Cambaliza vs. Cristal-Tenorio [A.C. 6290.

July 14, 2004]

FACTS:

[C]omplainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter
with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office. Case on deceit and grossly immoral conduct did not
pursue lacking clear and convincing evidence. On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the respondent
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar and two other allegations. The respondent
averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the complainant just to get even with her. The complainant later filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint as she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP and the case was pursued.
The IBP found the respondent guilty of assisting in unauthorized practice of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Cristal-Tenorio violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

RATIO:

A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule
9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:

Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character

JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of Court, respondent.

RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with grave misconduct
consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37-14552
for ejectment filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical error was committed in the complaint which
stated that the address of defendant is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake was rectified by the filing
of an amended complaint which was admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion
for execution. Complainant however, was surprised to receive a temporary restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220,
RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court. Complainant alleges that the issuance of the temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the
application for preliminary injunction.
Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the reason for the issuance of the
temporary restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing the wrong address in the complaint for ejectment
and told her that if she wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of respondent at the same time
giving his calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora
Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not be able to eject the defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that she could not
decide because she was only representing her sister. To her consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary
injunction as threatened by respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Branch 37 had issued an Order directing the execution of the Decision in
Civil Case No. 37-14552.
Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the antecedents in the ejectment case and the issuance of the restraining order by the
Regional Trial Court, and claimed that contrary to complainant Samonte's allegation that she was not notified of the raffle and the hearing, the
Notice of Hearing on the motion for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order was duly served upon the parties, and that the application
for injunctive relief was heard before the temporary restraining order was issued. The preliminary injunction was also set for hearing on August
7, 1996.
The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the hearing of the motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, complainant Samonte went to court "very mad" because of the issuance of the order stopping the execution of the decision in the
ejectment case. Respondent tried to calm her down, and assured her that the restraining order was only temporary and that the application for
preliminary injunction would still be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
complainant went back to court "fuming mad" because of the alleged unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.
Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his office, and informed him that she wanted to change counsel and
that a friend of hers recommended the Law Finn of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time showing a calling
card, and asking if he could handle her case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm, although he was invited to join but
he chose to remain in the judiciary. Complainant returned to court a few days later and told him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall
the writ of preliminary injunction, she will file an administrative case against respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated but the
respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the complainant must have filed this administrative charge because of her frustration in procuring the
ejectment of the defendant lessee from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complaint against him.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her report Judge Estrada states that the case was set for hearing three times, on September 7, 1997, on September 17, and on September
24, 1997, but neither complainant nor her counsel appeared, despite due notice. The return of service of the Order setting the last hearing stated
that complainant is still abroad. There being no definite time conveyed to the court for the return of the complainant, the investigating Judge
proceeded with the investigation by "conducting searching questions" upon respondent based on the allegations in the complaint and asked for
the record of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation. The case was set for hearing for the last time on October 22, 1997, to give complainant
a last chance to appear, but there was again no appearance despite notice.
The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the statements in his Comment and submitted documentary evidence consisting
mainly of the pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in RTC Civil Case No. Q96-28187 to show that the questioned orders of the
court were not improperly issued.
The investigating judge made the following findings:

"For failure of the complainant to appear at the several hearings despite notice, she failed to substantiate her allegations in the complaint
particularly that herein respondent gave her his calling card and tried to convince her to change her lawyer. This being the case, it cannot be
established with certainty that respondent indeed gave her his calling card and even convinced her to change her lawyer. Moreover, as borne by
the records of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187, complainant was duly notified of all the proceedings leading to the issuance of the TRO and the
subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of RTC, Branch 220. Complainant's lack of interest in prosecuting this administrative
case could be an indication that her filing of the charge against the respondent is only intended to harass the respondent for her failure to obtain
a favorable decision from the Court.

However, based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card attached as Annex "B" of complainant's affidavit dated September 25,
1996 allegedly given by respondent to complainant would show that the name of herein respondent was indeed included in the BALIGOD,
GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed any position in said office, the
fact remains that his name is included therein which may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not
be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears on the calling card as a partner in the Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices give the impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation and private
practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. It is to be noted, however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing
evidence that respondent actually offered to her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation committed by respondent in having his
name included/retained in the calling card may only be considered as a minor infraction for which he must also be administratively
sanctioned."

and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the minor infraction he has committed.
Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of an infraction. The complainant by her failure to appear at
the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it was the respondent who gave her the calling card of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon,
Dimailig and Celera Law Offices" and that he tried to convince her to change counsels. We find however, that while the respondent
vehemently denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his name appears on the calling card attached to the complaint which
admittedly came into the hands of the complainant. The respondent testified before the Investigating Judge as follows:

"Q: How about your statement that you even gave her a calling card of the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo, Dimailig and Celera law Offices at Room
220 Mariwasa building?

