Parsons and Sorokin. A Comparison of The Founding of American Sociological Theory Schools - 2001

Journal of Classical Sociology
Copyright © 2001 SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi Vol 1(2): 227–256 [1468–795X(200109)1:2;227–256;018785]
Parsons and Sorokin

A Comparison of the Founding of American Sociological Theory Schools
MILAN ZAFIROVSKI University of North Texas
ABSTRACT This article compares the main elements of Parsons’ and Sorokin’s
sociological work in the context of the formation and development of an
American school of social theory during the 1930s–1950s. Of these elements,
four are meta-theoretical, and four substantive or theoretical. Included in the first
group are the problems of methodology, selection, convergence versus diver-
gence, and interpretation. The possibility of social dynamics, the conception of
the social system, micro- versus macro-social and economic action comprise the
second. The comparison suggests that the different roles of Parsons and Sorokin
in American social theory are to be, in part, accounted for by extra-scientific rather
than strictly scientific factors.
KEYWORDS academic community, action, change, classical theory, convergence,

social system
Talcott Parsons and Pitirim Sorokin are without doubt two towering figures of
20th-century sociology. However, their respective roles (and recognition) in the
founding of an American school of sociological theory during the 20th century
were asymmetrical. Specifically, they ‘were men of equal brilliance but Parsons
founded a major sociological school while Sorokin left no school or intellectual
stamp on the discipline’ (Tiryakian, quoted in Johnston, 1995: ix).
To some extent, Sorokin has been subject to the same fate as Comte and
Spencer in being virtually forgotten in much of American sociology. This contrasts
with Parsons’ position as an ever-present figure to be followed and elaborated
upon, or, alternatively, reinterpreted and analyzed. Such an asymmetry in the roles
of Parsons and Sorokin in the creation of an American school of social theory
seems greater than that in recognizing the parts Weber, Durkheim and Marx
played in classical sociology. In contemporary sociology, this asymmetry tends to
widen, as indicated by Parsons’ rehabilitation in neo-functionalism as well as by
his presence in sociological rational choice theory, including its social exchange
version. Compare this to Sorokin’s secondary status, even irrelevance – reminis-
cent of Spencer, for example. The question arises as to why such an asymmetry
exists in the role attributed to Parsons and Sorokin, respectively, in the formation
and the subsequent development of an American school of social theory during
the 20th century.
Previous research has suggested some answers to this question. One
answer relates to the institutional setting of Harvard in conjunction with the
developments within the sociological community and the discipline (Johnston,
1996). Another answer concerns the different ideological-political and moral
outlooks or implications of the two theoretical systems rather than these systems
per se (Buxton, 1996). Still another answer singles out the conformity with
(Parsons) or deviance from (Sorokin) the expectations of the academic commu-
nity in the search for identity or moral career (Nichols, 1989). Also invoked as
possible answers are the ability (Parsons) or inability (Sorokin) successfully to
establish sociological schools, as well as successful (Parsons) or unsuccessful
(Sorokin) relations with graduate students and colleagues (Johnston, 1995;
Nichols, 1996) and university and other elites, including Rockefeller officials
(Buxton, 1996), and so on.
In light of this asymmetry the article makes a comparison between
Parsons’ and Sorokin’s sociological works as regards the founding of an American
social theory at Harvard in the 1930s–1950s. The question is whether purely
scientific-theoretical or extra-curricular factors are responsible for such an asym-
metry. With necessary precautions (Buxton, 1996; Nichols, 1996) and tentatively,
one can formulate and examine the argument that the causes for the differential
roles of Parsons and Sorokin in the formation of an American school of social
theory lie in the equivalent qualitative differences of their sociological works.
Presumably, the reason for this different destiny is that the former’s sociology is
simply superior to that of the latter in terms of theoretical-empirical adequacy.
This meta-theoretical argument can be examined by considering a selective
sample of the essential components of Parsons’ and Sorokin’s works. This
consideration is undertaken from the perspective of classical sociological theory.
Of these elements, four refer to the meta-theories, and four to the theories of the
two writers. The first group includes the questions of theoretical methodology,
selection, convergence versus divergence, and interpretation. The second includes
the issues of the possibility of social dynamics, the conception of the social system,
micro-social versus macro-social, and economic action and rationality. If such a
consideration provides no decisive support for the argument of scientific ade-
quacy, this negative ‘evidence’ might suggest that the reasons for Parsons’ and
Sorokin’s different academic fates in American sociology are to be sought
somewhere else. They may reside in extra-scientific factors, such as the institu-
228 JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 1(2)

tional context and ideological-political climate at Harvard and beyond, and their
repercussions on the status of their sociological works in the academic community
(Buxton, 1996; Johnston, 1995; Nichols, 1996). In examining the argument,
emphasis is placed on comparing Parsons’ and Sorokin’s sociological works in the
context of forming an American school of social theory rather than on their
personal relations, the micro- and macro-institutional settings or ideological-
political outlooks.
Previous research (Nichols, 1996; Talbutt, 1996) has not fully engaged in
such comparisons, centering, instead, on the relations between the personalities;
even when the research compares, it does not offer satisfactory accounts. In
particular, it does not elaborate on the linkage between the divergently con-
structed roles in creating an American school of social theory within the academic
community and the different merits of the sociological works. Parsons and
Sorokin have hardly been compared in terms of the merits of their sociological
works, an appraisal that is neither impossible nor irrelevant (Buxton, 1996),
especially when performed from a definite theoretical perspective. Such a lacuna
provides the key rationale for the present article. It expands the discussion on
Parsons and Sorokin by comparing their works in light of the creation of an
American school of social theory. Notably, this comparison is performed from the
perspective of classical sociological theory. The article represents an endeavor to
situate these works within classical theory rather than an exercise in the sociology,
history or psychology of knowledge, or these thinkers’ mental lives (Sorokin,
1963).
The rest of the article is organized in two sections. The first reconsiders
the meta-theoretical endeavors of Parsons and Sorokin, including their treatment
and interpretation of classical theory as presented in The Structure of Social Action
and Contemporary Sociological Theories, respectively. The second reexamines their
conceptualizations of substantive issues such as social systems, social change,
economic rationality and social action, as found in The Social System and Social
and Cultural Dynamics, respectively. Table 1 summarizes meta-theoretical and
substantive elements for comparison.
Meta-Theory: The Structure of Social Action

versus Contemporary Sociological Theories
The question of theoretical methodology
The status of Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action in American sociology can be
compared to that of Weber’s Protestant Ethic (or Durkheim’s Suicide), though in
substantive theoretical terms ‘Parsons is not Weber [or Durkheim]’ (Holmwood,
1996: 127). In turn, as an earlier cognate endeavor, Sorokin’s Contemporary
Sociological Theories is virtually forgotten or ignored. One wonders if such a
ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 229

TABLE 1. META-THEORETICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS FOR
COMPARING PARSONS AND SOROKIN
Meta-theory Substantive theory
Theoretical methodology Social system

Theory selection Social change
Theoretical convergence vs divergence Microscopic vs macroscopic
Interpretation of classical theory Economic action and rationality
differential treatment of these two comparable expositions of sociological theory

is ‘deserved’ in terms of scientific merits.
The Structure of Social Action is sometimes designated (Camic, 1989) as a
charter, a defense of sociology against the imperialism of psychological behavior-
ism and utilitarianism (neoclassical economics) through a specification of the
normative-institutional as the subject matter of sociology. Some of the ironies and
contradictions of such an endeavor are also exposed (Camic, 1989). For instance,
although based on the action frame of reference, it has no specific sociology of
action capable of dealing with social, historical and cultural variations in different
action types, and consequently a universalistic conception of the actor is not
concretized into a sociological analysis of sociohistorical forms and changes in
personality (Savage, 1981). Likewise, there is a generalized treatment of the
Hobbesian problem of social order, but not a sociological inquiry into temporally
and spatially varying causes and solutions of this problem (Giddens, 1984). Then,
there is an examination of sociological theory, but not a sociologically informed
analysis of the social or intellectual processes of theory emergence and
development.
Also, the limitations of Parsons’ theoretical methodology – based on the
naı̈ve acceptance of the epistemological postulates of neoclassical economics – can
be revealed when compared to the Weberian as well as the Sorokinian approach.
Weber’s attention to general regularities and individual configurations of society
as different but legitimate theoretical preoccupations differs from Parsons’ search
for first principles, ultimate truths and universal laws like those of neoclassical
economics. Unlike Weber’s view of social science as a noncumulative proliferation
of different theoretical paradigms and his circumvention concerning the prospects
of general sociological theory, Parsons engages in building a unified theoretical
system. Analogous differences between the two can be found in regard to the
social constitution of ordinary human knowledge (Camic, 1992; Holmwood,
1996; Savage, 1981). Besides, Parsons’ choice of methodology was dictated by
pragmatic–institutional rather than theoretical factors, namely by Harvard’s

