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Judicial Review in India: Concept, Provisions, Amendments and Other Details

Judicial Review in India: Concept, Provisions, Amendments and Other Details!


The power of judiciary to review and determine the validity of a law or an order may be described as
the powers of Judicial Review’.It means that the constitution is the supreme law of the land and any
law inconsistent therewith is void through judicial review.It is the power exerted by the courts of a
country to examine the actions of the legislatures, executive and administrative arms of government
and to ensure that such actions conform to the provisions of the nation’s Constitution. Judicial review
has two important functions, like, of legitimizing government action and the protection of constitution
against any undue encroachment by the government.

Extensive Concept of Judicial Review in India:


The Supreme Court has been vested with the power of judicial review. It means that the Supreme
Court may review its own Judgement order. Judicial review can be defined as the competence of a
court of law to declare the constitutionality or otherwise of a legislative enactment.Being the guardian
of the Fundamental Rights and arbiter of the constitutional conflicts between the Union and the States
with respect to the division of powers between them, the Supreme Court enjoys the competence to
exercise the power of reviewing legislative enactments both of Parliament and the State’s legislatures.

The power of the court to declare legislative enactments invalid is expressively provided by the
Constitution under Article 13, which declares that every law in force, or every future law inconsistent
with or in derogation of the Fundamental Rights, shall be void. Other Articles of the Constitution (131-
136) have also expressively vested in the Supreme Court the power of reviewing legislative enactments
of the Union and the States.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was curtailed by the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution
(1976), in several ways. But some of these changes have been repealed by the 43rd Amendment Act,
1977. But there are several other provisions which were introduced by the 42nd Amendment Act 1976
not repealed so far.

These are:
(i) Arts. 323 A-B. The intent of these two new Articles was to take away the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Art. 32 over orders and decisions of Administrative Tribunals. These Articles could,
however, be implemented only by legislation. Art. 323A has been implemented by the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 (ii) Arts. 368 (4)-(5). These two Clauses were inserted in Art. 368 with a view to
preventing the Supreme Court to invalidate any Constitutional Amendment Act on the theory of ‘basic
features’ of the Constitution.

These Clauses have been emasculated by the Supreme Court itself, striking them down on the ground
that they are violative in the two ‘basic features’ of the Constitution:
(a) the limited nature of the amending power under Art. 368 and

(b) judicial review in the Minerva Mills case.

The court was very reluctant and cautious to exercise its power of Judicial Review, during the first
decade, when the Supreme Court declared invalid only one of total 694 Acts passed by the Parliament.

During the second decade the court asserted its authority without any hesitation which is reflected in
the famous Golak Nath case and Kesavananda Barti case. In these cases the Supreme Court assumed
the role of constitution making.

Indian Judiciary has been able to overcome the restriction that was put on it by the 42nd amendment,
with the help of the 43rd and 44th amendments. Now the redeeming quality of Indian judiciary is that
no future governments could clip its wings or dilute its right of Judicial Review. In fact, now the
‘Judicial Review’ is considered to be the basic feature of our Constitution.

Constitutional Provisions for Judicial Review:


The Indian Constitution adopted the Judicial Review on lines of U.S. Constitution. Parliament is not
supreme under the Constitution of India. Its powers are limited in a manner that the power is divided
between centre and states.

Moreover the Supreme Court enjoys a position which entrusts it with the power of reviewing the
legislative enactments both of Parliament and the State Legislatures. This grants the court a powerful
instrument of judicial review under the constitution.

Both the political theory and text of the Constitution has granted the judiciary the power of judicial
review of legislation. The Constitutional Provisions which guarantee judicial review of legislation are
Articles 13, 32, 131-136, 143, 226, 145, 246, 251, 254 and 372.

Article 372 (1) establishes the judicial review of the pre-constitution legislation.

Article 13 declares that any law which contravenes any of the provisions of the part of Fundamental
Rights shall be void.

Articles 32 and 226 entrusts the roles of the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights to the
Supreme and High Courts.

Article 251 and 254 states that in case of inconsistency between union and state laws, the state law
shall be void.

Article 246 (3) ensures the state legislature’s exclusive powers on matters pertaining to the State List.
Article 245 states that the powers of both Parliament and State legislatures are subject to the
provisions of the constitution.

The legitimacy of any legislation can be challenged in the court of law on the grounds that the
legislature is not competent enough to pass a law on that particular subject matter; the law is repug-
nant to the provisions of the constitutions; or the law infringes one of the fundamental rights.

Articles 131-136 entrusts the court with the power to adjudicate disputes between individuals, between
individuals and the state, between the states and the union; but the court may be required to interpret
the provisions of the constitution and the interpretation given by the Supreme Court becomes the law
honoured by all courts of the land.

There is no express provision in our constitution empowering the courts to invalidate laws, but the
constitution has imposed definite limitations upon each of the organs, the transgression of which
would make the law void. The court is entrusted with the task of deciding whether any of the consti-
tutional limitations has been transgressed or not.

Constitutional Amendments and the Use of Judicial Review:


Until 1967, the Supreme Court upheld that the Amendment Acts were not ordinary laws and could not
be struck down by the application of Article 13 (2).

It was in the famous Golak Nath Vs. the state of Punjab case in 1967, where the validity of three
constitutional amendments (1st, 4th and 17th) was challenged, that the Supreme Court reversed its
earlier decision and uphold the provision under article 368 which put a check on the Parliament’s
propensity to abridge the fundamental Rights under chapter III of the Constitution.

In the Kesavananda Bharti Vs. State of Kerala case in 1973, the constitutional validity of the twenty-
fourth, twenty fifth and twenty ninth amendments was challenged wherein the court held that even
though the Parliament is entitled to amend any provision of the constitution it should not tamper with
the essential features of the constitution; and that Article 31c is void since it takes away invaluable
fundamental rights.

The court balances the felt ‘necessities of the time’ and ‘constitutional fundamentals’
when scrutinizing the validity of any law. H.M. Seervai has enumerated some of the
canyons, maxims and norms followed by the court:
1. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality, and a law will riot be declared tin
constitutional unless the case is so clear as to be free from doubt; and the onus to prove that it’s
unconstitutional lies upon the person who challenges it.
2. Where the validity of a stature is questioned and there are two interpretations, one of which would
make the law valid, and the other void, the former must be preferred and the validity of the law will be
upheld.

3. The court will not decide constitutional questions if a case is capable of being decided on other
grounds.

4. The court will not decide a larger constitutional question than is required by the case before it.

5. The court will not hear an objection as to the constitutionality of a law by a person whose rights are
not affected by it.

6. Ordinarily, courts should not pronounce on the validity of an Act or part of an Act which has not
been brought into force, because till then the question of validity would be merely academic.

7. In a later case, the Minerva Mill case, the Supreme Court went a step ahead. The 42nd Constitu-
tional Amendment of 1976 among other things had added a clause to Article 368 placing a
constitutional amendment beyond judicial review. The court held that this was against the doctrine of
judicial review, the basic feature of the Constitution.

Judicial Review under Private Law:


There are remedies against the actions of the executive under private law. A suit can be filed under
section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit can be for damages from the government or other
public authority when right is violated and an injury is suffered. It can also be for a declaration of the
illegality of the administrative action.

A suit can be filed for issuing injunction against the act that threatens the rights of persons. These
remedies can, however, be specifically excluded by a statute under which the administration acts. In
such cases the statute will provide alternative remedies.

If it does not, or if the alternative remedies provided are not adequate or sufficient the aggrieved
person will have a right to file a suit. When the alternative remedies are effective the citizen will have
the right only to resort to those remedies and not the remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure. These
rules are laid down through judicial decisions.

Strategy of Judicial Review:


The strategy of judicial review can be divided broadly into public law review and private law review.
Under the Constitution, legislative and administrative actions can be reviewed by courts under Ar-
ticles 32, 136, 226 and 227. Such review is called public law review. Article 32 guarantees the right to
move the Supreme Court if any fundamental right can be reviewed under this provision.
Writs:
Article 226 can be, and is more often, used for reviewing the action of administration. One can say
that there is an increase of litigation in this respect. The High Court can issue directions, orders or
writs in the nature of habeas corpus mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto, and certiorari for the
enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose.

Habeas corpus is a write issued by the court to bring before the court a person from illegal custody.
The court will examine the legality of detention and release the person if detention is found illegal.

Mandamus is issued to a public authority to do an act which under law, it is obliged to do or to forbear
from doing.

Prohibition is a write to prevent a court or tribune! from doing something in excess of its authority.
High Court has power to issue an order of prohibition to the executive authority prohibiting it from
acting without jurisdiction.

Certiorari is a write issued to a judicial or quasi-judicial authority to correct its order. This writ is
issued on specified grounds like violation of natural justice; excess, abuse or lack of jurisdiction;
fraud; and error of law apparent on the face of the record.

Quo-warranto is a writ issued to a person who authorisedly occupies a public office to step down from
that office. High courts and the Supreme Court have the power to issue not only these writs but also
appropriate directions and orders.

Judicial Review and Contempt of Court:


It is mandatory that an administrative officer or authority should obey the directions of a court and
execute the decisions of the court. What action can be court take if they do not do this? The court has
neither the sword not the purse like the executive. It has a potential power.

It has the power to take action of contempt of court. Those who violate or disobey the decisions of the
courts are proceeded against under this power. They can be punished and sent to jail. Obviously the
contempt power is the only weapon in the hand of judiciary to see that their decisions are executed.

Locus standi is the first limitation on judicial review. This means that only a person aggrieved by an
administrative action or by an unjust provision of law shall have the right to move the court for
redressal. Under this traditional rule a third party who is not affected by the action cannot move the
court.

Another limitation is that before a person moves the High Courts and the Supreme Court invoking
their extraordinary jurisdiction, he should have exhausted all alternative remedies. For example, these
may be a hierarchy of authorities provided in legislation to look-into the grievances of the affected
party. The aggrieved person should first approach these authorities for a remedy before invoking
extraordinary jurisdiction of the courts.

However, the alternative remedies should be equally efficacious and effective as the remedies available
from the courts are. If they are not, the jurisdiction can be invoked. In cases of manifest injustice and
the violation of procedural fairness, alternative remedy is not a bar.

A rule has been evolved to avoid repeated adjudication on the same matter between the same parties.
If the case is finally disposed of on merits the same issue cannot be re-agitated by any of the parties
filing another case. This limitation is called res judicata.

Changing Trends in Judicial Review:


Recently there is a rising trends in judicial activism in the land. The doors of the judiciary are kept
open for redressing the grievances of persons who cannot ordinarily have access to justice. The strict
observance of the traditional rule of locus standi will do injustice to certain persons who do not have
the money, knowledge and facilities of approaching court.

In such cases if a public spirited person comes forward on their behalf courts relax the rules an
adjudicate over the matter. Thus, in the matter of socially and economically backward groups or
persons who are not aware of their rights or not capable of pursuing their case in a court, the complex
and rigorous procedural formalities are not insisted upon. At this level there are cases when press
reports were taken as write petitions and reliefs granted. Letters addressed to the courts were also
‘treated as petitions.

Judicial review is one of the important techniques by which the courts examine the actions of the
legislature, the executive and the other governmental agencies and decide whether or not these
actions are valid and within the limits set by the Constitution.

