Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
G.R. No. L-20761 July 27, 1966 complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters from the point where the
LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET
AL., respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23267-R, holding it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to respondents
Mariano Beltran, et al., P6,000.00 for the death of his minor daughter Raquel
Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife,
together with their minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old,
Raquel, about 4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 years old, boarded the
Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953 Pampanga),
owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound
for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them
four pieces of baggages containing their personal belonging. The conductor
of the bus, who happened to be a half-brother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran,
issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full fares of the plaintiff
and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe,
since both were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance
with the appellant's rules and regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to
allow the passengers bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and
their children to get off. With respect to the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano
Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the first to get down
the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions
to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five
meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in
controversy to get his other bayong, which he had left behind, but in so
doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her father. While
said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the
conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near
the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly
started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the
fact that the conductor has not given the driver the customary signal to
start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind
by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a
plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately
jumped from the running board without getting his bayong from the
conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost in front of the shaded
place where he left his wife and children. At that precise time, he saw
people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on
the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other
than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode
earlier together with her parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit
against the defendant seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate
amount of P16,000 to cover moral damages and actual damages sustained
as a result thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on the merits, the court
below rendered the judgment in question.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of
contract of carriage and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child and
P400.00 as compensatory damages representing burial expenses and costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a
breach of contract in the case, for the reason that when the child met her death,
she was no longer a passenger of the bus involved in the incident and, therefore,
the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although the Court of Appeals
sustained this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty of quasi-
delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its driver, in
accordance with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of Appeals did not
only find the petitioner liable, but increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-
appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00 granted by the trial court.
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in
holding it liable for quasi-delict, considering that respondents complaint was one for
breach of contract, and (2) in raising the award of damages from P3,000.00 to
P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal from the decision of the lower court.
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement
holding petitioner liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It
may be pointed out that although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his
wife, and their children (including the deceased child) had alighted from the bus at
a place designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it was also
established that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a stop) to
get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus. There
can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
the bus for his bayongwhich was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier
between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and
passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car,
aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car. 1 The
issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already led by the
father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for
her safety under the contract of carriage also persisted.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not
cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger
has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to
be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from
a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger. 2 So also,
where a passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual
way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the
report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and
without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother, he is
deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger
entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.3
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which
was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was,
must have followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running
board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus
started to run, so that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving
vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run
over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent
had exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article
1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its
obligation to transport safely its passengers. In the first place, the driver, although
stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to
run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go and while the
latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran
and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and
they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to
the protection under their contract of carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated,
herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the
complaint, which reads —
That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel
Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of
exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of
the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport plaintiffs and their
daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the
operation of their vehicle.
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-
delict, while incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is
permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a
plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each
other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be resolved and
determined.4
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was
predicated when it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran,
plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their
agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during the trial that
the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while
there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run
off the vehicle. The presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise
to the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. And this
presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome.
Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the
child Raquel Beltran.
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of
Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass
upon and consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant's brief.
Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding
them on P3,000.00 damages for the death of their daughter. Neither does it appear
that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief
the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was
merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to
the general rule.5Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals
committed error in raising the amount of the award for damages is, evidently,
meritorious.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing,
the petitioner to pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00
for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran, and the amount of P400.00 as actual
damages. No costs in this instance. So ordered.
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967
ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and
operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon
Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the
Court of Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët
On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants
asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the
driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death
was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as
damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was
dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this
Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier
mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final
judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila
Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults
of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of
that case and the one at bar are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the
passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty
employee. As this Court there found:
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to
discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from
Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot
and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando
(La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to
Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In
fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission
of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the
passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding;
and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa
at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also
awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge
any of the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the
deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach
of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or employee of the
carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the
passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the
contract of carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the
passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when
the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of
1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers
absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts
committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was
truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art.
1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from
their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite
of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory
difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual
situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case.
Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the
common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its
passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were
taken from Anglo-American Law.2There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults
on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set

superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged actual
passenger safely.3 damages, the lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764
the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the
the act be within the course of employment only.4 passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim
therefor, having been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is
damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the
enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no
circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000
defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience
damages afore-stated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to
of the carrier's orders.5 The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it
plaintiff-appellant. 10
practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.6
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows
plaintiff's favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both
the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this
from the filing of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid,
rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-
the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So ordered.
390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking
of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection
afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter
alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but
above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's
safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers,
is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his
contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of
protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as
between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful
acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not
the passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical
ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns
of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court
rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code.
The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's
action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab driver was not
a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was
convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to
plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable
under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of
contract results in the passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this

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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19161 April 29, 1966
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
MACARIA BALLESTEROS, TIMOTEO CAMAYO, JOSE REYES and JULIAN
MAIMBAN, JR., respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
In civil case No. 45968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Macaria Ballesteros,
Timoteo Camayo, Jose Reyes and Julian Maimban, Jr. vs. Manila Railroad Company)
the defendant was adjudged to pay damages in the following amounts: P2,400 to
Macaria Ballesteros; P4,000 to Timoteo Camayo; P3,000 to Jose Reyes: and P2,000,
plus P1,000 as attorney's fees, to Julian Maimban, Jr.
The defendant appealed from the judgment, but upon motion by the plaintiffs, the
trial court, by order dated October 14, 1961, dismissed the appeal on the ground
that it was "manifestly and palpably frivolous and interposed ostensibly to delay the
settlement of the just and reasonable claims of the herein plaintiffs, which have
been pending since 1958." The defendant moved to reconsider, and upon denial of
its motion instituted in this Court the instant petition for mandamus to set aside the
order of dismissal and to order respondent court to give due course to the appeal.
In filing the petition directly with this Court, petitioner evidently intended to raise
only questions of law in the appeal contemplated, since under Rule 41, section 15,
"when erroneously a motion to dismiss an appeal is granted or a record on appeal
is disallowed by the trial court, a proper petition for mandamus may be filed in the
appellate court;" and under section 17(6) of the Judiciary Act this Court may review
on appeal only questions of law in civil cases decided by inferior courts unless the
value in controversy exceeds P200,000.1äwphï1.ñët
The fact that an appeal is frivolous and interposed only for purposes of delay has
been recognized as a valid ground to deny issuance of the writ of mandamus to
compel the trial court to approve and certify the appeal. In De la Cruz vs. Blanco
and Quevedo, 73 Phil. 596, We held:
And where as in the instant case, the dismissal has been ordered by the
trial court, it would not be disturbed in the Appellate Court if the latter finds
the appeal to have been interposed ostensibly for delay. It has been held
that a frivolous appeal is one presenting no justiciable question or one so
readily cognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is
little, if any, prospect that it can over succeed. The instant case is one such
instance in which the appeal is evidently without merit, taken manifestly
for delay.
And in Paner vs. Yatco, 87 Phil. 271, We denied the writ prayed for and held that
"while strictly and legally speaking the petition may be granted, we may, before
acting thereon, inquire into the facts involved in order to determine whether once
the writ is granted and the case is brought up here on appeal the appellant has any
chance, even possibility, of having the basic decision of the trial court set aside or
modified; for if the appellant has not that prospect or likelihood then the granting
of the writ and the consequent appeal would be futile and would mean only a waste
of time to the parties and to this Court."
The material facts, as found by respondent court in its decision, are as follows:
Private respondents here, plaintiffs below, were passengers on petitioner's bus, the
driver of which was Jose Anastacio. In Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Anastacio
stopped the bus and got off to replace a defective spark plug. While he was thus
engaged, one Dionisio Abello, an auditor assigned to defendant company by the
General Auditing Office, took the wheel and told the driver to sit somewhere else.
With Abello driving, the bus proceeded on its way, from time to time stopping to
pick up passengers. Anastacio tried twice to take the wheel back but Abello would
not relinquish it. Then, in the language of the trial court, "while the bus was
negotiating between Km. posts 328 and 329 (in Isabela) a freight truck ... driven by
Marcial Nocum ... bound for Manila, was also negotiating the same place; when
these two vehicles were about to meet at the bend of the road Marcial Nocum, in
trying to evade several holes on the right lane, where his truck was running, swerved
his truck towards the middle part of the road and in so doing, the left front fender
and left side of the freight truck smashed the left side of the bus resulting in
extensive damages to the body of the bus and injuries to seventeen of its
passengers, ... including the plaintiffs herein."
In rejecting petitioner's contention that the negligence of Marcial Nocum could not
be imputed to it and relieved it from liability, the trial court found that Dionisio Abello
"was likewise reckless when he was driving the bus at the rate of from 40 to 50
kilometers per hour on a bumpy road at the moment of the collision."
Another defense put up by petitioner is that since Abello was not its employee it
should not be held responsible for his acts. This defense was correctly overruled by
the trial court, considering the provisions of Article 1763 of the Civil Code and section
48 (b) of the Motor Vehicle Law, which respectively provide as follows:
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilfull acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set

Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person

to drive the motor vehicle under his control, or permit a person, sitting
beside him or in any other part of the car, to interfere with him in the
operation of the motor vehicle, by allowing said person to take hold of the
steering wheel, or in any other manner take part in the manipulation or
control of the car.
It appears further, and so the trial court found, that there were negotiations between
the parties to compromise the case, as a result of which respondents herein,
plaintiffs below, considerably reduced their claims to the amounts subsequently
awarded in the judgment; that petitioner had in fact settled the claims of the other
passengers who were also injured in the same accident and even the claim for
damages filed in another action by the owner of the freight truck; and that the
Government Corporate Counsel himself, who represents herein petitioner, rendered
two separate opinions (Op. No. 86, May 19, 1960; and Op. No. 99, series of 1961)
wherein, after analyzing the facts and the law applicable, he reached the conclusion
that the acts of the bus personnel, particularly "in allowing Mr. Abello to drive despite
two occasions when the bus stopped and the regular driver could have taken over,
constitute reckless imprudence and wanton injurious conduct on the part of the MRR
employees." On the basis of those opinions the Government Corporate Counsel
advised petitioner that the offer of the claimants was reasonable and should be
accepted. His advice, however, was not favorably acted upon, petitioner obviously
preferring to litigate.
