G.R. No.

173520 : January 30, 2013

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES RODOLFO
ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON, Respondents.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation
(Napocor) filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against defendants-
appellees Sps. R. Zabala & L. Baylon, before the RTC, Balanga City, Bataan
alleging that Spouses Zabala and Baylon own parcels of land located in
Balanga City, Bataan and that it urgently needed an easement of right of
way over the affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission
Lines. The Commissioners submitted their Report/ Recommendation fixing
the just compensation at P150.00 per square meter. Napocor prayed that
the report be recommitted to the commissioners for the modification of the
report and the substantiation of the same with reliable and competent
documentary evidence based on the value of the property at the time of its
taking. The Commissioners submitted their Final Report fixing the just
compensation at P500.00 per square meter.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC rendered its Partial Decision and ordered
Napocor to pay Php150.00 per square meter for the 6,820 square meters
determined as of the date of the taking of the property.
Napocor appealed to the CA arguing that the Commissioners reports are not
supported by documentary evidence. Napocor argued that the RTC did not
apply Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395 which limits its liability to easement fee of
not more than 10% of the market value of the property traversed by its
transmission lines. CA affirmed the RTCs Partial Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in fixing the amount of Php150.00 per
square meter as the fair market value of the property subject of the
easement right of way of Napocor?
HELD: The petition is partially meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: just compensation

Sec. 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts
to determine just compensation. The payment of just compensation for
private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our
Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative
enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining
whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been
violated. It is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by any other branch
or official of the government. Statutes and executive issuances fixing or
providing for the method of computing just compensation are not binding on
courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the
amount thereof.
The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that since the high-
tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will
perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is
only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full
market value of their property.

REMEDIAL LAW: commissioners report

The just compensation of P150.00 per square meter as fixed by the RTC is
not supported by evidence. Just compensation cannot be arrived at
arbitrarily. Several factors must be considered, such as, but not limited to,
acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the
condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors
can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by
documentary evidence.

Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may accept or
reject, whether in whole or in part, the commissioners report which is
merely advisory and recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the
report or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In this case,
however, in spite of the insufficient and flawed reports of the Commissioners
and Napocors objections thereto, the RTC eventually adopted the same. It
shrugged off Napocors protestations and limited itself to the reports
submitted by the Commissioners.

Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation should be

computed based on the fair value of the subject property at the time of its
taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Since in this case
the filing of the eminent domain case came ahead of the taking, just
compensation should be based on the fair market value of spouses Zabalas
property at the time of the filing of Napocors Complaint on October 27, 1994
or thereabouts.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Case is REMANDED to the RTC for
the proper determination of just compensation.

G.R. No. 181218 : January 28, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SPOUSES
PEDRO BAUTISTA and VALENTINA MALABANAN, Respondents.
 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:

Spouses Bautista are the registered owners of a 1,893-square meter parcel

of land located in Brgy. Bulacnin North, Lipa City. Respondents are their
children. Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), acquired a 36-square
meter portion of the lot for use in the STAR (Southern Tagalog Arterial Road)
Tollway project. Later on, DPWH offered to purchase an additional 1,155
square meters of the lot at P100.00 per square meter to be used for the
Balete-Lipa City Interchange Ramp B, but the spouses Bautista refused to
sell. Republic filed a Complaint with the RTC of Lipa City for the
expropriation of the said 1,155-square meter portion (the subject portion).

In an Order of Expropriation, the trial court condemned the subject portion

for expropriation and constituted a panel of commissioners, consisting of the
Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds of Lipa City, for the purpose of
ascertaining just compensation. On Republics Opposition, the trial court
appointed a third commissioner in the person of Nimfa Martinez-Mecate
(Mecate), who is the DPWH special agent for Road Right-of-Way for Region
IV-A.

The Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds thus concluded that the
just compensation should be within the range of P1,960.00 and P2,500.00
per square meter.
On the other hand, Mecates Commissioners Report recommended that the
reasonable value for agricultural, orchard, and sugar land is P400.00 per
square meter, and P600.00 per square meter for residential and commercial
land.
The trial court rendered its Decision, fixing just compensation for the subject
portion, including all its improvements, at P1,960.00 per square meter.
Petitioner interposed an appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed the appealed
decision.
The Republic argued that the CAs reliance on the Joint Commissioners
Report is erroneous because the said report failed to consider all factors
prescribed by law specifically Republic Act No. 8974 in determining just
compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in fixing the amount of P1,960.00 per
square meter as just compensation for the subject property?
HELD: The petition must be denied.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: just compensation
What escapes petitioner, is that the courts are not bound to consider these
standards; the exact wording of the said provision is that in order to
facilitate the determination of just compensation, the courts may consider
them. The use of the word may in the provision is construed as permissive
and operating to confer discretion. In the absence of a finding of abuse, the
exercise of such discretion may not be interfered with. For this case, the
Court finds no such abuse of discretion.
Mecates Commissioners Report evidently failed to consider factors other
than the value of the subject portion as reflected in the tax declarations, the
BIR zonal valuation, and its classification as an agricultural land. To make
matters worse, Mecate based her Report on the 1998 Appraisal Committee
Report of the Lipa City Appraisal Committee, which is clearly obsolete and
does not reflect 2004 property values. The Complaint for expropriation was
filed in 2004; thus, just compensation should be based on 2004 valuations.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.
Petition is DENIED

G.R. No. 192289, JANUARY 8, 2013

KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, Respondents.
REYES, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy to

run as municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas
(Buagas), then Acting Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to
the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the names of candidates
who were not registered voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name. cjuris

Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22,

2009 disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the
municipality where he seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of
an opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied
by the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this
resolution, the COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated December 22,
2009 was anchored on the certification, which was issued by Buagas and
Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase,
stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the municipality where he
seeks to be elected. cjuris

On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6,
2010 had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast
for the Vice-Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims
proclamation. Thus, this petition. cjuris

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. cjuris

HELD: The petition is meritorious. cjuris

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Comelec

The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a

candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor. cjuris

In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed
resolutions, ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint or
petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before the
conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which
should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly
being an unregistered voter of his municipality disqualified him from running
as Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was
an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if
we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en
banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a
matter, which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential
declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions. cjuris

REMEDIAL LAW: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64

Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court to assail the Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May
6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc. cjuris

Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be
reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. What the instant
Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims
proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions.
The crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as one which can be raised
as a pre-proclamation controversy.

Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 201716: JANUARY 08, 2013

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and
2010 national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo)
vied for the position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he
emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral
derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions
of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006
until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a
little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections
where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his
certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral
contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification to run.