A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the complainant that I gave her a calling card. I was surprised when she presented (it) to me during one
of her follow-ups of the case before the court. She told me that a friend of hers recommended such firm and she found out that my name is
included in that firm. I told her that I have not assumed any position in that law firm. And I am with the Judiciary. since I passed the bar. It is
impossible for me to enter an appearance as her counsel in the very same court where I am the Branch Clerk of Court."

The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name which appears on the calling card, a permissible form of
advertising or solicitation of legal services.[1] Respondent does not claim that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or consent and
the calling card[2] carries his name primarily and the name of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa
Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the left comer. The card clearly gives the impression that he is connected with the said law
firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of
Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which declares it
unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:

"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with official functions."

Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk. should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times
must not only be characterized by proprietor and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion. [3]
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for
engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is further
ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law

Dacanay vs Baker & McKenzie et al

Facts: In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented by Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to
release some shares to Torres’ client. The letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”. Dacanay denied Clurman’s liability and at the
same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead “Baker & McKenzie”, a foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply
was received so Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using “Baker & McKenzie”.

Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law firm is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said
foreign firm has members in 30 cities all over the world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that they can render
legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.

HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines. Such use of foreign law firm name is
unethical therefore Torres and his law firm are enjoined from using “Baker & McKenzie” in their practice of law.

CRUZ vs SALVA
FACTS:
 A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder.
They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty.
Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people and got confessions pointing to persons other
than those convicted.
Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the Justice
Sec decided to have the results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions. Salva organized a committee for
reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and confessions. Cruz’
counsel questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation because the case was pending appeal in the
SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz’ oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation. SC issued writ of
preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.

ISSUES

Whether or not Salva conducted the investigation property?

RULING:

No. the members of the Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and sensationalism, all of which may properly be
laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any
excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad
enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when
said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the
whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and the Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and
a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.

JUAN DULALIA, JR. v. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ

The primary duty of lawyers is to be well-informed of the existing laws, o keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments, and
jurisprudence, and be conversant with basic legal principles.

Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in the Municipal Government to build a high rise building in Bulacan. The
permit was not released due to the opposition of Atty. Cruz who sent a letter to the Municipal Engineers office, claiming that the building
impedes the airspace of their property which is adjacent to the Dulalia’s property. Juan Dulalia (Juan) filed a complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Pablo Cruz (Cruz) for immoral conduct.

Juan also claimed that Cruz’s illicit relationship with a woman while still married is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Cruz invokes good faith, claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code, for
while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:

Cruz’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and
stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as “ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.”

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct,
connotes “conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.”
Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. This
duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not
be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.

The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and is suspended from the practice of law for one year.

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with Central
Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.
A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed
a petition with the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After
EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents
Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as their counsel, former
Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan.
It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function
as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall
not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
the said service.”

HELD: The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse
interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue
of whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The
key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the
“matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza
on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza
had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics is
that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist
where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not
significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly
as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the
SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.

Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:

Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends
beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to
lawyers who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and
2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS

Facts: Petitioner Michael Medado, who obtained his law degree in the year 1979, took and passed the same year’s bar examinations and took
the Attorney’s Oath, failed to sign the Attorney’s Roll. After more than 30 years of practicing the profession of law, he filed the instant Petition
on February 2012, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. Medado said that he was not able to sign the Roll of Attorneys
because he misplaced the notice given to him and he believed that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys is
not urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) after conducting clarificatory conference on the matter recommended to the Supreme Court
that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.

Issue: WON the petitioner be allowed to sign in the roll of attorneys?

Ruling: Yes, the Court allowed the petitioner to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
The Court cannot forbid the petitioner from signing the Roll of Attorneys because such action constitutes disbarment. Such penalty is
reserved to the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
The Court cited three main points which demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. First,
Medado demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. It was
Medado himself who admitted his own error and not any third person. Second, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification
from the practice of law. He strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar. Third, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and
the Energy Development Corporation.
However, the Court cannot fully free Medado from all liability for his years of inaction. His justification of his action, that it was
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment” was opposed by the Court.
“A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.”
Although an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts he could no longer claim it as a
valid justification by the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record. His action of continuing the practice of
law in spite of his knowledge of the need to take the necessary steps to complete all requirements for the admission to the bar constitutes
unauthorized practice of law. Such action transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
With respect to the penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.
However, in the instant case the Court could not warrant the penalty of suspension from the practice of law to Medado because he is not yet a
full-fledged lawyer. Instead, the Court see it fit to impose upon him a penalty similar to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one ( 1) year after receipt of the Resolution and to fine him in the amount of P32,000.
The instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is Affirmed. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of the Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized
practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by the Court.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues

FACTS: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after
admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his
employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that
he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-
payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual membership.