The issues proposed to be taken up on appeal, as set forth in the petition, are
whether or not Dionisio Abello acted with reckless negligence while driving
petitioner's bus at the time of the accident, and whether or not petitioner may be
held liable on account of such negligence, considering that he was not its employee.
These are no longer justiciable questions which would justify our issuing the
peremptory writ prayed for. The first is a question of fact on which the affirmative
finding of respondent court is not reviewable by Us; and the second is one as to
which there can be no possible doubt in view of the provisions of the Civil Code and
of the Motor Vehicle Law hereinbefore cited. There would be no point in giving the
appeal due course.
The writ prayed for is denied, with costs against petitioner.

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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116110 May 15, 1996
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ANTONIO GARCIA & LETICIA GARCIA, A
& J TRADING, AND JULIO RECONTIQUE, respondents.
PUNO, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV-31246 awarding damages in favor of the spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia
for breach of contract of carriage.2
The records show that on July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old son,
Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City
driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.
At about 7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers
saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national highway. Its left rear portion
jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate
the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to
serve as a warning device. The truck driver, Julio Recontique, and his helper, Arturo
Escala, were then replacing a flat tire. The truck is owned by respondent A & J
Trading.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an in ordinately fast speed and failed to notice
the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago's passengers
urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even carried animated
conversations with his co-employees while driving. When the danger of collision
became imminent, the bus passengers shouted "Babangga tayo!". Santiago stepped
on the brake, but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck. It
caused the instant death of Santiago and Escala, and injury to several others. Leticia
and Allan Garcia were among the injured passengers.
Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg. They rushed her to the
provincial hospital in Cabanatuan City where she treatment. After three days, she
was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where she was confined for
more than a month.3 She underwent an operation for partial hip prosthesis.4
Allan, on the other hand, broke a leg. He was also given emergency treatment at
the provincial hospital.
Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and
Julio Recontique for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. 5 Leticia sued
as an injured passenger of Baliwag and as mother of Allan. At the time of the
complaint, Allan was a minor, hence, the suit initiated by his parents in his favor.
Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the mishap.
Baliwag alleged that the accident was caused solely by the fault and negligence of
A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique. Baliwag charged that Recontique failed to
place an early warning device at the corner of the disabled cargo truck to warn on
coming vehicles.6 On the other hand, A & J Trading and Recontique alleged that the
accident was the result of the negligence and reckless driving of Santiago, bus driver
of Baliwag.7
After hearing, the trial court found all the defendants liable, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
In view thereof, the Court holds that both defendants should be
held liable; the defendant Baliwag Transit, Inc. for having failed
to deliver the plaintiff and her son to their point of destination
safely in violation of plaintiff's and defendant Baliwag Transit's
contractual relation.
The defendant A & J and Julio Recontique for failure to provide its
cargo truck with an early warning device in violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law.8
The trial court ordered Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique to pay jointly and
severally the Garcia spouses the following: (1) P25,000,00 hospitalization and
medication fee, (2) P450,000.00 loss of earnings in eight (8) years, (3) P2,000.00
for the hospitalization of their son Allan Garcia, (4) P50,000.00 moral damages, and
(5) P30,000.00 attorney's fee.9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by absolving A &
J Trading from liability and by reducing the award of attorney's fees to P10,000.00
and loss of earnings to P300,000.00, respectively. 10
Baliwag filed the present petition for review raising the following issues:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in absolving A & J Trading from
liability and holding Baliwag solely liable for the injuries suffered
by Leticia and Allan Garcia in the accident?
2. Is the amount of damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to
the Garcia spouses correct?
We affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
I
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed to
deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and sound.
A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due
regard for all the circumstances. 11 In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the
common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.
Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding
of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption
may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence
as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. 12
The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised extra ordinary
diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its driver's recklessness.
Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a very high speed despite the
drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The passengers pleaded for its driver to
slow down, but their plea was ignored. 13 Leticia also revealed that the driver was
smelling of liquor. 14 She could smell him as she was seated right behind the driver.
Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified that immediately before the collision, the bus
driver was conversing with a co-employee. 15 All these prove the bus driver's wanton
disregard for the physical safety of his passengers, which makes Baliwag as a
common carrier liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries
to passengers through the negligence or willfull acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon proof that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection or supervision of their employees.
Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was caused solely by
the negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique. It harps on their alleged non
use of an early warning device as testified to by Col. Demetrio dela Cruz, the station
commander of Gapan, Nueva Ecija who investigated the incident, and Francisco
Romano, the bus conductor.
The records do not bear out Baliwag's contention. Col. dela Cruz and Romano
testified that they did not see any early warning device at the scene of the
accident. 16 They were referring to the triangular reflectorized plates in red and
yellow issued by the Land Transportation Office. However, the evidence shows that
Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near
the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning
device. 17 This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code, to wit:
(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. —
Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters
away shall be displayed at the corner of the vehicle whenever
such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-
lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.
Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times
with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either
pasted, painted or attached at its front and back which shall
likewise be visible at night at least one hundred meters away. No
vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in
this subsection shall be registered. (emphasis supplied)
Baliwag's argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially comply
with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law clearly allows the use not only of an
early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking
lights or flares visible one hundred meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself
admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the reflectorized
plates. 18 No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver,
Recontique.
Anent this factual issue, the analysis of evidence made by the Court of Appeals
deserves our concurrence, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, both the injured passengers of the Baliwag
involved in the accident testified that they saw some sort of
kerosene or a torch on the rear portion of the truck before the
accident. Baliwag Transit's conductor attempted to defeat such
testimony by declaring that he noticed no early warning device in
front of the truck.
Among the testimonies offered by the witnesses who were
present at the scene of the accident, we rule to uphold the
affirmative testimonies given by the two injured passengers and
give less credence to the testimony of the bus conductor who
solely testified that no such early warning device exists.
The testimonies of injured passengers who may well be
considered as disinterested witness appear to be natural and more
probable than the testimony given by; Francisco Romano who is
undoubtedly interested in the outcome of the case, being the
conductor of the defendant-appellant Baliwag Transit Inc.
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
It must be borne in mind that the situation then prevailing at the
time of the accident was admittedly drizzly and all dark. This being
so, it would be improbable and perhaps impossible on the part of
the truck helper without the torch nor the kerosene to remove the
flat tires of the truck . Moreover, witness including the bus
conductor himself admitted that the passengers shouted, that
they are going to bump before the collision which consequently
caused the bus driver to apply the brake 3 to 4 meters away from
the truck. Again, without the kerosene nor the torch in front of
the truck, it would be improbable for the driver, more so the
passengers to notice the truck to be bumped by the bus
considering the darkness of the place at the time of the accident.
xxx xxx xxx
While it is true that the investigating officer testified that he found
no early warning device at the time of his investigation, We rule
to give less credence to such testimony insofar as he himself
admitted on cross examination that he did not notice the presence
of any kerosene lamp at the back of the truck because when he
arrived at the scene of the accident, there were already many
people surrounding the place (TSN, Aug. 22, 1989, p. 13). He
further admitted that there exists a probability that the lights of
the truck may have been smashed by the bus at the time of the
accident considering the location of the truck where its rear
portion was connected with the front portion of the bus (TSN,
March 29, 1985, pp. Investigator's testimony therefore did not
confirm nor deny the existence of such warning device, making
his testimony of little probative value. 19
We now review the amount of damages awarded to the Garcia spouses.
First, the propriety of the amount awarded as hospitalization and medical fees. The
award of P25,000.00 is not supported by the evidence on record. The Garcias
presented receipts marked as Exhibits "B-1" to "B-42" but their total amounted only
to P5,017.74. To be sure, Leticia testified as to the extra amount spent for her
medical needs but without more reliable evidence, her lone testimony cannot justify
the award of P25,000.00. To prove actual damages, the best evidence available to
the injured party must be presented. The court cannot rely on uncorroborated
testimony whose truth is suspect, but must depend upon competent proof that
damages have been actually suffered. 20 Thus, we reduce the actual damages for
medical and hospitalization expenses to P5,017.74.
Second, we find as reasonable the award of P300,000.00 representing Leticia's lost
earnings. Before the accident, Leticia was engaged in embroidery, earning P5,000.00
per month. 21 Her injuries forced her to stop working. Considering the nature and
extent of her injuries and the length of time it would take her to recover, 22 we find
it proper that Baliwag should compensate her lost income for five (5) years. 23
Third, the award of moral damages is in accord with law. In a breach of contract of
carriage, moral damages are recoverable if the carrier, through its agent, acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. 24 The evidence show the gross negligence of the driver
of Baliwag bus which amounted to bad faith. Without doubt, Leticia and Allan
experienced physical suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety by reason of the
accident. Leticia underwent an operation to replace her broken hip bone with a metal
plate. She was confined at the National Orthopedic Hospital for 45 days. The young
Allan was also confined in the hospital for his foot injury. Contrary to the contention
of Baliwag, the decision of the trial court as affirmed by, the Court of Appeals
awarded moral damages to Antonio and Leticia Garcia not in their capacity as
parents of Allan. Leticia was given moral damages as an injured party. Allan was
also granted moral damages as an injured party but because of his minority, the
award in his favor has to be given to his father who represented him in the suit.
Finally, we find the award of attorney's fees justified. The complaint for damages
was instituted by the Garcia spouses on December 15, 1982, following the
unjustified refusal of Baliwag to settle their claim. The Decision was promulgated by
the trial court only on January 29, 1991 or about nine years later. Numerous
pleadings were filed before the trial court, the appellate court and to this Court.
Given the complexity of the case and the amount of damages involved, 25 the award
of attorney's fee for P10,000.00 is just and reasonable.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV-
31246 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION reducing the actual damages for
hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28692 July 30, 1982
CONRADA VDA. DE ABETO, CARME0000LO ABETO, CECILIA ABETO,
CONCEPCION ABETO, MARIA ABETO, ESTELA ABETO, PERLA ABETO,
PATRIA ABETO and ALBERTO ABETO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INCORPORATED, defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J..