The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to
run in the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as,
mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-
2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings,
was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily,
while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the
actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual
involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered
to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the
mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. During the
pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or
authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as
mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because
prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent,
Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid
proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

G.R. No. 199612 : January 22, 2013

RENATO M. FEDERICO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
COMELEC EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND OSMUNDO M.
MALIGAYA, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:

Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya

(Maligaya) were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, in the 2010 Elections. cralawlibrary

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and the

gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died. Edna withdrew
her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then filed a
new COC and a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the
position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband. cralawlibrary

On May 5, 2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed with the

Office of the Election Officer his COC and CONA as official candidate of the
Nationalista Party and as substitute candidate for mayor, in view of the
withdrawal of Edna. cralawlibrary

Maligaya filed his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy of Federico before the Comelec. Maligaya sought to have Federico
declared ineligible to run as substitute candidate for Edna since the period to
file the COC for substitute candidates had already lapsed after December 14,
2009.cralawlibrary

The COMELEC En Banc gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute
gubernatorial candidate in the Batangas province and to that of Federico as
substitute mayoralty candidate. cralawlibrary

But the official ballots had already been printed. On the day of elections, the
name SANCHEZ, Edna P. was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of
Sto. Tomas, and garnered the highest number of votes - 28,389 against
Maligayas 22,577 votes. cralawlibrary

The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed Edna as the winning

mayoralty candidate. Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of
Edna Sanchez. This petition was later withdrawn. cralawlibrary

The MBOC credited the same number of votes garnered by Edna to Federico
and proclaimed the latter as the winning candidate. Maligaya filed his
Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federico as mayor. cralawlibrary

Meanwhile, Maligayas petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of
Federico was denied by the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec First
Division denied Maligayas petition to annul the proclamation of Federico for
having been filed out of time.

Maligaya elevated the matter to the Comelec En Banc. The Comelec En Banc
issued the assailed Resolution granting Maligayas partial motion for
reconsideration. The Comelec En Banc was of the view that the annulment of
Federicos proclamation was in order because of his invalid substitution of
Edna, as his substitute COC was filed beyond the deadline and due to the
illegality of the proceedings of the MBOC in generating the second COCVP
without authority from the Comelec and without notice to the parties. cralawlibrary

Federico filed the present Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court. cralawlibrary

Pending resolution of the case, Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva (Intervenor Silva)

of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, filed his Motion for Leave to Intervene, praying
essentially that as Federico failed to qualify, he should be adjudged as his
legal successor as mayor, under the Local Government Code. cralawlibrary

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not Federico could validly substitute Edna who withdrew
her candidacy for the mayoralty position?
II. Granting that Federico was disqualified, whether or not he should be
succeeded by Intervenor Silva under the LGC or be replaced by
Maligaya? cralawlibrary

HELD: The electoral commission committed no grave abuse of discretion. cralawlibrary

POLITICAL LAW: substitution of candidates

FIRST ISSUE: Federicos substitution of Edna Sanchez as mayoralty
candidate was not valid. ςrνll

Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec came out
with Resolution No. 8678. On substitution, Section 13 thereof provides, the
substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy
as herein provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009. cralawlibrary

In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should

have filed a COC by December 14, 2009.

When Batangas Gov. Armando Sanchez died on April 27, 2010, Edna
withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substituted her late husband as
gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29, 2010. The party
actually had the option to substitute another candidate for Governor aside
from Edna. By fielding Edna as their substitute candidate for Governor, the
party knew that she had to withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering
that the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed,
no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of
then Governor Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the
gubernatorial race could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty
race.
SECOND ISSUE: There being no valid substitution, the candidate with
the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly
elected mayor.

As Federico's substitution was not valid, there was only one qualified
candidate in the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas - Maligaya. Being
the only candidate, he received the highest number of votes. Accordingly, he
should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor in the May 10, 2010
elections.
Considering that Maligaya was the winner, the position of Intervenor Silva
that he be considered the legal successor of Federico, whom he claims failed
to qualify, has no legal basis. There is simply no vacancy. When there is no
vacancy, the rule on succession under Section 44 of the LGC cannot be
invoked.

Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013

HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondent,ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG
JR., and RICARDO L. BAES JR.,Petitioners-in-Intervention.
SERENO, CJ:

FACTS:
Petitioner Henry Giron (Giron) and petitioners-in-intervention assail the
constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14
(Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.)9006, otherwise known as the
Fair Election Act.
Giron asserts that the insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act
violates Section 26(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically
requires: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof. He avers that these provisions
are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the
political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes cast for
substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed, while
Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective
office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of
elective officials immediately after they file their respective certificates of
candidacy for an office other than that which they are currently holding in a
permanent capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair
Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the
one subject-one title rule?

HELD: The petition must fail.

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title rule

It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in

favor of the constitutionality of a legislation, as Congress is deemed to have
enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption,
the one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear,
unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the
petition must fail.

The Court finds that the present case fails to present a compelling reason
that would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in
favor of the Fair Election Act.
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract
or index of the Act.

Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject
of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the
purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment
into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of
the legislators and the public.
Petition DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 191691 : January 16, 2013

ROMEO A. GONTANG, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF
GAINZA, CAMARINES SUR, Petitioner, v. ENGR. CECILIA
ALAYAN, Respondent.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Engr. Cecilia Alayan (Alayan) was appointed as Municipal
Assessor in Gainza, Camarines Sur. She applied for a change in status from
temporary to permanent, which the Civil Service Commission-Camarines Sur
Field Office (CSC-CSFO) denied for lack of relevant experience. On appeal,
the CSC-Regional Office approved her application. Thus, she reported for
work and sought recognition of her appointment and the grant of the
emoluments of the position from petitioner, then incumbent Mayor Romeo A.
Gontang (Mayor Gontang) of Gainza. The mayor denied her requests which
prompted her to file a petition for mandamus before the RTC, docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019. The RTC denied her petition on the
ground of prematurity since the CSC decision has not yet attained finality.

Alayan appealed to the Court of Appeals which ruled in her favour holding
that the pendency of an appeal is not a justification to prevent her from
assuming office. Said decision attained finality.
Meanwhile, Alayan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution by
the RTC for her alleged unsatisfied judgment award representing her unpaid
salaries and allowances during the pendency of her appeal in the CSC
Resolutions. The RTC issued the alias writ of execution.
Dissatisfied, Mayor Gontang, represented by Atty. Fandino and Atty. Saulon,
a private attorney, filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
However, the CA denied the petition on the ground that Atty. Saulon, a
private attorney, lacks legal authority to represent the Municipality of
Gainza, Camarines Sur.

Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized representation of Mayor
Gontang by private lawyer?

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW: municipal corporations

The present case stemmed from Special Civil Action No. 2002-0019 for
mandamus and damages. The damages sought therein could have resulted
in personal liability, hence, Mayor Gontang be deemed to have been
improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, the
Court ruled that in instances like the present case where personal liability on
the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure
the services of private counsel.
It can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official
capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his
authority. Personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having
had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v.
CFI, the Court held that in the discharge of governmental functions,
municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if
and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the
law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof. In one case, the Court
held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials
in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid
grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper.

