Topic: ABUSE OF RIGHT
Cruzs
Under Art. 19
ELEMENTS: 1) there is a legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the
sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another.
PETROPHIL CORPORATION VS CA
G.R. No. 122796, December 10, 2001
FACTS:
On December 27, 1970, petitioner entered into contract with private respondent Dr.
Amanda Ternida-Cruz, allowing the latter to haul and transport any and all packages
and/or bulk products of Petrophil. The contract provided among others, that Petrophil
could terminate the contract for breach, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or
inadequate performance or abandonment. Dr. Cruz was also required to reserve the use
of at least two (2) units of tank trucks solely for the hauling requirements of
Petrophil. Paragraph 11 of the contract also stipulated that the contact shall be for an
indefinite period, provided that Petrophil may terminate said contract at any time with
30 days prior written notice.
Annexed to the contract was the Penalty Clause which contained calibrated penal
sanctions for infractions that may be committed by Dr. Cruz and/or her employees.
Petrophil also required the formation of a Hearing Committee that will hear the offenses
committed by hauling contractors or their employees, to give an erring party
opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of any penalty.
In a letter dated May 21, 1987, Petrophil, through its Operations Manager, advised Dr.
Cruz that it was terminating her hauling contract in accordance with paragraph 11
thereof. Dr. Cruz appealed to Petrophil for reconsideration but said appeal was denied
on June 5, 1987.
On June 23, 1987, Dr. Cruz filed with the RTC Manila, a complaint against Petrophil
seeking the nullity of the termination of the contract and declaring its suspension as
unjustified and contrary to its terms and conditions. The other private respondents, who
are tank truck drivers of Dr. Cruz, also filed a complaint for damages against Petrophil
Officers.
Private Respondents: Dr. Cruz testified that she had been in the gasoline business as
dealer, operator and hauling contractor for the last 26 years. She claimed that the
termination of her hauling contract was a retaliation against her for allegedly
sympathizing with the then striking Petrophil employees and for informing the PNOC
president of anomalies perpetrated by some of its officers and employees.
Petitioner: It denied that Petrophil officials were out to starve Dr. Cruz‘s drivers for their
support of her. They professed that the hauling trips were reduced not because Dr. Cruz
was being punished, but because the company was assigning hauling trips on the basis
of compartmentation and not on a first-come first-serve. Additionally, witnesses for
Petrophil testified that on April 25, 1987, there was a strike at the Pandacan terminal and
Dr. Cruz and her husband were at the picket line. They refused to load petroleum
products, resulting in the disruption of delivery to service stations in Metro Manila and in
the provinces, which in turn resulted in loss of sales and revenues. Because of Dr.
refusal to load, the management terminated the hauling contract..
RTC: ordered defendants to pay private respondents unearned hauling
charges/income and attorney‘s fees
CA: affirmed with modifications. It sustained the decision of the RTC that the termination
of the contract was for a cause.
Petitioner contends that the courts a quo finding that the contract was terminated for
cause was a superfluity because petitioner was after all not contractually bound to use
the mode for cause under par. 7, nor prohibited from using the other mode, without
cause, under par. 11. It could use either. It says it chose to terminate the contract under
paragraph 11, whose language was very clear and required no
interpretation. Petitioner insists that Article 1377 of the Civil Code, applicable to
contracts of adhesion, does not apply in this case.
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that even granting arguendo that
petitioner had all the right to terminate the contract even without cause, petitioner
would still be liable to answer for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code on abuse
of right for terminating the contract without reason but out of sheer whim and caprice.
ISSUES:
1. WON the hauling contract needed interpretation - NO
2. WON petitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract, which would entitle
Dr. Cruz to damages. - YES
HELD:
1. NO
The Court agrees with the petitioner that the contract clearly provided for two ways of
terminating the contract, and, one mode does not exclude the other. Although the
contract provided for causes for termination, it also stated in paragraph 11 that the
contract was for an indefinite term subject to the right of Petrophil to terminate it any
time after a written notice of 30 days. When the language of a contract is clear, it
requires no interpretation. Thus, the finding that the termination of the contract was for
cause, is immaterial. When petitioner terminated the contract without cause, it was
required only to give Dr. Cruz a 30-day prior written notice, which it did in this case.
2. YES
Recall that before Petrophil terminated the contract on May 25, 1987, there was a strike
of its employees at the Pandacan terminal. Dr. Cruz and her husband were seen at the
picket line and were reported to have instructed their truck drivers not to load
petroleum products. At the resumption of the operation in Pandacan terminal, Dr. Cruz‘s
contract was suspended for one week and eventually terminated. Based on these
circumstances, the Court of Appeals like the trial court concluded that Petrophil
terminated the contract because of Dr. Cruz’s refusal to load petroleum products during
the strike. In respondent courts view, the termination appeared as a retaliation or
punishment for her sympathizing with the striking employees. Nowhere in the record do
we find that petitioner asked her to explain her actions. Petrophil simply terminated her
contract. These factual findings are binding and conclusive on us, especially in the
absence of any allegation that said findings are unsupported by the evidence, or that
the appellate and trial courts misapprehended these facts. In terminating the hauling
contract of Dr. Cruz without hearing her side on the factual context above described,
petitioner opened itself to a charge of bad faith. While Petrophil had the right to
terminate the contract, petitioner could not act purposely to injure private respondents.