HELD:
 NO.
 The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence
for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member
regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is denied.
 In re Atty. Marcial Edillon: o Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license
to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. o But we must
here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of
the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
 As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
 WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount
assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision,
with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.

TEODORO R. RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO, complainants, vs. ATTY. SERGIO
ANGELES, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Sergio Angeles on the grounds of Deceit and
Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint[1] reads as follows:
1.....The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at
Quezon City;
2.....Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases and his office is located at Suite 335, URC Building, 2123
Espaa, Manila;
3.....That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973 and sustained by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court an alias writ of execution was issued in said cases;
4.....That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a sheriffs return, dated November 10, 1982, stating that no
leviable property can be found in the premises of the defendants;
5.....That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the defendants in said cases had already given
Atty. Angeles a partial settlement of the judgment in the amount of P42,999.00 (as evidenced by xerox copies of Partial
Settlement of Judgment dated September 21, 1982 and Receipt of Payment dated September 22, 1982, hereto attached as
Annexes A and B, respectively), without our knowledge.
6.....That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00 he received from Mr. Silva nor remitted
to them even a part of that amount;
7.....That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was received by him on February 17, 1983, but as of this date the
undersigned have not yet received any reply. (See Exhibit C and D attached).
In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied the accusations and stated that he has the right to retain the said
amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to professional fees due him under the subsequent agreement first with complainant
Teodoro Rivera and later with Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of Assignment (Annex 8) [2] or under the previous
agreement of P20% of P206,000.00.
Complainants, in their Reply,[3] vehemently denied the assignment of their rights to respondent.
Thereafter, this case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation in our Resolution dated
November 21, 1983. The Office of the Solicitor General considered this case submitted for resolution on April 30, 1985 by declaring
respondents right to present evidence as considered waived due to the latters failure to appear on the scheduled hearings. However,
the records from said Office do not show any resolution.
 In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an Order requiring the parties to manifest whether or not they are
still interested in prosecuting this case, or whether supervening events have transpired which render this case moot and academic or
otherwise. The copy of said Order sent to the complainants was received by their counsel on October 30, 1998 while the copy to the
respondent was returned unclaimed.
Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report on April 29, 1999 finding respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 thereof and recommends
his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on June 19, 1999, issued a resolution, the decretal portion of
which reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151
Adm. Case No. 2519
Teodoro R. Rivera, et al. vs.
Atty. Sergio Angeles

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Atty. Sergio Angeles is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for his having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.

The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondents act of deceit and
malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed
the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession.[4] For it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust
and confidence.[5]
The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right
should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an
instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for having
been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.

JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON,

JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a verified letter-complaint[1] for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr. and
Crispulo Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyers oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent
Villalon because it was discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3,
1996.[2]
In the letter-complaint,[3] complainant alleged that on October 29, 1991, respondent Villalon, as counsel for the family of
complainant, spoke to the father of complainant and asked that he be given the title over a property owned by complainant located in
Pinugay, Antipolo, Rizal and covered by TCT No. M-3023, Emancipation Patent No. 410414, because he allegedly had to verify the
proper measurements of the subject property. Sometime in November, 1991, however, complainant and his family were surprised
when several people entered the subject property and, when confronted by the companions of complainant, the latter were told that
they were workers of Canares and were there to construct a piggery. Complainant complained to the barangay authorities in Pinugay
and narrated the incident but respondent Canares did not appear before it and continued with the construction of the piggery in the
presence of armed men who were watching over the construction. Complainant then went to respondent Villalon to complain about
the people of respondent Canares but nothing was done.
Complainant then filed a case for ejectment against respondent Canares. In his Reply however, the latter answered that the
subject property was already sold by complainant to respondent Canares in the amount of P450,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of
 Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5, 1991 and notarized by respondent Atty. Crispulo Ducusin. Complainant,
however, averred that he never sold the property, signed any document nor received any money therefor, and he also denied having
appeared before respondent Ducusin who was the notary public for the Deed of Absolute Sale. Complainant discovered that
respondent Villalon claimed that complainants father allegedly gave the subject property to him (respondent Villalon) as evidenced
by a document of sale purportedly signed by complainant.
In his Comment,[4] respondent Villalon denied that allegations of the complainant and in turn, he alleged that the property was
given voluntarily by Jose Ducat, Sr. to him out of close intimacy and for past legal services rendered. Thereafter, respondent
Villalon, with the knowledge and consent of Jose Ducat, Sr., allowed the subject property to be used by Andres Canares to start a
piggery business without any monetary consideration. A Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land was then signed by Jose Ducat, Sr. to
evidence that he has conveyed the subject property to respondent Villalon with the name of respondent Canares included therein as
protection because of the improvements to be introduced in the subject property. Upon presenting the title covering the subject
property, it was discovered that the property was registered in the name of Jose Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told
respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because the land was actually owned by him and that he merely placed the name of
his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the subject property be transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to
respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that he would return the document already signed and
notarized, which he did the following day. According to respondent Canares, the trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his
office demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut the trees inside the subject property by the caretaker of respondent
Canares.
On January 21, 1993, Jose Ducat, Jr. wrote[5] to this Court and averred that he neither signed the Deed of Sale covering the
subject property nor did he appear before the notary public Crispulo Ducusin, who notarized the same. He averred that respondents
Villalon and Ducusin should be disbarred from the practice of law and respondent Villalon be imprisoned for forging his signature
and selling the subject property without his consent.
In his Rejoinder[6], respondent Villalon denied the allegations of complainant and maintained that he is a member of good
standing of the Integrated Bar and that he has always preserved the high standards of the legal profession. Respondent Villalon
expressed his willingness to have the Deed of Sale examined by the National Bureau of Investigation and reiterated that the subject
property was orally given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. and it was only in October, 1991 that the conveyance was reduced in writing. He
added that the complainant knew that his father, Jose Ducat, Sr., was the person who signed the said document for and in his behalf
and that this was done with his consent and knowledge.
This Court referred[7] the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of
its Investigating Commissioner who found respondent Atty. Villalon guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for two (2) years and likewise directed respondent Atty. Villalon to deliver to the complainant his TCT No. M-3023 within ten
(10) days from receipt of notice, otherwise, this will result in his disbarment.
The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez are as follows:

Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The sincerity and demeanor they
displayed while testifying before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to
impute any ill-motive on the part of the complainant and his witness which can impel them to institute the instant complaint and testify falsely
against him. To be sure, the testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the Commissions full faith and credence.

Respondents evidence, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself the owner of the subject property
which was allegedly given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter of contravening and incontrovertible facts.

FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew or ought to
know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a
Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having given the subject
property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said
property.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a consideration,
must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of the verbal or
oral giving of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Sr.
in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which respondent prepared
allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of said
property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent himself when he said that the
signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or
ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes signature is tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the
said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the
subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said
document which denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.

FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. 2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose
Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is
likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having executed said document. He claims that he has
never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe
to the document; and that he has never received the amount of P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction. More
importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that
there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a
consideration. Accordingly, and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated
the document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense. [8]