Petition is GRANTED. The case is remanded to the CA for further

proceedings.

G.R. No. 201796 : January 15, 2013

GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI AND VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY M.
SAHALI,Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RASHIDIN H.
MATBA AND JILKASI J. USMAN, Respondents.

REYES, J.:
FACTS:

During the 2010 elections, Sadikul A. Sahali (Sadikul) and private

respondent Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four candidates who
ran for the position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and
private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) ran for the position of Vice-
Governor. cralawlibrary cralawlibrary

The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul

and Ruby as the duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively. cralawlibrary

Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC.
Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282 clustered precincts that
functioned in the province of TawiTawi. Sadikul and Ruby filed their answer
with counter protest. cralawlibrary

The COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD) to conduct a technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks appearing on the
EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters.
Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong
Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for Reconsideration. cralawlibrary

The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order which denied
the said motion for reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby. cralawlibrary
Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition asserting that the COMELEC First
Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. cralawlibrary

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not Sadikul and Rubys resort to the remedy of certiorari
to assail an interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC first
division is proper?
II. Whether or not Sadikul and Ruby were denied due process when the
COMELEC granted the motion for technical examination filed by
Matba and Usman without giving them the opportunity to oppose
the said motion? cralawlibrary

HELD: Petition is denied.

POLITICAL LAW: Section 7, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution; due
process
FIRST ISSUE: The power of the Supreme Court to review election
cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division
thereof. ςrνll

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Supreme Court elucidated on the import of

Section 7, Art IX of the Constitution in this wise: We have interpreted this
provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of
a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme
Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.
cralawlibrary

Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely
interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an incident in the main case
i.e. the propriety of the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for Sadikul and Ruby is to await
the decision of the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by
Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to appeal the
same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration. cralawlibrary

SECOND ISSUE: The Supreme Court cannot see how due process was
denied to the petitioners in the issuance of the COMELEC First
Divisions Order. ςrνll

It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is not duty-bound

to notify and direct a party therein to file an opposition to a motion filed by
the other party. It is incumbent upon the party concerned, if he/she deems
it necessary, to file an opposition to a motion within five days from receipt of
a copy of the same without awaiting for the COMELECs directive to do so. cralawlibrary

Sadikul and Ruby were able to present their opposition to the said motion for
technical examination in their manifestation and motion for reconsideration
which they filed with the COMELEC First Division. Indeed, their objections to
the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia were
exhaustively discussed by the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution. Having
filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Divisions Order, their
claim of denial of due process is clearly unfounded.cralawlibrary

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
Petition DENIED. COMELEC First Division AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 188299 : January 23, 2013

HEIRS OF LUIS A. LUNA and REMEGIO A. LUNA, and LUZ LUNA-
SANTOS, as represented by their Attorneys-in-Fact, AUREA B.
LUBIS, Petitioners, v. RUBEN S. AFABLE, TOMAS M. AFABLE, FLORANTE
A. EVANGELISTA, LEOVY S. EVANGELISTA, JAIME M. ILAGAN, ET.
AL., Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:

The heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, and Luz Luna-Santos (Heirs)
are co-owners of a parcel of land located in Brgy. Guinobatan, Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro which was subjected to compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Respondents Ruben
Afable, Tomas Afable, Florante Evangelista, Leovy Evangelista, Jaime Ilagan,
et al. (Afable, et al.) were identified by the DAR as qualified farmer-
beneficiaries. Hence, Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) were
issued to them. The heirs sought the cancellation of the said CLOAs before
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) Calapan City. Their petition was
anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land in question into a light
intensity industrial zone pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of
1981, enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Calapan, thereby excluding the
same from the coverage of the agrarian law. DARAB Calapan City ordered
the cancellation of the CLOAs.
Aggrieved, Afable et al. appealed to the DARAB Central Office and the latter
ruled in their favour. The heirs appealed the decision to the Office of the
President which ruled that the parcel of land is excluded from the coverage
of CARP.
Then, Afable et al. appealed the Office of the Presidents decision to the
Court of Appeals. The CA granted the appeal. Hence, the heirs appealed to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 21 validly classified the

parcel of land from agricultural to non-agricultural, and therefore, exempt
from CARP?
HELD: The land is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

POLITICAL LAW: power of local governments; police power

Local governments have the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural lands. Sec. 345 of RA No. 2264 (The Local Autonomy Act of
1959) specifically empowers municipal and/or city councils to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the National
Planning Commission. By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature
may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political
jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the
future projection of needs.
The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial
jurisdiction through zoning and reclassification is an exercise of police power.
The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses
is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and
benefit of the residents of a locality.

Petition GRANTED. The Decision of the Office of the President is

REINSTATED.

G.R. No. 199149 : January 22, 2013

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E.
PANOTES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 201350 : January 22, 2013

ELMER E. PANOTES, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LIWAYWAY VINZONS-
CHATO, Respondents.
PERLAS -BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010
elections as representative of the Second Legislative District of Camarines
Norte, composed of the seven (7) Municipalities of Daet, Vinzons, Basud,
Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente, and San Lorenzo, with a total of 205
clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was
proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having garnered a total of 51,707
votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes, or a plurality of 3,885 votes.
Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) assailing the results in four (4) municipalities, namely:
Daet, Vinzons, Basud and Mercedes. Panotes moved for the suspension of
the proceedings and prayed that a preliminary hearing be set in order to
determine the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the
elections. In its resolution, the HRET directed the copying of the picture
image files of ballots relative to the protest. Chato then filed an Urgent
Motion to Prohibit the Use by Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot
Images reiterating the lack of legal basis for the decryption and copying of
ballot images inasmuch as no preliminary hearing had been conducted
showing that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes was not preserved.
The HRET denied Chatos motion. HRET declared that, although the actual
ballots used in the May 10, 2010 elections are the best evidence of the will
of the voters, the picture images of the ballots are regarded as the
equivalent of the original ballots. Chato filed a motion for reconsideration but
the HRET denied the same.

Chato then moved for the revision of the ballots in all of the protested
clustered precincts arguing that the results of the revision of twenty-five
percent (25%) of the precincts indicate a reasonable recovery of votes in her
favor. She filed a second motion reiterating her prayer for the continuance of
the revision. The HRET denied the motion.
However, on March 22, 2012, the HRET issued the assailed Resolution No.
12-079 directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining
seventy-five percent (75%) protested clustered precincts, or a total of 120
precincts. Panotes moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same.
Hence, Panotes filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 12-079?
HELD: The HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued
Resolution No. 12-079.
POLITICAL LAW: HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of its members
It is hornbook principle that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review
decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of
grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court
shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its discretion or
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary
manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty.
To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless
constitute an intrusion into its domain and a curtailment of its power to act
of its own accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies
presented before it.
In the main, Panotes ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
HRET in ordering the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining
75% of the protested clustered precincts.

The Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its members.
By employing the word sole, the Constitution is emphatic that the
jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its
members is intended to be its own full, complete and unimpaired.
There can be no challenge, therefore, to such exclusive control absent any
clear showing, as in this case, of arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power that constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon
a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting
such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy therefor.

Petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 191890: December 4, 2012

EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, Petitioners,

MANUEL A. BARCELONA, JR., Petitioner-Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
BRION, J.:

FACTS:
 President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to petitioners
Evalyn Fetalino (Fetalino) and Amado Calderon (Calderon) as Comelec
Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years. Congress, however,
adjourned before the Commission on Appointments (CA) could act on their
appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took
effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no longer re-appointed. Thus, Fetalino
and Calderon merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four
months.
Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits
and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The
Comelec initially approved the claims pursuant to its resolution. However, in
its subsequent resolution, the Comelec, on the basis of its Law Departments
study, completely disapproved the Fetalino and Calderons claim, stating that
one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed
his term of office so as to fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568
that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five years salary. Petitioner-
intervenor Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. (Barcelona) later joined the petitioners in
questioning the assailed subsequent resolution.

ISSUES:
A. Whether or not an ad interim appointment qualifies as retirement under the
law and entitles them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity;

B. Whether or not the resolution that initially granted the five-year lump sum
gratuity is already final and executory;

C. Whether or not Fetalino and Calderon acquired a vested right over the full
retirement benefits provided by RA No. 1568.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Term of Office
First Issue: Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona are not entitled to the lump
sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended.

The Court emphasized that the right to retirement benefits accrues only
when two conditions are met: first, when the conditions imposed by the
applicable law in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and second, when an
actual retirement takes place. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
retirement entails compliance with certain age and service requirements
specified by law and jurisprudence, and takes effect by operation of law.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 allows the grant of retirement benefits to the
Chairman or any Member of the Comelec who has retired from the service
after having completed his term of office. Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona
obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never
completed the full seven-year term of office. While the Court characterized
an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo as a permanent
appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once the appointee has qualified into office, the Court have
also positively ruled in that case that an ad interim appointment that has
lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a
term of office.
Second Issue: The Comelec did not violate the rule on finality of
judgments.
Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: In ordinary
actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a
decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and
executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
A simple reading of this provision shows that it only applies to ordinary
actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs. Thus,
it is clear that the proceedings that precipitated the issuance of the assailed
resolution do not fall within the coverage of the actions and proceedings
under Section 13, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Thus, the
Comelec did not violate its own rule on finality of judgments.
Third Issue: No vested rights over retirement benefits.

Retirement benefits granted to Fetalino, Calderon and Barcelona under

Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568 are purely gratuitous in nature; thus, they have
no vested right over these benefits. Retirement benefits as provided under
R.A. No. 1568 must be distinguished from a pension which is a form of
deferred compensation for services performed; in a pension, employee
participation is mandatory, thus, employees acquire contractual or vested
rights over the pension as part of their compensation.

Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 195670: December 3, 2012

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, v. AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner Willem Beumer (Beumer), a Dutch National, and respondent

Avelina Amores (Amores), a Filipina, were married. After several years, the
RTC declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the formers
psychological incapacity. Consequently, Beumer filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for the distribution of the six lots
claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.

Amores averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses,
she and Beumer did not acquire any conjugal properties during their
marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to
purchase the four lots and the other two by way of inheritance. She
submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the
fact that she purchased one of the lots and the improvements thereon using
her own money. On the other hand, Beumer testified that while the four lots,
excluding the two lots allegedly acquired by Amores by way of inheritance,
were registered in the name of Amores, these properties were acquired with
the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit
since Amores did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He
also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of
Deeds was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Beumer is entitled for reimbursement of the value of
the lots based on equity.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: National Patrimony

In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v.
Helmut Muller, the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of
the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner
(Helmut Muller) against his former Filipina spouse. It held that the foreigner
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against
foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 185766: November 23, 2010
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, Respondents.
Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:

OnMarch 16, 2005, the Board of Directors of PCSO resolved to appoint

Josefina A.Sarsonas(Sarsonas)as Assistant Department Manager II of the
Internal Audit Department (IAD) of PCSO under temporary status. Thus, on
the same day, PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte issued a temporary
appointment to Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II. The Civil
Service Commission Field Office Office of the President(CSCFO-
OP)disapproved the temporary appointment of Sarsonas as she failed to
meet the eligibility requirement for the position

PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC-National Capital Region(CSC-NCR).The

CSC-NCR affirmed the disapproval by CSCFO-OP of the temporary
appointment of Sarsonas on the following grounds: (a) that she failed to
meet the eligibility requirement; and (b) that there were two
qualified eligibles who signified their interest to be appointed to the said
position, as certified by CSCFO-OP. The CSC denied the appeal. The CA then
reversed the decision of the CSC upon the appeal of PCSO.

ISSUE: Whether or not the position of Assistant Department Manager II falls

under the CES.

HELD: The petition has no merit.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Civil Service Commission

The CES covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of

Assistant Department Manager II does not require appointment by the
President of thePhilippines, it does not fall under the CES. Therefore, the
temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega as Assistant Department
Manager II do not require third level eligibility pursuant to the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations.

In order for a position to be covered by the CES, two elements must

concur.First, the position musteitherbe (1) a position enumerated under
Book V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative
Code of 1987, i.e. Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service,or(2) a position of equal rank as those
enumerated,and identified by the Career Executive Service Board to be such
position of equal rank.Second, the holder of the position must be a
presidential appointee. Failing in any of these requirements, a position
cannot be considered as one covered by the third-level or CES.

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the position of Assistant

Department Manager II is not one of those enumerated under the
Administrative Code of 1987. There is also no question that the CESB has
not identified the position to be of equal rank to those enumerated.Lastly,
without a doubt, the holder of the position of Assistant Department Manager
II is appointed by the PCSO General Manager, and not by the President of
thePhilippines. Accordingly, the position of Assistant Department Manager II
in the PCSO is not covered by the third-level or CES, and does not require
CSE eligibility.

Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 175155 : October 22, 2012

JOHN C. ARROYO, JASMIN ALIPATO, PRIMITIVO BELANDRES, NESTOR

LEDUNA, PATRICK SEMENA, ANITA DE LOS REYES, MERCY SILVESTRE,
RODOLFO CABALLERO, GINA CABALLERO, LETECIA HUEBOS, TARCILA
PINILI, RODELIA UY, CRIS PARAS, FLOR MORENO, AND JOSE
PEROTE,Petitioners, v. ROSAL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Jasmin Alipato, Primitivo Belandres, Nestor Leduna, Anita de los

Reyes, and Gina Caballero were among the actual occupants of a parcel of
land located in Bacolod City. They occupied the land by mere tolerance of
the landowner. To evade eviction and in order to avail of the benefits of
acquiring land under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), the said occupants
formally organized themselves into an association, theRosal Homeowners
Association, Inc. (RHAI).