All the (3) elements that constitutes abuse of rights under Article 19 are present in this
case. Hence, the termination by petitioner of the contract with Dr. Cruz calls for
appropriate sanctions by way of damages.
ADDITIONAL:
1. Petitioner likewise contends that the lower court erred when they applied the
procedures set forth in the Policy Statement and Guidelines and penalty clause - >
raised for the first time on appeal; not considered
2. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it imposed a tortious liability
where the requisites therefor were not established by the evidence ->
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage
done. Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the respondent-
drivers. But as a consequence of its willful act directed against Dr. Cruz, respondent-
drivers lost their jobs and consequently suffered loss of income. Note that under Article
20, there is no requirement that the act must be directed at a specific person, but it
suffices that a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in
order that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 81262. August 25, 1989.]
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M.
TOBIAS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
6. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; PROOF
NECESSARY. — To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof
that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a
person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that the charges were false and groundless.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE FILING OF A SUIT, NOT CONSTITUTE THEREOF. —
The filing of a suit, by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious
prosecution.
FACTS:
Respondent Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable
and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a
purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager. In 1972, Globe Mackay discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the
anomalies and reported them his immediate superior Ferraren and to
petitioner Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General
Manager of Globe Mackay.
One day after Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him
by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take
a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave
his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
When private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a ―crook‖ and a
―swindler.‖ Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was
also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and
initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his
complicity in the anomalies.
The Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report
clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator
submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly
stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
Tagle, the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous
transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report reiterating his
previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in
the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions
were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also
yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the
anomalies and the fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by
its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of
Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal
complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa
through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of
Article 290 of the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through
Seizure of Correspondence). All of the six criminal complaints were
dismissed by the fiscal.
In the meantime Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972.
Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter‘s
decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners‘ appeal
from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter‘s decision. Tobias
appealed the Secretary of Labor‘s order with the Office of the President.
During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and
private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement
regarding the latter‘s complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the RETELCO. However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the
latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to
dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
The RTC of Manila rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by
ordering petitioners to pay actual damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney‘s fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC
decision to the CA. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount
of damages.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners‘ motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on
certiorari was filed.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
HELD:
The petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in
the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of
petitioners‘ abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman
treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the
damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the
codification of ―some basic principles that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order.‖ Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in
Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one‘s rights but also in the performance of
one‘s duties.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order,
it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law,
provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate
any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to
dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private
respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides
that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has
not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual
circumstances called for its application, the question of whether or not
the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends
on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court,
after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that
they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the
latter must now be indemnified.
XX
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was
private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of
anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry ―showed belligerence..‖ This,
petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter‘s
reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than
civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action
such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a
leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded
Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible
attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned
to work on after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work,
Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. ―Tobby, you are the crook
and swindler in this company.‖
Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was
submitted some time later, the statement made by petitioner Hendry was
baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of
harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. If the dismissal is
done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21
of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other
tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the
latter‘s termination from work. After the filing of the first of six criminal
complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the
actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias‘
protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file
a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added
that, ―You Filipinos cannot be trusted.‖ The threat unmasked petitioner‘s
bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand,
the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry‘s earlier statements
about Tobias being a ―crook‖ and ―swindler‖ are clear violations of
‗Tobias‘ personal dignity.
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to
RETELCO .Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with
RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a
longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias,
petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a
―moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of
employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was.‖ Petitioners
further claim that ―it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of
every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the
latter‘s life, honor or property. And this includes warning one‘s brethren of
the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into
confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect‖ These
arguments, rather than justify petitioners‘ act, reveal a seeming obsession
to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the
time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal
complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case
against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be
―penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by
filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal
suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of
anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of
money‖
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons
shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of
their rights, the right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be exercised
maliciously and in bad faith.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person
and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the
charges were false and groundless
In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed,
the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal
case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the
cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against Globe
Mackay, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is
led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by
malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
XX (on damages)
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive.
It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing
several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they
dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and
the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language
heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison
letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias‘ loss of possible
employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints.
Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds
that, contrary to petitioners‘ contention, the amount of damages
awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.
NOTES:
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper,
invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that ―[t]he
only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein)
could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from
his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-
appellants (petitioners herein).
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss
which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal
wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application in this case. It
bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the
right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right
was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now
be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was
also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by
petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the
Court has already ruled in a case that [p]er express provision of Article
2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.‖ Hence, the CA committed
no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners.
Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that ―[i]n quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence,‖ the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages,
with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed
is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case,
the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by
petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary
damages to the latter.
DRILON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon dated March 20,
1990, General Renato de Villa, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, requested the Department of Justice to order the investigation of
several individuals named therein, including herein private respondent Homobono
Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed December 1989 coup d'etat.
Gen. de Villa's letter-complaint with its annexes was referred for preliminary
inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors. Petitioner then Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe, the Team Leader, finding sufficient basis to continue
the inquiry, issued a subpoena to the individuals named in the letter-complaint, Adaza
included, and assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of investigators
composed of prosecutors George Arizala, as Chairman, and Ferdinand Abesamis and
Cesar Solis as members. The panel then found that there is probable cause to hold
herein respondents for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND
FRUSTRATED MURDER hence recommended the filing of the corresponding information
against them in court.
Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him, private
respondent Adaza filed a complaint for damages, before Branch 100 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. In his complaint, Adaza charged petitioners with engaging in
a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of
rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners, according to
Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books.
The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Adaza's complaint on the ground that said
complaint states no actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action against
petitioners but was denied.
On appeal, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and ordered
respondent Judge to proceed with the trial of Civil Case.
Hence, this petition, dated October 9, 1992, pleading this Court to exercise its power of
review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may collect damages arising from the alleged
malicious prosecution of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder to him.
HELD: No
RATIO: The term malicious prosecution has been defined in various ways.
In American jurisdiction, it is defined as:
"One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained
(Eustacev. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706,83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with intention of
injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the
person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called the action of
malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459, 102 Ga. 264; Eggett v. Alien, 96
N.W. 803, 119 Wis. 625)."
In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:
"An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit,
or other legal proceeding has been instituted malidously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the
defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force,
regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R,
November 19,1956)."
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in
the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly
Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To constitute malicious
prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by
the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the
mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one
liable for malicious prosecution. Thus, in order for a malicious prosecution suit to
prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the prosecution and
the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action
finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. All these requisites must concur.
G.R. No. 160959 April 3, 2007
ANTONIO DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO., INC., MANUEL M. ORIG and ELISEO R. BRAGANZA, JR.,
Respondents
Facts:
Antonio G. Diaz was the president of Diaz and Co., Inc. He was also vice-
president of Diaz Realty Inc. which, in turn, owned the Doña Segunda Hotel, formerly
known as the Davao Imperial Hotel (Imperial Hotel Building), located along C.M. Recto
Avenue, Davao City. Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. (DLPC), on the other hand, is a
public utility duly franchised to provide light, heat and power to its customers in Davao
City and the municipalities of Panabo, Santo Tomas and Carmen, in Davao del Norte.
Manuel Orig was the resident manager/vice-president for Administration of DLPC, while
Eliseo R. Braganza was its in-house lawyer. DLPC supplied the Doña Segunda Building
(Imperial Hotel Building) with electricity service8 under Account No. 087-10669 and with
Meter No. 36510.
On July 25, 1983, DLPC sent a Notice of Disconnection10 to Diaz and Co., Inc.
informing it that, as of June 13, 1983, the hotel‘s unpaid electric consumption bill
amounted to P190,111.02. Since Diaz and Co., Inc. ignored the letter, Meter No. 36510
was disconnected on July 29, 1983. Since Diaz and Co., Inc. ignored the letter, Meter
No. 36510 was disconnected on July 29, 1983.
 in 1984, the National Food Authority (NFA) established its KADIWA13 store at
C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao City.14 It leased a portion of the ground floor of the Imperial
Hotel Building from Diaz and Co., Inc.15 NFA/KADIWA also applied for electricity service
with DLPC, and a contract16 was later executed between the parties. On March 15,
1984, DLPC connected the area leased by NFA/KADIWA to its electric grid 17 under
Account No. 091-12643,18 and installed Meter No. 8473819 to measure NFA/KADIWA‘s
monthly electric consumption.
In August 1986, the Kadiwa Center IV closed, and NFA/KADIWA vacated the
Doña Segunda Building.20 In a letter21 dated August 11, 1986, NFA/KADIWA Provincial
Manager, Roberta R. Melendres, informed DLPC that the light and power connection of
NFA/KADIWA would be left behind; its right to the connection would be transferred to
Diaz.22 She also informed DLPC that the P1,020.00 deposit of NFA/KADIWA for the power
connection had been refunded to it by Diaz.
Board of Energy, and unilaterally replaced Meter No. 84738. The electricity in the
building was then restored.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY DIAZ
Diaz claimed that DLPC arbitrarily and illegally removed Meter No. 84738 in
violation of their business franchise and Article 19 of the New Civil Code, and had
threatened to remove Meter No. 86673509. DLPC, for its part, filed a counter-application
for preliminary mandatory injunction47 in the same case to compel the removal of Meter
No. 86673509 which Diaz had installed without DLPC’s consent and authority. The RTC
ordered Diaz to immediately remove Meter No. 86673509
On December 19, 1998, the parties in Civil Case No. CEB-104954 executed a
Compromise Agreement

In a letter24 dated September 2, 1986, Diaz informed respondent Manuel Orig

1. Plaintiff-appellee hereby reduces its total claims in the complaint to only
that he had leased the untenanted portions of the Doña Segunda Building from Diaz
P385,000.00 and further waives any claim in excess of said amount in the same case,
and Co., Inc., and requested that a new electrical connection for the building in his
and the defendant-appellant shall pay said amount in full immediately upon the
name be installed, separate from the one assigned to him by NFA.25
execution of this agreement. The latter also waives its counterclaims against the former
in the above-entitled case.