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo finding that
defendant-appellant "did not exercise extraordinary diligence or prudence as far as
human foresight can provide ... but on the contrary showed negligence and
indifference for the safety of the passengers that it was bound to transport, …" and
for the death of Judge Quirico Abeto, defendant- appellant was ordered to pay
plaintiffs, the heirs of Judge Abeto, the following:
1st — For the death of Judge Quirico Abeto, the amount of
P6,000.00;
2nd — For the loss of his earning capacity, for 4.75 (4 ¾) years
at the rate of P7,200.00 per annum in the amount of P34,200.00;
3rd — For moral damages in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of
P10,000.00;
4th — For actual damages in the sum of P2,000.00 minus P400.00
received under Voucher Exhibit 'H' the amount of Pl,600.00;
5th — For attorney's fees, the sum of P6,000.00 and/or the total
sum of P57,800.00 and; To pay the costs of this proceedings.
Plaintiff's evidence shows that about 5:30 in the afternoon of November 23, 1960,
Judge Quirico Abeto, with the necessary tickets, boarded the Philippine Air Lines' PI-
C133 plane at the Mandurriao Airport, Iloilo City for Manila. He was listed as the No.
18 passenger in its Load Manifest (Exhibit A). The plane which would then take two
hours from Iloilo to Manila did not reach its destination and the next day there was
news that the plane was missing. After three weeks, it was ascertained that the
plane crashed at Mt. Baco, Province of Mindoro. All the passengers, including Judge
Abeto, must have been killed instantly and their remains were scattered all over the
area. Among the articles recovered on the site of the crash was a leather bag with
the name "Judge Quirico Abeto. " (Exhibit C.)
Judge Abeto, prior to the plane crash, was a Technical Assistant in the Office of the
President receiving an annual compensation of P7,200.00; and before that, has held
the various positions in the government, namely: Municipal President of Iloilo;
Provincial Fiscal of Antique, Negros Occidental and Cebu; Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and Secretary of Justice. He was in good health before the
incident even if he was already 79 years old at that time.
Plaintiff-appellee Conrada Vda. de Abeto was appointed administratrix of the estate
of Judge Abeto. The other plaintiffs-appellees are the children of the deceased.
When they received the news of the plane crash, Mrs. Abeto was shocked and until
it was ascertained that the plane had crashed three weeks after, she could not sleep
and eat. She felt sick and was miserable after that. The members of the family also
suffered.
Personal belongings which were lost amounted to P300.00. Burial expenses of the
late judge was P1,700.00.
When defendant-appellant would not hear demands for settlement of damages,
plaintiffs-appellees were compelled to hire counsel for the institution and
prosecution of this case.
Defendant-appellant tried to prove that the plane crash at Mt. Baco was beyond the
control of the pilot. The plane at the time of the crash was airworthy for the purpose
of conveying passengers across the country as shown by the certificate of
airworthiness issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). There was
navigational error but no negligence or malfeasance on the part of the pilot. The
plane had undergone 1,822 pre- flight checks, 364 thorough checks, 957 terminating
checks and 501 after maintenance checks. These checks were part of the quality
control operation of defendant airline Further, deviation from its prescribed route
was due to the bad weather conditions between Mt. Baco and Romblon and strong
winds which caused the plane to drift to Mt. Baco. Under the circumstances,
appellant argues that the crash was a fortuitous event and, therefore, defendant-
appellant cannot be held liable under the provisions of Article 1174 of the New Civil
Code. Besides, appellant tried to prove that it had exercised all the cares, skill and
diligence required by law on that particular flight in question.
The trial court, finding for the plaintiffs, said:
The Court after a thorough perusal of the evidences, testimonial
and documentaries submitted by both parties has come into the
conclusion that the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs have
established the following significant facts which proved the
negligence of the defendant's pilot of the plane on that flight- in
question.
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
1st — That the Pilot of the plane disobeyed instruction given in
not following the route of Amber 1 prescribed by the CAA in
Violation of Standard Regulation.
Second — The defendant failed to perform the pre-flight test on
plane PIC-133 before the same took off from Mandurriao Airport
to Manila in order to find out a possible defect of the plane.
Third — When the defendant allowed during the flight in question,
student Officer Rodriguez on training as proved when his body
was found on the plane's cockpit with its microphone hanging still
on his left leg.
Fourth — When the Pilot during the flight in question failed or did
not report his position over or abeam Romblon which is a
compulsory reporting point.
These facts as established by the evidence of the plaintiff lead to
the inevitable conclusion that the defendant did not exercise
extraordinary diligence or prudence as far as human foresight can
provide imposed upon by the Law, but on the contrary showed
negligence and indifference for the safety of the passengers that
it was bound to transport. By the very evidence of the defendant,
as shown by the deposition of one Jose Abanilla, dated December
13, 1963, Section Chief of the Actuarial Department of the Insular
Life Insurance Company regarding life expectancy through
American experience, the late Judge Abeto at the age of 79 would
still live or have a life expectancy of 4.75 years.
Appealing to this Court, defendant claimed that the trial court erred:
I
... in finding, contrary to the evidence, that the appellant was
negligent;
III
... in not finding that the appellant, in the conduct and operation
of PI-C133, exercised its statutory obligation over the passengers
of PI C133 of extraordinary diligence as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person with due regard for all the circumstances and in
not finding that the crash of PI-C133 was caused by fortuitous
events;
... in awarding damages to the appellees; and
IV
... in not finding that appellant acted in good faith and exerted
efforts to minimize damages.
The issue before Us in this appeal is whether or not the defendant is liable for
violation of its contract of carriage.
The provisions of the Civil Code on this question of liability are clear and explicit.
Article 1733 binds common carriers, "from the nature of their business and by
reasons of public policy, ... to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance ... for
the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances
of each case." Article 1755 establishes the standard of care required of a common
carrier, which is, "to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
for all the circumstances." Article 1756 fixes the burden of proof by providing that
"in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." Lastly, Article 1757
states that "the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers ...
cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise."
The prescribed airway of plane PI-C133 that afternoon of November 23, 1960, with
Capt. de Mesa, as the pilot, was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, denominated as airway
"Amber l," and the prescribed elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The fact is, the
plane did not take the designated route because it was some 30 miles to the west
when it crashed at Mt. Baco. According to defendant's witness, Ramon A. Pedroza,
Administrative Assistant of the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., this tragic crash would have
not happened had the pilot continued on the route indicated. Hereunder is Mr.
Pedroza's testimony on this point:
Q Had the pilot continued on the route
indicated, Amber A-1 there would have been no
crash, obviously?
A Yes, Your Honor
ATTY. HILADO:
(To the witness)
Q Because Mt. Baco is 30 miles from Amber I?
A Yes,sir.(TSN,p.75,Oct.22,1963 hearing)
xxx xxx xxx
And, Assistant Director Cesar Mijares of the Civil Aeronautics Administration testified
that the pilot of said plane was "off course."
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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set

Q But the fact is that you found him out, that exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved.
he was off course? (Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal, 22 SCRA 171.)
A Yes, sir. The total of the different items which the lower court adjudged herein appellant to
Q And off course, you mean that he did not pay the plaintiffs is P57,800.00. The judgment of the court a quo is modified in the
follow the route prescribed for him? sense that the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the said amount to the plaintiffs,
with legal interest thereon from the finality of this judgment. With costs against
A Yes, sir.
defendant-appellant.
Q And the route for him to follow was Amber A-
l?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the route for Iloilo direct to Manila, is
passing Romblon to Manila?
A Yes, passing Romblon to Manila.
Q And you found that he was not at all following
the route to Romblon to Manila?
A Yes, sir.
Q You know Mr. Witness that a disregard or,
violation, or disregard of instruction is
punishable by law?
A Yes,sir. (TSN,pp.247-248,Dec. 20, 1963)
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the pilot did not follow the designated route for his
flight between Romblon and Manila. The weather was clear and
he was supposed to cross airway "Amber I" over Romblon;
instead, he made a straight flight to Manila in violation of air traffic
rules.
At any rate, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by appellant as to how the
accident occurred, the presumption is, it is at fault.
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought
for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier
assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be
suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault
or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). This is an

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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-50076 September 14, 1990
NORBERTO QUISUMBING, SR., and GUNTHER LOEFFLER petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Having met with no success in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the Court
of Appeals, the petitioners are now in this Court in a third and final attempt to
recover from the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (hereafter, simply PAL) the value of jewelry,
other valuables and money taken from them by four (4) armed robbers on board
one of the latter's airplanes while on a flight from Mactan City to Manila, as well as
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The petitioners accept the correctness of the basic facts adopted by the Court of
Appeals from the judgment of the Court of First Instance, to wit: 1
1. . . . Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Leoffler were among
the of ... (PAL's) Fokker 'Friendship' PIC-536 plane in its flight of
November 6,1968 which left Mactan City at about 7:30 in the
evening with Manila for its destination.
2. After the plane had taken off, Florencio O. Villarin, a Senior NBI
Agent who was also a passenger of the said plane, noticed a
certain 'Zaldy,' a suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez, seated at
the front seat near the door leading to the cockpit of the plane. A
check by Villarin with the passenger's ticket in the possession of
flight Stewardess Annie Bontigao, who was seated at the last seat
right row, revealed that 'Zaldy' had used the name 'Cardente,' one
of his aliases known to Villarin. Villarin also came to know from
the stewardess that 'Zaldy' had three companions on board the
plane."
3. Villarin then scribbled a note addressed to the pilot of the plane
requesting the latter to contact NBI duty agents in Manila for the
said agents to ask the Director of the NBI to send about six NBI
agents to meet the plane because the suspect in the killing of
Judge Valdez was on board (Exh. 'G'). The said note was handed
by Villarin to the stewardess who in tum gave the same to the
pilot.