Therefore, with the power of judicial review the courts act as a custodian of the fundamental rights.
The Indian Judiciary, given the federal structure of the Constitution, also settles conflicts of
jurisdiction in legislation between the centre and the states. With the growing functions of the modern
state judicial intervention in the process of making administrative decisions and executive them has
also increased.

Judicial Review and the Ninth Schedule of the Indian Constitution

Read this article to learn about the judicial review and the ninth schedule of the Indian

constitution!

Defining Judicial Review:


Judicial review is the doctrine in democratic theory under which legislative and executive action is

subject to invalidation by the judiciary.

Legislature, Executive and Judiciary are three organs of the political system and a system of checks

and balances keeps them working in coordination with each other in a healthy manner.

Judicial Review in the Indian Context:

The provision of judicial review has been adopted in the Indian constitution from the constitution of

the United States of America. In the Indian constitution, Judicial Review is dealt with, under Article

13. Judicial Review implies that the Constitution is the supreme power of the nation and all laws are

under its supremacy.

Article 13 states that:

1. All the post constitutional laws, after the coming into force of constitution, if differ from it in all or

some of its provisions then the provisions of constitution will prevail & the provisions of that post

constitutional law will hide till any amendment in constitution relating to the same matter. In such

situation, the provision of that law will again come into force (the Theory of Eclipse).

2. In a similar manner, laws made after adoption of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly

must be compatible with the constitution; otherwise, the laws and amendments will be deemed void-

ab-initio.

In such situations, the Supreme Court or High Court interprets the laws as if they are in conformity

with the constitution. If such an interpretation is not possible because of inconsistency, and where a

separation is possible, the provision that is inconsistent with Constitution is considered void.

The Ninth Schedule:

The first amendment to the Indian Constitution added the Ninth Schedule to it. It was introduced by

the Nehru Government, on 10 May 1951 to address judicial decisions and pronouncements especially

about the chapter on fundamental rights. Nehru was also very clear on the purpose behind the first

amendment. The state wanted to pursue nationalisation, take away lands from the zamindars, re-

distribute them, and make special provisions for the socially and economically backward.
Despite having architected the Constitution, Nehru was not confident that the laws made to pursue

these special interests of the state would stand up to judicial scrutiny on account of being

discriminatory.

The First Amendment that brought in Articles 31A and 31B conferring upon the state the right to make

laws to acquire private property and to deem such laws as not being discriminatory and to further

protect all such laws from any judicial review by creating something called the Ninth Schedule. It is

interesting to note that the origins of the Ninth Schedule lie in land acquisition by the state, given the

current political debate on SEZs and Singur, Nandigram.

Since the First Amendment, the Ninth Schedule has been relied upon to amend the constitution

multiple times over. The 4th amendment inserted six acts to the 9th schedule. The 17th amendment

added 44 more acts. The 29th amendment brought in 2 acts from Kerala. The 34th amendment in

1974 added 20 more land tenure and land reforms laws enacted by the states.

In 1975, Indira Gandhi’s infamous abuse of executive power leading up to emergency saw the 39th

amendment adding certain central enactments. 1976 saw the 40th amendment even more to the 9th

schedule. The 47th amendment in 1984 added more, and then in 1990 the 66th amendment gave

more protection to land ceiling acts.

The 76th amendment to accommodate Tamil Nadu Government’s legislation to provide for

reservations to the level of 69 percent for SC/ST and OBCs followed. What takes the cake however is

the 78th amendment, which was about not just immunity to laws in 9th schedule, which was suspect,

but amendments to those laws and making those amendments immune. Since then there were absurd

laws from Sugarcane supporting price to the New Delhi Urban Zoning Laws all clamoring for an

exalted spot in the much abused Ninth Schedule.

The Supreme Court Judgment and the Ninth Schedule:

In a landmark ruling on 11 January 2007, the Supreme Court of India ruled that all laws (including

those in the Ninth Schedule) would be open to Judicial Review if they violated the basic structure of

the constitution. Chief Justice of India, Yogesh Kumar Sabharwal noted, “If laws put in the Ninth
Schedule abridge or abrogate fundamental rights resulting in violation of the basic structure of the

constitution, such laws need to be invalidated.”

The Supreme Court judgment laid that the laws placed under Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 shall

be open to challenge in court if they violated fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14, 19, 20

and 21 of the Constitution.

Impact of the Judgment:

The Judgment ended up the controversy behind the Ninth Schedule largely and was successful to put

a bar on political intentions of keeping certain sensitive issues out of the reach of Judicial Review for

narrow political gains. The landmark judgment was successful in strengthening the democratic base of

the society and bringing into the realm of justice, unfair acts of misuse of the provision of the ninth

schedule in the Constitution.

Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility

by Shuani Economics

The law of Diminishing Marginal Utility is an important law of consumption. It expresses the
relationship between the quantity of goods which a person possess and the marginal utility of each
unit of the good. A particular want is satiable, even though human wants in general are un-satiable.
This theory has given rise to law of Diminishing Marginal Utility.

Marshall expresses the law as “The additional benefit which a person derives from a given increase of
his stock of a thing diminishes with every increase in the stock that he already has.” As we go on
consuming more and more of a commodity, our want for that particular commodity goes on
diminishing and a point is reached when we do not require any more of it.

This is the point of safety or the point of complete satisfaction. Marginal utility of the commodity to
the consumer depends upon the volume of the stock purchased by him. The larger the stock
purchased, the smaller the utility derived from an additional unit of the commodity.

The Marginal Utility of a good diminishes as the quantity of the goods increases. Let us take an
example. One is extremely fond of rasagullas and his friend offers him as many rasagullas as he can
consume at one setting. The person will be eager to have the first rasagulla and it will give him highest
satisfaction. Having taken the first, he is less eager to have the second rasagulla and it will give him
less satisfaction than the first.
The third one will give still less satisfaction than the second and so on. A point will reach when the
person refuses to take any more rasagulla as his want for it has been fully satisfied. Then he will find
negative satisfaction. This is the experience of every consumer when he consumes a commodity unit
by unit during one setting. When the intensity of desire for a good is more it will have high utility for
him. Gradually the utility for that good diminishes. But the total utility increases.

This law can be illustrated by the following table:

This table shows that as the consumer goes on consuming successive units of Rasagulla, the marginal
utility of Rasagullas diminishes. For example, when the consumer consumes Rasagullas the first one
gives him 100 marginal utility. But it diminishes to 80 when he takes the second unit. He gets
marginal utility 50 from the third, 20 from the 4thand 0 or no utility, when he consumes the
5th Rasagulla. Again if he tries to consume the one he finds negative utility. Thus the marginal utility of
rasagulla is diminishing by the consumption of each additional unit.
This table shows that the marginal utility is becoming less and less when the consumption of rasagulla
increases. From this table we can also know that, though the marginal utility diminishes, the total
utility increases from 100 to 250 by additional consumption. At one point, it remains constant i.e. 250
in consumption of both 4th and 5th units of rasagullas. Then again it diminishes when 6th and
additional units are consumed. For this reason, it is said that the total utility is increased at a
diminishing rate.
This law of Diminishing Marginal Utility may also be geometrically illustrated in a diagram. In this
diagram, units of rasagulla consumed are represented on the horizontal axis AB and Marginal utility
on the vertical axis AC. When the first rasagulla is consumed the marginal utility is 100. It is
represented by the height of the straight line drawn upward from the point 1 marked on AB. The
utility of the second unit i.e. 80 is represented by the vertical straight line from point 2 marked on AB.

The third rasagulla gives the utility of 50 and the 4th unit 20 which are represented by the vertical
straight lines from the point 3 and 4 on AB line. When the 5 th unit is consumed, the marginal utility
becomes zero and then negative utility is gained when 6th unit of rasagulla is consumed.
A downward sloping DD’ line is drawn by joining the tops of all the straight lines which is known as
Marginal Utility Curve. It indicates that the utility from successive units of continuously reaching ‘0’ at
the 5thunit. DD’ line coming below AB line indicates that the utility of the sixth and subsequent
rasagulla is negative. The consumer stops consumption at zero utility. If he continues, he will get
disutility or dissatisfaction.

Assumption of the Law:


The law of Diminishing Marginal Utility is based on the following assumption:
1. Suitable units:
It is assumed that units of commodity consumed are of suitable size. If the thirsty man takes water by
spoonful, the utility he gets from the second spoon of water may be more than that from the first. The
law therefore assumes that units of consumption are of suitable size. For example, a glass of water, a
complete rasagulla etc.

2. Identical units:
The units of goods consumed are identical in size and quality. The second rasagulla may give you more
satisfaction if the first is a small or rotten one. If the goods consumed are of uniform size and quality
the marginal utility will diminish by each additional unit.

3. Quick succession:
It is further assumed that the units of the goods consumed should be within quick succession. There
should not be more of time intervals between two units. If one takes one rasagulla in the morning and
one at night this law cannot work. So this law assumes that the consumption of various units of the
commodity is continuous.

4. Unchanged tastes:
This law assumes that the tastes of the consumer remain the same during the period of consumption.
If the taste of the consumer will change suddenly, he may get increasing satisfaction from additional
units. This law also assumes that other things like habits, temperament and income of the consumer
will remain constant.
5. Independence of commodities:
The law assumes independence of commodities. It implies that the commodity consumed is entirely
independent of other commodities in the market. So the utility derived from it is not influenced by the
supply of other commodities in the market.

Exceptions or Limitations of the Law:


There are certain limitations of the law of Diminishing Marginal Utility:
1. Rare collection:
This law cannot be operated in case of collection of rare stamps, coins etc. A stamp collector gets
increasing pleasure from the increase in the stock of his stamp. This is however an exception to the
law.

2. Abnormal consumer:
A drunkard, madman and a miser are abnormal persons. They are all exception to this law. A miser is
never satisfied with the acquisition of money. The more money he has, the more he runs after it and
finds more utility from the additional unit. So this law is applicable to normal person.

3. Money:
This law is not applicable to money. Money has the purchasing power over all commodities. The more
money we have, the more we desire to have increasing amount of money. So the Law of Diminishing
Marginal Utility is said to be inoperative in case of money.

4. Habit:
The desire for a commodity sometimes arises from impulse, imitation or the possession of other
individuals. In such cases, the law may not apply. Many commodities are purchased by us as a matter
of habit. In these cases we do not consider marginal utilities.

Marginal Utility and Total Utility:


When a person consumes or possesses more than one unit of a good, the utility of each unit becomes
different on the basis of Law of Diminishing Utility. The sum of utilities of all the units consumed is
the total unit of the goods to the consumer. The utility of an additional unit is termed Marginal utility.
When only one unit is consumed total utility is the same as the marginal utility. When two units are
consumed total utility is the sum of the utility of the first and that of the second unit.

Total utility increases with the amount consumed but at a diminishing rate. When the second unit of
rasagolla is consumed the increase in total utility is 180, when the third unit is consumed it becomes
230. Total utility increases, reaches at a maximum point and thereafter declines.

According to Marshall, “As the consumption (or possession) of a goods increases unit by unit, the
marginal utility of the goods diminishes while its total utility increases, but at a diminishing rate”.
Importance of the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility:
1. The law helps to solve the paradox of value. The law tells us that when the stock of the commodity
with the consumer is high, the marginal utility of the commodity to the consumer is low. Price of a
commodity depends on its marginal utility and not on total utility.