On September 15, 1986, DLPC denied the request on the ground that since
Diaz and Co., Inc. is a closed family corporation whose stockholders are the immediate
2. Upon receipt of the payment of the aforesaid sum, plaintiff-appellee shall
members of the Diaz family, the lease in favor of Diaz could be simulated. 26 DLPC,
immediately grant and install in favor of defendant-appellant or Antonio G. Diaz electric
however, reminded Diaz that it would be too happy to grant his request "if he and/or
service for the Doña Segunda Building, popularly known as Imperial Hotel Building, or for
Diaz and Co., Inc. would pay what is due and owing to it."27
portions thereof designated by either including the tenants or lessees occupying the
same, upon proper application therefor and the presentation of the requisite electrical
Diaz and Co., Inc. sent a letter28 to DLPC dated September 17, 1986 declaring permit.
that it had assumed the electrical bills of NFA/KADIWA under Account No. 091-12643,
and requested that the monthly bills/statements be sent to it. In its reply, DLPC rejected
3. the parties agree to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 18,288 of the Regional Trial Court of
the request and declared that it was not aware that Diaz and Co., Inc. had refunded
Davao City, pending in Branch XVI thereof, entitled "Diaz vs. Davao Light & Power Co.,
the NFA/KADIWA its P1,020.00 deposit
Inc. and Manuel Orig." for Mandamus inclusive of the counter-claim therein, the same
having become moot and academic.
On September 26, 1986, Diaz filed a petition for mandamus30 before the RTC,
Davao City. He alleged that as a holder of a certificate of public convenience, DLPC is
COMPLAINT FOR THEFT BY DLPC AGAINST DIAZ (KUNG TATANONG LANG NI MAM)
mandated by law to provide him with electric service

September 23, 1986, the portion of the building formerly leased by
NFA/KADIWA was leased to Matias Mendiola.32 Because he needed more electricity
than what could be provided by the existing electrical wirings, Mendiola opted to
change the electrical installation from a one-phase meter to a three-phase meter
connection.33 Mendiola‘s application was approved by DLPC.
January 7, 1987, Diaz filed an application for preliminary injunction was issued
to all security guards of the Doña Segunda Building who were ordered to prevent
anyone from disturbing Meter No. 84738.37 Because of this, DLPC failed to substitute its
single-phase meter with a three-phase meter. DLPC‘s linemen thus installed the three-
phase meter without removing the single-phase meter.38
DLPC then removed its single-phase meter on November 20, 1987, which
rendered almost half of the building without power.41 That same day, Diaz went to the
DLPC building and threw stones at it, breaking four glass windows in the process.42 He
then bought his own electric meter, Meter No. 86673509,43 had it calibrated by the
Based on the aforestated facts, on July 11, 1988, DLPC filed a complaint for
theft of electricity against Diaz with the City Prosecutor‘s Office, Davao City; respondent
Braganza submitted an Affidavit63 to support the charge. In defense, Diaz alleged the
following: (1) that the complaint was intended to harass him; (2) he was entitled to
electric service by virtue of his subrogation to the right of NFA/KADIWA; (3) the
installation of Meter No. 86673509 was made with the knowledge and consent of DLPC;
(4) there is a pending case between the parties regarding Meter Nos. 84738 and
86673509; and (5) the filing of the action is premature. The complaint was docketed as
I.S. No. 593.
On March 21, 1989, Lolito O. Evangelino, 4th Asst. City Prosecutor, City
Prosecutor‘s Office of Davao City, issued a Resolution64 recommending the dismissal of
the charge. He opined that the correspondence to DLPC Manager Orig negated
DLPC‘s claim of lack of consent and knowledge, and since the issue is still pending
litigation in court, the determination of whether there is theft of electricity is premature
(Sp. Civil Case No. 18288 and Civil Case No. 18,855-87).
 DLPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration65 which the City Prosecutor denied on
the ground that DLPC failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking and intent to
gain. DLPC appealed the dismissal to the Secretary of Justice,66 who, however,
dismissed the appeal in a letter67 dated August 2, 1990. The Motion for Reconsideration68
filed by DLPC was likewise denied in the letter69 dated September 6, 1990.
COMPLAINT for VIOLATION OF BP BLG. 876 AGAINST DIAZ (KUNG TATANONG LANG NI
MAM)
Undaunted, DLPC filed a criminal complaint70 against Diaz for Violation of P.D.
401,71 as amended by B.P. Blg. 87672 with the City Prosecutor‘s Office, Davao City.73 The
complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 92-4590. In his counter-affidavit dated September
19, 1992, Diaz alleged that a similar complaint (I.S. No. 593) had been filed by DLPC
against him.74 In a Resolution75 dated October 23, 1992, Calixto A. Esparagoza, 2nd Asst.
City Prosecutor, dismissed the case. The Public Prosecutor likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration of DLPC on November 26, 1992.
Meanwhile Diaz, Ramos, and Arguellas, as complainants, filed a criminal
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Norte charging the
officers of DLPC with estafa through falsification of public documents. They also alleged
that the officers of DLPC exacted additional and illegal profits from its consumers by
devising a deceptive Varying Discount Formula; based on the alleged
misrepresentation of said officers, the Board of Energy (BOE) granted DLPC provisional
authority to apply the formula, thereby resulting in losses of more or less P300,000.00 to
Diaz, Ramos, and Arguelles.76 As regards the charge of falsification, the complainants
alleged that DLPC had its properties appraised by the Technical Management Services,
Philippines, Inc. (TAMSPHIL), and included non-existent properties that did not belong to
it; it also recorded the TAMSPHIL appraisal in its books of account even before it had
been approved by the BOE; and submitted financial statements containing the
appraisal to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the BOE.77
The Investigating Prosecutor found probable cause against the respondents.