After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts and observations of the
Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all adopted by its Board of Governors, are well-taken, the
same being supported by the evidence adduced.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility
in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at
all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in
the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
profession.[10]
It has been established that the subject parcel of land, with an area of five (5) hectares located in Barrio Pinugay, Antipolo,
Rizal, is owned by and registered in the name of complainant herein, Jose Ducat, Jr. Respondent Villalon insists nonetheless that the
property was orally given to him by complainants father, Jose Ducat, Sr., allegedly with the complete knowledge of the fact that the
subject property belonged to his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. It is basic law, however, that conveyance or transfer of any titled real property
must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by his attorney-in-fact by virtue of a proper special power of attorney
and duly notarized. Respondent Villalon, as a lawyer, is presumed to know, or ought to know, this process. Worse, when the transfer
was first reduced in writing in October, 1991 per Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land,[11] purportedly in favor of Atty. Arsenio C. Villalon
and/or Andres Canares, Jr., respondent Villalon knew that it was Jose Ducat, Sr. who signed the said document of sale without any
Special Power of Attorney from the registered owner thereof, Jose Ducat, Jr.; and that Jose Ducat, Sr. also signed it for his wife,
Maria Cabrido, under the word Conforme. As regards the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated December 5,
1991, covering the same property, this time purportedly in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. only, respondent Villalon admitted that there
was in fact no payment of P450,000.00 and that the said amount was placed in that document only to make it appear that the
conveyance was for a consideration.
All these taken together, coupled with complainant Jose Ducat, Jr.s strong and credible denial that he allegedly sold the subject
property to respondent Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. and that he allegedly appeared before respondent notary public Ducusin,
convince us that respondent Villalons acts herein complained of which constitute gross misconduct were duly proven.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus,
every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility inasmuch as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and
demands utmost fidelity and good faith.[12]
We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed upon respondent Atty. Villalon
too severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar. In Cesar V. Roces vs. Atty. Jose G. Aportadera,[13] this Court
suspended therein respondent Atty. Aportadera for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law for two main reasons:
(i)....His dubious involvement in the preparation and notarization of the falsified sale of his clients property merits the penalty of
suspension imposed on him by the IBP Board of Governors; and
(ii)....The NBI investigation reveals that: (1) respondent misrepresented himself to Gregorio Licuanan as being duly authorized by
Isabel Roces to sell her property; (2) it was respondent who prepared the various deeds of sale over Isabels subdivision lots; (3)
Isabel was already confined at a hospital in Metro Manila on January 4, 1980, the deeds date of execution; (4) respondent knew
that Isabel was hospitalized in Metro Manila when he subscribed the deed; (5) he knew that Isabel died in Metro Manila soon
after her confinement; and (6) he did not give the seller a copy of the questioned deed of sale. [14]
 Unlike the circumstances prevailing in the said case of Aportadera, the record does not show that respondent Villalon had any direct
participation in the notarization by respondent notary public Crispulo Ducusin of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated
December 5, 1991,[15] which was supposedly signed by complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. who, however, strongly denied having signed the
same. The earlier Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land dated this ___day of October 1991, allegedly signed by Jose S. Ducat, Sr., as
vendor, covering the same property, in favor of respondent Arsenio S. Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. was not notarized. The
record also shows that Jose Ducat, Sr. and complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. are father and son and that they live in the same house at 912
Leo Street, Sampaloc, Manila. It is not also disputed that respondent Villalon has been the lawyer for a number of years of the
family of Jose Ducat, Sr.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat
Jr., the latters TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his
sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.

Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)

FACTS:

Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the finding of the Court that he
was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment
on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not
aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a
pending civil case before his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the
Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out
to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank. The mortgage was later
foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in
the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation;
reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of
possession or ownership over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding
his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.

HELD:
His petition must be denied.
Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not
only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.
It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his
procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part
and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be erased by
the termination of the case and where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad
reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.
Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was
submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.
Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common
dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

Santa Pangan vs Atty. Dionisio Ramos

FACTS: In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed because Atty. Ramos
allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found
that he used the name “Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos”. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such name because in his birth
certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. “D.D.” stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mother’s surname. However,
in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorney’s roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice
law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official oath
obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable
obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In representing himself to the court as “Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D. Ramos”,
respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and
warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.

In Re: Diosdado Gutierrez

FACTS: Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on
the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of
the latter’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense
itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The
crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position
(Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify
his being purged from the profession.

Flora Narido vs Atty. Jaime Linsangan

FACTS: This case arose from a labor dispute where Atty. Rufino Risma represented Flora Narido, an indigent client against her employer
Vergel De Dios, the client of Atty. Jaime Linsangan. During the proceedings in the trial court, Atty. Risma vehemently opposed the submission
of a certain affidavit executed by De Dios because, in the belief of Risma, said affidavit is perjured. He threatened Atty. Linsangan that if said
affidavit is submitted in court, they shall file a disbarment case against him. The affidavit was filed and so Risma and Narido filed an
administrative case against Linsangan.
Linsangan on the other hand filed a separate administrative case against Risma where he accused Risma of instigating his client to file an
administrative case against him; that said administrative case is groundless; that it was only filed to spite him and is just a mere scheme to
threaten him and to ensure that Risma and Narido has an edge over the labor case.
ISSUE: Whether or not both administrative cases should prosper.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the Solicitor General where it was recommended that both administrative cases are not
well merited.
In the administrative case against Linsangan, it was found out that there is no sufficient evidence to prove that De Dios’ affidavit is perjured. Or
if even so, there is no showing that Linsangan was in bad faith for it was not proven that he has the intention of misleading the court.
In the administrative case against Risma, it was not proven that he instigated Narido. It was Risma’s zeal in protecting his client’s interest that
made him to convince Narido to file an administrative case against Linsangan. There was no bad faith on the part of Risma. He even advanced
the expenses because Narido is indigent.
HOWEVER, it was found that Risma made an arrangement with Narido that he shall collect 15% from whatever amount they shall collect from
De Dios as a result of the labor case. Risma was admonished for this; that under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, he’s only allowed to
collect a maximum of 10%. He’s advised to keep abreast of said law.