2. The law tells us to justify progressive taxation.

3. The law is the basis of various law of consumption. For example, the law of demand is directly based
on the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility. The concept of consumer’s surplus and the Law of Equi-
marginal Utility are also based on this law.
Law of Equi-marginal Utility:
Human wants are unlimited, but his means to satisfy these wants are limited. That is why a rational
human being will go on purchasing a commodity up to the point when marginal utility of the
commodity becomes equal to the price paid. He will stop purchasing the article when he feels that he
will get more satisfaction if he spends his money on something else. Thus the consumer substitutes a
goods of greater utility for one of less utility while spending each unit of money.

In this process, he reaches a point where further substitution becomes unnecessary. This is because, at
that point, money is seen to have equal marginal utility in each use. In other words, the last unit of
money spent on each goods gives the same amount of utility to the consumer. The way of distributing
the limited money income on several alternative goods to get maximum satisfaction is the Law of
Equi-marginal Utility.

The Law of Equi-marginal Utility states that the marginal utilities of different commodities to a
person at any particular time are proportional to the prices paid for them. The essence of this law is
that it explains the manner in which the consumer should allocate his income among various
commodities in order to get maximum satisfaction.

This law is also called the Law of Substitution. According to Marshall, the Law may be stated: “Money
at the disposal of a consumer is distributed among several uses in such a way that it has the same
marginal utility in all.”

This law may be illustrated by an imaginary example. Suppose a man has five rupees and he needs two
goods A and B. He spends money rupee by rupee. He thinks that the first rupee spent on ‘A’ would
give him 20 units of utility. Each subsequent rupee spent on ‘A’ would give him lower and lower utility
in accordance with the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility. Similarly, he would get progressively
diminishing utility from every successive rupee spent on ‘B’. This can be represented in the following
table.
From this table it can be seen that the consumer will spend the first rupee on ‘A’ and not on ‘B’. He
would get 20 utility from A and 19 utility from B. On this basis he would spend the second rupee on B,
the third rupee on A, the fourth rupee on B and the fifth rupee on A. Thus he spends three rupees on A
and two rupees on B.

It may be seen that the utility from the third rupee spent on ‘A’ is 16 and that from the second rupees
spent on B is also 16. Thus the marginal utility of money on both the commodities has become the
same. It will be seen that this way of distributing five rupees gives him maximum satisfaction. In this
distribution the total utility is (20 + 18 + 16 + 19 + 16 = 89). If he will spend all his five rupees on ‘A’
his total utility will be (20 + 18 + 16 + 14 + 12 = 80). This is less than the first one. If he will spend two
rupees on ‘A’ and three rupees on ‘B’, then his total utility will be (20 + 18 t 19 + 16 + 13 = 86) and this
distribution also gives him less satisfaction.

The law is called the Law of Equi-marginal Utility, because satisfaction is maximized by making the
marginal utility of money equal in all uses to which the limited money income is put. Only if the prices
of goods are the same, the equality of marginal utility of money in all uses would mean equality of
marginal utilities of commodities. The law requires that the marginal utility of money in each use will
be satisfied.

This law is also called the Law of Substitution, because goods of utility substitute goods of less utility.
This can be represented in a diagram.
Along OX axis, we measure successive rupees spent separately on A and B and along OY axis we
measure the utility of each rupee spent on A and B. The diagram shows that the first rupee spent on A
gives AA’ utility, the second rupee BB’, the third CC and so on. The first rupee spent on ‘B’ yields MM’
utility, the second NN’ utility and so on.

It is seen that CC = NN’. Thus the consumer equalizes marginal utility of money on both the
commodities A and B by spending three rupees on A and two rupees on B from Rs. 5/- which are at his
disposal. Any other allocation of consumer’s income of Rs. 5/- would not maximize satisfaction.

Limitations of the Law:


1. The Law of Equi-marginal utility has a great practical significance and it is applied to all branches of
economic activity.

2. It is useful to individual as one can get maximum satisfaction by allocating his finds among various
commodities.

3. This Law is equally important to the producer. The main aim of the producer is to get maximum
profit. He can maximize his profit only by minimizing the cost of production.

4. This law has great importance to the Government to do maximum welfare of the society through
minimum expenditure. The law is useful in guiding public expenditure among different lines of
activity.

5. The law is applicable in the field of using scarce resources in different lines in the distribution of
assets in various forms and between spending and saving.

Thus, the Law of Substitution is of great practical importance in different fields of economic activity.

73rd Amendment of the Constitution of India, 1992 – Summary

The Amendment Act has added part IX to the Constitution of India entitled as ‘Panchayats’. The part
consists of provisions from Article 243 to 243-0. A new schedule called as Eleventh Schedule lists 29
functional items that panchayats are supposed to deal with under Article 243-G. The basic provisions
of the Act are divisible into compulsory provisions and voluntary arrangements.

The provisions which the state statutes will have to provide for are:
(1) Creation of a State Elections Commission to conduct elections to PRIs,

(2) In order to review the financial position of the PRIs, each state to set up a State Finance
Commission for five years.
(3) Tenure of PRIs fixed at five years and, if dissolved earlier, fresh elections to be held within six
months,

(4) Creation of a three-tier Panchayati Raj structure at the zila, block and village levels,

(5) The minimum age for contesting elections to PRIs to be 18 years,

(6) Reservation for women in panchayats (chairman and members) up to one-third seats,

(7) Reservation of seats for SC/ST in panchayats (chairman and members) in proportion to their
population,

(8) Indirect elections to the post of chairman at the intermediate and apex tiers,

(9) All posts at all levels (with two exceptions) to be filled by direct elections, and

(10) Organisation of gram sabhas.

As local self-government is an item in the State List, the state governments have been given a
reasonable discretion to take decisions in the following areas.

These voluntary provisions vary from state to state:


(1) Voting rights to MPs and MLAs in these bodies,

(2) Reservation for backward classes,

(3) Financial powers,

(4) Autonomy of the panchayats, and

(5) Devolution of powers to perform functions of the Eleventh Schedule and planning.

The Eleventh Schedule of the Act enumerates 29 subjects which fall in the purview of the panchayats.
The Act has refrained from putting those into the Seventh Schedule of three lists for the simple reason
that states are free to determine the Panchayati Raj activities and adjust this Eleventh Schedule as per
situations and resources. The Schedule is quiet flexible and exhaustive.

The PRI can make rules, regulations and administer them by creating services and charging tax, cess,
octroi, etc., in lieu of these functional services. The Tenth Finance Commission suggested grants-in-
aid for the local bodies from state exchequers to supplement their efforts. The panchayati institutions
can take policy decisions in the areas like land reform, ecology preservation, rural industries and
farming. The PR institutions have been accepted as the implementing agency of the state
governments.

The Eleventh Schedule lists the following 29 subjects:


Eleventh Schedule:
(1) Agriculture including agricultural extension.

(2) Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil conservation.

(3) Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development.

(4) Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry.

(5) Fisheries.

(6) Social forestry and farm forestry.

(7) Minor forest produce.

(8) Small scale industries, including food-processing industries.

(9) Khadi, village and cottage industries.

(10) Rural housing.

(11) Drinking water.

(12) Fuel and fodder.

(13) Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communication.

(14) Rural electrification, including distribution of electricity.

(15) Non-conventional energy sources.

(16) Poverty alleviation programme.

(17) Education including primary and secondary schools.

(18) Technical training and vocational education.

(19) Adult and non-formal education.


(20) Libraries.

(21) Cultural activities.

(22) Markets and fairs.

(23) Health and sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centres and dispensaries.

(24) Family welfare.

(25) Women and child development.

(26) Social welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded.

(27) Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes.

(28) Public distribution system.

(29) Maintenance of community assets.

The pre-1992 situation about PRIs was chaotic. Most of the states did not bother about any uniform
pattern. The partisan character of the state governments viewed Panchayati Raj politics in terms of
their support structures or destabilising factors. In either case, they were apprehensive of Union
governments intervention or opposition parties taking over Panchayati Raj bodies.

The votaries of Panchayati Raj were states like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat and Kerala. While
other states like Rajasthan, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab became lukewarm and less
enthusiastic about panchayat elections. States like Bihar, Haryana, Orissa and Jammu and Kashmir
viewed the change with scepticism. Hence the Union government has to proceed with caution and the
amendment was designed to develop and keep the consensus in basic areas of panchayati governance.

The salient features of the 73rd Amendment can be presented as under:


The Gram Sabha:
The act provides that a gram sabha will consist of persons registered in the electoral rolls of a village
within the area of a panchayat at the village level. Thus, it is a village assembly consisting of all the
registered voters in the area of the panchayat. It exercises such powers and performs such functions at
the village level as the legislature of a state determines.

The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee made no formal mention of the gram sabha but the gram sabha
was existing as a statutory body in almost all the states. In states like Bihar, Orissa and Rajasthan, all
the adult residents of a village or a group of villages are its members. The membership of a gram
sabha ranges from 250 to 5,000 and it meets twice in a year. The sabha elects from among its
members an executive committee and the sarpanch presides over the meetings. The budget, plans and
programmes, audit reports and progress reports of panchayats are placed before this popular body.

The Sadiq Ali Committee which reported about gram sabhas in Rajasthan in 1964,
pointed out the following weaknesses in their working:
(1) Poor attendance, particularly of women.

(2) Absence of secretarial assistance, and

(3) Its meetings were not duly publicised.

(4) The illiteracy of villagers.

(5) The sarpanch avoided calling a meeting for fear of being questioned.

(6) Meetings were held during the harvest season.

The apathy and non-attendance of villagers in gram sabha meeting has been a major issue of criticism
of PRIs. The Rajasthan state constituted G.L. Vyas Committee in 1973 to rectify this dysfunctionalism
of the grass roots institution. The Vyas Committee suggested:

(1) Compulsory attendance for the sarpanch in meetings.

(2) Statutory recognition of gram sabha.

(3) The tehsildar, the naib tehsildaar and the village school teachers should encourage villagers to ask
questions.

(4) The time of meetings to be May-June and January-December.

(5) Compulsory attendance of the patwari and VLW.

The activisation of gram sabha is a problem in all the states. Officials attribute it to the apathy of rural
folks while villagers complain that meetings are manipulated and decisions are neither publically
arrived at nor accountability is fixed.

The 73rd Amendment has addressed itself to this ailment and has provided the
following for activisation of this core institution:
(1) Public problems of the village will be discussed and beneficiaries of welfare programmes would be
identified.

(2) The panchayat secretary will be the secretary of the sabha also.

(3) Two compulsory meetings otherwise the sarpanch will be asked to quit.

(4) The quorum of meetings will be one-tenth of the total.

(5) Assistance to panchayat in the execution of rural development schemes.

(6) Vigilance committee of the sabha will keep an eye on the panchayats.

(7) The budget and programmes of the panchayat will keep the suggestions of the sabha in view.

(8) A constitutional status to gram sabhas.

All this has improved the situation considerably. The research indicates that it is not the apathy, but
the feeling that their will is being ignored, makes them absent in the meetings. Now as National Rural
Employment Guarantee Programme comes into operation, the panchayat/gram sabha secretary
cannot afford to take grama sabha meetings lightly.

