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) and a

Writ of PERMANENT. INJUNCTION can be issued to prevent, restrain
and prohibit respondent Reyes from exercising the prerogatives and
performing the functions as Marinduque Representative, and to order
her to VACATE the said office.
HELD:

As to the first and second issues, Velasco contends that he "has a well-
defined and clear legal right and basis to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus."
He insists that the final and executory decisions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-
053 (DC), and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 207264, as well as the nullification of
respondent Reyes's proclamation and his subsequent proclamation as the duly
elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque, collectively give him the
legal right to claim the congressional seat.

Thus, he contends that it is the ministerial duty of respondent Speaker Belmonte,

Jr. "to administer the oath to [him] and to allow him to assume and exercise the
prerogatives of the congressional seat for Marinduque representative;" and (ii)
respondent Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap "to register [his] name xxx as the duly elected
member of the House and delete the name of respondent Reyes from the Roll of
Members."

Despite the foregoing, Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker

Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the performance of
their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding him (Velasco) from the
enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque.

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to
register the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives,
respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in existence final and executory
resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory
resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate
of Candidacy. There is likewise a final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in
SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes, and proclaiming
 22

Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque.

The foregoing state of affairs collectively lead this Court to consider the facts as
settled and beyond dispute - Velasco is the proclaimed winning candidate for the
Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque.

Jurisdiction of the COMELEC viz-a-

viz HRET; Requisites before the
COMELEC is considered to have lost
jurisdiction to decide disqualification
cases of candidates for Congress.

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO TAN, GR No.
207264, June 25, 2013

Perez, J.

This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the order of cancellation of the
Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque.

The facts are as follows:

1. On October 31, 2012, respondent Tan filed an amended petition to deny due
course and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner because of
material representations therein where she stated that: [1] she is single when
the truth is, she is married to Rep. Herminaldo Mandanas of Batangas; [2]
that she is a resident of Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of
Bauan, Batangas which is the resident of her husband, Rep. Mandanas and
at the same time, she is a resident of 135 JP Rizal St., Milagrosa, QC, as
shown in the directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of
Representatives; [3] her date of birth is July 3, 1964 when other documents
show she is either born on July 8, 1959 or July 3, 1960; and [4] she is not a
permanent resident of another country when she is in fact a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United States of America; and [5] that she is a
Filipino citizen when she in fact is an American Citizen;

2. Petition answered the above complaint by alleging that while she is publicly
known as the wife of Rep. Mandanas, there is no valid and binding marriage
due to non-compliance of some formal requirements. As such, she is not
duty-bound to live with Rep. Manadanas so that his residence cannot be
attributed to her. The NSO-issued Birth Certificate shows that she was born
on July 3, 1964. And finally, she alleged that the allegation that she is a
permanent resident of the United States and that she is in fact an American
citizen is not supported by evidence;

3. On February 13, 2013, private respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to

Admit Newly-Discovered Evidence which is actually a database record of the
Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American Citizen and a
holder of a US Passport and a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner
issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of
the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a US Passport
in her various travels abroad;

4. On March 27, 2013, the 1st Division of the COMELEC issued a Resolution
cancelling petitioner’s COC on the ground that she is not a citizen of the
Philippines and that she failed to comply with the requirements of RA No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she did not
have the 1-year residency under Section 6 , Art. VI of the Constitution and as
such, she is not eligible to run for the position of Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque;
 23

5. On April 8, 2013, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc by claiming that she has not lost her being a natural-born
Filipino citizen by obtaining and using an American Passport; the 1st Division
erred in holding that she is an American citizen just because she married an
American, if ever, it only resulted in dual citizenship. She attached her
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 24, 2012
and likewise argued that the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution was complied with because she never was a naturalized citizen
and therefore, she never lost her domicile of origin;

6. On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC or on the day after the May 13, 2013
National and Local Elections, the COMELEC denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit;

7. On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed as the WINNER of the May 13,
2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone District of
Marinduque;

8. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality

declaring its May 14, 2013 Decision final and executory considering that
twenty one (21) days have lapsed and no order was issued by the Supreme
Court restraining its execution;

9. On June 5, 2013, petitioner took his oath of office before Speaker Feliciano
Belmonte;

10. On June 7, 2013, the petitioner filed the instant petition before the Supreme
Court;

11. On June 25, 2013 OR EIGHTEEN (18) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF FILING
OF THE PETITION, the Supreme Court en banc DECIDED THE INSTANT
PETITION WITHOUT EVEN REQUIRING THE RESPONDENTS TO FILE
THEIR COMMENT.

ISSUES

1. THE COMELEC IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER

WHO IS A DULY PROCLAIMED WINNER AND WHO HAS ALREADY
TAKEN HER OATH OF OFFICE FOR THE POSITION OF MEMBER OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE LONE DISTRICT OF
MARINDUQUE.
2. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABSUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE “NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE” WITHOUT HAVING BEEN TESTIFIED ON, OFFERED AND
ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF HER RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
3. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DECLARED THAT SHE IS NOT A FILIPINNO
CITIZEN AND THAT SHE DID NOT MEET THE RESIDENCE
REQUIREMENT.
4. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSAE OF
DISCRETION WHEN BY ENFORCING THE PROVISIONS OF RA NO.
9225, IT IMPOSED ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS IN ADDITION TO
THOSE IN SECTION 6, ART. VI OF THE CONSTITUTION.

HELD:

The petitioner claims that only the House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal (HRET) which has jurisdiction to decide the issue of her eligibility and
qualifications. It appears that the filing of this case to the Supreme Court is a clear
attempt to stop the COMELEC from implementing its final and executory judgment.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over her case
for the following reasons:
 24

1. HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s

qualifications as well as over the questioned COMELEC Resolution,
unless a petition is duly filed before the HRET. The petitioner has not
averred that she has filed such action.
2. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered
as a “Member” of the House of Representatives as shown by Section 17,
Art. VI of the Constitution and explained by the Supreme Court in IMELDA
MARCOS VS. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329.

Is the petitioner a Member of the House of Representatives?

No. In VINZONS-CHATO VS. COMELEC, 520 SCRA 166, citing Aggabao

vs. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400 and Guerrero vs. COMELEC, 391 Phil. 344,
the Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably held that once a

winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns and
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.

The above rule was reiterated in LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, 583 SCRA
1 and GONZALES VS. COMELEC, 644 SCRA 761.

In short, in order to be considered a Member of the House of

Representatives, there must be concurrence of the following requisites:

1. valid proclamation;
2. a proper oath; and
3. assumption of office.

The petitioner is not considered a Member of the House of Representatives

BECAUSE SHE HAS NOT ASSUMED OFFICE WHICH BEGINS ON THE NOON OF
June 30, 2013. Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

Likewise, there is no compliance of the 2nd requirement as to “Oath”. While

there was the purported oath before Speaker Belmonte on June 5, 2013, the same is
not the oath provided under Section 6, Rule II of the Rules of the House of
Representatives which provides that “members shall take their oath or affirmation
either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.”

Again, even though she allegedly took her oath before Speaker Belmonte on
June 5, 2013, there was no indication that it was made during plenary or in open
session that is why it is unclear if the said requirement was complied with.

(Note: Regular session of Congress starts at the 4th Monday of July following
their election so it is very obvious that Congress was not in session yet on June 5,
2013)

The petitioner should have questioned the COMELEC Resolution before the
Supreme Court within five (5) days to stop the same from becoming final and
executory.

The petitioner’s objection to the newly-discovered evidence having been used

against her without anyone testifying on it is without merit since COMELEC is not
bound by technical rules of evidence. Proceedings to cancel a COC is summary in
nature and therefore, the said newly-discovered evidence was properly admitted by
the COMELEC. No violation of her right to due process because she was given the
opportunity to argue her case. From the time the said “evidence” was provided to her
up to the time the 1st Division promulgated its Decision, she had a period of five (5)
months to rebut the same.
 25

The evidence on record taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on
petitioner’s citizenship. She, however, failed to clear such doubt. She never denied
using a US Passport.

Finally, as to the issue of residence, considering that she lost her natural-
born status, petitioner could not be considered a resident of Marinduque.

Clearly, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

References:

1. Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, 583 SCRA, 583 SCRA 1

2. Vinzons-Chato vs. COMELEC, 520 SCRA 166;
3. Aggabao vs. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400
4. Guerrero vs. COMELEC, 391 Phil. 344
5. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 644 SCRA 761
6. Dimaporo vs. COMELEC, 544 SCRA 381
7. Tagolino vs. HRET & LUCY TORRES-GOMEZ, March 2013
8. ALAN PAGUIA VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND
HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010

COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION

TO RESOLVE DISPUTES INVOLVING
THE EXPULSION OF A PARTY-LIST
MEMBER WHO IS ALREADY A
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES.

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, v. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS EN BANC, G.R. No. 205505,
September 29, 2015

THE FACTS:

1. On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to

Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010
Elections. On 6 March 2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its
nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascarina as
second nominee.

2. On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the

winning party-list groups. Based on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-
List v. COMELEC, Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, and thereafter
assumed office.

3. Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list

organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee
Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by
its nominees. Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year term.

4. On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during
which it introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the
salient changes was the composition of the Central Committee, which would
still be composed of 15 representatives but with five each coming from
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation). The
amendments likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central
Committee members within six months after the Second National Convention.

In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent
members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the
 26

Central Committee. The Interim Central Committee was dominated by

members of the Rimas Group.

5. On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed
office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for
disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the
Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement
as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating
Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.

6. On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration

with the Interim Central Committee, which subsequently denied the same in a
Resolution dated 29 December 2011.

7. On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed
with COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12-
039. The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second
Division, prayed that petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating
Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession of the second
nominee, Roberto Mascarina as Ating Koop's representative in the House.

8. In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012, the COMELEC Second Division upheld

the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as
the duly qualified nominee of the party-list group. The Second Division
characterized the issue of the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from
Ating Koop as an intra-party leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an
incident of its power to register political parties.

9. Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the
Second Division's Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31
January 2013. The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En

Banc) RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVED, to:

a. DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico

in the House of Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate
Succession of the Second Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr.
Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party Representative, for lack of
jurisdiction;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

b. UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro Lico from ATING

KOOP Party-list Group; [and]

c. UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its

President, Amparo T. Rimas, x x x

In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no

jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives,
considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member
of the House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition.

At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's
expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee
ousted him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in hold-over
capacity even after their terms had expired; and that the COMELEC was not in a
position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of
the expulsion.

Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as the legitimate
representative of Ating Koop considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to
show that the Lico Group made a valid call for the special election of Central
Committee members as required under the Amended Constitution and By-Laws; 2)
there is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended the Cebu
 27

meeting; and 3) the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop's
Amended Constitution and By-Laws.33

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER

THE EXPULSION OF A MEMBER OF A PARTY-LIST GROUP FROM THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER

THE EXPULSION OF A MEMBER FROM THE PARTY-LIST OR INTRA-
CORPORATE DISPUTE AMONG THE MEMBERS.

HELD:

The COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from
the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction. However, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a
matter beyond its purview.