An Information was filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tagum, Davao
del Norte, docketed as Crim. Case No. 5800. Respondents appealed the resolution of
the public prosecutor finding probable cause against them. The appeal was granted.
On motion of the Prosecutor, the RTC dismissed the case in an Order dated July 13,
1983.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES (LIBEL)
On June 10, 1992, DLPC instituted a civil action for Damages,87 before the RTC,
Cebu City, against Diaz for defamatory and libelous remarks and for abuse of rights. The
plaintiff alleged that Diaz, motivated by malice and ill-will, had taken it upon himself to
find fault in DLPC‘s acts and oppose all its application with the BOE, using the media to
assault its good name by circulating or publishing libelous and false statements in the
newspapers. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11843.
DLPC further alleged that Diaz published and disseminated a handbill claiming
that there was something irregular and anomalous regarding the Energy Regulation
Board‘s approval of the appraisal of the properties and equipment of DLPC, because of
which the customers of DLPC could expect a P5.00 per kilowatt charge in the future.
Diaz allegedly gave identical interviews with the Mindanao Daily Mirror and the Ang
Peryodiko Dabaw reiterating what he said in the handbill.88 In addition, Diaz, in an
interview with the People‘s Daily Forum, claimed that the National Power Corporation
sold two (2) generating sets to DLPC for only P1.00 each.89
Consequently, DLPC suffered besmirched reputation and public humiliation, and
damage to its business standing. The complaint contained the following prayer:
1) Immediately issue a temporary restraining order ex-parte precluding defendant from
committing further acts of tort or libel against plaintiff, and after the hearing of plaintiff‘s
application for preliminary injunction, issue such writ after posting of the required
injunction bond;
2) After trial, render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Antonio Diaz
making the injunction permanent, and ordering the latter to pay the former –
a) The sum of P10,000,000.00 as moral damages anddamages to its business standing;
b) The sum of P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) The sum of P500,000.00 as attorney‘s fees and expenses of litigation;
d) The cost of suit.90
After trial, the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-11843 rendered a Decision91 in favor of DLPC
and against Diaz, awarding more than P1,500,000.00 in damages to DLPC and
dismissing the counterclaim of Diaz. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises above set-forth, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of
plaintiff Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. and against defendant Antonio Diaz ordering said
defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,500,000.00 by way of moral damages for
besmirched reputation, loss of business standing and goodwill;
2. To pay plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 in exemplary damages by way of example
or correction for the public good; and
3. To pay plaintiff the amount of P500,000.00 in attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses
and to pay the costs.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the compromise agreement entered into between DLPC
and Diaz barred the former from instituting further actions involving electric Meter No.
84736 or 86673509;
(2) whether or not DLPC acted in bad faith in instituting the criminal cases
against Diaz; and
(3) whether or not Diaz is entitled to damages.
1.Contention of DIAZ
Petitioner insists that the compromise agreement as well as the decision of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 14909 already settled the controversies between them; yet, DLPC
instituted the theft case against Diaz, and worse, instituted another action for violation
of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. Thus, the only conclusion that can be inferred
from the acts of DLPC is that they were designed to harass, embarrass, prejudice, and
ruin him. He further avers that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. CEB-1049
completely erased litigious matters that could necessarily arise out of either Electric
Meter No. 84736 or 86673509.
Court:
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby
the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one
already commenced. The purpose of compromise is to settle the claims of the parties
and bar all future disputes and controversies. However, criminal liability is not affected
by compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made
of the damages suffered by the offended party. Nowhere in said agreement did the
parties agree that DLPC was barred from instituting any further action involving electric
Meter No. 84736 or 86673509.
2. NO BAD FAITH
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or
duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to
prove the same.
The evidence presented by respondents negates malice or bad faith. Petitioner himself
alleged in his complaint that he unilaterally installed Meter No. 86673509 to replace
Meter No. 84738 after it was removed by DLPC. No less than this Court, in G.R. No. 85445,
admonished petitioner and reminded him that connections of electrical service and
installations of electric meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties,
and that payments for electrical consumption should also be made promptly whenever
due.
3. MAIN TOPIC - NO
Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the complaints.
However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. INJURY is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; DAMAGE is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations
are often called damnum absque injuria.121 Whatever damages Diaz may have suffered
would have to be borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the filing of the
complaints against him
WHAT IS DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?
Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, the legitimate exercise of a person‘s
right, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable
injury.
WHAT IS MALICIOUS PROSECUTION?
Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by
or against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.122 It is an
established rule that in order for malicious prosecution to prosper, the following requisites
must be proven by petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive.123 The foregoing are necessary to preserve
a person‘s right to litigate which may be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious
prosecution cases.124 From the foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that malice
and want of probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award of
damages based on malicious prosecution
IV. PUBLIC HUMILIATION
SOLEDAD CARPIO vs LEONORA VALMONTE
September 09, 2004, GR No.151866
Second Division
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: LEONORA VALMONTE, a wedding coordinator, was hired by the soon to be
married Michelle Del Rosario and Jon Sierra to organize their church wedding on
October 10, 1996.
On the said day, at about 4:30 pm, VALMONTE arrived at Suite 326-A Manila
Hotel where the bride Del Rosario and her family were billeted. There were already
several persons at the said area when she arrived, these include the bride, relatives,
make-up artist, photographers and SOLEDAD CARPIO (aunt of the bride Del Rosario).
The latter was preparing to dress for the occasion.