The community has to identify and certify the list of beneficiaries and this will generate sustained
interest in the working of the gram sabha. Government aid for national disasters like floods, famine,
quakes, etc., need rural support and people increasingly realised the relevance and importance of
grama sabha participation.

The Three-Tier System:


The Union government has prescribed a uniform three-tier system of panchayati institutions for a
period of five years.

The B.R. Mehta model remains the basic frame and the Act defined the institutions as
under:
(1) Panchayat means an institution (by whatever name called) of self-government for rural areas.

(2) Village means a village specified by the governor by public notification to be a village for the
purpose, and includes a group of villages so specified.

(3) Intermediate level means a level between the village and district levels specified by the governor’s
public notification for this purpose.
(4) District means a district in a state.

Thus, the Act brings about uniformity in the structure of Panchayati Raj throughout the country.
However a state having a population not exceeding 20 lakhs may not constitute panchayats at the
intermediate level. All the panchayati institutions are to be elected on the basis on adult suffrage but
the chairpersons at all the three levels should be elected indirectly by and from among the elected
members. But the state legislatures are free to revise this indirect election pattern.

The Act provides for the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every
panchayat (i.e., at all the three levels) in proportion of their population to the total population in the
panchayat area. Further, the state legislature provides for the reservation of offices of chairpersons in
the panchayat at the village or any other level for the SCs and STs.

It further provides for the reservation of not less than one-third of the total number of seats for
women (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging the SCs and STs). Further, not
less than one-third of the total numbers of offices of chairpersons in the panchayats at each level are
to be reserved for women.

The Act also authorises the legislature of a state to make any provision for reservation of seats in any
panchayat or offices of chairperson in the panchayat at any level in favour of backward classes. The
term of office is five years but a panchayat can be dissolved before the completion of its term.

Further fresh election to constitute a panchayat should be completed:


(i) Before the expiry of its duration of five years; or

(ii) In case of dissolution before the expiry of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution.
The Amendment Act prescribes the qualifications and disqualifications of members subject to revision
by state legislatures.

The Act says that person shall be disqualified for being chosen as for being a member of
panchayat if he is so disqualified:
(i) Under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the legislature of the state
concerned, or

(ii) Under any law made by the state legislature. However, no person shall be disqualified on the
ground that he is less than 25 years of age if he has attained the age of 21 years. All questions of
disqualifications are referred to such authority as the state legislature determines.

The Two Commissions:


The Parliament knew it for sure that elections will be the real arena of discord and problems may lead
to crises and an early collapse of the system. The Act envisions an election commission in every state
to ensure free and fair panchayati elections periodically. It was quite a challenging job to get elections
conducted at the grass-roots level.

The Election Commission of India could not be involved in it but a similar and uniform model on the
lines of Election Commission of India should be workable over a period of time. The amendment is
extra conscious of the sensitivities of the states and to keep them in good humour even the powers and
the functions of these institutions have been envisaged in a vague manner with enough leeway for the
state legislations to fill up the blank functions and powers.

The state legislature may endow the panchayats, with such authority as may be necessary to enable
them to function as institutions of self-government.

Such a scheme may maintain provisions for the devolution of powers and
responsibilities upon panchayats at the appropriate level with respect to:
(i) The preparation of plans; and

(ii) The implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted
to them, including those in relation to the 29 matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.

The state legislature may:


(i) Authorise a panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate taxes, duties, tolls and fees;

(ii) Assign to a panchayat taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the state government;

(iii) Provide for making grants-in-aid to the panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the state; and

(iv) Provide for constitution of funds for crediting all moneys of the panchayats.

The reformers were quite sanguine to the fact that states will be unenthusiastic to endow panchayati
institutions with adequate resources and the experiment may crash in the want of funds. Political
partisaness apart the development work in rural areas may keep these institutions starving for a long
time and the local leadership may get exhausted and frustrated in the process of procuring resources.

The Constitution provides for a finance commission for distribution of resources between the Centre
and states. Here the resources were to be distributed between states and panchayati institutions with a
possibility of federal grants-in-aid system. So the amendment makes a statutory provision for the state
Finance Commission.
The governor of a state shall, after every five years, constitute a Finance Commission to review the
financial position of the panchayats.

It shall make the following recommendations to the governor:


(1) The principles which should govern:

i. The distribution between the state and the panchayats of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls
and fees levied by the state.

ii. The determination of taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to the panchayats.

iii. The grant-in-aid to the panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the state.

(2) The measures needed to improve the financial position of the panchayats.

(3) Any other matter referred to the Finance Commission by the governor in the interests of sound
finance of the panchayats.

The state legislature may provide for the composition of the commission, the required qualifications of
the members and the manner of their selection. The governor shall place the recommendations of the
commission along with the action taken report before the state legislature. The Central Finance
Commissioner shall also suggest the measures to augment the Consolidated Fund of a state to
supplement the resources of the panchayats in the states.

The state legislature has to make provisions with respect to the maintenance of accounts by the
panchayats and the auditing of such accounts. The 73rd Amendment applies on union territories also,
subject to exceptions specified by the President of India. But it does not apply to the states of
Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Jammu & Kashmir for their special status and tribal council
situations already in existence.

The Panchayat Tier:


Although almost all states of the Indian Union have passed necessary Panchayat Acts, still the
suggestion of ARC of having one panchayat for one village of about 2,000 residents is far from being
implemented. Adult suffrage with social justice reservations is a great step forward yet the wide
variety of patterns in the spectrum raise many eyebrows. The reservation of women in some states and
disqualifying panchayat leaders on the birth of a third child or absence of supercession dissolution
rules stand in the working of panchayats in their initial years of gestation.

Some of these frailties are obvious and can be identified as under:


(1) An unhealthy electoral environment.
(2) Lack of proper state guidance specially that of the revenue and police authorities.

(3) Sarpanchs and especially husbands of female Sarpanchs dominate.

(4) Rules and procedures.

(5) Slow action against defaulters.

(6) Weak secretarial assistance.

(7) Poor financial resources.

The need, therefore, is to augment the resources and establish ‘Gram Sachivalayas’ as suggested by
Shiv Charan Mathur panel of Administrative Reforms in Rajasthan. The district secretariats will give
PRI a distinct identity and clarity of rules and procedures will make the institutions affective.

The Panchayat Samiti Tier:


The panchayat samiti or the block level institution has been in great debate in the two Mehta Reports.
As a key functionary, the BDO has been the centre of controversies. The variations in power role and
even in nomenclature demanded a consensus.

In pre-1994 situation, the panchayat samiti was known as:


(1) Mandal Panchayat in Karnataka

(2) Janpad Panchayat in Madhya Pradesh

(3) Panchayat Sangh in Tamil Nadu

(4) Taluka Panchayat in Gujarat

(5) Anchal Samiti in Arunachal Pradesh

(6) Kshetriya Samiti in J&K

The ARC suggested that the area of the block should be coterminous with that of a tehsil or a sub-
division. The 73rd Amendment has introduced the necessary uniformity.

The panchayat samiti today has two kinds of functions:


(1) Primary functions such as, drainage, roads, primary health centres and primary schools, cultural
activities and health services, and
(2) Developmental functions which may include execution of development programmes, seeds and
fertilizers distribution, conservation of soil, credit for agricultural purposes, irrigation facilities,
forests, cattle and fodder improvement, cottage and small scale industries, etc.

To discharge these functions, the panchayat samiti can seek people’s cooperation through functional
committees. The BDO who is equivalent to the position of a SDO serves as the executive secretary of
the samiti administration. The samiti can levy taxes, but the scarcity of resources is a perennial
grievance.

The Zila Parishad Tier:


Like panchayat samiti, the institution of zila parishad had variation as strong and weak zila parishads.
Some status accepted it as the major unit of rural development. Others like Haryana, Madhya Pradesh
and Orissa have underrated its importance and have even tried to abolish it. The names of the
institution explain the nature of the models.

(1) Assam Mahakama Parishad

(2) Tamil Nadu District Development Council

(3) Andhra Pradesh Zila Praja Parishad

(4) Gujarat District Panchayat

Ending the diversity in composition which caused variations in roles, the new dispensation makes it a
directly elected body of the people with a tenure of five years. Its functions and roles have been
delineated by the act in specific terms.

According to the statute, the zila parishads will:


(1) Advise state government on matters relating to development in the district,

(2) Co-ordinate development plans prepared by the panchayat samitis,

(3) Co-ordinate the work of panchayat samitis, and

(4) Advise the state government on the allocation of work to Panchayati Raj institutions.

(5) Examine and approve the budget of panchayat samitis,

(6) Distribute funds to various panchayat samitis,

(7) Issue directions to panchayat samitis for efficient performance of their duties,
(8) Inform the divisional commissioner and the district collector about irregularities in PRIs,

The chairman of the ZP, called as Zila Pramukh is an indirectly elected functionary but happens to be
a member of the parishad. He is accountable to the zila parishad which can remove him by a vote of
no-confidence. It is around this pivot that the future pattern of Panchayati Raj will revolve in the
states.

The role of the collector vis-a-vis zila parishad is the key issue and his relationship with the District
Rural Development Agency (DRDA) has already heralded the change. The Administrative Reforms
Commission, in its report on state administration has recommended that “the developmental function
should be transferred from the collector to the zila parishad and a whole-time senior officer be
appointed as the chief executive officer of the zila parishad.

This officer be designated as the district development officer and he should exercise supervisory
control over the district level officers of various development departments and the technical and non-
technical staff of the zila parishad. The district development officer should work under the leadership
and guidance of the zila pramukh.”

The 73rd Amendment enables the legislatures of the states to enclow panchayat bodies with the
powers and responsibility to prepare plans for economic development and social justice. It will cause a
steady increase in the developmental powers and functions of this apex body.

The Services without a Sachivalaya:


The existing personnel system in Panchayati Raj administration is a mixed and open one which can be
called a transitional arrangement till regular cadres of PR bodies are recruited by some qualified
recruiting agency. The state officials who are working on deputation or whose services have been
loaned cannot run the autonomous local government institutions and what has happened thus far is a
story of continuous conflict between strong bureaucracy and weak democracy.

The district collector and his team of SDOs or BDOs has to be kept out of the Panchayati Raj
institution because their very presence as managers of development or captains of extensions officers
team or administrative secretaries of elected bodies destroys the very spirit of democratic
decentralisation.

The experience of practically all the states of the country denotes that state level officers have their
prejudices and even a petty village level worker treats the panchayat as a pocket borough for his
depredations. Secretarial assistance or some sort of a gram sachivalaya is a necessity and the
deputation arrangement should soon has to replaced by a regular cadre of Panchayati Raj adminis-
trators at every level.
Naturally, the state level civil servants do not like this change and the solution lies in asking the State
Public Service Commissions to screen state official for final absorption in Panchayati Raj service
cadres – senior as well as junior.

The Financial Management of Panchayats:


Presently the financial administration of all PR bodies is also run by state official on deputation. The
VLW, the BDO and the secretary, zila parishads are acting as finance officers responsible for
maintaining accounts books, records and registrars. The ARC anticipated a situation when panchayati
institutions will be financially autonomous and viable.