4. After receiving the note, which was about 15 minutes after take
off, the pilot of the plane, Capt. Luis Bonnevie, Jr., came out of
the cockpit and sat beside Villarin at the rear portion of the plane
and explained that he could not send the message because it
would be heard by all ground aircraft stations. Villarin, however,
told the pilot of the danger of commission of violent acts on board
the plane by the notorious 'Zaldy' and his three companions.
5. While the pilot and Villarin were talking, 'Zaldy' and one of his
companions walked to the rear and stood behind them. Capt.
Bonnevie then stood up and went back to the cockpit. 'Zaldy' and
his companions returned to their seats, but after a few minutes
they moved back to the rear throwing ugly looks at Villarin who,
sensing danger, stood up and went back to his original seat across
the aisle on the second to the last seat near the window. 'Zaldy
and his companion likewise went back to their respective seats in
front.
6. Soon thereafter an exchange of gunshots ensued between
Villarin and 'Zaldy' and the latter's companions. 'Zaldy' announced
to the passengers and the pilots in the cockpit that it was a hold-
up and ordered the pilot not to send any SOS. The hold-uppers
divested passengers of their belongings.
7. Specifically, ... Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. was divested of
jewelries and cash in the total amount of P18,650.00 out of which
recoveries were made amounting to P4,550.00. . . Gunther
Leoffler was divested of a wrist watch, cash and a wallet in the
total of P1,700.00. As a result of the incident ... Quisumbing,
Sr.suffered shock, because a gun had been pointed at him by one
of the holduppers.
8. Upon landing at the Manila International Airport. 'Zaldy' and his
three companions succeeded in escaping.
Demands were thereafter made on PAL by Quisumbing and Loeffler "to indemnify
... (them) on their aforesaid loss, but ... (PAL) refused ... (averring that) it is not
liable to (them) in law or in fact."2
Contending that the "aforesaid loss is a result of breach of ... (PAL's) contractual
obligation to carry ... (them) and their belongings and effects to their Manila
destination without loss or damage, and constitutes a serious dereliction of ... (PAL's)
legal duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the same." ,
Quisumbing and Loeffler brought suit against PAL in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, as stated in this opinion's opening paragraph, to recover the value of the
13 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
property lost by them to the robbers as well as moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 3 The plaintiffs declared that their suit was
instituted "... pursuant to Civil Code articles 1754, 998, 2000 and 2001 and on the
ground that in relation to said Civil Code article 2001 the complained-of act of the
armed robbers is not a force majeure, as the 'use of arms' or 'irresistible force' was
not taken advantage of by said armed robbers in gaining entrance to defendant's ill-
fated plane in questions. And, with respect to said Civil Code article 1998, it is not
essential that the lost effects and belongings of plaintiffs were actually delivered to
defendant's plane personnel or that the latter were notified thereof (De los Santos
v. Tamn Khey, [CA] 58 O.G. 7693)."4
PAL filed answer denying liability, alleging inter alia that the robbery during the flight
and after the aircraft was forcibly landed at the Manila Airport did indeed
constitute force majeure, and neither of the plaintiffs had notified PAL "or its crew
or employees that they were in possession of cash, German marks and valuable
jewelries and watches" or surrendered said items to "the crew or personnel on board
the aircraft."5
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment 'dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint with costs against ... (them)." 6 The Court opined that since the plaintiffs
"did not notify defendant or its employees that they were in possession of the cash,
jewelries, and the wallet they are now claiming," the very provision of law invoked
by them, Article 1998 of the Civil Code, denies them any recourse against PAL. The
Court also pointed out that-
... while it is true that the use of gems was not taken advantage
of by the robbers in gaining entrance to defendant's ill-fated
plane, the armed robbery that took place constitutes force
majeure for which defendant is not liable because the robbers
were able to gain entrance to the plane with the guns they used
already in their possession, which fact could not have been
prevented nor avoided by the defendant since it was not
authorized to search its passengers for firearms and deadly
weapons as shown in Exhibits '6', '7', '8,' and '8-A.' As its robbery
constitutes force majeure, defendant is not liable.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals.7 The Court affirmed the trial court's
judgment.8 It rejected the argument that "the use of arms or ... irresistible force"
referred to in Article 2001 constitutes force majeure only if resorted to gain entry
into the airplane, and not if it attends "the robbery itself." The Court ruled that under
the facts, "the highjacking-robbery was force majeure," observing that —
... hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of
firepower and violent fury. Firearms, hand-grenades, dynamite,
and explosives are introduced into the airplane surreptitiously and
with the utmost cunning and stealth, although there is an
occasional use of innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered
unless a plane is given to the hijackers' complete disposal. The
objective of modern-day hijackers is to display the irresistible
force amounting to force majeure only when it is most effective
and that is when the jetliner is winging its way at Himalayan
altitudes and ill-advised heroics by either crew or passengers
would send the multi-million peso airplane and the priceless lives
of all its occupants into certain death and destruction. ...
The Appellate Court also ruled that in light of the evidence PAL could not be faulted
for want of diligence, particularly for failing "to take positive measures to implement
Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying
firearms on board aircrafts;" and that "the absence of coded transmissions, the
amateurish behaviour of the pilot in dealing with the NBI agent, the allegedly open
cockpit door, and the failure to return to Mactan, in the light of the circumstances
of the case ..., were not negligent acts sufficient to overcome the force majeure
nature of the armed robbery." In fact, the Court went on to says, 9
... it is illusive to assume that had these precautions been taken,
the hijacking or the robbery would not have succeeded. The
mandatory use of the most sophisticated electronic detection
devices and magnetometers, the imposition of severe penalties,
the development of screening procedures, the compilation of
hijacker behavioural profiles, the assignment of sky marshals, and
the weight of outraged world opinion may have minimized
hijackings but all these have proved ineffective against truly
determined hijackers. World experience shows that if a group of
armed hijackers want to take over a plane in flight, they can elude
the latest combined government and airline industry measures.
And as our own experience in Zamboanga City illustrates, the use
of force to overcome hijackers, results in the death and injury of
innocent passengers and crew members. We are not in the least
bit suggesting that the Philippine Airlines should not do everything
humanly possible to protect passengers from hijackers' acts. We
merely state that where the defendant has faithfully complied with
the requirements of government agencies and adhered to the
established procedures and precautions of the airline industry at
any particular time, its failure to take certain steps that a
passenger in hindsight believes should have been taken is not the
negligence or misconduct which mingles with force majeure as an
active and cooperative cause.
14 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set

Under the circumstance of the instant case, the acts of the airline
and its crew cannot be faulted as negligence. The hijackers had
already shown their willingness to kill. One passenger was in fact
killed and another survived gunshot wounds. The lives of the rest
of the passengers and crew were more important than their
properties. Cooperation with the hijackers until they released their
hostages at the runway end near the South Superhighway was
dictated by the circumstances.
Insisting that the evidence demonstrates negligence on the part of the PAL crew
"occurring before and exposing them to hijacking," Quisumbing and Loeffler have
come up to this Court praying that the judgments of the trial Court and the Court of
Appeals be reversed and another rendered in their favor. Once again, the issue will
be resolved against them.
A careful analysis of the record in relation to the memoranda and other pleadings of
the parties, convinces this Court of the correctness of the essential conclusion of
both the trial and appellate courts that the evidence does indeed fail to prove any
want of diligence on the part of PAL, or that, more specifically, it had failed to comply
with applicable regulations or universally accepted and observed procedures to
preclude hijacking; and that the particular acts singled out by the petitioners as
supposedly demonstrative of negligence were, in the light of the circumstances of
the case, not in truth negligent acts "sufficient to overcome the force majeure nature
of the armed robbery." The Court quite agrees, too, with the Appellate Tribunal's
wry observation that PAL's "failure to take certain steps that a passenger in hindsight
believes should have been taken is not the negligence or misconduct which mingles
with force majeure as an active and cooperative cause."
No success can therefore attend petitioners' appeal, not only because they wish to
have a review and modification of factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals, which
established and uniformly observed axiom proscribes, 10 but also because those
factual conclusions have in this Court's view been correctly drawn from the proofs
on record.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,
ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian,
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate
of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City,
driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen
passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan
Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right
of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the
witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left
side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the
four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was
running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road
and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way
they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated
beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind
them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of
the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans
from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said
they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether
or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the
conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers
trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in
the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including
the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned,
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis,
spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and
around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the
call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus
were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his
widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children,
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial,
the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as
attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to
Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the appeal to
us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its
passengers and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the
pertinent codal provisions:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extra ordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth
in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers
16 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped
the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of
transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry
Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that
there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was
speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that
according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned
after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the
blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the
velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable.
The only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but
rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who
were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must
have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We
disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is
as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected
and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some
highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire
and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the
circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it
was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them,
and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not
available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can
also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its
conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known
that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt
and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor
would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring
the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the
carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles
1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning
capacity of the deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage
award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would
constitute satisfactory compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and other
damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees, and assessing
the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court, but also
in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs prepared by them,
the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS for the loss
of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be
disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to
the evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her,
was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano
17 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set

Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus
inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus changed immediately
because they were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the
driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his instructions. If
this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not taken
the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed
the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do,
probably, despite his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not
have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove
his vehicle negligently, resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical
injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of their goods, and yet the
criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was
provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on whose
testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were
reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several witnesses,
passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of
the said driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion
of the safety of passengers on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the
trial court are increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800)
PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the
decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.

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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16086 May 29, 1964
M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC. and MARTIN BUENA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO MONSERRAT and MARTA
CONSIGNADO, respondents.
BENGZON, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the Laguna court of first instance, the spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Marta
Consignado sued M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc., and Martin Buena to recover
damages for the death of their four-year old daughter Victoria.