The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner

Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second
nominee as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the
question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution gives the HRET jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-
list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representatives. n this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and
he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the
COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

This case is different from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on

Elections. In that case, the disqualification by the COMELEC of petitioner Reyes,
even as she was already [1] proclaimed winner in the elections at the time she filed
her petition with the High Court and [2] had taken her oath. In doing so, the
argument that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET was rejected
because she was not yet a member of the House of Representatives: petitioner
Reyes had yet to assume office, the term of which would officially start at noon of 30
June 2013. In the present case, all three requirements of proclamation, oath of
office, and assumption of office were satisfied.

Finally, insofar as intra-corporate disputes within a party-list group, the

COMELEC has jurisdiction to settle the same. Indeed, the COMELECs jurisdiction
to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is well established. This power to
rule upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as
an incident of its enforcement powers.

COMELEC could not disqualify a

candidate based on a law which was
already repealed.

GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P. ALDON, AND
 28

RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, G.R. No. 215847,

January 12, 2016

THE FACTS:

1. On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus

Election Code (Election Code)2Section 261(d) and (e) of this Code prescribe
the following elements of coercion as an election
offense:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. -The following shall be guilty of an election

offense: x x x

(d) Coercion of subordinates. –

(1) Any public officer, or any officer of any public or private

corporation or association, or any head, superior, or administrator of
any religious organization, or any employer or landowner
who coerces or intimidates or compels, or in any manner
influence, directly or indirectly, any of his subordinates or
members or parishioners or employees or house helpers, tenants,
overseers, farm helpers, tillers, or lease holders to aid, campaign or
vote for or against any candidate or any aspirant for the
nomination or selection of candidates.

(2) Any public officer or any officer of any commercial, industrial,

agricultural, economic or social enterprise or public or private
corporation or association, or any head, superior or administrator of
any religious organization, or any employer or landowner
who dismisses or threatens to dismiss, punishes or threatens to
punish by reducing his salary, wage or compensation, or by
demotion, transfer ,suspension, separation, excommunication,
ejectment, or causing him annoyance in the performance of his job or
in his membership, x x x

2. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides that the Commission may
administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261(d) or (e).

3. On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the
definition of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code. It increased the penalty
for coercion committed in violation of a person's right to suffrage to prision mayor.
Further, Section 3 of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Section 26, paragraphs (d)(l) and
(2) of the Election Code.

4. On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B. Maguad

filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse
of Authority against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero This complaint was
docketed as Administrative Case No. 05-2012.

5. On November 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) issued Resolution

No. 291-2012 recommending to Antique Governor Exequiel Javier (Gov. Javier) the
preventive suspension of Mayor Roquero.

6. On November 21, 2012, Mayor Roquero filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Antique, against Gov. Javier and the
members of the SP to restrain them from proceeding with Administrative Case No.
05-2012. The petition was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 12-11-86.

7. The case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 11 which issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.;

8. Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Dimamay, and the members of the SP filed a petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP-07307.
 29

9. On December 18, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9581 prohibiting any
public official from suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay
officer during the election period for the May 13, 2013 elections. This resolution
implements Section 261 (x) of the Election Code.

10. On January 15, 2013, the CA issued a TRO in CA-G.R. SP-07307.

11. On January 16, 2013, the RTC, Branch 11 promulgated its judgment
granting certiorari and prohibition. It ordered the SP to cease and desist from further
proceeding with Administrative Case No. 05-2012. It likewise ordered Gov. Javier to
refrain from implementing SP Resolution No. 291-2012 and from preventively
suspending Mayor Roquero.

12. On January 23, 2013, Gov. Javier issued Executive Order No. 003, S. 2013,
preventively suspending Mayor Roquero for thirty (30) days.

13. On February 7, 2013, the SP of Antique issued a decision finding Mayor Roquero
guilty of Grave Misconduct in relation with Section 3(e) of R. A. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Grave Abuse of Authority in relation with
Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 6713. The SP suspended her for four (4) months.

14. Mayor Roquero filed an Election Offense complaint against Gov. Javier for
violating Section 261(x) of the Election Code. The case was filed before the
COMELEC Law Department and docketed as Election Offense Case (EOC) No. 13-
025.

15. Meanwhile (or on March 15, 2013), the CA granted the writ of preliminary
injunction filed by Gov. Javier, et al., in CA-G.R. SP-07307. It enjoined Judge Nery
Duremdes of the RTC, Branch 11 from conducting further proceedings in SPL Civil
Action No. 12-11-86.

16. On March 22, 2013, private respondents Cornelio P. Aldon (Aldon) and
Raymundo T. Roquero (Roquero) also filed a petition for disqualification before the
Commission against Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Rosie A. Dimamay, and the other
members of the SP. The case was docketed as COMELEC Special Action (SPA)
No. 13-254 (DC.) Aldon and Roquero sought to disqualify Gov. Javier and the other
incumbent officials from running in the 2013 elections on the ground that the latter
committed the election offenses of Coercion of Subordinates [Sec. 261(d)]
and Threats, Intimidation, Terrorism x x x or Other Forms of Coercion [Sec.
261(e)] by suspending Mayor Roquero. They alleged that the suspension was
political harassment calculated to intimidate the Roqueros into backing out of the
2013 elections.

17. After the May 13, 2013 Elections, Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier,
Edgar D. Denosta, Teopisto C. Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed
winners.

18. On October 3, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA
No. 13-254 (DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the
Governor of Antique.

19. The COMELEC held that the preventive suspension of Mayor Roquero
under Executive Order No. 003 violated the election period ban because it was not
for the purpose of applying the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It also
considered the Commission's findings in EOC No. 13-025 that there was substantial
evidence showing that Gov. Javier acted in bad faith when he suspended Mayor
Roquero as a form of punishment for opposing him.

I S S U E S:
 30

I.

Whether the Commission gravely abused its

discretion when it issued Resolution No. 9581
fixing the 2013 election period from January 13,
2013 until June 12, 2013, for the purpose of
determining administrative and criminal liability for
election offenses.

II.

Whether the Commission erred in ruling that R.A.

No. 7890 did not remove coercion as a ground for
disqualification under Section 68 of the Election
Code.

III.

Whether the Commission en banc committed grave

abuse of discretion in issuing its Order dated
January 12, 2015, disqualifying Gov. Javier and
annulling his proclamation as the governor of
Antique.
cralawlawlibrary

H E L D:

The COMELEC is expressly

authorized to fix a different
date of the election period.

The petitioner contends that the election period for the reckoning of
administrative and criminal liabilities under election laws should always be the same-
90 days before and 30 days after an election-fixed in Article IX-C, Section 9 of the
Constitution and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7056. The petitioner argues that by
extending the period for incurring criminal liability beyond the 90-day period, the
Commission encroached on the legislature's prerogative to impute criminal and
administrative liability on mala prohibita acts. Therefore, COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9385 and 9581 were issued ultra vires. The said argument has no merit.

No less than the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of the
election period. Article IX-C, Section 9 provides:

Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the

Commission in special cases, the election period
shall commence ninety days before the day of election
and shall end thirty days thereafter.

Congress, through the Election Code, explicitly recognizes this authority:

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Commission's act of fixing the

election period does not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The
Commission did not prescribe or define the elements of election offenses. Congress
already defined them through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and
other pertinent election laws.

There is likewise no merit in the petitioner's allegation that he was denied due
process because the Commission adjudicated the issue without conducting any
subsequent hearings and without requiring the submission of position papers or
memoranda, notarized witness affidavits, or other documentary evidence aside from
the annexes included in the petition and the answer.

Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
 31

judicial sense. A formal hearing is not always necessary and the observance of
technical rules of procedure is not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. The
essence of administrative due process is the right to be heard and to be given an
opportunity to explain one's side. Where the Commission hears both sides and
considers their contentions, the requirements of administrative due process are
complied with.

The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7890, are as follows:

SECTION 1. Article 286, Section Three, Chapter Two, Title Nine of Act
No. 3815, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"ART. 286. Grave Coercions. - The penalty of prision correccional and a line
not exceeding Six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
without any authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or
intimidation, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.

"If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of

suffrage, or for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious
act, to prevent him from exercising such right or from so doing such act, the
penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed."

SEC. 2. Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(l) and (2), Article XXII of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby repealed.

A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes
inoperative from the moment the repealing law becomes effective. The COMELEC's
reasoning that coercion remains to be a ground for disqualification under Section 68
of the Election Code despite the passage of R.A. No. 7890 is erroneous. R.A. No.
7890 expressly repealed Section 261 d(l) and (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
rendering these provisions inoperative. The effect of this repeal is to remove Section
261(d) from among those listed as ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no
longer existed. As we held in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, [t]he
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated
in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond
the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.

RE-ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT AUTOMATIC RE-
ACQUSITION OF DOMICILE AS A QUALIFICATION
FOR ELECTION.

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD,
JR., G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

1. Petitioner and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. were both
candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province
of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.

2. Private respondent filed a Petition to deny due course to or cancellation of

petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false
representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-
resident thereof.

3. During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel,

manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and
the petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay
 32

Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition

during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a
Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in
his petition.

4. Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003.

5. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit

of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to
conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225. He claimed that he did not lose his
domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen
as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and
his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while
working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.

6. On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding

that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within
one year prior to the election.

7. The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency
raised by petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also in
consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the
qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found that while
petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken
his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his
Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements
provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons
who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year
residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted
in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes; thus,
having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove
that he was able to re-establish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible
to run for elective office in said locality which he failed to do.

8. Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns
showed that petitioner won over private respondent. Private respondent filed
an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.

9. On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.

10. On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the
COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.

11. On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation.

12. On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed

Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

13. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the instant petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

14. In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the May
3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En
Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the appropriate
correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in favor of
petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation
 33

and proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of

Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.

15. On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued
a Writ of Execution .Private respondent took his Oath of Office1 on
December 20, 2013.

ISSUES:

WHETHER THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY

ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE
WORKED IN SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR
"GREENER PASTURE."

WHETHER EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER

HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE
WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS
REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP,
TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS
PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON
RESIDENCY.

HELD:

Petitioner claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues
that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein
for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a
registered voter and had exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house
therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his
vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers
that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate
running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he
seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents'
vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in
Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with the law.

We are not persuaded.

RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition

Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country,
can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. The
law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention
of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino.

RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical

and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a
natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen. However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes
material. Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225 provides:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
 34

rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under

existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of
1991, provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective local official.
Section 39 thereof states:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen

of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city
or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able
to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a
resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately
preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of
petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material misrepresentation when
he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year
immediately preceeding the day of elections.

Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan,
Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes.
However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v.
COMELEC we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as
permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian
citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to
Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as
waiver of such abandonment.

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225

did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must
still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from
the time he made it as such.

Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of
elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.

Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan,
Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial compliance with
the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on Elections, we held:

x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a

republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by
the fundamental law itself.

Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he

is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately proceeding the
 35

day of the election, thus, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

Election protests involving election of

municipal officials must be filed within a
non-extendible 10-day period from date of
proclamation.

MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND JOSE ALEJANDRE P. PAYUMO
III, G.R. No. 216691, July 21, 2015

The Facts

1. Petitioner Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were candidates for the
mayoralty race of Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13, 2013 national and local
elections. In the poll's conclusion, Garcia was proclaimed winner for having
garnered 31,138 votes as against Payumo's 13,202.