An independent system of panchayati accounting and panchayati audit is a precondition to run the
system. The half-heartedness of state officials and lack of political will on the part of state leaders have
created an anomalous situation because of which the inbuilt control of state officials over PRIs has
rendered them ineffective. The present arrangement of personnel and budget management cannot be
tenable and all kinds of controls through state bureaucracy have to be replaced by a new system of
accountability and democratic working.

The institutional, administrative, financial and technical control of state government over Panchayati
Raj bodies is inimical to the spirit of the 73 rd Amendment. Even coordination by state authorities or
institution will be far from the intention of the reformers. Like the 1919 dyarchy, the reserved half of
district government is making a bid to foil the democratic working of the transferred half in the name
of coordination through structural arrangements and common work procedures.

The Gestation Period:


It is too early to evaluate the working of Panchayati Raj in India. A decade is hardly a time to appre-
ciate the potentialities of the institutions suffering from teething troubles. The legacies of community
development administration are not healthy. The district administration presents the entire
experiment with a jaundiced eye.

The prejudices have been rationalised to the extent that failures have been declared much before the
launching of the reform. Research indicates that state level political leaders are the real villains of
peace. They talk from housetops about the inevitability of decentralisation, but are extremely
suspicious and nervous in parting with power.

They see the erosion of their roots in panchayati elections. Once these institutions get roots the
parachuting of state and national leaders will become difficult. So they keep talking about district
development councils and the alibis that go with district developmental planning.
The 73rd Amendment offers a big opportunity to create the third tier of parliamentary
government in India’s Federal Scheme, but the obstacles in place of being removed are
being created by:
(1) MPs and MLAs of the states,

(2) Cabinet ministers in the states,

(3) Civil servants at each level, and

(4) Village leaders of caste, class and community who see threat to their established position in the
change.

The Frailties of the System:


Although panchayati elections in almost all the states have been a phenomenal operation and PR
institutions have settled down to normal working without adequate resources and much-needed
infrastructure.

Still, the problem areas of the frail structure and their working can be identified as
under:
(1) Poor local leadership based on narrow sectarian considerations of caste without much vision and
far sight. The social justice class arising from reservations of varieties tends to push the real deserving
outside the pale of power in the rat race for scrambles.

(2) Financial crunch, partly because of the lack of state support and partly because of unwillingness of
newly elected leaders to tax their voters.

(3) Women leadership through reservation at the grass-roots level, where their husbands and kins
play a pernicious role because of the male dominant joint family system.

(4) Apathy of district administration to prove their indispensability and convince the common villager
that their own local leaders are no match to urban educated outsiders.

(5) Partisan character of local elections which are neither factional nor programme based. The
electoral system of higher bodies has criminalised local politics and politicised the petty crime.

(6) The malpractices in panchayat working go unpunished because of the lack of procedures and
arbitrary punishment system has become operative in the discretionary pockets in the absence of
traditions and clear-cut rules.
(7) Practically all the schemes of development and social welfare are routed to panchayati institutions
through the district administration. It makes the former a second fiddle and the legitimacy of
panchayati institutions has suffered in the process.

(8) In spite of all provisions of constitutional amendments, the states have been authorised to transfer
powers, finance and responsibilities to the panchayats. The constitutional amendment leaves
everything to the self-thinking of the states. But, the bitter truth is that the indifferent attitude of the
states has been responsible for not giving a chance to develop democracy at the local level.

Therefore, the success of the constitutional amendment depends on the fact that how far the Centre
and the states inspired by the public spirits, implement honestly the provisions.

(9) It is still feared that as the narrow politics of the vote has made the biggest democratic institutions
of the country useless and bonded to rule, least the Panchayati Raj institutions should meet the same
fate.

(10) Some critics are of the opinion that the new panchayat system is the same weak effort as was
done to revive the panchayats by adding one directive to the Principle Directives of the Constitution.
As per the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, the states have framed different rules to implement it.
These provisions, perhaps, would make it obligatory for the states to hold panchayat elections and the
economic basis of the panchayats would comparatively be more clear but these provisions would not
give a much needed lease of life to the panchayats.

(11) There is no provision to establish “Nyaya Panchayats” or “Gram Nyayalayas” in the amendment.
Giving concessions as per differences of the local groups of the state, the constitution and the
jurisdiction of these village courts should have been clarified.

The Innovative Approach for 2020:


The cumulative impact of all this has rendered the PRIs lame and defunct. They are begging for their
due before the officials of the state. The coalition experiments at the Centre and the different political
parties ruling the states, have created problems of hung legislatures, wherein panchayati pockets are
seen with suspicion and scepticism. In the meantime, the rural world is metamorphosing under the
impact of liberalisation and globalisation.

The literacy rate has touched an all time high and connectivity revolution of mobile phones and
computer internet is the rural market of the future. The mass media has already made in roads and
the rural urban distinctions are disappearing fast in terms of development facilitations. The vested
interests in status quo cannot fight this inevitability of change.
But its speed can be accelerated if Panchayati Raj institutions are revamped with a
vision. Innovative bold approach to rural governance can rebuild a ‘Developed India’ by
2020, if the following amendments or reforms are expedited in the panchayati
experiment:
1. The federal government initiates a massive programme of central aid to three selected districts from
each state every year on a rational basis merging the MP and MLA funds in the federal aid
programmes. If it is done, the scenario will be visibly changed by 2020.

2. All district development planning is handed over to zila parishad committee co-opting experts and
local participants which should involve private sector philanthropists and entrepreneurs to take up
individual projects on BOOT or BOLT basis under the co-ordinational supervision of zila parishads.
The district administration should totally be withdrawn from development projects.

3. The financial resource allocation, though a responsibility of state finance commission, but it should
be linked with National Finance Commission and one of the expert members from the National
Finance Commission should take care of the quantum of grants-in-aid from the state.

4. The state development service for PRIs should soon be constituted and the ‘Gram Sachivalaya’ on
the pattern of state secretariat be created at district level to formulate and implement policies of zila
parishads with a feedback from below.

5. An office called as Panchayati Lokpal may be created in each state to hear complaints and ensure an
objective implementation of rules and regulations including the suspension and super cession of
elected bodies of Panchayati Raj. If it is deemed as expensive, the district and sessions judges may
perform this job as an additional charge.

6. A Gram Nayalaya as recommended in the Desai report of Law Commission may be established at
panchayat samiti headquarters to take care of panchayati litigation with a right to appeal to the
district and session judge and the High Court.

7. Panchayati training programmes should be organised at district level and below. Trainers may go to
panchayat headquarters and the state should look after ‘Trainers’ Training’ and ‘Research and Reform’
on the basis of feedback reports from the trainees. Practical aspects of training on the spot should be
emphasised.

8. The state government along with experts from Union government should evaluate the achievements
of PR institutions every fifth year after elections and instalmentally transfer more and more regulatory
functions from the district administration.
9. The experiment of district development committee with collector as secretary should be tried in
those border areas where integrated development of the district includes the efforts of rural and urban
local bodies.

Towards Panchayat Parliamentarianism:


Needless to mention that panchayati experiments needs goodwill, courage and optimism on the part
of all involved. In 1950, India did not deserve democracy but given the opportunity the countrymen
have proved worthy of it. Rural India needs a second war of Indian independence against her own
urban elites. The policies of liberalisation and privatisation have started creating the rural
infrastructure.

Now, there are only three alternatives left for rural governance:
(1) A district level three-tier of panchayati parliamentary democracy with a zila pramukh as a sort of
district CM, alongwith a cabinet but without a governor. The modalities may differ and change with
the passage of time.

(2) A merger model of district administration in Panchayati Raj governance in coming fifteen years as
was envisaged in Digvijay Singh Model for Madhya Pradesh.

(3) Continuation of dyarchy and parallelism of regulatory and developmental governments with
clearer demarcations of jurisdictions.

A serious effort in this direction was made in 1999 when the Congress government of Chief Minister
Digvijay Singh took the initiative and made a declaration for the adoption of district government in
Madhya Pradesh. From district administration to district government was hailed as a big leap and a
detailed legal plan of action was announced to introduce district government by expanding the
District Committee System of 74th Amendment.

It assigned a new role to the collector and one cabinet minister in charge of the district government to
take the district government closer to the people. Originating from the Kanha Plan, the concept was
debated at various levels and the institutional shape was envisaged through extended delegation of
tasks, powers and responsibilities to the district committees and various kinds of sub-committees in
different spheres of administrative activities at the level of the district and below.

The idea was to make the dyarchy workable and push the transitional charge towards a positive
institutionalisation of democracy at the grass roots. The Digvijay Singh Model as it is called, clarified
relationships and exhibited confidence in the capability of the people, whose problems were to be
resolved without shuttling between district headquarters and the state secretariat in the capital.
The midway approach tried to satisfy all by reconciling the conflicting claims of panchayati leaders,
district level bureaucracy and the people down below the line at the grass roots. The purpose was to
create conditions conducive for change and the scheme was launched with usual fanfare and honest
commitment.

But then, it was a political decision and each political party viewed the entire transitional arrangement
in terms of its own perspective and political spoils. The BJP government of Uma Bharti felt terribly
concerned and even alarmed. She decided to abrogate. The Act and the whole talk of district
government vanished with a whimper. The change of district government has to have political
repercussions, but the political leaders of all political parties have to sit down to work out details
under the leadership of the Union government.

The dyarchy that is being practised today is faulty in principle, faulty in planning and faulty in
practice. It is unnatural, artificial and betrays confidence in people. At best it can be justified as a
transitional measure, because the rural folks, who can take decisions about development cannot be
called incompetent to control their policyless and the revenue administration of the collectorate.

The second alternative of merging the district administration into panchayati democracy is being
debated and several modalities are emerging. The collector can be the chief secretary of the district
ruling set up. The elected political leaders may be trained for some time but the district bureaucracy
should know it for sure that their days are numbered.

There is no point in lengthening the travails of transition and creating bad blood or bitterness in the
process. The parliamentary system of the third lowest tier should not be a copy of the central or state
tiers. It will be a grass roots democracy with a difference at the district and then again at block and
village levels.

From gram sabha to Lok Sabha was a Jai Prakash model and Indianising India’s rural democracy
requires an optimistic dent in the district system. Debureaucratising rural governance and vesting
popular representatives with power to shape their own destiny by 2020 will be the triumph of the
second war of Indian Independence which aims to liberate rural India and replace district
bureaucracy by parliamentary democracy.

Urban Local Self-Government in the District:


The Patliputra of Mauryan age may be a romantic lore of Indian history but urbanisation as a
phenomenon of social and political living is a legacy of the British Raj. Having settled down at sea
ports, the East India Company unconsciously developed the rim land and the port towns for their sea
faring commercial ventures. Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were the direct outcome of this policy.
The spells of urbanisation and later industrialisation gave birth to urban centre, like Ahmedabad,
Surat, Bhadonch, Coimbatore, Madurai and Paradweep. After independence, almost 30 per cent of
country’s population has migrated to big cities like Kanpur, Chandigarh, Bangalore, Hyderabad,
Jaipur, Lucknow, Ranchi and Bhopal. The former cities have become metropolitan towns and new
megalopolises are developing around as satellite metro centres of Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai.

These urban centres are a part of the district system of government, yet their distinctiveness exits
because of population, modes of employment, need of community services and facilitation
infrastructures. They are absolutely different from the rural areas.