academic structure, ideological-political Weltanschauung and moral climate (Bux-
ton, 1996; Johnston, 1995).
By contrast, Sorokin’s theoretical methodology, called integralism (Ford,
1996; Hanson, 1996), owes nothing to neoclassical economics, and is more in
line with the classical sociological tradition, and to that extent is less vulnerable to
objections. In particular, Sorokin rejects any economic, utilitarian and other
mono-causal explanations of social phenomena, including social action, unlike
Parsons’ vacillation and ambivalence vis-à-vis utilitarianism and neoclassical eco-
nomics. Sorokin’s theoretical methodology is devoid of the individualistic–
utilitarian bias implicit in Parsons’ (ambivalent) embrace of the basic
methodological arguments of neoclassical economics (Camic, 1992; Rambo,
1995; Savage, 1981).1
Sorokin’s theoretical methodology appears more structural, dynamic,
integral and pluralist, and to that degree more concordant with the classical
sociological tradition. There are no a priori conceptual grounds for favoring
Parsons’ theoretical methodology – called the action frame of reference, in
combination with the systems approach and functionalism – to Sorokin’s integral-
ism and holism. One need not necessarily share Parsons’ naı̈ve fascination with the
ambitious epistemological principles and objectives of neoclassical economics;
albeit, compared with rational choice theorists, he looks like an exemplar of
moderation (Savage, 1981; Sciulli, 1984). By contrast, though as well informed in
utilitarianism and methodological individualism as Parsons, Sorokin gives more
weight to methodological approaches as more genuinely (macro-)sociological and
consonant with the classical tradition – structural, systemic, holistic, dynamic or
integralist methodology (Ford, 1996).
Further, Parsons’ seemingly neutral terminology, namely The Structure of
Social Action, may contain conceptual problems. Insofar as the concept of social
action presupposes or implies methodological individualism, and that of social
structure presupposes holism, the two incompatible sociological principles are
juxtaposed to each other. Relatedly, this can imply ‘impossible reconciliation of
[determinism] with free will’ (Sorokin, 1928). One suspects that this is glossed
over or attempted to be reconciled ex post, namely by the concept of normative-
institutional individualism (Parsons, 1937: 709–10). Given such theoretical impli-
cations, better expressions may be ‘Social Structure and Social Action’, to convey
the co-determination of society and individuals, that is, structuration (Giddens,
1984); or ‘The Structural Determinants of Social Action’, to express the fact that
human action is socially, normative-institutionally structured, and the like. Alter-
natively, ‘The Structure of Society’ makes more sense – though the analysis is not
completely structural and macro-sociological – than the original. Also, the latter
invokes psychological or Freudian connotations (Savage, 1981: 193–4), implying
that action or the actor has some inner structure akin to that of the ego, id, super-
ego (Parsons, 1970). And, given the original intention and actual content of The
Structure, the title is misleading in the sense of implying a theoretical (substantive)

rather than a meta-theoretical analysis (Holmwood, 1996). Since the former is of
secondary importance in relation to the latter, the whole endeavor should be
called ‘Selected Sociological Theories of Action’.
In a sense, Sorokin’s title, Contemporary Sociological Theories, is a misnomer
too. Given the vast coverage extending beyond, at the time, contemporary theory
(Johnston, 1995), a more proper title would be the ‘Development of Sociological
Theory’, ‘Classical Sociological Theories’ or ‘Sociological Theories’. This mis-
specification is still less misleading and confusing than in The Structure, in which
meta-theoretical considerations of some classical theories parade as substantive
theory, even ‘observation and verification of fact’ (Parsons, 1937: 725), that is,
analysis of action and social structure (Giddens, 1984: xiii–xiv). By comparison to
The Structure’s ambiguity, Contemporary Sociological Theories is a clearly stated
attempt at exposition of the development of sociological theory, with occasional
substantive formulations of an integralist conception (Ford, 1996)
The problem of theory selection

One of the enduring perplexities of The Structure of Social Action is the curious
selection of the classical authors (Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, Marshall) displaying
convergence upon a ‘voluntaristic theory of action’ (Parsons, 1937: 12–14). The
most striking and surprising is the inclusion of Alfred Marshall. According to
Parsons, the ‘inclusion of Marshall is justified by the fact that economic theory
and the question of its status involves a crucial set of problems in relation to the
theory of action in general, and to the positivistic, especially its utilitarian variant’
(1937: 13).
While suspecting utilitarianism (Bourricauld, 1981: 11), even rejecting its
Spencerian version, Parsons includes Marshall, an eminent representative of
utilitarian neoclassical economics or marginalism, namely the theory of marginal
utility. No doubt Marshall, like Pareto, entertains doubts about the adequacy of
utility theory or a ‘rigid utilitarian position for explaining certain facts of
economic life [e.g. free enterprise]’ (Parsons, 1937: 702). Yet, Marshall’s action
theory is admittedly predicated on the theoretical foundations of utilitarianism
and neoclassical economics, namely the conception of (marginal) utility, the
principle of substitution, the means–end schema, rational choice and the analytical
independence of ends (Parsons, 1937: 702).
Notably, Marshall ‘was primarily immersed [in] utilitarian individualism’
(Parsons, 1937: 13). Because of these utilitarian foundations of his action theory,
Marshall’s ‘consideration of integrated value systems as distinct from random ends
is limited to [capitalism and] fails to develop the logical possibilities of there being
others in other societies’ (Parsons, 1937: 703). Hence, if Marshall converges
upon action theory, this is a slightly modified utilitarian version, which Parsons
refutes in principle or mitigates by a more normatively and institutionally groun-
ded model. At best, Marshall admittedly ‘represents hardly more than a beginning

of the advance beyond the utilitarian position’ (Parsons, 1937: 720). To that
extent, to include Marshall in The Structure, an intended defense of sociology
against utilitarian economics and other skeptics, is probably a non sequitur. As an
important neoclassical economist with some sporadic insights of sociological
import, Marshall is of secondary relevance for sociology, including the theory of
action, in comparison with Weber, Durkheim and Pareto. To join Marshall
together with Weber, Durkheim and Pareto (the sociologist) is hardly defensible
even within the frame of reference of a voluntaristic theory of action. This implies
theoretical inconsistency on the part of Parsons (Savage, 1981: 193–4), or a
misreading of Marshall, or just an expedience.2
In retrospect, Parsons’ selection bias in the inclusion of Marshall can be
traced to a conjunction of circumstances. These include Parsons’ initial training in
neoclassical economics conjoined with his being in the Department of Economics
at Harvard before joining its sociology department, the latter’s first chair being
none other than Pitirim Sorokin.
Compared to The Structure’s selection bias and narrow focus, Sorokin’s
coverage of writers in Sociological Theories is (perhaps overly3) comprehensive and
characterized by rare erudition and clarity (Johnston, 1996). All relevant social
theorists, including those of whom the author as vehemently as Parsons dis-
approves – e.g. Marx’s ‘economic determinism’ and ‘monism’ (Sorokin, 1928) –
are given due consideration (though many interpretations are questionable).
Sorokin makes no attempt at searching for convergence upon a unified socio-
logical (action or other) theory. Instead, his premise is conceptual pluralism and
diversity expressing the richness of sociological theorizing, in contrast to Parsons’
conviction that the ‘evolution’ of sociological theory ensues in the action frame of
reference to be ‘given its full expression by Parsons and his colleagues’ (Giddens,
1984: xiv).
Parsons’ inclusion of Marshall among the major ‘European writers’ is
compounded by equally dubious exclusions; for example, the question arises as to
the omission of Marx, Simmel and others (Camic, 1992). Parsons justifies Marx’s
omission from The Structure on theoretical-methodological grounds, but these
justifications are not devoid of ideological connotations, thus representing
Pareto’s derivations or ex post rationalizations. Simply, to include Marx would
probably not have been ‘politically correct’ in the United States in the 1930s and
a fortiori in the 1950s during the ideological hysteria and witch-hunting of
McCarthyism. Marx was excluded because his critical analysis of contemporary
capitalism was an ideological anathema for Parsons and other ‘patriotic’ American
social scientists at that time. Only in this sense can one say that Marxian
conception and method was incongruent with Parsons’ self-assigned mission of
establishing an American school of social science through a forced synthesis of the
works of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber.4
Marx’s absence from The Structure seems more conspicuous than the
presence of Marshall. Unlike Weber, Parsons probably wanted to avoid a dialogue