In the morning of May 22, 1954, said child and her parents were paying passengers
in a bus of defendant transportation company driven by co-defendant Buena, bound
for Antipolo, Rizal. In Sta. Rosa, Laguna, while the bus was running, a rear tire
exploded, blasting a hole in the very place where Victoria was standing in front of
her mother. As a result, the child fell through the hole, and died that same morning
from injuries sustained in the fall.1äwphï1.ñët
The court of first instance dismissed the complaint on the ground that (1) the
accident was not due to negligence of the carrier, but was an act of God; and (2)
even if negligence was attributable to defendants, their liability had been discharged,
as evidenced by Exhibits 2 and 3 quoted in the footnote. 1
On appeal by plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, upon the finding
that (1) defendants failed to prove the extraordinary diligence required of carriers;
and (2) Exhibits 2 and 3 did not effect a waiver of plaintiffs' right to damages. Said
appellate court, therefore, required defendants to pay plaintiffs P6,000.00 as
indemnity for the child's death; P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as
attorney's fees, with interest from the date of its decision, (minus the P150.00 that
had been given to plaintiff Guillermo Monserrat, thru Exhibit 3).
In their petition for review by certiorari, the carrier and the driver raise the following
issues: (1) whether in a contract of carriage breached by the passenger's death, his
parents may be granted moral damages; and (2) whether the sum of P6,000.00 may
be awarded as death indemnity for a child passenger. In their brief, they pose the
following questions in addition to the above issues; (3) was there a contract of
carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation company; (4)
have petitioners rebutted the presumption that they have been negligent; (5) was
the bus crowded; (6) was the bus running fast when the tire exploded; (7) what
caused the bursting of the tire; (8) was the bus floor weak; (9) was the blow-out of
the tire caso fortuito; and (10) was petitioners' liability cancelled by Exhibits 2 and
3?
The alleged lack of a contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner
transportation company, if true, is a complete defense against claimants' cause of
action. However, the issue is now inarguable, it being partly factual, on which the
appellate court made its finding.
Respondents and the child were paying passengers in the bus; petitioners were duty
bound to transport them, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons (Art.
1755, New Civil Code). Therein they failed. The child died because the floor of the
bus gave way; this reinforces the presumption that petitioners had neglected to
provide a safe conveyance (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). Evidence of the required
extraordinary diligence was not introduced to rebut the presumption.
On the contrary, the appellate court found that the bus was overcrowded and
overspeeding, and the floor thereof was weak — persuasive indications of
negligence; and reasoned out that the tire exploded due to one or a combination of
the following: "The tire was not strong and safe; the air pressure was not properly
checked; the load was heavy; the excessive speed of the bus must have overstrained
the tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the tire which could have expanded
the already compressed air therein."2
Petitioners venture to guess that it was due either to accidental puncture by a sharp
instrument, as a nail, or to latent defect in the tire. Evidence should have been —
but was not — presented to establish such defense.
Even conceding that the tire blow-out was accidental, we could still hold the carrier
liable for failure to provide a safe floor in the bus.
Exhibits 2 and 3 are not proof that petitioners have discharged their legal liability to
claimants. What is expressed there is the latter's belief — clearly erroneous — that
petitioners are not liable to them and acknowledgment of the voluntary help
extended by petitioner transportation company. The belief is baseless. That
respondents entertained such an ill-founded impression is not to be wondered at.
They are ignorant, illiterate, indigent, and, at the time they signed Exhibits 2 and 3,
thoroughly confused and distracted by the death of their child.
The minimum death indemnity is P3,0003, although this Court has in various
instances granted P6,000.00. As for moral damages, the carrier is liable therefor to
the parents of a child who meets death while a passenger in any of the carrier's
vehicles (Arts. 2206 and 1764, New Civil Code). Since respondents are indigents,
and have litigated as paupers, they should be allowed attorney's fees of P500.00.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
19 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990
BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO
RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division), RICARDO BETER,
SERGIA BETER, TEOFILO RAUTRAUT and ZOETERA
RAUTRAUT, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City dismissing
the private respondents' complaint for collection of "a sum of money" and finding
the petitioners solidarily liable for damages in the total amount of One Hundred
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). The petitioners also question the appellate
court's resolution denying a motion for reconsideration.
On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven by
Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the death of
passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de
Oro City passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked
up a passenger; that about fifteen (15) minutes later, a passenger at the rear portion
suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the
passengers; that when the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former already dead as a result of
head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her
death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the
bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and
Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter are
the parents of Ornominio while Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera [should be Zotera]
Rautraut are the parents of Narcisa) filed a complaint for "sum of money" against
Bachelor Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera.
In their answer, the petitioners denied liability for the death of Ornominio Beter and
Narcisa Rautraut. They alleged that ... the driver was able to transport his
passengers safely to their respective places of destination except Ornominio Beter
and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the bus without the knowledge and consent,
much less, the fault of the driver and conductor and the defendants in this case; the
defendant corporation had exercised due diligence in the choice of its employees to
avoid as much as possible accidents; the incident on August 1, 1980 was not a traffic
accident or vehicular accident; it was an incident or event very much beyond the
control of the defendants; defendants were not parties to the incident complained
of as it was an act of a third party who is not in any way connected with the
defendants and of which the latter have no control and supervision; ..." (Rollo, pp.
112-113).i•t•c-aüsl
After due trial, the trial court issued an order dated August 8, 1985 dismissing the
complaint.
Upon appeal however, the trial court's decision was reversed and set aside. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered finding the appellees jointly and
solidarily liable to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the following
amounts:
1) To the heirs of Ornominio Beter, the amount of Seventy Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) in loss of earnings and support,
moral damages, straight death indemnity and attorney's fees;
and,
2) To the heirs of Narcisa Rautraut, the amount of Forty Five
Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) for straight death indemnity, moral
damages and attorney's fees. Costs against appellees. (Rollo, pp.
71-72)
The petitioners now pose the following questions
What was the proximate cause of the whole incident? Why were
the passengers on board the bus panicked (sic) and why were
they shoving one another? Why did Narcisa Rautraut and
Ornominio Beter jump off from the running bus?
The petitioners opine that answers to these questions are material to arrive at "a
fair, just and equitable judgment." (Rollo, p. 5) They claim that the assailed decision
is based on a misapprehension of facts and its conclusion is grounded on
speculation, surmises or conjectures.
As regards the proximate cause of the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut, the petitioners maintain that it was the act of the passenger who ran
amuck and stabbed another passenger of the bus. They contend that the stabbing
incident triggered off the commotion and panic among the passengers who pushed
one another and that presumably out of fear and moved by that human instinct of
self-preservation Beter and Rautraut jumped off the bus while the bus was still
20 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
running resulting in their untimely death." (Rollo, p. 6) Under these circumstances,
the petitioners asseverate that they were not negligent in the performance of their
duties and that the incident was completely and absolutely attributable to a third
person, the passenger who ran amuck, for without his criminal act, Beter and
Rautraut could not have been subjected to fear and shock which compelled them to
jump off the running bus. They argue that they should not be made liable for
damages arising from acts of third persons over whom they have no control or
supervision.
Furthermore, the petitioners maintain that the driver of the bus, before, during and
after the incident was driving cautiously giving due regard to traffic rules, laws and
regulations. The petitioners also argue that they are not insurers of their passengers
as ruled by the trial court.
The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of
contract of carriage. The applicable provisions of law under the New Civil Code are
as follows:
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence, from
the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor Express, Inc. is
bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus
belonging to petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of the bus,
suffered injuries which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1756
of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. is presumed to have acted
negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in
accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.
Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut on its
posture that the death of the said passengers was caused by a third person who
was beyond its control and supervision. In effect, the petitioner, in order to
overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law, states that the
vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was
caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not
have any control.
Article 1174 of the present Civil Code states:
Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulations, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen, or which though
foreseen, were inevitable.
The above-mentioned provision was substantially copied from Article 1105 of the
old Civil Code which states"
No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or
which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the
cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in
which the obligation itself imposes liability.
In the case of Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657 [1924]), we defined "events" which
cannot be foreseen and which, having been foreseen, are inevitable in the following
manner:
... The Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an
effort to define the term 'caso fortuito' and hold that the two
expressions are synonymous. (Manresa Comentarios al Codigo
Civil Español, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scaevola, Codigo Civil, vol.
19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The antecedent to Article 1105 is found in Law II, Title 33, Partida
7, which defines caso fortuito as 'occasion que acaese por
aventura de que non se puede ante ver. E son estos,
derrivamientos de casas e fuego que enciende a so ora, e
quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca de ladrones' (An event that
takes place by incident and could not have been foreseen.
21 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robbers ...)
Escriche defines caso fortuito as an unexpected event or act of
God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted, such as floods,
torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion,
insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents
and other occurrences of a similar nature.
In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the
Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: 'In a legal sense and,
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents
the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the
human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor. (5) Enciclopedia Juridica Española, 309)
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary
circumstance independent of the will of the obligor or of his
employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. ...
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it
triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the
passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling
off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The
sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within
the context of force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case
of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure.
The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries
resulting from such accident. Thus, as early as 1912, we ruled:
From all the foregoing, it is concluded that the defendant is not
liable for the loss and damage of the goods shipped on the lorcha
Pilar by the Chinaman, Ong Bien Sip, inasmuch as such loss and
damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force
majeure, and there was no negligence or lack of care and
diligence on the part of the defendant company or its agents. (Tan
Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. 152 [1912]; Emphasis
supplied).
This principle was reiterated in a more recent case, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court(167 SCRA 379 [1988]), wherein we ruled:
... [F]or their defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper
the accident must be due to natural causes and exclusively
without human intervention. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the next question to be determined is whether or not the petitioner's
common carrier observed extraordinary diligence to safeguard the lives of its
passengers.
In this regard the trial court and the appellate court arrived at conflicting factual
findings.
The trial court found the following facts:
The parties presented conflicting evidence as to how the two
deceased Narcisa Rautruat and Ornominio Beter met their deaths.
However, from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, the Court
could not see why the two deceased could have fallen off the bus
when their own witnesses testified that when the commotion
ensued inside the bus, the passengers pushed and shoved each
other towards the door apparently in order to get off from the bus
through the door. But the passengers also could not pass through
the door because according to the evidence the door was locked.
On the other hand, the Court is inclined to give credence to the
evidence adduced by the defendants that when the commotion
ensued inside the bus, the two deceased panicked and, in state
of shock and fear, they jumped off from the bus by passing
through the window.