Atty. Casiano Laput vs Atty. Francisco Remotigue

FACTS: Laput used to be the counsel for Nieves Barrera until the latter discharged her because she lost trust and confidence in him due to
dubious transactions that Laput handled while representing her in a testate proceeding. One of the lawyers retained by Barrera to replace Laput
was Remotigue. In September 1957, Remotigue, without notice to Laput, asked the court to direct Laput to turn over certain documents and
titles to Barrera so that the latter may properly disposed some estate properties. The court granted the same. But Laput stubbornly kept the said
documents as he claimed that said estate properties are subject to his lien and that he needs to be paid first.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laput has the right to keep said documents.
HELD: No. It turns out that Laput’s attorney’s fees were already significantly paid while he was still the counsel for Barrera (as backed by
evidence presented by Remotigue) hence he no longer has a lien to the properties of the estate. Therefore, he cannot retain the certificates of
title in question. On another note, he cannot now charge Remotigue with malice and bad faith when the latter filed without notice of Laput
motions to direct Laput to surrender said certificates because as records proved, even though no notice was sent to him, he had regularly
checked on the record of this case hence he would have come across the same.

CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E. F. REMOTIGUE, respondent.
This is an original complaint — a sequel to Adm. Case No. 219 — filed with this Court charging the respondent with malice, bad faith, and
misrepresentation when the latter allegedly filed motions in court without notice to complainant, thereby committing unfair and unethical
practices bordering on dishonesty, all to the prejudice of said complainant.
Complainant alleges that by virtue of a duly recorded “Attorney’s Lien” entered into the records of Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, he has in his lawful possession records and papers of the estate under administration, among which are transfer
certificates of title to all real properties of the estate located in Cebu province; that on February 21, 1956 and on September 16, 1957, the
respondent, without notice to complainant, filed with the probate court motions praying that complainant be directed to surrender the aforesaid
certificates of title, and on December 3, 1958, another motion, without notice, praying that he be issued owner’s duplicate copies of the
certificates of title on the ground that the same were lost, the respondent knowing all along that complainant is in lawful possession of said
certificates of title; and that with the duplicate titles, respondent and his client Mrs. Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera (formerly the client of
complainant) sold without notice the lots covered thereby, all of which, aside from being unfair and unethical, were prejudicial to
complainant’s recorded lien to the said lots and titles in question.
Respondent denied any knowledge of the recorded lien of complainant and his retention of records and transfer certificates of title. Respondent
also denied that he was the author of the first motion complained of; that the second motion prayed for an order directing complainant to turn
over to them the certificates of title; or that he filed another motion alleging that they lost the Torrens titles to the estate lots, the true facts being
that the administratrix, on December 3, 1958, filed a “Petition for the Issuance of Duplicate Owner’s copy”, for the reason that she could not
locate said transfer certificate of title in spite of diligent action; that as early as November 18, 1958, the administratrix sought authority from
the court to sell real property of the estate in order to satisfy several indebtedness of the estate; that the court finally approved the sales made,
on October 8, 1959, in spite of the written opposition of complainant; and that if he (respondent)had known that the transfer certificates of title
in question were in the possession of complainant he could have taken an easier procedure by merely asking Atty. Laput to produce them.
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court referred this case for investigation, report and recommendation found that since January 11, 1955,
when the widow, Mrs. Barrera, filed the pleading entitled “Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano U.
Laput”, complainant herein (Atty. Laput) was already asked by the widow in that pleading “to turn over all the records, bank books, other
pertinent papers and documents of the above entitled case which I have handed him; and assets, if any, to the undersigned administration
pending my appointment of a new lawyer for the administration registration” and that although Atty. Laput was not served copy of this
pleading, he must have come across it inasmuch as from time to time, he went over the records of Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, and yet Atty. Laput did not comply with the request of the widow to turn over to her all the records of her case.
In a motion dated September 16, 1957, filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu in said special proceedings, respondent asked the court
to order Atty. Laput “to surrender to the administratrix or to the Court the passbook in the Philippine National Bank of the deposits of the estate
and all such other documents in his possession and belonging to the estate . . .”. By virtue of this motion, the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
on October 17, 1957, ordered complainant Laput “to surrender and deposit with the clerk of court, within ten days from notice, the passbook of
the estate’s deposit in the Philippine National Bank, Cebu Branch, and of the documents belonging to the estate in his possession.”
The Solicitor General found that in spite of all the above-mentioned pleadings, motions, and order of the Court, complainant stubbornly kept to
himself the transfer certificates of title in question, and so it could seem that complainant was the one at fault.
The Solicitor General also found that after complainant was discharged by the administratrix, his claim for attorney’s fees in the sum of
P26,561.48 out of total of P31,329.15, was already collected by him from the estate during his incumbency as the lawyer for the administratrix;
that the Court of First Instance of Cebu fixed, as early as December 19, 1955, the amount of P4,767.67 as the balance to be paid to Attorney
Laput, later on increased to P5,699.66, and that in spite of such fixing by the court of his attorney’s fees and the order of payment to him of the
balance of P5,699.66 by the estate, as early as December 27, 1955, which order was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, complainant Laput
pretended that all throughout the years following 1955 to the date of his filing the present complaint, he (Atty. Laput) believed that he had still
the right to retain the certificates of title in question.
An examination of the motions complained of by Atty. Laput shows that respondent’s answers are correct; and it is therefore clear from all the
foregoing that respondent did not act with malice or bad faith. Hence, the recommendation of the Solicitor General for respondent’s complete
exoneration should be, as it hereby, is approved