with the ‘ghost of Marx’, but the ghost still loomed large. In this connection, the
question arises as to whether Parsons really thought that Marshall had been more
relevant for sociology, including the theory of action, than had Marx (Giddens,
1984: xiii–xxi). Though the theoretical (and ideological) divergence of Parsons
from Marx is indubitable and professed by the former, one wonders if this
divergence can be a valid reason for the latter’s exclusion from the major classical
theorists. The theoretical-ideological differences of such classical sociologists as
Weber and Pareto from Marx did not prevent the former from engaging in critical
discourse with the latter. In contrast, while being vehemently critical (and almost
abusive, as implied by Merton [1968: 24–7]) of Marx, Sorokin gives him due
consideration in Contemporary Sociological Theories. In a similar vein to Parsons,
Sorokin (1928) rejected Marx’s sociological theory on grounds of its economic
determinism and ‘fatalism’, denying it originality, relevance, even scientific status.
Yet, unlike Parsons, Sorokin did not sweep Marx’s ‘economic monism’, including
the theory of class struggle, critique of capitalism and prediction of ‘socialist
paradise’, under the carpet but faced it on its own terms.
In regard to Parsons’ Structure the question can also arise as to the
exclusion of Simmel (Levine, 1991). In addition to his higher overall relevance for
sociological theory than Marshall, Simmel comes closer than any one of the four
‘European writers’ (except for Weber) to the designation of an action theorist, by
virtue of his essentially individualist, voluntarist and (partly) rationalist conception
(Levine, 1989). In this connection, Simmel can even be regarded as the founder
of social exchange theory in sociology.
The exclusion of Comte and Spencer can produce some misgivings as well.
This holds good of Comte given his titular role as sociology’s founder and, more
important, his substantive contributions to the discipline. These include the
theory of social structure, order and equilibrium (social statics) and of social
evolution, change and progress (social dynamics), not neglecting his epistemology
(Heilbron, 1990). Notably, whereas the idea of the ‘evolution of society’ later
became an important concern for Parsons, the (Hobbesian) problem of social
order is an overarching theme in his early and mature writings. In this regard,
Parsons over-emphasizes the analytical importance of the Hobbesian problem of
order in the works of such classical sociologists as Durkheim. Contrary to Parsons’
interpretation, Durkheim explicitly rejects Hobbes’ conception on account of its
creating an untenable ‘break in continuity between the individual and society
[such that] to induce the individual to pursue social ends, constraint must be
exercised upon him’ (1966: 22). This suggests that Durkheim does not envision
or try to resolve the Hobbesian problem of social order in the same way as Parsons
does.
Next, Spencer’s omission can also be viewed as paradoxical, since he is an
archetype of the action theorist: uncompromisingly individualist, voluntaristic and
rationalistic or utilitarian, though not a consistent nominalist (Stark, 1961). The
Structure’s best-known single statement (‘Who now reads Spencer?’ [1937: 3]) is

implausible with respect to Parsons’ own sociological theory. The irony is that the
designation ‘Spencerian’ can be applied to Parsons, at least on account of his
conceptual and terminological apparatus. Such typically Spencerian concepts as
social structure, function, social system, structural differentiation, evolution,
integration, industrial society, dynamics, organism, equilibrium, and so on, per-
meate Parsonian sociology. At the least, Spencer is probably the first sociologist to
use the terms ‘structure’ and ‘function’ (Turner and Maryanski, 1979), the
hallmarks of Parsons’ structural functionalism. In the light of this Spencerian
evolution, Parsons’ declaration that ‘Spencer is dead’ (1937: 3) has turned out to
be a testament to the ‘change in his own thought’ (Pope, 1973: 340).
Convergence versus divergence

Parsons’ assumption of convergence of Marshall, Pareto, Weber and Durkheim
upon a voluntaristic theory of action represents the major theme of The Structure.
However, this assumption can be questioned on several grounds. Specifically,
Marshall’s is an essentially utilitarian economic theory; Pareto’s a dual model of
social action: one for rational-logical conduct in the economic system, the other
for non-rational behavior in the social system; Weber’s is the most complex,
encompassing utilitarian-rational (aim-rational), nonutilitarian-rational (value-
rational), traditional and affectual actions; and Durkheim does not seem to
advance a ‘voluntaristic theory of action’ in the individualist, utilitarian and
rationalist sense. Admittedly, coupled with his rejection of utilitarianism and
individualism, ‘relatively little of Durkheim’s attention was centered on the
intrinsic means–end scheme [i.e. rationality]’ (Parsons, 1937: 710).
Convergence is tenuous even between the economists Marshall and
Pareto, and more so between them and the sociologists Weber and Durkheim.
While Marshall harbors reserves about extending the economic approach to all
human behavior in the manner of contemporary imperialist economists, Pareto is
more aware of the limits of the approach. Thus Pareto confines the subject of
economics to logico-rational action and that of sociology to non-logical behavior
driven by residues and derivations. Notably, Pareto holds the ‘conviction of the
inadequacy [of utility theory] for the scientific explanation of concrete human
action even within the economic field’ (Parsons, 1937: 704). For Pareto a
universal rational choice paradigm would be an instance of what Sorokin (1928)
calls ‘theoretical monism’, more so than for Marshall and most (neo)classical
economists in the utilitarian tradition (e.g. Edgeworth, 1967). Such a paradigm
would be equally dubious for Weber. Weber, by implication, limits the subject of
economics to aim- or instrumentally-rational (zweckrational) social action, as
distinguished from its value-rational (wertrational), traditional and affective types.
Moreover, only a portion of rational-purposive action falls within the province of
economics insofar as one ‘shall not consider every instrumental action as eco-
nomic’ (Weber, 1968: 339), but also as non-economic. Of these four ‘European

writers’, Durkheim is particularly opposed to a utilitarian voluntaristic theory of
action, as shown by his rejection of Hobbesian-Spencerian utilitarianism and
individualism. If Parsons wanted to establish convergence upon such a theory, he
would have had to include, for instance, Spencer, Smith, Ricardo or Mill along
with Marshall and possibly Pareto, probably reconsider Weber, and definitely drop
Durkheim.
In contrast to Parsons’ search for convergence upon a unified theory of
action, Sorokin finds considerable divergences between major sociological theor-
ies and offers a pluralist account (Levine, 1991). Given the discrepancies among
the four authors considered by Parsons, the divergence hypothesis of the nature
and development of sociological theory is no less sensible than the convergence
thesis. Parsons’ unification program around the action paradigm resembles and
anticipates the recent attempts at theoretical unification in social science, pre-
dicated upon the rational choice or utilitarian paradigm.
If Parsons seeks to establish a single-paradigm sociological theory by
merging separate paradigms, Sorokin, proceeding on the assumption of theoret-
ical pluralism, views sociology as a multiple-paradigm science. Against this
background of Sorokin’s theoretical pluralism, Parsons builds the argument for
unification of multiple sociological theories into a single conceptual framework
such as the action frame of reference. For Parsons, the corresponding task of
theory unification is relatively easy: it is the matter of self-revelation. Sociologists
only have to acquire the self-awareness of convergence upon an integrated theory
of action, which means that they need to accept at face value Parsons’ inter-
pretation and conception of sociological theory, as presented in The Structure.
This amounts to an attempt at creating a hegemonic thought (Johnston,
1995) in sociology. It also reflects an optimism reminiscent of religious missionar-
ies, ideologues and political leaders attempting, by subtle ways (Johnston, 1995),
to convert others to their Weltanschauung or to produce a world-view that meets
the demands of non-sociological audiences, namely Harvard and Rockefeller
officials (Buxton, 1996). Parsons’ is the attitude of a social thinker believing that
his particular frame of reference represents the universal truth, and hence others
should unify around it (Giddens, 1984: xiii–xiv). For him theory unification is a
matter of faith in the validity of a single paradigm, that is, action theory in
conjunction with a model of social structure.
To Sorokin, the issue is not of convergence upon and conversion to a
single-paradigm sociological theory, given, inter alia, the lack of such a perfect
paradigm in the development of sociology. Moreover, Parsons’ choice of a
voluntaristic action theory, with its microscopic, individualistic and static proper-
ties, would be among those least suited to this role within Sorokin’s macroscopic,
dynamic and integralist framework (Richardson, 1996; Tiryakian, 1996). Addi-
tional, mostly latent, nominalist and pseudo-economistic properties – e.g. aggre-
gation, summation, combination – of the action theory would make it even more
incompatible with this framework. In consequence, sociological-theory unifica-

tion is for Sorokin more than a matter of faith in the assumed validity of a single
theoretical paradigm. With respect to the specific action paradigm, this faith was
negative, as indicated by Sorokin’s suspicion of its overly individualistic and
utilitarian (sensate) implications.
Interpretations of classical theory