2. The Office of the Election Officer of Dinalupihan then released to Payumo a

certified copy of the printed Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation
(printed COCP), bearing May 15, 2013 as the date of proclamation of the winning
mayoralty candidate. As per the records, the printed COCP reflected the
signatures and thumbprints of the members of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBOC). Chanrobleslaw

3. On May 27, 2013, Payumo filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan (RTC), docketed as Election Protest No. DH-001-
13, citing the alleged prevalence of fraud and irregularities in all the clustered
precincts of Dinalupihan, heightened by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machines' unreliability, casting doubt on the results of the counting and
canvassing of votes.

4. As to the timeliness of the election protest, Payumo claimed that from May 15,
2013, the proclamation date appearing on the printed COCP, he had ten (10)
days, or until May 25, 2013, within which to challenge the election results. He
added that since May 25, 2013 falls on a Saturday, he filed his protest on the
immediately succeeding working day, Monday, May 27, 2013.

5. In answer, Garcia belied the allegations of fraud and urgently moved for the
dismissal of Payumo's protest. She claimed that she was proclaimed mayor on
May 14, not May 15, 2013, as indicated in the manual Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation (manual COCP) issued by Dinalupihan's MBOC. She,
thus, argued that the election protest was filed beyond the mandatory ten-day
(10-day) reglementary period for filing an election protest, which, as she claimed
in this case, lasted only until May 24, 2013, a Friday. On the ground of belated
filing, Garcia urged the RTC to dismiss the election protest outright.

6. February 17, 2014, dismissed Payumo's protest for being barred by the statute of
limitations. The fallo of the Order reads: r

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the election protest filed by protestant Jose

Alejandre P. Payumo III on May 27, 2013 is hereby DISMISSED for having
been filed one day beyond the non-extendible period provided under Rule 2,
Section 7, in relation to Rule 2, Section 12 (c), of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, the
2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving
Elective Municipal Officials.

7. al Payumo appealed the dismissal with the Comelec, alleging that he cannot be
faulted for relying on the May 15, 2013 date indicated in the printed COCP since
it was the official Comelec document signed by all the members of Dinalupihan's
MBOC; that the manual COCP was only received by Garcia, and no one else;
and that he had no representative when Garcia was allegedly proclaimed the
winner.
 36

8. The Comelec First Division, by its September 10, 2014 Resolution, granted
Payumo's appeal and directed the RTC to proceed with the appeal. The same
was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, this case.

THE ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT PAYUMO'S

ELECTION PROTEST WAS FILED
OUT OF TIME.

HELD:

The petitioner contends that the reckoning date of the 10-day reglementary
period is from the actual date of proclamation, which is May 14, 2013. Meanwhile,
Payumo counters that Garcia was proclaimed on May 15, 2013, and
assuming arguendo that it was done on May 14, 2013, as Garcia insists the
proclamation date to be, he cannot be faulted for relying on the date appearing on
the printed COCP he received.

Respondent Comelec's Consolidated Comment, filed by the Office of the

Solicitor General, echoes the sentiment of Payumo that the latter could not have
known that Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2015 because the printed COCP,
which was furnished him, stated otherwise. The Comelec likewise alleged that Garcia
failed to establish that Payumo had a representative present at the exact moment
Garcia was proclaimed winner and, thus, assuming that it were true, he could not
have known that Garcia was already declared winner on May 14, 2015.

Whether or not Payumo's election protest is barred by the statute of limitations

is answered by the date when the MBOC proclaimed Garcia as the winning
mayoralty candidate. The significance of verifying this proclamation date is
underscored by Rule 2, Section 12 (c), in relation to Sec. 7 of the same rule, A.M. No.
10-4-1-SC, otherwise known as the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests
before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials, which provisions pertinently
state:ch y

Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests. - The court shall

summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or
petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds:

(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;

(b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section
10;
(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;

Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. - The election

protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of
proclamation. (emphasis added)

Jurisprudence is very clear that the 10-day reglementary period is mandatory

and jurisdictional, and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives
the court of jurisdiction over the protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken
lightly nor brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The
rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-compliance of
which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.

The RTC, on July 1, 2013, conducted a motion hearing to determine

the timeliness of the election protest. Records reveal that during the said
proceeding, the members of the MBOC testified in the following manner:
cralawred

Court:
Please take your seats. So, Election Officer Leonilo Miguel, Municipal Treasurer
Lani Penaflor. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, the resolution of the Motion to Resolve
Affirmative Defense on the ground that the protest was filed out of time will be
 37

resolved based on the answers that you will give this afternoon, xxx So, the first
question of the Court is that, when did you officially proclaim the winning
candidate, the protestee, Maria Angela S. Garcia? You give your answers one
by one. So. for Election Officer Mr. Miguel, what is your answer?

Leonilo Miguel:
Sir, we proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia on May 14.

Court:
What time?

Leonilo Miguel:
At almost 5:00 o'clock, sir.

Court:
So, take your seat first. And then Municipal Treasurer Lani Penaflor, as part of
the members of the [MBOC] of Dinalupihan, - when did you officially proclaim
Maria Angela Garcia as the winning mayor of Dinalupihan, Bataan?

Lani Peñaflor:
Can I give my statement, sir?

Court:
Please give up (sic).

Lani Peñaflor:
I, Lani Penaflor, vice-chairman of the [MBOC], do hereby certify that x x x I do
also certify that I signed last May 14, 2013 the Manual Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation of the winning candidates pursuant to Comelec
Resolution No. 9700.
Court:
Okay, thank you. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, again, as a member of the [MBOC],
Dinalupihan, Bataan, when did you proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the winning
mayor for Dinalupihan, Bataan?

Socorro Sacdalan:
We proclaimed the winning candidate, Maria Angela S. Garcia, on May 14,
2013,sir.

Court:
What time, if you recall?

Socorro Sacdalan:
At around 5:00 o'clock p.m., sir.

As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was proclaimed

winner of the mayoralty race on May 14, 2013, not on May 15, 2013 as what
erroneously appears on the printed COCP.

Contrary to Payumo's assertion, the manual COCP is the official Comelec

document in cases wherein the canvassing threshold is lowered. In fact, clear from
the language of the Resolution is that the winners, in such instances, are proclaimed
"by manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning
Candidates," the format for which is appended to Comelec Resolution No. 9700. It is
incorrect to state, therefore, that only the printed COCP can serve as basis for
ascertaining the date of Garcia's proclamation. As in this case, it is the manual COCP
which contains the true and exact date of Garcia's proclamation — May 14, 2013, not
the printed COCP.

The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is not

 38

difficult to deduce — every candidate interested in the outcome of the election is

expected to be vigilant enough in protecting his or her votes and would, therefore,
enlist the aid of volunteer poll watchers in every clustered precinct to guard against or
document possible irregularities, or that the candidate would personally be present at
or, at the very least, would send representatives to the canvassing areas to ensure
the proper tallying of votes and to monitor the real-time results of the elections as
they are electronically transmitted. Consequently, they are expected to know of the
exact moment the winning candidate is proclaimed by the board of canvassers
concerned.

The Resolution of the COMELEC was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the February 17, 2014 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in Balanga,
Bataan, dismissing Petitioner Jose Alejandre Payumo Ill's election protest for being
barred by the statute of limitations is REINSTATED.

Validity of the substitution of a

deceased candidate.

VICE-MAYOR MARCELINA S. ENGLE

v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND
WINSTON B. MENZON, G.R. No. 215995, January
19, 2016

THE FACTS:

1. Petitioner and private respondent vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Babatngon, Leyte in the May 13, 2013 elections;

2. Petitioner's late husband, James L. Engle, was originally a candidate for said
contested position; however, he died of cardiogenic shock on February 2,
2013. Due to this development, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on
February 22, 2013 as a substitute candidate for her deceased spouse.

3. In response, private respondent filed, on February 25, 2013, a Petition to

Deny Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner arguing in the main that the latter misrepresented that she is
qualified to substitute her husband, who was declared an independent
candidate by the COMELEC.

4. It would appear that James L. Engle's Certificate of Nomination and

Acceptance (CONA) was signed by Lakas Christian Muslim Democrats
(Lakas-CMD) Leyte Chapter President, Ferdinand Martin G. Romualdez
(Romualdez). However, Lakas-CMD failed to submit to the COMELEC Law
Department the authorization of Romualdez to sign the CONAs of Lakas-
CMD candidates in Babatngon as prescribed by Section 6(3) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9518. Thus, the COMELEC Law Department considered all
Lakas-CMD candidates whose CONAs were signed by Romualdez as
independent candidates. Additionally, private respondent claimed that "[t]he
false representation of the [petitioner] that she is qualified for public office
consisted of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."

5. In petitioner's Verified Answer, she countered that: (1) the ground relied upon
in private respondent's petition was not the ground contemplated by Section
1, Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523; (2) the COMELEC did not
issue an official declaration that petitioner's husband was an independent
candidate; and (3) James L. Engle's CONA was signed by an authorized
person acting on behalf of LAKAS-CMD.

6. The petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC was still pending
with the COMELEC Second Division when the May 13, 2013 Elections were
held. James L. Engle's name remained on the ballot. On May 15, 2013, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a certificate of canvass of votes and
 39

proclamation of winning candidates for Babatngon Mayor and Vice-Mayor

wherein petitioner was declared as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of
Babatngon, Leyte. Petitioner was credited with the Six Thousand Six Hundred
Fifty Seven (6,657) votes cast for her husband as against private
respondent's Three Thousand Five Hundred Fifteen (3,515) votes.

7. It was only on July 5, 2013 did the COMELEC Second Division promulgate
the assailed Resolution which denied due course to and cancelled petitioner's
COC resulting in the annulment of petitioner's previous proclamation as duly-
elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte and the declaration of private
respondent as winner of the contested position and ordered to immediately
notify the parties, reconvene and proclaim Petitioner WINSTON B.
MENZON as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of Babatngon, Leyte.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER COULD VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE FOR HER

DECEASED HUSBAND WHO WAS CONSIDERED BY THE COMELEC AS AN
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE

HELD:

Despite finding that there was no false material representation in petitioner's COC,
the COMELEC nonetheless cancelled the same on the ground of invalidity of
petitioner's substitution for her husband as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Babatngon,
Leyte. The COMELEC anchored its action on the fact that Romualdez's authority to
sign James L. Engle's CONA was belatedly submitted and thus, the latter should be
considered an independent candidate who cannot be substituted under Section 77 of
the OEC and Section 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9518.

Petitioner’s deceased husband's name remained on the ballot

notwithstanding his death even before the campaign period for the local elections
began on March 29, 2013. Yet, he received almost twice the number of votes as the
second placer, private respondent, in a decisive victory. Since the people of
Babatngon, Leyte could not have possibly meant to waste their votes on a deceased
candidate, we conclude that petitioner was the undisputed choice of the electorate as
Vice-Mayor on the apparent belief that she may validly substitute her husband. That
belief was not contradicted by any official or formal ruling by the COMELEC prior to
the elections.

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural

barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of
the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.

We had the occasion to rule in Sinaca vs. COMELEC that "an election in which
the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not invalid even
though an improper method is followed in the nomination of candidates."

It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of
candidacy, such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information
required to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections.
Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory. With respect to election laws, it is
an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps
before election will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the
will of the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or
if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of the candidate as winner
may not be nullified on such ground. The defects in the certificate should have been
questioned before the election; they may not be questioned after the election without
invalidating the will of the electorate, which should not be done. In Guzman v. Board
of Canvassers, the Court held that the "will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
 40

technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This
legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would
be fatal to the status of the candidate before the [election], but after the people have
expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the
candidate has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy."