After coordinating with the bride Del Rosario, Valmonte proceeded at the
Manila Restaurant as the designated reception area carrying the items for the wedding
rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She then paid the suppliers and gave
allowance to the band.
Afterwhich she went back at Manila Hotel only to find out that upon entering
the suite the people are staring at her. At this instance, Carpio uttered the following
words, “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka
pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kuwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.”
Carpio points to Valmonte as the one who took her jewelry consisting of two
(2) diamond rings, one (1) set of diamond earings, bracelet and necklace amounting to
P1,000,000 which were placed in a bag inside the comfort room.
Carpio then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte‘s bag. Later, the
hotel security helped in the conduct of search. She was allegedly bodily searched,
interrogated and trailed by security guard throughout the evening. Also, during the time
Valmonte was being questioned by the investigating Police Officers, Carpio kept on
sayingthe words “Siya lang ang lumabas ng kuwarto.“ . Moreover, Vamonte‘s car
parked at the hotel premises was also searched but the alleged items were not found.
Due to the said incident, Valmonte demanded a formal letter of apology from
Carpio which is to be circulated to the newlyweds‘ relatives and guests TO REDEEM HER
SMEARED REPUTATION due to the imputations made by Carpio against her. However,
the former did not heed to the latter‘s demand which prompted her to file a complaint
for damages and praying for actual, moral and exemplary damages, including
attorney‘s fees.
Carpio denied the charges and argued that she never uttered the
abovementioned words and claimed that she had no participation since everything
that transpired is purely police matter in relation to the theft incident.
ISSUE: WON Carpio is liable for damages.
HELD: YES, the Court ruled that Carpio is clearly liable for moral damages.
It stressed that Carpio‘s verbal reproach against Valmonte was certainly
uncalled for considering that by her account (Carpio‘s account) nobody knew that she
brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside tha paper bag.
The Court pointed that the words used by Carpio are outrightly accusatory
and not merely inquisitive. She virtually branded Valmonte as the thief when she openly
accused her as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of her jewelry
in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordered that she be immediately bodily
searched.
It added that Article 19 and the complementing Articles 20 and 21 provide the
legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one
commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not
constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary
rights of the party aggrieved.
The Court laid down that the three (3) elements must be present to find the
existence of an abuse of right:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) Which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
These three (3) elements are present in the case at bar. Although Carpio has
the right to ascertain the identity of the culprit, her act of maligning Valmonte without
proof is impermissible. For these acts, it was held that Carpio willlfully caused injury to
Valmonte in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act
with justice and good faith and her only purpose is to prejudice Valmonte which
constituted transgression of Article 19 in relation to Article 21.
Question: What about actual damages? Is Valmonte entitled to it?
Answer: No, the Court ruled that the cliam for actual damages was not substantiated.
Gonzales v. PCIB (G.R. No. 180257)
Facts:
Petitioner was a client of PCIB for a good 15 years and was granted a credit line with
the aggregate amount of his accounts as collateral for the availment of the said line.
Petitioner served as an accommodation party to spouses Panlilio who obtained loans
covered by promissory notes, notably stating that petitioner is solidary liable with the
spouses for the payment of the loans. The loan was granted and the spouses received
the proceeds but subsequently defaulted in the payment of said dues. As a result, the
credit line was terminated and the FCD account of petitioner was frozen. In the
meantime, Gonzales issued a check but was dishonored which resulted to a falling out
and a heated argument causing him great embarrassment and humiliation. Petitioner
filed a case with the RTC on account of the alleged unjust dishonor of the check. RTC
ruled in favor of PCIB. CA affirmed in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not PCIB acted in bad faith by dishonoring the check of petitioner.
Ruling: YES.
In the instant case, Gonzales suffered from the negligence and bad faith of PCIB. From
the testimonies of Gonzales‘ witnesses, particularly those of Dominador Santos and
Freddy Gomez, the embarrassment and humiliation Gonzales has to endure not only
before his former close friend Unson but more from the members and families of his
friends and associates in the PCA, which he continues to experience considering the
confrontation he had with Unson and the consequent loss of standing and credibility
among them from the fact of the apparent bouncing check he issued. Credit is very
important to businessmen and its loss or impairment needs to be recognized and
compensated.
Even in the absence of malice or bad faith, a depositor still has the right to recover
reasonable moral damages, if the depositor suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety,
embarrassment, and humiliation. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral
damages are certainly recoverable if they are the proximate result of the defendant‘s
wrongful act or omission. The factual antecedents bolstered by undisputed testimonies
likewise show the mental anguish and anxiety Gonzales had to endure with the threat of
Unson to file a suit. Gonzales had to pay Unson PhP 250,000, while his FCD account in
PCIB was frozen, prompting Gonzales to demand from PCIB and to file the instant suit.
G.R No. L-20089 26 Dec, 1964
Wassmer vs. Velez
Bengzon,J.P.,J.:
Background of the case:
• A story that proves that there is no forever :p (joke)
• The story arose when herein defendant breach his promise to marry his fiancé where
everything is already prepared and well settled for their wedding, hence Beatriz sue
Francisco for damages.