Critics identify dubious interpretations of the classics on the part of Parsons in his
Structure. For example, besides being less grounded or substantive and more
(meta-)theoretical or abstract than Weber (Holmwood, 1996: 126–30), Parsons
advances questionable interpretations of Weberian sociology. As critics suggest, a
case in point is Parsons’ discovery in Weber of a normative solution to the
problem of social order, isomorphic to his (Giddens, 1984: xiii–xx; Savage, 1981:
125–7). Parsons’ emphasis on the place of normative-integrative factors in
Weber’s sociological theory may be due to the conflation between factual
regularities (statements of facts) and normative validity (value judgments), a
distinction explicit in classical sociology (yet, implicit, even absent, in rational
choice and welfare economics). In this critique, Parsons attributes to Weber a
conception of the necessary conformity of action to social norms/values, neglect-
ing that such an action mode (value-rational) is only one of the Weberian four
ideal types.
In this regard, particularly striking is Parsons’ insufficient attention to
Weber’s theory of power and domination in its non-normative formulation – e.g.
‘acquisition by force’ and other non-legitimate power – in contrast to his pro-
nounced interest in its normative connotation – namely legitimation, authority
and consent (Cohen et al., 1975; Giddens, 1984). No wonder that critics object
that Parsons applies a methodological reductionism to Weber’s theory by effec-
tively reducing the four types to value-rational action and social rule systems, and
subsuming social rule systems, including those mediated by actors’ subjective
meanings, under binding and internalized norms (Savage, 1981: 125–7). Other
critics have denoted this procedure normative or sociological reductionism
(DiTomaso, 1982).
By comparison, Sorokin’s interpretation appears more balanced and better
captures the complexity and richness of classical sociological theory, including its
Weberian and Durkheimian formulations. Inter alia, this is shown by Sorokin’s
refusal to equate action to normative conformity and by his attention to the
interplay of normative and non-normative components in action by specifying
the relevance of norms for individuals and groups, though not in the same manner
as Parsons (Talbutt, 1996). By contrast, Parsons overstates not only the con-
vergence of Weber’s theory of action upon a normative conception of social action
and structure, but also the extent of the overall consistency of this theory (Turner,
1984). Then, he overlooks that Weber’s mature theory of capitalism – as found in

The General Economic History – was more macro-structural, causal and institu-
tional and less normative-ideational than it appears in The Protestant Ethic
(Collins, 1980).
As in the case of Weber, Parsons’ interpretation of Durkheim seems to be
more in the function of his own action frame of reference than of his pre-
decessor’s. This is manifested in his relative neglect (in The Structure) of the
Durkheimian conception of society as a reality transcending its constituent parts in
favor of a pseudo-nominalist interpretation stressing the emergence of society
from the process of aggregation of acting individuals. Parsons effectively elim-
inates or eclipses the autonomous social sphere by collapsing it into its component
actors and ‘unit acts’ via an application of the action frame of reference. Since
Durkheim’s conception is essentially incompatible with a voluntaristic theory of
(individualist, rational) action, this interpretation has the function of grounding
Parsons’ action theory in this classical theorist (Giddens, 1984: xiii–xiv). Because
convergence in this respect is dubious in regard to Durkheim, critics note that the
latter can only be adduced as negative evidence for Parsons’ voluntaristic theory of
action (Camic, 1992; Pope, 1973).
Also, Parsons’ interpretation of the relationship between the theories of
Durkheim and Weber is often criticized. Parsons interprets this relationship as a
‘remarkable point-for-point correspondence between Weber and Durkheim’
(1937: 717), and thus as support for the convergence thesis concerning the
theory of action. In turn, Sorokin advances an opposite, non-convergence thesis
in what Parsons names as the ‘most widely used compendium in the field in the
1930s [Sociological Theories]’. Since Parsons deems the new convergence thesis
more adequate, he uses it as the rationale for an invidious comparison (Camic,
1989) between his Structure and Sorokin’s Sociological Theories. Of course,
Sorokin’s (1966) evaluation of Parsons’ Structure and other works is no more
complimentary either (Johnston, 1995). However, a non-invidious comparison
between the two magna opera might corroborate the divergence rather than the
convergence thesis, especially in regard to Weber and Durkheim. The ultimate
implication of Parsons’ convergence thesis seems to be an insidious confirmation
of his theory. As some critical commentators note, this is accompanied by a
distortion of the crucial divergences between the precursors, above all Weber and
Durkheim, by reading the ‘later construction into its predecessors’ (Pope et al.,
1975). Arguably, Parsons interprets the classics, Durkheim and Weber in partic-
ular, as if they were merely an introduction to his sociological conception,
including the action theory (Giddens, 1984: xiii–xx). Particularly, he unduly
stresses the convergence of Weber and Durkheim upon a voluntaristic theory of
action insofar as Durkheim is not an action theorist in the proper sense. The
convergence thesis applied to these two classical theorists prevents Parsons from
seeing the crucial divergences between the two, for which purpose Sorokin’s
interpretation in Sociological Theories can perhaps better serve.5 Table 2 sum-
marizes this section.

TABLE 2. SOCIOLOGICAL META-THEORY IN PARSONS AND SOROKIN
Element Parsons Sorokin
Theoretical Pseudo-nominalism (the Modified holism

methodology action frame of (integralism)
reference)
Theory selection Arbitrary and restricted Principled and
(Weber, Durkheim, comprehensive (all
Pareto, Marshall) relevant authors
included)
Convergence vs Theoretical convergence Theoretical divergence
divergence upon a voluntaristic and pluralism. No
theory of action common action theory
identified
Interpretation of In function In the context of the
classical theory (corroboration) of one’s overall development of
own theory sociological theory
Substantive Theory: Social and Cultural Dynamics

versus The Social System
Both Sorokin’s Social and Cultural Dynamics (1941) and Parsons’ Social System
(1951) represent endeavors in substantive sociological theory in contrast to the
more meta-theoretical orientation of Sociological Theories and The Structure.
Although Dynamics explores the factors, patterns and effects of social-cultural
change, and The Social System social order or social statics, their comparison as
exemplars of general sociological theory is admissible. Such a comparison may
reveal that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Sorokin’s theoretical effort is far
from being inferior to that of Parsons, though one should beware of too harsh
evaluations of the latter (Black, 1961; Gouldner, 1970; Holmwood, 1996).
Particularly, in terms of empirical-historical grounding, the former may prove to
be in many respects superior to the latter. In this regard, Sorokin rather than
Parsons can be regarded as a better follower of the classical approach to the
construction and grounding of sociological theory, as epitomized in Parsons’
major influences, Weber and Durkheim (Holmwood, 1996: 126–30).
The possibility of social dynamics