Traditionally, a village has been defined as:


(1) A cluster of houses with a population of 10,000 or less.

(2) A social habitation where most of the people make their living by producing from the farms. The
Blurring Divide

In fact, an urban area is marked by the state government under law. Traditionally it is a poor place
where most of the people live like a village family, sharing a common culture and traditional life
patterns. As the concept of rural development alleviates rural poverty and means of communication
provide connectivity and mobility, the rural urban divide is becoming blurred and untenable.

The big and sprawling villages are emerging as towns and perhaps after a decade or two, the town
culture will take over the rural culture. To arrest this mass migration from Agraria to Industria is one
of the biggest challenges of development. The transitional phase is being cut short by programmes of
mass literacy, rural electrification and women’s empowerment.

Naturally, the divide will remain for some time and a further divide may follow between metro cities
and urban centres. The legacy of the British Raj in this field will provide the base but a new urban
India in contrast to a panchayati rural India will develop on different lines.

The Historical Perspective:


The 74th Amendment Act, 1992 represents the culmination of efforts that were going on in British
India since 1687. The company and later on the Crown’s government made some abortive attempts to
streamline the urban system as it obtained under their rule.

The following landmarks deserve mention:


1687:
The Madras Corporation was born

1726:
The Calcutta and Bombay Corporation were created

1870:
Lord Mayo’s resolution visualised financial devolution to local institutions

1882:
Lord Ripon, the father of local staff government gave the Magna Carta of local self-government

1909:
Hobhouse Commission on decentralisation brought local bodies in the limelight

1919:
Local bodies were handed over to a responsible Indian minister under the dyarchical reforms in the
provinces

1924:
The British government got the Cantonment Act passed by central legislature

1935:
Local self-government declared as a provincial subject under provincial autonomy

All this could not help urban local bodies to get their due. Except in metropolitan towns of Madras,
Bombay and Calcutta, the municipalities and other urban local bodies were only notional in their
working. The Constituent Assembly did not show any concern to local problems – rural as well as
urban.

It was as late as 1985 that the ministry of urban development was created. Even today, the defence
ministry and home ministry are the nodal agencies that deal with cantonment boards, and the urban
bodies in union territories respectively.

Some of the landmarks of post-independence era reflect the casual concerns of Union
government which appointed the following committees and commissions to examine
urban local problems:
(1) Wittal Local Finance Enquiry Committee 1951

(2) John Mathai Taxation Enquiry Commission 1954 .

(3) Ahmad Committee on the Training of Municipal Employees 1965

(4) Jain Committee on Rural-Urban Relationship 1966


(5) Zakaria Committee of Ministers on Augmentation of Financial Resources of Urban bodies 1968

(6) Committee on Service Conditions of Municipal Employees 1968

(7) Gajpati Committee on Budgetary Reforms in Municipal Administration 1974

(8) Sahay Study Group on Constitution, Powers and Laws of Urban Local Bodies and Corporations
1982

(9) Correa National Commission on Urbanisation 1988

Today, legally speaking when India’s urban population stands in the neighbourhood of 35 crores, i.e.,
around 33 per cent and above it is obligatory on every government to manage this transformation
from rural to urban settlements. Several task forces on planning and development of towns and cities
(1975), strategies of urban development (1982) and housing and urban development (1983) have
made their recommendations.

The concern of these study groups in varied areas has resulted in the creation of National Commission
on Urbanisation (NCU). The commission examines issue and problems pertaining to urban
management, spatial planning, resource allocation, urban housing, conservation, urban poverty, legal
frameworks and information systems.

The commission has recommended that: every town with a population of more than 50,000 be
provided with an urban community development department, for the processing of development
programmes. A National Urbanisation Council should be set up to formulate and implement
urbanisation policies. For this the Ministry of Urban Development will have to be restructured and
made a nodal ministry.

An Indian Council for Citizen’s Action can encourage citizens through voluntary effort. Consequently,
the Ministry of Urban Development was set up in the Union government and urban development was
shifted to the ministry of works and housing which was later renamed as the ministry of works,
housing and urban development. Urban development was again shifted to the ministry of planning,
works, housing and urban development in 1967 and a separate Ministry of Urban Development
started functioning under a cabinet minister of Union government since 1985.

The 65th Amendment systematised the urban local reforms but it was lost in the Rajya Sabha.
However, the basic provisions enshrined in this amendment were taken up by Narsimha Rao
Government in 1992. The two houses of the Parliament and the requisite number of vidhan sabhas
approved it and the President of India gave his assent to this 74th Constitutional Amendment Act of
1992 and it was placed on the statute book on June 1st 1993.
73rd And 74th Constitution Amendments and Reservation for Women

Article 40 of the Indian constitution directs the government to establish panchayats to serve as

institutions of local self-government. Most states implemented this directive principle along the lines

of the recommendations of the Balwantarai Mehta Commission Report.

The commission recommended a ‘three-tier’ system of Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs), viz. the

popularly elected village council (gram panchayat) as the village level basic unit. Block (block is the

larger sub unit of a district) council (or panchayat saphithi) at the Block level, and the district council

(or the Zilla Parishad) at the district level. Introduction of PRIs was hailed as one of the most

important political initiatives in India.

Main Problems:

The panchayat raj system has been experiencing ups and downs over the years. The activities of these

institutions are broad based but its resource base is very weak. In view of this, the PRIs constituted in

various states could not live up to the expectations of the people. Deficient in funds and authority, the

panchayats in most states were largely inactive until late 1970s.

Some of the major problems and shortcomings that adversely affected the functioning

of these institutions are:

i. Elections not being held regularly;

ii. Lack of adequate transfer of powers and resources;

iii. Lack of power to generate their own resource; and

iv. Non-representation of women and weaker sections in the elected bodies.

In 1989, the Government of India took two major initiatives to enhance the role of panchayats. First, it

initiated the Jawahar Employment Plan (Jawahar Rozgar Yojana) which provided funding directly to

village councils to create jobs for unemployed through public works.

Second, it also proposed the 64th Constitution Amendment Bill to make it mandatory for all states to

establish a three tiered (village, block and district) system of Panchayats in which representatives
would be directly elected for five year terms. Panchayats were to be given expanded authority and

funding over local development efforts. Despite the popular appeal of transferring power to

panchayats, the 64th amendment bill was rejected by Rajya sabha.

73rd and 74th Constitution Amendments:

Given its far-reaching consequences, the 73 rd Amendment (together with the 74th) is rightly called ‘a

silent revolution’ for various reasons. First of all, the PRIs no longer operate at the whim of state

governments and their laws. They are now a part of the Constitution and enjoy the status of

institutions of self-government, as parliament at the federal level and legislative assemblies at the

state level.

The amendment prescribes regular elections every five years and election within six months of the

dissolution of any PRI. To ensure free, fair, and timely elections there is a provision for the setting up

of state election commission. The most revolutionary provision is the reservation of one-third of the

seats for women in local bodies, along with reservation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled

tribes in proportion to their regional populations.

The amendment lays down 29 functions to be entrusted to the PRIs. To maintain a democratic ethos,

popular accountability, and transparency, the amendment emphases the need for periodic meetings of

the gram sabha, composed of all adults in each village. These meetings will approve ongoing

programmes and financial allocations. In brief, the amendment visualises the allocation of funds,

functions, and functionaries to these bodies to ensure genuine and effective democratic

decentralisation.

The Constitutional Amendment Bill came into effect from April 24, 1994. Principally, it

gave:

i. The panchayats constitutional status (previously panchayat matters were considered as state

subjects);

ii. An institionalised three tier system at village, block and district levels;

iii. The amendment stipulated that all panchayat members be elected for five year term in the

elections supervised by the state election commission.


Profile of women’s participation in local governance:

There were already some women in local government prior to the passing of the 73rd and

74th Amendments. But they were few and far between. In most cases the state laws prescribed at least

one or two seats for women in the old-style PRIs. Very often these seats were filled though

nomination.

The nominees, invariably, were members of elite families belonging to higher castes and owning

substantial land, thus enjoying high status in terms of family, cast, and class. These women were

usually related to established political leaders. As symbols of tokenism, they rarely took active interest

in the functioning of the PRIs. The new system of reservation and competitive elections based on adult

franchise changed this situation radically.

When the provisions for reservations of seats for women were being debated in parliament, several

members were doubtful that such large numbers of women would come forward to contest these seats.

But these doubts proved to be wrong.

In total, for over one million seats reserved for women in all the local bodies, more than five million

women candidates contested. Thus, on an average, there were five women candidates contesting each

seat. Moreover, some women condition won unreserved or general seats, defeating their male rivals.

Of course, such cases were not many, but they were no less significant.

It needs to be mentioned that the reservation of seats for women (and for SCs and STs) concerns not

only members but also office-bearers. Thus, not only one-third of elected members but one-third of

sarpanches or chairpersons have also to be women.

In the country as a whole, there are 231,630 gram panchayats (village councils). Over 77,210 of them

now have women as sarpanches. At the intermediate level, there are 5,912 taluka (or block/mandal)

panchayat samitis. More than 1,970 of them have women sabhapatis or heads and of the 594 zilla

parishads” (district councils) 200 have women presidents. Thus, in the country as a whole, about one

million women now occupy positions as members or heads in rural and urban local government

bodies. This may be unique in the world.


There are variations among states in the magnitude of Women’s representation. While most states

manage to meet the constitutional target of 33 per cent seats for women, in some this proportion has

been exceeded. For example, in Karnataka, women occupy 43.6 per cent seats in local bodies. This

means a large number of women have managed to win general (unreserved) seats, defeating rival male

and female candidates. This suggests a highly significant trend for the future.

This statutory reservation for women has provided an opportunity for the formal involvement of

women in the development through political process at the grass roots level thereby enabling them to

influence the decisions in the local governments.

Further, the state legislature may:

i. Authorise a panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance

with laid down procedures and limits;

ii. Assign to a panchayat such taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and selected by the state government

to be used for specific purposes subject to specified conditions and limits; and

iii. Provide grants-in-aid to the panchayats from the consolidated fund of the state.

Women Reservation Policy in India

Women Reservation Policy in India!


The demands for special concessions and privileges to women are matters of right and not of charity
or philanthropy. When reservation for women in panchayats was announced, some people supported
it but some others said that it would generate a spirit of denigration.

At the panchayat level, one-third seats were reserved for women by making an amendment (73rd) in
the Constitution. Later on, a separate clause was added reserving one- third of seats for the SC and ST
women within the SC and ST quotas. This means that if there are 100 seats in a local body, of which 23
seats are reserved for the SCs/STs, then 7 or 8 of these (23) seats would be reserved for SC/ST women.

The 33 seats reserved for women would be adjusted to include the 7 SC/ST women seats so that the
general category of women reserved seats would come down from 33 to 26. Some states (like U.P)
have reserved seats for OBC women at the panchayat level. This means that out of 33 seats for women,
7 will be for SCs/STs, 9 will be for OBC and 17 will be for general women.
Before the Bill on 33 per cent reservation of seats for women in the Lok Sabha was introduced in
December 1998; it had been prevented from being introduced on three different occasions: once,
during Prime Minister Deve Gowda’s time (1996), again during Prime Minister Gujral’s time (1997),
and once again, during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s time (1998). At one stage (during I.K.
Gujral’s regime), the Bill was submitted to Gita Mukherjee Committee which in its report, submitted
in November 1996, recommended one-third reservation for women.