Applying these jurisprudential precedents, we find that the late submission of

Romualdez's authority to sign the CONA of James L. Engle to the COMELEC was a
mere technicality that cannot be used to defeat the will of the electorate in a fair and
honest election.

The Court has likewise ruled in the past that non-compliance with formal
requirements laid down in election laws when not used as a means for fraudulent
practice will be considered a harmless irregularity. To be sure, a political party has
the right to identify who its members are. From the evidence it can be concluded that
James L. Engle was not an independent candidate but indeed a nominee of Lakas-
CMD and he may be validly substituted by his wife, who was nominated by the same
political party, in light of his unexpected demise prior to the elections.

THE SANDIGANABAYAN HAS NO

JURISDICTION TO TRY A GRAFT
CASE AGAINST A “REGIONAL
DIRECTOR” OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE WHO HOLDS A
SALARY GRADE 26 POSITION

DANILO A. DUNCANO v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

(2ND DIVISION), AND HON. OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, G.R. No. 191894, July 15,
2015

1. Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as
classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.
2. On March 24, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the
Ombudsman, filed a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan against him for
violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent

thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking
public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation
to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and
net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading
of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993
Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT
LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and
prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

3. Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer
the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before respondent Sandiganbayan Second
Division. As the OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary
Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al., he
asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4
(A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the
case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a
 41

Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade
27.

4. On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its

Resolution, disposing:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the
instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be
therefore issued against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those
exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not
Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally
provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch
of the government occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials
who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g).

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied; 16 Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY AND

DECIDE A CRIMINAL CASE INVOLVING A REGIONAL DIRECTOR HOLDING A
SALARY GRADE 26 POSITION IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT.

HELD:

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of

the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D.
No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No.
1861. edarclaw

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as
provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and
14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D.
No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year,
R.A. No. 10660 .

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:

“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of

the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
 42

engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang

panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul

and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the

position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-

owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade

‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.

“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades. While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall

remain with the Sandiganbayan. To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic
Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the “larger fish” and leave
the “small fry” to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it
provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials

whose salary grades were at Grade “26” or lower, devolving thereby
these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at
 43

Grade “27” or higher and over other specific public officials holding
important positions in government regardless of salary grade

The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and
expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called “big fishes” in the government
rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for “petty crimes,”
the so-called “small fry,” which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions
enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade,
which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion
constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to “officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.”

Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither

does he hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As
he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco. Therein, the accused
was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga
City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his position was
classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.

The Sandiganbayan has no

jurisdiction over violations of Section
3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public
officials and employees occupying
positions of regional director and higher
with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under
the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758) in relation to their office.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation

Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America (U.S.) even
though not ratified by the Senate, is
valid and constitutional, since it is
not a Treaty but an Executive
Agreement.

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG et al. vs. . EXECUTIVE

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et al., G.R. No. 212426,
January 12, 2016

The petitioners question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense

Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of America (U.S.). Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into
EDCA with the U.S.. The EDCA is not valid because it was not ratified by the Senate
of the Philippines even though it is a treaty.

The EDCA allows the temporary stay of US Military personnel within

Philippine Military bases, including their military equipments.

The petitioners insist that it should be ratified in accordance with Section 25 ,

Art. XVIII and Section 21, Art. VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution since it is a
treaty.

Section 21 of Art. VII provides:

 44

No treaty or international agreement shall be

valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3of
all the members of the Senate.

Section 25 of Art. XVIII provides:

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement

between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning military bases, foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred
in by by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.

I S S U E:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ENHANCED DEFENSE

COOPERATION AGREEMENT (EDCA) BETWEEN
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (U.S.) IS A TREATY
OR AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT.

H E L D:

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the

Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) is just an
executive agreement. The provisions allowing the temporary stay of members of the
UN Armed Forces is just an implementation of the provisions of the Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and the United States of America as well as
the Visiting Forces Agreement, treaties which are duly ratified by the Senate of the
Philippines and declared valid and constitutional by the Supreme Court in earlier
cases.

“MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS” EVEN

THOUGH DATED BEFORE THE
PROHIBITED PERIOD”

ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA- GARAFIL , v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND

HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, G.R. No. 203372, June
16, 2015

ATTY. DINDO G. VENTURANZA v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEILA M. DE

LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, et al, [G.R. No. 206290]

IRMA A. VILLANUEVA AND FRANCISCA B. ROSQUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS

AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, [G.R. No. 209138]

EDDIE U. TAMONDONG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,

[G.R. No. 212030]

THE FACTS:
 45

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various
positions in several government offices. Among them are:

a. Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), was appointed

State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),

b. Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), was appointed Prosecutor

IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City,

c. Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva) was appointed Administrator for Visayas of

the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA),

d. Francisca B. Rosquita (Rosquita), was appointed Commissioner of the

National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and

e. Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed member

of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).

Their appointments were questioned as unconstitutional for being

inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

President Benigno Aquino II did not implement said appointments and

instead appointed others in their place by virtue of Executive Order No. 2. Petitioners
petition with the Court of Appeals questioning said act were denied.

Hence the present petitions.

ISSUE:

Were the appointments extended by former President Gloria Aquino to them

violates Section 15, Art. VII of the Constitution though the dates of said appointments
appear to be before the prohibited period?

HELD:

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution reads:

Two months immediately before the next

presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut-off date for
valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on
midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as
an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only “temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.” None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall
under this exception.

To summarize, the pertinent dates for each petitioner are as follows:

Date ofDate ofDate of

Date of OathAssumption
G.R. No. Appointment Transmittal Receipt by
of Office of Office
Letter Letter MRO
203372
(Atty.
22 March
Velicaria- 5 March 2010 8 March 201013 May 2010 6 April 2010
2010
Garafil)
 46

206290
(Atty. 23 February 12 March15 March15 March
9 March 2010
Venturanza) 2010 2010 2010 2010

209138
(Villanueva) 3 March 2010 4 May 2010 13 April 2010

209138
18 March
(Rosquita) 5 March 2010 13 May 2010
2010

212030 25 March
(Atty. 2010 and 6
1 March 2010
Tamondong) July 2010

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his
oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010,
President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments
issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on
midnight appointments.

All of petitioners’ appointments are midnight appointments and are void for violation
of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. EO 2 is constitutional.

“None of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal
letters) have been issued (and released) before the ban.” The dates of receipt by the
MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the
appointment papers by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during
the appointment ban. Thus, all the appointments in these cases are midnight
appointments in violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Aytona v. Castillo (Aytona) is the basis for Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Aytona defined “midnight or last minute” appointments for Philippine
jurisprudence. President Carlos P. Garcia submitted on 29 December 1961, his last
day in office, 350 appointments, including that of Dominador R. Aytona for Central
Bank Governor. President Diosdado P. Macapagal assumed office on 30 December
1961, and issued on 31 December 1961 Administrative Order No. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all appointments made by President Garcia after 13
December 1961 (President Macapagal’s proclamation date). President Macapagal
appointed Andres V. Castillo as Central Bank Governor on 1 January 1962. This
Court dismissed Aytona’s quo warranto proceeding against Castillo, and upheld
Administrative Order No. 2’s cancellation of the “midnight or last minute”
appointments.

x x x Now it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night,

President Garcia exercised such “double care” which was required and
expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the contention that
these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional
provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers,
this Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative
Order No. 2, cancelling such “midnight” or “last-minute” appointments.

It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should
be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could
happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President
months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety
of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal
act that signifies the President’s intent of its issuance.
 47

Limitations on the President’s power

to grant pardon; are former public
officials convicted of PLUNDER not
qualified to be pardoned due to the
gravity of their offense?

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECXTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
GR No. 206666, JANUARY 21, 2015

The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the COMELEC
En Banc in the case of [1] "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada" for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when the COMELEC denied her petition to disqualify Joseph Estrada
from running a City Mayor of Manila during the 2013 elections and [2] a Petition-in-
Intervention filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he prays to be declared the 2013
winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s (former President Estrada)
disqualification to run for and hold public office.

The Facts

On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President

Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of
plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled “People of the Philippines v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, et al.” The dispositive part of the graft court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
On the other hand, for failure of the prosecution to prove and establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose “Jinggoy”
Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder,
and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.

The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be
applied in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accordingly, the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada was

sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute
disqualification.

Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as

amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Sandiganbayan declared the forfeiture in
favor of the government of the following properties of Former President Estrada:

(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven

Hundred Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), with
interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.

(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos

(P189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and income earned,
deposited in the Jose Velarde account. (3) The real property
consisting of a house and lot dubbed as “Boracay Mansion” located at
#100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
 48

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

(former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada. The full text of said pardon states:

MALACAÑANG PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines

PARDON

WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who have

reached the age of seventy (70),

WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six and a
half years,

WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no

longer seek any elective position or office,

IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the

Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.

The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and in full,

including all writs and processes issued by the Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof,
except for the bank account(s) he owned before his tenure as President.

Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this

pardon shall take effect.

Given under my hand at the City of

Manila, this 25th Day of October, in
the year of Our Lord, two thousand
and seven.
Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)
By the President:

IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)

Acting Executive Secretary

On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada “received and
accepted” the pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation
thereon.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of

Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.

On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition
for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC claiming
that he is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder
by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26558 entitled ‘People of the Philippines
vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada’ Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification.”

She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:

Sec. 40, Local Government Code:

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are

disqualified from running for any elective local position:
 49

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by

competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which
he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and
to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division,

dismissed the petition for disqualification. It provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court’s jurisdiction by filing the
present petition. She presented five issues for the Court’s resolution, to wit:

I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON WAS NOT
CONDITIONAL;

II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO
RUN AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 FOR HAVING BEEN CONVICTED OF
PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;

III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA’S PARDON NEITHER
RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS
PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC
OFFICE; and

While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, or on May 13, 2013, the
elections were conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into
office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. The next day, the local board of
canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.

The Issue

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is
 50

qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to
him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:

In her petition, Risos-Vidal points out that the pardon granted to former
President Estrada was conditional as evidenced by the latter’s express acceptance
thereof. The “acceptance,” she claims, is an indication of the conditional nature of the
pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas Clause of the
pardon, i.e., “WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office.” She explains that the aforementioned
commitment was what impelled former President Arroyo to pardon former President
Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been extended. And any breach
thereof, that is, when former President Estrada filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President and Mayor of the City of Manila, he breached the condition of the pardon;
hence, “he ought to be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence x x x and disqualifies him as a candidate for the mayoralty [position] of
Manila.”

The petition for certiorari lacks merit.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. The petition for disqualification filed by
Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada was anchored on Section 40 of the
LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral turpitude,
former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective
office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a
statement expressing “[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.” Risos-
Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of
Manila in the May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local
elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former
President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the
remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the
restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and be voted upon for
public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the
foundations of her theory.

The pardoning power of the President

cannot be limited by legislative
action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of

Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to
grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided

in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for

violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the
President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only

instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in:

 impeachment cases;
 51

 cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and

 cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which
there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.

Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. In Cristobal v. Labrador and
Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under the 1935 Constitution, wherein the
provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with
what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared
that “subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power
cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action.”