Just as The Structure gives the impression of being a premeditated response in the
form of an invidious comparison to Sociological Theories, Parsons’ Social System

conveys a similar intent vis-à-vis Sorokin’s Dynamics. This applies to The Social
System’s section dealing with the possibility of a general theory of social change or
of societal dynamics. Parsons denies the possibility for dynamics ‘at the present
stage of knowledge’, the theory that Sorokin (with some help from Merton
[1996]) advances in Dynamics and elsewhere. Parsons’ denial seems directed
against Sorokin’s as well as Marx’s (Giddens, 1984; Gouldner, 1970) version of a
general theory of social change. Curiously, Parsons overlooks that such theory is
present in sociology since Comte–Spencer’s social dynamics, including its Darwin-
ian versions (Savage, 1981: 217–22), and Marx–Weber’s equivalents, as well as in
neoclassical economics since Mill (who borrowed the concept from Comte).
Parsons seems to imply that Sorokin (or Marx) cannot possibly do what he
attempted in Dynamics (or Capital), namely to undertake a systematic analysis of
social change. The logical plausibility of Parsons’ denial can be questioned by
asking why a general theory of social change, including revolution, would be
impossible, whereas such a theory of social structure/system is not. Parsons is not
happy with conventional social dynamics à la Comte and Spencer, as well as with
Sorokin’s version and Marx’s conception of the laws of motion. But Parsons’
disaffection does not make the general theory of social change a priori impossible
or completely inadequate.
Parsons’ position on social dynamics displays self-contradictions in The
Social System. In the latter Parsons adopts and combines Weber’s theory of social
change with that of Durkheim – i.e. rationalization and functional differentiation
as the master trend(s) of social dynamics. Parsons’ (1966) mature evolutionism is
the exemplar of a general theory of social change, the possibility of which is
denied to Sorokin and other non-Parsonians, including Marxists. This may be
interpreted as Parsons’ denial of validity to any theory of social change (and social
structure) other than his own (Johnston, 1995).
The above suggests that Parsons’ peculiar attitude toward Sorokin’s
Sociological Theories and Dynamics (and toward Marx) precludes the former from
recognizing the possibility of a general theory of social change. In The Social
System, the denial of a general theory of social change perhaps reflects Parsons’
personal rivalry, maneuvering (as shown in his plots to replace Sorokin as the chair
of the Department of Sociology at Harvard), and attempts to establish hegemonic
thought in American social theory (Buxton, 1996; Johnston, 1995). Probably for
similar reasons, the meta-theoretical postulate of convergence in The Structure 6
replaces that of the pluralism and divergence of sociological theory, as portrayed
in Sorokin’s Sociological Theories. These personal rivalries with Sorokin seem to
indicate that Parsons was really determined to found an American school of social
theory in his own image. In this sense, Parsons’ position on social dynamics may
be rationalized (in Pareto–Freud’s sense) by invoking not only the assumptions of
the sociology of knowledge, but also those of the psychology of knowledge
dealing with moral careers and identities in science (Nichols, 1996).

Conceptions of the social system
Parsons’ theory of social structure, system and order contrasts with that of
Sorokin. Parsons’ concept of the social system appears inferior to that of Sorokin
from the perspective of classical sociology (and economics). This is particularly
due to Parsons’ (1951: 25–6) indiscriminate extension of the concept of social
system to encompass ‘any system of interaction’ between two or more actors.
This definition is idiosyncratic in that it deviates from the commonly
accepted use of the concept in classical sociology to which Parsons pays tribute. In
classical sociology, the social system – as used by, for example, Comte, Spencer,
Marx, Durkheim and Pareto – is primarily a systemic concept for the society at
large, not, or only secondarily, for its component parts, such as social groups,
organizations and institutions. In Parsons’ use, however, even dyads and other
small-size groups are deemed social ‘systems’. To that extent, his use of the
concept is less macroscopic than justified from the stance of classical theory. By
contrast, Sorokin’s is a macroscopic, structural and singular concept of social
system (Tiryakian, 1996; Wilkinson, 1996), and thus more in affinity with classical
sociology. For the latter, there is, strictly speaking, a social system, not social
systems – it is society itself. From this perspective, it is hardly plausible or accurate
to speak of the social system (and, for that matter, of social structure) not in the
singular. Parsons’ use of the term is often confusing, switching between the
singular and the plural, as well as between psychological (subjective) and struc-
tural (objective) notions of social system (Savage, 1981: 164–5). In addition, his
concept of ‘social system’ amounts to an intentional conversion – often with
conservative ideological underpinnings – of the classical concept of society and the
normative sphere into a ‘system’.
As Parsons’ concept of social system includes small groups and large
collectivities, it is incongruent with the classical concept, even if the first are called
partial and the latter total social systems. Classical sociological theory rarely
defines the social system in this ambiguous way as encompassing virtually all social
aggregates, small and large. The classical meaning of the social system is diluted in
The Social System. In classical sociology the social system is a societal system, a
systemic equivalent to the larger society, not to its parts. For Comte, Durkheim
and Pareto, there is no such thing as social systems within a society, as this is the
social system in the strict sense, just as for economists there are no economic
systems within an economy, the latter being the economic system. The same holds
true of the political system, the cultural system, and so on, within a society. What
Parsons calls social systems are various parts of the societal system or society, such
as the economic system, the political system, the cultural system or the commu-
nity. These are social subsystems, but not social systems in the same right as the
societal system qua society. In this regard, Parsons’ concept of social system is not
only a departure from, but less coherent than, the classical concept (including
Spencer’s understanding of social system in a societal sense).

In turn, Sorokin’s concept of social system as a macroscopic, integral and
dynamic cultural-societal complex (Ford, 1996; Hanson, 1996) seems more
appropriate on account of its greater accord with the classical tradition. For
instance, Sorokin’s Social and Cultural Dynamics primarily deals with the socio-
cultural system qua society rather than as social group, or both, as in The Social
System. Unlike the latter, Dynamics leaves no ambiguity as to what is meant by the
concept. To that extent, Sorokin’s macro, structural and objective concept of
social system and/or social structure can be deemed more definite and parsimon-
ious than Parsons’ ambiguous macro–micro, subjective–objective notion.
In consequence, Parsons’ notion of social system is, from the classical
perspective, too microscopic and psychological (Savage, 1981: 193–4), as is much
of his general theory. Parsons was influenced by the general systems theory that
conceptualizes physical and social phenomena as ‘systems’. Particularly, Parsons
adopts at face value Henderson’s admittedly physiological interpretation of
Pareto’s conception of the social system. In doing so, Parsons shows, as analysts
notice, some carelessness about the non-sociological overtones of this inter-
pretation, for, besides his enamoring with Pareto, Henderson knew very little
about sociology (Buxton, 1996).
The peculiar impact on Parsons of the general systems theory and
Henderson’s biological appropriation of Pareto is especially evident in The Social
System. What Parsons signifies by the social system is not always clear: the society
at large, social groups, multiple societies (the world system), or all of this? Still,
the microscopic, subjective or psychological definition of the social system as a
social group smaller than society is prevalent (Savage, 1981: 164–5, 193–4). To
term social groups, just as whole societies, ‘social systems’ can be misleading,
though the prefix ‘partial’ can help distinguish the former from the latter as total
social systems. Parsons’ use of the term ‘social system’ is ambiguous, at once
signifying the total social system or society – though seldom the world system,
unlike Sorokin’s usage (Tiryakian, 1996) – and, most often, partial systems (social
groups, associations or organizations).
If Parsons follows the established use of the ‘social system’ in classical
theory, he may avoid this cacophony of meanings. Being macroscopic – and what
Sorokin calls ‘integralist’ – this use implies equivalence of the social system with
the structure of society or the macro-social order as an integral entity. That is the
meaning in the work of most classical sociologists and economists, from Comte
and Spencer to Marx, Durkheim and Pareto. In retrospect, such a macro model of
the social system seems more adequate, at least in terms of clarity, consistency and
parsimony, than the micro–macro model implicit in the general systems theory
and related conceptions. The latter concept is particularly defective when used in
conjunction with such notions as economic, political and cultural systems, for the
connotation of all these ‘systems’ is macro- rather than microscopic.
For example, since Walras and Pareto, economists have used the term
‘economic system’ in the unambiguously macroscopic rather than microscopic