Facts:
• Francisco Belez herein defendant and Beatriz Wassmer as petitioner agreed and
promise to get married on 04 Sep 1954
• On 2 Sep 1954 Beatriz received a letter from Francisco stating that they will have to
postponed their wedding because Francisco‘s mother opposes the wedding
• The next day he again sent a letter that there is no changes in the wedding, but the
next day he never appeared
• Beatriz filed an information against Francisco for damages, Francisco filed no answer
and was declared in default, and a judgment was rendered in favour of Beatriz
 ordering Francisco to pay actual damages (P2,000), moral and exemplary damages
(P25,000) and attorney‘s fees and the cost.
• Francisco filed a petition for relief and requesting a new trial and reconsideration, the
court granted such request and to reach an amicable settlement.
• However Francisco failed to appear on the 23 Aug 1955 (deadline), instead
requested an extension for 2 weeks. Again they failed to to appear after two weeks.
• Another chance was given by the court for the parties to reach an amicable
settlement, however they failed.
Francisco‘s Contention:
• That there is an excusable negligence, and is a ground to set aside the judgment by
default
• That the judgment is contrary to law since there is no provision in the Civil Code
authorising an action for breach of promise to marry
Issue: WON Francisco should be liable to pay damages based on Breach of Promise to
marry.
Held: No, but should be held liable under Art. 21 of the New Civil Code
Ratio:
As to Francisco‘s 1st Contention:
• The court stated that a petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of
merits stating facts constituting a valid defence.
• However, the affidavit of merits of the defendant was merely stating conclusions or
opinions instead of facts, hence was considered by the court not valid
As to the Second Contention (Main Issue):
• The Court held that breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, and that
the Congress deliberately eliminated such provision in the draft of the NCC.
• However the Court pointed out that the acts of herein Defendant are considered
unjustifiably contrary to good customs and are punishable under Art. 21 of the NCC.
Art 21 of the NCC provides:
“any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.”
Acts considered by the Court Contrary to good customs:
• Defendant applied for a marriage license, set the wedding on 4 Sep 1954, invitations
were sent to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The wedding gown, dresses of
maid of honour and flower girls were prepared. Matrimonial bed, accessories and
other apparel important to the wedding were purchased. And on 2 Sep, Francisco
sent a letter postponing, the next day saying nothing‘s change but on the day of the
wedding he never appeared.
• This acts as the court held are not a mere breach of promise to marry, to formally set
a wedding and go through all the preparations and publicity only to walk out on the
day of the wedding is quite different.
• The court stated that this is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which Francisco must be held answerable in damages under Art. 21 of NCC.
Other Discussion:
• Francisco contends that he could not be held liable for exemplary damages
because Art 2232 of NCC provides a condition that the acts of the defendant should
be ― acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.‖
• The Court held that his acts were: ―wanton…, reckless and oppressive
manner.‖
• The court also reduces the amount of moral and exemplary damages to P15,000
Baksh v CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get
married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical
exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner
even went to Marilou‘s house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then
forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before
she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment
while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but
the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him
since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never
proposed marriage or agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of
Marliou‘s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment
since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private
respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
HELD:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a
woman to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the
woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner‘s deceptive promise to
marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy
to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for
the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in
disregard of the laws of the country.
TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO
CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002
FACTS:
The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house
located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3,
1995, defendant‘s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to
conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and
observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the
plaintiff‘s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been
tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the
information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be
brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was
indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of
the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the
laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01
representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff
filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction despite the immediate reconnection.
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done
without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING‘s rights, feelings, social and
business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for
damages.
HELD:
Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent
the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral
and exemplary damages including attorney‘s fees. Moral damages may be
recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of
property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other
hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the
effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must
be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. ―Under the law, the Manila
Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the
ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board‖. During the inspection, no
government official or ERB representative was present.
BULATAO, NLJR , future J.:
The Topic is Disconnection of Service
Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing vs Manila Electric Company (MERALCO)
GR No 142943, April 03, 2002 Third Division
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Bottomline of the Case: ―there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for
the right reason.‖ –Quisumbing vs Meralco
(the lack of due process in disconnecting Quisumbing‘s electrical supply)
FACTS:
The spouses Quisumbing are consumers of MERALCO. However, their accounts
showed unusual surged of electric consumption which prompted MERALCO to send
its service-inspectors and found that indeed there was electric meter tampering as
provided in Section 4 of Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/ Materials
Pilferage Act of 1994 (RA 7832). They effected immediately the disconnection of the
service which was witnessed only by MERALCO employees. Afterwards, at the
MERALCO laboratory, a representative from the Electric Regulatory Board (ERB)
witness the examination of the water meter. Further, a review of the said account
revealed that the petitioner‘s owed MERALCO the amount of P193, 332 based on the
accounts history and corresponding computations coupled with expert‘s examination
of the tampered meter which purportedly resulted in unrecorded AND unpaid
electrical consumption.
ISSUE: (Since the topic is Disconnection Service, ito lang ang i-focus ko. Yungmga
ibang discussion nasa Q and A)
Whether or not the respondent MERALCO‘s acts in disconnecting the electric service
is correct.
HELD and RATIO: No, the Court held that the law is clear in its provision. Section 4 of
Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/ Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 (RA
7832) provides that
“Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in
order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested
to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized represenatative of the Energy
Regulatory Board.”
The Court highlighted the satisfaction of the requisite that there must be a personal
witnessing and attestation by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB
representative.