To fully avail of the benefits of the CMP, the NHMFC required the RHAI
members to sign the Lease Purchase Agreement (LPA) and to maintain their
membership in good standing in accordance with the provisions of the By-
Laws of RHAI. Alipato, et al., however, refused to sign the LPA as a
precondition under the CMP. They likewise failed to attend the regular
meetings and pay their membership dues as required by the RHAI By-
Laws. As a result, RHAI approved a resolution to enforce the eviction
ofAlipato, et al. and recover possession of the portions of land which they
were occupying. Pursuant to the said resolution, RHAI, through written
letters of demand, called for Alipato, et al. to vacate the premises and
deliver possession thereof to RHAI. Alipato, et al. ignored the demand. Thus,
RHAI filed an action for recovery of possession of the subject property before
the RTC.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of RHAI. Hence, this instant petition.

Alipato, et al. insist that they cannot be ejected from the property since they
are the actual occupants thereof even before the landowner acquired the
same. They also averred that they were denied due process when they were
expelled from RHAI without notice.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not Alipato, et al. were denied of their right to due process
when they were expelled as members of RHAI?

II. Whether or not Alipato, et al. were denied of their right to own a piece
of land under the socialized housing program of the government?
HELD: The petition must fail.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: due process

FIRST ISSUE: The Court finds no merit on their claim of denial of

due process.

The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence
thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. The records of this case
disclose that there was a board resolution issued for the expulsion of the
erring or defaulting members of RHAI.The latter were duly informed that
they were already expelled as members of the association through
notices sent to them. These notices, however, were refused to be
received by petitioners. There is nothing irregular when they were
expelled for non-payment of dues and for non-attendance of meetings.
This is expressly sanctioned by the By-Laws of RHAI.

SECOND ISSUE: Alipato, et al. were not denied of their right to

own a piece of land.

Apparently, petitioners refusal to sign and submit the LPA, the most
important requirement of the NHMFC for the acquisition of the land,
disqualified them as loan beneficiaries. As such, they acquire no better
rights than mere occupants of the subject land.

In any case, the due process guarantee cannot be invoked when no

vested right has been acquired. The period during which petitioners
occupied the lots, no matter how long, did not vest them with any right to
claim ownership since it is a fundamental principle of law that acts of
possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the
owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
acquisitive prescription.

Petition is DENIED.
 G.R. No. 182431: November 17, 2010

Land Bank of the Philippines, Petitioner v. ESTHER ANSON RIVERA,

ANTONIO G. ANSON AND CESAR G. ANSON, Respondents
Perez, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents are co-owners of a parcel of land under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 in 1972.Only
18.8704 hectares of the total are of 20.5254 hectares were subject of the
coverage. The Land Bank of the Philippines directed payment, and the
Respondents instituted a suit to determine the value of the property. They
computed that it was P2,668,302.00 for the entire landholding of 20.5254
hectares.

The RTC declared that Land Bank should only pay Php1,297,710.63.
Petitioner filed a petition for Review at the CA, which held that Land Bank
should only pay P823,957.23, plus interest of 12% per annum on the
amount ofP515,777.57. Land Bank disagrees with the 12% interest and
appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

1. Whether the 12% interest is justified.

HELD:

Yes.
Constitutional Law: Expropriation
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the
sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be
the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course
of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the government.Thus,if property is taken for public use
before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must include interest on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.In fine, between
the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the
position he was in before the taking occurred.
 However, as regards the costs of suit, Land Bank is exempt. Rule 142 Costs
Section 1.Costs ordinarily follow results of suit. Unless otherwise provided in
these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of
coursebut the court shall have power, for special reasons adjudge that either
party shall pay the costs of an action, or that the same be divided, as may
be equitable.No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of thePhilippines
unless otherwise provided by law.

since LBP is performing a governmental function in agrarian reform

proceeding, it is exempt from the payment of costs of suit as provided under
Rule 142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
Petition Granted. But Land Bank is exempt from costs of suit.

G.R. No. 191618: November 23, 2010

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, v. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
Nachura, J.:

FACTS:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section
4,Article VII of the Constitution.

ISSUES:
A. Whether the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional
for being a violation of paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution

B. Whether the designation of members of the supreme court as members of

the presidential electoral tribunal is unconstitutional for being a violation of
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
HELD: The petition has no merit.

Constitutional LAW: Presidential Electorate Tribunal

First Issue:
Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before
this Court involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among
others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),cannot claim ignorance
of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably,
theoverarching frameworkaffirmed inTecson v. Commission on Electionsis
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and
vice-presidential election protests while concurrentlyacting as an
independent Electoral Tribunal.
Verba legisdictates that wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers orratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
surrounding the framing of the Constitution.
Last,ut magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the
Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is
obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the
constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the
change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed
simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions
as a special electoral court. the PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institutionindependent,but not separate, from the
judicial department,i.e., the Supreme Court.
Second Issue:

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case ofAngara v. Electoral
Commission,Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels." In fact,Angarapointed
out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And
yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of
the present Constitution.

Petition is DENIED.
 G.R. No. 187752: November 23, 2010

IRENE K. NACU, substituted by BENJAMIN M. NACU, ERVIN K. NACU,

and NEJIE N. DE SAGUN, Petitioners, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
and PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, Respondents.
Nachura, J.:

FACTS:
PEZA issued a memorandum prohibiting its employees from charging and
collecting overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises. Nacu however,
still charged overtime fees. After investigations, the Director General of
PEZA filed a complaint forDishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The PEZA used the services of
the NBI in determining the similarity of her signature with the alleged items.
After the hearing, Nacu was found guilty. Upon appeal, the CSC affirmed the
findings of the PEZA Board of Discipline. The Court of Appeals likewise
upheld the decision of the CSC after appeal. After a failed motion for
reconsideration, Nacu appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

A. Whether or not Nacu is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service is supported by substantial
evidence.
HELD: The petition has no merit.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Substantial Evidence

Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Labs findings, Nacu should
have channeledher efforts into providing her own proof that the signatures
appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all, whoever
allegesforgery has the burden of proving the same by clear and convincing
evidence. Nacu could not simply depend on the alleged weakness of the
complainants evidence without offering stronger evidence to contradict the
former.

The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically

operational. It must be claimed; otherwise, the protection does not come
into play. Moreover, the right must be claimed at the appropriate time, or
else, it may be deemed waived.In the present case, it does not appear
that Nacu invoked her right against self-incrimination at the appropriate
time, that is, at the time she was asked to provide samples of her signature.
She is therefore deemed to have waived her right against self-incrimination.
All told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and penalized with
dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties.The general rule is
that where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by
substantial evidence, such findingsare accorded not only respect but also
finality, and are bindingon this Court. It is not for the reviewing court to
weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrativeagency
on the sufficiency of evidence.

Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 193256:March 22, 2011.

ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS)
PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, JAMES MARTY
LIM, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MELANIO
MAURICIO, JR., Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:

On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a

petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and
accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-Liston the ground that petitioner is a
front for a religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-
list group under Section 6 (1)ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise
known as theParty-List System Act.

OnJune 16, 2010, the COMELEC, Second Division issued a Resolution

dismissing the petition. The dismissal on procedural grounds was grounded
on the lack of proper verification of the petition.According to the COMELEC,
Second Division, the Verification with Certification Re: Forum Shopping and
Special Power of Attorneywas not duly notarized in accordance withthe 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended. Sections 1 and 6, Rule II require
that the person appearing before a notary public must be known to the
notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity. In this case, the "Acknowledgment" at the end of the verification
did not contain the name of private respondent whosupposedly appeared
before the notary public, and he was not identified by any competent
evidence of identity as required by the rules on notarial practice.
TheCOMELEC, Second Divisionalso dismissed the petition based on
substantial grounds, as it found that ABC is not a religious sect, and is,
therefore, not disqualified from registration.
 However, the COMELECen bancfound that the petitions verification page
substantially complied with the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice, and that the records
of the case showed that the Resolution of the Second Division was issued without
any hearing, contrary to RA No. 7941, which deprived Mauricio of the opportunity
to submit evidence in support of his petition.
In filing this petition, Petitioner contends that the COMELECen bancno longer had
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of registration and accreditation
of ABC Party-List after it was already proclaimed as one of the winners in the party-
list elections ofMay 10, 2010. Further, petitioner submits that Section 6 of R.A. No.
7941, which states that the COMELEC maymotuproprioor upon verified complaint of
any interested party remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional orsectoral party, organization or coalition, is
applicable only to a non-winning party-list group.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Comelec has jurisdiction to hear the case on

ABC partylistscancellation of registration

2. Whether or not a cancellation case should be summary

HELD:

The petition is denied.

POLITICAL LAW: Jurisdiction and powers of the Comelec to cancel
party list registration.

First issue: Section 2 (5), Article IX-Cof the Constitution grants the COMELEC the
authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority
to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the
COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. In the case of the party-list
nominees/representatives, it is the HRET, in accordance with Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution, that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their
qualifications.Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the
House of Representatives,but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as
a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, the jurisdiction of the HRET over
contests relates to the qualifications of a party-list nominee or representative, while
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over petitions for cancellation of registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition.In sum, the
COMELECen banchad jurisdiction over the petition forcancellation of the registration
and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation ofSection 6 (1) of
R.A. No. 7941.
Second issue: Petitioner contends that the COMELECen banccommitted grave
abuse of discretion when it singled out this case and directed that it be set for
hearing when other cases of the same nature were summarily
andmotupropriodismissed by the COMELEC, citing the cases of BANAT v. CIBAC
Foundation and BANAT v. 1-Care and APEC. However, in both cases, the
proceedings were summary because the registration/qualification/cancellation of
the party lists had already been decided in another case.

Petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 182591: January 18, 2011

MODESTO AGYAO, JR.,Petitioner vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION,Respondent
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner was re-appointed, following the expiration of his previous

temporary appointment, to PEZA Director II by the PEZA Director-General de
Lima. The appointment was submitted to the Civil Service Commission. The
re-appointment was invalidated by the CSC as petitioner lacked the
prescribed Career Executive Service Office/Career Service Executive
Examination (CESO/CSEE) qualifications. The CSC ruled that the position of
PEZA Director II is above the Division Chief level, which falls properly under
level 3, or Career Executive Service. Petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which sustained the ruling of the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not PEZA Director II falls under level 3 or Career

Executive Service, of the Administrative Code.
HELD: Petition is impressed with merit.
Political Law: It has been held in a long line of Jurisprudence that for a
position to fall under Career Executive Service, the appointing authority
must be the President of the Philippines. The Administrative code makes this
classification based on the Constitutional powers granted to the President. As
such, any deviation of interpretation would not only be against the prevailing
law (i.e. Administrative Code), but also be unconstitutional. The position of
PEZA Director II is appointed by the PEZA Director-General, not by the
President of the Philippines. Hence, the CESO/CSEE requirements are not
needed by the appointee.

A.M. No. P-10-2829: June 21, 2011

JUDGE EDILBERTO G. ABSIN, Complainant, v. EDGARDO A. MONTALLA,

Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 29 San Miguel, Zamboanga del
Sur, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:

This administrative matter stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by

JudgeEdilbertoG.Absin(JudgeAbsin), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, San Miguel,Zamboangadel Sur (RTC-Branch 29), charging
respondentEdgardoA.Montalla(Montalla), stenographer of the same court, with
neglect of duty in failing to submit the required transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) despite repeated reminders from the court.

In his Comment dated and mailed on 10 March 2010,Montallaadmitted he was the

stenographer who took down the stenographic notes on the dates mentioned and
both the presiding judge and the clerk of court repeatedly reminded him to
transcribe the stenographic notes of the proceedings.Montalla, however, claimed he
was prevented from performing his tasks due to poor health as he was diagnosed
with pulmonary tuberculosis, peptic ulcer, and diabetes.Montallanow seeks the
compassion of the Court as he is allegedly still recovering from his illnesses.

In the Resolution dated 2 August 2010, the parties were required to manifest if
they were willing to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
filed. We noted the letter dated 24 September 2010 of JudgeAbsininforming the
Court that he was submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
filed without further comment. We dispensed with the manifestation ofMontallawho
failed to file the same within the period despite receipt of the resolution.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) opined thatMontallashould have been
fully aware that public officers are repositories of public trust and are under
obligation to perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of
their ability. For failure to submit the required TSNs,Montallais guilty of gross
neglect of duty classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal. However,
for humanitarian reasons, the OCA recommended the imposition of the penalty of
suspension of six months without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether Montalla is administratively liable for gross neglect of duty

HELD: Yes

POLITICAL LAW: Law on Public Officers, Gross Neglect of Duty

Montallashould be reminded that it is the duty of the court stenographer who has
attended a session of a court to immediately deliver to the clerk of court all the
notes he has taken, the same to be attached to the record of the case.Precisely,
Administrative Circular No. 24-90was issued in order to minimize delay in the
adjudication of cases as a great number of cases could not be decided or resolved
promptly because of lack of TSNs. The circular required all stenographers to
transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the TSNs to the record of the case
not later than 20 days from the time the notes are taken. The attaching may be
done by putting all TSNs in a separate folder or envelope, which will then be joined
to the record of the case. The circular also provided that the stenographer
concerned shall accomplish a verified monthly certification as to compliance with
this duty and in the absence of such certification or for failure and/or refusal to
submit it, his salary shall be withheld.