sense. As a result, the concept of general economic equilibrium refers to the
economy as a whole, as distinguished from that of partial equilibrium pertaining
to particular industries. In this macroscopic meaning the economic system
represents a systemic entity in reference to the economy as a whole, not to
particular economic units, industries or markets, as implied in the microscopic. In
this sense, there are no economic systems, but only an economic system within a
given society; the same holds of the political and cultural system in that society. All
these systems can be called social systems by virtue of their emergence, existence
and embeddedness in society. However, they are not genuine social systems in the
sense of holistic categories, for they are parts of an overarching societal system,
and thus components or subsystems of this total social system. Thus, economic,
political and cultural systems are not self-subsistent and self-contained in relation
to society (yet cf. Bourricauld, 1981: 11–15). They are narrowly holistic relative
to the particular domains of society to which they refer, that is, the economy,
polity and culture.
The classical treatment of the economic system suggests that, from a
holistic perspective, there exist no multiple self-sufficient social systems in a given
society – that system is society itself. If Parsons means society by the term ‘social
system’, he should consistently put the prefix ‘total’ to distinguish it from social
subsystems, such as various groups or economic, political, cultural and other
(sub)systems; in the opposite case, ‘partial’ makes sense. Since consistency in using
either prefix is missing in The Social System, one has to guess as to what is meant
by the ‘social system’.
Hence, the solution to Parsons’ cacophony of meanings – one consistent
with the classical tradition versus the ‘fad’ of the general systems theory – may be
an unequivocally holistic and macroscopic concept of social system. Just as the
economic, political and cultural system can be treated in the holistic sense as
signifying the economy, polity and culture within a society, the social system
denotes simply society. For that reason, calling society a total social system, and
various social groups or spheres partial systems, though a sensible step, is not a
fully satisfactory solution. A theoretically peculiar implication of Parsons’
approach is that the economic or political system in the narrowly holistic sense can
be seen as ‘broader’ than the social system if the latter is understood in the
microscopic, non-holistic sense as interactive social groups, as if society were a
part of the economy or polity, rather than vice versa. This shows the inadequacies
of Parsons’ application of the general systems theory to society.
This application is often overly extensive, as shown by Parsons’ attempt
to apply it not only to the macro-sociological theory of social structure but also
to the micro-sociological theory of action. The result is to treat not only
societies and their constituents (groups and organizations) but also action as a
social system. Thence Parsons derives – or adapts Sorokin’s (1962) concepts
society, culture and personality (Nichols, 1996) to arrive at – action systems,
namely personality, social and cultural systems (alongside behavioral organisms).

The latter application confounds the situation. In addition to the under-
lying conflation between the social system as society and as a collectivity within
society, now one has to think of it as a particular type of ‘action system’. The
sui generis nature of the social system as society, not reducible to action, individual
or subjective components, is thereby lost (Savage, 1981: 193–4). Given the
lingering micro-sociological propensity in defining the social system as an inter-
active group, its reduction to an ‘action system’, though a collective one, is hardly
surprising.
From a macro-sociological perspective, this reduction is admissible to the
extent that it implies that action systems or actors can be not only individual but
also collective. This view is adopted even by some individualist theorists
(Coleman, 1990), while rejecting the notion that social systems as societies and
cultural systems as whole cultures can be actors. What is then left of Parsons’
multiple action systems is only personality and partly social systems in the sense of
social organizations (corporate actors) falling short of the larger society.
Insofar as Parsons’ concept of social system appears ambiguous and
insufficient from the classical perspective, this involves an ironic twist. The classical
theorists analyzed in The Structure, including Pareto, have a consistent concept of
social system as a macroscopic, holistic, societal category. Why Parsons abandons
this concept in favor of the general systems theory may in part be accounted for by
invoking what Sorokin (1956) calls academic fads, fashions and foibles. By
comparison, Sorokin’s concept of social system is, by being more in line with
classical sociology, less ambiguous and less deficient. As in Durkheim, Marx,
Pareto and others, Sorokin’s social or sociocultural system mainly refers to society,
not to the particular social aggregates within it. Then, Parsons’ concept of social
system as a microscopic entity (any interaction system) evinces a pseudo-
psychological and micro-sociological rather than a structural and macro-
sociological bias (Grafstein, 1992; Savage, 1981).
Microscopic versus macroscopic

The pseudo-micro reduction of the societal system is one symptom of the
Parsonian micro-sociological and partly psychological penchant in the treatment
of society and its elements. This is epitomized in Parsons’ action theory, with its
self-attributed synthesizing mission vis-à-vis previous theories (Giddens, 1984:
xiii–xiv). What many contemporary sociologists overlook is that Parsons’ socio-
logical theory is not only an ‘over-socialized conception of man’ (Wrong, 1994:
213), but also an over-individualistic or pseudo-psychological conception of
society. Namely,
. . . what Parsons produces is an overindividualized conception of society,

in which stable social structure must meaningfully mirror the standards

and patterns of choice ascribed to individuals. The near equation of society
and normatively grounded structure reflects the socialization of the indi-
vidual but also the leashing of society. (Grafstein, 1992: 43)
By contrast, Sorokin’s theory, especially that expounded in Social and Cultural

Dynamics, by coming closer to regarding society as an entity not fully reducible to
its individual units, can be more fruitful from the angle of the continental
theoretical tradition.
In this regard, Parsons appears more as a sociological nominalist and
micro-sociologist than as a sociological realist and macro theorist. That his
sociological nominalism amounts to a numerical model of society is indicated by
his view of society as an aggregate emerging from the interactions of individuals,
not as something immanent preexisting in its own right (Savage, 1981). In
defense of Parsons, one may say that this approach is not atomistic but institution-
alized individualism (Bourricauld, 1981: 11–15). Still, society is seen as the
emerging numerical product of the arithmetical summation of individual units and
their interactions, rather than as an entity transcending the mere sum of these
units (Frohock, 1987: 134–5). By comparison to Parsons’ nominalism, inherited
from neoclassical economics’ aggregation procedure, even Spencer (1969: 7–8),
by conceding that society is an entity rather than a collection of individuals,
sounds an exemplar of macro-theorizing and sociological realism. Moreover, some
modern rational choice sociologists (e.g. Coleman, 1990) do not seem very happy
with such an aggregation procedure.
Parsons’ pseudo-psychological and micro bias can be traced to several
roots. One is the obsession with the Hobbesian problem of social order, especially
its individualist solutions and implications, such as inter-individual normative or
value consensus, thus positing a ‘sophisticated yet arbitrary idealism’ (Savage,
1981: 127). Another is the fascination with neoclassical economics and its
individualistic and utilitarian assumptions based on a simplistic quasi-psychology.
While rejecting Spencerian utilitarianism, Parsons adopted some modality of
economic (marginal) utility from Marshall, and of ‘political utility’ from
Hobbes.
Still another root is Parsons’ increasing incorporation of Freudian and
other psychological theories in sociological theorizing, appropriating the termi-
nology and spuriously linking the Hobbesian problem of order with Freud’s
theory (Kaye, 1991). As a result, Parsons ‘depends upon precisely the same
ambiguous psychologism’ (Savage, 1981: 193) as those sociological theories (e.g.
Homans’ exchange theory) that resort to a kind of psychological reductionism
that he found objectionable. This can be deemed a curious and unintended
consequence of what is commonly viewed as a systemic, structural social theory.
Overall, Parsons’ theory appears more psychologistic than much of classical
sociological theory, including the work of Spencer and Simmel. On this account,
it can be deemed an overly individualistic theory of society, not just an over-

socialized conception of the individual, as usually thought. Given this pseudo-
psychological crust of Parsons’ sociology, it is curious how it has long been
overlooked by many analysts (for exceptions see Frohock, 1987; Grafstein, 1992;
Mayway, 1984; Rambo, 1995; Savage, 1981).
No doubt, Parsons and Sorokin are both anti-realist – and, alternatively,
nominalist and to that extent ‘individualist’ – in their theoretical or philosophical
orientation. Parsons collapses the classical continental conception of the social by
(partly) abandoning sociological realism and holism à la Durkheim in favor of
nominalism and individualism transmitted in a mitigated form from utilitarianism
and neoclassical economics. Similarly, Sorokin’s anti-realist nominalist position is
evident in Sociological Theories (hence his preference for Tarde over Durkheim).
Owing nothing to utilitarianism and neoclassical economics, this position is then
conjoined with holism or integralism in Sorokin’s later works, including Social
and Cultural Dynamics. To that extent, both Parsons and Sorokin were instru-
mental in American theory erecting barriers against the realist tradition of
European social theory, thus conforming to the prevalent individualist ideology in
the USA.
However, there is at least one difference in degree between Parsons and
Sorokin. In Sorokin the nominalist and micro-sociological element is relatively
less pronounced and less questionable from the perspective of classical sociology.
Further, in contrast to Parsons’ anti-realism and individualism imported from
utilitarian economics (and reflecting the ‘politically correct’ ideology in America),
Sorokin’s sociology rests on integralism (Ford, 1996; Hanson, 1996), which
exhibits a higher affinity with sociological realism and holism, as found in
European (continental) classical sociology. In this connection, a charitable reinter-
pretation or suggestion (see Giddens, 1984) is that both theorists avoid the Scylla
of nominalism and individualism and the Charybdis of realism and holism by
making integrative endeavors, namely converging upon the integral conception of
social norms (Talbutt, 1996). Some sociologists (Bourricauld, 1981; Fararo,
1989; Luhmann, 1995) would attribute these endeavors to Parsons, and others
(Ford, 1996; Nichols, 1996) to Sorokin.
Needless to say, an a priori orientation to sociological individualism and
nominalism versus holism and realism, or vice versa, does not prejudge the
adequacy of a theory (Giddens, 1984). Contrary to the preconceptions of rational
choice theorists, the meta-theoretical resort to sociological individualism and the
rejection of holism does not guarantee more adequate sociological theories. Since
Parsons’ theory is more psychological and individualistic than was classical
European theory, it is a misnomer to denote the former overly structural or
macro-social. In Parsons’ sociology, as in neoclassical economics, social institu-
tions and norms are no more than outcomes and aggregations of voluntaristic
individual actions (Frohock, 1987). Parsons’ theory represents an over-
individualized conception of society in that it treats social structure as reflecting
individual values and patterns of action almost in the rational choice manner