It is the prevailing rule and settled jurisprudence that
transportation companies are not insurers of their passengers.
The evidence on record does not show that defendants' personnel
were negligent in their duties. The defendants' personnel have
every right to accept passengers absent any manifestation of
violence or drunkenness. If and when such passengers harm other
passengers without the knowledge of the transportation
company's personnel, the latter should not be faulted. (Rollo, pp.
46-47)
A thorough examination of the records, however, show that there are material facts
ignored by the trial court which were discussed by the appellate court to arrive at a
22 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
different conclusion. These circumstances show that the petitioner common carrier
was negligent in the provision of safety precautions so that its passengers may be
transported safely to their destinations. The appellate court states:
A critical eye must be accorded the lower court's conclusions of
fact in its tersely written ratio decidendi. The lower court
concluded that the door of the bus was closed; secondly, the
passengers, specifically the two deceased, jumped out of the
window. The lower court therefore concluded that the defendant
common carrier is not liable for the death of the said passengers
which it implicitly attributed to the unforeseen acts of the
unidentified passenger who went amuck.
There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the
solitary door of the bus was locked as to prevent the passengers
from passing through. Leonila Cullano, testifying for the defense,
clearly stated that the conductor opened the door when the
passengers were shouting that the bus stop while they were in a
state of panic. Sergia Beter categorically stated that she actually
saw her son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the
force of the onrushing passengers.
Pedro Collango, on the other hand, testified that he shut the door
after the last passenger had boarded the bus. But he had quite
conveniently neglected to say that when the passengers had
panicked, he himself panicked and had gone to open the door.
Portions of the testimony of Leonila Cullano, quoted below, are
illuminating:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said the conductor opened the door, the door at the
front or rear portion of the bus?
A Front door.
Q And these two persons whom you said alighted, where did they
pass, the fron(t) door or rear door?
A Front door.
xxx xxx xxx
(Tsn., p. 4, Aug. 8, 1984)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened after there was a commotion at the rear portion
of the bus?
A When the commotion occurred, I stood up and I noticed that
there was a passenger who was sounded (sic). The conductor
panicked because the passengers were shouting 'stop, stop'. The
conductor opened the bus.'
(Tsn. p. 3, August 8, 1984).
Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the deceased
passengers jumped from the window when it was entirely possible
for them to have alighted through the door. The lower court's
reliance on the testimony of Pedro Collango, as the conductor and
employee of the common carrier, is unjustified, in the light of the
clear testimony of Leonila Cullano as the sole uninterested
eyewitness of the entire episode. Instead we find Pedro Collango's
testimony to be infused by bias and fraught with inconsistencies,
if not notably unreliable for lack of veracity. On direct
examination, he testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So what happened to the passengers inside your bus?
A Some of the passengers jumped out of the window.
COURT:
Q While the bus was in motion?
A Yes, your Honor, but the speed was slow because we have just
picked up a passenger.
Atty. Gambe:
Q You said that at the time of the incident the bus was running
slow because you have just picked up a passenger. Can you
estimate what was your speed at that time?
Atty. Calo:
No basis, your Honor, he is neither a driver nor a conductor.
COURT:
Let the witness answer. Estimate only, the conductor experienced.
Witness:
Not less than 30 to 40 miles.
COURT:
Kilometers or miles?
A Miles.
Atty. Gambe:
23 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
Q That is only your estimate by your experience?
A Yes, sir, estimate.
(Tsn., pp. 4-5, Oct. 17, 1983).
At such speed of not less than 30 to 40 miles ..., or about 48 to
65 kilometers per hour, the speed of the bus could scarcely be
considered slow considering that according to Collango himself,
the bus had just come from a full stop after picking a passenger
(Tsn, p. 4, Id.) and that the bus was still on its second or third
gear (Tsn., p. 12, Id.).
In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common
carrier, through its employees, consisted of the lack of
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising
vigilance and utmost care of the safety of its passengers,
exemplified by the driver's belated stop and the reckless opening
of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an
appreciably fast speed. At the same time, the common carrier
itself acknowledged, through its administrative officer, Benjamin
Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on
passengers and the public at large, while equipped with only a
solitary door for a bus its size and loading capacity, in
contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (RA 4136 as amended.) (Rollo,
pp. 23-26)
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not
immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding
from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way
while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after
people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with
doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome
the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common
carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers"
deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths
of the two passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure
of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the
passengers to their destinations as warranted by law. (See Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra).
The petitioners also contend that the private respondents failed to show to the court
that they are the parents of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut respectively and
therefore have no legal personality to sue the petitioners. This argument deserves
scant consideration. We find this argument a belated attempt on the part of the
petitioners to avoid liability for the deaths of Beter and Rautraut. The private
respondents were Identified as the parents of the victims by witnesses during the
trial and the trial court recognized them as such. The trial court dismissed the
complaint solely on the ground that the petitioners were not negligent.
Finally, the amount of damages awarded to the heirs of Beter and Rautraut by the
appellate court is supported by the evidence. The appellate court stated:
Ornominio Beter was 32 years of age at the time of his death,
single, in good health and rendering support and service to his
mother. As far as Narcisa Rautraut is concerned, the only evidence
adduced is to the effect that at her death, she was 23 years of
age, in good health and without visible means of support.
In accordance with Art. 1764 in conjunction with Art. 2206 of the
Civil Code, and established jurisprudence, several factors may be
considered in determining the award of damages, namely: 1) life
expectancy (considering the state of health of the deceased and
the mortality tables are deemed conclusive) and loss of earning
capacity; (2) pecuniary loss, loss of support and service; and (3)
moral and mental suffering (Alcantara, et al. v. Surro, et al., 93
Phil. 470).
In the case of People v. Daniel (No. L-66551, April 25, 1985, 136
SCRA 92, at page 104), the High Tribunal, reiterating the rule
in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (31 SCRA 511), stated
that the amount of loss of earring capacity is based mainly on two
factors, namely, (1) the number of years on the basis of which
the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the
losses sustained by the heirs should be fixed.
As the formula adopted in the case of Davila v. Philippine Air
Lines, 49 SCRA 497, at the age of 30 one's normal life expectancy
is 33-1/3 years based on the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality (2/3 x 80-32).i•t•c-aüsl By taking into account the pace
and nature of the life of a carpenter, it is reasonable to make
allowances for these circumstances and reduce the life expectancy
of the deceased Ornominio Beter to 25 years (People v.
Daniel, supra). To fix the rate of losses it must be noted that Art.
2206 refers to gross earnings less necessary living expenses of
the deceased, in other words, only net earnings are to be
considered (People v. Daniel, supra; Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra).
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Applying the foregoing rules with respect to Ornominio Beter, it is

both just and reasonable, considering his social standing and
position, to fix the deductible, living and incidental expenses at
the sum of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) a month, or Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P4,800.00) annually. As to his
income, considering the irregular nature of the work of a daily
wage carpenter which is seasonal, it is safe to assume that he
shall have work for twenty (20) days a month at Twenty Five
Pesos (P150,000.00) for twenty five years. Deducting therefrom
his necessary expenses, his heirs would be entitled to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) representing loss of support and
service (P150,000.00 less P120,000.00). In addition, his heirs are
entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as straight death
indemnity pursuant to Article 2206 (People v. Daniel, supra). For
damages for their moral and mental anguish, his heirs are entitled
to the reasonable sum of P10,000.00 as an exception to the
general rule against moral damages in case of breach of contract
rule Art. 2200 (Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75). As attorney's fees,
Beter's heirs are entitled to P5,000.00. All in all, the plaintiff-
appellants Ricardo and Sergia Beter as heirs of their son
Ornominio are entitled to an indemnity of Seventy Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00).
In the case of Narcisa Rautraut, her heirs are entitled to a straight
death indemnity of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), to moral
damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees, or a total of
Forty Five Thousand Pesos (P45,000.00) as total indemnity for her
death in the absence of any evidence that she had visible means
of support. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision dated May
19, 1988 and the resolution dated August 1, 1988 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55347 October 4, 1985
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSARIO
TUPANG, respondents.
Arturo Samaniego for private respondent.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the principle of state immunity from suit, the Philippine National Railways,
PNR for short, instituted this petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision
of the respondent Appellate Court which held petitioner PNR liable for damages for
the death of Winifredo Tupang, a paying passenger who fell off a train operated by
the petitioner.
The pertinent facts are summarized by the respondent court as follows:
The facts show that on September 10, 1972, at about 9:00 o'clock
in the evening, Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff Rosario
Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to
some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines
Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could
resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge
at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in
his death.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the
other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the
train conductor Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at
Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the
information. Police authorities of Lucena City were dispatched to
the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo
Tupang.
As shown by the autopsy report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-
respiratory failure due to massive cerebral hemorrhage due to
traumatic injury [Exhibits B and C, Folder of Exhibits],Tupang was
later buried in the public cemetery of Lucena City by the local
police authorities. [Rollo, pp. 91-92]
Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario Tupang, the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, after trial, held the petitioner PNR liable for damages for
breach of contract of carriage and ordered "to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his
earning capacity and the further sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. 1
On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR
did not exercise the utmost diligence required by law of a common carrier. It further
increased the amount adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay the
plaintiff an additional sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Moving for reconsideration of the above decision, the PNR raised for the first time,
as a defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. It alleged that it is a mere
agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of its
own, and that its funds are governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to
garnishment or execution. The motion was denied; the respondent court ruled that
the ground advanced could not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Hence, this petition for review.
The petition is devoid of merit. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as
amended. Section 4 of the said Act provides:
The Philippine national Railways shall have the following powers:
a. To do all such other things and to transact all such business
directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
b. Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law.