The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby

establishing that, under the present Constitution, “a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action.”

Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the

exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be
interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits
provided for by the Constitution. This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of
the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation,
was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987
Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the
pardoning power of the President in the form of “offenses involving graft and
corruption” that would be enumerated and defined by Congress through the
enactment of a law.

THE DISQUALIFICATION OF FORMER

President Estrada under Section 40
of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of
the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him.

Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running for any
elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former President Estrada is
disqualified under item (a), to wit:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence.

Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it

provides for an exception, to wit:

Section 12. Disqualifications. – x x x unless he has been given plenary

pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)

As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President Estrada’s

conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running for the elective local position of
Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC. However, the
subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively restored
his right to seek public elective office. This is made possible by reading Section 40(a)
of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC. While it may be apparent that the
proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of
the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty.
In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the
pardon conditional.
 52

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the

pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer
seek any elective position or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor
militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and
to seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially true as the
pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term “civil and political rights” as being restored.

Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it

is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word “whereas. Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree
of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Justice Leonen is of the view that the pardon in question is not absolute nor
plenary in scope despite the statement that former President Estrada is “hereby
restored to his civil and political rights,” that is, the foregoing statement restored to
former President Estrada all his civil and political rights except the rights denied to
him by the unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification made up of,
among others, the rights of suffrage and to hold public office because the word
“FULL” was not present. However, the statement “[h]e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights,” is crystal clear – the pardon granted to former President
Estrada was absolute, meaning, it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in
scope, complete and plenary in character, as the term “political rights” adverted to
has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.

There appears to be no distinction as to the coverage of the term “full

political rights” and the term “political rights” used alone without any qualification.
How to ascribe to the latter term the meaning that it is “partial” and not “full” defies
one’s understanding.

The Philippine Baselines Act is

constitutional because it even
increased our National territory.

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN

PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF.
HARRY C ROQUE, THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW STUDENTS VS. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET
AL, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011

Justice Carpio:

RA No. 9522 is constitutional. It is not true that it

resulted in the decrease of our National Territory as
claimed by the petitioners. In fact, our National Territory
increased from 440,994 square nautical miles to
586,210 nautical miles or an increase of 145,216
square nautical miles. The new baselines under RA No.
9522 is comnpliant with the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which the
Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Is the Disbursement Acceleration

Program (DAP) of the executive
 53

department of the government

constitutional?

ARAULLO VS. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, et

al., GR No. 209287, July 1, 2014 and February 3,
2015)

ISSUES:

1. Is the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) of the executive

department under the Department of Budget and Management
constitutional if it uses: [1]savings from completed programs; [2] funds
intended for discontinued or abandoned programs; and [3] unpaid
appropriatons for compensation--- to be used for projects without a law
appropriating it for specific projects or to be given to Members of
Congress for projects identified by them?

It is unconstitutional. It violates Section 25 [5] and Section 29

[1] of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriations made by law.”

2. Are the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments

under the DAP considered as SAVINGS ?

No. They are not SAVINGS and therefore, its use in the DAP violates Section
25 [5] Art. VI of the Constitution.

3. What are the requisites before appropriated funds may be validly transferred
under Section 25 [5] Art. VI of the Constitution?

The requisites are:

1. There must be a law authorizing the President, Senate President,

Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice and heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to TRANSFER FUNDS WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE OFFICES;

2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations

for their respective offices; and

3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general

appropriations law for their respective offices.

4. Are the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments may be

considered savings to be used for DAP purposes before the end of the fiscal
year?

No.

5. What is known as the “cross-border augmentations” or “cross-border

transfers”? Is it allowed by the Constitution?

It is the transfer of savings from one department to the other like

savings in the executive department “crossing its borders” and given to the
legislative department under the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or
items in the latter’s budget. This is what is exactly prohibited by Section 25 [5]
of Article VI.

THE PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT

ASSISTANCE FUND (PDAF) OF
 54

SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING
VIOLATIVE OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS, NON-DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS, PRINCIPLE
OF CHECKS AND BALANCES,
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND LOCAL AUTONOMY.

GRECO BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY PPAQUITO OCHOA, ET AL., G.R. No.
208560, November 19, 2013 and companion cases

Bernabe, J.

The main issue in these cases is the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System or the PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND (PDAF) WHERE
EVERY SENATOR IS GIVEN TWO HUNDRED MILLION (P200,000,000.00) PESOS per
year and SEVENTY MILLION (P70,000,000.00) PESOS per year for every Member
of the House of Representatives in the General Appropriations Act for their “hard
projects” [P100,000,000.00 for Senators and P40,000,000.00 for every Member of
the House of Representatives] and “soft projects” [P100,000,000.00 for Senators and
P30,000,000.00 for every Member of the House of Representatives] .

The Supreme Court held that the Pork Barrel System is unconstitutional for it
violates the following:

1. SEPARATION OF POWERS. This is so because Congress should enact

laws only and that the executive department shall implement the same.In
the case of the Pork Barrel System, Congress will enact it but the
individual members of Congress still play a role in its implementation. The
Supreme Court in ABAKADA PARTY LIST VS. PURISIMA, 562 SCRA
251 had already held that “from the moment the law becomes effective,
any provision of the law which empowers Congress or any of its
Members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the separation of powers”.

2. NON-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. The power of

appropriation is lodged in CONGRESS AS A WHOLE. The Pork Barrel
System confers on INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS post-enactment authority
on his “pork barrel” . This violates the non-delegation of legislative power
because such act ALLOWS EACH LEGISLATOR TO EFFECTIVELY
EXERCISE THE POWER OF LEGISLATION on his appropriated “pork
barrel.”

3. CHECKS AND BALANCES. Since the PDAF does not contain “specific
appropriations of money” but only a general provision granting
P200,000,000.00 for each Senator and P70,000,000.00 for each Member
of the House of Representatives, the President is deprived of his veto
power on “specific item” in the General Appropriations Act. The PDAF
violates Section 25 [4], Art. VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
provides that special appropriations shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended. In the case of the PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE FUND (PDAF), after the General Appropriations Act is
passed, individual legislators would then receive their personal lump-sum
allocations and could effectively appropriate PDAF Funds based on their
discretion.

4. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS. While Congress has the

oversight powers over the funds which it appropriated and implemented
by the executive agencies of the government and therefore they could
monitor the use of said funds during budget hearings through examination
of the officials of the executive department and its power of inquiry in aid
 55

of legislation, the same could not be done for the lump-sum allocations or
PDAF of members of Congress.

5. AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT. As a result of the power

granted by the General Approriations Act authorizing the Members of
Congress to participate in the post-enactment implementation of the
funds covered by their “pork barrel”, it subverts local autonomy because
legislators, in effect, intervene in purely local matters.

NOTE: The Supreme Court did not rule on whether or not the “pork barrel system”
perpetuates “political dynasty” because up to the present, there is no “Political
Dynasty Law” enacted by Congress even though the latter was mandated by the
Constitution to do so. The Supreme Court, however, recognized the effect of said
“pork barrel” of each legislator as very effective in perpetuating his and his family’s
control over his district.

References:

LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY &

POVERTY (LAMP) VS. SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, 670
SCRA 373, April 24, 2012

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION VS. HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105, August
19, 1994

After 101 years, the “Topcaio or Labo

Doctrine” was abandoned by the
Supreme Court.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS , ROMMEL ARNADO and LINOG
BALUA, GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013

Sereno, CJ

The Facts:

1. Respondent Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen. However, he lost his
Filipino citizenship as a result of his naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America;

2. On July 10, 2008, he applied for repatriation based on RA No. 9225 in San
Francisco, California before the Consulate General of the Philippines and
took an Oath of Allegiance. On the same day, an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor;

3. On April 3, 2009, Arnado again took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship;

4. On November 30, 2009, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte which states that he is a natural
born/naturalized Filipino citizen; not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that he is eligible to the office which he seeks to be elected;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines, among
others;

5. On April 28, 2010, respondent Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a

petition to disqualifyArnado because he is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner attaching a certification from the
 56

BID dated April 23, 2010 indicating Arnado’s nationality as “USA-American”.

Balua likewise presented a computer-generated travel record of Arnado dated
December 3, 2009 showing Arnado using US Passport when he left the
Philippines on July 14, 2009 and returned on June 25, 2009 and again
departed on July 29, 2009 and arriving back in the Philippines on November
24, 2009. Another Certification from the BID dated April 23, 2010 shows that
Arnado arrived in the Philippines on January 22, 2010 using a US Passport
and describing him as an American Citizen. Also, it shows that Arnado arrived
in the Philippines on March 23, 2010 using an American Passport and
describing his nationality as “USA-American”;

6. The 1st Division of the COMELEC required Arnado to file his Answer and
Memorandum within three (3) days from receipt but he failed so Balua filed a
motion to declare him in default and be allowed to present his evidence ex-
parte. Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not act on the motion until Arnado
was proclaimed winner as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was
only after his proclamation that he filed his answer before the COMELEC;

7. Instead of treating the case as one for the cancellation of a certificate of

candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC treated it as one for
disqualification and granted the petition. It likewise annulled the
proclamation of Arnado as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and directed the “order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 take effect”;

8. Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc and
the petitioner, being the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
for the said position, intervened and filed a Motion for Reconsideration as well
as Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado claiming that he
should be proclaimed as winner;

9. On February 2, 2011, the COMELEC en banc reversed and set aside the
Decision of the First Division and GRANTED Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration. It held that by renouncing his Philippine Citizenship, he
became a pure Philippine citizen again as if he never became a citizen of
another country. It likewise held that “the use of a US Passport does not
operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as
there is no law saying such.

Hence, this Petition by Maquiling questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado

qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US Passport and
prays that he be proclaimed winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER THE USE OF A FOREIGN PASSPORT AFTER RENOUNCING

FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP AMOUNTS TO UNDOING A RENUNCIATION
EARLIER MADE OR IS SUCH AN ACT AFFECTS ONE’S QUALIFICATIONS
TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE..
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE RULE OF SUCCESSION IN THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (where the Vice Mayor succeeds and not the second placer if
the elected mayor is disqualified) IS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.

HELD:

1. Is Arnado qualified to run for the position of Municipal Mayor?

While Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office
and that he even took the Oath of Allegiance not just once but twice, and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation thereby completing the requirements for eligibility to run
for public office, he himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US Passport to travel in
and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy.
 57

The pivotal issue therefore is whether or not he was solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy thereby rendering him
eligible to run for public office.

From the time he renounced his foreign citizenship and on November 30,
2009 when he filed his certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport four (4)
times which runs counter to his affidavit of renunciation. Renunciation of a foreign
citizenship is not a hollow oath that can be simply be professed at any time, only to
be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
foreign country which granted the other citizenship. While using a foreign passport is
not one of the grounds to renounce or loss Philippine citizenship under Act No. 63,
such an act repudiates the very oath of renunciation to be qualified to run for a local
elective position. He is therefore disqualified not only holding public office but even
from becoming a candidate in the May 10, 2010 elections.

2. Since Arnado was not qualified to run for Municipal Mayor, who shall take
his place? The petitioner who was the second placer to Arnado or the Vice
Mayor-elect?

In answering the said issue, there is a need to revisit TOPACIO VS.

PAREDES, 23 Phil. 238 [1912] , which was reiterated in LABO VS. COMELEC,
July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297, where it was held that “a second placer cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in an election contest.