It said that this is deeply rooted to the DUE PROCESS, since to allow MERALCO will be
TANTAMOUNT TO TYRANNY of its consumers since it will have a UNILATERAL AUTHORITY
to disconnect. Here, the PRESENCE OF GOVERNMENT AGENTS who may authorize
immediate disconnections go into the ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS. The Court added
that it cannot allow MERALCO to act virtually as PROSECUTOR and JUDGE in imposing
the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering.
Although the Court later on lauded MERALCO in its zest to curb out case of electric
meter tampering, it held that ―there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time
for the right reason.‖
(I will present in question and answer the other topics discussed)
Question: When will the prima facie presumption of Illegal use of Electricity arise under
Section 4 of RA 7832?
Answer: Said prima facie presumption will arise ONLY UPON the SATISFACTION of
certain requisites, one of which is the PERSONAL WITNESSING and ATTESTATION (a)by
an officer of the law or (b)by an authorized Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
representative when the discovery was made.
Q: Is it sufficient if there was the presence only of the Owner or his representative?
A: (Statutory Construction), The law is clear and is free from doubt. The courts may not
construe otherwise the clear provision of the statute that the must be PERSONAL
WITNESSING and ATTESTATION (a)by an officer of the law or (b)by an authorized
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) representative when the discovery was made.
Q: When is the presence of either (a)by an officer of the law or (b)by an authorized
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) needed?
A: The law says that BEFORE immediate disconnection may be allowed, the
DISCOVERY of the illegal use of electricity MUST have been PERSONALLY Witness and
Attested to by an officer of the law or by an authorized representative of the ERB.
Q: What is the relationship of DUE PROCESS in this case?
A: The Court declared that it cannot allow MERALCO to act virtually as PROSECUTOR
and JUDGE in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter
tampering. It will be tantamount to tyranny of its consumers since it will have a
UNILATERAL AUTHORITY to disconnect. Here, the PRESENCE OF GOVERNMENT AGENTS
who may authorize immediate disconnections go into the essence of DUE PROCESS.
Q: What are the requisites for the AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES?
A: The requisites are:
1. There is an injury whether physical, mental or psychological-clearly sustained by
the claimant;
2. There is a culpable act or omission factually established;
3. The wrongful ac or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of
theinjury sustained by the claimant; and
4. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
of the Civil Code.
Q: What is the nature of the award of Exemplary damage?
A: This is imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addtition to
Moral, Temperate, Liquidated, or Compensatory Damages. It is given (a)to serve as a
deterrent against OR (b)as a negative incentive to socially deleterious actions.
In this case, exemplary damage was awarded to serve an example, that
before a disconnection of electrical supply can be effected by a public utility like
Meralco, it must faithfully follow the requisites of the law.
VITAL GOZON VS. CA (G.R. No. 129132)
FACTS: Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 ordered the
reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health where Dr. Alejandro S. de
la Fuente was demoted to Medical Specialist II from being the Chief of the Clinics of
the National Children's Hospital. De la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH
Reorganization Board but was ignored and she brought this to Civil Service
Commission. While the case was pending, the position of Chief of Clinics were turned
over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla. Dr. de la Fuente's
case was decided and declared that the demotion/transfer of appellant de la
Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null and void, the resolution
became final. De la Fuente there upon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the
Medical Center Chief of National Children's Hospital, demanding the implementation
of the Commission's decision but she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters or to
take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and executory
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. She instituted in the Court of Appeals an
action of " mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-
Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to
comply with the final and executory resolution but Vital-Gozon did not respond to the
order of the court. Thus CA declared, that the said resolution declared dela Fuente as
the lawful and de jure Chief of Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had
no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. A writ
of execution was issued thereafter. On her motion for reconsideration, Vital-Gozon
argued that the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in
a mandamus action and referred this to the Office of Solicitor General. Court of
Appeals denied the motion and ruled that the Solicitor General has no authority to
appear as counsel for respondent Gozon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of
mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages
sought to be recovered from the defendant officer
HELD: The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit
and specific statement regarding " actions for moral and exemplary damages, " and
finding none, concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been granted
competence to assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The conclusion is
incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and
exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is
indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims for moral,
exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of
cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the
rule in question is a mere procedural one allowing the joining of an action of
mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for
damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit
may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being
inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the
case. It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or
civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her
being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General. The petition was DENIED and
the resolution was affirmed.
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
TOPIC: ABORTION
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
physician who caused the same.
FACTS:
 Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) in 1948 — through her
aunt Paula Yambot.
 In 1950, she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally
married.
 Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parents, and acting on the advice of
her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant.
 After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant.
 As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in
October 1953.
 Less than two years later, she again became pregnant.
 On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's
daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic, where the three met
the defendant and his wife.
 Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of
fifty pesos
 The plaintiff was at this time campaigning for his election to the provincial board;
he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
 It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and
award of damages.

RULING:
 Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received and
no right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
o In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone
can take place from on that lacked juridical personality
 It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive
o In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held
that recovery cannot had for the death of an unborn child

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all.
 But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from
the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical
integrity.

No basis for an award of moral damages because the appellee's indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
 The appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he
was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he
appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof,
and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of
the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant.
o His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor
a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim
 It is unquestionable that the defendant's act in provoking the abortion of petitoner's
wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally
reprehensible act, that cannot be too severely condemned; and the consent of the
woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of
the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on
record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.
Without costs.