Under the foregoing section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and
attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law. There can be no question
then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes
just like any other corporation. 2
The petitioner's contention that the funds of the PNR are not subject to garnishment
or execution hardly raises a question of first impression. In Philippine National
Railways v. Union de Maquinistas, et al., 3 then Justice Fernando, later Chief Justice,
said. "The main issue posed in this certiorari proceeding, whether or not the funds
of the Philippine National Railways, could be garnished or levied upon on execution
was resolved in two recent decisions, the Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Industrial Relations [81 SCRA 314] and Philippine National Bank v. Hon. Judge
Pabalan [83 SCRA 595]. This Court in both cases answered the question in the
affirmative. There was no legal bar to garnishment or execution. The argument
26 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set

based on non-suability of a state allegedly because the funds are governmental in But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, 8 it
character was unavailing.So it must be again." appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he
In support of the above conclusion, Justice Fernando cited the Court's holding opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have
in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, to wit: "The premise that held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said
the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence,
that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the
entity. It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary
Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. damages must be set aside. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where
As was explicitly stated in the opinion of then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
"The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the manner. 9 There being no evidence of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of
government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied petitioner, the grant of exemplary damages should be discarded.
upon, is untenable for, as a government- owned and controlled corporation, the WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby modified by
NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the eliminating therefrom the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 adjudicated as
Government. It has-pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October moral and exemplary damages, respectively. No costs.
23, 1950 * * *, pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established- 'all the powers SO ORDERED.
of a corporation under the Corporation Law * * *. 4
As far back as 1941, this Court in the case of Manila Hotel Employees Association v.
Manila Hotel Co., 5 laid down the rule that "when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any
other corporation. [Bank of the U.S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Waitch 904, 6 L. ed. 244].
By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations. 6 Of Similar
import is the pronouncement in Prisco v. CIR,' that "when the government engages
in business, it abdicates part of its sovereign prerogatives and descends to the level
of a citizen, ... . " In fine, the petitioner PNR cannot legally set up the doctrine of
non-suability as a bar to the plaintiff's suit for damages.
The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by
the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other
passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of
the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it
approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, Neither did the
train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off
the train at lyam Bridge. 7
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations
and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by
any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the
performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled
by the respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of
negligence with clear and convincing evidence.

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Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 144723 February 27, 2006
LARRY ESTACION, Petitioner,
vs.
NOE BERNARDO, thru and his guardian ad litem ARLIE BERNARDO,
CECILIA BANDOQUILLO and GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Larry Estacion (petitioner)
seeking to annul the Decision dated April 17, 20001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 41447 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 41, Negros Oriental, holding petitioner and his
driver Bienvenido Gerosano (Gerosano) liable for damages for the injury sustained
by Noe Bernardo (respondent Noe). Also assailed is the appellate court’s Resolution
dated August 16, 20002 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In the afternoon of October 16, 1982, respondent Noe was going home to
Dumaguete from Cebu, via Bato and Tampi. At Tampi, he boarded a Ford Fiera
passenger jeepney with plate no. NLD 720 driven by respondent Geminiano
Quinquillera (Quinquillera), owned by respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo),
and was seated on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera. From San
Jose, an old woman wanted to ride, so respondent Noe offered his seat. Since the
Fiera was already full, respondent Noe hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the
vehicle. Somewhere along Barangay Sto. Niño, San Jose, Negros Oriental, between
kilometers 13 and 14, the Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the right
shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck, owned
by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same direction, hit
the rear end portion of the Fiera where respondent Noe was standing. Due to the
tremendous force, the cargo truck smashed respondent Noe against the Fiera
crushing his legs and feet which made him fall to the ground. A passing vehicle
brought him to the Silliman University Medical Center where his lower left leg was
amputated.
Police investigation reports showed that respondent Noe was one of the 11
passengers of the Fiera who suffered injuries; that when the Fiera stopped to pick
up a passenger, the cargo truck bumped the rear left portion of the Fiera; that only
one tire mark from the front right wheel of the cargo truck was seen on the road. A
sketch of the accident was drawn by investigator Mateo Rubia showing the relative
positions of the two vehicles, their distances from the shoulder of the road and the
skid marks of the right front wheel of the truck measuring about 48 feet.
On February 18, 1993, respondent Noe, through his guardian ad litem Arlie
Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint3 for damages arising
from quasi delict against petitioner as the registered owner of the cargo truck and
his driver Gerosano. He alleged that the proximate cause of his injuries and suffering
was the reckless imprudence of Gerosano and petitioner’s negligence in the selection
of a reckless driver and for operating a vehicle that was not roadworthy. He prayed
for actual damages, loss of income, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs of suit.
Petitioner and his driver Gerosano filed their Answer 4 denying the material
allegations in the complaint. They, in turn, filed a third party complaint5 against
respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, as owner and driver respectively of the
Fiera. They alleged that it was the reckless imprudence of respondent driver
Quinquillera and his clear violation of the traffic rules and regulations which was the
proximate cause of the accident and asked for indemnification for whatever
damages they would be sentenced to pay. Respondents Bandoquillo and
Quinquillera filed their Answer to the third party complaint asking for the dismissal
of the third party complaint and for payment of attorney’s fees.
Driver Gerosano was charged criminally for reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
physical injuries with damage to property before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan and San Jose, Negros Oriental. On November 16, 1987,
the MCTC rendered its decision6 finding him guilty of the crime charged and was
sentenced to four months and one day to two years and four months and to pay the
costs.
On February 18, 1993, the RTC rendered its judgment in the civil case, 7 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering
defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to pay plaintiff, jointly or solidarily, the following:
1. ₱129,584.20 for actual damages in the form of medical and
hospitalization expenses;
28 | P a g e
Transportation Law Cases 4th Set
2. ₱50,000.00 for moral damages, consisting of mental anguish, moral
shock, serious anxiety and wounded feelings;
3. ₱10,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and
4. ₱5,000.00 for litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court ruled that the negligence of Gerosano, petitioner’s driver, is the direct
and proximate cause of the incident and of the injuries suffered by respondent Noe;
that Gerosano’s gross negligence and reckless imprudence had been confirmed by
the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 463; that based on the findings of the police
investigator, the faulty brakes caused the cargo truck to bump the Fiera; that the
Traffic Accident Report showed that the tire mark of the cargo truck measuring 48
feet is visibly imprinted on the road where the incident took place indicating that the
said vehicle was speeding fast; that the existence of one tire mark of the cargo truck
proved that the said vehicle had a faulty brake, otherwise, it would have produced
two tire marks on the road; and that the photographs taken right after the incident
also showed who the guilty party was.
The trial court did not give credence to the argument of petitioner and his driver
that the truck was properly checked by a mechanic before it was dispatched for a
trip. It found that petitioner is negligent in maintaining his vehicle in good condition
to prevent any accident to happen; that petitioner is liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code as employer of driver Gerosano for being negligent in the selection and
supervision of his driver as well as for maintaining and operating a vehicle that was
not roadworthy; and that petitioner and his driver are solidarily liable for all the
natural and probable consequences of their negligent acts or omissions. The trial
court dismissed the third party complaint filed by petitioner and his driver against
respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera.
Dissatisfied, only petitioner appealed to the CA. On April 17, 2000, the CA rendered
the assailed decision which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated August 16, 2000.
Hence, the herein petition for review.
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:9
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER
LARRY ESTACION EXERCISED THE DUE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A
FAMILY TO PREVENT DAMAGE DESPITE ABUNDANCE OF EVIDENCE TO THAT
EFFECT;
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
LARRY ESTACION EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND
SUPERVISION OF HIS EMPLOYEE AND IN MAINTAINING HIS CARGO TRUCK
ROADWORTHY AND IN GOOD OPERATING CONDITION;
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXONERATING RESPONDENTS
CECILIA BANDOQUILLO AND GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA.
In his Memorandum, petitioner contends that he was able to establish that he
observed the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection of his
employees but also in maintaining his truck roadworthy and in good operating
condition; that the CA erred in exonerating respondents Bandoquillo and
Quinquillera, owner and driver, respectively of the Fiera from liability when their
negligence was the proximate cause of respondent Noe’s injuries; that respondent
Noe’s act of standing in the rear carrier of the Fiera is in itself negligence on his part
which was aggravated by the fact that respondent Quinquillera overtook the cargo
truck driven by Gerosano on the curve and suddenly cut into the latter’s lane; that
due to the overloading of passengers, Gerosano was not able to see the brake lights
of the Fiera when it suddenly stopped to pick up passengers; that overloading is in
violation of the applicable traffic rules and regulations and Article 2185 is explicit
when it provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation"; that since the Fiera driver was negligent, there
arises a presumption that respondent Bandoquillo, as owner of the Fiera, is negligent
in the selection and supervision of her employee; that assuming petitioner Estacion
and his driver are not entirely blameless, the negligence of Quinquillera is sufficient
basis why the respective liabilities should be delineated vis-à-vis their degree of
negligence consistent with Article 217910 of the Civil Code.
Respondent Noe filed his Memorandum alleging that the first and second issues
raised are factual in nature which are beyond the ambit of a petition for review; that
petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of negligence thus he is liable for the
negligence of his driver Gerosano; and that the third issue is best addressed to
respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera.
Respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera failed to file their memorandum despite
receipt of our Resolution requiring them to submit the same.
We find it apropos to resolve first the third issue considering that the extent of the
liability of petitioner and his driver is dependent on whether respondents Bandoquillo
and Quinquillera are the ones negligent in the vehicular mishap that happened in
the afternoon of October 16, 1982 where respondent Noe was injured, resulting in
the amputation of his left leg.
At the outset, the issue raised is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or
not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review
on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.11As a rule,
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factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.12
On the basis of the records of this case, we find that there is cogent reason for us
to review the factual findings of the lower courts to conform to the evidence on
record and consider this case as an exception to the general rule.
The trial court and the appellate court had made a finding of fact that the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by respondent Noe was the negligent and careless
driving of petitioner’s driver, Gerosano, who was driving at a fast speed with a faulty
brake when the accident happened. We see no cogent reason to disturb the trial
court’s finding in giving more credence to the testimony of respondent Noe than the
testimony of Gerosano, petitioner’s truck driver.