(Rambo, 1995). In addition, not only the socialization of individuals, but also the
pseudo-sociological construction of society is implied in reducing the latter to
individual values and patterns (the ‘action frame of reference’) in conjunction with
‘normatively grounded structures’ (Grafstein, 1992: 43).
Next, that Parsons’ theory abounds with various concepts and taxonomies,
but advances no substantive propositions or hypotheses specifying the relations
between these concepts (or their indicators), has been stressed by many sociolo-
gists. By contrast, Sorokin’s includes both typologies and substantive proposi-
tions, namely hypotheses and empirical generalizations based on rich historical
and empirical evidence, though avoiding the approach of Lilliputian fact-finders
(Ford, 1996). For illustration, Sorokin’s model of curvilinear and circular social-
cultural change is probably superior (Richard, 1996) to the quasi-linear evolu-
tionary paradigm of infinite progress, a paradigm implied in the Parsonian model
as master trends of rationalization and structural differentiation (Holmwood,
1996).
Presumably, Parsons’ highest theoretical achievement is classifying and
establishing the linkage between the pattern-variables at the level of action and the
functional prerequisites at the level of social system. However, some analysts
object that this endeavor ‘cannot be maintained on logical grounds [because]
there is no logical relation between the choices possible to the actor and the
requirements of the social system’ (Savage, 1981: 59–60). On this account
Sorokin’s non-linear model of social dynamics may be of higher substantive
theoretical significance than Parsons’ pseudo-linear conception and the static
typology of pattern-variables and functional imperatives. Given the paucity of
substantive propositions, one can say that Parsons is hardly Weber, Durkheim or
Marx. In this respect, Parsons is perhaps an American counterpart to a prominent
exponent of general social theory in Europe (but largely unknown in the USA),
George Gurvitch. Unlike Parsons’ meta-theory (Holmwood, 1996: viii–ix), Sor-
okin’s seems closer to an empirically-historically grounded sociological theory in
the manner of Weber, Durkheim and Marx, despite the differences from them. As
such, Sorokin’s sociological theory is found (Ford, 1996) to contain definite
testable propositions with a clearly defined scope (some of them tested by Hillery
et al., 1996). By contrast, to many analysts Parsons’ theory appears to abound
with untestable domain assumptions with built-in ideological and moral commit-
ments (Gouldner, 1970) or ‘empty meta-theoretical boxes’ (Holmwood, 1996).
Economic action and rationality

Far from holding a coherent attitude toward utilitarianism and neoclassical
economics with its peculiar notion of rationality as utility optimization, Parsons is
often ambiguous (Mayway, 1984; Rambo, 1995; Savage, 1981). This contrasts
with Sorokin’s consistently negative position on utilitarianism as a theoretical
conception and a key element of sensate social-cultural systems.

In particular, Parsons’ rejection of (especially) Spencerian utilitarianism
and its economic ramifications seems more declarative than substantial, given the
propensity for economic analogies, metaphors and terminology. In addition to
The Structure, such a predilection is manifest in many other works, including The
Social System and particularly Economy and Society. Apart from being too abstract
and artificial, this resort to economic analogies and concepts is questionable
insofar as many of these analogies are tenuous and problematic.
Examples of such analogies include those between wealth as the circulating
medium in the economy and power as the circulating medium in the polity,
between market competition and political competition, between economic and
political cycles, including political inflations and deflations, between factors of
economic production and functional prerequisites of social systems, between
economic variables (or motivations) and pattern-variables, and so on (Savage,
1981: 193–4). Relatedly, in a manner reminiscent of rational choice theory,
Parsons occasionally embarks on extensive applications to non-economic domains
of economic models and concepts, for example maximization, minimization,
calculation, the market, supply, demand, price, exchange, cost–benefit, input–
output, profit, capital, investment, marginal utility and productivity, equilibrium,
and so on.
In retrospect, such an approach, though occasionally insightful in Parsons’
hands, has been indirectly responsible for the rise of rational choice sociology,
including exchange theory.7 The contradiction between Parsons’ declarative
rejection of utilitarianism and his persistent propensity for utilitarian-style analo-
gies between economic and non-economic variables and for using the terminol-
ogy of neoclassical economics is symptomatic in his complaint at not being
considered an exchange theorist like Homans, Emerson or Blau (Mayway, 1984).
Still, unlike many advocates of the ‘economic approach to human behavior’,
Parsons displays sophistication by perceiving the limits of utilitarianism and
neoclassical economics in sociological theorizing.
On balance, Parsons vacillates between enthusiasm and skepticism exhibit-
ing ambivalence. This ambivalence may be added or linked to the constant tension
in his theory between the micro- and the macro-social, action and social system,
order and development, statics and dynamics, equilibrium and change, intention
and structure or function, individualism and holism, need-gratification and insti-
tutions, values or norms, as well as between pattern-variables and functional
imperatives, the economic and the non-economic, social and cultural systems, and
so on (Savage, 1981). On the other hand, such ambivalence is absent from or of
peripheral importance in Sorokin’s sociological theory. Being coherently macro-
scopic, holistic and dynamic (Ford, 1996; Nichols, 1996; Tiryakian, 1996), the
latter, though not free of contradictions (Perrin, 1996), exhibits no such acute
conceptual tensions as those found in Parsons.
Hence, Parsons’ ambivalence toward the role of utilitarianism and neoclas-
sical economics in social theory is more intense than usually thought. Parsons

does not adopt without question the absolute status of the concepts of homo
economicus, utility, profit, free market or consumer’s sovereignty in neoclassical
economics, just as he rejects the counter-absolutism of the Marxian theory of
alienation (Sciulli, 1984). In turn, he employs problematic economic analogies
and metaphors in conceptualizing non-economic, especially political, phenomena,
extending economic rationality beyond its primary realm of the market (Rambo,
1995; Turner, 1991).
Thereby Parsons deviates from rather than follows Weber (Holmwood,
1996) as well as Pareto. Weber primarily linked the operation of instru-
mental rationality (Zweckrationalität) – as distinguished from value rationality
(Wertrationalität) – to the economy, and only secondarily to other social systems
in which different action principles and types operate, namely value-rational,
traditional or emotional. This approach is even more explicit in Pareto, who, by
dividing social actions into logico-rational and non-rational – driven by interests
and sentiments, respectively – restricts the operation of economic rationality to
the market sphere.
In order to be in line with Weberian action theory, Parsons needs to
establish analytical correspondence between his four social subsystems or func-
tional imperatives, as found in the AGIL scheme and Weber’s four action types.
Albeit seemingly similar, the attempted linkage between the functional imperatives
and the pattern-variables is no substitute for this correspondence, since it is
logically or theoretically unsustainable (Savage, 1981: 164–5). In such analytical
correspondence, the economy (performing adaptation) involves instrumentally
rational action, the polity (concerned with goal-attainment) value-rational action,
culture (dealing with integration) traditional action, and the societal community,
including the family (coping with latent-pattern maintenance), emotional action.
This correspondence is illustrated in Table 3. Parsons frequently anticipates or
approximates (Hirsch, 1990), but seldom explicitly establishes, this correspond-
ence. This failure is probably due to Parsons’ ambivalent attitude toward utilitari-
anism and neoclassical economics as well as to his peculiar interpretations of
Weber and other classical sociologists.
Alternatively, rightly interpreting Pareto – and this might mean abandon-
ing Henderson’s biological interpretation (Buxton, 1996) – Parsons would
probably have identified two principal relations of correspondence. One is
between the economic system and utilitarian, logico-rational actions induced by
largely material interests, the other between the social system and non-utilitarian,
non-rational actions conditioned by residues (sentiments) and derivations
(rationalizations).
By virtue of better expressing Pareto’s argument, this path of double
correspondence seems more sensible than extending the rational type of action to
both economic and non-economic social systems. To be sure, the suggested
procedure involves approximations in establishing correspondence relations
between social systems and social actions, but is more consistent with Weberian