Camacho vs. Pangulayan

Facts: Atty. Manuel N. Camacho, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College, filed a complaint against the
lawyers of Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices (Atty. Pangulayan, et al.) for having procured and effected on separate occasions, without
his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients which, in effect, required them to waive all
kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession
warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

The students, members of the Editorial Board of the school paper, were expelled by the school as recommended by the Student Disciplinary
tribunal for publishing some objectionable features or articles. They were found guilty of using indecent language and unauthorized use of
student publication funds. Atty. Pangulayan admits that he only participated in the formulation and execution of the various Re-Admission
agreements complained of and alleges that the agreements had nothing to do with the civil case but were purely administrative.

Issue: WON Atty. Pagulayan act in accordance with ethical standards for procuring said agreements.

Held: No, the IBP found that Atty. Pangulayan was aware that when the letters of apology and Re-Admission agreements were formalized, the
complainant was already the counsel for the students in the civil case. However, he still proceeded to negotiate with the students and their
parents without communicating the matter to their lawyer. His failure is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional responsibility
and an utter disregard of the duty he owes to his colleague. His defense that the agreements were purely administrative does not hold because
the manifestation stated that the students shall drop all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings against AMA. The IBP recommended a 6-
month suspension but the SC found it too harsh and ruled only a 3-month suspension

ROBINSON vs VILLAFUERTE (G.R. No. L-5346 January 3, 1911)

FACTS: April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in CFI Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, alleging: That the plaintiff was
engaged, in Manila and at the time specified further on, in the importation and sale of flour and other products from abroad, with an office in
Manila, a business which he still continued, through the agency of Castle Brothers, Wolf & Sons, established therein; that the defendant, a
resident of Lucena, Tayabas, by an instrument duly executed (October 19, 1906), by his attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente
Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and authorized for the purpose, and ratified on the same date before the notary public of
Manila, D.R. Williams, acknowledged and confessed that he owed the plaintiff the net sum of P3,852.50; that by the said instrument duly
executed the defendant bound and pledged himself to pay to the plaintiff the said sum in four monthly installments from that date, at the rate of
P1,000 for each of the first three installments and P852.50 for the last one, and likewise the interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum, to be
adjusted and paid at the time of paying each of the installments fixed; that in the said instrument the defendant moreover bound himself to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P500 for costs and expenses, in case the latter should recur to judicial process for the collection of the
aforementioned debt; and that, as security for the payment of the said debt, of the interest thereon and of the amount for costs and expenses, the
defendant voluntarily executed, by means of the said instrument and in favor of the plaintiff, a special mortgage upon the properties of his
absolute ownership and control (11 Rural estates in Lucena). It was stated in the instrument, as an express condition, that default of payment of
any of the installments specified in the fourth preceding paragraph would cause the entire obligation to mature and would entitle the plaintiff (it
says "defendant") to require the payment of the same in its totality and forthwith to institute foreclosure proceedings against any and all of the
mortgage properties.
The complaint further alleged, that, notwithstanding the repeated demands made upon the defendant, the latter had not paid his debt
nor the interest thereon, excepting the sum of P550.
As a second cause of action, the complaint alleged, among other things: That the defendant, by means of an instrument duly executed
on December 21, 1906, by his attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and authorized
— an instrument ratified on the same date before the notary Daniel R. Williams — and in consideration of the credit which the plaintiff agreed
to allow the said defendant up to the sum of P3,560, executed a special voluntary mortgage of the properties of his absolute ownership and
control. The mortgage was executed as security for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum or sums which the defendant might owe him by
reason of the said credit, which was granted.
 The defendant, in his answer, alleged: That the defendant did not execute, consent to, nor authorize the execution of a power of
attorney of any kind whatsoever in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion; that the defendant received no sum whatever from the plaintiff nor
was he in the latter's debt for the amount claimed in the complaint, nor for any other sum of money; that he did not give his consent to all of to
any one of the mortgages alleged in the complaint, and that all the said mortgages on the properties were founded on a supposed power of
attorney said to have been executed by the defendant in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, which power of attorney was fictitious, false,
fraudulent, null and void, that it was not executed by the defendant, nor did the latter intervene therein and that the said power of attorney had
no true reason for existence; wherefore the defendant asked that judgment be rendered absolving him from the complaint with the costs against
the plaintiff, by annulling each and all of the mortgages alleged in the complaint and the inscription of each of them in the office of the register
of property of Tayabas, and by ordering the cancellation of all the inscriptions of the said mortgages and encumbrances of the aforementioned
properties.
The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W. Robinson, is the collection of various sums owed by the defendant, Marcelino
Villafuerte y Rañola, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage on the real properties set out in the two notarial documents evidencing the
debt, exhibited under letter A and B, and inscribed in the property registry of the Province of Tayabas.