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a

wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not have been a candidate in
the first place but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election
date. However, regardless of the outcome of the election, his ineligibility remains
unchanged. The number of votes cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to
qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office. The
ballots cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. To rule otherwise would be trample
upon the law that sets forth the qualifications of the candidate. We might as well write
off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who
should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes

from among the qualified candidates. With the disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling
becomes the winner of the election. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in
his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule of
succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

References:

a. ARNADO VS. COMELEC, January 2016-05-27

b. Labo vs. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992;
c. Mercado vs. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132
d. Topacio vs. Paredes, 27 Phil. 238 [1912]
e. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934
f. Velasco vs. COMELEC, 575 SCRA 59
g. Quizon vs. COMELEC, 545 SCRA 635
h. Saya-ang vs. COMELEC, 462 Phil. 373
i. Aratea vs. COMELEC, October 9, 2012
j. Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, GR No. 193237, October 9, 2012
k. Fr. Nardo Cayat vs. COMELEC, April 2007

A candidate for the House of

Representatives who was disqualified
for failure to comply with the
residence requirement under the
 58

Section 6, Art, VI of the Constitution

could not be validly substituted. His
substitute ewven though she
obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates is not entitled
to the said position. Distinctions
between disqualification under Sec.
68 of the OEC and Section 78.

SILVERIO TAGOLINO VS. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL &
LUCY TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19,
2013

Actor Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his Certificate of Candidacy seeking the
congressional office of the House of Representatives for the 4 th District of Leyte. He
indicated his residence as 910 Carlota Hills, Ormoc City. The same was questioned
before the COMELEC by Buenaventura Juntilla, one of the candidates for the said
position claiming that Richard is a resident of Colgate St., East Greenhills, San Juan
City, MM. The COMELEC disqualified Richard based on Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code for lack of residence. On May 5, 2010, Lucy Torres-Gomez (Lucy) filed
her Certificate of Candidacy as SUBSTITUTE of Richard. Despite the vigorous
objection of Juntilla, the COMELEC allowed the substitution and Lucy was elected
as Representative of the 4th District of Leyte in the May 10, 2010 elections.

A case was filed before the HRET questinoning the election of Lucy on the
ground that the “substitution” is not valid but the HRET sustained the validity of the
said substitution

Issue:

Was there a valid substitution? Was Lucy Torres Gomez validly elected as
representative of the 4th District of Leyte?

Held:

A valid Certificate of Candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid

candidate substitution.Since Richard’s COC was not valid for material representation
as to his residence, then there was no valid substitution. In short, since Richard is not
considered a “candidate” or there was no candidate to speak of, there would be no
candidate to be substituted.

Unlike disqualification under Section 68 where he can be susbstituted

because the candidate therein has all the qualifications but disqualified because of
prohibited acts like election offenses or because he is a permanent resident of a
foreign country, a candidate disqualified under Section 78 could not be validly
substituted.

The Senate and the House of

Representatives are entitled to only
one (1) representative in the Judicial
and Bar Council, not one (1) each.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR

COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS FRANCIS ESCUDERO &
NIEL TUPAS, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013

MENDOZA, J.:

The present case stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential
successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1]
whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows
 59

more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of
having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each
is sanctioned by the Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision,
disposing the same in the following manner: WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative
in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with
due regard to Senate Resolution Nos. 111, 112, 113, and 114, the Court set the
subject motion for oral arguments on August 2, 2012. On August 3, 2012, the Court
discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the meantime, to suspend the
effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the
August 3, 2012 Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their

respective MEMORANDA within ten (10) days from notice. Until
further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012
Decision, which reads:

“This disposition is immediately executory.”

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of

the evils of political pressure and partisan activities, the members of the
Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and
called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby

created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of
the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member
of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1)
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members. Pursuant to
the constitutional provision that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each
House sent a representative to the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation. In
1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth
member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began
sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. It has been the
situation since then.

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its
decision and dismiss the petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one
representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its
bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment
when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; 3]
that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the
 60

Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of
the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should
there be a stalemate is not exactly correct. While the Court may find some sense in
the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents,
still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues
covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion
arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the
final resolution of this case. As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall
discuss them jointly.

Held:

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined and by
which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and
useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. The Framers reposed their wisdom
and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the
framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the
interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic
postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the
Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose.
Every word employed in the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate
intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and defiance. What
the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in
order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in
opting to use the singular letter “a” to describe “representative of Congress,” the
Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one
(1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in
no uncertain
terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions. A reading of the 1987
Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in
tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which
provides that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken “by a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.” Another is Section 8
thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed “by
a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.”
Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the Congress,
voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members.” In all these
provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and
voted upon by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by
sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is
not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a
conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the Framers were not keen on
adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was
not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support
the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely
assigned a
contributory non-legislative function. The underlying reason for such a limited
participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to
recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the
Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular
House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by
voting jointly or separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative or its non-
legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration of
an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
Vice-President, and impeachment, the dichotomy of each House must be
acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses.
In all these instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and
 61

functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with
the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and balances,
as to the other branches of government. In checkered contrast, there is essentially
no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the
Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three
(3) representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-
officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice
(representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress
(representing the Legislative Department).

The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave
recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government. On this score, a
Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of
Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position to then Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno: I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one
representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1)
of the 1987 Constitution x x x.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any
further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that
“construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them.” Further, to allow Congress to
have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government which is
enshrined

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was
ratified by the direct action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents
perceive as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its
power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the law something that is
contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived
inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making
amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement. In other words, the
Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus
“a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.” “The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration.” Pursuant to this, “the Court cannot under its power of
interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from
inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated.”
“The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that
would be judicial legislation.” Stated differently, the Court has no power to add
another member by judicial construction. The Court remains steadfast in confining its
powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never
be allowed to become judicial exuberance. In cases like this, no amount of practical
logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an exclusion or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of
congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject
matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to
accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed
solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

The Motion for Reconsideration was therefore Denied.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO., SR. VS. COMELEC

& ERNESTO VEGA, G.R. No. 201716, JANUARY 08,
2013

In 2001, he won as Mayor. In 2004, his

opponent was initially proclaimed
 62

winner but on Protest, he was

declared Mayor in May, 2006 so he
was able to serve 1 year of his
supposed 3-year term. In 2007, he
won again as Mayor. May he run for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections
without violating the 3-consecutive
term rule?

THE FACTS:

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and
2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo
protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of
office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or
for a period of a little over one year and one month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again
opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty
seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s
disqualification to run, the corresponding petition, docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128
(DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the
COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, who in the
meantime bested Torres by 219 Votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-
elect of Viga, Catanduanes.

Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the
adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private
respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto7 action before the
RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat
Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.

By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared
Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered

GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo
Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes.

In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC found Abundo to have
already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and
2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term.
Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections
consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga
mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007,
to be exact.

To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full
service of Abundo’s second term as mayor. Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the
COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.

On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second

Division rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED
and
 63

the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on
the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term
by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service
for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule.

In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en

banc per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The COMELEC en banc’s
Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for

reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12

In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc

held in essence the following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundo’s
2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as
he is considered never to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his
election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective official
to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not to
the service of the term.

On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the
entire records of the instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of court of
RTC-Br. 43. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records,
the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for Execution through
an Order of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day. On
July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same
at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via substituted service. On July 3,
2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012
Resolution21 and a copy of the TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M.
Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths
of office22 as mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.

Core Issue:

Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three (3) consecutive terms

The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than
the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly
elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for
purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials.

On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what
otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title
to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due
proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is
found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except

barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
 64

and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. —

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to

the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must
concur.

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the
different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit and analyze the
various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the matter.

As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec.

43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local
official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service for three consecutive
terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court
stated the observation that the law “does not textually state that voluntary
renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of
service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit rule.”

As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, the principle behind the

three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official
cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth
term,34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the
election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition. There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the
successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually
occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third.
Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.” This
qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to
skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends.
This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which
may be brought about by certain events or causes.

While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has

engendered a host of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on
local officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms
or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus
entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes:
succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension,
declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest,
declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest,
proclamation of a noncandidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the
official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
 65

This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such

consecutive terms were considered or not considered as having been “involuntarily
interrupted or broken.”

(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law

In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr. (1998)

and Montebon v. Commission on Elections (2008), the Court delved on the effects
of “assumption to office by operation of law” on the three-term limit rule. This
contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by succession a higher
local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the following
contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros
on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar
Borja. Capco was then elected and served as mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995
1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the mayoralty position
during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for
mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule.

Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, “it
is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply.” There was, the Court ruled, no
violation of the three-term limit, for Capco “was not elected to the office of the mayor
in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law” when a
permanent vacancy occurred in that office.

The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There,

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of
Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January
2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded and assumed the position of
vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed
his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification
was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that
Montebon’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption
of
his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in
local government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary
severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post
as councilor in order to assume office as vice mayor, his occupation of the higher
office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as
councilor.

(2) Recall Election

With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service,

Adormeo v. Commission on Elections (2002) and the aforementioned case of
Socrates (2002) provide guidance.

In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of
Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections,
Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term
ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served
the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001,
his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held
therein that the remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which
Talaga served as mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the three-
term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of Talaga’s mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.
 66

A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in

that case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn
qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been
elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in
1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001.

Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie
for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and
eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings
and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as
mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule. In
upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:

x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he

became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his
closest opponent, Socrates. From June 30, 2001 until the
recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn
was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an
interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor,
not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a
legal prohibition.

The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that “an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term [and, hence], [a]ny subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer
covered x x x.”

(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City

On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not
constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service.

The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections (2003). Latasa is

cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998,
and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was converted into a component city,
with the corresponding cityhood law providing the holdover of elective officials. When
Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor for the 2001 elections, the Court
declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the
three-term limit rule on the basis of the following ratiocination:

This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his

office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed
abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he
vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as
city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even
just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa
never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

(4) Period of Preventive Suspension

In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the
period during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension
cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The
Court explained why so:

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule

demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an
interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three
terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term
 67

interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in

office although he is barred from exercising the functions and
prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best
indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence
of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to
appoint one since no vacancy exists.

(5) Election Protest

With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit
rule, jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The Court’s pronouncements in
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections (1999), Ong v. Alegre (2006), Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections (2007) and Dizon v. Commission on Elections (2009), all
protest cases, are illuminating.

In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal

mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and was
eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground
of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May
1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order
and writ of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the
remainder of the term. In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate
of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the
ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post.
The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for the
three-term limit to apply: “1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.”

In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent
in the case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as
having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption
of office as mayor “cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but
by reason of a void proclamation.” And as a corollary point, the Court stated that
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an
involuntary relinquishment of office.

This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre owing to a
variance in the factual situations attendant. In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was
elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998,
1998-2001, and 2001- 2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his
supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ong’s proclamation on the postulate
that Ong lost during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision became
final and executory on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998- 2001
mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as
mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation
of the three-term limit rule. Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he
could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was
not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office as a “presumptive winner.”
Dismissing Ong’s argument, the Court held that his assumption of office as mayor for
the term 1998-2001 constitutes “service for the full term” and hence, should be
counted for purposes of the three term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions
stated in Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as
service for a full term because Ong’s proclamation was voided only after the expiry of
the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not
having won the 1998 elections was “without practical and legal use and value”
promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further
reasoned:

Petitioner [Francis Ong’s] contention that he was only a

presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a
 68

duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected

mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the
functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation
of the three-term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious
effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary
view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule
- be considered as having served a term by virtue of a
veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another
actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in
due course after an election.