The Women’s Bill pending in the parliament (84th amendment to Constitution) at the
time of Vajpayee’s losing Vote of Confidence provided for:
(a) 33 per cent seats for v/omen in legislatures;

(b) It did not suggest reservation on caste basis (i.e., it did not permit reservation for SC/ST/OBC
women; and

(c) It suggested rotational system.

The question to be discussed today, therefore, is: Is reservation policy or protective discrimination for
women a logical and a useful strategy for ensuring justice and equal opportunity to women? The
argument in favour of the Bill is that Women’s representation in politics will be a first step towards
women empowerment. About two years ago, a leading national daily published an urban opinion poll
which showed wide support for the women’s reservation bill. But then a number of articles were
published against the Bill in a 10:1 ratio.

These articles had started appearing after one OBC member of the parliament (president of a political
party) had given a ‘parkatti’ (the bobbed-hair brigade) statement in the Lok Sabha against the
members of women’s organisations in a contemptuous way.

Several arguments are given against the Women’s Bill. The first argument is that the political parties
are talking in favour of the Women’s Bill only to appease and entice their voters. Their non-
seriousness in women’s empowerment is indicated by the fact that within their own organisations they
have not introduced the quota system, except the Congress Party which introduced 33 per cent
women’s reservation in the party only in December 1998.

Even the BJP (which succeeded in introducing the Bill in the Parliament in December 1998) had
allotted only 23 out of 477 seats it had contested in 1995 general elections to women, out of which 13
women were elected. In the BJP Working Committee, out of 75 members there are only eight women.
In its 650-member National Council, there are only 150 women.

The Congress Party has only three women in its 20- member Working Committee. The Communist
Party has 12 women in its 150-member National Council, and three members in its 21-member
National Executive. In September 1999 general elections for the Lok Sabha, no political party has
given tickets to women in more them 10 per cent cases. In some parties the percentage of women
candidates is not even 2 to 3.

The second argument is that reservation cannot achieve much. Intact, it can be counter-productive. At
best, reservation is ‘palliative’ and no decisive transformation can take place unless such a measure is
accompanied by structural changes in the nation’s productive relations.

The third argument is that our country is already divided in various groups. Women’s reservation will
further divide the population artificially. Reservation for the backward castes and tribes were accepted
under social conditions for a period of ten years only, and since then they have been continued for
vested interest of catching political votes.
The fourth argument is that it will affect the efficiency and working of the parliament, as even now all
women members in parliament are not active. There are cases of women MPs who have never spoken
in their term of five years or spoken only once or twice in five years. If a large number of such women
enter parliament, what will be the ‘nature’ and quality of debates? Even in panchayats, a large number
of cases of women sarpanchas have been reported where decisions are taken by their husbands and
other male members of their families. What can thus be expected of women in parliament?

The fifth argument is that just as because of the reservation policy, the SC, ST and OBC officers on
higher administrative posts are working on the basis of caste and creed, women in parliament too will
take interest in women’s problems only. We want legislators who actively participate in national and
international issues which require vast knowledge and high education.

The sixth argument is that our experience in the last five decades has shown that the reservation
policy has not delivered the desired results. The candidates selected against reserved seats have not
been able to adequately articulate the grievances and needs of the people of their constituencies.

The last argument is that reservations will generate conflicts and tensions.

The main demand of some leaders and political parties opposing the Women’s Bill is to include a
built-in quota for the OBCs and minorities within the women’s quota, i.e., they want caste-based
reservation along with gender-based reservation. Surprisingly, these leaders and political parties have
never demanded OBC reservation for men in the Lok Sabha, knowing well that if they did, the number
of OBC men in the Lok Sabha will sharply decline, which will lead to their disempowerment.

Thus, what the members who want an amendment to the women’s Bill favour in not only gender
discrimination but also caste discrimination. The demand for representation for Muslims will further
contribute to discrimination on religious basis. Will all these discriminations (gender, caste and
religion) protect the secular fabric of the country?
Categorising women on the basis of caste and religion will be a step towards their further segregation
in society because Muslim and OBC women representatives will have nothing to do with the general
problems and issues concerning women. They will be ‘sectoral’ leaders than leaders of women in
India.

Major political parties are taking vague positions on the issue of ‘quota within quota’ because they are
only concentrating on electoral benefits. They appear to be least bothered about in the casteisation of
political contests becoming institutionalised. What they want is an opportunity to send their wives,
daughters and sisters to parliament. The present and past experiences cannot be forgotten.

Two former chief ministers of two states got their own wives nominated as candidates for elections
and one of them even became the Chief Minister in place of her husband. One Congress MP in one
state had to quit his Lok Sabha seat and his wife was nominated to contest elections from the same
constituency. The famous family consisting of mother, son and daughter are occupying seats in the
Lok Sabha since many years.

In November 1998 Assembly elections in three states and again in September 1999 general elections
for the parliament, many MPs manipulated to get their wives and other female family members
nominated for contesting elections. The opponents of the so-called concept of ‘dynasty polities’ are
themselves practising ‘family managed’ politics.

The institution of democracy was expected to serve as instrument for building a new India. But has it
produced the intended results? For its failure, it is not the institution itself which is to be blamed, it is
the way it has worked, or the way its working has been distorted by those in power.

It is because of the vested interests of the middle classes and upper castes that our country has a
dualistic pattern of growth in which those with access to the holders of power flourish and the
population at the lower level (socially and economically) is denied all the tangible gains from the
development process. Will the reservation of seats for women and women’s increasing entry in
parliament remove the dissatisfaction of these people and give a new hope to poor, uneducated and
the backward communities of our country?

The disadvantaged people do need protection and opportunity to rise but opportunities cannot be
extended en masse and for all time to come. A watchdog body should keep an eye on the progress of
the introduced scheme and as soon as it is found that certain disadvantaged group no longer needs the
crutches of reservations, the scheme should be withdrawn.

The Women’s Bill has opened up the debate about the future direction of Indian politics and society.
Should male politicians and female activists look at the issue of seats in the legislatures from purely
limited political point of view? It appears that the goal of entering the corridors of political power is
becoming pre-eminent and the larger issues of social philosophy regarding emancipation of women
are being abandoned by everyone.

It will not be empowerment of women per se if they are segregated first on the basis of gender and
then on the basis of religion and caste. One suggestion is that we should be aiming at is not the
reservation of 33 per cent of seats for women but ensuring their participation in the political system.

Whatever may be the theoretical arguments against the reservation policy, in practice this policy will
continue to be supported by all political parties because of the electoral advantage the political parties
derive from this issue. As such, the people, instead of raising the issue of reservation, should raise the
issue of vested interests of the political parties and political leaders versus the logical interests of the
common people in society. Secondly, there should be no compromise on quality and efficiency. The
eligibility conditions should be such that women may think of political participation not for gaining
status but for serving the community at large.

Essay on Panchayati Raj System in India (465 Words)

by Puja Mondal Essay

Panchayats have been the backbone of the Indian villages since the beginning of the recorded history.
Gandhiji s dream of every village being a republic or Panchayats having powers has been translated
into reality with the introduction of three-tier Panchayati Raj system to enlist people’s participation in
rural reconstruction.

24th April, 1993 was a landmark day in the history of Panchayati Raj in India as on this day the
Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992 came into force to provide constitutional status to the
Panchayati Raj institutions.

The salient features of the Act are as follows:


i. To provide three-tier system of Panchayati Raj for all states having population of over 20 lakh.

ii. To hold Panchayat elections regularly for every 5 years.

iii. To provide reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women (not less than
33 percent).

iv. To appoint State Finance Commissions to make recommendations regarding financial powers of
the Panchayats.

v. To constitute District Planning Committees to prepare draft development plan for the district as a
whole.
According to the Constitution, Panchayats shall be given powers and authority to function as
institutions of self-government.

The powers and responsibilities to be delegated to Panchayats at the appropriate level


are:
1. Preparation of plan for economic development and social justice.
2. Implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice in relation to 29 subjects
given in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution.
3. Levying and collecting the appropriate taxes, duties, tolls and fees.
The 73rd Amendment Act gives constitutional status to the Gram Sabha. The provisions of Panchayats
(Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 extends Panchayats to the tribal areas of eight states,
namely Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa
and Rajasthan. This has come into force on 24th December, 1990. Except Rajasthan and Bihar, all
states have passed laws to give effect to the provisions contained in the Act 40 of 1996.

Under the Act, Gram Sabha has been vested with powers for:
i. Ownership of minor forest produce, approval of development plans, selection of beneficiaries under
various programmes.

ii. Consultation on land acquisition, manage minor water bodies, control mineral leases,
regulate/prohibit sale of intoxicants, preventing alienation of land and restoring unlawfully alienated
land of STs, managing village markets, controlling money lending to STs, and controlling institutions
and functionaries in all social sectors.

The ministry extends limited financial assistance to the states to train and create awareness among
the elected members of Panchayats and functionaries. The Ministry has been providing financial
assistance through the Council for Advancement of Peoples Action and Rural Technology (CAPART)
to the non-governmental organizations for conducting training and awareness generation
programmes on Panchayati Raj. The Ministry also commissions research and evaluation study related
to Panchayati Raj from voluntary organizations institutions

Gender Discrimination in India

Gender has been an important and powerful variable that has influenced not only family life but
human life as well. It plays a vital role in the allocation of roles, status and power in all societies.
Gender equality is an important issue of human rights and social justice. “Gender” generally refers to
the differences between men and women. Encyclopaedia Britannica notes that gender identity is “an
individual’s self conception as being male or female, as distinguished from actual biological sex”. The
term “gender” generally refers to purely social rather than biological differences.
Women and men are two important components of society. Efforts to promote greater equality
between women and men can also contribute to the overall development of human society. The
socioeconomic role of women cannot be isolated from the frame work of development of the Country.
Yet they are discriminated against in almost every walk of life right from the very earliest stages.

Female feticide and infanticide are a denial of the right to life itself Females are discriminated against
in the spheres of health and nutrition which makes them more susceptible to mortality and
contributes to unbalanced male-female ratio as well as in the spheres of education, employment and
wage earning, access to property, domestic work, health and nutrition, in the field of custom and
culture and that of political representation. So the empowerment and autonomy of women and the
improvement of women’s social, economic and political status are essential for the achievement of
sustainable development in all areas of life.

Gender Discrimination in Different Areas:


Gender discriminations are found in various areas. Let us illustrate about the discriminatory
treatment in some areas of importance.

(a) Sex Ratio:


Sex ratio denotes the number of females per 1000 males. There is no gender based equality in the sex
ratio. The figures given in the table indicate that the preference for the male child is still predominant
in India.

Table 1 – Sex Ratio in India

The table given above shows the decline in the sex ratio of the country from 1901(972) to 2001 (933).
The more we are striking to reach the status of developed and civilized nation, the poorer is the sex
ratio of the country. Compared to the early part of this century, the present status of sex ratio is not
only very poor but alarmingly dangerous.
The child sex ratio is adverse for females, even in the economically developed States of Punjab,
Haryana, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Delhi and Chandigarh. In Punjab, a majority of blocks have a sex
ratio of well below 800 females per thousand males, indicating anywhere between 200 to 250
“missing” girls

(b) Literacy:
Education is the foundation stone for the all round development of men. It is also the strongest means
of strengthening the capabilities of women. Hence, to bring gender based justice in society, it is
necessary to have 100% women literacy but unfortunately the gender disparity in education is
alarming. Even 60% women literacy has not yet been achieved by our nation.