The correctness of such finding is borne by the records. In his testimony, Gerosano
said that he was driving the truck at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour; 13 that
the Fiera was behind him but upon reaching the curve, i.e.,after passing San Jose
going to Dumaguete, the Fiera overtook him and blocked his way;14 that he was 10
meters from the Fiera prior to the impact15 when he applied the brakes16 and tried
to evade the Fiera but he still hit it.17
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court when they found that the truck
was running at a fast speed because if Gerosano was really driving at a speed of 40
kilometers per hour and considering that the distance between the truck and the
Fiera in front was about 10 meters, he had more than enough time to slacken his
speed and apply his break to avoid hitting the Fiera. However, from the way the
truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it showed that Gerosano was driving
at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 feet as shown in the sketch
of police investigator Rubia of the tire marks visibly printed on the road.
Moreover, the photographs taken after the incident and the testimony of Gerosano
as to the extent of damage to the truck, i.e. the truck’s windshield was broken and
its hood was damaged after the impact,18 further support the finding of both courts
that Gerosano was driving at a fast pace.
The accident was further caused by the faulty brakes of the truck. Based on the
sketch report, there was only one tire mark of the right tire of the cargo truck during
the incident which, as testified to by police investigator Rubia, meant that the brakes
of the truck were not aligned otherwise there would be two tire marks impressions
on the road.19 Although petitioner contends that there are other factors to explain
why only one skid mark was found at the place of the incident, such as the angle
and edges of the road as well as the balance of the weight of the cargo laden in the
truck, he failed to show that indeed those factors were present to prove his defense.
Such claim cannot be given credence considering that investigator Rubia testified
that the body of the truck was very much on the road, i.e., not over the shoulder of
the road,20 and the road was straight.21 Indeed, it is the negligent act of petitioner’s
driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with faulty brakes which
was the proximate cause of respondent Noe’s injury.
Petitioner’s claim that right after overtaking the cargo truck, the Fiera driver
suddenly stopped to pick up three passengers from the side of the road; that the
overloading of passengers prevented his truck driver from determining that the Fiera
had pulled over to pick up passengers as the latter’s brakelights were obstructed by
the passengers standing on the rear portion of the Fiera were not substantiated at
all. Respondent Quinquillera, the driver of the Fiera, testified that the distance from
the curve of the road when he stopped and picked up passengers was estimated to
be about 80 to 90 feet.22 In fact, from the sketch drawn by investigator Rubia, it
showed a distance of 145 feet from the curve of the road to the speed tire mark
(which measured about 48 feet) visibly printed on the road to the Fiera. This means
that the Fiera driver did not stop immediately after the curve as what petitioner
claims. Moreover, Gerosano admitted that his truck was at a distance of 10 meters
prior to the impact. The distance between the two vehicles was such that it would
be impossible for Gerosano not to have seen that the Fiera had pulled over to pick
up passengers.
However, we agree with petitioner that respondent Noe’s act of standing on the rear
carrier of the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his
part. We find that the trial court and the CA erred when they failed to consider that
respondent Noe was also guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence
is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection. 23
It has been established by the testimony of respondent Noe that he was with four
or five other persons standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera since it was already
full. Respondent Noe’s act of standing on the left rear carrier portion of the Fiera
showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm
or put his life in danger. It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed
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to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his
injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body.24 Respondent Noe’s act of hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his
life and limb.
We likewise find merit in petitioner’s contention that respondent Quinquillera, the
Fiera driver, was also negligent. There is merit to petitioner’s claim that there was
overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations. Respondent Noe
himself had testified that he was standing at the rear portion of the Fiera because
the Fiera was already full. Respondent Quinquillera should not have taken more
passengers than what the Fiera can accommodate. If the Fiera was not overloaded,
respondent Noe would not have been standing on the rear carrier and sustained
such extent of injury.
Furthermore, we find that respondent Quinquillera was negligent in allowing
respondent Noe to stand on the Fiera’s rear portion. Section 32(c) of Article III of
Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as "The Land Transportation and Traffic
Code" provides:
(c) Riding on running boards – No driver shall allow any person to ride on running
board, step board or mudguard of his motor vehicle for any purpose while the vehicle
is in motion.
Respondent Quinquillera’s act of permitting respondent Noe to hang on the rear
portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position creates undue risk of harm to
respondent Noe. Quinquillera failed to observe that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demand. Thus, respondent Noe suffered
injury.25 Since respondent Quinquillera is negligent, there arises a presumption of
negligence on the part of his employer, respondent Bandoquillo, in supervising her
employees properly. Such presumption was not rebutted at all by Bandoquillo. Thus,
the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the third party complaint filed by petitioner
against respondents Quinquillera and Bandoquillo.
Petitioner contends that he was able to establish that he exercised the due diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection of his employees as well as in the
maintenance of his cargo truck in good operating condition. He claims that in
addition to looking at Gerosano’s driver’s license, he accompanied the latter in his
first two trips, during which he ascertained Gerosano’s competence as a driver,
petitioner being a driver himself; that the truck driven by Gerosano has never figured
in any accident prior to the incident involved; that upon his acquisition of the cargo
truck on March 16, 1982, only 7 months prior to the incident, the same was
thoroughly checked up and reconditioned; and that he had in his employ a mechanic
who conducted periodic check-ups of the engine and brake system of the cargo
truck.
We are not persuaded.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
As the employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-
delict committed by the former. Petitioner is presumed to be negligent in the
selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law and may be relieved
of responsibility for the negligent acts of his driver, who at the time was acting within
the scope of his assigned task, only if he can show that he observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.26
In Yambao v. Zuniga,27 we have clarified the meaning of the diligence of a good
father of a family, thus:
The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of the aforecited
statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Thus, when
an employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to persons or property
due to his own negligence, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent, either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision
over him after the selection. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability
for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the
presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the
selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care
and diligence of a good father of a family. x x x
Petitioner’s claim that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of her driver, Venturina, deserves but scant consideration. Her allegation that
before she hired Venturina she required him to submit his driver’s license
and clearances is worthless, in view of her failure to offer in evidence
certified true copies of said license and clearances. Bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the rules of
evidence. x x x
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In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and clearances
when he applied with petitioner in January 1992, the latter still fails the test of due
diligence in the selection of her bus driver. Case law teaches that for an
employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, he
should not be satisfied with the applicant’s mere possession of a
professional driver’s license; he must also carefully examine the applicant
for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of
service. Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to this extent of
verifying Venturina’s qualifications, safety record, and driving history. The
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of her bus
driver, thus, remains unrebutted.
Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his
selection. For as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present
any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and
guidelines on road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of
any showing that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic
seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim
exemption from any liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
In sum, petitioner’s liability to private respondents for the negligent and imprudent
acts of her driver, Venturina, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest
and clear. Petitioner, having failed to rebut the legal presumption of negligence in
the selection and supervision of her driver, is responsible for damages, the basis of
the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer’s own
negligence. x x x28 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner failed to show that he examined driver Gerosano as to his qualifications,
experience and service records. In fact, the testimony of driver Gerosano in his
cross-examination showed the non-observance of these requirements. Gerosano
testified that petitioner was his first employer in Dumaguete and that he was
accepted by petitioner on the very day he applied for the job; 29 that his driver’s
license was issued in Mindanao where he came from30 and that while petitioner
asked him about his driving record in Mindanao, he did not present any document
of his driving record.31 Such admission clearly established that petitioner did not
exercise due diligence in the selection of his driver Gerosano.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner’s driver Gerosano was driving in an efficient
manner when petitioner was with him in his first two trips would not conclusively
establish that Gerosano was not at all reckless. It could not be considered as due
diligence in the supervision of his driver to exempt petitioner from liability. In the
supervision of his driver, petitioner must show that he had formulated training
programs and guidelines on road safety for his driver which the records failed to
show. We find that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the
selection and supervision of his employees.
Moreover, there was also no proof that he exercised diligence in maintaining his
cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition. While petitioner’s mechanic
driver testified that he made a routine check up on October 15, 1982, one day before
the mishap happened, and found the truck operational, there was no record of such
inspection.
Turning now to the award of damages, since there was contributory negligence on
the part of respondent Noe, petitioner’s liability should be mitigated in accordance
with Article 2179 of the Civil Code which provides:
When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
The underlying precept of the above article on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
negligence.32
In Phoenix Construction, Inc., v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 where we held that
the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio’s injuries was the
wrongful and negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked but found
Dionisio guilty of contributory negligence on the night of the accident, we allocated
most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. In said case, we required Dionisio to bear
20% of the damages awarded by the appellate court, except as to the award of
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
In the present case, taking into account the contributing negligence of respondent
Noe, we likewise rule that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by
distributing the damages also on a 20-80 ratio excluding attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.34 Consequently, 20% should be deducted from the actual and moral
damages awarded by the trial court in favor of respondent Noe, that is: 20% of
₱129,584.20 for actual damages is ₱25,916.84 and 20% of ₱50,000.00 for moral
damages is ₱10,000.00. Thus, after deducting the same, the award for actual
damages should be ₱103,667.36 and ₱40,000.00 for moral damages or 80% of the
damages so awarded.
Petitioner and respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are jointly and severally
liable for the 80% of the damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
conformably with our pronouncement in Tiu v. Arriesgado35 where we held:
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The petitioners, as well as the respondents Benjamin Condor and Sergio Pedrano
are jointly and severally liable for said amount, conformably with the following
pronouncement of the Court in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver
of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third
party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v.
Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the
operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally
held liable to the injured passenger or the latter’s heirs. The basis of this allocation
of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
"Nor should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs
from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
from quasi delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 56
Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as
well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances
they are liable on quasi delict."36
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 2000 as well as its Resolution dated August
16, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the dispositive
portion of the Decision dated February 18, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City in Civil Case No. 8122, should read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering
defendants Gerosano and Estacion, as well as third party defendants Bandoquillo
and Quinquillera, to pay plaintiff, jointly and solidarily, the following:
1. ₱103,667.36 for actual damages in the form of medical and
hospitalization expenses;
2. ₱40,000.00 for moral damages, consisting of mental anguish, moral
shock, serious anxiety and wounded feelings;
3. ₱10,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and
4. ₱5,000.00 for litigation expenses.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED."
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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