The Court has ruled, in a number of cases,that the failure to submit the TSNs within
the period prescribed under Administrative Circular No. 24-90 constitutes gross
neglect of duty. Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense and
punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense pursuant to Section 52(A)(2) of
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

This is not the first time thatMontallawas charged with neglect of duty for delay in
the submission of the TSNs. He was previously warned of a repetition of the same
or similar infraction. InOfficeof the Court Administrator v.
Montalla, Montallaincurred a delay of more than three years in transcribing the
TSNs despite constant reminders from his superiors to submit the same. In that
case,Montallaadmitted lapses in the performance of his function which caused a
delay in the speedy disposition of cases. He invoked serious marital problems which
allegedly greatly affected his work. The Court consideredMontallas"humble
acknowledgment of his transgressions and his offer of sincere apology and promise
to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties" and the fact that it was
his first infraction.Montallawas found guilty of simple neglect of duty and was
finedP2,000with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

In the present case,Montallaalso failed to submit the required TSNs despite the
warnings and the chances given to him to submit the same. The TSNs were taken
in 2004, 2005, and 2006 and he was required to submit the same in 2009, 2010
and just recently, in February 2011. His utter disregard of the court directives and
the reminders from his superiors and his lapses in the performance of his duty as a
court stenographer caused delay in the speedy disposition of the case. This is no
longer simple neglect of duty.Montalla, in repeatedly failing to submit the required
TSNs for several years now, no longer deserves the compassion and understanding
of the Court.

As a stenographer,Montallashould realize that the performance of his duty is

essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice, and his inaction
hampers the administration of justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary. The
Court has expressed its dismay over the negligence and indifference of persons
involved in the administration of justice.No less than the Constitution mandates
that public officers must serve the people with utmost respect and responsibility.
Public office is a public trust, andMontallahas without a doubt violated this trust by
his failure tofulfillhis duty as a court stenographer.

PETITION GRANTED.

G.R. No. 176172 :November 20, 2012

EFREN G. AMIT, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE

NO. VI, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), and THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE, Respondents.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit on the Multi-Purpose

Drying Pavement (MPDP) project conducted by the Department of Agriculture
(DA). COA discovered that eleven (11) government employees were allegedly
responsible for ghost projects and misappropriation of public funds. Thus, COA
administratively charged them before the Ombudsman including
petitioner Efren Amit who was a Senior Agriculturist of the DA whose functions
include the approval of MPDP project documents.

The Ombudsman found all the officials so charged guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty for conspiring in the falsification of documents to facilitate the
disbursement and misappropriation of the funds intended for the MPDP projects. In
some of the vouchers, the signatures of certain officials were forged. It was also
discovered that the vouchers and checks for the MPDP project were released
without proper authorization to certain beneficiaries. The Ombudsman concluded
that the employees conspired with one another to facilitate the disbursement and
misappropriation of funds intended for the MPDP project.

Amit appealed to the CA. The CA denied the petition and ruled
that Amits approval of the documents in question is not merely
ministerial. Amit moved to reconsider the denial of his petition but the CA
denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Amit is liable for falsification of documents and

misappropriation of public funds?

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CRIMINAL LAW: conspiracy

First, Amits acts did not result from a mere failure to exercise the necessary
prudence in complying with the proper procedure. The performance of the
complained acts was discretionary on his part. Amits acts were
done willfully and deliberately. Amit, for instance, inexplicably signed the
issue slips despite his alleged knowledge that these documents were
unnecessary.With Amits signing of the documents, however, the immediate
release of the funds was facilitated.

Second, the Ombudsmans finding of conspiracy reveals the crucial role

which Amitplayed in the commission of fraud with other officials. Amits role
in the committed irregularities shows his concurrence although based on
circumstantial, not direct, evidence with the other officials objective to
defraud the government. The irregularities will not see their fruition if Amit
and the other officials involved in the fraud did not consent to its
implementation by making it appear that there were valid requisitions,
deliveries, inspections, pre-auditing and approval of the vouchers and checks
paid to the contractors/suppliers. These acts pointed to one (1) criminal
intentwith one participant performing a part of the transaction and the
others performing other parts of the same transaction to complete the whole
scheme, with a view of attaining the object which they were pursuing.

POLITICAL LAW: public office; misconduct

Third, Amits defense the alleged reliance on the acts of his subordinates in
good faith is simply unacceptable. Public office is a public trust and public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.

Fourth, Amit did not wholly rely on the acts of his subordinates. As earlier
mentioned, he performed functions using independent judgment. Misconduct
is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. As
differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct
consists in the officials unlawful and wrongful use of his station or character
[reputation] to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others.

Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011

SERGIO G. AMORA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

AND ARNIELO S. OLANDRIA, respondents.

NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candijay,
Bohol. At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had
been twice elected to the post in 2007 and in 2007. Olandria, one of the
candidates for councilor in the same municipality, filed before the COMELEC
a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras
COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria
pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada
(Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.
Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be
considered as not filed.
Amora countered that:
1. The Petition for Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course
or cancel a certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is
filed out of time;

2. Olandrias claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of
the COC;

3. The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to

the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the
document;
4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been
members of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several
years; and

5. Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the

COC be under oath.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified
Amora from running for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding

Olandria's claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of
a ground for disqualification.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.

POLITICAL LAW Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy

In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that
an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an
additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the
Omnibus Eleciton Code in Section 68, which reads:

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance
to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right
after the effectivity of this Code; and
 (g) The insane or feeble-minded.

It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the
grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would
uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to
disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds
for disqualification."
Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the fact
that Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty. Granada,
before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the core issue. He said that
accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:

Section 2. Affirmation or Oath. The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers

to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
and

(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of
the instrument or document.

Therefore, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the

affiant is personally known to the Notary Public, which is the case herein.

In this case, contrary to the declarations of the COMELEC, Amora complied

with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty.
Granada personally knew each other; they were not just colleagues at the
League of Municipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, but they consider each other as
distant relatives. Thus, the alleged defect in the oath was not proven by
Olandria since the presentation of a CTC turned out to be sufficient in this
instance.
Petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in
his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT
 DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-
FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 199085 : September 18, 2012

BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., Petitioner, v. HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her
capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., in his
capacity as COMELEC Chairperson; RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM AND AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, in their capacity as COMELEC
COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO, GEOUGE C. DEE, JACINTO G. ANG,
ROMEO B. FORTES AND MICHAEL D. VILLARET, in their capacity as
CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-
COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITEE ON THE 2004 AND
2007 ELECTION FRAUD, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No.199118 : September 18, 2012

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
represented by Chairperson Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, represented by Secretary Leila M. De Lima, JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR AQUILINO M.
PIMENTEL III, and DOJ-COMELEC FACT FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of
officials from the DOJ and theComelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding
Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and
SouthCotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding
Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA),
et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a

resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be
filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo,
among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ

Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection
clause?

HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.

FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.

POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and
functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to
investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement
and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to
effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was
reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code.

Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary

investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however,
was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the
Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors
had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing
delegated authority given by the Comelec.

Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of
the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of
ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an
adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.

SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal
protection clause.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
Team is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain
persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target
only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo
Administration.

While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were
public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in
the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also
subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It

is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.

Petitions are DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 191998,

G.R. No. 192769, G.R. No. 192832 : December 7, 2010

WALDEN F. BELLO AND LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondent/LIZA L. MAZA AND SATURNINO C.
OCAMPO,Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent /BAYAN MUNA
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTED BY TEODORO CASINO, Petitioners,v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND JUAN MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO OF ANG GALING PINOY PARTY-
LIST, Respondents.

BRION,J.:

FACTS:

Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List(AGPP) filed with the Commission on Elections its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in theMay 10, 2010elections. Subsequently,
onMarch 23, 2010, AGPP filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the
Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees.

OnMarch 25, 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8807which prescribed the
rules of procedure applicable to petitions to disqualify a party-list nominee for
purposes of theMay 10, 2010elections.

OnMarch 25, 2010, petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo,

and BayanMuna Party-List, represented by Teodoro Casi, (collectively referred to
ascertiorari petitioners) filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification
against Arroyo, pursuant to Resolution No. 8696, in relation with Sections 2 and 9
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 (the Party- List System Act).

Thecertioraripetitioners argued that not only must the party-list organization

factually and truly represent the marginalized and the underrepresented; the
nominee must as well be a Filipino citizen belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, citing in this regard the case
ofAng Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. On this basis,
thecertioraripetitioners concluded that Arroyo cannot be considered a member of
the marginalized and underrepresented sector, particularly, the sector which the
AGPP represents tricycle drivers and security guards because he is not only a
member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of
Representatives; (b) the Chairman of the Houses Energy Committee; and, (c) a
member of key committees in the House, namely: Natural Resources, Aquaculture,
Fisheries Resources, Ethics and Privileges, Justice, National Defense and Security,
Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Ways and Means.

On April 6, 2010, petitioners Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales

(mandamus petitioners) wrote the COMELEC Law Department a letter requesting
for a copy of the documentary evidence submitted by AGPP, in compliance with
Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807.On the same day, the COMELEC Law Department
replied that as of that date, the AGPP had not yet submitted any documentary
evidence required by Resolution No. 8807.

Themandamuspetitioners requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to act,

consistently with Section 10 of Resolution No. 8807, and declare the disqualification
of the nominees of AGPP for their failure to comply with the requirements of Section
6 of Resolution No. 8807. Section 6 of the Resolution provides that the party-list
group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence to duly prove that the
nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to
the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent.
It likewise provides that the COMELEC Law Department shall require party-list
groups and nominees to make the required documentary submissions.

In its May 7, 2010 Joint Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the
petitions for disqualification against Arroyo. It noted that Section 9 of RA 7941
merely requires the nominee to be "abona fidemember [of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for] at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
elections." The COMELEC En Banc refused to reconsider.
Themandamuspetitioners filed with the Supreme Court their Petition
forMandamusand Prohibition with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction,docketed asG.R. No. 191998.They sought to compel
the COMELEC to disqualifymotu propriothe AGPP nominees for their failure to
comply with Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807, and to enjoin the COMELEC from
giving due course to the AGPPs participation in the May 10, 2010 elections.

On July 23 and 29, 2010, thecertioraripetitioners elevated their case to the

Supreme Courtviatwo (2) separate petitions forcertiorari, docketed asG.R. Nos.
192769 and192832, to annul the COMELEC Second Divisions May 7, 2010 joint
resolution and the COMELECen bancsJuly 19, 2010 consolidated resolution that
dismissed their petitions for disqualification against Arroyo as AGPPs nominee.

In the interim, AGPP obtained in theMay 10, 2010elections the required percentage
of votes sufficient to secure a single seat.This entitled Arroyo, as AGPPs first
nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. OnJuly 21, 2010, the COMELEC,
sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, proclaimed Arroyo as AGPPs duly-
elected party-list representative in the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

I. Whetheror not mandamuslies to compel the COMELEC to disqualify AGPPs

nomineesmotu proprioor to cancel AGPPs registration;

II. Whether or not the COMELEC can be enjoined from giving due course to
AGPPs participation in the May 10, 2010 elections, the canvassing of AGPPs
votes, and proclaiming it a winner; and

III. Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyos
qualifications as AGPPs nominee after his proclamation and assumption to
office as a member of the House of Representatives.

HELD: The petitions are dismissed.

REMEDIAL LAW; MANDAMUS

First Issue: For a writ ofmandamusto issue (inG.R. No. 191998), Petitioners
must comply with the condition that there be "no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." However, they failed to do so. Under Section
2, in relation with Section 4, of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 (quoted below), any
interested party may file with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against a
party-list nominee. Furthermore, under Section 6 of RA 7941, any interested party
may file a verified complaint for cancellation of registration of a party-list
organization. These provisions effectively provide the "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy" that themandamuspetitioners should have taken. In filing the present
petition, themandamuspetitioners also violated the rule on the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide and thus prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts.

REMEDIAL LAW; MOOTNESS

Second Issue: The court finds that the second issue has been mooted by the
supervening participation, election and proclamation of AGPP after it secured the
required percentage of votes in the May 10, 2010 elections.The prohibition issue
has been rendered moot since there is nothing now to prohibit in light of the
supervening events.A moot case is one that ceases to present
ajusticiable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon (in this case, the prevention of the specified acts) can no longer be done.

POLITICAL LAW; HRET

Third Issue: The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to
pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and
assumption of office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of
the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted upon was their
party. In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPPs first nominee, has
already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives.The court takes judicial notice, too, of the filing of two (2) petitions
forquo warrantoagainst Arroyo, now pending before the HRET.The court holds that
the Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has
the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyos qualifications as a
Member of the House of Representatives.

Joephil Bien v. Pedro Bo

G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010

Nachura

Facts: Bo filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against barangay officials of

San Isidro, including Bien, for the destruction of his cottage and coconut plantation.
He insists that Bien and the other barangay officials connived in doing so in order to
construct their own private cottages for their own benefit.

The Ombudsman found Bien and the other barangay officials administratively liable
for abuse of authority.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative liability of Bien, et. al. should be upheld
despite failure to prove their participation in the said destruction.

Held: Yes. In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e.,
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. In the case at bar, substantial evidence consisted
in the findings of the DENR-PENRO identifying petitioner as one of the owners of the
twenty-two (22) cottages illegally erected on the subject property covered by a
lease application of respondent. The Final Report of the DENR-PENRO narrates the
circumstances surrounding the conflict between respondent and the barangay
officials of San Isidro Ilawod, concerning respondent application for lease of the
subject property.