According to the 2001 census reports, the national literacy rate is 65.38% (54.16% for women and 75.
85% for man ) According to the 1991 census report, the national literacy percentage was 52.217
.(39.29% for women as against 64.13 % for man ). Corresponding figures for rural areas stand at
30.62% as against 57.58% of man. In south Asia, female literacy rate is only around 50% of those of
males. The situations even worse in Bhutan (28.1 %), Bangladesh (26.1 %), Pakistan (24.4%),
Afghanistan (15%) and Nepal (14%).

In respect of scientific, technical and higher education, situation is worse in developing as well as in
industrialized countries. Table 2 shows that -in the beginnings of the 20th century, not even 1%
women were literate while about 10% men were literate and the gender gap in literacy rate was around
9% It is observed that although in the subsequent years, the literacy, rate of man as well as women
have increased, the gender gap in literacy rate has been also increasing. It can be observed that this
gap has increased from 9% in 1901 to 25.8% in 2001.

Table -2

Health and nutrition:


So far as health care is concerned, the low sex ratio of women in the country and higher mortality rate
among the girl children is an indication of lower status of girl child in the society and discriminatory
health practices against women. Several micro level studies are a pointer to the higher ratio of
malnutrition among the girls. It is true that generally nutritional levels are very low and proper health
and medical facilities are not readily available to women.

Hence they suffer from many reproductive complications and contagious diseases. According to a
survey conducted by National Nutrition Board, anemia rate is higher among women than among men
in all age groups in both rural and urban areas. More than 50 percent of pregnant women in the
developing world are anemia (WHO 1992). About 250 million women suffer the effects of iodine
deficiency and although the exact numbers are unknown, million are probably blind due to Vitamin A
deficiency. Malnutrition hampers women’s productivity, increases their susceptibility to infections
and contributes to numerous debilitating and fatal conditions.

Maternal mortality ratio in the developing world is more than 15 times higher than in industrialized
Countries. In some Asians and North African Countries, the discrimination against women through
neglect is such that they have a shorter life expectancy. Health Programmes for the girl child are very
minimal and programmes to prepare her for young womanhood are most inadequate.

Violence against women:


Violence means use of force or coercion against someone. It has been observed that since age’s women
have been made victims of various sorts of Violence such as eve teasing molestation, dowry torture in
work place. In-spite of women movements gaining attention it is found that a woman is battered,
bruised, humiliated, assaulted in their homes, on journeys or in work places by their male
counterparts only due to our patriarchal social system.

The various forms of violence that are prevalent today include female fetus abortion, girls child
infanticide, rape, sexual harassment, eve-teasing, sexual exploitation, prostitution, domestic violence,
dowry, immoral trafficking, kidnapping, verbal abuse, molestation etc. The National Crimes Report
Bureau reported that every three minutes in India, a crime is committed against women.

Every 15 minutes, one woman is molested and every 29 minutes a woman is raped. Every 77 minutes
one woman becomes a victim of dowry death and every nine minutes a woman becomes a victim of
cruelty by her husband. Violence against women begins before she is born and continues till her
breaths her last in this world. Illegal sex determination centres have become graveyards for the poor
girl child.

On discovering that a woman is going to deliver a baby girl, the girl child is killed in the womb of her
mother. If fortune favours a girl child, she takes birth into this world but she has to suffer injustice by
accepting the discrimination made by her parents between her and her brothers. During her teenage,
she has to accept all that is meted out to her and develop the spirit of tolerance. At the time of
marriage, (he girl is considered to be a commodity and her value is judged by the amount of dowry she
brings for her in-laws. Different types of violence committed against women in India are presented in
table-III.

Different types of violence committed Against Women in India(1998 to 2001):

Work Participation:
Besides gender inequity in education or health care, there is gender inequity in work participation rate
as well. A World Bank estimate reveals that women. Constitute only 32 percent of the labour force in
India. The gender gap in work participation rate is around 26 percent. Moreover among women
working, most are working in informal sector like agriculture, household industries, petty trade and
services, building and construction where chances of exploitation are more. Usually women in our
society are financially dependent and this is one of the major causes of their exploitation.

The participation of women in various income generating sectors is not very encouraging. Due to this
poor work participation, the economic empowerment of women is not taking place and this is one of
the major hurdles in the overall development of women. The following table depicts the present work
participation of women in India.

Table -3
Women still suffer salary disparity compared to men in numerous instances of professional life (on an
average 20% less).

Political Representation:
In the political sphere also gender inequality is prominent and despite the theoretical right to contest
election, women occupy only 8.9 percent of Loksabha and 7.3 percent of Rajya Sabha seats, which is
less than 9 percent of seats in parliament. The low participation in the political sphere is mostly due to
the social setting and lack of interest, attitude and ability among women.

Gender Discrimination in India (6 Major Causes)

Attaining gender justice is not an easy task in India. From time immemorial, a girl child has been
considered as an unwanted entity and a burden whom the parents would not mind doing away with.
Discrimination against women begins even before her birth. The gruesome evils of female feticide and
infanticide prove how brutal the world could be to women.

Though the Indian constitution provides equal rights and privileges for men and women and makes
equal provision to improve the status of women in society, majority of women are still unable to enjoy
the rights and opportunities guaranteed to them.

Traditional value system, low level of literacy, more house hold responsibilities lack of awareness,
non-availability of proper guidance, low mobility, lack of self confidence family discouragement and
advanced science and technology are some of the factors responsible to create gender disparity in our
society. The most important causes of gender disparity such as poverty, illiteracy, unemployment,
social customs, belief and anti-female attitude are discussed here.

1. Poverty:
In India of the total 30 percent people who are below poverty line, 70 percent are women. Women’s
poverty in India is directly related to the absence of economic opportunities and autonomy, lack of
access to economic resources including credit , land ownership and inheritance, lack of access to
education and support services and their minimal participation in the decision making process. The
situation of women on economic front is no better and men still enjoy a larger share of the cake. Thus
poverty stands at the root of gender discrimination in our patriarchal society and this economic
dependence on the male counterpart is itself a cause of gender disparity.

2. Illiteracy:
Despite the notable efforts by the countries around the globe that have expanded for the basic
education , there are approximately 960 million illiterate adults of whom two thirds are women
.Educational backwardness of the girls has been the resultant cause of gender discrimination.

The disparities become more visible between male and female literacy rate, during 2001. The literacy
rates for males increased from 56% in 1981 to nearly 76% in 2001. The corresponding change in
female literacy rate from 30 to 54%. On the whole the decline on gender gap peaked in 1981 at 26.6%
and was 21.7% in 2001 is less impressive. The interstate variation in literacy rate for males was much
lower in comparison to females. At the state level female literacy rate varies from 35% in Bihar to 88%
in Kerala In states like Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan, the
female literacy rate is below 50%.

The progress towards education by girls is very slow and gender disparities persist at primary, upper
primary and secondary stage of education. Girl’s account for only 43.7% of enrolment at primary level,
40 .9 % at upper primary level, 38.6% at secondary level and 36.9% at degree and above level. More
over girl’s participation in education is still below 50% Gender differences in enrolment are prevalent
in all the state at all levels. They are not able to realize full identity and power in all spheres of life only
due to illiteracy.

3. Lack of Employment Facilities:


Women are not able to resolve the conflict between new economic and old domestic roles. In both
rural and urban India, women spend a large proportion of time on unpaid home sustaining work.
Women are not able to respond to new opportunities and shift to new occupations because their
mobility tends to be low due to intra-house hold allocation of responsibilities.

Rights and obligations within a house hold are not distributed evenly. Male ownership of assets and
conventional division of labour reduce incentives for women to undertake new activities. In addition
child bearing has clear implications for labour force participation by women. Time spent in bearing
and rearing of children often results in de-Skilling, termination of long term labour contacts. Thus
women are not being able to be economically self sufficient due to unemployment and their economic
dependence on the male counterpart is itself a cause of gender disparity.

4. Social Customs, Beliefs and Practices:


Women are not free from social customs, beliefs and practices. The traditional patrilineal joint family
system confines women’s roles mostly to the domestic sphere, allocating them to a subordinate status,
authority and power compared to men. Men are perceived as the major providers and protectors of a
family while women are perceived as playing only a supportive role, attending to the hearth. Boys and
girls are accordingly drained for different adult roles, status and authority. In Indian culture since
very early periods, men have dominated women as a group and their status has been low in the family
and society.

The preference for sons and disfavour towards daughter is complex phenomenon that still persists in
many places. Sons especially in the business communities are considered to be economic, political and
ritual assets where as daughters are considered to be liabilities. Thus anti female social bias is the
main cause of gender disparity in our society.

The boy receives a ceremonial welcome on his birth where as everyone is sad at the birth of a girl
child. The preference for male child is due to lower female labour participation, prevalence of social
evils like dowry and many others causes. The typical orthodox mentality is present even in this
modern era leading to sex determination tests and abortion in an illegal way.

Parents often think that teaching a girl child to manage the kitchen is more important than sending
her to school. Many feel that it is an unnecessary financial burden to send a girl child to school as
subsequently she will be married off and shifted to some other family. This orthodox belief of parents
is responsible for gender disparity.

5. Social Altitude:
Though many social activists and reformers carried their crusade against all social odds to restore
honour and dignity to women, attitudinal disparities still hunt our rural masses. Despite pronounced
social development and technological advancement, women in our society still continue to be victims
of exploitation, superstition, illiteracy and social atrocities.

The social stigma that women are housekeepers and should be confined to the four walls of the house
is perhaps a viable cause of gender disparity. They should not raise their voice regarding their fortune
for the sake of the prestige of the family. In patriarchal society a lot of weightage is given to men.

In the health and nutritional field, male members of family are supposed to take fresh and nutritious
food in comparison to women because either they are earning members or head of the family or they
are supposed to be more important than female members. This type of social attitude is conducive to
create the problem of gender discrimination.

6. Lack of Awareness of Women:


Most of the women are unaware of their basic rights and capabilities. They even do not have the
understanding as to how the socio-economic and political forces affect them. They accept all types of
discriminatory practices that persist in our family and society largely due to their ignorance and
unawareness.

Article 15 of the Indian constitution states that the state shall not discriminate any citizen on the
grounds of only sex. The irony is that there still is widespread discrimination which is a form of
injustice to women. Hence at the onset of the new millennium let this generation be a historic example
by putting an end to the gender – based discriminations by unfurling the flag of gender justice in all
our action and dealings.

As Desai has stated, if women get equal opportunities like men, they can work in every field like men.
Today if she lags behind a little, it is not her fault but the fault of traditions which have suppressed
them for centuries , owing to this, her own thoughts like also hang around only familial life and her
nearest environment also does not provide favourable conditions for her devotion in the outside work.
In order to change the situation along with economic growth social progress is also greatly required.
Hence the need of the hour is to effectively combat gender disparity as to promote gender equality by
sufficiently empowering the women.

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