ISSUE: Whether a Law Clerk, Jose Moreno Lacalle, should be permitted to examine witnesses during the hearing of the case

RULING:
With regard to the first two alleged errors, relative to Jose Moreno Lacalle being permitted to address questions to some of the
witnesses during the hearing of the case, notwithstanding the presence of Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who represented the plaintiff, it is
unquestionable that the intervention of the said law clerk and employee of Messrs. Haussermann, Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's
attorneys in this suit, was improperly admitted; it was not authorized by any law, for the reason that the said Lacalle did not have the
capacity and qualifications of a lawyer admitted under oath to practice his profession before the courts of these Islands, and therefore,
on objection being made to his present at the hearing of the case, the judge should have sustained such objection and should have excluded
Lacalle and not permitted him to address questions to the plaintiff's witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that Attorney Agustin Alvares,
designated in substitution of the said Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the plaintiff's representative in CFI Tayabas, was present.
Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of some of the proceedings under the direction of Jose Moreno Lacalle are not
subject to annulment, as no positive detriment was caused to the defendant, although such intervention is in no manner permitted by the law of
procedure. However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's witnesses and the presentation of documents of various
kinds exhibited at the trial be stricken out for the reason that they were made by a person who was neither a party to the suit nor counsel for the
plaintiff, yet we do not find any reason, based upon any positive prohibition of the law, to authorize the striking out to the answers given by the
witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even though the said answers may have been evoked by questions addressed by a person not authorized by
law, and there is much less reason for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the same witnesses by the defendant's attorney, and the
answers thereto.
Although the presentation of the documents which support the claims of the plaintiff party be deemed to be improper, on account of
their having been made by a person who had not the qualifications of a practicing attorney it is nevertheless true that their presentation was
authorized by the attorney Alvarez and the documents exhibited continued to be united to the record and were not stricken out therefrom on
motion by the other side, but, on the contrary, the attorney for the defendant or his counsel discussed the authenticity and validity of the said
documents, made allegations against the same and concluded by asking that these documents, and also the inscription of those designated under
letters A and B, be declared null and void.
From the preceding statements it is concluded that the intervention of Jose Moreno Lacalle in the present suit has in no manner
prejudiced the rights and interests of the defendant and that, if judgment was rendered against him and in favor of the plaintiff, it was
in consequence of the merits of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and of the inefficacy and worthlessness of the testimony given by
the defendant.
If the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had presented substantial, strong and convincing evidence of the falsity of the two powers of
attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, the plaintiff's documentary evidence would have been totally invalidated and
annulled, and this suit would have had a different ending.

Director of Religious Affairs vs Estanislao Bayot

FACTS: In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and
publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The
Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to
never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation
of business from the public. .” It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The
Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of
the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.

In Re Sycip
Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of
partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in the
Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.

Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who already passed away in the name of the firm?
NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the high standards
demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join
an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. … It is not a
partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de
plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because
something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.