The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong
was different, to wit:

The difference between the case at bench and

Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida,
the result of the mayoralty election was declared a
nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and,
as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of
Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an
order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another,
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term, there being an involuntary severance from office
as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an
effective interruption of the continuity of service.

Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the
consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v. Morales.
Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following
consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In relation to the 2004
elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as garnering the
majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004
to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later filed against Morales
predicated on the ground that he is ineligible to run for a “fourth” term, having served
as mayor for three consecutive terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his
supposed 1998- 2001 term cannot be considered against him, for, although he was
proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected mayor vis-à-vis the
1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001, his
proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival,
Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales
parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker.

The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of
Morales presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For nease of
reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like
Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the end of the term. Hence,
the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit: Here,
respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He
assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for
the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. To
reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term.

Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month,
by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous
years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the
expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service of the full
term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a “caretaker of the
office” or a mere “de facto officer” for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule.
 69

In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections, the Court would

again find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification proceeding
when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007 elections for a term
ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from his post by virtue of this Court’s
ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the three-term limit rule
was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in
his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was
no longer a disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court
wrote:

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance

from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption
of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May
2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s
office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May
2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the
mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’
continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July
2004 to 30

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on

issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary
interruption, viz:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the

official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion
of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term
as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term
limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held
prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption (Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and
who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim,
i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private
citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a

municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective

officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected
during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising
the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and

assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election
protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving
what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office
had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or
interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major
part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided
the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision

becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office,
 70

then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption
since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of
term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).

Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that
he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the
constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term. In gist,
Abundo arguments run thusly:

1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former
dealt with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the
continuity of service of a term;

2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be

interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional
three-term limitation;

3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of “term” in Aldovino,

Jr. by its reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the
unified logic in the disquisition;

4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida

and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections.

5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no
interruption in the service of Abundo since what he considered as an
“interruption” of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started;
and

6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation

was adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant
(Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so
interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.

Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of
Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo
did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case confirmed his
entitlement to said office and he was only unable to temporarily discharge the
functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest. We note that this
present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the
rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the
case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting neffects of the imposition of a preventive
suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We
find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual backdrop.

Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject
of disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared
loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest
and was declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor
Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward the end of their
respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had
assumed the remainder of the term.

Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as

instructive, and consider several doctrines established from the 1998 case of Borja,
Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this
Court’s conclusion. The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to
abrogate the “monopolization of political power” and prevent elected officials from
breeding “proprietary interest in their position”60 but also to “enhance the people’s
freedom of choice.” In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, “while people should
be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should
be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.”
 71

In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares
that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as
mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed
Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the
term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise
how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent
proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the application
of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official has been
elected is satisfied.

This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had
served for “three consecutive terms,” as the phrase is juridically understood, as
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local
elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of whether or not there
was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting
in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.

The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the
July 2004-June 2007 term. There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-
2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor,
Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until
June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be
said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004- 2007 term to which
he was otherwise entitled. A “term,” as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means,
in a legal sense, “a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office.” It also means the “time during which the officer may claim
to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another.” It is the period of time during which a duly
elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From
paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3)
years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from
June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he
wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither
can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective
office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as
proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and
exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution
of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little
over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term
for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served
the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s

opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary
interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot,
in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold. The notion of full service of three consecutive
terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service and voluntary
renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation,
intermission or suspension. To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the
obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by
effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of
the elective office. On the other hand, the word “renunciation” connotes the idea of
waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline
or resign. Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus
mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the
term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
 72

It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence

deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of the term
has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent did not lose title to the
office. As the assailed Resolution
states:

In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have

lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he actively sought
entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest
case. And respondent-appellant’s victory in the said case is a
final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty
post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004- 2007. At most,
respondent-appellant was only unable to temporarily
discharge the functions of the office to which he was
validly elected during the pendency of the election protest,
but he never lost title to the said office.

The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the
actual length of service by the public official in a given term is immaterial by
reckoning said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, “this formulation—no more than three
consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible
rule.” Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since respondent Abundo
served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 “term” should not be considered for
purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the framers of the
Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is clear that
reference is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may
render. Therefore, one’s actual service of term no matter how long or how short is
immaterial.

In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of
the actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily
unable to discharge his functions as mayor. The COMELEC’s case disposition and its
heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend themselves for concurrence. The
Court cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll body’s determination
that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during
the pendency of the election protest.

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest

grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term.
Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual
service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary
interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the
full 2004-2007 term. This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be
overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest,
Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other
words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004— the start of the term—until May 9,
2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo
was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his
protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective
position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the
finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact,
had no legal right to said position. Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to
respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo. In
Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification
to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus: On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post,
even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term
because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break
from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. We rule that the
above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant
case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or
 73

disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post. For one, during the
intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007
term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he
was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to
assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner
yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot
plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents
and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest accords him title
to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective
office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a

break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served
barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent
similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and
Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not proclaimed
winners since they were noncandidates in the regular elections. They were
proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve
the terms of the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court
deemed their terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was a
private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor. If in
Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service
because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more reason,
Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not
proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and
serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest.

As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the “law

contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.” Applying the said principle in the
present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the election protest,
Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga,
Catanduanes. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as
mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because, as
earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent,
Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.

As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases
involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the final
reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and
opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of
an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the
mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough
authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring.

In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and
cause grave injustice to Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly declared
as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of
Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing candidate––or the person
who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held it
anyway––We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant
who, by popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold
the same was halted by an invalid proclamation.

Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the
injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by
depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the
Constitution, We bear in mind that We “cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to
decide what the people want” and hence, should, as much as possible, “allow the
people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to
curtail the power when it overreaches itself.” For democracy draws strength from the
choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.
 74

Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of

Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections
and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.

Autonomy of local government units;

control or supervision of the
Executive Department over the local
government units? Not in cases of
national patrimony under Art. XII
where the State has control over local
governments.

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL
RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his
capacity as Secretary of DENR, GR. No. 175368,
APRIL 11, 2013

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that the
Supreme Court order to: ( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of
1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the
People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents from
exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary
of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding
and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor
of Bulacan. Petitioners claim that it was an act of “control” by the executive
department over local government units when Art. X grants the Executive
Department through the President only “supervision over local government units.

Held:

Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the

provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government
Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and
(3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

The 1987 Constitution provides:

Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines

shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that
the acts of their component units are within the scope
of their prescribed powers and functions.

Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991 show that the relationship between the President
and the Provinces or respondent DENR, as the alter ego of the President, and the
Province of Bulacan is one of executive supervision, not one of executive control.
The term “control” has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the term “supervision”
is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function
in accordance with law.

Held:

The petition lacks merit.

 75

Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony)

of the Constitution provides that “[t]he exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.”

Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution

provides that “[t]he Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x.” Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, was
enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale Mining
Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
concerned government agencies.

May individuals who do not belong to

the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and other sectors
qualified as nominees of party-list
groups? May national parties join the
party-list elections?

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.

203766, and companion cases, February 26, 2013

The two issues raised before the Supreme Court are:

first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating
in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations using the criteria laid
down by the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections (BANAT) ; and

second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should
be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following

prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the
Supreme Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying
petitioners, all the present petitions are remanded for the COMELEC to determine
who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in
this Decision.

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political
power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution
provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
 76

and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list

system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

In short, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1)

national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are
different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent
any particular sector.

The ruling of the Supreme Court in ANG BAGONG BAYANI and BANAT that
major and national parties are not allowed to join the party-list is abandoned.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and

subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not

need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register

under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and

underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent

the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political
constituencies,” [A] either must belong to their respective sectors, or [B]
must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
 77

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

May gays, lesbians, bisexual, and

transgenders be allowed as a party-
list group even though they are not
among those enumerated in the
Constitution as well as the party-list
law as “marginalized” or “under-
represented” sectors of the
Philippine society? May they be
disqualified because of their belief of
“same sex marriage” which is
allegedly contrary to the teachings of
the Holy Bible and the Koran?

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.

190582, April 7, 2010

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006.
The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that:

a. Gays, lesbians, etc. are not included in the “marginalized groups”

enumerated by the Supreme Court in the case of ANG BAGONG
BAYANI VS. COMELEC;
b. They espouse illegal doctrines like same sex marriages which is in
violation of Art. 201 of the Revised Penal Code and Articles 696 and 1306
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The COMELEC likewise used the
Holy Bible and the Koran in denying Ladlad’s application since same sex
marriage violated both.

HELD:

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that
the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated
with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that the SC ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious
matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.” The SC held that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

“Residence” requirement for local

elective officials.
 78

ROMMEL JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.

19170, April 24, 2012

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He
migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to
the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo, Jr., in Barangay Veteran’s Village,
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September
1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of
the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.

From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the
same village where he lived and a fishpond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga
Sibugay. He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but
respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay Captain of Barangay Veteran’s Village,
opposed the same. Acting on the application, the Election Registration Board
approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections’
(COMELEC’s) voters list for Precinct 0051F of BarangayVeterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo
promptly filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground
that the latter made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply
with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of
the Local Government Code.

After hearing, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that, while Jalosjos
had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with the requirements of R.A. 9225,
he failed to prove the residency requirement for a gubernatorial candidate. He failed
to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc
affirmed the Second Division’s decision, ruling that Jalosjos had been a mere guest
or transient visitor in his brother’s house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as
his domicile.

Issue:

Is he a resident of Zamboanga Sibugay?

Held:

Yes.

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of

provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the
election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a
particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.

There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with

residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still,
jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile
or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the
place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile
from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired
Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice.
 79

On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live
with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to
change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting
in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live
in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since
lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

Meaning of the word

“residence” as a qualification for the
position of Governor of Palawan.

ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA VS. COMELEC, G.R.

NO. 191938, JULY 2, 2010

The residence requirement is rooted in the recognition that officials of districts

or localities should not only be acquainted with the metes and bounds of their
constituencies; more importantly, they should know their constituencies and the
unique circumstances of their constituents – their needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common welfare.
Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar, with these circumstances can only come
with residency in the constituency to be represented.

The purpose of the residency requirement is “best met by individuals who

have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.” At the same time, the
constituents themselves can best know and evaluate the candidates’ qualifications
and fitness for office if these candidates have lived among them.

In this case, when his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was
declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of
Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of
Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of
Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms
immediately before the elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as
Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a “highly urbanized city”
and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal
consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents
from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor,
Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No.
03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub,
Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the
position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr.

(the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
They essentially argued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who
has not yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for
Governor of Palawan. Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has successfully
abandoned Puerto Princesa City as his domicile of origin, and has established a new
domicile in Aborlan since 2008.