TABLE 3. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ACTION TYPES AND SOCIAL
SYSTEMS
Action type Social (sub)systems
WEBER
Instrumentally rational action Economy (adaptation)
Value-rational action Polity (goal-attainment)
Traditional action Culture (integration)
Emotional action Societal community/family
(latency)
PARETO
Logical actions (interests) Economic system/equilibrium
Non-logical actions (residues and Social system/equilibrium
derivations)
and Paretian approaches than extending and making dominant a single action type
(e.g. instrumentally or logical) in all social phenomena/systems. Elements of this
second procedure are present in Parsons, and subsequently brought to their
limiting consequences in the economic approach to social behavior. Table 4
condenses this section.
TABLE 4. SUBSTANTIVE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN PARSONS AND

SOROKIN
Element Parsons Sorokin
Social change Denial of a general Construction of a

theory of social change general sociocultural
dynamics
Social system Both small social groups Society, culture or
and societies civilization mostly
Microscopic vs Microscopic and Macroscopic and
macroscopic pseudo-psychological socio-culturalist
Economic action and Broad use of economic Critical attitude toward
rationality analogies and concepts sensate categories and
societies

Conclusion
Conceptual and other congruencies, including intersecting career paths (Buxton,
1996; Johnston, 1995; Nichols, 1996), between Parsons and Sorokin are numer-
ous and striking. They were social scientists of equal brilliance (Tiryakian, 1996).
Both were more or less incurable social theorists. Both were system-builders
trying to (re)construct general sociological theory. Both were staunch defenders
of sociology’s right to exist and develop within the academic and larger commu-
nity. Both were trained in and influenced by the classical, European tradition of
social thought. Both rejected single-factor explanations of social structure and
social change. Finally, both were active participants in or keen observers of
American society and culture, chairs of the Department of Sociology at Harvard
(Parsons succeeding Sorokin), and so on.
The differences between the two are also numerous and remarkable.
Though both supreme theorists, Sorokin was more empirically oriented than was
Parsons. Parsons’ conceptual system, in trying to establish a unified sociological
paradigm and program, involved more ambitious and grand theory than that of
Sorokin (Ford, 1996). Sorokin conceived the development of sociology as one of
proliferation of divergent theoretical schools, Parsons as a rapprochement or
convergence toward a voluntaristic theory of action. Further, Parsons’ inter-
pretation of the European theoretical influences (analytical congruence) was
different from Sorokin’s. While Parsons wholeheartedly participated in the patri-
otic celebration of American society, viewing it – just as Hegel saw the Prussian
state – as the final stage of social evolution (Giddens, 1984; Gouldner, 1970),
Sorokin adopted a critical attitude to what he saw to be a form of declining
sensate supersystem (Hillery et al., 1996). Finally, the crucial post facto difference
between the two resides in their radically different academic fates within the
American sociological community (Buxton, 1996; Tiryakian, 1996).
To summarize, this article has been organized around a comparison,
from the perspective of classical sociology, of Parsons’ and Sorokin’s main
works in terms of the creation and evolution of an American school of social
theory. This comparison suggests that the reasons for the greater importance of
Parsons relative to Sorokin in the formation and development of American social
theory in the 1930s–1950s may not have been endogenous or scientific but
exogenous or social (Buxton, 1996; Johnston, 1995; Nichols, 1996). These
second factors include the extra-scientific definition of the scientific situation, that
is, of the respective merits of Parsons and Sorokin, by the American sociological
community. If this Thomas theorem is plausible (Thomas, 1951: 81), one can
speculate that Parsons’ privileged though contested position in the American
sociological pantheon relative to Sorokin (during the 1930s–1950s) could be
attributed to such extraneous factors as pluralistic ignorance, including
preference falsification, and laws of imitation characterizing the American aca-
demic community. This is a limiting and secondary expectation consistent with

the sociology (and psychology) of knowledge. In sum, this article has purported
to compare and reassess – from the perspective of classical sociology – two major
sociologists with regard to founding an American theory school at a certain
period.
Notes
1. To do justice to Parsons, despite his fascination with and application of it, he has never taken
neoclassical economics at face value (Bourricauld, 1981); this holds true of his attitude toward
utilitarianism.
2. It seems that Parsons’ two earlier articles on Marshall were adapted and implanted in the main
body of The Structure in order to prove the convergence argument. The first article was titled
‘Wants and Activities in Marshall’ (Parsons, 1931) and the second ‘Economics and Sociology:
Marshall in Relation to the Thought of his Time’ (Parsons, 1932).
3. This especially applies to Sorokin’s coverage of a number of obscure Russian authors whose
relevance for sociology was largely inconsequential.
4. I thank Ken Morrison for this observation.
5. As a secondary point, in comparison to the comprehensiveness, erudition and clarity of Sorokin’s

Sociological Theories, Parsons’ Structure appears narrow in terms of theories reviewed and
abstruse in terms of exposition, albeit, almost equally like Sorokin, Parsons was vigorously exposed
to and in full command of European sociological traditions.
6. Another symptom of such nihilistic attitudes toward his predecessor is Parsons’ infamous role in
replacing Harvard’s Department of Sociology, founded by Sorokin in 1930, with the Department
of Social Relations in 1946 (Johnston, 1996), subsequently regaining its original name (under
Homans as the chair).
7. For example, Parsons was largely instrumental in Coleman’s conversion to rational choice theory,
especially with the analogy between wealth and power, an analogy converted into a full
equivalence by this public choice theorist.
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Milan Zafirovski is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at University of North Texas. His
research interests are interdisciplinary and include classical and contemporary sociological and economic
theory, economic sociology, rational choice and social stratification. His recent publications include
Exchange, Action and Social Structure: Elements of Economic Sociology (2001), ‘The Rational Choice
Generalization of Neoclassical Economics Reconsidered’ (Sociological Theory, 2000), and ‘Spencer Is
Dead, Long Live Spencer: Individualism, Holism, and the Problem of Norms’ (British Journal of
Sociology).
Address: Department of Sociology, University of North Texas, PO Box 311157, Denton, TX 76203, USA.
[email: milanzafir@yahoo.com]

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Journal of Classical Sociology

Parsons and Sorokin

MILAN ZAFIROVSKI University of North Texas

KEYWORDS academic community, action, change, classical theory, convergence,

228 JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 1(2)

Meta-Theory: The Structure of Social Action

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 229

Meta-theory Substantive theory

Theoretical methodology Social system

differential treatment of these two comparable expositions of sociological theory

230 JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 1(2)

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 231

The problem of theory selection

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ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 233

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Convergence versus divergence

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 235

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Interpretations of classical theory

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 237

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Element Parsons Sorokin

Theoretical Pseudo-nominalism (the Modified holism

Substantive Theory: Social and Cultural Dynamics

The possibility of social dynamics

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 239

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ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 241

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ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 243

Microscopic versus macroscopic

. . . what Parsons produces is an overindividualized conception of society,

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By contrast, Sorokin’s theory, especially that expounded in Social and Cultural

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 245

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Economic action and rationality

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 247

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ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 249

Action type Social (sub)systems

TABLE 4. SUBSTANTIVE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN PARSONS AND

Element Parsons Sorokin

Social change Denial of a general Construction of a

250 JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 1(2)

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 251

4. I thank Ken Morrison for this observation.

5. As a secondary point, in comparison to the comprehensiveness, erudition and clarity of Sorokin’s

252 JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 1(2)

ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 253

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ZAFIROVSKI PARSONS AND SOROKIN 255

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