To refute Mitra’s claimed residence in Aborlan – specifically, that he resides at

the Maligaya Feedmill property – the respondents additionally submitted the
affidavits of the 14 Punong Barangays of Aborlan and of six residents of Aborlan, all
stating that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and has never been seen in that
 80

municipality and that the office of the feedmill where he allegedly resided and
is unlivable due to noise and pollution.

The COMELEC’s First Division disqualified Mitra and the same was affirmed
by a divided En Banc based on the following:

First, registration as a voter of Aborlan is not sufficient evidence that Mitra has
successfully abandoned his domicile of origin.

Second, mere intent cannot supplant the express requirement of the

law; the “physical presence” required to establish domicile
connotes actual, factual and bona fide residence in a given
locality.

HELD:

Mitra is a resident of Aborlan, Palawan.

From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from
Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan to comply with the residence requirement of a
candidate for an elective provincial office. Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, does not abhor this intended transfer of residence,
as its Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to be a resident of the local
government unit where he intends to run for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election. In other words, the law itself recognizes
implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposes only the
condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of course, as
a continuing requirement or qualification, the elected official must remain a resident
there for the rest of his term.

Mitra’s domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to

qualify as Governor – in light of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto
Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can
no longer vote for provincial officials – he had to abandon his domicile of origin and
acquire a new one within the local government unit where he intended to run; this
would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which
the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following:

(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;

(2) an intention to remain there; and

(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

Respondents claim that the feedmill place is beneath of what Mitra – a

three-term congressman and a member of the Mitra political clan of Palawan –
would occupy. No airconditioning unit, TV sets, etc..

Mitra has established business interests in Aborlan, a fact which the

respondents have never disputed. He was then the incumbent three-term
Representative who, as early as 2008, already entertained thoughts of running for
Governor in 2010.

Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence – i.e., the dwelling where a person

permanently intends to return to and to remain – his or her capacity or inclination to
decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial. The COMELEC used a non-legal
standard in disqualifying Mitra.

“Residence” requirement for

members of the House of
Representatives.
 81

REP. DANILO RAMON FERNANDEZ VS. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
JESUS VICENTE, G.R. No. 187478, December 21,
2009

Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District

of the Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/exact address as “No. 13 Maharlika St.,
Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna” (alleged Sta.
Rosa residence).

Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a “Petition to

Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for
Disqualification” before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna.
He claimed that Fernandez made material misrepresentation in his COC regarding
his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan,
Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan is located in the Fourth Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner
maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First
District. The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the First

District of Laguna on June 27, 2007, having garnered a total of 95,927 votes,
winning by a margin of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate.

On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before
the HRET, docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared
ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing
the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioner’s election
and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.

The HRET ruled in favor of private respondent and held that Fernandez was
not qualified to be the representative of the 1 st District of Laguna since he failed to
comply with the residence requirement under Section 6, Art. VI of the Constitution.

Issue:

Is Fernandez a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he does not even a

house therein because his house is found Pagsanjan, Laguna, which is within the 4th
Legislative District of Laguna?

Held:

Fernandez does not deny that his domicile of origin is Pagsanjan in the
Fourth District of Laguna. Pagsanjan is his domicile of origin, or since his birth,
where he formerly ran for provincial Board Member of Laguna in 1998, for Vice-
Governor of Laguna in 2001 and for Governor of Laguna in 2004. In all his
Certificates of Candidacy when he ran for these positions, he indicated under oath
that his domicile or permanent residence was in Pagsanjan in the Fourth District of
Laguna, not in the First District where he later ran in the last elections.

Petitioner alleges that in the questioned Decision, the HRET added a new
qualification requirement for candidates seeking election to the position of Member of
the House of Representatives, and that is, they must be real property owners or must
have a house to reside in the legislative district where they seek election.

We find the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the
Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances
of this case.

The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a
townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His
ownership of properties in other places has been taken to mean that petitioner did
 82

not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that he had not abandoned
his domicile of origin.

Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile
of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws
which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one
district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a
congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we see the fact that petitioner
was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier for
him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional
candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he
resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of
property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the
right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.

Creation of a separate
legislative district for
M a l o l o s C i t y, B u l a c a n , w i t h a
population of less than
250,000 declared
unconstitutional

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S.

FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA VS. COMELEC, G.R
No. 188078, January 25, 2010

CARPIO, J.:

Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in

Congress through four legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of
the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and
Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City
Charter, by creating a separate legislative district for the city. At the time the
legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No.
3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the
population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May
2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an
undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by
the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.

Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed

this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in
Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the
city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand”. The only
issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000,
whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the
City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating
a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
 83

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on

demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda
has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void
on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the population of
Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal
demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city
whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district
only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000
population.

Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1

August 2007. Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to
only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded
yearly, the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.

All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of
Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010.” Based on the Certification’s own growth
rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10
May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no published population projections
for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and provinces.

A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative

district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city must first attain
the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such
city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case
that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000,
whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.

Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of

Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010
elections, the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such
population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its
own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

Requisites for the creation of a

province from another province, i.e.,
Province of Dinagat Islands. Income,
population and land area.

RODOLFO NAVARRO VS. ERMITA, G.R. NO.

180050, FEBRUARY 10, 2010 & APRIL, 2011

Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al., seek nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional.

They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if
uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly deprives the people
of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and
rich resources from the area.

The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under
R.A. No. 2786 on June 19, 1960. The province is composed of three main groups of
islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande;
and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa,
Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. Based on the official 2000
Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics Office
(NSO), the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000 was
481,416, broken down as follows:
 84

Mainland 281,111

Surigao City 118,534

Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93,354

Dinagat Island 106,951

Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local
Government Code, a province may be created if it has an average annual
income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified
by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000
square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.

MAIN ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355, CREATING

THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT ISLANDS, COMPLIED WITH
THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER
SECTION 461 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.

HELD:

At first, the Supreme Court held tha the law creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands is unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements. It only met one
of the three, i.e., income. It has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers,
which falls short of the statutory requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers.
Moreover, based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total population of
the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory
requirement is a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants.

On Motion for Reconsideration, however, the Supreme Court reversed itself

and held that since it complies with the income requirement, it needs just one other
requisite to comply with the requirements to become a new province. In this case,
the area requirement is deemed complied with since “[t]he land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of two or more islands.”

The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10,

Article X of the Constitution states:

SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be

created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”

Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed

the criteria for the creation of a province, thus:

SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be

created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the
following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand

(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
 85

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand

(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of
said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.

Security of tenure of probationary

government employee; due process

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. GREGORIO

MAGNAYE, JR., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010

FACTS:

In March 2001, Mayor Roman H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed

Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the Office of Economic Enterprise [Operation of
Market] (OEE). After a few days, Mayor Rosales detailed him to the Municipal
Planning and Development Office.

In the May elections of that year, Mayor Rosales was defeated by Raul L.
Bendaña, who assumed office on June 30, 2001. Thereafter, Magnaye was returned
to his original assignment at the OEE. On July 11, 2001, Bendaña also placed him
on detail at the Municipal Planning and Development Office to assist in the
implementation of a Survey on the Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning Project.

On August 13, 2001, the new mayor served him a notice of termination from
employment effective the following day for unsatisfactory conduct and want of
capacity.

Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office on the
ground that Mayor Bendaña was not in a position to effectively evaluate his
performance because it was made less than one and one-half months after his
(Mayor Bendaña’s) assumption to office. He added that his termination was without
basis and was politically motivated

The CSCRO-IV dismissed Magnaye’s complaint for lack of merit. It upheld

his dismissal from the service on the ground that Mayor Bendaña’s own assessment,
together with the evaluation made by his supervisors, constituted sufficient and
reasonable grounds for his termination.

However, the CSC Decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition by the Civil Service Commission.

THE ISSUE:

The principal issue, therefore, is whether or not the termination of Magnaye

was in accordance with the pertinent laws and the rules.

HELD:

The Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The CSC is of the position that a civil service employee does not enjoy
security of tenure during his 6-month probationary period. It submits that an
employee’s security of tenure starts only after the probationary period.

The CSC position is contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law
itself. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers
not just in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted
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activities, the right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work and a
living wage but also to security of tenure, and Section 2(3), Article IX-B is emphatic
in saying that, "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law."

Consistently, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that “no officer
or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for
cause as provided by law after due process.”

Our Constitution, in using the expressions “all workers” and “no officer or employee,”
puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee
which means that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of
tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their
probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to
qualify as regular employees.

Civil Service Commission has no

administrative jurisdiction over
offenses committed by court
personnel. Only the Supreme Court.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. HERMINIGILDO

ANDAL, G.R. No. 185749, December 16, 2009

CARPIO, J.:

Herminigildo L. Andal (respondent) holds the position of Security Guard II in the

Sandiganbayan. On 24 January 2000, he filed an application to take the Career
Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT) and was
admitted to take the examination. The examination results showed that respondent
passed the examination with a rating of 81.03%.

On 25 January 2000, Arlene S. Vito (Vito), claiming to have been authorized by

respondent to secure the results of the examination, presented a handwritten
authorization allegedly signed by respondent. Upon verification and comparison of
the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of
respondent which Vito presented, there appeared a dissimilarity in the facial features.
Bella A. Mitra, then Officer-in-Charge of the Examination, Placement and Services
Division (EPSD) of the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-
NCR), issued a Memorandum on the alleged “impersonation” of respondent and the
matter was referred to the Legal Affairs Division to conduct a fact-finding
investigation. On 29 November 2000, the CSC-NCR formally charged respondent
with dishonesty.

A formal investigation of the case was scheduled on 4 June 2001, 21

November 2001, 5 February 2002, and 10 July 2002. Notices were sent to
respondent’s last known address as indicated in his Application Form but respondent
failed to appear on the scheduled hearings. Respondent was deemed to have waived
his right to appear at the formal investigation and the case proceeded ex parte.

On 5 August 2005, the CSC-NCR rendered judgment finding respondent guilty

of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the CSC which issued Resolution No.

062255 dated 20 December 2006, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Herminigildo L. Andal is hereby

DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 25, 2005 of the Civil
Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR), Quezon
City, finding him guilty of Dishonesty and imposing upon him the
penalty of dismissal from the service with accessory penalties of
disqualification from re-entering government service, forfeiture of
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retirement benefits, and bar from taking any civil service examination,
pursuant to Section 57 of the Uniformed Rules, is AFFIRMED.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the CSC judgment but the motion
was denied in the CSC Resolution No. 071493 dated 1 August 2007.

Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review
under Rule 43. On 22 September 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in
favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision

dated 25 May 2005, Resolution No. 062255 dated 20 December 2006,
and Resolution No. 071493 dated 01 August 2007 in Admin. Case No.
00-12-027 are SET ASIDE and respondent Civil Service Commission
is enjoined from implementing the same. Respondent Civil Service
Commission is hereby ORDERED to immediately refer said
administrative case for Dishonesty against petitioner Herminigildo L.
Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.

The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied
in its Resolution dated 2 December 2008.

Hence, the present petition.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not the Civil Service Commission has
disciplinary jurisdiction to try and decide administrative cases against court
personnel.

HELD:

The CSC’s authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases are not in dispute. The question is whether the CSC’s disciplinary jurisdiction
extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision

over all courts and the personnel thereof.

By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges’ and court personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. This we have ruled in Maceda
v. Vasquez and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v. Civil Service Commission.
In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service Law by a
court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against
a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme
Court.